July 196
volume LXVIII number

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

for full contents see inside page

The University of Chicago Press
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

The American Journal of Sociology

Manuscripts (in duplicate) should be addressed to the Editor of THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1126 East 59th Street, The University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Illinois, and *not* to an individual. They should include an abstract of not over 100 words summarizing the findings, and should be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

As manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial review, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering page. All identifying *footnotes* should also appear on a separate page.

Business correspondence should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

The American Journal of Sociology is published bimonthly in July, September, November, January, March, and May by the University of Chicago at the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois. ¶ Subscription rates for U.S.A. and possessions: 1 year, $6.00; 2 years, $11.50; 3 years, $16.50. Canada and Pan American Postal Union: 1 year, $6.50, 2 years, $12.50; 3 years, $18.00. All other countries: 1 year, $7.00; 2 years, $13.50; 3 years, $19.50. Special rate to members of the American Sociological Association: $5.00. Students: $3.50. Single copies: $1.75. ¶ Subscriptions are payable in advance. Please make all remittances payable to The University of Chicago Press in United States currency or its equivalent by postal or express money orders or bank drafts. ¶ Subscriptions will be entered to start with the first issue to be published after receipt of order.

Claims for missing numbers should be made within the month following the regular month of publication. The publishers expect to supply missing numbers free only when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

The articles in this Journal are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York, New York.

Applications for permission to quote from this Journal should be addressed to The University of Chicago Press, and will be freely granted.

Microfilms of complete Journal volumes are available to regular subscribers only and may be obtained at the end of the volume year. Orders and inquiries concerning purchase should be addressed to University Microfilms, 313 N. First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Change of Address: Notify your local postmaster and the Journals Division of the University of Chicago Press immediately, giving both old and new addresses. *Allow four weeks for the change.*

Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Illinois.


PRINTED IN U.S.A.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume LXVIII

BIMONTHLY

JULY 1962—MAY 1963



UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

PUBLISHED JULY, SEPTEMBER, NOVEMBER, 1962
JANUARY, MARCH, MAY, 1963

COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
PRESS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME LXVIII

ARTICLES

CONTENTS

BOOK REVIEWS

CONTENTS

CURRENT BOOKS

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

IN MEMORIAM

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume LXVIII JULY 1962 *Number 1*

THE DISSONANT RELIGIOUS CONTEXT AND EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

MORRIS ROSENBERG

ABSTRACT

Contextual dissonance refers to a situation in which the individual's social characteristics differ from those of the population by which he is surrounded. Data from a sample of high-school students suggest that children reared in a dissonant religious context are somewhat more likely to have low self-esteem, to manifest psychosomatic symptoms of anxiety, and to experience depressive affect. Experiences of prejudice appear to contribute to these results. Among those in dissonant contexts, children reared in "culturally dissimilar" neighborhoods appear more likely than others to manifest symptoms of emotional disturbance.

I. INTRODUCTION

The influence of the individual's social context upon his attitudes and behavior has been pointed up in a number of recent sociological studies.[1] Several of these studies have highlighted the importance of the discrepancy between, or concordance of, the individual's social characteristics and those of the population by which he is surrounded. For example, it may be a very different experience for a white child to be raised in a Negro neighborhood than for a Negro child to be raised in the same neighborhood; for a Catholic child to be raised in a Protestant neighborhood than for a Protestant child to be raised in the same neighborhood; for a middle-class child to be raised in a working-class neighborhood than for a working-class child to be reared in this social context. In other words, it is not simply the individual's social characteristics nor the social characteristics of those in the neighborhood in which he lives which are crucial, but the *relationship* between the two—their concordance or discordance—which is of central significance.

In this paper, we wish to examine the relationship between one such dissonant context—the religious context—and certain signs of psychic or emotional disturbance. Does a Catholic child raised in a Protestant neighborhood, for example, show more symptoms of anxiety and depression than one reared in an environment inhabited

[1] Alan B. Wilson, "Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (1959), 836–45; Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Kitt, "Reference Group Behavior," in R. K. Merton and P. F. Lazarsfeld (eds.), *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier"* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), pp. 71 ff.; Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), *passim;* Leonard Pearlin and Morris Rosenberg, "Nurse-Patient Social Distance and the Structural Context of a Mental Hospital," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII, No. 1 (1962), 56–65. A methodological discussion of contextual analysis appears in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Problems in Methodology," in R. K. Merton, L. Broom, and L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 69–73.

mostly by his coreligionists? Does such an experience affect his self-esteem? Does a dissonant context have the same effect upon the other religious groups? Does it make a difference *what* the nature of the dissonant context is, for example, is it a different experience for a Catholic child to be raised in a Protestant neighborhood than it is for him to be raised in a Jewish neighborhood? These are some of the questions to which the present research is addressed.

Our data are drawn from questionnaires administered to high-school juniors and seniors in ten high schools in New York State. The population of New York State public high schools was stratified by size of community, and the sample of schools was selected from this population through use of a table of random numbers. Three separate but overlapping questionnaires were administered alternately to the respondents; each student completed one questionnaire. Some of the data to be presented, then, come from different questionnaire forms.

II. RELIGIOUS DISSONANCE AND EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

In the course of completing questionnaires dealing with the values, goals, and self-conceptions of youth, these high-school upperclassmen were told:

> This section deals with the neighborhood in which you grew up. If you lived in more than one neighborhood, think of the neighborhood in which you lived *longest*.
>
> Think back to the time when you were in grammar school. Generally speaking, what was the religious affiliation of most of the people in the neighborhood in which you lived?

Respondents were then asked to fill in the approximate proportions of each religious group in these neighborhoods. It was thus possible to compare those who were predominantly surrounded by coreligionists in childhood, those whose neighborhoods were about evenly divided between members of their own and another religion, and those who were in a distinct religious minority.

Table 1 suggests that the experience of living in a dissonant religious context has certain psychic consequences for the individual exposed to it. In every case, we see, students who have been raised in a dissonant social context are more likely than those who have been reared in a consonant or mixed[2] religious environment to manifest symptoms of psychic or emotional disturbance. For example, Catholics raised in non-Catholic neighborhoods are more likely than Catholics raised in predominantly Catholic or half-Catholic neighborhoods to have low self-esteem, to feel depressed, and to report many psychosomatic symptoms.[3]

[2] "Consonant" means that almost all or about three-quarters of the people in the neighborhood were of the same religion as the respondent; "mixed" means that about one-half were of the same religion; and "dissonant" means that one-quarter or almost none were of the same religion.

[3] The measure of self-esteem is a ten-item Guttman scale which, through the use of "contrived" items (see S. A. Stouffer *et al.* "A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI [1953], 273–91) yields a seven-point scale. The reproducibility is 93 per cent and the scalability is 72 per cent. The items in this scale, with which respondents were asked to strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree, are the following: (1) On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. (2) At times I think I am no good at all. (3) I feel that I have a number of good qualities. (4) I am able to do things as well as most other people. (5) I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (6) I certainly feel useless at times. (7) I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. (8) I wish I could have more respect for myself. (9) All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. (10) I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Depressive affect is measured by a six-item Guttman scale with a reproducibility of 95 per cent and a scalability of 75 per cent. The items in this scale, which were randomly distributed throughout the questionnaire, are the following: (1) On the whole, how happy would you say you are? (2) On the whole, I think I am quite a happy person. (3) In general, how would you say you feel most of the time—in good spirits or in low spirits? (4) I get a lot of fun out of life. (5) I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. (6) How often do you feel downcast and dejected?

The psychosomatic symptoms score is based

Similarly, Protestants or Jews raised in dissonant social contexts are more likely than those reared in neighborhoods inhabited chiefly or equally by their coreligionists to manifest these signs of emotional disturbance. These three measures are, of course, highly related to one another, but they are neither conceptually nor empirically identical. Whatever measure is used, the results are essentially similar.

The effect of the dissonant context does not appear to be a large and powerful one; many of the differences are quite small. While some of these differences are not statistically significant and some others are barely so, note that the results are all perfectly consistent. For all nine comparisons made, those in the dissonant context are without exception more likely than others to manifest these symptoms of psychological disturbance. For this reason, these results may merit attention.

It is important to note that there is no clear difference in emotional distress between those raised in neighborhoods inhabited *almost exclusively* by coreligionists and those reared in areas in which only *about half* the members are coreligionists. This result would suggest that whether everyone in the neighborhood is of one's group is less important than whether there are *enough* of them to give one social sup-

TABLE 1

CONTEXTUAL DISSONANCE AND SELF-ESTEEM, PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS, AND DEPRESSION, BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

	Catholics		Protestants		Jews	
Measure	In Non-Catholic Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	In Catholic or Mixed Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	In Non-Protestant Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	In Protestant or Mixed Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	In Non-Jewish Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	In Jewish or Mixed Neighborhoods (Per Cent)
Self-esteem:						
Low ...	41	29	31	25	29	18
Medium	30	25	27	30	10	23
High	30	46	42	45	61	60
No. of respondents*....	(37)	(458)	(164)	(241)	(41)	(80)
Psychosomatic symptoms:						
Many..............	65	55	54	48	55	51
Few	35	45	46	52	45	49
No. of respondents. .	(37)	(467)	(164)	(245)	(42)	(77)
Depressive affect:						
Depressed	20	18	22	11	28	16
Not depressed	80	82	78	89	72	84
No of respondents.	(35)	(429)	(148)	(221)	(39)	(70)

* The difference in number of cases in the tables is due to the fact that "no answers" have been omitted from the calculations. Most of the "no answers" have been so classified because they did not complete all the items in each scale or score because of lack of time Since several of the "depression" items appeared near the end of the questionnaire, the largest proportion of "no answers" appears on this scale

upon ten of the fifteen symptoms which appeared in the Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct used by the Research Branch of the United States Army in World War II. The development and validation of these psychosomatic items are presented in Shirley A. Star, "The Screening of Psychoneurotics in the Army: Technical Development of Tests," in S. A. Stouffer *et al. Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950). The items utilized were: (1) Do you ever have trouble getting to sleep or staying asleep? (2) Do your hands ever tremble enough to bother you? (3) Are you bothered by nervousness? (4) Have you ever been bothered by your heart beating hard? (5) Have you ever been bothered by pressures or pains in the head? (6) Do you ever bite your fingernails now? (7) Have you ever been bothered by shortness of breath when you were not exercising or working hard? (8) Are you ever troubled by your hands sweating so that they feel damp and clammy? (9) Are you ever troubled with sick headaches? (10) Are you ever bothered by having nightmares (dreams that frighten or upset you very much)?

port, a feeling of belongingness, a sense of acceptance. Thus, two groups may well look down upon one another, but each group may take pride in itself. Even though members of each group may challenge and attack the other, every individual still has a group with which he can identify. It is only when the individual is in the distinct minority, when it is impossible for him to restrict his associations to members of his own group, that the deleterious psychological consequences of the dissonant religious context become evident.

you ever teased, left out of things, or called names by other children because of . . . your religion?" Table 2 shows that within every religious group students reared in the dissonant context are much more likely than those raised in a consonant or mixed context to have experienced such taunting or exclusion on the basis of religious affiliation.

Such discrimination, we would expect, can hardly fail to have some effect upon the psychic state of the individual. And Table 3 shows that this is so. Within each religious group, those who have experienced discrimination are more likely to have low self-esteem, more likely to have many psychosomatic symptoms, and more likely to be depressed. This is true for all nine comparisons made. The most conspicuous relationship is found between the experience of prejudice and the report of psychosomatic symptoms. Such psychosomatic symptoms represent physiological indicators of anxiety, and there is reason to believe that they are closely associated with neuroticism.[4] This would suggest that the child who experiences prejudice is more likely to develop feelings of fear, anxiety, insecurity, and tension—a striking testimony to the penalty in human happiness

TABLE 2

DISSONANT CONTEXT AND SUBJECTION TO RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

Question	Catholics: In Non-Catholic Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	Catholics: In Catholic or Mixed Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	Protestants: In Non-Protestant Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	Protestants: In Protestant or Mixed Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	Jews: In Non-Jewish Neighborhoods (Per Cent)	Jews: In Jewish or Mixed Neighborhoods (Per Cent)
"When you were a child, were you ever teased, left out of things, or called names by other children because of your . . . religion?"						
Ever*	22	5	22	6	48	26
Never	78	95	78	94	52	74
No. of respondents	(37)	(454)	(162)	(238)	(42)	(78)

* "Ever" refers to those who answered "often," "sometimes," or "rarely."

III. THE EFFECT OF DISCRIMINATION

The child who is isolated from his religious group thus tends to face his immediate environment without the sustenance of group support. It is not difficult to envision the experiences he might undergo. The nature of ethnocentrism is such that the majority group tends to define the minority out-group member as different and inferior. Specifically, this may take the form of excluding the minority-group member from participation in activities, taunting him, hurling derogatory epithets at him, or using the abundant variety of instruments of cruelty of which children are capable.

To examine this question we asked our respondents: "When you were a child, were

[4] See Star, *op. cit.*, chaps. xiii–xiv.

and psychic well-being paid by the innocent and unwitting victims of prejudice.

We have seen that students raised in dissonant social contexts experience greater psychic disturbance than others, that such students are more likely to have experienced prejudice, and that those who have experienced prejudice are more likely to manifest such disturbance. This would suggest that one reason students in the dissonant context are more disturbed is that they have experienced such prejudice. In order to see whether this is so, we have examined the relationship of contextual dissonance to psychic disturbance, controlling experiences of prejudice; the method of control employed is "test factor standardization."[5] The results show that in eight out of nine cases the relationship between contextual dissonance and emotional disturbance is reduced when prejudice experiences are controlled. The relationships do not, however, completely disappear.

These data would suggest, then, that the experience of discrimination does contribute to the psychological consequences of contextual dissonance but that it does not account for them completely. To be reared in a dissonant context thus reflects more than the experience of being taunted, ridiculed, attacked, or excluded on the basis of one's group affiliation. What is also probably involved is the insecurity which stems from lack of integration in a group, issuing from a feeling of social isolation, a sense of being "different," an absence of "belongingness." It is apparent why such experiences may be associated with an individual's level of self-acceptance as well as his feelings of anxiety and depression.

DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSIVENESS TO DISCRIMINATION

While the data in Table 3 suggest that all the religious groups are emotionally responsive to the effects of prejudice, attention is drawn to the fact that they are not *equally* responsive to it. Specifically, it appears that Catholics and Protestants are more affected by the experience than Jews. Why the Jewish children, who have experienced by far the most prejudice, should be least affected by it is not certain. Perhaps the prejudice against Jews in the society is so pervasive that its expression is taken for granted; perhaps Jewish children are taught early to expect such slights and to harden themselves against them; perhaps, since discrimination plays such a relatively large role in the lives of Jewish children, they may tend to react to it by attributing the fault to the discriminator rather than to themselves. Whatever the reason, our re-

TABLE 3

EXPERIENCE OF PREJUDICE AND SELF-ESTEEM, DEPRESSION, AND PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS, BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

	Per Cent Experienced Prejudice in Childhood					
	Catholics		Protestants		Jews	
Measure	Ever	Never	Ever	Never	Ever	Never
Self-esteem:						
Low	36	30	37	29	24	23
Medium	40	26	26	27	20	18
High	25	44	37	45	55	59
No. of respondents	(40)	(601)	(62)	(494)	(61)	(112)
Psychosomatic symptoms:						
Many	74	54	64	48	55	44
Few	26	46	36	52	45	56
No. of respondents	(40)	(613)	(61)	(496	(59)	(112)
Depressive affect:						
Depressed	56	40	53	34	39	36
Not depressed	44	60	47	66	61	64
No. of respondents	(36)	(561)	(51)	(452)	(51)	(102)

[5] This procedure is described in Morris Rosenberg, "Test Factor Standardization as a Method of Interpretation," *Social Forces* (forthcoming).

lts suggest that the group which experi-ces the most prejudice is, in terms of our licators of emotional disturbance, least ected by it, whereas the group which, in r sample, experiences the least prejudice most affected by it. Many of the most ious victims of prejudice, then, are those the majority group.

IV. CONTEXTUAL SPECIFICATION

Given the fact that children reared in a sonant religious context are more likely suffer the pangs of self-contempt, to feel ›ressed, and to experience various psy›somatic manifestations of anxiety, the estion arises: are certain dissonant con-ts more prejudicial to the individual's chic well-being than others? Perhaps tholics living in Protestant neighbor-ods are less affected by their minority up position than Catholics in Jewish ghborhoods. Perhaps Jews in Protestant ghborhoods are less affected than Jews Catholic neighborhoods. In other words, ile we have seen that the dissonant re-ious context appears to have a bearing on one's psychic and emotional state, it y be that certain contexts are "more sonant" than others.

Considering only those students who e been reared in a dissonant religious ntext, we have compared the levels of self-esteem, depression, and anxiety of members of each religious group reared in neighborhoods occupied chiefly by members of the other two religious groups. Table 4 suggests the following: (1) that Catholics in Protestant areas experience less emotional disturbance than Catholics in Jewish areas; (2) that Protestants in Catholic areas experience less disturbance than Protestants in Jewish areas; and (3) that Jews in Protestant areas experience less disturbance than Jews in Catholic areas. Since we are dealing only with those in dissonant contexts, the number of cases is small and the results therefore cannot be considered reliable.[6] Further studies utiliz-

TABLE 4

PSYCHIC STATES OF STUDENTS IN DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS CONTEXTS

Measure	Catholics in Predominantly Protestant Areas (Per Cent)	Catholics in Predominantly Jewish Areas (Per Cent)	Protestants in Predominantly Catholic Areas (Per Cent)	Protestants in Predominantly Jewish Areas (Per Cent)	Jews in Predominantly Protestant Areas (Per Cent)	Jews in Predominantly Catholic Areas (Per Cent)
-esteem:						
ow or medium	68	75	58	78	20	45
ligh	32	25	42	22	80	55
lo. of respondents	(28)	(8)	(149)	(9)	(10)	(20)
chosomatic symptoms:						
lany	68	62	56	62	55	60
'ew	32	38	44	38	45	40
lo. of respondents	(28)	(8)	(150)	(8)	(11)	(20)
›ressive affect:						
)epressed	19	25	23	25	11	29
lot depressed	81	75	77	75	89	71
lo. of respondents	(26)	(8)	(138)	(4)	(9)	(21)

[6] It may be noted that there are discrepancies in the total number of cases classified as "dissonant" in Tables 1 and 4, particularly among Jewish respondents. One reason is that a number of respondents reported that they grew up in "Christian" neighborhoods. Jewish students who gave this reply were classified in Table 1 as growing up in non-Jewish neighborhoods, but it was not possible to determine whether these neighborhoods were Catholic or Protestant. Hence, these cases have been omitted from Table 4. Another reason is that in Table 4 we are dealing with those who grew up in *predominantly* (all or three-quarters) Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish neighborhoods. We have thus omitted, for example, Catholics reared in approximately half-Protestant–half-Jewish neighborhoods; Protestants reared in half-Catholic–half-Jewish neighborhoods; and Jews reared in half-Catholic–half-Protestant neighborhoods.

ing a larger number of cases would be required to strengthen these conclusions. Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that in eight out of nine comparisons made, the results are in agreement with the conclusions cited above. Since such a high level of consistency obtains, these results appear to warrant further analysis.

Though we lack a sufficient number of cases for statistical adequacy, there is another way of approaching the problem. If some principle can be enunciated which is consistent with these findings, it would increase our confidence that the observed differences are real and meaningful. The principle we propose to account for these findings is the concept of *cultural similarity or dissimilarity*. We will suggest that, if an individual lives in a culturally dissimilar neighborhood, then this context is "more dissonant" than if he lives in a culturally similar neighborhood.

To recapitulate, our data suggest that Catholics in Protestant neighborhoods are less disturbed than Catholics in Jewish neighborhoods; that Protestants in Catholic neighborhoods are less disturbed than Protestants in Jewish neighborhoods; and that Jews in Protestant neighborhoods are less disturbed than Jews in Catholic neighborhoods. If these results are due to the fact that more dissonant contexts are associated with more emotional disturbance, then it would have to be shown (1) that Catholics are culturally more similar to Protestants than they are to Jews; (2) that Protestants are culturally more similar to Catholics than they are to Jews; and (3) that Jews are culturally more similar to Protestants than they are to Catholics. Before we can determine whether this is so, it is first necessary to discuss the nature of "cultural similarity."

CULTURAL SIMILARITY

The question of cultural similarity is a complex one. In gross terms, of course, it is obvious that American and British societies have more cultural elements in common than, say, American and Chinese societies. If one were to make a more detailed comparison of two cultures, however, one would have to compare their traditions, customs, mores, values, perspectives, philosophies, art, technology, goals, ideals, etc. Given our limited data, such comparisons are manifestly impossible. We have, however, selected one area which would generally be considered culturally relevant—the area of values.

If we consider a value to be "a conception of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action,"[7] then there are four areas in our study which appear to fit this description: (1) self-values—which traits, qualities, or characteristics does the individual consider important in judging himself? (2) maternal values—for what types of behavior was the individual most likely to gain the approval of his mother? (3) paternal values—for what types of behavior was the individual most likely to gain the approval of his father? and (4) occupational values—what satisfactions, gratifications, or rewards is the individual most concerned with obtaining from his life's work?[8]

A simple procedure for comparing the similarity of religious groups was employed. With regard to each item, we asked whether the proportion of Catholics choosing the item was closer to the proportion of Protes-

[7] Clyde Kluckhohn *et al.* "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in T. Parsons and E. A. Shills (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 395.

[8] Self-values included such items as: ambitious; clear-thinking or clever; hard-working or conscientious; dependable and reliable; etc. Parental values were measured by asking whether mothers and fathers were most likely to approve of the child for being strong and aggressive; for doing well in school; for getting along with other children; etc. Occupational values dealt with whether the individual was most concerned with using his abilities at his work, gaining status and prestige, having the opportunity to be creative and original, etc. The list of occupational values is drawn from Morris Rosenberg, *Occupations and Values* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 141–42.

tants choosing it or to the proportion of Jews; whether the proportion of Protestants choosing it was more similar to the proportion of Catholics or of Jews; and whether the proportion of Jews choosing it was more similar to the proportion of Protestants or of Catholics. This involved forty-four comparisons of self-values, five comparisons of maternal values, six comparisons of paternal values, and six comparisons of occupational values.

Table 5 indicates that, in each of the four value areas under consideration, Catholics were more often similar to Protestants than they were to Jews; Protestants were more often similar to Catholics than they were to Jews; and Jews were more often similar to Protestants than they were to Catholics.

TABLE 5

COMPARISONS OF CULTURAL SIMILARITY OR DISSIMILARITY

Group Compared	No. of Comparisons: Self-values	Maternal Values	Paternal Values	Occupational Values
Catholics more similar to Protestants	27	5	6	4
Catholics more similar to Jews	11	.	.	2
Equal	6	.	..	..
No. of comparisons	44	5	6	6
Protestants more similar to Catholics	29	3	4	4
Protestants more similar to Jews	12	1	1	2
Equal	3	1	1	
No. of comparisons	44	5	6	6
Jews more similar to Protestants	22	4	2	4
Jews more similar to Catholics	15	1	1	2
Equal	7		3	.
No. of comparisons	44	5	6	6

Of course, we cannot be certain that similar results would appear if other areas of culture were considered. Assuming, however, that these are reasonable indicators of cultural similarity, this would mean that some contexts are "more dissonant" than others in the manner specified.

With these results, we can now return to our earlier discussion of varying dissonant contexts. As we noted in Table 4, Catholics in Protestant areas generally showed less disturbance than Catholics in Jewish areas; Protestants in Catholic areas showed less disturbance than Protestants in Jewish areas; and Jews in Protestant areas showed less disturbance than Jews in Catholic areas. In each of these three comparisons, those who were reared in a "more dissonant" religious context appeared to experience greater disturbance than those reared in a "less dissonant" context. These results would suggest that it may not only be a question of *whether* the context is dissonant, but *how* dissonant it is, which has implications for mental health.

It is obvious, of course, that given the small number of cases in this section of the report and the breadth of the concepts involved, one can only advance such a generalization with the utmost tentativeness. It can only be stated that the results are consistent with such a conclusion. Further studies utilizing more adequate samples and broader indicators of cultural similarity would be required to support or falsify this conclusion.

V. DISCUSSION

We have seen that children raised in dissonant religious contexts are in subsequent years more likely to manifest disturbances in self-esteem, depressive affect, and psychosomatic symptoms. Our data do not suggest that the dissonant social context is a

powerful factor in producing these signs of emotional disturbance, but the consistency of the results suggests that it may be a real factor. We doubt whether the dissonant context often produces these psychological consequences independently of other factors. Rather, we would be inclined to assume that its main influence is exercised upon those already predisposed to psychological disturbance; those standing near the cliff are pushed ever closer to it or actually over it. The child who is uncertain about his worth becomes all the more doubtful when others define him as different and inferior; the child who is tense becomes all the more tense when threatened by others; the child who is moderately depressed becomes more so when he is rejected by his age mates. But if these predispositions did not exist, it is doubtful whether the dissonant religious context per se would be powerful enough to generate such consequences.

Let us, however, attempt to spell out in greater detail how the dissonant social context might exercise its influence on one of the psychological consequences discussed, namely, self-esteem. Our data have suggested that children raised in a dissonant religious context have lower self-esteem than those raised in a consonant context, and that the more dissonant the context, the smaller the proportion who accept themselves. One factor which undoubtedly plays a role is prejudice in its direct and unabashed form. Thus, children who have been raised in a dissonant context are far more likely than others to report that they have been teased, called names, or left out of things because of their religion, and those who have had such experiences are less likely to accept themselves. It may be that this effect is intensified the more dissimilar the individual's group affiliation and that of his neighborhood. To be taunted, jeered at, or rejected by one's peers might well be expected to leave its imprint upon the individual's picture of himself.

But it is probably more than simple prejudice, narrowly conceived as hostility to members of a group, which is responsible for these results. Beyond this, actual cultural dissimilarity may produce rejection. It is characteristic of cultural groups that they tend to feel united on the basis of shared norms, values, interests, attitudes, perspectives, goals, etc. Ease of communication and a sense of solidarity spring directly from such similarity of thought and feelings. The likelihood that an individual will be accepted into the group is thus not only a question of whether he is socially defined as different by virtue of his group membership, but also by whether he *actually is* different—in interests, values, "personality" traits—by virtue of the fact that he has, perhaps through his parents and relatives, absorbed the values of his own membership group. For example, a Jewish child may learn from his parents, relatives, etc., that it is extremely important to be a good student in school. If he is raised in a Catholic neighborhood, where, according to our data, less stress is placed upon this quality, then he may be scorned by his peers as a "grind," an "eager beaver," an "apple polisher," etc. At the same time he may place little value on being "tough," a "good fighter," etc.; these qualities, more highly valued in the group by which he is surrounded, may give him the reputation of being a "sissy." If cultural dissimilarity does have such an effect, then it is likely that the greater the cultural dissimilarity, the greater the effect.

The point, then, is that qualities which may be accepted or admired in one's own group may be rejected by members of another group. Hence, there is a real likelihood that one will feel different when in a dissonant social context, and this sense of difference may lead the individual to question himself, doubt himself, wonder whether he is unworthy.

The same factors may operate to generate depression and anxiety. While it is not possible to enter into detail at this point, there is theoretical and empirical reason for expecting disturbances in self-esteem to be associated with depression and anxiety. It

is thus possible that the relationship between the dissonant context and depression and anxiety may in part be mediated through its influence on the self-picture. In addition, the tension generated by prejudice, the threat of attack, the lack of social support, the feeling of isolation, the possible feeling of helplessness, could all be expected to contribute to depression and anxiety among those predisposed in that direction.

It is also possible that the effect of contextual dissonance may be heightened by living in a neighborhood chiefly inhabited by people who are, in the broader society, defined as a minority group. To be an "outsider" in a predominantly Catholic or Jewish neighborhood appears to be associated with greater emotional disturbance than to be an "outsider" in a Protestant neighborhood. It is thus possible that Catholics and Jews, defined as "minority groups" in the broader society, develop stronger religious group solidarity within their own neighborhoods. Hence, the youngster who lives in a neighborhood chiefly inhabited by members of such solidary religious groups, but who is himself not a member of the group, may experience particularly strong feelings of isolation.

We noted earlier that contextual consonance or dissonance can only be defined by the *relationship* between the individual's social characteristics and the social characteristics of those by whom he is surrounded. Thus, we have spoken of a context as dissonant if the individual is immersed in an environment whose predominant social characteristics are different from his own. In princple, the social characteristic under consideration might be race, religion, social class, nationality, etc., or it might be a social quality defined by a narrower environment. In this sense, then, a white child in a Negro neighborhood, a Negro child in a white neighborhood, a working-class child in a middle-class neighborhood, a Catholic child in a Protestant neighborhood, an Irish child in a Polish neighborhood would all be imbedded in dissonant social contexts. But this does not mean that all dissonant contexts would be expected to have the same effect. First, to be a middle-class child in a working-class neighborhood may be quite different from being a working-class child in a middle-class neighborhood. In other words, *relative status* ranks may have an influence, even though both contexts are equally dissonant. Second, to be of Spanish origin in an Italian neighborhood may have little effect if nationality is not a highly *salient* group characteristic. Third, the effect of contextual dissonance might vary with the *clarity of social definition*. Thus, social classes are not sharply and unequivocally defined, and the awareness of class difference may be vague if contiguous classes are involved. For these reasons, conclusions concerning the effect of religious dissonance cannot simply and readily be transferred to other kinds of dissonant contexts.

The quality of religious affiliation thus has certain properties which are not necessarily characteristic of other social qualities. Membership in the group is quite clear and unequivocal; it is a socially salient characteristic; and it tends to be subject to differential social evaluation in the broader society. Whether other group characteristics lacking certain of these qualities, or possessing others, would produce similar results under conditions of contextual dissonance can only be determined by further research.

National Institute of Mental Health

THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE PARSIS

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, JR.

ABSTRACT

Two economic values, two technical values, and a value common to both areas, are abstracted from Weber's and Merton's works on the early Protestants. These five values are described as they are expressed in Zoroastrianism. The relevant behavior of present-day Zoroastrians—the Parsis of India—is examined and found to give us more confidence in the suggested positive association between the acceptance of economic and technical values and the appearance of commercial and technological behavior.

Max Weber's famous essay, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*,[1] has stimulated a host of writings, not all of which have supported his ideas. In presenting still another paper in this area, our purpose is not to defend or to attack Weber's thesis in its entirety. Rather, by abstracting certain specific ideas from both his work and the subsequent work by Merton,[2] and by testing, in a very rough way, the validity of these ideas as they apply to a non-European community, the Parsis of India, we hope to gain more confidence in the suggested high association between the belief in economic and technical values and the actual performance of the tasks of trade and technology.

Since Puritan and Parsi beliefs differ on the specific level of terminology in ritual and scripture, a linguistic bridge must be constructed at a slightly higher level of generalization to span the gap between the two value systems and give us an abstract language in which to describe the relationships between value and behavior we hope to find. To meet this semantic problem, we have used a stylistic device based on Weber's concept of varying rationalities.

VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Acquisitive rationalities.—As Weber pointed out, "When the limitation of consumption is combined with the release of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious: accumulation of capital through the ascetic compulsion to save."[3] This statement contains two specific notions: the idea that the acquired goods are to be accumulated and saved rather than consumed and "used up"; and the belief in acquisitive activity as opposed to a more passive attitude toward material goods. Viewed in this way, it is possible to formulate two distinct values: *the desire to accumulate rather than to consume material goods;* and *the desire to maximize one's material prosperity.*

The two values are similar, yet the important difference lies in the meanings the acquired goods have as reflected in the uses to which they are put. On the one hand, the desire to accumulate material holdings need not be related to the absolute level of one's material prosperity. Savings can occur among both the rich and the poor. On the other hand, as Deusenberry has pointed out,[4] efforts spent in increasing one's material prosperity need not lead to increased accumulation of wealth if there is a corresponding increase in consumption. It is possible for the two types of behavior to exist independently of each other.

Financial rationality.—When the two acquisitive values are found within one system of rationality, they may balance and complement each other and in this

[1] Trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

[2] Robert K. Merton, "Puritanism, Pietism and Science," in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 574–606.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

[4] James S. Deusenberry, *Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 22.

combination could be thought of as "financial values." Accumulated wealth is used (invested) in the pursuit of increased prosperity, and the increased riches are not consumed but are saved for further use in the never ending quest for greater income, more accumulated wealth. The financial values may be held for religious (as with the Puritans), political, or cultural reasons, but in each case we would expect members of such groups holding the values to tend—given the opportunity[5]—to select financial vocations in favor of other possible pursuits. In other words, we would expect the members to be favorably biased toward financial activity.

Rationality of work.—Weber described the attitude toward work among the early Protestants in the following way: "the valuation of the fulfillment of the duty of worldly affairs as the highest form which moral activity of the individual could assume . . . gave every-day worldly activity a religious significance."[6] The net result of this belief was that "For the Puritan . . . mundane toil becomes itself a kind of sacrament."[7] We can reformulate this value in a more secular sense to read: *a belief that material work is intrinsically good.* If we accept Weber's descriptions of the belief of the early Protestants not only in the two previously discussed financial values, but also in the *intrinsic value of material work,* then we would expect the early Protestants to be favorably biased not only toward financial activities, but also toward those vocations involving more physical work, including, perhaps, the buying and selling, the storage and shipping of the material goods of commercial trade.

VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH SCIENTIFIC PURSUITS

Having briefly set forth three values among many that Weber said were associated with economic activity, let us move on to discuss two of the values Merton said were associated with scientific pursuits.

Scientific rationality.—Merton said that one Puritan belief, the assumption of an *underlying order in nature,* was also a basic value of science. In saying this, he followed that school of philosophy that argues that the scientist believes the random impressions received through his senses can be made orderly through human arrangement.[8] This belief is in turn based upon the assumption that the diverse phenomena can be grouped under general laws which will reveal what Einstein called the "pre-established harmony."[9] The "ultimate given" in this system of scientific rationality is the basic assumption of what Whitehead called the *Order in Nature.*[10]

However, as Merton has pointed out, the assumption of an *underlying order in nature* is not the only ultimate given in the scientific rationality.[11] Another criterion is needed to sort the various impressions into the meaningful and the meaningless, those accepted and those rejected. What is needed is some standard of verification which can be used to establish the "reality" of the assumed *order in nature.* Merton and others have suggested that empiricism was the standard used in the search for evidences of the regularities of the universe. In spite of the various uses of the term, all systems of scientific empiricism make the assumption that it is possible to know the world through the senses. This dependence of science "upon the agreement of sense impressions for

[5] Given not only the material opportunity but also the absence of conflicting values within the beliefs of the group which would counterbalance the effect of the two values being discussed.

[6] *Op. cit.,* p. 80.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 166.

[8] J. Bronowski, *The Common Sense of Science* (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), p. 58.

[9] J. W. N. Sullivan, "The Values of Science," in *The Limitations of Science* (New York: Mentor Books, 1949), p. 166.

[10] Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World; Lowell Lectures, 1925* (New York: New American Library, 1948), p. 11.

[11] *Op. cit.,* p. 579.

verification of its observations"[12] can be expressed as the belief in a *sensate standard of verification.* Merton argues that the Puritan assumption of an *underlying order in nature* and the Puritan acceptance of a *sensate standard of verification* favorably biased the members of that religion toward scientific pursuits.[13]

When science is applied through material work to the physical world for practical purposes, it becomes, by definition, technology. In performing the tasks of technology, the technician may have a greater tolerance than the abstract scientist for the material work involved. It is possible that the belief in the *intrinsic worth of material work* may be more widely held among technicians than among "pure" scientists. Following this line of conjecture, one could say that the "rationality of work," discussed above, could also be one of the distinguishing features between the basic attitudes of the scientist and those of the technician.

Having briefly described five abstract values suggested by the works of Weber and Merton, we shall now turn to their formulation in the religion of the Parsis—Zoroastrianism. The reader should understand that our purpose is to relate certain values with certain behavior patterns and not to discuss the role of religion, *as such,* in economic or technical behavior. The point is that if other ideologies—religious, political, economic, philosophical, cultural, or any other—also accept and believe in the five values delineated here, then we would also expect the members of those groups, given the opportunity, to be favorably biased toward the relevant pursuits. Keeping this point in mind, let us examine the Zoroastrian expression of the five abstract values.

THE VALUES AS EXPRESSED IN ZOROASTRIANISM

Zoroastrianism is considered to be one of the great religions of the world even though its followers today number only about 150,000. It was established as a systematic body of belief by Zoroaster in Persia around 600 B.C. From that time until the seventh century, when Persia was conquered by the Muslims, Zoroastrianism was the official state religion of the Persian Empire.

While the primary source for the Zoroastrian statements reflecting the abstract values of our opening discussion will be the ancient Gathas,[14] other sources are used to indicate that the religion of the Gathas was still basically the religion of the Parsis in the period relevant to this paper. The five values are found in the Zoroastrian ideology in a systematic way based primarily upon what we have called the assumption of an *underlying order in nature.*

Underlying order in nature.—This belief is of such importance in Zoroastrianism that it has been given its own term: it is called *"asha." Asha* and its derivatives are mentioned in at least 185 of the 256 existing verses of the Gathas.[15] According to Jackson, *asha* "represents the divine law and moral order in the world, together with good works, purity, truth, and holiness, in short all that is meant by the Sanskrit cognate *ṛta.*"[16] The Indian scholar Dhalla describes the Indo-Iranian meaning given to *ṛta:*

> Despite the casual freaks and caprices, the laws governing the movements of nature seem to be immutable. This unfailing regularity of

[12] William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), p. 20.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 574.

[14] The Gathas contain the oldest parts of the Zend Avesta and concern the establishment of the ethics of the religion. Later works dealt with ceremonies, rituals, and specific theological practices (see M. N. Dhalla, *History of Zoroastrianism* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1938], pp. vii–xviii).

[15] *The Holy Gathas of Zarathustra,* trans. and ed. B. T. Anklesaria (Bombay: Shahnamah Press, 1953).

[16] A. V. Williams Jackson, *Zorastrian Studies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), p. 49.

nature led the Indo-Iranians to discern the fact that a stable order prevailed in the universe which ensured its existence. They called it ṛta. They emulated this universal order and introduced it in all their human activities.[17]

For example, the critical question of what is "good" is made clear in terms of this order in nature to every Zoroastrian. From infancy they are taught the holy aphorism, called *"Ashem Vohu,"* which may be rendered: "Order or holiness is the best good. Hail, Hail is to him, who is the best holy one by way of holiness."[18] Upon the three injunctions of purity and order in thought, word, and deed is built the entire structure of Zoroastrian morality.[19] Or as Jackson has said, the three goals of good thoughts, good words, and good deeds are the "quintessence of the moral and ethical teachings of Zoroaster."[20]

Given this belief in a spiritual order to the universe, how do Zoroastrians recognize the divine order as it exists in the mundane world? Is it described in all its particulars by the priests, the scripture, or the traditional rituals? Does Zoroastrianism delineate a specific creed which gives an explanation of every possible facet of the divine law of order?

Sensate standard of verification.—In partial answer to these questions, Zoroaster teaches that the revelation of the divine order is found in nature itself and not in any one man's doctrine (*Ha* 43:10).[21] He says that the perfect aspect of religious grace is found among those who "seek the splendour of the Law divine," so that they may know the universe (*Ha* 51:4,5).

As we have seen in our opening discussion, some philosophers consider a questioning mind, curious about the possible regularities in nature, as one of the qualities of the scientist. If we take this Zoroastrian insistence on a questioning mind as one aspect of a sensate standard of verification, we might expect certain regularities to have been discovered by Zoroaster or his followers. In other words, if Zoroastrianism has two of the values of science, then we could reasonably expect a historical record of Zoroastrian science. If such a body of knowledge existed, it would present another indirect evidence of the existence within the religion of a sensate standard of verification.

Among the ancient Greeks, Zoroaster was perhaps as well known for his works determining certain regularities in nature as he was for his other religious teachings. The Macedonian conquest placed the Greeks in direct contact with the writings of Zoroaster, and the "works catalogued under the name of Zoroaster in the library of Alexandria contained two million lines."[22] These works have been lost to the world, but they may have been the missing books of the Avesta which were reportedly wholly scientific in their contents.[23]

We would have much more confidence in the religious acceptance of a sensate standard of verification if we could find explicit instructions to the faithful to verify their beliefs through their senses. We have been able to find only two such very specific instructions. In one Zoroaster teaches his followers that knowledge acquired through the sense of sight is for the praise of Ahura Mazda through the

[17] Dhalla, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47.

[18] E. S. D. Bharucha, *Zoroastrian Religion and Customs* (Bombay: D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 1928), p. 45.

[19] Framjee Dosabhoy, *The Parsees: Their History, Manners, Customs, and Religion* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1858), p. 251.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

[21] This and all of the following quotations from the Gathas will use Anklesaria's translation and transliteration. The citation will either be mentioned in the text, or will be given in parentheses thus: *Ha* 43:10, meaning chap. 43, verse 10.

[22] Franz Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism* (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp. 138–39.

[23] A. V. Williams Jackson, *Zoroaster, The Prophet of Ancient Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1898), pp. 95–96.

Law immutable (*Ha* 50:10). In the second instance, he clearly states that each man is to accept only those beliefs he himself believes to be true after hearing different sages and by listening and looking, instructing himself about the nature of the universe:

> Do you listen with your own ears, do you look with the best inspiring divine intelligence,
> At the creed of your own choice, each man for himself,
> In order to instruct himself through our sages before the magnific events [*Ha* 30:2].

These fragments and traces, while in no way conclusive, do permit us to operate on the reasonably well-grounded assumption that the sensate standard of verification was indeed the standard used by Zoroaster to determine the evidences of the divine order in the material world.

Material work is intrinsically good.—The Zoroastrian quest for empirically verified knowledge of the underlying order in nature was not simply for the sake of knowledge. The wisdom of the law immutable, *asha,* was to be *used* to construct the Kingdom of Ahura Mazda in the mundane world (*Ha* 44:6). Zoroaster asks Ahura Mazda to declare that the "real progressive spiritual life" is won by the "best Words and Works . . . of praise by the Good mind and by the divine Law. . ." (*Ha* 34:15). The Zoroastrian insistence on good deeds done in the material world is a more concrete formulation of the abstract value, a belief that material work is intrinsically good.

The establishment of the Kingdom of Perfect Order was the ultimate goal of this work in the material world. Zoroaster passionately asks his faithful not to waver, not to be staggered by the formidable magnitude of the task, "but to aspire and work and struggle and fight for it with body and mind, heart and soul:"[24]

> Therefore does Zarathustra dedicate even his own life
> And that of his Good Mind as the first offering to Mazda.
> And the Inspiration and Kingdom of Work and that of Word to Asha [*Ha* 33:14].

It is through these great exertions to establish the Kingdom of Order that faithful Zoroastrians win their salvation. Bharucha says that every Zoroastrian "will have to be judged, rewarded or punished solely according to his deeds in this world irrespective and independent of the merits of any intervening medium or savior."[25]

This Zoroastrian belief in the intrinsic worth of material work has not escaped the notice of several scholars. Jackson wrote that the "Iranian, by influence of his creed, was characterized by action exertion, and practical views of life. . . ."[26] Cumont argued that the Persian view of the world as a great struggle between the forces of Good and Evil, was "peculiarly favorable for the development of individual effort and human energy. . . ."[27] Max Weber gave Zoroastrianism as an example of those religions whose devout believe they are God's tools accomplishing God-willed action.[28] Tilgher said that Zoroastrianism prized labor and gave it an ethical value.[29]

Maximization of material prosperity.—Since the Kingdom of Order was to be constructed in the mundane world with material goods, such goods were highly valued. Furthermore, the increasing material wealth of the Zoroastrian faithful is believed to be an increasing glorification of Ahura Mazda. The following verse is repeated *sixty* times throughout the Ga-

[24] Dhalla, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

[26] *Zoroastrian Studies*, pp. 132–33.

[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

[28] "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 284–85.

[29] Andriano Tilgher, *Work, What It Has Meant to Man Through The Ages*, trans. D. C. Fisher (London: George O. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1931) p. 21.

thas, testifying to the central importance of directing one's efforts toward ever greater prosperity:

The excellent Law immutable is prosperity; it is uprightness; the Law immutable is weal for him who is for the excellent Law immutable
In the name of God.
May the eminent glory of the prospering Lord Ahura Mazda increase!

Khshnuman

It might be reasonable to argue that this prosperity is of an other-worldly type, had not Zoroaster made clear what he meant by the term. In unusually plain language, the prophet asks for the rewards of both worlds:

I who go around you, O Omniscient Lord! with the Good Mind
To gain for me the rewards of the two lives, of the corporeal and that of the mental,
With the Law divine whereby to the aspiring ones prosperity may be given [*Ha* 28:2].

The religious idea of using the Law immutable to increase one's wealth is very near to the social idea that when one's wealth is increasing one must be following *asha*, and conversely, when one's wealth is decreasing one must be failing to meet the standards of the religion.[30] This idea is expressed in the Gathas in that to the noble who "associate with Asha," "Mazda Ahura will give him spiritual life, / Will with the Good Intelligence increase properties for him" (*Ha* 46:13). But for the wicked there is no prosperity, instead there is only injury and adversity (*Ha* 30:11).

Accumulation rather than consumption of material goods.—To shift our attention away from the religious reasons for increasing one's wealth to the meaning acquired wealth has for Zoroastrians is only to look at the same religious reasoning from a slightly different point of view. By keeping the wealth one has won through hard work, the successful Zoroastrian, in effect, preserves the fruits of his past religiosity. For example, Zoroaster asks to not only acquire but also to maintain wealth: "Verily I desire the immutable Law to maintain; give me through Perfect Devotion that / Reward acquired by following the path of Asha, which is the life of the Good Mind" (*Ha* 43:1). The idea of gaining and maintaining wealth is also found in certain aspects of the Zoroastrian marriage ceremony,[31] the initiation ritual,[32] and in some proverbs.[33]

In our description of the ethics of Zoroastrianism, we have limited ourselves to those religious values which appeared to be similar to the theoretically defined values of our opening discussion. We have not attempted to describe the total system of the religion, nor are we saying that these are the only Zoroastrian attitudes which are conducive to economic and technical pursuits. In fact, the Zoroastrian emphasis on honesty, education, human welfare, and the national pride among Zoroastrians today in their great Persian heritage, all are probably factors promoting an active, knowledgeable approach toward attaining desired ends.

In the preceding pages we have attempted to identify values in Zoroastrianism which have a theoretical relevance for certain types of behavior. If our thinking has been correct, then present-day Zoroastrians—the Parsis of India—would tend to pursue these activities once they are given the opportunity to do so.

THE BEHAVIOR OF THE PARSIS

The Zoroastrians of India are called "Parsis" after Persia, the land of their

[30] Weber emphasized this "social" effect of similar religious ideas in early Protestantism. Good works and the wealth resulting from such efforts were the means, "not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation" (*The Protestant Ethic,* p. 115).

[31] Dosabhoy, *op. cit.,* p. 83.

[32] James Hope Mouton, *The Treasure of the Magi* (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), p. 162.

[33] J. J. Modi, *Moral Extracts from Zoroastrian Books* (Captain Printing Works, 1925), p. 33.

origin. The ancestors of the contemporary Parsis came to India in the eighth century as religious pilgrims fleeing from the persecutions of the Muslims in their homeland. The Hindus allowed them to settle, and by 1931 the Parsis were the most urban (89 per cent),[34] and the most literate in English (50.4 per cent, almost twice that of the next highest native group, the Jews, who had 26.4 per cent).[35] Yet they had remained one of the smallest religious communities in India, having a population of only 102,000 persons in 1921.[36] These demographic variables are important and should be kept in mind as likely factors contributing to the Parsi activity in trade and finance. However, our attention here is focused only on other possible variables—including the presence of the relevant values.

Since we are following Weber's ideas on the influence of certain beliefs on economic behavior, we would expect that the economic values of accumulation rather than consumption of material goods, a desire to increase one's material prosperity, and a desire to work in the material world, would tend to lead Parsis—given the opportunity—into commercial ventures. Of course, the "capitalism" of Weber's thesis did not exist in India before European domination, but other forms of commercial behavior did. The question is not whether the Parsis were "Weberian capitalists," but simply whether the Parsis took a proportionately greater part than others in the economic activities of their time and place.

Parsi commercial pursuits.—It is believed that as early as the close of the eleventh century, Parsis were one of the chief classes of traders in Cambay.[37] In 1534 a Portuguese doctor visited Cambay, and in his book published in 1563, he mentions that there were merchants in Cambay, "Gentios who come from Persia" who were called "Esparcis."[38] Another European traveler visited Surat in 1638 and observed that the Parsis were engaged in various pursuits including trading and banking.[39] These early accounts are valuable since they show a Parsi interest in trade long before major European commerce came to India.

However, with the arrival of the Europeans, the Parsi traders now had the opportunity to extend their activities by using the larger ships of the Europeans. In the first half of the eighteenth century, Parsis opened new native trade routes to Burma, Calcutta, Persia, Arabia, and China.[40] Perhaps the greatest of the Parsi China merchant princes was Sir Jamshedji Jijibhai. An idea of the wealth he made from his trading activities can be gathered from the amount of his wealth that he gave away. From 1822 to 1847, he gave away more than £221,981 to various schools, public works, and charities.[41]

The first occupational statistics indicating Parsi activity in trade appeared in 1858. However, this report is not considered to be very reliable since it listed the total population of Bombay Parsis as 110,544 in 1858 (the total number of Parsis in all India did not reach this figure until the Census of 1931). While the total numbers may be misleading, perhaps something can be gained from Dosabhoy's com-

[34] Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 185.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[36] *Statistical Abstract of British India,* LVII (1912/13–1921/22), 16–17, Tables 8 and 9.

[37] *Bombay Gazetteer,* IX, Part II, p. 185, as quoted in Rustom B. Paymaster, *Early History of the Parsees in India: From Their Landing in Sanjan to 1700 A.D.* (Bombay: Society for the Promotion of Zoroastrian Religious Knowledge and Education, 1954), p. 23.

[38] Garcia da Orta, *Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs in India,* trans. Sir Clements Markham (1913), p. 445, as quoted in Paymaster, *ibid.*, p. 37.

[39] Albert de Mandelslo, *Les Voyages du Sieur Albert de Mandelslo,* p. 180, as quoted in Paymaster, *ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

[40] D. F. Karaka, *History of the Parsis* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1884), II, 16–17, 54–56.

[41] Dosabhoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 181–83.

ment: "the largest number, or more than one-half of the whole Parsee population, follow the avocation of merchants, bankers, or brokers, which fact furnishes a clear proof of the commercial bent of the Parsee mind.[42]

The argument advanced in this paper is that this "commercial bent of the Parsee mind" is similar to the capitalistic bent of the Puritan mind in Weber's study. As Weber did, we stress the point that values are only one factor in the total behavior pattern. Any analysis of a particular group must also include the *opportunity* it had to pursue its interests. The fact that the Parsis prospered under British rule was in no small way related to the British establishment of the right of private property for its subjects. As one author has expressed it, under British rule the Parsis, "began for the first time to reap the fruit of their own industry."[43]

On the other hand, one must remember that the Parsis were active in commercial pursuits with not only the British, but also the Dutch, the French, the Portuguese, and the native governments of the region. For example, one can consider the Parsi activity in the office of *desai*, or tax farmer, of India. The first recorded Parsi who held this position did so for the native government of Gujarat beginning around 1450.[44] The Parsis of Navsari maintained this position for more than three hundred years, until at least 1779.[45] An indication of the wealth controlled by Parsis in this pursuit can be seen in the case of the Vikajis family which made direct advances to the native government of the Nizam of Hydrabad of £1,080,000 during the period 1835–45.[46] The Parsis did not limit their tax-collecting activities to native governments, however. The first Parsi to arrive in Bombay came there in 1640 to handle the tax collection in the city for the Portuguese.[47] Later the English took over the city, but we find from a public document dated in 1834 that the Parsis managed the work of tax collection in Bombay for at least 165 years.[48]

The Parsis showed their willingness to follow new vocations in the pursuit of material gain when the English and the Dutch established "factories" in Surat in 1613 and 1618.[49] Just seven years after the opening of the English trade center, the first English account of the Parsis' religion and history was made, "by the interpretation of a Persee, whose long employment in the Company's service had brought him to a mediocrity in the English tongue."[50] By the middle of the seventeenth century, Parsis were acting as agents and brokers not only for the English but also for the Dutch, the French, and the Portuguese.[51] Toward the end of the nineteenth century, reliable statistics are available on the occupation of *dubash*, or commissioned agent for a European firm. The tentative conclusion of Parsi commercial interest drawn from the historical cases is supported by the rather impressive statistical fact: according to the Census of 1881, of the 159 *dubashes* listed in Bombay, 146 were Zoroastrian.[52]

Assuming this all too brief treatment of the Parsi mercantile operations sufficiently indicates Parsi behavior in this field, let us move on to the second part of our thesis: Merton's ideas concerning the rela-

[42] *Ibid*, p. 152.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp 138–39.

[44] Paymaster, *op. cit*, p. 111.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 130–31.

[46] Karaka, *op cit.*, pp. 25–27.

[47] S. R. F. Vaccha, *Mumbaino Bahar*, 1874, as quoted in Paymaster, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] M. M. Murzban, *The Parsis in India* (Madras: Modern Printing Works, 1917), I, 162.

[50] Henry Lord, "A Discovery of Two Foreign Sects in the East Indies, viz., the Sects of the Banians, the Ancient Natives of India, and the Sect of the Parsees, the Ancient Inhabitants of Persia," in John Pinkerton (ed.), *Voyages and Travels* (London: Strahan & Preston, 1811), VIII, 279.

[51] Paymaster, *op. cit.*, p. 122 .

[52] Karaka, *op. cit.*, I, 98–99.

tion of the belief in an underlying order in nature, a sensate standard of verification, and the intrinsic worth of material work to the pursuit of scientific and technological activities.

Parsi technical pursuits.—Parsi activity in trade was matched by Parsi interest in the construction of the means of trade. The fame of the Parsi shipbuilders was recorded by Europeans as early as 1716.[53] Parsi achievements in the technological field of shipbuilding include the following: the establishment, under British auspices, of the Bombay Dockyard in 1735;[54] the first community in India to build ships up to one thousand tons without the aid of any European shipbuilders;[55] the construction in 1804 of the first English man-of-war built in India; and in the first 149 years of the Bombay Dockyard, the construction of 335 new vessels, in addition to repairing "Innumerable ships."[56]

The Parsis also took part in the construction of the railways of India. One of the great Parsi railroad builders and civil contractors was Jamshedji Dorabji, a man with no formal education. By 1882, this self-taught Zoroastrian had constructed ninety miles of railway for the Great Indian Peninsula Railway in addition to building mills, public buildings, etc., costing nearly £1,000,000.[57] Of course, Dorabji's case was unusual, but the general Parsi interest in technological fields is indicated by the occupational statistics of the Census of 1881. Twenty-six of the forty-six shipbuilders, and thirty-three of the eighty-four civil engineers listed in Bombay at that time were Zoroastrian.[58]

Some Parsi merchants demonstrated their concern with science by founding scientific societies and schools. One of the earliest was established in 1831 in the city of Broach by the eldest son of a rich Parsi merchant.[59] But perhaps the greatest Parsi contribution to scientific education in India was made by the Parsi industrialist, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata. He gave not only the unusually large sum of £200,000, but also his time and insight to help found the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore in 1898.[60]

As an indicator of the general Parsi interest in science and technology, we can turn, just as Weber and Merton did with the Protestants, to the "prevocational" attitudes expressed in school records. Fortunately, a record of the college and university degrees taken by religion was made by the Indian Census for 1920–21 and 1921–22. While the Parsi population at that time was only 102,000 persons, or 0.03 per cent of the 316,128,000 total population of India,[61] they took 6.8 per cent of the engineering degrees; 4.7 per cent of the degrees in medical fields; 1.7 per cent of the degrees in science (Bachelor's, Master's and Doctor's degrees in science); and 1.4 per cent of all "Western" degrees granted in India.[62] The Parsis were not only overrepresented in the colleges and universities of India during this period, they were extremely overrepresented in the scientific and technical fields.

Another way of looking at this same set of data is to say that of the 238 degrees taken by Parsis during this period, 37.4 per cent were in scientific or technical

[53] Paymaster, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[54] Karaka, *op. cit.*, II, 60–62.

[55] Lieut. E. Moore, *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment* (1794), pp. 379–80, quoted in Paymaster, *op. cit.*, p. 57

[56] Karaka, *op. cit.*, II, 60-62.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

[59] *Ibid*, p. 40

[60] F. R. Harris, *Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata* (London· Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 129–30.

[61] *Statistical Abstract*, LVII (1912/13–1921/22), 16–17.

[62] Computed from *Statistical Abstract*, LVI (1911/12–1920/21), 300–305, Table 153; and LVII (1912/13–1921/22), 256–61, Table 153. It is interesting to note that while Parsis took 16.7 per cent of the fifty-four commerce degrees granted in India at that time, commerce accounted for only 3.8 per cent of the total degrees taken by Parsis in all fields.

fields. This compares with the percentage of degrees taken in these fields by each of the other native Indian groups: Indian Christian, 26.7 per cent; Buddhist, 19.8 per cent; others, 17.5 per cent; Hindu, 14.2 per cent; and Muslim, 5.6 per cent. Again there clearly appears to be an unusually high degree of interest among Parsi students in the more technical fields of study.

The question can be raised as to whether this Parsi interest in the early 1920's was a long-term phenomenon or a more recent development. During the thirty-nine years following the opening of the first school of modern medicine in Western India in 1845, "a very large number of Parsis qualified themselves as physicians and surgeons. Fourteen entered the Indian Medical Service by successfully passing the competitive examination in London."[63] More complete data for other technical fields is available concerning the degrees taken from Bombay University by Parsis from 1901 through 1937. During this period, the Parsi students took roughly one-third of all their degrees in the fields of science, engineering, and medicine.[64] It seems reasonable to conclude that the early Parsi interest in technological pursuits was continued and reflected in their choice of school topics when formal Western education came to India in the nineteenth century.

CONCLUSION

We have treated the twin Parsi interests in trade and technology in one article to gain the advantage of explaining two different types of behavior with one set of variables and using one methodology. Specifically, the commercial values suggested by Weber's work are a great help in understanding the Parsi record of trade; and the values suggested by Merton's work are useful in giving meaning to the technical pursuits of the community, since in both cases the relevant abstract values of commerce and technology were expressed in Zoroastrianism. On the other hand, the case of the Parsis gives us more confidence in the reliability of the suggested positive association between the acceptance of commercial and technological values and the appearance of commercial and technological behavior. Methodologically, the historical techniques used by Weber and Merton still are fruitful if one succeeds in finding those instances in the recorded history of the world which lend themselves to the analysis of issues of current sociological interest.

There is another useful idea which results from this dual treatment—that of "industrial rationality." When the values of commerce are "combined" with the values of technology, in other words, when all five values mentioned in this paper are considered to be part of a single rationality, then the resulting "mixture" can be thought of as the rationality of the industrial entrepreneur. The discussion of this idea, along with the story of the great Parsi industrialists, is beyond the scope of this work and will be taken up in a future article.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[63] Karaka, *op. cit.*, I, 298.

[64] S. F. Desai, *A Community at the Cross-Road* (Bombay: New Book Co., Ltd., 1948), pp. 58*a*–58*b*, Table XX.

CHURCH, SOCIETY, AND LABOR RESOURCES: AN INTRA-DENOMINATIONAL COMPARISON[1]

IVAN VALLIER

ABSTRACT

This paper, a comparative analysis of two Latter-day Saint bodies, deals with the independent role of the external situation on social system structure and functioning. The Mormons and the Reorganites, closely similar in value orientations and beliefs but historically involved in widely different situations, have established contrasting solutions to the strategic missionary manpower problem. Significant intra-church consequences flow from these differences. In the Mormon case the historical situation created the conditions for the full institutionalization of both the mission role and volunteer labor. In the second case situational imperatives required the Reorganization to postpone collective goal action and thereby decreased the organization's need to channel religious loyalties into labor resources.

The attainment of collective religious goals by a body of believers requires, no less than in any other organized pursuit, the effective procurement of various kinds of resources, means, or instrumentalities. One of the most critical resources is labor power[2]—human energies and skills that can be allocated to various tasks and responsibilities. The demand for labor services varies widely from one type of religious system to another and depends, at least, on the following factors: (1) the nature of the religious goals, (2) the time limit set for their accomplishment, and (3) the perceived role of human endeavor in this accomplishment. The number of workers recruited in any given case to perform religious tasks is also importantly affected by the religion's conception of labor eligibility. Who may serve is seldom determined simply on the basis of willingness.[3]

One of the most conspicuous labor problems religious groups face arises in connection with proselyting the non-believer. A religious group committed to the task of "taking the gospel to the whole world" is required to solve problems of selecting missionaries, educating, assigning, and financing them, and developing a mission organization. In an attempt to find out how such ambitious religious systems solved these problems, a comparative study of proselyting institutions was undertaken in two very similar American religious bodies. The two cases, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Reorganites), share identical religious values, hold to the same basic beliefs, structure their activities within the same general organizational plan, focus on the world-wide missionary task with equal vigor, yet demonstrate radically different solutions to the missionary manpower imperative.

The problem of this paper is signaled by the fact that in 1960 the Mormon church had seven thousand full-time, self-supporting missionaries assigned to proselyting throughout the world while the Reorganiza-

[1] I should like to thank the Council for Research in the Social Sciences, Columbia University, for providing a grant to initiate the research on which the major part of this paper is based.

[2] For an analytical treatment of the labor resource concept, the stages of labor commitment, and the place of labor among other types of mobilizable resources, see Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, *Economy and Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 119–23, and Neil Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), esp. pp. 33–35.

[3] Recent works on aspects of the religious labor force include F. Ernest Johnson and J. Emory Ackerman, *The Church as Employer, Money Raiser, and Investor* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959); Joseph H. Fichter, *Religion as an Occupation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961).

tion assigned less than one hundred, all church supported. In terms of total membership, the Mormons allocated one full-time missionary for every 200 members; the Reorganization allocated one man for every 1,750 members.

The choice of these particular systems was dictated by a research design which called for the comparison of units that share a basic religious value tradition and major goals but are located in widely different situations or social environments. In this way I attempted to gain, from the beginning, maximum control over cultural factors that are known to be a major source of variation.[4] Comparative studies which attempt to explain variations in social

	Type I		Type II	
Values and Beliefs	X	Y	X	X
External Situation	M	M	M	N
Structural Solution	A	B	A	B

Fig. 1

structure by holding the situation constant and varying the values may be identified as Type I. The design followed in this paper, varying the situation and attempting to hold values, beliefs, and goals constant, is designated as Type II. The two approaches are presented in Figure 1.

The guiding hypothesis of the paper can be stated simply: the different "structural solutions" (A and B) are directly related to different "external situations" (M and N, respectively). The explanation, we propose, is not therefore to be sought at the level of basic values, or in different goals, or through differences in the motivational strength of the members. Our focus, rather, is on the external situation of the two religious systems and its implications for the labor-force problem.

The body of the article is divided into three parts: a brief description of the two religious systems and their historical separation; a comparative analysis of the systems' major differences in the missionary sphere with special attention to their functions and dysfunctions; finally, a socio-historical explanation of these key differences in terms of each religious system's goal attainment and the external situation.

THE UNITS: MEMBERS OF A "DENOMINATIONAL FAMILY"

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints are members of America's fifth largest "denominational family."[5] Today the Mormons number approximately 1,400,000 and are concentrated in the states of Utah, Idaho, and California, though with rapid increases in the Pacific Northwest and the Metropolitan East.[6] The Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints of Independence, Missouri, the second group, has a membership of 175,000 mainly located in Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, and Michigan.[7] This group, hereafter referred to as the Reorganization, is frequently but mistakenly referred to as Reform Mormons. Actually this group represents those Latter-

[4] Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1961). This investigation represents the most rigorous attempt among sociologists to show the independent importance of basic value orientations.

[5] Approximately 82 per cent of the 62,000,000 Protestants in the United States belong to one of nine "denominational families," which are, in rank order: Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Latter-day Saints, Reformed churches, Church of God, Pentecostal, and Adventists. See Frank S. Mead, *Handbook of Denominations* (2d rev. ed.; New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), pp. 236–43.

[6] Thomas F. O'Dea, *The Mormons* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Leonard J. Arrington, *The Great Basin Kingdom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press, 1958).

[7] See Inez Smith Davis, *The Story of the Church* (Independence, Mo.: Herald Publishing House, 1948) and *The History of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints*, 4 vols. (Independence, Mo.: Herald Publishing House, 1896–1903).

day Saints who, after Joseph Smith's death in 1844, rejected the legitimacy of Brigham Young's leadership, his claim as successor to Smith as prophet-president, and his subsequent elaboration and institutionalization of certain "unofficial" doctrines, including plural marriage, temple sealings, and the Adam-god principle.[8] The Reorganization developed among those members who refused to follow Young, stayed in the Midwest, and subsequently reorganized under the leadership of Joseph Smith's eldest son, Joseph Smith III.

The Reorganization's rejection of Young's claim to leadership did not, however, include a rejection of the church's basic organizational plan, the principle of temple work, or the major goals of proselyting the non-believer and gathering him into the Community of Zion. In short, the basis of difference was the perceived misuse of organizational procedure and authority and the distortion of certain commandments. The historical conflict was not thus a conflict about basic goals, basic organizational principles, or key beliefs.[9]

In broad terms, the basic similarities of the two religious systems are the following: In addition to a near duplication of names, both groups share a distinctive complex of value orientations (this-worldliness, progress, achievement, and co-operation), legitimate their position in society and their objectives with a similar ideology (a "chosen people" and the exclusive recipients of authority to act for God), and pursue, at the most general level, identical goals—the evangelization of the world and the building of Zion. In addition, both the Mormons and the Reorganites hold the Book of Mormon as "sacred,"[10] accept an "open scripture" on the basis of a belief in "contemporary revelation," and provide leadership through a hierarchically ordered, but specially "called," lay priesthood. Both groups practice adult baptism by immersion, institutionalize the system of tithes, and preach abstention from tobacco and strong drink. A person gains salvation by degrees through obeying God's commandments, doing good works, and applying one's capacities toward remaking the world according to God's purposes.

In both groups organized, extensive missionary work with a world-wide objective is a priority goal. This activity dominates the two systems and is directly linked to the second major goal, building Zion or the Kingdom of God on earth. Joseph Smith, in his fourteen years as prophet-seer-revelator of the new church, 1830–44, preached an immediate but nevertheless conditional millennium. Christ's Second Coming was certain to take place but depended on the church's success in establishing a center community of all believers (Zion). In this context, extensive missionary work was imperative. Within the first two years of the church's development, Smith resourcefully worked out a set of basic rules to handle the problem. Four norms were established: (1) all elders were subject to a "mission call," an event which made them eligible for a period of indefinite service in some home or foreign area; (2) during this absence they had to make provision for the support of their families in order to avoid dependency on the church; (3) they were to go without pay, that is, "without purse or scrip," relying on the goodness of the people and the blessings of God to furnish their daily needs; and (4)

[8] See Roy A. Chevillo, "The Role of Religious Education in the Accommodation of a Sect" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1940).

[9] Compare their official magazines—the Mormon's *The Improvement Era* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Publishing Co.), and the Reorganization's *The Saints Herald* (Independence, Mo.: Herald House).

[10] The "basic books" or scriptures are the same for both the Mormons and the Reorganites, viz., the Bible, the *Book of Mormon*, and *Book of the Doctrine and Covenants*. The Mormons also include Joseph Smith's *The Pearl of Great Price*. The content of the *Book of Doctrine and Covenants*, a collection of "revelations received from God through the Prophet," varies somewhat in the two groups, but the key revelations concerning goals, doctrines, and procedures are the same.

they were to travel in teams of two. The basic solution Smith developed allowed the church to recruit missionaries as they were needed, to vary the numbers as the time and situation changed, and to develop an impressive proselyting program without financial expense to the young, ambitious church.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MISSIONARY INSTITUTIONS, 1960[11]

The attempt to continually maximize missionary work under variant historical conditions has required, in both religious systems, particular kinds of innovations. In turn these changes in the organization and policy of the missionary outreach have had important consequences at several levels of social structure within each case.

In both the Mormon church and in the Reorganized church eligibility for full-time missionary work depends, first of all, on the man's priesthood qualifications. Missionaries are always members of the Melchizedek priesthood, the higher order, and are classified within this status category as elder, seventy, or apostle. Achieving this prerequisite priesthood status is however very difficult in the two systems. In the Mormon church every twelve-year-old boy becomes eligible for a lower (Aaronic) priesthood office as a deacon. The young man passes subsequently to the office of teacher at fourteen or fifteen, then at seventeen to the office of priest, the highest level in the Aaronic priesthood. By the time he reaches nineteen he is eligible for candidacy as an elder and, therefore, for full-time missionary service.

The Reorganization holds to the same priesthood categories but avoids deliberately the early, automatic conferral of priesthood status. A man's age is irrelevant. What matters are his "spiritual qualifications" and his special recognition by God, as conveyed to the relevant authorities. Furthermore a man does not necessarily begin at the bottom and work up the hierarchy as does the Mormon. He may begin as a deacon and move subsequently to priest and elder or remain there for life. Movement is not automatic. The Reorganization stresses the charismatic factor, choosing men according to the needs of the moment, the apparent qualities of the candidate, and the particular hunches of the authorities. Obviously, the Mormon strategy provides a proportionally larger priesthood and, correspondingly, a wider basis from which to select missionaries.

The Mormon process for recruiting missionaries is initiated by the local congregation's leader, the ward bishop. Having observed the young men of the congregation over a period of years, he is qualified to judge who, among the nineteen-year-olds, is potentially good missionary material and who is not. Those who appear eligible are asked officially if they are seriously considering missionary service. Those who say "Yes" are interviewed by the bishop, then by a stake officer (regional level), and subsequently by one of the major full-time authorities in the central church organization. This three-level screening process may take place within a few weeks or several months, depending on the timing of the high-level leader's visit to the local area. If a candidate "passes" the hierarchy by meeting the criteria of moral soundness, good health, and proper attitude, he is "called" by the president of the church and immediately assigned for a two-year period to one of the sixty-nine missions throughout the world. The Mormon elder has no choice as to where he will go; "this is left to the Lord." The yield from this fast-moving and elaborate program is approximately 30 per cent of those eligible by age.

The Reorganized church selects missionaries quite differently. When placed alongside the Utah church, the procedures seem unsystematic, loosely co-ordinated, and half-hidden. The recruiting process is dom-

[11] The description of the two sets of institutional arrangements is based on forty field interviews conducted by the author and his wife with officers of the two churches and missionary personnel in the summer of 1960.

inated by the church elite: the three members of the First Presidency, the Twelve Apostles, and the high-level veteran missionaries. Potential missionaries are "spotted" by these men during their traveling assignments in the church. A "good" man comes to their attention; he is informally investigated (characteristic behavior, general abilities, family life, background experience, financial record with the church, and so on), and, if promising, is recommended as a candidate and goes on a waiting list. When, subsequently, additional full-time missionaries are needed, the "willing" man is officially approached and asked to accept a "call" to full-time service with the church. This "call" may come as a surprise; one missionary said, "I just never had any idea that they would want me. I was stunned for a few days." Since the majority of these men are already in their twenties or thirties and therefore involved in occupational and family roles, it is essential that the official "call" be postponed until the church has made certain of his qualifications and their capacity to carry him financially. These precautionary measures tend, of course, to make the whole recruitment process informal and semisecretive. Theoretically, a priesthood member can make formal application for full-time missionary work. This procedure, however, contradicts the principle of "divine call" and indirectly threatens the "initiating" role of the high-level church official. It is not surprising to find that formal applications are few.

The general characteristics of Reorganite missionaries can be shown by describing the four men who were assigned to Latin America at the time of this writing. All are married; all have at least two children; all have college degrees; all are near or in middle age. By contrast, the Mormon missionaries are between ages nineteen and twenty-two. More importantly, they are not yet involved in major adult roles. A majority of the Mormon missionaries have had a year or two of college, but they are not yet married; they are not yet of draft age, and they have not yet entered their occupation.

The Mormons staff their world-wide missionary organization with volunteer laborers. The Reorganization, by comparison, takes the financial responsibility for the missionary's expenses, provides him with a car, and, since he is usually a married man with children, supports his family. This difference in financing has important consequences for parts of the missionary program. Since the Utah missionary pays his own way, the church does not have to wait for an increase in church revenue to expand the missionary activity but can concentrate on training and selecting the best people without regard for finances.

The Reorganization's solution stands quite in contrast. Since the church is financially obligated to the missionary and his family, missionaries can be "called" only when sufficient money is available. Consequently a systematic, full-scale program is out of the question. This presents them with the problem of recruiting men who have already entered the occupational world. The Reorganization therefore has to compete with the economy. Despite the fact that they share with the Mormons the central goal of world-wide proselyting they are severely limited in the number of men that they can "hire." The missionary labor force can expand only when the amount of money for missionary work expands.

The magnitude of differences in actual cost deserves special attention. In 1959, the Reorganization spent approximately $600,000 to support one hundred missionaries; one-fourth of its total annual income of $2,541,694. In 1957, the Mormons spent an *estimated* $636,000 for 5,300 missionaries. Since a Mormon serves for two years, approximately one-half of the 5,300 or 2,650, returned home in 1957. The expenses for the return transportation of these 2,650 men (this is the only financial obligation of the church to the missionary) turns out to be slightly more than 1 per cent of the total church expenses, an amount of $58,145,863.

The average cost for the Reorganite missionary amounted to $6,000; for the Mormon, $120.

The two different arrangements for selecting missionaries and keeping them alive contradict the often-held belief that social systems which are oriented to a common core of values approach the solution of their functional problems in a basically similar way. The Mormons have developed an almost bureaucratic solution for the recruitment of missionaries while the Reorganites hold to the principle of the individualized spontaneous "divine call." Yet in financing missionary activities, the tables are turned. The Mormons gain missionaries on a volunteer basis. The Reorganization, on the other hand, has an occupational-type contract with the missionary and must meet the financial and other demands of a man who has already started his career. These essentially different contracts create a number of variations in the missionary's actual work, his length of expected service, and his relationships with the church and its personnel while in the field.

During his two-year term, the young Mormon missionary follows a detailed time schedule, involving early morning study, several hours in the field, the "following up" of new leads, and participation in local church services. The expected work load is 60 hours per week. Since Mormon missionaries operate in teams of two, each man has a "companion" with whom he lives, works, and worships. Over a two-year period, a man's "companion" may change as many as ten times. A new missionary begins with a "veteran" who remains with him until he is sufficiently trained to be placed with a less experienced companion. The power structure of a team is always clear, one "more" experienced man and one "less" experienced man. In this way, the "science of proselyting" is continuously channeled from the experts to the apprentices. This structural arrangement provides a systematic socialization context for the labor force and allows maximum flexibility in allocating men with wide differences in background, personality, and capacity.

The Mormon missionary teams are managed by a supervising elder who, in turn, works directly under and with the mission president. The mission president, also a volunteer, is ordinarily a middle-aged man who, with his family, agrees to leave his occupation and give three, sometimes four, years to the work of the church. The mission president and his family occupy a church-owned home, drive a church car, and receive an allowance sufficient for living needs. Each mission president operates under the direction of the central organization's Twelve Apostles and Assistants to the Twelve. If a seemingly unsolvable problem arises in the mission, the president of that mission communicates directly to the central church authorities.

Turning now to the terms of contract for the Reorganite missionary, several interesting and basic contrasts deserve mention. The Reorganization, under responsibility to assume the financial expense of the missionaries and their families, gamble on the eventual advantage of experience over high numbers at low cost. The Reorganization chooses a missionary with an eye to his permanency. He represents an investment and his skills in proselyting, moral leadership, and administration are assumed to increase with time. A man appointed to the missionary role serves, in most instances, a two-year period of probation. Once completed to the satisfaction of both parties, the man informally receives tenure for life. His geographical location usually changes every two years.

During the first year, the new man works very closely with a senior missionary in the area or with the Apostle who is in charge of the entire mission. Frequently they travel and make new contacts together. However, the classical two-by-two pattern is not fully institutionalized. The church simply cannot afford it. Consequently once the missionary reaches a certain level of confidence and skill, he operates primarily

alone, unless he is able to recruit helpers from the local priesthood. Since, however, the local elders have full-time occupations in the secular world, their volunteer time is limited to evenings and weekends. This arrangement frequently creates a basic strain. Although both men are elders, the full-time church appointee dominates the relationship. The full-time man is often younger, with more education, and oriented to the goals of the total church. His local "helper," in contrast, is often a skilled worker or farmer and views issues in terms of their local significance.

The Reorganite missionary in comparison to the Mormon has a high degree of autonomy in the field. Although he is responsible to the Apostle in the mission district, this relationship is usually very informal. The missionary develops his own style. His schedule is essentially a result of his own planning, not ordered from above.

The Reorganized church's missionary organization is a full-fledged occupational subsystem. In it, the men compete for recognition, worry about promotion, rank geographical and cultural areas in terms of work conditions, and expend great energy in climbing the bureaucratic ladder: from elder to seventy, from seventy to a president of the seventy, finally, perhaps to apostleship—the ultimate in missionary service.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHURCHES AS TOTAL SYSTEMS

These striking differences are expected to have significant consequences for each church as a total unit. The patterns developed to gain a missionary labor force are not isolated features of the religious system but a connected part in a wider complex of social structure and organizational processes. This principle of interdependence implies that a full understanding of particular patterns in a social system cannot be gained without analyzing their manifold consequences (positive or negative, manifest or latent) for other aspects of the larger unit. The task in this section is to estimate the several intra-system consequences of each church's missionary manpower solution. For this purpose each church is viewed as a series of analytical subsystems differentiated out along four functional dimensions: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency (pattern maintenance and tension management).[12] Since the labor imperative constitutes a




FIG. 2.—Consequences of labor-recruiting patterns. *G*, total goal program of system vis-à-vis the larger society; *I*, member-to-member harmony and interlevel integration; *L*, maintenance of values and beliefs plus emotional release for system members as individuals.

critical resource problem for the total church, the patterns developed for gaining this resource are functionally aligned with the adaptive subsystem. Taking this as a starting point, the consequences of these labor-recruiting patterns are estimated for each remaining subsystem. In terms of this model, each labor force "complex" has plus, minus, or neutral effects on the other three cells. The problem is schematically defined in Figure 2.

In the Reorganization the immense financial outlay for proselyting, which in

[12] See Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, "The Dimensions of Action Space" in T. Parsons, Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 63–109; Parsons and Smelser, *Economy and Society*, chaps. i and ii; and Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*, chap. ii.

1959 amounted to nearly one-fourth of the church's general income, reduces the system's capacity to reach other objectives related to the over-all plan of "building the good society." The implications for total goal attainment are clear. The cost of sending a limited number of missionaries is so great that many other programs have to be curtailed. In this sense the labor solution weakens the church's capacity in the *G* subsystem. The score, accordingly, is minus.

In considering the consequences of the Reorganization's labor solution for total integration it is important to note that the missionaries hold an elite tenured status in the priesthood hierarchy and within the general membership. Their "high calling" sets them apart. On this basis they have informally developed into a separate stratum. Their proselyting work frequently takes them into geographical areas where local congregations ("branches") have been established. In these situations both local priesthood members and the missionaries make up the leadership. In comparison to his local counterpart, however, the missionary stands out. His pronouncements carry authority, his suggestions are eagerly received, and his sermons are delivered with gusto. The local leaders fade into the wings. This pattern of full-time headquarters men versus part-time local volunteers creates varying amounts of intra-church tension and conflict. Informal interviews with both missionaries and local men attest to the significance of this cleavage and indicate that the unintended negative consequence of this pattern is a weakening rather than a strengthening of total integration. On this basis, the score is minus.

The latency cell includes two functional problems: pattern maintenance and tension management. The referent for the first is the total social system—the validity of its key values and beliefs. Tension management, on the other hand, pertains to the emotional-expressive problems of the personalities involved in the social system. In estimating the consequences of the missionary solution for these problems, two questions require attention: (1) Do the missionaries, as a group, contribute importantly to the task of keeping the church's beliefs and values strong and effective? (2) Does the missionary role, as a feature of the total church, serve importantly as a tension-release mechanism for the membership? In short, is the missionary role available to members who have enthusiasms, loyalties, and tensions that press for expression in the context of the church? The answer to the first question is "Yes." The missionary, as a top representative of the religious culture, acts in close accord with the key norms and, by teaching them to others, adds to their strength. Similarly, the job does provide the missionary with many opportunities for emotional release and meaningful expression. But because the missionary role is limited to so few members (100 out of 175,000), the net effects of these positive inputs for the entire system are not too great. On this basis, the score is neither plus nor minus, but neutral.

In turning to the analysis of the functional consequences of the Mormon solution to the missionary manpower problem (adaptive), it should be noted again that the relative cost per missionary to the church is approximately one-sixtieth the amount expended by the Reorganization and that the missionary corps, although viewed as an elite, is made up of temporary two-year men and does not as such constitute a differentiated stratum in the total church. The fact that a man leaves and returns to the community within two years does not lead the membership to place him on a pedestal. More important perhaps for the integration of the total church is the fact that the full-time missionary does not appear to threaten the local part-time priesthood. There are two reasons for this: first, the membership is not required to pay the missionary's expenses and, second, most of the local men have either themselves served as missionaries or, among the younger priesthood members, will at some

time in the future. Furthermore, the proportion of men and women who serve as missionaries is sufficiently large (one to every two hundred members) to have a considerable effect on both the maintenance of the church's values and beliefs and the positive release of emotional feeling. By noting that approximately 3,500 missionaries return each year to the church community, the significance of the pattern-maintenance output can be estimated.

The "balance sheet" for the Mormon case is, then, quite in contrast to the Reorganization case. The solution releases most of the church's income for other goals and programs; it tends to promote intrachurch solidarity rather than undermining it,[13] and the large numbers of people who serve imply that pattern maintenance is furthered and a high degree of tension release is provided through this mechanism of full-time service.

The comparative picture, based on the foregoing analysis, is diagramed in Figure 3.




FIG. 3

A SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFERENCES

An explanation of these differences rests on an understanding of the external situation of the two systems during a limited but strategically important historical period, 1855–80. These twenty-five years span the formative periods for both systems: the Mormons in the Great Salt Lake Basin and the Reorganites in the Illinois-Iowa region. During this period both churches established normative patterns and organizational procedures that became a base line for many subsequent developments. In each case the external situation had a direct bearing on the church's control over its membership and the intensity of religious activities connected with total goal attainment. Both the need for religious laborers and the likelihood of their recruitment varied accordingly.

The two systems' relationship to their respective situations varied in three major respects: (1) the Mormons held a majority status in the larger community; the Reorganites were a decided minority;[14] (2) the Mormon situation required and encouraged co-operative activity in the service of

[13] This favorable picture for the Mormons on this specific problem does not imply that the church is free of major strain and internal dilemmas. Cf. O'Dea, *op. cit.*, pp. 222–57.

[14] Between 1860 and 1880 the Reorganites had approximately 3,000 members scattered throughout three states (Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin) with a combined population of 3,162,745 in 1860 and 6,017,983 in 1880. In contrast, the Mormons in Utah between 1860 and 1880 constituted about 95 per cent of the total population, Indians excluded (see *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* [Washington, D.C.: United States Bureau of the Census, 1960], pp. 12–13).

priority religious goals; the Reorganites' situation completely restricted these endeavors; (3) the Mormon membership was concentrated in a limited area; the Reorganites were widely dispersed throughout the Midwest. Between 1855 and 1880 these three factors had a decisive and lasting impact on the course of the two systems and produced a set of conditions that led to distinct variations in several basic relationships: between the central church organization and the local congregation; between the members' religious activities and central religious goals; and between the individual and the total religious organization.

THE MORMONS

By 1855 the Mormons were fully established in the Utah territory. They became a dominant majority in a threatened geographical area and for two decades were almost completely isolated from the wider society. In this situation the church, the community, and the family were closely integrated and aligned. The priesthood, under Brigham Young's leadership, dominated the society. Religious slogans, supernatural sanctions, and the church's hierarchical organization were used effectively to accomplish both religious and non-religious tasks.

In this early era the missionary role was noticeably extended in scope and raised to a level of primary importance in the whole system. The "mission call" became a key device to recruit manpower for a wide number of tasks and enterprises: to colonize and work agricultural land, to initiate and develop new industries, to assist immigration from abroad, to haul supplies, to fight Indians, to construct telegraph lines, to keep the unemployed active, and, of course, to build temples and proselyte among the Gentiles. The following is Arrington's concise description of the "Cotton Mission":

> In October 1861, 309 families were called to go south immediately to settle in what would now be called "Utah's Dixie." . . . The 309 families of Utah settlers were joined the same year by approximately thirty families of Swiss converts who had been transported to Utah in the Church teams of 1861. . . . At the October general conference of the church, . . . in 1862, the 339 were strengthened by the calling of 22 additional families. These were told that the mission of the previous year had been a "decided success," for "God was inspiring the mission," and that it was their privilege. . . . All told, nearly 800 families, representing 3,000 persons, were called to Dixie in the early 1860's. . . . These persons were all selected with a view to the contributions they could make to the new community.[15]

The church moved toward its central goals rapidly and effectively. Colonization activities in Utah prepared the way for building Zion. Vigorous proselyting activities abroad, stimulated by developments in Utah, provided thousands of new members who were promptly transported to the Center Place.[16] The members of the Mormon church were allocated, on an unprecedented scale, to activities that directly related to the central goals of the religious system. Motivation was linked directly to responsible positions in the church. The expectation developed that each member, either singly or as part of a group, was subject to "call" for the work of the church. Anyone who was able was recruited and given responsibility. The "mission" pattern was fully institutionalized and served as a major lever for linking the resources of the church to primary goal activities. The social control for accomplishing this stemmed from the close structural relationships that developed between the family and the community and between the local congregations and the central church. Not only could pressure be brought to bear on the unwilling but, in turn, those who "served" received the approval and prestige that made it worthwhile. In short, rewards distributed by the church determined directly

[15] Arrington, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[16] See B. H. Roberts, *A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret News Press, 1930), III, 382–413; and Milton R. Hunter, *Brigham Young the Colonizer* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret News Press, 1940), esp. pp. 86–111.

one's status in the larger community and, accordingly, had important consequences for his opportunities in other major areas of life.

This pattern of effectively linking the local congregation to central church and the individual's energies to key religious objectives has been perpetuated throughout the years. Even though major changes in the political and economic status of the Mormon community have occurred, the linkage between the family, the local congregation, the community, and the central church has been preserved in its fundamental outlines. These structural features are directly related to the church's present-day capacity to recruit a missionary labor force. The Mormon today is integrated into the total church and, if he so chooses, his energies can be quickly and effectively channeled into major goal activities. The full-time missionary corps described above is one outstanding consequence of this relationship.

THE REORGANIZATION

Many Latter-day Saints, at the time of Joseph Smith's death in 1844, were living as isolated families throughout Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. These people, separated from the fast-moving events that accompanied Smith's final year in Nauvoo, Illinois, rejected Young's claim to leadership and subsequently refused to follow him west. In choosing to remain in the Midwest, the Reorganites became a dispersed minority in anti-Mormon territory. To the society at large, the Reorganites and Mormons were the same. This forced the Midwest group into a role requiring good behavior. The dominant, unsympathetic non-Latter-day Saint majority had to be assured that no further attempts would be made either to form exclusive communities or to press others to accept their peculiar beliefs. Between 1855 and 1880 the Reorganites were required to gain respectability in the surrounding society. The major goals of proselyting and building Zion became subordinated to the problem of public relations. In this context Joseph Smith III (the original leader's eldest son who became prophet-president of the Reorganization in 1860) enunciated a basic policy which carried fundamental implications for the subsequent development of the church. He advised the Reorganization's members to "stay in their places," to live good lives, and to await the day when the Lord would call them together in Zion. Young Smith, who had experienced mob violence in connection with his father's death, was painfully aware of the larger society's power. He realized the adverse implications of renewing a vigorous program of proselyting and community life. On this basis he advised the members to consolidate locally.[17]

The church, during a crucial formative period, developed into a series of isolated, local congregations whose members concentrated on preserving their identity and keeping up the faith. Members of the priesthood were called on missions, but for the most part these were limited to random excursions into the immediate region. Occasionally elders in teams of two were sent abroad. However, financial difficulties were frequent and often led to the abandonment of a particular missionary venture.[18] Smith's basic policy of respectability and gradualism that was introduced in 1860 severed the intimate connection between proselyting and the over-all goal of building the Kingdom of God on earth. By interrupting the process of Zion building, Smith weakened the basic link between the task of accomplishing central goals and the motivation of the members. Those who were motivated to serve did not have an institutionalized role for expressing their loyalties. Instead they were directed to focus on the local scene and to learn respectability and patience. Since missionary work had formerly borne a direct relationship

[17] For a detailed history of this period, including full statements of this policy, see *The History of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, op. cit.*, III, esp. 211–80.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp 277–90; also IV, 25 ff. and 59 ff.

to the central goal of gathering together all believers, the abandonment of this program, even though temporary, demoralized mission work and reduced the church's over-all capacity to enlist and make use of volunteer labor. While the Mormon church was vigorously driving toward the evangelization of the world and gathering the Saints of Zion, the Reorganization was attempting to develop an identity and hold fast to its sacred beliefs. These emphases in the Reorganization *did not require the full-scale mobilization of manpower or the continued development of a strong church organization at all levels.* In short, the decisive period did not lead to the institutionalization of a structure of religious opportunity through which motivated members could directly link their energies to significant church endeavors. Instead, the Reorganization's membership remained neutralized in a secular, unsympathetic situation, feeding on their peculiar beliefs and waiting for the day when the work could go forward.

The Reorganization entered its first active phase in the 1880's. The church headquarters were moved from Plano, Illinois, to Lamoni, Iowa where a co-operative farming community, publishing house, and a college were established.[19] This served as a stepping stone to the ultimate goal, moving back into Independence, Missouri, the God-appointed Holy Land. Since the early church had been forced to leave there in 1833,[20] the Missouri location held a special attraction for them. In 1911 the Reorganization reclaimed the sacred land. But more than fifty years had passed since young Smith's enunciation of the policy of gradualism. Overwhelmed during that long period by problems of identity ("Who are we?" "How do we differ from the Mormons?") and respectability ("We do not believe or practice polygamy; we do not intend to cause trouble; we are good citizens"), without concrete programs, and lacking centralized control and a determinate leadership group, the Reorganization lost its impetus as a religous movement.

It is quite clear from the foregoing analysis that the respective situations of the two Latter-day Saint bodies required different types of priority in the solution of the churches' functional problems. The Mormon's focus was on the "instrumental" axis; the Reorganization's was on the integrative and "expressive" axis. The Mormon situation required strong, centralized organization and labor power, a clear differentiation of authority, and regularized channels for allocating resources to key activities. Quite the opposite held for the Reorganization. In order to live in the society without trouble, major goals were interrupted. Loyalty, not labor, was the key. The local congregation, an island in a vast sea of Gentile indifference, became the central religious unit. Emphasis was placed on shared beliefs, dramatic spiritual experiences, and past persecutions. These tendencies promoted mutual acceptance and in-group solidarity with the result that pattern maintenance held priority over religious action. The central organization of the church consequently slipped into a subordinate, back-room position. When, thirty years later, hostilities subsided the central leadership began to assert the church's position and to move toward the long-held objective. These attempts have not lead to great successes. The decentralized pattern and a collective consciousness about a minority role interfered with handling of the problems characteristic of a goal phase.[21]

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

While sociologists recognize the importance of the external situation for social system functioning and change, few attempts have been made to deal with the

[19] *Ibid.*, IV, 373–75.

[20] Davis, *op. cit., passim.*

[21] On the relationship between hierarchy, differentiated rewards, and role-expectations in the "goal phase" see Parsons, Bales and Shils, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

problem systematically.[22] So long as we are content to think of social units as closed systems and without histories, this poverty will continue. Recently developed models emphasizing boundary relationships and multilevel input-output exchanges hold definite promise for correcting this imbalance.[23]

The sophisticated conceptualization of system-situation relationships must be accompanied, however, by comparative research on cases that share basic values, manifest goals, and key structural features but operate in noticeably different situations.[24] It should be emphasized in this context that "different situations" do not simply mean differences in geographical location, though this factor may be of great consequence in certain instances. The situation of a social system, whether business firm or city church, is a combination of factors, including the nature of the immediate community, the presence or absence of competing systems, the legal statutes defining limits on certain corporate actions, the established or available resource channels, and images of the system held by significant publics.

Within its situation a system may be, among other things, relatively autonomous or dependent, weak or strong, expanding or retreating, integrated or isolated, and competing or co-operating. These hypothetical and rather simplified differences on a few key variables suggest the enormous possibilities for continuing work in this area.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[22] On this topic see James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-setting as an Interaction Process," *American Sociological Review,* XXIII (February, 1958), 23–31, and Charles Perrow, "Organizational Prestige: Some Functions and Dysfunctions," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVI (January, 1961), 335–41.

[23] See esp. Parsons and Smelser, *op. cit.,* and Smelser, *op cit.,* pp. 17–20.

[24] The term "situation" is preferred to "environment" since the latter term tends to imply an immediate concreteness rather than analytic space.

GROWTH OF STRATA IN EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PHILIP J. ALLEN

ABSTRACT

A historical-sociological analysis is made of the intra-occupational differentiation and stratification processes occuring within the Methodist ministry, first in England, and then in the United States, which seem to have reflected the entire church's organizational development.

This study deals with the emergence and growth of intra-occupational stratification within a professional group during its initial stages of development. It is concerned primarily with structural differentiation and only secondarily with intra-occupational mobility.

Whereas occupational stratification and mobility studies have usually dealt with inter-occupational stratification[1] and mobility[2] (the majority of the latter treating vertical movement between father-son generations[3]), a few have dealt with intra-generational mobility.[4, 5]

It is believed that a fruitful approach to the intra-occupational stratification process can be made by observing and analyzing the manner in which strata emerge within a specific occupational group which at the outset is relatively unstratified. The early stages of the Methodist religious movement in England and America provide an illustration of the process whereby strata emerge and grow in number as the group grows in size through time.

The founder of Methodism was John Wesley, an Anglican clergyman. While he was still a student at Oxford University, he was disturbed by the growing secularization of the English clergy, as well as by the widespread suffering and misery of persons drawn from the countryside to the cities to man factories and mines during England's agricultural and industrial revolution. Clergymen in eighteenth-century England are reported to have been given to gambling, drinking, and fox-hunting, oblivious to the growing contempt of masses of people toward them, people for whose welfare they seemed to show little concern. The historian, William W. Sweet, states:

> Every sixth house in London was a saloon, and drunkenness became . . . universal. . . . Crime was rampant among all classes, and so common was murder and robbery that no one thought of stirring out of his house at night without arms. At no period in all the history of the English people had morals sunk to such a low ebb.

[1] H. Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson, *Occupational Trends in the United States* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1940); Edward Gross, *Work and Society* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), esp. Part II.

[2] S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), esp. chap. ii; P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1937); W. L. Warner and J. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry, 1928–1952* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).

[3] F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, *American Business Leaders* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932); Lipset and Bendix, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 18–38.

[4] C. Arnold Anderson, "Lifetime Inter-occupational Mobility Patterns in Sweden," *Acta Sociologica*, I (1955), 168–202; S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "Social Mobility and Occupational Career Patterns," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVII (1952), 366–74; Gross, *op. cit.*, esp. chap. v.

[5] The plethora of related psychological studies published over the past four decades have focused almost entirely upon intra-personal factors, such as the so-called leadership traits, and because of this they will be excluded from consideration in the present study. R. M. Stogdill provides a summary of these studies up to 1948 in "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology*, XXV (1948), 35–67.

And what was the religious situation in England at this time? The depth and apathy and shame to which organized religion in eighteenth-century England had sunk beggars description. . . . The whole Church of England, from the Archbishop of Canterbury down, was honeycombed with indifference and complacency. Many of the clergy spent their time in gambling, fox-hunting, and drinking, and made little pretense of caring for the spiritual well-being of the perishing people about them.[6]

Other writers agree with Sweet. Said Arthur Lyon Cross, "the sporting parson, keen on hunting and hard drinking, was becoming a familiar figure."[7] Carlton J. H. Hayes wrote: "Indeed, throughout the eighteenth century, the established church of England was marked by a coldness and formality, and . . . became more obviously the property of the upper classes,"[8] many of whom considered religion to be "fictitious," a "principal subject of mirth and ridicule . . . for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world."[9] One writer more pointedly blames the church. Says he, "The court became a royal brothel. . . . The ministrations of the Church grew formal and ineffective. The Puritan churches themselves at last fell into general decay. . . . The decayed state of the English Church . . . was, in fine, the cause, direct or indirect, of most of the infidelity of the age."[10]

The case against the Anglican church for its passive, if not active, role in the rising flood of immorality, in eighteenth-century England, seems rather strong, and "There is every reason to believe," in the words of a church historian, "that the Methodists were the instruments of stemming this torrent."[11] It was while at Oxford in 1729 that John Wesley joined a small group of students, the "Holy Club," whose dual purpose was stated as being spiritual self-improvement of members and regular visitation of nearby prisons and slums where they "sought out the lowly and the vicious and . . . restored their self-respect."[12] The activities of the "Holy Club," whose leadership Wesley soon assumed, became so systematized and methodical that the group was dubbed "Methodists," "Bible Moths," and "Enthusiasts."

They obtained their name from the exact regularity of their lives, which gave occasion to a young gentleman of Christ Church to say, "Here is a new sect of Methodists sprung up!" alluding to a sect of ancient physicians who were called Methodists, because they reduced the whole healing art to a few common principles, and brought it into some method and order.[13]

After his graduation and ordination in the Church of England, Wesley had several contacts with pietistic Moravians from whom he gained an appreciation for religious conversion as a way to personal transformation. Thereafter, Wesley started preaching the doctrine of religious conversion in Anglican churches. This unwelcome doctrine to Anglican clergymen led them to label Wesley an "Enthusiast" and increasingly to close their doors and pulpits to him.

Immediately, Wesley took to preaching in open fields. While he had been reared and schooled in the bureaucratic atmosphere of the Established Church of which his own father was a clergyman, he seems to have developed in the new setting certain charismatic features that attracted large numbers in London and Bristol, many of whom remained as faithful followers. He soon realized that for lasting results, it

[6] *Methodism in American History* (New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1933), pp. 36–37.

[7] *A Shorter History of England and Greater Britain* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), p. 556.

[8] *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 514.

[9] Bishop Joseph Butler, quoted by Vincent L. Milner, *Religious Denominations of the World* (Philadelphia: William Garretson & Co., 1871), p. 81.

[10] Abel Stevens, *The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century Called Methodism* (3 vols.; New York: Carlton & Porter, 1858), I, 21–26.

[11] Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[12] Cross, *op. cit.*, p. 558.

[13] Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

was necessary to organize new recruits into small groups for regular meetings where encouragement and support could be generated to grow in the new life. These groups were called "classes," and they comprised "about twelve persons (sometime fifteen, or twenty, or even more) in each class; one of whom is styled their leader."[14] There were also "bands" which seem to have comprised more highly select, devout, and trustworthy members whose advice Wesley sought, from time to time, concerning the organization. From the latter, in time, Wesley appointed lay or *local preachers* to oversee the work of *class leaders.*

Each "class" was assigned a *prayer leader* who had the special function of "prayer and exhortation" of fellow class members. The prayer leader, in turn, was under the class leader whose responsibility, among other things, was to collect contributions from members for the successful operation of the Methodist society at large.[15] Here, then, were three rungs up the ladder of "intra-occupational" differentiation: prayer leader, class leader, and local preacher.

The local preacher was a layman who had sensed a "call" to preach and who was deemed qualified but who, although licensed to preach by the Methodist society, retained a layman's status and continued earning his living at his previous vocation.

As the groups grew in number over the British Isles, John Wesley found it increasingly difficult to visit each personally. Accordingly, he created a new stratum of *itinerant preachers* (or *traveling preachers*), who were to supervise the work of local preachers and local groups, preaching to groups they visited. Traveling preachers had been subjected to intensive testing, as they rose from the ranks, and these, in time, were differentiated into two strata, *assistants* and *helpers.* Assistants were generally older, more experienced, and recognized as superiors by helpers, supervising the latter's work. The term *assistant* indicated that the individual was "assisting" Mr. John Wesley in the administrative work. The evidence suggests that the growth of the organization and its geographic spread required this additional stratum on the pyramid, possibly to reduce the number of those regularly reporting to the man at the top and to place a greater responsibility for carrying on the routine work of the organizational machinery upon a highly select number of subordinates immediately beneath him.

To facilitate his own work and to regularize the work of his preachers Wesley organized the local groups into *circuits* and these latter into a *conference* which he convened annually. He

> took fifteen or twenty societies, more or less, which lay around some principal society in those parts, and which were so situated that the greatest distance from one to another was not much more than twenty miles, and united them into what was called the circuit. At the yearly conference, he appointed two, three, or four preachers to one of these circuits, according to its extent. . . . Here, and here only, were they to labor for one year, that is, until the next conference. One of the preachers on every circuit was called the assistant. . . ; he took charge of the societies within the limits assigned him; he enforced the rules everywhere, and directed the labors of the preachers associated with him. Having received a list of the societies forming his circuit, he took his own station in it, gave to the other preachers a plan of it, and pointed out the day when each should be at the place fixed for him, to begin a progressive motion around it, in such order as the plan directed. They followed one another through all the societies belonging to that circuit, at stated distances of time, all being governed by the same rules and undergoing the same labor. By this plan every preacher's daily work was appointed beforehand; each knew, every day, where the others were, and each society when to expect the

[14] John and Charles Wesley, May 1, 1743, quoted by Milner, *op. cit.*, pp. 88 and 91.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 88. See also Max Weber's discussion on "The Routinization of Charisma" (Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons [New York: Oxford University Press, 1947], p. 369), where he recognizes the necessity for this.

preacher, and how long he would stay with them.[16]

Some of the important elements in bureaucratic organization so clearly depicted by Max Weber appear above. "The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one."[17] "The regular activities required for the purposes of the organization are distributed in a fixed way as official duties."[18] Duties are specified and actions are directed "by a consistent system of abstract rules. . . ."[19] Through a neatly pyramided hierarchy of statuses, John Wesley was able to co-ordinate the work of all preachers and, by issuing directives "through channels," impart coherence and unity to the entire, far-flung, rapidly developing organization. In the status hierarchy, each individual was responsible to someone immediately above him, and each had to discharge the duties attending his role satisfactorily to retain his present status and, in time, to be "promoted."

It should be noted that John Wesley considered the Methodist movement a lay movement within the Church of England. Accordingly, he repeatedly urged Methodists to receive the sacraments of communion and baptism only at the hands of ordained Anglican churchmen. In this way, he avoided serious conflict with the legally recognized authorities in the English Church.[20]

In the 1760's some Methodists started migrating to the New World, including a few local preachers who began to conduct religious meetings in the colonies of Ne York, Maryland, and Virginia. Variou features of Wesley's organization whic functioned so well in Britain were brough to the New World. In 1769, at the reques of American Methodists, Wesley sent tw preachers from England, a gesture tha suggested the extension of his authorit over American Methodists.

Various communications from Wesle and the response accorded them by th Methodist colonists indicate that his au thority was generally accepted. Othe preachers were sent by Wesley, in the nex few years, including one who was desig nated as "General Assistant," who was in trusted with the responsibility of supe vising and co-ordinating the work in Ame ica, where Methodists were still urged t receive the sacraments at the hands o Anglican clergymen. By 1773, according t the Methodist Conference *Minutes* of tha year, ten Methodist preachers were re ported known to be in America, includin the "General Assistant."

Meanwhile, a ground swell for politica independence surged in the Colonies. Joh Wesley's authority over American Meth odism came to be questioned by some especially after his published Tory view against the swelling tide for independenc in the Colonies became widely known.[2 Some preachers, whose authority emanate from appointment by Wesley, urged con tinued loyalty and obedience to him, whil others who feared being suspected by fel low Americans of disloyalty to the Ameri can cause—some of them already dubbe "Tories" by virtue of religious linkage t Wesley—wanted to dissociate themselve completely from Wesley.

When the Revolution broke out, man

[16] Milner, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–92.

[17] Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

[18] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 196.

[19] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 330.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 131. Here Weber states that a "new order . . . may become legitimized by the claim that it had always been valid though not rightly known, or that it had been obscured for a time and was now being restored to its rightful place."

[21] It would be interesting to speculate on th reasons for Wesley's strong Tory views. The his torian, W. E. H. Lecky, states: "The eminentl religious character of George III, though gen erally very inimical to everything approachin Dissent, more than once spoke with warm ad miration of the Methodists" (*A History of Eng land in the Eighteenth Century* [4 vols.; Ne York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882], II, 673).

Anglican churchmen fled to England, leaving many Americans without qualified, ordained clergymen to administer the sacraments. In such circumstances some unordained Methodist preachers in Virginia and North Carolina filled the vacuum: They first "ordained" themselves and then undertook to administer the sacraments to others.[22]

By this time, all the Methodist preachers previously sent by Wesley, except Francis Asbury, left the Colonies. Those preachers remaining behind had been licensed to preach in the New World. Asbury was torn between loyalty to Wesley and British Methodism, on the one hand, and loyalty to the American cause for independence and his American fellow Methodists, on the other. That some inner conflict over divided loyalties was present within some American Methodists is certain, but even more certain is the fact that the major commitment of the large majority was to the American cause. Although Wesley was strongly partisan, he urged American Methodists to remain non-partisan, to which Francis Asbury responded by an entry in his *Journal:* "I am truly sorry that the venerable man ever dipped into the politics of America," adding that "no doubt he would have been as zealous an advocate of the American cause" had he been "a subject of America." It is worthy of note that, despite heavy pressures to do so, Asbury refused to bear arms as a clergyman and that, after a period of self-imposed seclusion, he resumed his religious work during the remainder of the Revolution unmolested.

The Methodist bureaucratic structure in Britain, held together by Wesley's charismatic authority and organizational skill, was somewhat modified in America, the major change occurring in the source of final authority. In Britain, it was Wesley; but in America, in keeping with the strong democratic ferment, the top leadership came to be elected from below.

That there was some undercover struggle for power among leaders, particularly among those appointed by Wesley, before and after the American Revolution, may be inferred from various historic documents. The emergence of Francis Asbury as the major widely recognized leader may be attributed to his greater sympathy with the democratic movement shared with American Methodists, combined with his charismatic linkage to Wesley who had originally appointed him, his own personal charismatic qualities, and his organizational skill. His stern self-discipline was greatly admired. He forced himself to travel constantly on horseback, and he averaged one sermon a day over forty-five years. Pushing through rain, marshes, and swamps, sometimes compelled to swim across icy creeks, he was sick with fever much of the time when preaching. Defying inclement weather, he would call out to his discouraged companions, "Let us journey on, we are neither sugar nor salt; there is no danger of our melting." "Charisma knows only inner determination and inner restraint. The holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission."[23]

In Asbury, American Methodists found a single focus for their varied sentiments and loyalties, religious and patriotic. He represented both a charismatic link to the founder of Methodism and a pillar of loyalty to the cause of American independence. Thus, Asbury symbolized a synthesis of divergent loyalties that plagued untold numbers of Americans: loyalties to England, their mother-country, and to America, the country of their choice or birth. In him, too, they found a happy combination of charismatic authority and an egalitarian ideology.

As earlier indicated, the essential features of Wesley's organization were brought to America. According to the Methodist Conference *Minutes* of 1773, all ten traveling preachers were on the same status level,

[22] Sweet, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–95.

[23] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, p. 246.

except the "General Assistant," whose work consisted in both preaching and co-ordinating the work of other preachers. Beneath the "General Assistant," an unspecified number of traveling preachers were acting as "assistants," whose role as such could not have been very clearly differentiated by this time. That some differentiation had begun is suggested by the agreement at the 1773 Conference on the obligation of "every preacher who acts as assistant to send an account of the work once in six months to the General Assistant."[24] So the stratum of assistants begins to appear, by this time, between local preachers, below, and the General Assistant, above.

The Annual Conference was the earliest professional organization of the Methodist ministry in America. It still is *the* professional organization for this group. The first meeting of an American Annual Conference of which there is any clear record took place in 1773. Only traveling preachers qualified for full ministerial membership, then, and this is still the case. As indicated by Figure 1, the 1773 occupational pyramid was nearly flat. Only the supervisor, or General Assistant, stood out above the other nine traveling preachers. In the 1774 *Minutes,* however, the nine appear as assistants. Beneath them were five recently "admitted into full membership"; and beneath the latter were seven who were "admitted on trial" into the Annual Conference. Here, then, were four strata appearing in the newly formed professional organization in Colonial America.

The jump from ten to seventeen preachers between 1773 and 1774 reflects the jump in reported church membership from 1,160 to 2,073. The admission of five preachers into "full membership" of the Annual Conference and of seven other preachers "on trial" seems to have been necessitated by the rapid growth of the entire organization. Thus, we observe incipient growth of intra-occupational stratification linked with growth in size of organization to which service was rendered.

A glance at Figure 1 reveals the pyramid to be top-heavy with assistants, in 1775, when Methodism in America had a reported membership of 3,148. A 52 per cent membership increase over the previous year seemed to require expansion in number of preachers serving. Accordingly, nine new traveling preachers were admitted into the lowest stratum, "on trial," in 1776, when church membership was reported as 4,921. Table 1 shows growth in number of church members and of preachers, as well as member-preacher ratio, from 1773 to 1800.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION OF THE METHODIST CHURCH IN AMERICA FROM 1773 TO 1800*

Year	Members	Preachers	Member-Preacher Ratio
1773	1,160	10	116
1774	2,073	17	122
1775	3,148	19	166
1776	4,921	24	205
1777	6,968	36	194
1778	6,095	29	210
1779	8,577	49	196
1780	8,504	42	203
1781	10,539	54	195
1782	11,787	59	200
1783	13,740	78	177
1784	14,988	83	180
1785	18,000	104	173
1786	20,681	117	177
1787	25,842	133	195
1788	37,354	166	225
1789	43,262	196	211
1790	57,631	227	254
1800	64,894	287	226

* The statistics were abstracted and arranged from the *Minutes of the Annual Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Years 1773–1828, op cit.*

Rapid annual growth in church membership seems to have paralleled the rapid growth of the American population at that time. With some fluctuations, there was a general increase in member-preacher ratio, from year to year. This may be attributed, in part, to the increase in population of towns, which may have been paralleled by increase in size of the average

[24] *Minutes of the Annual Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Years 1773–1828* (referred to hereinafter as *Minutes*) (New York: Mason & G. Lane, 1840), I, 5.




FIG. 1.—Changes in the structure of the American Methodist ministry from its inception to 1789. *A*, 1773–80; *B*, 1781–84; *C*, 1785–89.

Methodist congregation that came to hear the traveling preacher, as he made his rounds in his circuit.

The change in structure of the occupational pyramid from 1778 to 1779 seems rather great, a change which is largely retained through 1780. The majority of Methodist preachers were, indeed, on equal footing in 1779 and 1780. This leveling may be explained by the extremely hostile environment that surrounded Methodists during the darker, uncertain years of the American Revolution, 1778 to 1780. The drop in church membership in 1778, accompanied by a proportionately greater drop in preachers, is difficult to explain. It could have been partly a consequence of a hostile environment, as well as of the serious rift between the two groups of ministers from the northern and southern states, over the self-ordination of the latter, in 1779, to permit them to administer the sacraments. So serious was the division that two Annual Conferences were held in 1779.[25]

In a hostile environment, the group's internal solidarity seems to grow stronger, as sociologists have known since W. G. Sumner's *Folkways* and studies of conflict groups such as *The Gang* by Frederic Thrasher. In commenting upon World War I, Winston Churchill observed: "Unities and comradeships had become possible between men and classes and nations and grown stronger while the hostile pressure and the common cause endured."[26] In a hostile environment, the Methodist ministers seem to have experienced a comradeship of equals asserting itself in the internal structure and relations within their group, as seems to be reflected in the "leveling up" shown by the 1779 and 1780 pyramids. By 1781, the military victory for Americans was in sight, even before the enemy forces surrendered in October of that year. A 23.8 per cent jump in church membership between 1780 and 1781, accompanied by an even greater relative increase in ministers (28.6 per cent) seems to suggest that hostility toward Methodists declined substantially by the end of the war. But during the height of the hostility, there was considerable suffering endured by some Methodists.

Says Sweet: "Maryland authorities were especially active in persecution of Methodists."[27] Preacher Joseph Hartley "was confined by the authorities, accused of Toryism," while Freeborn Garrettson was beaten and "threatened with imprisonment."

Preacher Philip Gatch was tarred and, in the process, "one of his eyes was permanently injured." At the 1778 Conference, Gatch withdrew from the traveling ministry "due to broken health." The Methodists faced a crisis and, in that crisis, the ministers seem to have been drawn closer together into a brotherhood of equals, as reflected by the elevation of nearly all to the status of assistants.[28]

The 1779 *Minutes* mention, for the first time, two preachers who "desist from traveling." They were promptly dropped from Conference membership. In addition to the hostility, there were physical hardships encountered in the work, not to mention the rigorous demands for self-discipline made upon each member by the prevailing moral norms of the group. Members, moreover, were compelled to give up personal property, as indicated by the following questions and answers at the 1780 Conference:

"Quest. 16. Ought not this Conference to require those traveling preachers who hold

[25] Sweet, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

[26] Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Vol. IV: *The Aftermath* (London: Butterworth, 1928), quoted by R. K. Merton in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), p. 367.

[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

[28] It is possible to hypothesize that the easy reward of fast upward mobility was utilized to compensate preachers for the personal, economic, and other hardships imposed upon them by their hostile environment during the years of crisis. But the over-all evidence seems to give greater support to the above hypothesis.

slaves to give promise to set them free?" [Answer:] "Yes."

"Quest. 17. Does this Conference acknowledge that slavery is against the laws of God, man, and nature, and hurtful to society. . . ? Do we pass our disapprobation on all our friends who keep slaves, and advise their freedom?" [Answer:] "Yes."[29]

Year after year, thereafter, numerous withdrawals appear in the records, usually by way of "location," that is, by reverting to the "local preacher" status, that of a layman licensed to preach locally, while he worked at some other occupation to earn his living.

From the outset in 1773 until 1814, by actual count of those reported in the Minutes of Annual Conferences in America, there were 1,616 traveling preachers who had been received into Conference membership. Of these, 821 were "located," the majority only after spending only a few years in the itinerant ministry. A wife and children were a handicap to the itinerancy of circuit riders. Indeed, their support was extremely difficult on the meager income of a traveling preacher, which was fixed at the 1792 Conference at sixty-four dollars per year, plus travel expenses that included horseshoeing and subsistence for the preacher and his horse. In the case of those married, wives were allowed "Sixty-four dollars if they be in want of it." All preachers, including the top man, had equal incomes.

In 1779, Francis Asbury was elected by the American Annual Conference to "act as General Assistant in America, because 1st, on account of his age; 2nd, because originally appointed by Mr. Wesley."[30] Seniority and linkage with the founder of Methodism received special recognition. (Weber pointed out that a new charismatic leader may be selected "By the designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his own successor and his recognition on the part of the followers."[31]) Asbury's authority was acknowledged as follows: "On hearing every preacher for and against what is in debate, the right of determination shall rest with him, according to the Minutes."[32]

In 1781, the pyramid increased one stratum in height, forming a separate category for those "remaining on trial from the previous year." No reason is given for keeping these "on trial." There is suggested, here, the adoption by American Methodists of the screening and selective process devised by John Wesley for English Methodism, beginning at its first Conference held in 1744 and developing into the following process of selecting itinerant preachers:

1. They are received as private members of the society on trial. 2. After a quarter of a year, if they are found deserving, they are admitted as proper members. 3. When their grace and abilities are sufficiently manifest they are appointed leaders of classes. 4. If they then discover talents for more important services, they are employed to exhort occasionally in the smaller congregation, when the preachers cannot attend. 5. If approved in this line of duty, they are allowed to preach. 6. Out of these men who are called *local preachers* are selected the *itinerant preachers*, who are first proposed at a quarterly meeting of stewards and local preachers of the circuit; then at a meeting of the travelling preachers of the district; and lastly, in the conference; and, if accepted, are nominated for a circuit. 7. Their characters and conduct are examined annually in the conference; and, if they continue faithful for four years of trial, they are received into full connection. At these conferences, also, strict inquiry is made into the conduct and success of every preacher, and those who are found deficient in abilities are no longer employed as itinerants; while those whose conduct has not been agreeable to the Gospel, are expelled, and thereby deprived of all the privileges even of private members of the society.[33]

In 1783 and 1784, the pyramids seem top-heavy with *assistants*, a carry-over from the years of crisis. At the historic

[29] *Minutes*, p. 10.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 365.

[32] *Minutes*, p. 10.

[33] An authority who seems to have had first-hand acquaintance with the selective process, a "Mr Benson," quoted by Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

Baltimore Conference of 1785, when the American Methodist Episcopal Church was created, complete reorganization occurred. It was John Wesley who suggested it. The following note, together with Wesley's letter, appears in the "Minutes taken at the Several Annual Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the Year 1785":

As it was unanimously agreed at this Conference that circumstances made it expedient for us to become a separate body, under the denomination of the Methodist Episcopal Church, it is necessary that we should here assign some reasons for so doing.

The following extract of a letter from the Rev. Mr. John Wesley will afford as good an explanation as can be given on this subject:—

"Bristol, Sept. 10, 1784

"To Dr. Coke, Mr. Asbury, and our brethren in North America:—

"1. By a very uncommon train of providences, many of the provinces of North America are totally disjoined from the British Empire, and erected into independent states. The English government has no authority over them, either civil or ecclesiastical, any more than over the states of Holland. A civil authority is exercised over them, partly by the congress, partly by the state assemblies. But no one either exercises or claims any ecclesiastical authority at all. In this peculiar situation some thousands of inhabitants of these states desire my advice; and in compliance with their desire, I have drawn up a little sketch.

"2. Lord King's account of the primitive church convinced me, many years ago, that bishops and presbyters are the same order, and, consequently, have the same right to ordain. For many years I have been importuned, from time to time, to exercise this right, by ordaining part of our travelling preachers; but I have still refused, not only for peace' sake, but because I was determined as little as possible to violate the established order of the national Church to which I belonged.

"3. But the case is widely different between England and North America. Here there are bishops who have legal jurisdiction. In America there are none, and but few parish ministers; so that for some hundred miles together there is none either to baptize or to administer the Lord's supper. Here, therefore, my scruples are at an end; and I conceive myself at full liberty, as I violate no order, and invade no man's right, by appointing and sending labourers into the harvest.

"4. I have, accordingly, appointed Dr. Coke and Mr. Francis Asbury to be joint superintendents* over our brethren in North America; as also Richard Whatcoat and Thomas Vasey to act as elders among them, by baptizing and administering the Lord's supper.

"5. If anyone will point out a more rational and Scriptural way of feeding and guiding those poor sheep in the wilderness, I will gladly embrace it. At present, I cannot see any better method than that I have taken.

"6. It has indeed been proposed to desire the English bishops to ordain part of our preachers for America. But to this I object, (1) I desired the Bishop of London to ordain one only, but could not prevail. (2) If they consented, we know the slowness of their proceedings, but the matter admits of no delay. (3) If they would ordain them now, they would likewise expect to govern them. And how grievously would this entangle us! (4) As our American brethren are now totally disentangled both from the state and from the English hierarchy, we dare not entangle them again either with one or the other. They are now at full liberty simply to follow the Scriptures and the primitive church. And we judg it best that they should stand fast in that liberty wherewith God has so strangely made them free.

John Wesley"

"* As the translators of our version of the Bible have used the English word *bishop* instead of *superintendent*, it has been thought by us that it would appear more Scriptural to adopt their term bishop"

Therefore, at this Conference, we formed ourselves into an independent church; and following the counsel of Mr. John Wesley, who recommended the episcopal mode of church government, we thought it best to become an episcopal church, making the episcopal office elective, and the elected superintendent, or bishop, amenable to the body of ministers and preachers.[34]

In the newly independent nation, however, there seemed to be a strong antipathy to hierarchical relations and stratification implicit in the term "bishop." Accord-

[34] *Minutes*, pp. 21–22.

ingly, only the word "superintendent" is found in the minutes of the Annual Conferences when reference is made to the person(s) holding this office, until 1800, when the title "bishop" which had been officially sanctioned in 1785, appears in the minutes (1800) and continues to appear each year thereafter. It should be noted that by 1800 Methodism had become a full-fledged, established denomination,[35] a fact soon reflected in the appointment of a Methodist clergyman to the chaplaincy of the House of Representatives and then of the Senate.

As indicated above, the 1785 Conference decided that the episcopal office was to be elective. Two ordained "elders," therefore, were elected to the office of bishop: Thomas Coke, the ordained Anglican clergyman sent by Wesley, and Francis Asbury, ordained by Thomas Coke.

There were other elders ordained at the 1785 Conference, as well as several deacons, just one rank beneath them. Now the structure of the pyramid was as follows: two bishops at the top, twenty elders beneath them, thirty-one assistants—"all deacons" —on the third level down, four deacons not in the assistant category on the fourth level down, ten preachers "admitted into full connection," on the fifth level down, fourteen preachers "remaining on trial" on the sixth level down, and seven preachers "admitted on trial" that year, on the lowest level. As one follows the names of the various men in the minutes of the Annual Conferences, from year to year, members of one stratum may be seen moving up into the stratum immediately above them. Some moved more rapidly than others, possibly depending upon both the required personal qualifications and developing circumstances in the field. If, as Max Weber maintained, "Charisma can only be 'awakened' and 'tested'; it cannot be 'learned' or 'taught,'"[36] then, those preachers deficient in it might not be as vertically mobile as those who possessed it. The assumption, here, of course, is that charisma was a factor in upward mobility.

Beginning with 1785, the elders preempted the supervisory role and were assigned the responsibility of supervising the work of deacons and other preachers in lower strata, averaging about six in number. Assistants were mentioned for the last time in the minutes of 1786. After that time, the assistant class was dissolved, leaving a pyramid comprising the following strata in descending order: two bishops, twenty-five elders, twenty-four deacons, seventeen preachers "admitted into full connection," eighteen "remaining on trial," and thirty-five "admitted on trial." Today, there may be a degree of overlap between some of these strata: for example, one may be "admitted into full connection" the same year in which he is ordained. But at that time, particularly before 1785, one could be admitted into "full connection" without being ordained.

Jesse Lee, who appears as elder for the first time in the minutes of 1790—who served as chaplain of the House of Representatives for three terms and one term as Senate Chaplain, and who had previously served as personal assistant to Bishop

[35] Ernst Troeltsch contrasted extreme types of religious organizations within a society in terms of degrees of their social acceptance, the socially rejected sect type found at one extreme and the fully socially accepted ecclesia or church type found at the other, a type which virtually preempted the role of a religious institution in the society (see Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,* trans. Olive Wyon [2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1931]; see also Purnell Handy Benson, *Religion in Contemporary Culture* [New York: Harper & Bros., 1960], chap. xiii, esp. pp. 613–16; Elizabeth K Nottingham, *Religion and Society* [New York: Random House, 1954], chap. vi, esp. pp. 62–69; Edward T. Ramsdell, "Sect," in Vergilius Ferm [ed], *An Encyclopedia of Religion* [New York: Philosophical Library, 1945]). Since Troeltsch's writing, a religious denomination has been viewed as a stage of development in the natural history of a religious institution approaching the church type, but differing from it in that the denomination is only one of several socially accepted religious institutions in the society, each of which "tries to organize the forces of society on whatever level they are found and to control them for its own stated ends" (Troeltsch, *op. cit.*).

[36] *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* p. 397.

Francis Asbury—has left us a clear picture of gradation or stratification in the early years of American Methodism. He writes:

> In this country they formerly stood in three grades, (1) Helpers, (2) Assistants, (3) General Assistants. The Helper was the young preacher in each circuit where there were generally two preachers in a circuit. The Assistant was the oldest preacher, and of the business of the circuit. The General Assistant was a preacher who had the particular charge of all the circuits, and of all the preachers to their several circuits, and changed them as he judged to be necessary, for the good of the preachers, or the benefit of the people. . . . His being called a General Assistant also signified that he was to assist Mr. Wesley in carrying on the work.[37]

That a fairly clear intra-occupational stratification was openly acknowledged in the Methodist ministry as early as 1790 is indicated by Lee's comment upon the minutes of 1790:

> The form of the minutes was not altered, and the first question was, "Who are admitted on trial?" This mode of beginning the minutes has ever since been pursued. The second question is, "Who remain on trial?" and thus proceed up in gradation to Bishops. Formerly the first question was, "Who are the Bishops?" and then proceed downwards to the lowest order.[38]

In 1792, a distinction was officially made between the "presiding elder" and other elders, a distinction that was incorporated in the *Discipline*[39] of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The presiding elder "was to preside, during the absence of the bishop, at the quarterly conferences; was to enforce the laws of the Church upon both clergy and laity; was to keep the bishop informed of the work; and was to 'attend the bishop when present in his district.' "[40] A letter written by Bishop Asbury, dated November 27, 1812, states: " 'I must repose great confidence in, and expect great help from, the Presiding Elders. They must be my committee of information, council and safety.' "[41]

Despite the intra-occupational stratification that existed and seemed generally accepted, many ministers rebelled against verbalized prestige distinctions that pointed up vertical social distances between strata. Charisma of person, more than charisma of office, seemed to be respected. Attempts at bureaucratic domination elicited resentment.

Bishop Coke, who had been appointed by Wesley and was then elected to the bishopric by Methodist ministers in 1785, seems to have internalized distasteful components of bureaucratic and authoritarian roles in the hierarchy of the Church into which he had been ordained before coming to America. Coke's attempts to dominate those early Methodist preachers were resisted. Imbued with frontier folkways of equality and democracy, they were not to be easily dominated.

In 1793, "several preachers" under the leadership of James O'Kelly claimed the right to protest against an undesired appointment and withdrew from the Methodist Episcopal Church to form a new church, the Republican Methodists, in which all preachers "were to be on an equal footing. One preacher was not to above another; nor higher in office or in power than the other preacher. No superiority or subordination was to be known among them."[42] For a time, this group seemed to experience some success, drawing to it preachers and sympathetic laymen from Virginia and North Carolina. In time, however, fissiparous tendencies emerged; its constituents began to differ in opinion and policy and "divided and subdivided," ac-

[37] Jesse Lee, *A Short History of the Methodists in the United States* (Baltimore: Magill & Clime, Booksellers, 1810), pp. 33–34.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

[39] The *Discipline* of the Methodist Church, published every four years after each General Conference (composed of delegates from Annual Conferences), contains the constitution and various rules of the church, in addition to its "Social Creed" and ritual for administering the sacraments.

[40] Paul N. Garber, *The Romance of American Methodism* (Greensboro, N.C.: Piedmont Press, 1931), p. 122.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[42] Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

cording to Jesse Lee, "till at the present it is hard to find two of them that are of one opinion."[43]

Despite this rupture in early Methodism, Bishop Coke did not change his painfully authoritarian behavior. So aggravating did he become that, in the General Conference of 1796, one of the members, incensed at Coke's introduction of a resolution and his insistence that it be passed by the Conference, shouted at the top of his lungs: "Popery, Popery, Popery!" For a moment, Coke was shocked. Then, eying the preachers icily, he asked: "Do you think yourselves equal to me?" Nelson Reed stood up and, contemptuously disregarding Coke, addressed himself to Bishop Asbury: "Yes we do think ourselves equal to him, notwithstanding that he was educated at Oxford, and has been honored with the degree of Doctor of Laws; and more than that, we think ourselves equal to Dr. Coke's king!"

Coke was stunned by this stinging rejection, and he seems never to have fully recovered thereafter. The fact that Coke had come from England as recently as 1784, just one year after the peace treaty was signed with England, may have comprised a barrier between him and the American preachers, a barrier which he only accentuated by his authoritarian intransigence. Coke seems to have failed to realize that the intra-occupational stratification that was unquestioningly accepted by Anglican clergymen—and even by English Methodist preachers familiar with the Anglican hierarchy—was far from placidly accepted by Americans. Shortly after this episode, Coke returned to England and ceased to feature significantly in the life of American Methodists.

There is a strong temptation to indulge in a detailed, sophisticated analysis of the entire Methodist movement, or of its professional leadership, utilizing one or another conceptual framework—Max Weber's, Pitirim A. Sorokin's, that of Ferdinand Tönnies or those of some others—a temptation that will be resisted here. But it can be pointed out that, from its inception to the time Methodism became differentiated as a separate religious organization and institutionalized, it underwent a number of changes; for example, in legitimate authority and leadership, Methodism moved from "charismatic" toward rational bureaucratic;[44] in religious organization, it moved from "sect type" toward "church type"; and in intra-occupational structure, it moved from a relatively undifferentiated structure at the outset, when Wesley met "classes" personally; through the differentiation of some followers into class leaders, local preachers, traveling preachers, assistants, and later, in America, to deacons, elders, presiding elders, and bishops.

The followership with its organization into "classes," in the early stages, provided a setting for the "selection"[45] of class leaders, local preachers, and traveling preachers who, in time, became fully differentiated and organized into a professional group. This group itself, eventually, began to show intra-occupational differentiation and stratification in terms of local preachers,[46] deacons, elders, presiding elders,[47] and bishops, a differentiation which has persisted to the present time.

Mary Washington College
University of Virginia

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, esp. pp. 328, 358–63, 335, *passim*.

[45] On "social selection," see the excellent discussion in Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, pp. 133–35; Philip J. Allen, "Upward Mobility within a Profession" (a doctoral dissertation, American University, 1953).

[46] "Local preachers," who are still unordained, often are appointed as pastors of small—usually rural—congregations, today, provided they meet certain personal and educational qualifications, and they are known as "accepted supply" ministers.

[47] The title "presiding elder" persisted in the Methodist Episcopal Church South until 1939, when that Church united with the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Methodist Protestant Church. The title "district superintendent," which for many years had been in use within the Methodist Episcopal Church, was adopted by the three bodies now united and known as the Methodist Church.

MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS[1]

ROBERT H. GUEST

ABSTRACT

Gouldner's study of managerial succession in a gypsum plant is compared with the author's study of succession in a large automobile plant. The comparison delineates the organizational pressures in the two social systems that led the first manager to adopt "punishment-centered" bureaucratic measures and the second to adopt "representative" measures. The action of the first resulted in increased tension and organizational dissatisfaction. The actions of the second manager had precisely the opposite effects. The comparison, in general, confirms Gouldner's hypothesis as to the effects of alternative bureaucratic patterns.

This paper compares two studies of managerial succession in complex industrial organizations: (1) Alvin W. Gouldner's study of a gypsum plant reported in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*,[2] and (2) a study recently completed by this observer in a large American automobile plant.[3]

Both studies examine the process by which organizational tensions are exacerbated or reduced following the succession of a new leader at the top of the hierarchy. Succession in Gouldner's case resulted in a sharp increase in tension and stress and, by inference, a lowering of over-all performance. The succession of a new manager had opposite results in the present case. Plant Y, as we chose to call it, was one of six identical plants of a large corporation. At one period in time the plant was poorest in virtually all indexes of performance—direct and indirect labor costs, quality of output, absenteeism and turnover, ability to meet schedule changes, labor grievances and in several other measures. Interpersonal relationships were marked by sharp antagonisms within and between all levels.

Three years later, following the succession of a new manager, and with no changes in the formal organizational structure, in the product, in the personnel, or in its basic technology, not only was there a substantial reduction of interpersonal conflict, but Plant Y became the outstanding performer among all of the plants.

The difference between what happened in Gouldner's study and this observer's study is explained by the kinds of administrative actions which each manager initiated: These actions were shaped in large measure by the social system which each inherited upon succession to office.

The analytical framework used by Gouldner was derived from his modification of Weber's concept of authority based on "discipline" as distinguished from authority based on "expertise." The former mode of administration he calls "punishment-centered," the latter, "representative."[4] The Plant Y study made use of

[1] An expanded version of a paper presented at the fifty-fifth annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, 1960. The study was conducted when the author was associate director of research at the Yale Technology Project, Charles R. Walker, director.

[2] Alvin W. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1954). Page references in the text refer to this work.

[3] Robert H. Guest, *Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin-Dorsey Press, 1962).

[4] Gouldner separated two broader strands of Weber's theory which Weber himself had not clearly distinguished. The first was Weber's observation that modern bureaucratic organization was effective and maintained itself because the organization was administered by "experts." Members willingly obeyed the directions of superiors, reasoning that such obedience was the best way of realizing the acknowledged goals of the organization (Gouldner, *op. cit.*, p. 32).

Weber's second emphasis, Gouldner observed,

the Homans' thesis which held that effective authority as measured by performance is related to reciprocal interactions and favorable sentiments.

In spite of differences in the way the empirical material was handled the two central hypotheses in each study are quite similar.

Gouldner says: "Internal tensions are more likely to be associated with the punishment-centered bureaucracy than with representative bureaucracy" (p. 243). In the Plant Y study the hypothesis was phrased in these terms: "To the extent that interactions between people at various levels of a hierarchy are originated primarily by superiors, sentiments of hostility will increase and performance will be lowered." Gouldner's association of "close" supervision and rule enforcement with the punishment-centered mode of administration is empirically similar to the notion that sentiments of hostility to superiors can be associated with an administrative pattern in which interactions are originated primarily by superiors.

What follows is a comparison of the conditions in the two organizational systems before and after succession which in large measure influenced the way authority was exercised by the respective managers.

The successor at the gypsum plant (Peele) and the successor at Plant Y (Cooley) had similar mandates from the parent organization. Both men were told that their respective plants had been "slipping" and that production had to improve. In assigning them to their new jobs, both men were told that the primary criterion on which they would be judged would be results—increased production to meet competitive market conditions.

"Peele, therefore, came to the plant sensitized to the rational and impersonal yardsticks which his superiors would use to judge his performance" (p. 72).

Cooley came to Plant Y "sensitized" to the same yardstick. Like Peele, he knew he was "on trial" with his superiors and that to hold his job or to expect future promotion he had to "make good." The promotion of both in itself symbolized the power which higher management held over both men, and they knew it. Both were expected to take action in keeping with the rational value system of higher management.

As Gouldner observed, Peele, by the sheer fact of succession, "had heightened awareness that he could disregard top management's rational values only at his peril" (p. 72). Cooley was aware of these same risks but, according to what he said and did at the time of his succession, one can see the beginnings of a fundamental difference in his perception of his role vis-à-vis his superiors. Cooley accepted his role as top management's agent charged with achieving the goals of greater production, but he did not necessarily accept his superiors' value system when it came to the *method* of fulfilling their expectations. His superiors (at least some of those in the main office) made it quite plain what methods he was expected to use. He was expected, and they said so, to utilize to the fullest extent the power formally vested in the office of manager, the power of discipline. He was told to "clean house" and to get rid of those in supervision who were failing to perform properly. Like Peele, he was told he could make what Gouldner called "strategic replacements," and that top management would wholly support him in such action.

Although Gouldner never said it explicitly, he inferred that Peele took the same instructions of "tightening up" and of "cleaning house" as an order. Cooley on the other hand did not accept his instructions as orders. Indeed, pressures were brought to bear on his immediate divisional

---

was that bureaucracy was a mode of organization in which "obedience was an end in itself. The individual obeys the order, setting aside judgments either of its rationality or morality, primarily because of the position occupied by the person commanding" (*ibid.*, p. 32).

superior to "allow Cooley to run his own show" without close supervision from his superior.

That Peele was deeply concerned about top management's expectations is revealed in Gouldner's observation that his behavior in the early period of succession was marked by considerable anxiety. "Comments about Peele's anxiety were made by many main office personnel, as well as by people in the plant who spoke repeatedly of his 'nervousness'" (p. 72). If Cooley had deep anxieties he never displayed any signs of "nervousness" either to his superiors, to members of the plant organization, or to this observer. A point to make here is not to deny basic differences in personality traits, but to suggest that there was also some difference, at least, in the *strength* of the organizational pressures from above that were brought to bear on each man. Putting it another way, Peele was under some of the same kinds of pressures that Cooley's predecessor, Stewart, had been under.

Stewart's feelings and perceptions are revealed in one comment he made during a crisis:

> The central office keeps saying to me, "Why can't you [keep to the schedule]? So and so in another plant can." When I get this kind of pressure on me I get butterflies in my stomach. We have a labor turnover hitting close to sixty men a day (in a plant of 5,000). Just yesterday I jumped a man who was not on his job. It's impossible for me alone to keep everybody in line but I do the best I can.

Thus, Stewart, like Peele in Gouldner's study, found it expedient and even necessary to initiate punishment-centered methods of administration.

The two successors, Peele and Cooley, shared one thing in common upon succeeding to office. Both were "outsiders" to their respective plant organizations. Neither had had any previous involvement in the social system of the plant. This allowed both men, as Gouldner stated it with respect to Peele, "to view the plant situation in a comparative dispassionate light" (p. 72). They were unhampered by previous personal commitments to the in-group. They did not have to be concerned about breaking any long-standing friendship ties. The only "commitments" were to their superiors.

Peele, however, faced two problems that Cooley did not have to face. First, it had been a tradition at the gypsum plant that the "legitimate heir" to the manager's job had always been someone promoted from within the local organization. Also, the previous manager, who had held the job for several years, was well known and highly thought of in the close-knit community surrounding the plant. Thus, the condition which allowed Peele to view the organization with impersonal detachment was the same condition which, in the eyes of his subordinates, denied from the start the legitimacy of his succession.

Peele faced a second, related problem. His predecessor had left behind a core of supervisors who had been intensely loyal to him. And because of the "indulgency pattern," which had characterized the previous administration, authority had been derived from a *personal* loyalty and not an impersonal respect for the office of manager. Peele could not count on an automatic transfer of respect for the office such as one might find in a military or other highly bureaucratized organization.

At Plant Y managers changed frequently, a new manager taking over once every three to five years.[5] New managers almost always came from other plants in the division. Being in a large metropolitan area there had developed no close association between a manager and the local community. Thus, Cooley was not, by the act of succession, breaking any precedent that

[5] This fact appears consistent with Grusky's findings with respect to large bureaucracies (see Oscar Grusky, "Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII [1961], 262, and O. Grusky, "Administrative Succession in Formal Organization," *Social Forces*, XXXIX [December, 1960]).

otherwise might have generated resistance from the start. More important, Cooley's predecessor had not left behind a core of "lieutenants" who were personally loyal to him. Just about everyone was glad to see his predecessor, Stewart, "retired."

The fact that Peele's succession in itself generated some intense "institutional" hostilities and Cooley's did not must be given considerable weight in explaining what Gouldner would call the "type of bureaucratic method" which each man, following his succession, found legitimate and expedient.

Not long after Peele took over he became aware of the resistance that he could expect from the subordinate organization. Gouldner points out that Peele never carefully analyzed the causes of resistance or the implications of the causes to the methods he would use to institute changes. It was simply resistance and it had to be overcome.

According to Gouldner, Peele had "two major avenues of solution available to him: (*a*) He could act upon and through an informal system of relations, (*b*) He could utilize the formal system of organization in the plant. Stated differently, Peele could attempt to solve his problems and ease his tensions either by drawing upon his resources as a 'person,' or by bringing into operation the authority invested in his status as plant manager" (p. 84).

Peele chose the latter course. Given the situation he faced, he found it was difficult to do otherwise. As he perceived the situation he could not use the "personal touch" because his aim—and his mandate from above—was to uproot precisely this kind of informal "indulgent" pattern of relationships which had existed earlier at all levels from manager on down. Nor were his subordinates too concerned with cutting costs and raising productivity. This lack of interest was all part of the general indulgency pattern. Peele's aims and those of his subordinates were different from the start. As Gouldner points out: "It is difficult to maintain, and *especially to create,* informal solidarity in pursuit of ends which are so differently valued by group members" (p. 84).

In many respects Cooley had available to him the same two general alternatives of action when he became manager. He could establish informal personal ties with his subordinates as preliminary action leading ultimately to action that would cut costs and increase productivity. On the other hand, he could use the raw power of his office to force changes and bring about improvements. He could immediately issue new orders, institute new rules; he could insist on stricter enforcement of old rules. He could let it be known that any deviations would be punished. He could insist that all information flow through the formally established vertical channels and that various control, reporting, and service functions live up to the letter of the operating manual. In short, he too had the alternative of bringing about further bureaucratization of Plant Y.

Such measures had been undertaken by his predecessor—and had failed. Cooley, therefore, found it more legitimate and expedient to take the path which Peele could not, or at least did not, take. He decided to ignore the legal powers vested in the office of manager and find out through informal contacts with his subordinates what they thought was needed to raise the plant's operating efficiency.

Here again it is necessary to underscore the historical conditioning factors explaining why Peele took one course of action and Cooley another. Putting it simply, Peele's subordinates wanted no change either in interpersonal relationships or in production results. Cooley's entire group was anxious to change both. It is perhaps more accurate to say that Cooley's subordinates wanted to eliminate both the "fear-pressure complex" which had pervaded the organization and the technical and administrative bottlenecks which prevented the assembly line from operating

smoothly and which, in turn, intensified interpersonal hostilities.

In the process of trying to bridge the communications gap between manager and subordinates both men took different steps. Peele, not trusting his subordinates' willingness to give him the necessary information on which to base decisions, personally went out into the plant at unexpected times and places to "check up" on supervisors and hourly workers to see to it that they were working properly and obeying the rules and regulations. Cooley also spent considerable time "out in the shop," also showing up at unexpected times and places. In Peele's case, his object, which he acknowledged and which others perceived, was to personally "straighten out the shirkers." Cooley's acknowledged intention was to observe the technical problems and to encourage subordinates to suggest improvements.

Peele's actions, part of many to follow, signaled the beginning of the punishment-centered mode of administration based on *discipline*. Cooley's actions were the manifest start of the representative mode based on Gouldner's elaboration of Weber's term "expertise." In the language of Homans, Cooley was, by his own behavior, encouraging subordinates to initiate interactions *to* superiors.

Peele, finding it difficult to maintain direct and "close supervision" over all of his subordinates simultaneously, looked for some other alternative. He decided to bring in some "trusted lieutenants" from the outside. Gouldner labels these as "strategic replacements." They enabled "the new manager to form a new informal social circle, which revolves about himself and strengthens his status. It provides him with a new two-way communication network; on the one hand, carrying up news and information that the formal channels excluded; on the other hand carrying down the meaning or 'spirit' of the successor's policies and orders" (p. 92). Gouldner goes on to make the important observation that a successor under these circumstances is relying not on the existing bureaucratic structure, but is in fact establishing an additional structure based upon "extra-formal" ties (p. 92).

Cooley brought in no trusted lieutenants to serve as the communication link between himself and the three hundred members of supervision and five thousand workers below him. For most routine communications he used normal channels. No alterations were made in the structure. He did, however, introduce one communication mechanism which his predecessor did not adopt and which Peele in the Gouldner study could not adopt—group meetings at all levels within and between departments. In his early period in office Cooley met regularly with his immediate staff. The purpose of these meetings was not to relay pressures down from the corporate organization, but rather to encourage ideas from below which had been withheld previously. In time, and without the manager's directing the action, similar meetings "sprang up" at all levels and departments. The manifest purpose of the group meetings was to solve "business" problems, yet the experience had unanticipated consequences. Each member gained a feeling of reinforcement and support not provided for in the formal "scalar" relationships. Those at higher levels were able to return to their separate departments knowing that they had the support of peers and superiors. This reinforcement process carried down through each level. There was a reverse process as well. Subordinates, having the opportunity to interact frequently and without restraint in a group situation, felt they had more "organized" support in bringing suggestions and complaints to those at higher levels. The reinforcement effect was especially important to the manager himself in his dealings with corporate officials. He had full support from below, a condition which neither his predecessor nor Peele in Gouldner's study ever enjoyed.

The sharpest contrasts between Peele's

and Cooley's methods of administration can be seen with respect to the way each made use of the formal rules. One of Peele's first acts, one which generated considerable hostility within the organization, was to fire an employee for violating a rule that had rarely been enforced by his predecessor. In time, as Gouldner points out, many formal rules "that had been ignored were being revived, while new ones were established to supplement and implement the old" (p. 69). New directives and daily reports on production, accidents, and breakdowns were required. Restrictions were imposed for loitering. Rest periods were banned. A system of warning notices was installed on a series of "offenses," including smoking, absenteeism, safety, and others. Rules were set up regulating the times for punching in and out. A "cold impersonal 'atmosphere,'" Gouldner noted, "was slowly settling on the plant" (p. 69).

After he took over as manager of Plant Y Cooley showed little indication that he was concerned about rule enforcement as the primary and legitimate means for motivating his group of three hundred supervisors. This is not to say that rules were not being enforced. There were elaborate "legal" mandates and restrictions superimposed on the plant in keeping with standard requirements of the division and corporation. The actions of the manager and his staff were highly circumscribed by the labor agreement, budgetary restrictions, work standards, and a system of paperwork required by higher authorities. The point is that Cooley, unlike Peele, relegated rule enforcement to a second level of importance. Again, unlike Peele and unlike his own predecessor, Stewart, he rarely found it necessary to use the extreme penalty of discharge against his supervisory staff. This was his announced policy, and he abided by it throughout his term of office.

At this point it would be more useful to compare Peele not with Cooley but with Cooley's predecessor, Stewart. Just as Peele "was seen as bringing the plant into line with established company rules" (p. 95), so Stewart was seen turning more and more to the impersonal mechanism of rule enforcement as greater pressures were brought to bear on him from higher management. Stewart to an increasing extent was demanding rigid enforcement of the rules relating to absenteeism. Wash-up time was eliminated as supervisers were ordered to work the men from "whistle to whistle" as required by the rules. With more intense rule enforcement the union was filing more grievances, arguing not that the rules were not "in the books," but that according to past practice many rules had not been enforced previously. When disputes arose between production and non-production departments, Stewart stressed the separate responsibility of each as prescribed by the formal rules rather than subordinating the rules themselves to the practical solution of problems.

Stewart's use of punishment-centered actions and their consequent effects is revealed typically in the following comment by an inspection foreman:

> I remember one time getting called on the carpet by the plant manager, and he told me, "If you're afraid of the production people, then you're not a good inspection foreman. If you don't like the way it's going, then you just stop the line. If you can't do that, then you're not an inspector. Never be afraid of the production people." The manager ordered me to have the maintenance department install a series of buttons throughout the shop, and he told me that any time I didn't like something to just go over and push the button and stop the line. Well, I had the buttons installed all right, but I never used them. I thought it would do more harm than good. After all, I have to live with those production people every day.

This comment illustrates the dilemma in which members of Plant Y often found themselves—that of carrying out orders and enforcing rules which they did not feel were legitimized by subordinates.

Just as Peele was anxious to justify his punishment-centered actions "should the main office ever examine or challenge them"

(p. 94), so Stewart took steps to assure the legitimacy of his actions. On at least two occasions Stewart recorded his staff meetings and played them back to his corporate superior to demonstrate that he was issuing the proper orders and carrying out the rules as prescribed by superiors. "He did it just to put us on the spot" was the typical reaction of his staff members.

Thus, the actions of Peele, the *successor* at the gypsum plant, and those of Stewart, the *predecessor* at Plant Y, show remarkable parallels: the methods used clearly followed the punishment-centered pattern.[6]

We can now briefly sum up the "institutionally derived pressures" which, apart from possible differences in individual personalities, shaped the actions of the two "successors," Peele and Cooley.

1. Peele was under constant pressure, or so he perceived it, by his superiors to institute bureaucratic routines and to use disciplinary measures to gain efficiencies.

Cooley, after his initial instructions, was not under these pressures from superiors. They wanted results but left the methods up to him.

2. Peele had to overcome a deeply embedded tradition that only "insiders" should succeed to the office of manager. There was no such tradition at Cooley's plant.

3. Managerial authority at the gypsum plant had been based on *personal* loyalty. Authority in the much larger and more complex Plant Y organization had been based on respect for the office of manager.

4. Lack of community acceptance was a source of resistance for Peele. The plant-community relationship in the Plant Y metropolitan area was no problem for Cooley.

5. Peele faced the pressures of subordinates who wanted to hold on to the old "indulgency" pattern based upon close informal ties. The pressure from above was to destroy this pattern through the impersonal mechanism of rule enforcement.

The pressure from Cooley's subordinate group was to do away with the former authoritarian mode of administration and to adopt not necessarily an "indulgency" pattern, but one that would allow greater participation in decision-making.

6. Peele was under pressure from above to increase productivity, but there were no complementary pressures on him from below to run the plant more efficiently. Cooley's subordinate group was anxious to eliminate the technical difficulties which had kept productivity low and which had generated interpersonal hostility.

7. Peele brought in strategic replacements as his communications link. Cooley used the personnel at hand without superimposing an extra-formal link. He also encouraged the establishment of groups which served as communication and decision-making centers.

In a general qualitative sense the two studies confirm Gouldner's hypothesis that internal organizational tensions are more likely to be associated with a punishment-centered bureaucracy than with a representative bureaucracy. The need the present writer saw was not only to confirm or reject the hypothesis. In the Plant Y study an attempt was made to add a quantitative dimension to the vague terms "punishment-centered" and "representative." This was done by extrapolating from the eighty interviews conducted before and after the succession of the manager certain *interaction* data. In most interviews it was possible to determine (*a*) how frequently sub-

[6] Peter M. Blau in personal correspondence made the enlightening observation that "the person who comes in after an indulgent leader has a very difficult time trying to establish bureaucratic procedures, while the person who comes in after a disciplinarian leader can maintain bureaucratic disciplines and still not appear as a disciplinarian. He can be perceived as a 'good guy' because he can relax a few of the authoritarian measures the former administrator had instituted. This suggests that bureaucratic institutions help a manager to achieve a position of genuine leadership, help him to be perceived by subordinates as carrying out legitimate ends, simply by his not enforcing all the bureaucratic procedures available to him."

ordinates, superiors, and peers interacted with one another under both administrations, and (*b*) who tended to originate action for whom.

It was found that total interaction frequencies had not changed quantitatively. Closer examination, however, revealed that the character and content had changed considerably. During the Stewart administration the plant operated under chronic emergency conditions. As one foreman put it, "This place is just one damned emergency after another." Members of the organization were forced to interact frequently in order to take care of immediate emergencies. Under the new administration the rate of "emergency interaction" was sharply reduced. The organization as a technical system functioned more smoothly. But new kinds of interactions could be observed. Members were engaged much more frequently in long-range planning sessions in pairs and in groups.

The more signficant change was in *direction* of interaction. In Period I there were approximately five superior-originated interactions for every one subordinate-originated interaction. After three years under the new manager the ratio was approximately two to one. Standing alone such data take on meaning only when coupled with the pattern of sentiment change under the administration of the successor. Whereas formerly all forty-eight of those members of supervision interviewed expressed a high degree of hostility toward top plant management almost no one expressed any hostility toward top management in Period II.

The modest suggestion implied here is that the use of quantitative interaction data plus information on sentiments may help to give a more sophisticated operational meaning to general terms Gouldner uses, such as "punishment-centered" versus "representative" modes of administrative behavior in complex organizations.

Finally, quantification of *performance results* is crucial if any significance is to be attached to one form of administrative behavior as contrasted with another. In the present study such evidence was clear cut. By every measure of performance Plant Y improved following the succession of the new manager, and in most performance indexes it went from bottom to top position among six plants which were almost identical in size, technology, and organizational structure.[7]

As a conclusion one is tempted to go beyond the limited substantive and methodological comparisons of the present study and that of the gypsum plant. On a level of practical and theoretical interest there emerges from both studies encouraging evidence suggesting that it is possible for democratic processes to function in an otherwise authoritarian bureaucratic social system. The successful efforts of the mining group in Gouldner's gypsum plant to resist increased bureaucratization was due to what he calls a "proto-*democratic* process of legitimation" of the supervisor's authority. If one goes to the heart of what caused Plant Y to become an outstanding success it was that the leader's authority was derived in large part from the "consent of the governed." In an era when social scientists are "under the gun" from business for suggesting that greater democracy in business enterprises is not only possible but desirable, these findings, limited as they are, are encouraging.

THE TUCK SCHOOL
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

[7] For quantitative information on performance results see Guest, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–107.

COMMENT

ALVIN W. GOULDNER

Guest's work is among a number of welcome indications that we are presently acquiring the kind of data that can further the development of a modestly circum-

scribed, "middle-range" theory of succession. It is, I believe, a most valuable documentation of the cumulative development that can be derived from theoretically sensitive and conscientious case studies; it manifests that increasingly rare quality in sociological work, a detailed and first-hand knowledge of "natural" groups, viewed systematically. The following comments should be understood within this over-all, very positive appreciation of what Guest has done. Since Guest's article appears to be a synopsis of his forthcoming book, in which his evidence is presented and his analysis elaborated, comments about the article as such are, in a sense, not based on "best evidence," and can only be very tentative and general. I therefore confine myself to a very brief discussion of a few salient points:

1. I have the impression that the drift in some current analyses of succession, perhaps including Guest's, has been toward a more synchronic and less diachronic treatment which may be due more to the nature of the formal models that are being applied to it than to the requirements of the data itself. Continuance in this direction would, however, be unfortunate (and unnecessary), for some of the key variables are manifestly activated at different points in time. Everything does not occur at once: the successor is appointed, he is briefed by his sponsoring superiors, initial reactions are made by his subordinates, the successor attempts to implement his policies, etc. It is, of course, appropriate that efforts to develop more formal models of succession be made but there is no reason why these cannot systematically take account of the processual aspects. This temporal dimension can be analyzed formally in various ways already available, in terms of a Markov chain, for example, or through computer simulation.

2. I would think it also appropriate that we begin to develop models to deal with some of the larger changes in organization structure, for example, a shift from punishment-centered to representative bureaucracy, and begin to fit analyses of the microdynamics of succession into these. For it seems clear that the administrative constraints on, or opportunities available to, a successor will differ radically with the structural arrangements prevailing under his predecessor. For example, the successor who follows a situation in which punishment-centered bureaucracy was established has an opportunity to recharge subordinates' motivations by withholding or reducing the constraints previously in effect. The very possibility of the *success* of a representative bureaucracy may depend on the subordinates' experience with the prior, less gratifying organizational structure. If, however, a successor enters a situation in which representative bureaucracy had prevailed, it may be more difficult for him to improve upon the prior level of gratifications supplied subordinates. The latter may come to take the gratifications which they had previously experienced for granted, and there may be a tendency for their motivation (to conform and to produce) to run down even in a representative bureaucracy, perhaps thereby readying the organization for a swing back to more punishment-centered forms. It is clear that only temporally oriented organizational research can clarify such problems, and organizations must be studied over much longer spans of time than most of us have usually done.

3. Structurally significant adaptations to the tensions of succession, such as punishment-centered or representative bureaucracy, are obviously not the only adaptive responses possible. Close supervision and strategic replacements, among others, are also possible adaptive mechanisms. We need to clarify further the links between these more ephemeral adaptations and the more structurally enduring forms, and the conditions under which the former will occur. For example, Guest notes that Cooley did not make any strategic replacements while Peele did. To what extent is this due to Cooley's definition of his plant situation

and to what extent is this due to the constraints of the larger labor market in which he was operating? Peele was operating during a period of increasing recession and retrenchment following World War II, which made labor relatively more plentiful than it had been. (Correspondingly, it is possible that these different economic circumstances exposed both managers to different degrees of anxiety-inducing pressure from their own superiors.) Perhaps Guest will care to comment on the larger economic situation during Cooley's succession and how, if at all, this may have affected his succession in general, and his failure to make strategic replacements, in particular. Guest acknowledges that Cooley did for a while engage in forms of close supervision and, like Peele, visited the plant at unexpected times and places. While Cooley's stated intentions for doing so apparently differed from Peele's, it is not clear from Guest's report why Cooley did not feel he could rely on his supervisory force to do what he wanted, nor is it clear whether the latter found this practice acceptable or whether some felt that it might undermine their authority. This uniformity in the behavior of the two managers is especially notable in view of their other differences and perhaps, therefore, deserves fuller discussion.

4. I am inclined to register a mild demurrer with respect to only one of Guest's comments, specifically where he characterizes punishment-centered and representative bureaucracy as "vague" concepts. The fact is, I do define both repeatedly throughout *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* and, indeed, give them formal, tabular, summary definitions on two whole pages (pp. 216–17) of that study. I must confess that it is I who find unclear Guest's effort to "use . . . quantitative interaction data plus information on sentiments . . . to give a more sophisticated operational meaning to [these] general terms. . . ." I cannot understand how an operational definition can be "more sophisticated" than the connotative definitions with which I was concerned and which, it would seem, must logically precede operationalization. In any event, it seems impossible to appraise and discuss Guest's index further on the basis of the brief allusion he makes to it.

The most valuable contribution that Guest makes is to focus attention on the ways in which succession is an opportunity as well as a threat (something that Selznick has also done with great theoretical effectiveness) and may help an organization to solve problems as well as induce them. It thus provides an illuminating and much needed corrective to my own one-sided emphasis on succession tensions.

CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

REJOINDER

ROBERT H. GUEST

Gouldner is quite right in taking me to task for failing to note his repeated definition of terms. What I meant to say was something more on the order of his own words on paragraph (2), namely, that the terms "punishment-centered" and "representative bureaucracy" can be refined further and sharpened after deeper analyses of what Gouldner calls the "microdynamics of succession." As to the diachronic versus sychronic argument, evidently I failed to make it patently clear that my succession study was diachronic and that the *processual* aspects were central to the method of analysis. On Gouldner's questions about "conditions" of succession: the new manager—Cooley—operated in periods of both increased production *and* of retrenchment. Also, for a period of at least three years *after* the successor—Cooley—had moved out of the organization it continued to improve with no evidence of "a swing back to more punishment-centered forms."

STATISTICAL METHODS FOR ANALYZING PROCESSES OF CHANGE[1]

LEO A. GOODMAN

ABSTRACT

Methods for making predictions and for testing various hypotheses concerning processes of change are presented here. Applying these methods to the reanalysis of panel data on pre-election vote intention, we find that the tests given here permit more detailed analysis than did tests applied earlier to these data and that the prediction methods lead to more accurate results. For example, while earlier analysis suggested that the process of attitude change in the July–August period (during which time the Democratic convention was held) differed from that in the August–September period, reanalysis indicates that the corresponding differences between the two periods were *not* statistically significant *except* for the data relating to those who "Didn't Know" in July and in August respectively; that is, apparent over-all differences in the process of change can be attributed to differences for those who "Didn't Know."

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we present probability models relating to the study of certain kinds of processes of change, and suggest statistical methods for analyzing them. Our point of view concerning probability models is similar to that presented by T. W. Anderson in his interesting study of attitude changes.[2] However, the statistical methods given here are different. Many research workers will find the methods presented here easier to understand and to apply than the corresponding methods in Anderson's paper. Some of these methods will also permit a more detailed analysis of the data than did the methods given in the earlier paper.

Some of the methods to be discussed here were first mentioned in a brief abstract by the present author,[3] and the mathematical theory necessary for their justification was given in a joint paper by Anderson and the author.[4] Several techniques which are included here were not discussed in the earlier publications.

In order to describe our methods and facilitate their comparison with those in Anderson's paper, we shall use, as illustrative material, data on attitude changes given in his article. It should be emphasized, however, that the application of these methods need not be limited to the study of attitude changes. We expect the general approach presented here, or some modified version of it, to prove useful in the analysis of a number of different processes of change.[5]

Usually there will not be exact agreement between observed phenomena (the data) and the corresponding expectations derived from a probability model (a theory) relating to them, even if the model does in fact provide a true "explanation" of the phenomena. However, probabilistic aspects of the model will often make it

[1] Research carried out at the Statistical Research Center, University of Chicago, under sponsorship of the Statistics Branch, Office of Naval Research. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.

[2] "Probability Models for Analyzing Time Changes in Attitudes," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).

[3] Leo A. Goodman, "On the Statistical Analysis of Markov Chains" (abstract), *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, XXVI (1955), 771.

[4] T. W. Anderson and Leo A. Goodman, "Statistical Inference about Markov Chains," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, XXVIII (1957), 89–110.

[5] See, e.g., Isadore Blumen, Marvin Kogan, and Philip J. McCarthy, *The Industrial Mobility of Labor as a Probability Process* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1955), and Leo A. Goodman, "Statistical Methods for the Mover-Stayer Model," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, LVI (1961), 841–68, where data on mobility are analyzed using methods somewhat similar to, though different in technical detail (mathematical and substantive) from, the methods given here.

possible to determine how much lack of agreement is probable. This will then provide a natural basis for the development of statistical tests to determine whether the model actually does fit the data sufficiently well. If the model is not congruent with the data, then the manner in which the data differ from the expectations could be studied further and modified models developed that might provide better representations of the phenomena, better descriptions and predictions. In this paper, we present specific illustrations of this process of model building, testing, modifying, etc.

The methods presented here can be applied to data obtained from case studies where each individual studied is asked a given set of questions in successive interviews, or where each individual is classified with respect to a given set of categories at successive time points. Do these case histories exhibit certain kinds of statistical regularities? We provide methods for answering this question for such case studies or for panel studies where a random sample of individuals respond to a set of questions in a series of interviews. Most of these methods can also be applied, with only slight modification, to a rotating panel study, in which after several interviews some individuals in the original sample are replaced by others. The particular kinds of inferences that can be made will, of course, depend upon the method of selection of the individuals studied and the population from which they were selected.[6]

The data we shall use here were obtained in a panel survey of potential voters in Erie County, Ohio.[7] A group of people were interviewed in May, June, July, August, September, and October. One of the questions dealt with which party (candidate) the respondent intended to vote for. Data for 445 people who responded to all six interviews were used in Anderson's analysis and will be used here.[8]

For each month, each of the 445 responses can be classified as either "Republican" (R), "Democratic" (D), or "Don't Know" (U). The monthly response frequencies (i.e., the number of R, D, and U responses) form a partially condensed report of the dynamic process of individual changes recorded in successive interviews. For each individual, his responses in the six interviews could be listed, and since there are three possible responses (R, D, U), there will be $3^6 = 729$ possible response patterns, some of them occurring more frequently than others. We now propose and test a variety of models (hypotheses) that, if found to be correct, would help us to explain these pattern frequencies and to make predictions of future responses.

2. PROBABILITY MODELS

2.1. *First-order chain.*—Let $p(R, R)$ be the probability of an R response in a given month among those who were R in the preceding month; let $p(R, D)$ be the probability of a D response in a given month among those who were R in the preceding month; let $p(R, U)$ be the probability of a U response in a given month among those who were R in the preceding month; let $p(D, R)$ be the probability of an R response in a given month among those who were D in the preceding month; let $p(D,$

[6] If a random sample of individuals is drawn from a specified population, and if the interviewing procedure itself does not affect those in the panel study in a significant manner, then the methods presented here can be used to make inferences concerning the population sampled. The assessment of the possible effects of the interviewing procedure (repeated questioning) can be determined by a carefully designed experiment.

[7] For a description of this survey, see Anderson's article and also Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

[8] The problem of non-response was not considered in Anderson's article and will not be considered here, since it would complicate the exposition of the general point of view. Of course, this problem may be important, and it must be kept in mind by the research worker interested in making inferences from a panel study of a set of individuals to a larger population.

) be the probability of a D response in given month among those who were D the preceding month; etc.[9] In this way, ne transition probabilities are obtained, hich we list in Chart 1. If these transi-)n probabilities determine the basic mech- ıism of the process for a single individual, ıen this process is called a "first-order [arkov chain."[10]

The relevant data for estimating the atrix of transition probabilities for, say, ıe June interview, given the May inter- ew, are summarized in a 3 × 3 cross- assification of responses in May and June. hese data for the successive pairs of onths—May–June, June–July, July–Au- ıst, August–September, and September– ctober—are given in Chart 2.

The transition probabilities are esti- ıated by dividing each cell entry in the ıbles by the corresponding row total; for ιample, the probability of an R response ı June among those who were D in May, (D, R), can be estimated by 7/128 (5.5 ɜr cent), the proportion of R responses ı June among those who were D in May. hart 3 gives the estimated transition prob-)ilities for the five successive pairs of ıonths.

A cursory inspection of the five matrices ı Chart 3 would seem to indicate that the rst two are similar, and that they are ifferent from the last two. The same rocess of change seems to have taken lace in the May–June period as in the une–July period. The process of change ppears to be different in the July–August eriod from the earlier periods (the prob- bility of holding to a specific party in- ɜntion is higher and the probability of re- ɜrving judgment is lower). It is interest- ıg to note that the Democratic conven- tion was held in the period between the July and the August interviews; the Republican convention had been held in an earlier period. The process of change seems not to have varied much until both conventions were held. With respect to the difference between the third matrix and the fourth and fifth matrices, Anderson states that this difference is essentially a matter of the time scale (i.e., the July–August matrix seems to represent changes at twice the speed of the August–September and September–October matrices), and he suggests that an interpretation is that the second

CHART 1

MATRIX OF TRANSITION PROBABILITIES FOR FIRST-ORDER CHAIN

		A GIVEN MONTH			TOTAL
		R	D	U	
THE PRE-CEDING MONTH	R	$p(R, R)$	$p(R, D)$	$p(R, U)$	1 00
	D	$p(D, R)$	$p(D, D)$	$p(D, U)$	1 00
	U	$p(U, R)$	$p(U, D)$	$p(U, U)$	1 00

convention sets into operation a different process of change that slows down as the campaign progresses.[11]

If the process of change were alike for the May–June and June–July periods, then the estimated matrix of transition probabilities obtained for the May–June period could be used with the data on June responses to predict the responses in the July interview. The quality of the predictions

[9] This notation differs somewhat from that ap- ɜaring in the mathematical statistical literature, ut it seems best for our present exposition.

[10] For further details about Markov chains, the ader is referred to William Feller, *An Introduc- on to Probability Theory and Its Application*, ol. I (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1950), ıd to Anderson's article.

[11] In sec. 4.2 we shall test the statistical significance of the differences and similarities mentioned above and shall analyze these matrices in more detail. We note there, e.g., that the only significant difference between the third matrix and the fourth and fifth is with respect to the people who "Don't Know" (the undecided in July are more likely to decide by the time of the next interview than are those who are undecided in August), thus providing a quite different interpretation from that given in Anderson's paper for the difference between the July–August period and the August–September and September–October periods.

for successive months depends on whether the successive transition probability matrices are alike, that is, on whether they are constant. These predictions would be rather good for the July interview, since the data indicate that the matrices for May–June and June–July were quite similar. However, if the May–June or the June–July matrix were used along with the data on July responses to predict the August responses, the predictions might be poor since the matrix for July–August differed from the earlier ones. The question of constancy of the transition probabilit matrix is therefore an important one. Meth ods for studying this question (i.e., fc testing the hypothesis) will be presente in section 4.2 and compared with the coı responding tests suggested in Anderson' paper.

If the process were alike for August September and September–October, then th two estimated matrices could be combine into a single matrix estimating the constan matrix of transition probabilities. If thi single matrix describes how responses in ;

CHART 2

		June R	June D	June U	Total
May	R	125	5	16	146
	D	7	106	15	128
	U	11	18	142	171
Total		143	129	173*	445

		July R	July D	July U	Total
June	R	124	3	16	143
	D	6	109	14	129
	U	22	9	142	173
Total		152	121	172	445

		August R	August D	August U	Total
July	R	146	2	4	152
	D	6	111	4	121
	U	40	36	96	172
Total		192	149	104	445

		September R	September D	September U	Total
August	R	184	1	7	192
	D	4	140	5	149
	U	10	12	82	104
Total		198	153	94	445

		October R	October D	October U	Total
September	R	192	1	5	198
	D	2	146	5	153
	U	11	12	71	94
Total		205	159	81	445

* The numerical value 179, rather than 173, is given in Anderson's article, but this is obviously a typographical error

given month are dependent on responses in the preceding month, then applying the data on October responses to this matrix we can attempt to predict what would be the responses if the group of persons could have been interviewed again in November concerning their vote intention. This prediction method, which assumes that the matrix will apply to the October–November period, will be discussed further in section 3.1.

We have noted that the basic mechanism of the first-order chain (model) is the matrix of transition probabilities, where responses in a given month are dependent on responses in the immediately preceding month. This model does *not* assume that responses in a given month are independent of responses in the month before the immediately preceding month, but one of the consequences of the model is that if knowledge about responses in the two preceding months is available, then it is the information about the immediately preceding month that is relevant. (This is a consequence of the fact that transition probabilities as given in Chart 1 form the basic mechanism of the process.) This model may not be realistic enough, and so we now consider the case where knowledge about responses in the two preceding months, rather than just the responses in the immediately preceding month, may be necessary in order to understand the changes in response that take place in a given month.

2.2. *Second-order chain.*—We shall now

CHART 3

		June		
		R	*D*	*U*
May	*R*	856	034	110
	D	055	828	117
	U	064	105	831

		July		
		R	*D*	*U*
June	*R*	867	021	112
	D	047	845	108
	U	127	.052	821

		August		
		R	*D*	*U*
July	*R*	961	013	026
	D	050	917	033
	U	233	.209	558

		September		
		R	*D*	*U*
August	*R*	958	005	037
	D	027	940	033
	U	.096	115	.789

		October		
		R	*D*	*U*
September	*R*	970	005	025
	D	.013	954	033
	U	117	128	755

be concerned with the transition probabilities of a particular response, say D, in a given month among those who had a particular pattern of responses, say R and then U, in the two preceding months. In this case, a transition probability matrix is obtained containing $3 \times 3 \times 3 = 27$ probabilities, which can be arranged in a cross-classification table with $3 \times 3 = 9$ rows to describe the possible patterns in the two preceding months and 3 columns to describe the response in the given month. If this matrix of transition probabilities determines the basic mechanism of the process for a single individual, then the process is called a "second-order Markov chain."

CHART 4

TIME $t-2$	TIME $t-1$	TIME t		
		R	D	U
	R	962	010	028
R	D	273	727	000
	U	395	116	489
	R	783	000	217
D	D	019	934	047
	U	105	263	632
	R	855	012	133
U	D	080	810	080
	U	134	117	749

The relevant data for estimating the matrix of second-order transition probabilities for, say, the July interview, given the responses in May and June, are summarized in a 9×3 cross-classification of responses in May, June, and July. Estimated matrices could be obtained for the successive triplets of months May–June–July, June–July–August, July–August–September, August–September–October. The estimated matrices for these four periods could then be compared to see how similar they are. Differences between these matrices might tend to suggest that the process of change varied with the time period considered. However, since some of the cells in each of the four 9×3 cross-classification tables, from which the estimated matrices are computed, would contain in the case considered here only a small number of observations, we might expect quite a large amount of variation in the four matrices as a result of sampling fluctuation alone. In order to decide whether the differences in the four estimated matrices can be attributed to sampling fluctuation or to real variation in the process of change, statistical tests are required. The hypothesis that the matrices of second-order transition probabilities are constant was not discussed in Anderson's paper; we shall present methods for testing this hypothesis in section 4.2.

If the four matrices of second-order transition probabilities are constant (which seems doubtful), then there is some justification for combining the four estimated matrices into a single matrix estimating the constant matrix of transition probabilities. This single matrix was given in Anderson's paper and is reproduced in Chart 4. This table indicates, for example, that among those people who were R in one month and then D in the next month, 27.3 per cent were R in the following month.

It is of interest to know whether use of the two preceding months in describing transition probabilities is any more helpful than merely use of just the immediately preceding month. A cursory glance at Chart 4 would seem to indicate that we gain by taking account of responses two time points back. For example, among those persons who were R and then R again in two successive months, 96.2 per cent were also R in the following month; among these persons who were D and then R in two successive months, only 78.3 per cent were R in the following month; among those persons who were U and then R in two successive months, 85.5 per cent were R in the following month. Hence, the response in a given month may not depend on the re-

sponse in the preceding month alone. If Chart 4 does describe how responses in a given month are statistically dependent on the responses in the two preceding months, then applying the data on responses in September and October to this matrix we can attempt to predict what would be the responses if the people were reinterviewed in November. This will be discussed further in section 3.3.

2.3. *Models for different strata.*—It may well be that the models we have considered above are still not realistic enough. For example, the population may be sufficiently heterogeneous, with different strata within the population subject to different processes of change, so that an analysis that did not explicitly take this into account would go awry. If this is the case, a separate analysis of the kind described here could be carried out for each known stratum separately. As an example of this use of separate analyses, Anderson stratified the population studied with respect to their interest in the campaign, classifying individuals into one of three groups: high, moderate, and low interest. For each group, estimated matrices of transition probabilities were obtained, and are given here in Chart 5.

The differences between the estimated matrices for the different groups may be examined. For example, in comparing any two groups in Chart 5, the more interested group had a higher proportion of persons who were *R* in a given month among those who were *R* in the preceding month; a higher proportion of persons who were *D* in a given month among those who were *D* in the preceding month; and a lower proportion of persons who were *U* in a given month among those who were *U* in the preceding month. Statistical methods are given in Anderson's paper for testing whether the estimated matrices for two different groups estimate a common matrix of transition probabilities; that is, we are able to test whether two different groups have a similar process of change. These statistical methods will be discussed further in section 4.4, where alternative procedures are mentioned and where methods are presented for comparing any number of groups.

CHART 5

	High Interest		
	R	*D*	*U*
R	976	000	024
D	011	978	011
U	125	333	542

	Moderate Interest		
	R	*D*	*U*
R	968	016	016
D	019	.953	028
U	182	.151	667

	Low Interest		
	R	*D*	*U*
R	932	000	068
D	030	.910	060
U	081	074	.845

If there are essential differences among the three groups, it should be possible to obtain more accurate predictions of future responses by taking into account these differences. Information concerning the response frequencies of the three groups in October could be applied to the matrices in Chart 5 to predict what the responses would be if the groups were interviewed again in November. This matter will be discussed further in section 3.4.

The general approach of stratifying the population and then studying the pattern of change for each of the strata can be used to study different social classes or different races, individuals with different religious affiliations or different educational backgrounds, individuals subject to different mass media, individuals that have different psychological characteristics, activities,

interests, amounts of influence or leadership, etc. A similar kind of statistical analysis of the patterns of change for different groups of individuals can also be used to determine, from the results of an experiment, the effect of different experiences on the process of change. In other words, if the population, or a sample from it, is divided into different groups at random and each group is then subject to a different kind of experience, the subsequent patterns of change for the different groups can be analyzed by the methods given in section 4.4 to study the effect of the different experiences on the process. Of course, the more detailed stratifications and/or experiments will require samples of larger size for their analysis.

2.4. *General remarks.*—We have been discussing the analysis of the changes in responses to a single question concerning vote intention. The models discussed so far attempt to explain changes in a given response (attitude) only in terms of the past history of changes in this one response (though we did relate changes in the transition matrices to other events—the conventions). These models can be generalized to carry out a simultaneous analysis of several responses (attitudes). Anderson's paper includes an illustrative example dealing with the process of change of two attitudes. He presents a statistical method for testing whether changes in two attitudes are independent. We shall present in section 4.5 other methods for studying the mutual relations among several attitudes. The statistical techniques used in the analysis of relations among several attitudes may also be used in the analysis of the relations between attitudes and actions (e.g., preference for a party and actual vote) or among several actions in a study of the mutual interactions of a number of variables.

The use of certain probability models will, of course, imply certain assumptions about the phenomena studied. For example, use of the first- or second-order chain model will imply, in the case where a random sample of individuals is studied, that only a certain amount of past history affects the present attitudes of the population from which the sample was drawn (while this past history is in turn affected by earlier history). Also, these particular models do not deal directly with social interdependencies, which may affect the relationship between the individuals studied and their response patterns. For some purposes these may be serious limitations; for other purposes, it will not matter.

The models are rather general and describe a number of different processes. In studying any particular empirical phenomenon, it is sometimes desirable to construct models based on more specific theories related to it. By an examination of the general models and data, we hope to be able to see what are the apparent complications in the data and how to develop more specific models that will help us to understand the phenomena more fully.

The first-order chain model, the second-order model, and models that are based, in part, on a stratification of the population can all lead to quite different interpretations of the same set of data. Other models, which are different from those we have presented, will lead to still other interpretations of the data. We mention one such model now.

As we have seen, one interpretation of the data in Chart 2 for the May–June transitions is in terms of a first-order chain model. However, the following model may be closer to reality. There are three latent classes—*R*, *D*, *U*—in the population, and there are certain probabilities that an individual in the *R* latent class will be classified as *D* or *U* in the May interview, certain probabilities that an individual in the *D* latent class will be classified as *R* or *U* in the May interview, and certain probabilities that an individual in the *U* latent class will be classified as *R* or *D*. There are similar probabilities associated with the June interview, and the responses for an individual in a given latent class are as-

sumed to be independent in the two time periods. Some further assumptions can be made concerning the relations between the probabilities. This latent class model may be interpreted either as an "error of measurement model," where the probability that an individual in the R latent class will be classified as a D is interpreted as an error rate, or more directly in terms of the existence of real latent classes, where the individuals in the R latent class can, with a given probability, give a D response, which is his true response in that given interview. For this model, methods quite different from those discussed here will be appropriate, and predictions based on this model will also be quite different.[12]

Since the questions asked and the answers obtained from a set of data depend on the model used, it therefore is important to obtain a reasonable model. For a given set of data, it may be difficult to choose between different models. For example, for the data in Chart 2 for the May–June transitions, the first-order chain model and the latent class model may seem equally reasonable. However, it is possible, by examining the individual response patterns from May to July, to study the question of which of the two models fits the data better. For any two really different models, it should be possible to determine the kinds of data that would be necessary to distinguish which model fits the data better.

3. METHODS OF PREDICTION

3.1. *First-order prediction.*—Summing the cell entries in the 3 × 3 cross-classification of responses in August and September with the corresponding cell entries in the cross-classification of responses in September and October, we obtain a single 3 × 3 cross-classification table that can be used to estimate the matrix of first-order transition probabilities, assuming that this matrix is constant during the periods August–September, September–October.[13] The matrix of estimated transition probabilities is given in Chart 6. Applying the results of the October interview (i.e., the number of R, D, U responses) to this estimated matrix, Anderson obtained the following predictions of vote intention in November: 209.4, 161.3, 74.3, for R, D, U, respectively, while the actual vote in November was 204 Republican and 146 Democratic,

CHART 6

Time $t-1$	Time t		
	R	D	U
R	964	005	031
D	020	947	033
U	106	.121	.773

with 95 among the 445 in the study not voting. In the following sections, an attempt will be made to improve predictions of voting behavior by developing methods for modifying the predictions given in Anderson's paper.

3.2. *Action predictions.*—Anderson has pointed out that a possible explanation of the discrepancy between his predictions and the actual vote may be the difference between verbalizing a vote intention and the action of voting. (Since Anderson's data related to vote intention, his predictions were also of vote intention.) We now consider how his predictions might be modified to take account of the difference between vote intention and voting. Let $p(R)$ represent the probability that a person will vote

[12] For a discussion of simple models of this kind, the reader is referred to Patricia Kendall, *Conflict and Mood* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954); Eleanor E. Maccoby, "Pitfalls in the Analysis of Panel Data: A Research Note on Some Technical Aspects of Voting," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (1956), 359–62; Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications. II: Further Discussion and References," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, LIV (1959), 123–63.

[13] Mathematical justification for this estimation procedure is presented in Anderson and Goodman, "Statistical Inference about Markov Chains," *op. cit.*

among those who would have said that they intended to vote Republican if they had been interviewed in November. Let $p(D)$ represent the probability that a person will vote among those who would have said that they intended to vote Democratic if they had been interviewed in November. For simplicity, we shall assume that if a person who would have been Republican in a November interview actually voted, he would vote Republican (in the November election), and we shall also assume that if a person who would have been Democratic in a November interview actually voted, he would vote Democratic. Let $p(U)$ represent the probability that a person will vote among those who would have said that they didn't know in a November interview. Then the prediction for the number of R votes among those (209.4 people estimated) who would have said they intended to vote R is $209.4 \times p(R)$; the prediction for the number of D votes among those (161.3 people estimated) who would have said they intended to vote D is $161.3 \times p(D)$; and the prediction for the number of people voting among those (74.3 people estimated) who would have said that they didn't know is $74.3 \times p(U)$.

We must now consider for which party the $74.3 \times p(U)$ people would vote. From the estimated matrix of transition probabilities (Chart 6), we note that among those people who state that they don't know in a given month, 10.6 per cent will be R in the following month, 12.1 per cent will be D in the following month, and 77.3 per cent will be U in the following month. Hence, 22.7 per cent will be either R or D in the following month. Among those who will be either R or D, we find that 46.7 per cent ($10.6/22.7 = 0.467$) will be R, and 53.3 per cent ($12.1/22.7 = 0.533$) will be D. Therefore, we might attempt to predict that, among those who say they don't know and do vote, 46.7 per cent will vote R and 53.3 per cent will vote D. Hence, among this group of $74.3 \times p(U)$ people, $74.3 \times p(U) \times .467$ people would vote R and $74.3 \times p(U) \times .533$ people would vote D.

In order to predict actual voting behavior, numerical estimates of the probabilities $p(R)$, $p(D)$, and $p(U)$, must be obtained. One difficulty is that these probabilities depend on the particular people studied in a given election. These probabilities might be estimated for a particular election from supplementary information, obtained possibly in the panel study, concerning registration, intentions, strength of interest, activities and attitudes of the given population, or from any other relevant information concerning the relations among voting behavior, voting intention, population composition, and other factors. If the probabilities $p(R)$, $p(D)$, $p(U)$ remain constant for a series of elections, then these probabilities can be estimated from data concerning past elections and used to estimate the next election. If they do not remain constant, the relation between the changes in these probabilities and various other factors (e.g., strength of interest) may be examined and used for estimating the probabilities in a given election. Since appropriate data from such studies of voting behavior were unavailable to this writer, the following estimates will be used for illustrative purposes only: $p(R) = .951$, $p(D) = .855$, and $p(U) = .235$. These estimates were obtained by examining the actual voting behavior of the people in the panel study, and so the predictions based on these estimates cannot be taken very seriously because of this element of circularity; for the people in the study, 95.1 per cent ($195/205 = 0.951$) actually voted among those who said they intended to vote Republican in the last interview, 85.5 per cent ($136/159 = 0.855$) actually voted among those who said they intended to vote Democratic, 23.5 per cent ($19/81 = 0.235$) actually voted among those who said they didn't know. If these estimates had been based on supplementary information, available before the time of the actual voting period, then they could have been used

to modify the predictions of intentions in order to obtain predictions of voting behavior. Of course, supplementary information available only after the voting time cannot be used in practice except for purposes of research and prediction relating to later elections.

We might predict that

$209.4 \times .951 + 74.3 \times .235 \times .467 = 199.1 + 8.2 = 207.3$ people would vote R, $161.3 \times .855 + 74.3 \times .235 \times .533 = 137.9 + 9.3 = 147.2$ people would vote D, and $445 - (207.3 + 147.2) = 90.5$ people would not vote.

When compared with the actual voting behavior, these predictions are more accurate than those given in the preceding section. (The element of circularity in this particular case should, of course, not be overlooked.)

We now discuss another method of dealing with the differences between verbalizing a vote intention and action. Let $p'(R)$ represent the probability that a person will vote among those who said in the October interview that they intended to vote Republican; let $p'(D)$ represent the probability that a person will vote among those who said in the October interview that they intended to vote Democratic; let $p'(U)$ represent the probability that a person will vote among those who said in the October interview that they didn't know. Then the prediction for the number of people voting from among the 205 people (see Chart 2) who were R in October is $205 \times p'(R)$; the prediction for the number voting from among the 159 who were D in October is $159 \times p'(D)$; and the prediction for the number voting from among the 81 who were U in October is $81 \times p'(U)$.

We must now consider for which party the $205 \times p'(R)$ people (the people who were R in October and actually do vote) would vote.[14] From the estimated matrix of transition probabilities (Chart 6), we note that, among those people who were R in a given month, 96.4 per cent will be R in the following month, 0.5 per cent will be D in the following month, and 3.1 per cent will be U in the following month. Hence, 96.9 per cent will be either R or D in the following month. Among those who will be either R or D, we find that 99.5 per cent ($.964/.969 = .995$) will be R and 0.5 per cent ($.005/.969 = .005$) will be D. Therefore, we might attempt to predict that, among those who were R in October and do vote, 99.5 per cent will vote R and 0.5 per cent will vote D. Hence among this group of $205 \times p'(R)$ people, $205 \times p'(R) \times .995$ people would vote R and $205 \times p'(R) \times .005$ would vote D. We also find from Chart 6 that, among those who were D in a given month and who will be either R or D in the following month, 2.1 per cent ($.020/.967 = .021$) will be R and 97.9 per cent ($.947/.967 = .979$) will be D. Hence, among those people who were D in October and do vote (i.e., $159 \times p'(D)$ people), we might attempt to predict that $159 \times p'(D) \times .021$ would vote R and $159 \times p'(D) \times .979$ would vote D. We also find that, among those who were U in a given month and who will be either R or D in the following month, 46.7 per cent will be R and 53.3 per cent will be D. Hence, among those who were U in October and do vote (i.e., $81 \times p'(U)$ people), we might attempt to predict that $81 \times p'(U) \times .467$ would vote R and $81 \times p'(U) \times .533$ would vote D.

In order to predict actual voting behavior, we must now obtain numerical estimates of the probabilities $p'(R)$, $p'(D)$, and $p'(U)$. Since appropriate data from studies of the relation between voting behavior and other factors were unavailable, the estimates $p'(R) = .951$, $p'(D) = .855$, and $p'(U) = .235$ will be used here, as earlier in this section, for illustrative purposes only. (The element of circularity is present

[14] We shall not assume here that a person voted Republican if he was R in October and did in fact vote. In the preceding analysis it was assumed that a person voted Republican if he would have been R in a November interview and did in fact vote, which is quite reasonable since the election took place in November.

ere as in the earlier discussion.) We might edict that

$205 \times .951 \times .995 + 159 \times .855 \times .021 + 81 \times .235 \times .467 = 194.0 + 2.9 + 8.9 = 205.8$ people would vote R, and that $205 \times .951 \times .005 + 159 \times .855 \times .979 + 81 \times .235 \times .533 = 1.0 + 133.1 + 10.1 = 144.2$ people would vote D.

s with the method presented earlier in this ction, there is close agreement between r predictions and the actual vote. The edictions based on the two methods of is section are more accurate than the prections in the preceding section; the eleent of circularity will, however, affect to me extent our assessment of these results.

We have indicated two methods for modying predictions in order to take account the difference between verbalizing a vote tention and action. Other methods could developed that might actually lead to ll better results.

3.3. *Second-order predictions.*—The pretions given in Anderson's paper were sed upon a first-order chain model. We w present predictions based upon the second-order chain model.

Summing the cell entries in the 9×3 oss-classification of responses in May–ne–July with the corresponding cell enes in the three other 9×3 cross-classifiions (June–July–August, July–August–ptember, August–September–October) we tain a single 9×3 cross-classification ble that can be used to estimate the ma- of second-order transition probabilities, uming that this matrix is constant during four time periods. The estimated matrix second-order transition probabilities was en in Chart 4. If we assume the conncy of these matrices (a test for this hyhesis is given in sec. 4.2), the results for September and October interviews (i.e., frequency of the nine possible responses the two interviews) as given in Chart 2 be applied to this estimated matrix hart 4) to obtain predictions of vote intion in November. Carrying out these quite straightforward calculations, the following predictions are obtained: 212 people would be R, 159 would be D, and 74 would be U.

These predictions are not very different from those based upon the first-order chain model given in section 3.1. Specifically, both methods predict about the same number of people would be U; that is, 74.0 or 74.3. Therefore, in comparing these methods, we shall study how the methods differed in their predictions of the R and D responses. Among those who would be either R or D, the first-order method predicts that 56.5 per cent ($209.4/370.7 = 0.565$) would be R, while the second-order method predicts that 57.1 per cent ($212/371 = 0.571$) would be R. Among those who actually did vote in this group of people, the panel study data indicate that 58.3 per cent ($204/350 = 0.583$) voted R. Hence, the second-order method has resulted in a quite good prediction of the percentage of the vote that was Republican. The second-order prediction was somewhat more accurate in this particular case than the first-order prediction. It should be remembered, however, that the second-order method, like the first-order method, could not predict accurately the number who actually did not vote.

In this discussion of second-order prediction, we have not taken into account the difference between verbalizing a vote intention and action. Methods similar to those described in section 3.2 could be used to make the appropriate modifications.

3.4. *Predictions for different strata.*—The prediction methods presented in the preceding sections could be applied separately to different strata in the population. For example, assuming that the three matrices given in Chart 5 estimate the first-order transition probabilities for the three strata—high, medium, and low interest groups, respectively—then information concerning the response frequencies of each of these groups in the October interviews could be applied to the corresponding matrices to predict the November vote inten-

tion for each group. Since the information concerning the October responses for the different groups was not given in Anderson's paper, we are unable now to actually compute these predictions. If such information had been available, the computations would be quite straightforward. If, in addition, information is available concerning the proportions of people in the population under consideration who belong to the various strata, the predictions for the separate strata could then be combined to obtain predictions for the entire population.

3.5. *Remarks on "stationary state" predictions.*—If the matrix of transition probabilities describing the process of change is constant, and if the process of change were to continue for a large number of time periods, we would usually find that a "stationary state" was finally reached. In other words, after a long time, the proportions in the various categories would be approximately constant and would not depend upon the proportions that were in these categories at an initial time point. For example, if the estimated matrix of transition probabilities given in Chart 6 described the process of change, and if this process were to continue for a large number of time periods, we would find that finally the proportions of *R, D,* and *U* responses in an interview would be approximately constant, and these constant proportions would be 54.3 per cent *R*, 33.4 per cent *D*, and 12.3 per cent *U*.[15]

Since 445 people were interviewed, we might expect that $445 \times .543 = 241.7$ people would be *R*, $445 \times .334 = 148.6$ would be *D*, and $445 \times .123 = 54.7$ would be *U* in an interview after a very long period of time, if the process of monthly change could be described by the matrix given in Chart 6. This does not mean that we might expect that 24.7 people would "settle down" to being *R* after a long period of time; but rather that, in an interview after a long time, 24.7 people can be expected to be *R*, and in another interview after some more time, the same number (24.7) of people, who are most probably not all the same ones as in the earlier interview, can also be expected to be *R*.

The proportions computed for the "stationary state" might be useful as an aid to understanding the process of change and the implications of a given matrix of transition probabilities. These proportions tell us what the results would be if the same process of change continued for a much longer time. Under the assumption that the matrix remains constant, the proportions computed for the "stationary state" are predictions about the far future; that is, long-range predictions. If the assumption of a constant process of change is unrealistic in a particular situation, which is often the case, then these long-range predictions may be subject to large errors. Furthermore, we would not expect these predictions to be accurate if they were used to predict the responses that would occur after only a single period —for example, from October to November. In fact, we find that these long-range predictions (i.e., 241.7 *R*'s, 148.6 *D*'s, 54.7 *U*'s) are very inaccurate for predicting actual voting behavior in November.

If the matrix of transition probabilities is applied once in the first period, twice during the second period, three times during the third, etc., then the process of change is not constant but accelerates as time passes, and the "stationary state" for the process can be reached without a very long passage of time. Hence, the proportions given for the "stationary state" may also be interpreted as a description of the proportions that would be obtained if the particular process of change accelerated by the successive application of the given matrix of transition probabilities. For the actual data studied here, the process did not accelerate. In fact, it may have decelerated from the July–August to the August–September period. Hence, this is an added rea-

[15] These numbers can be determined either by successive application of the matrix (Chart 6) to an initial set of proportions, or by use of formula (2 12) in Anderson's paper. They appear as n. 13 in his paper and were used to make predictions here.

son why the predictions based on the "stationary state" proportions were very inaccurate.

The information concerning "stationary states" might be useful in comparing various processes of change and various given matrices. For example, if the process of change described by Chart 4 were to continue for a long period of time or if the process accelerated, then the proportions of *R, D,* and *U* responses that would be obtained can be computed, and would be .621, .271, and .108, respectively. For the 445 people in the group, we might expect that $445 \times .621 = 276.3$ would be *R*, $445 \times .271 = 120.6$ would be *D*, and $445 \times .108 = 48.1$ would be *U* in an interview after a very long period of time if the process of monthly change might be described by Chart 4. Thus, the long-range implications (assuming either a constant matrix or an accelerating process) of this process of change are somewhat different from the results using the matrix in Chart 6.

4. TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

The methods we shall now present are closely related to the commonly used χ^2 test of independence in a contingency table (i.e., a cross-classification table). The standard χ^2 test of independence is a "large sample" test, and the tests we shall now present are also large sample tests. The sample sizes necessary for the use of the methods given here are probably about the same as those required for the related standard χ^2 test.[16]

The commonly used measures of the amount of dependence in a cross-classification table, some of them related to the χ^2 statistic for testing independence in the table, can be applied to the various tables given in the charts in the following sections (where the χ^2 test is made) to measure the amount that the data actually differ from the corresponding expectations derived from the null hypotheses considered there.[17] For each null hypothesis considered, we shall present the appropriate χ^2 test. The standard estimated expected value computed for each cell in the cross-classification table used to obtain the appropriate χ^2 statistic will be the corresponding expectation derived from the null hypothesis, and standard measures of dependence for this cross-classification table will measure, in a certain sense, the difference between the data and the corresponding expectations.

4.1. *The hypothesis that responses in successive interviews are independent.*—Assuming the first-order chain model, the first simple, though not very promising, hypothesis that comes to mind is that the transition probabilities relating to the responses in a given month may in fact be independent of the responses in the preceding month. We mention this hypothesis since there are many situations where it will be of interest, although for the pre-election panel data, it is quite unrealistic. Even a cursory glance at the relevant data in Chart 2 or the corresponding data in Chart 3 will indicate that the hypothesis will be rejected. It is not necessary to present the numerical calculations here, though we shall describe the general procedure for testing this hypothesis.

Suppose we wish to test that the responses in June are independent of the responses in May. The data given in Chart 2 for the May–June period describe a two-way classification table, and we are concerned with testing the hypothesis of independence in this table. Hence, the usual χ^2 test may be performed. The χ^2 statistic will have $2 \times 2 = 4$ degrees of freedom.[18]

[16] For a discussion of χ^2 tests of independence in contingency tables, see, e.g., Wilfred J. Dixon and Frank J. Massey, Jr., *Introduction to Statistical Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951). This topic is covered in many textbooks in elementary statistics.

[17] For a discussion of the measurement of association in cross-classification tables, see Goodman and Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* XLIX (1954), 732–64, and "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications. II: Further Discussion and References," *ibid.,* LIV, 123–63.

[18] In addition to the standard χ^2 test of independence in a contingency table, there are different statistical tests appropriate for other hypotheses

Suppose we wish to test the hypothesis that the responses in each month are independent of the responses in the preceding month. A separate χ^2 test can be performed on each of the five tables (see Chart 2), and the five values of χ^2 obtained might be added together. The sum of these five values will also have a χ^2 distribution with $4 \times 5 = 20$ degrees of freedom, if the hypothesis is true. A statistical test of the hypothesis of independence can be obtained by determining the sum of these five values and seeing if it is significantly large.

If it is assumed that the matrices of transition probabilities for the five periods are the same (see sec. 4.2), then a different test of the hypothesis of independence should be performed. The data given in Chart 2 for the five periods should be combined into a single 3×3 table by summing the corresponding cell entries in each of the five tables. To test the hypothesis that the responses in each month are independent of the responses in the preceding month, we need only test the hypothesis of independence in the combined 3×3 table. Hence, the usual χ^2 test can be performed. The χ^2 statistic will have $2 \times 2 = 4$ degrees of freedom.

4.2. *The hypothesis that the transition probability matrices are constant.*—A method for testing this hypothesis is given in Anderson's paper. A simpler method will be presented here.

Suppose we wish to test the hypothesis that the matrix of transition probabilities for the May–June period is the same as for the June–July period, assuming that the process can be described by a first-order chain. Using the data for May–June and June–July periods given in Chart 2, we form a new set of tables as shown in Chart 7.

We now have a 3×2 table for the R category, a 3×2 table for the D category, and a 3×2 table for the U category. The hypothesis of independence can be tested in each of these three tables by computing the value of χ^2 for each of the tables.[19] Each of these χ^2 values (.47, .15, 6.65 for R, D, U, respectively) has $2 \times 1 = 2$ degrees of freedom, and the sum of the three χ^2 values (7.27) has $3 \times 2 = 6$ degrees of freedom. Using these χ^2 values we can test whether the transition probabilities in the May–June period are the same as in the June–July period. We can also determine, by studying the three separate χ^2 values (each with 2 degrees of freedom), for which of the three categories (R, D, or U) the transition probabilities are different.

CHART 7

	R	D	U	Total
May R	125	5	16	146
June R	124	3	16	143

	R	D	U	Total
May D	7	106	15	128
June D	6	109	14	129

	R	D	U	Total
May U	11	18	142	171
June U	22	9	142	173

The method that has just been described may be used to compare the transition probabilities for any two periods, for example, May–June with September–October.

relating to the contingency table. For example, the hypothesis that the marginal distributions (i.e., the response frequencies for different months) are the same would be of particular interest with respect to the tables considered here. See Alan Stuart, "A Test for Homogeneity of the Marginal Distributions in a Two-Way Classification," *Biometrika*, XLII (1955), 412–16. A related though different hypothesis is studied by Albert H. Bowker, "A Test of Symmetry in Contingency Tables," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XLIII (1948), 572–74.

[19] A simplified method for computing χ^2 in a table with 2 rows and c columns is given, e.g., on p. 189 of Dixon and Massey, *op. cit.*

We now indicate how to test the hypothesis that the matrices of the transition probabilities are the same for all five periods, assuming that the process is a first-order chain. An analogous procedure can be described to compare any three periods, or any four periods.

CHART 8

	R	D	U	Total
May R	125	5	16	146
June R	124	3	16	143
July R	146	2	4	152
August R	184	1	7	192
September R	192	1	5	198

	R	D	U	Total
May D	7	106	15	128
June D	6	109	14	129
July D	6	111	4	121
August D	4	140	5	149
September D	2	146	5	153

	R	D	U	Total
May U	11	18	142	171
June U	22	9	142	173
July U	40	36	96	172
August U	10	12	82	104
September U	11	12	71	94

Using the data in Chart 2, we form a new set of tables (Chart 8).

We now have a 3×5 table for the R category, a 3×5 table for the D category, and a 3×5 table for the U category. Assuming that the sample sizes are sufficiently large (which may be somewhat doubtful for the R category table), the hypothesis of independence can be tested in each table by computing the value of χ^2 for each of them (30.64, 22.85, 49.85 for R, D, U, respectively). Each of these χ^2 values has $2 \times 4 = 8$ degrees of freedom, and the sum of the three χ^2 values (103.34) has $3 \times 8 = 24$ degrees of freedom. Using these χ^2 values, we can test whether the transition probabilities are alike for all five periods. We can also determine, by studying the three separate χ^2 values (each with 8 degrees of freedom), for which of the three categories (R, D, or U) the transition probabilities are different. Each of these three values of χ^2, in this particular case, is significant at the 1 per cent level. Thus, for each of the three categories (R, D, and U), the null hypothesis that the transition probabilities are alike in all five periods is rejected at the 1 per cent level of significance. If small values of χ^2 had been obtained, rather than significantly large values, and if the sum of the three values was also small and not significant, then the null hypothesis would have been accepted. (Rather than state that the null hypothesis would have been "accepted," some research workers might prefer to state that the null hypothesis would not have been rejected or that it would have still been "entertained after the data had been analyzed.") When the sample size is sufficiently large so that errors of the second type, as well as errors of the first type, can be small, this would have served as confirmation of the fact that the data could be fitted by a first-order chain model with a constant transition probability matrix.

Let us now make some numerical comparisons between the method just described and the formula given in Anderson's paper. For hypotheses of the kind described in this section, all the numerical results for significance tests that appear in his paper are given in column A of Table 1.

When the sample is large, some of the tests given in Anderson's paper are statistically equivalent (under the null hypothesis) to, although from the point of view of the formulas and computations they

are quite different from, the corresponding methods given here. We would therefore expect that the results given in column A would not differ much from those given in the χ^2 column, though for those who are familiar with the usual χ^2 test for contingency tables the computation leading to the values in the χ^2 column (based on the methods given here) will be preferable to the corresponding computation given in Anderson's paper. The only large difference that actually appears in the table is for the May–June, June–July, July–August comparison, 64.77 versus 27.96. This difference seemed puzzling to us, and so we recomputed these values, using both the method given here and the formula in Anderson's paper, discovering that the value of 27.96 given in his paper was in error; it should have been 70.28. Hence, here too, the difference between the A and the χ^2 columns is not large; that is, 64.77 versus 70.28. It was simpler for us to compute the χ^2 values than the corresponding A values, and so this computation might replace the formula given in his paper. (Research workers who may be more familiar with the use of the "likelihood ratio test" for independence in contingency tables rather than with the χ^2 test, and with the computation of likelihood ratio statistics using available tables of logarithms rather than with the computation of χ^2 statistics, might find Anderson's formula preferable.)

In Table 2 we give the χ^2 values for all the relevant comparisons, for the separate hypotheses relating to R, D, and U, and also for the total data.[20] The hypotheses considered in Anderson's paper were related only to some of the results given in the total column of this table.

We notice that the significant result for the total data in the July–August, August–September, September–October comparison is almost completely due to the U data and does not appear at all in the R and D data. Also, in the July–August, August–September comparison, a similar result is obtained. Hence, the process of change in the July–August period appears to be similar to the August–September period except for the behavior of the undecided people. The undecided in July are more likely to decide by the time of the next interview (the Democratic convention took place in this period) than are those who are undecided in August (both conventions had already taken place by then).[21] We might also point out that, although the total data do not indicate significance for the May–June and June–July comparison, the U data do indicate differences between these two periods. The undecided in May are more likely to be D in June, while the undecided in June are more likely to be R in July (the Republican convention was held between the latter two

TABLE 1*

Time Changes	A	Degrees of Freedom	χ^2	Decision
May–June, June–July	7 64	6	7 27	Accept
May–June, June–July, July–August	27 96	12	64 77	Reject at 1 per cent or 5 per cent level of significance
July–August, August–September, September–October	21 86	12	24 63	Reject at 5 per cent level of significance
August–September, September–October	1 50	6	1 48	Accept

* The results given in the rows of this table are not statistically independent. Also, the particular hypotheses discussed in Anderson's paper were chosen on the basis of the data, which will affect the risks associated with the procedure.

[20] I am indebted to Judah Matras for carrying out these computations.

[21] Causation, of course, cannot be inferred from this kind of statistical analysis alone.

interviews). Those who are R in July (after the Republican convention) are more likely to remain R than are those who were R before July. It should be pointed out that, in comparing any two successive periods, the D data indicate no significance, the R data indicate significance only for the June–July and July–August comparison, while the U data indicate significance for all comparisons except the August–September, September–October periods (when both conventions had taken place).

for testing this hypothesis was given by formula (4.10) in Anderson's paper.[23] A different, and simpler, method for testing this hypothesis is presented here.

Assuming that the process can be described either by a first-order or a second-order chain and that Chart 4 describes the estimated matrix of second-order transition probabilities, we form a new set of tables (Chart 9).

We now have a 3×3 table for the R category at time $t - 1$, a 3×3 table for the

TABLE 2

Time Changes	Degrees of Freedom	R	D	U	Total
May–June, June–July	2	47	.15	6 65*	7 27
June–July, July–August	2	8 93**	5 32	30 31**	44 56**
July–August, August–September	2	89	97	15 28**	17 14**
August–September, September–October	2	41	74	33	1 48
May–June, June–July, July–August	4	11 27*	6 79	46 71**	64 77**
June–July, July–August, August–September	4	14 38**	10 35*	35 84**	60 57**
July–August, August–September, September–October	4	1 45	3 29	19 89**	24 63*
May–June, June–July, July–August, August–September	6	20 42**	14 40**	49 45**	84 27**
June–July, July–August, August–September, September–October	6	20 61**	15 91**	37.35**	73 87**
May–June, June–July, July–August, August–September, September–October	8	30 64**	22 85**	49 85**	103 34**

* Significant at the 5 per cent level.
** Significant at the 1 per cent level

An approach similar to the one presented in this section can be used to test the hypothesis that the four estimated matrices for the second-order transition probabilities (May–June–July, June–July–August, July–August–September, August–September–October) are the same. It should be mentioned that the sample of 445 people is actually rather small for testing this particular hypothesis; there may not be enough data to indicate significance.[22]

4.3. *The hypothesis that a model is first-order rather than second-order.*—A method

D category at time $t - 1$, and a 3×3 table for the U category at time $t - 1$.[24] The proportions in each row must now be multiplied by the denominator of the proportion (i.e., the number of cases used to compute the proportion) to change the proportions to frequencies. When the proportions have been changed to frequencies, we then have 3×3 cross-classification tables. The hy-

[22] For further details concerning this test see Anderson and Goodman, "Statistical Inference about Markov Chains," *op. cit.*

[23] This formula was given incorrectly in Anderson's paper, but has been corrected in Anderson and Goodman, *op. cit.*

[24] It would have been more convenient, for hypothesis testing, if the table of frequencies rather than proportions were available, as was the case for the tables considered in the preceding section, but these data were not given in Anderson's paper.

pothesis of independence can be tested in each of these three tables by computing the value of χ^2 for each of the tables. Each of these χ^2 values will have $2 \times 2 = 4$ degrees of freedom, and the sum of three χ^2 values has $3 \times 4 = 12$ degrees of freedom. Using these values, we can test whether the transition probabilities depend on the response pattern at both the two preceding time periods or only on the response in the immediately preceding time period; that is, whether the model is second-order or first-order. We can also determine, by studying the three separate χ^2 values (each with 4 degrees of freedom), for which of the three responses (*R, D,* or *U*) at the immediately preceding time period the transition probabilities actually depend on responses for the two preceding periods.

If the data that appear in the three 3×3 tables were obtained from a given set of three successive months, then the conclusions based on the application of the statistical method described here would apply to the process in this given time period. However, if the data in these tables were obtained as the sum of several such sets of tables for several sets of three-month periods, then it will be necessary to assume that the transition probability matrix for the second-order chain is constant in time, in order to justify the procedure of using the sum of these tables as the data to which the statistical method described here is applied.

4.4. *The hypothesis that several strata have the same process of change.*—To test the hypothesis that two strata have the same process of change, a formula is given in Anderson's paper. We shall now present a version of this formula that is somewhat easier to compute and shall also indicate how to test the hypothesis when more than two strata are to be compared. For simplicity, it is assumed here that the process in each stratum is a first-order chain, although the same general approach can be applied to more general situations.

Let us first compare the patterns of change given in Chart 5 for two of the strata, high interest (*H*) and low interest (*L*). We form a new set of tables from the data given for these two strata (Chart 10).

We now have a 3×2 table for the *R* category, a 3×2 table for the *D* category, and a 3×2 table for the *U* category. The proportions in each row must now be multi-

CHART 9

Time $t-2$	Time $t-1$	*R*	*D*	*U*
R	*R*	962	.010	028
D	*R*	783	.000	217
U	*R*	855	.012	133

Time $t-2$	Time $t-1$	*R*	*D*	*U*
R	*D*	.273	.727	000
D	*D*	.019	934	047
U	*D*	080	840	080

Time $t-2$	Time $t-1$	*R*	*D*	*U*
R	*U*	.395	116	.489
D	*U*	105	263	.632
U	*U*	134	117	749

plied by the denominator of the proportion (i.e., the number of cases used to compute the proportion) to change the proportions to frequencies. When the proportions have been changed to frequencies, we then have three 3×2 cross-classification tables. The hypothesis of independence can be tested in each of these three tables by computing the value of χ^2 for each of the tables.[25] Each of these χ^2 values will have $2 \times 1 = 2$ degrees of freedom, and the sum of the three χ^2 values has $3 \times 2 = 6$ degrees of freedom. Using these χ^2 values,

[25] See n. 19.

we can test whether the transition probabilities are the same for the two groups. We can also determine, by studying the three separate χ^2 values (each with 2 degrees of freedom), for which of the three responses (*R, D,* or *U*) are the two groups different.

To test the hypothesis that three (or more) groups have the same process of change, an analogous procedure may be followed. We shall indicate how this is done using the data for the three strata (high, medium, and low interest) given in Chart 5. We form a new set of tables from the data given for these three strata (Chart 11).

CHART 10

	R	*D*	*U*
H R	976	000	024
L R	932	000	068

	R	*D*	*U*
H D	011	978	011
L D	.030	.910	060

	R	*D*	*U*
H U	125	333	542
L U	081	074	845

A value of χ^2 (with $2 \times 2 = 4$ degrees of freedom) may be computed for each of the three tables (after the tables have been modified by changing the proportions to frequencies), and an analogous analysis of these values of χ^2 may be made.

4.5. *The hypotheses that two attitude patterns and the changes in two attitudes are independent.*—A method for testing the hypothesis that the changes in attitudes are independent is given in Anderson's paper, and it is pointed out that even if changes in attitudes are independent, this does not imply that the attitudes themselves are independent. We now present a method for testing that the patterns of attitudes are independent: this method and hypothesis are different from those given in Anderson's paper.

Let us consider data relating to the responses to two questions: (A) whether or not the respondent had seen an advertisement of a particular product and (B) whether or not he had bought the product. The data are arranged in Chart 12.[26]

CHART 11

	R	*D*	*U*
H R	976	000	024
M R	968	.016	016
L R	932	000	068

	R	*D*	*U*
H D	011	978	.011
M D	019	953	028
L D	030	910	060

	R	*D*	*U*
H U	125	.333	542
M U	182	151	667
L U	081	074	.845

Each column represents a different pattern of response to Question A, and each row represents a different response pattern to Question B. The column heading, say,

[26] These data, from the files of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, were presented in Anderson's paper. The arrangement (i.e., tabulation) of these data in his paper is quite different from Chart 12 here. We note that the consideration of *different* (though related) hypotheses leads to different arrangements of the data and to different statistical tests.

$1 \rightarrow 2$, indicates that the column represents those people who had a "1" response on Question A (they said they saw the advertisement) on the first interview and a "2" response on Question A (they said they did not see the advertisement) in the second interview. Similarly, the row heading, say, $2 \rightarrow 1$, indicates that the row represents those people who had a "2" response on Question B (they said they did not buy the product) in the first interview, and a "1" response on Question B (they said they did buy the product) in the second interview. To see if the pattern of response in the two interviews is independent, we test the hypothesis of independence in the above 4×4 cross-classification by computing χ^2 for the table. The χ^2 statistic will have $3 \times 3 = 9$ degrees of freedom. Since the χ^2 value is 205 and is highly significant, the response patterns for the two questions are not independent. However, if we examine the chart further, we see that the distribution of response patterns to Question B for the first column does not differ very much from the distribution in the second column. The χ^2 value, with three degrees of freedom, for the 2×4 cross-classification table consisting of the data in the first two columns of Chart 12 is 2.06, and is not statistically significant.[27] Hence, the response pattern on Question B for those who were $1 \rightarrow 1$ on Question A was approximately the same as the response pattern for those who were $1 \rightarrow 2$ on A. In other words, for those who said in the first interview that they had seen the advertisement, their patterns of response to Question B did not depend on whether or not they said in the second interview that they had seen the advertisement. Also, the response patterns on Question B for those who were $1 \rightarrow 2$ on Question A did not differ significantly from the response pattern for those who were $2 \rightarrow 1$ on A. The χ^2 value, with 3 degrees of freedom, was 2.71. That is, among those persons who changed their responses to Question A on successive interviews, the response pattern on Question B among those who were $1 \rightarrow 2$ on A did not differ significantly from those who were $2 \rightarrow 1$ on A. A still more detailed statistical analysis of this table can be carried out, but we shall not do that here.

[27] The χ^2 values given in this section are not independent of each other; they are all based on the data in Chart 12.

CHART 12

RESPONSE PATTERNS TO TWO QUESTIONS ON TWO INTERVIEWS

		Response Pattern to Question A			
		1→1	1→2	2→1	2→2
Response Pattern to Question B	1→1	83	35	25	95
	1→2	8	7	10	15
	2→1	22	11	8	6
	2→2	68	28	32	493

5. THE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL RESPONSES

In this paper we have dealt with the analysis of data concerning response patterns. If the monthly totals (i.e., the number of *R, D, U* responses) are available, but the response pattern data are not, the methods presented here cannot be applied. For this situation, George A. Miller has suggested a method of analysis, although he presented it in a somewhat different context.[28] His method is applicable to the case where it is known a priori that the process of change can be described by a first-order chain with a *constant* matrix of transition probabilities. For the data analyzed here, we noted that the matrix of first-order transition probabilities was constant for, at

[28] "Finite Markov Processes in Psychology," *Psychometrika,* XVII (1952), 39–47. See also Leo A. Goodman, "A Further Note on 'Finite Markov Processes in Psychology,'" *Psychometrika,* XVIII (1953), 245–48, where Miller's method and proof are discussed further, and Albert Madansky, "Least Squares Estimation in Finite Markov Processes," *Psychometrika,* XXIV (1959), 137–44.

most, two time periods. To apply Miller's method of analysis to the monthly totals for these data, the matrix of transition probabilities must be constant for at least three specified consecutive time periods in this particular case, and to obtain quite satisfactory results the matrix should be constant for many consecutive time periods. Miller's method cannot be applied satisfactorily to our data. Nevertheless we have mentioned it here since it may be of interest to the research worker who is unable to obtain data concerning response patterns but has response frequencies for specified time periods.

It should be mentioned that data concerning response frequencies will in general provide little information concerning the frequency of various response patterns.[29] For example, if the response frequencies were the same in two different time periods, this could mean that no individuals changed their responses or that some or many changed their responses but the changes "canceled out." In the light of present knowledge, the study of processes of change should be based on data concerning changes in individual response patterns whenever possible, rather than on the partial condensation of these data given by the response frequencies for a number of time periods.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

[29] This comment is somewhat related to the point of view presented (in a different context) by W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, XV (1950), 351–57. The discussion by Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1959), 610–25, is also related in a general sense to this problem, though it too is presented in the context of ecological correlation.

SOCIAL CLASS, EXPECTATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE OF MENTAL PATIENTS[1]

MARK LEFTON, SHIRLEY ANGRIST, SIMON DINITZ, AND BENJAMIN PASAMANICK

ABSTRACT

The influence of social class and expectations on the posthospital performance of sixty-two married female mental patients is examined here. Both class and expectations were posited as interrelated determinants of performance. The results indicate that this thesis is highly questionable. Social class did not correlate significantly with performance; patient expectations, on the other hand, were related to such performance in the working class but not in the middle class. These findings suggest that for these cases, disease manifestations are more significant than class and expectations as criteria of posthospital adjustment.

Sociologists have recently turned their attention to what promises to be a fruitful avenue by which to substantiate their professional concern in the area of mental illness—namely, the clinical psychiatric process and its necessary consequence, case outcome. One of the more positive results of this recent emphasis has been the delineation of social class and class-related factors as determining variables in such psychiatric procedures as diagnosis and treatment and in the post-treatment experiences of former patients. On one hand, the Hollingshead group has paid particular attention to class and diagnosis and treatment.[2] H. E. Freeman and O. G. Simmons, on the other hand, try to relate class and expectations to the performance levels of patients who succeed in remaining in the community following a period of hospitalization.[3] The specification of these variables by Freeman and Simmons, as correlates of posthospital performance, is derived directly from their investigation of the experiences of 182 psychotic males in which the following findings were obtained: (1) a direct relationship exists between the class status of the patient's family and performance level[4] and (2) a direct relationship exists between the expectations of family members and performance level.[5] Interpreting these results they argue that (*a*) middle-class families are relatively less tolerant of deviant behavior than others and their poor performers are, therefore, more likely to have been returned to the hospital and (*b*) if congruence between expectations and performance is essential to the stability of an interpersonal system, low performance on the part of a patient must be complemented by low expectations on the part of his relatives in order for him to remain in the family.

Two separate questions or problems are

[1] This research is being undertaken by the Research Division of the Columbus Psychiatric Institute and Hospital and is supported by a grant (M-2953) from the National Institute of Mental Health. During the course of this investigation, Shirley Angrist held a pre-doctoral fellowship from the National Institute of Mental Health, United States Public Health Service.

[2] A. B. Hollingshead and F. C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

[3] These authors have published a number of papers relevant to this issue: e.g., "Mental Patients in the Community: Family Settings and Performance Levels," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (April, 1958), 147–54; "Wives, Mothers and the Posthospital Performance of Mental Patients," *Social Forces*, XXXVII (December, 1958), 153–59; "The Social Integration of Former Mental Patients," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, Vol. IV (Spring, 1959). Other papers will be cited when appropriate.

[4] "Social Class and Posthospital Performance Levels," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (June, 1959), 345–51.

[5] "Familial Expectations and Posthospital Performance of Mental Patients," *Human Relations*, XIII, No. 3 (1959), 233–42.

raised by this work. First, to what extent are these findings which are based on a sample of chronic male patients applicable to the study of other types of mental patients (for example, acute cases, females)? Second, Freeman and Simmons fail to provide a demonstration of the relationship between social class and expectations.[6] The failure to do so is important for several reasons. To begin with, the absence of a clearly defined relationship between these variables makes it difficult to assess the relative influence of each as a determinant of posthospital performance. This issue is especially critical if one is to assume that class and expectations are independent of each other. If this is the case, two distinct problems emerge. First, the implied influence of class membership remains putative—that is, its status as a determinant still begs demonstration in terms other than those which first prompted its consideration. Second, by denying its association with a higher level construct, the efficacy of expectations as a generalized concomitant of performance is greatly restricted—expectations for performance become situationally determined and, hence, more likely subject to idiosyncratic interpretations.

If, on the other hand, it is assumed that class and expectations are highly correlated in the sense that the former implies the latter, and if performance fails to correlate significantly with either or both class and expectations, this would necessitate a re-examination of the postulated direction of the relationships previously reported and of the criteria by which performance level is measured and evaluated.

This study is addressed to these problems and assumptions. Under investigation are the relationships between social class, instrumental role expectations, and the performance of former female patients who were discharged from a psychiatric institution. The major differences between the work reported here and that of Freeman and Simmons are: (1) the study group is composed of former patients who had manifested *acute* rather than chronic psychiatric difficulties; (2) these are married women and all returned to their husbands upon discharge from the hospital; (3) the patients themselves *and* their husbands were interview respondents; and (4), perhaps most significant, is the effort to examine social class and expectations as integral rather than as independent factors.

In the following the questionable postulate that class and expectations are critical determinants of the performance of these women will be examined. In this study previously neglected variables within the posthospital environment—namely, the disease manifestations of the patient and the manner in which she defines her role—have been taken into account.

STUDY GROUP AND METHOD

The subjects were sixty-two married women who were discharged from a short-term, intensive-therapy psychiatric institution between December, 1958, and July, 1959, and who had not re-entered this or any other medical facility for psychiatric treatment for a period of six months. These women represent 21.6 per cent of the total number of females discharged in those eight months, 36.5 per cent of all who were married, and 43.7 per cent of the married women who had avoided re-entry into treatment and were still living in the community six months after hospital release.[7] Only those

[6] It should be noted that, in their discussion of social class and its relation to performance, Freeman and Simmons imply the importance of role expectations as a concomitant of class. Their discussion of expectations, however, although obviously significant in terms of delineating the relevancy of familial factors, makes no effort to explicitly examine what was previously implied. Instead both variables are presumed to be reflective of the same phenomenon—"tolerance of deviant behavior."

[7] For a description of the original study population see S. Dinitz *et al.*, "Psychiatric and Social Attributes as Predictors of Case Outcome in Mental Hospitalization," *Social Problems*, VIII (Spring, 1961), 322–28; S. Angrist *et al.*, "Rehospitalization of Female Mental Patients," *A.M.A. Archives of General Psychiatry*, IV (April, 1961),

women were included who met the following criteria: (1) white; (2) functionally as opposed to organically impaired; (3) not addicted to either alcohol or drugs; (4) living with spouse; and (5) both the former patient and her husband had been interviewed.[8]

All sixty-two patients and their husbands were interviewed by trained psychiatric social workers six months after discharge. The interviews were designed to elicit from each of the husbands an index of his wife's actual performance in three separate areas of functioning—domestic activity (e.g., cooking, shopping, cleaning), social participation (e.g., visiting, entertaining), and psychological behavior. These measures consisted of five, nine, and thirty-two items, respectively.[9] Responses were scored according to arbitrarily assigned weights with the higher scores representing better performance. The scores were regarded as additive. In addition to the separate scores so obtained, a total performance index was derived as a composite of these three indexes.[10]

A separate section of the interview schedule was designed specifically to elicit the husbands' expectations of the role performance of their wives. The twelve items which comprised this index are particularly pertinent to the women's domestic and social behavior and thus parallel, in part, their reports of actual performance. These responses were treated in a manner similar to that discussed above—the higher the score, the greater the expectation for performance.

363–70; and Dinitz *et al.*, "The Posthospital Psychological Functioning of Former Mental Hospital Patients," *Mental Hygiene,* XLV (October, 1961), 579–88.

[8] The decision to focus on married patients for the purposes of this paper and to control the factors indicated derives directly from experiences with the total subject population. Our earlier findings suggest that (1) the married women, as a group, perform far better than any of the non-married former patients and (2) that married women are subject to and themselves express higher expectations for role performance than the others. These results, although related and important in and of themselves, are nevertheless prone to a number of substantive and methodological difficulties. Foremost among these are: (1) Many of the role performance and expectation items are more clearly applicable to wives and mothers than to widowed, divorced, and otherwise single females. Low performance, therefore, on the part of those in the latter categories could well be viewed with some ambivalence, i.e., either low performance per se, or the behaviors in question are simply irrelevant. (2) A variety of significant others (husbands, parents, children, siblings, friends, neighbors) introduces the issue of differential perception, knowledge, and/or concern and their effects upon reports of performance as well as on level of expectations. Although this particular problem is more severe for the non-married females, it is not entirely absent in the case of the married subjects.

In order, then, to adequately examine the effects of social class and expectations on performance, it was deemed necessary to control for those factors which had already introduced several interpretative difficulties and others which were likely to do the same.

[9] For a complete description of these instruments and a discussion of questions of reliability see Shirley S. Angrist, "Social Factors in the Outcome of Mental Hospitalization" (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1960) (microfilm).

[10] The significance and implications of the results presented here, as well as those in related papers regarding the posthospital experiences of former patients, depend largely on the accuracy and validity of our performance measures. An attempt was made, therefore, to obtain professional psychiatric evaluations independent of those derived from the significant others. For this purpose a random sample of the original study population was asked to co-operate by presenting themselves for a psychiatric interview. Using a standard psychiatric rating instrument (the Lorr Multidimensional Scale for Rating Psychiatric Patients) each patient was rated by one of two staff psychiatrists. Despite some obvious differences in perception and insight between psychiatrists and the significant others and between the two physicians themselves, significant correlations were obtained between the Lorr Scale scores and the psychological performance scores derived from the reports of patients' relatives (for a discussion of these findings see B. Pasamanick and L. Ristine, "Differential Assessment of Posthospital Psychological Functioning: Evaluations by Psychiatrists and Relatives," *American Journal of Psychiatry,* CXVIII [July, 1961], 40–46). In addition, the fact that the three performance indexes used in this study—psychological, domestic, and social—are highly related lends plausibility to their use as indicators of the actual functioning level of the patients involved.

While the former patients were not asked about their actual functioning, they were asked to indicate their own expectations with respect to performance. The items were identical to those used with their husbands' and were scored in a similar fashion.

The social class index used in this report was based on the Hollingshead Two Factor Index of Social Position.[11] The procedure consists of assigning the husband's occupational status a weight of 7 and his educational status a weight of 4. In accordance with current usage, Hollingshead's Classes I, II, and III are considered to be "middle class," and Classes IV and V to be "working class."[12]

TABLE 1

PEARSONIAN CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HOLLINGSHEAD TWO FACTOR INDEX OF SOCIAL POSITION AND PERFORMANCE LEVELS OF SIXTY-TWO PATIENTS AND MEAN PERFORMANCE SCORES, BY CLASS

			MEAN PERFORMANCE SCORES			
INDEX	r	p	Middle Class ($N=21$)	Working Class ($N=41$)		p
Domestic performance ..	.13*	N.S.	13 10	13 17	14	N.S.
Social participation	09	N.S.	58 52	58 93	25	N S.
Psychological performance	05	N S.	88 52	87 76	51	N.S.
Total performance† .	12	N.S.	160 14	159 86	16	N.S.

* Because of the reverse nature of the Hollingshead Index—i e , the higher the score, the lower the class—a positive correlation would feature a negative sign To avoid confusion and since all the correlation coefficients reported in this paper are positive, the negative sign is not used.

† Each of the three separate indexes of performance is positively and significantly correlated with the Total Performance Index- $p <$ 01 in each case

FINDINGS

Social class and posthospital performance.—An earlier report showed that the married patients are better performers and are subject to higher and more consistent expectations than any of the women in several non-married categories included in the larger study population.[13] Therefore, by restricting our attention to married females, the posited relationship between social class and expectations, on the one hand, and posthospital performance, on the other, receives its severest test. The data presented in Table 1 show clearly that class fails to pass this test. The correlation coefficients as well as the mean performance scores computed for each of the major class groupings fail to demonstrate significant differences in performance by class.[14] As noted previously, a major factor inhibiting the discriminatory power of social class could logically be attributed to the fact that these women, as a group, are indeed high or at the very least adequate role performers—that is, the skewed nature of the performance curve, therefore, precludes a reliable differentiation by class.

The fact is, however, that not only are these former patients readily dichotomized

[11] A. B. Hollingshead, "Two Factor Index of Social Position" (1957) (mimeographed).

[12] See, e.g., M. L. Kohn, "Social Class and Parental Authority," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (June, 1959), 352–66.

[13] Dinitz *et al.*, "Psychiatric and Social Attributes as Predictors of Case Outcome in Mental Hospitalization," *op. cit.*

[14] The authors wish to make known their recognition of some recent criticism regarding the Hollingshead Index of Social Position—i.e., that education alone may account for differences attributed to social class status. In this regard see S. M. Miller and E. G. Mishler, "Social Class, Mental Illness, and American Psychiatry," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXXVII (April, 1959), 174–99; and H. E. Freeman, "Attitudes toward Mental Illness among Relatives of Former Patients," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (April, 1961), 59–66. In line with this argument, separate analyses of education and occupation were made; the results reported in this paper were not in any way altered so as to warrant the abandonment of the Index as used.

into distinct and statistically significant performance groups (the means for the high and low total performance groups are 167.55 and 152.42, respectively—the resulting t is 10.66, $p < .001$), but also the second of the variables at issue, role expectations, does significantly distinguish between high- and low-performing women.

Instrumental role expectation and performance.—It was stated at the outset of this paper that the expectations for performance on the part of significant family members have been regarded as a crucial concomitant of posthospital functioning. Not only is this concept essential to the work of Freeman and Simmons, but it illustrates one of the most fundamental of sociological propositions. When introduced in this way, the relationships depicted in Table 2 offer an intriguing pattern. The correlation coefficients reveal that, although the expectation scores of both patients and husbands are positively and significantly related to the total performance index, the level of expectation of the former patients themselves is by far the more critical correlate. This is evidenced not only by the differential magnitude of the coefficient with respect to total performance but especially by those obtained between expectations and psychological behavior and social participation. Furthermore, the relative stability of these relationships is markedly different. Whereas the expectations of the women relate strongly to performance, even when those of their husbands are controlled ($r_{12.3} = .42, p < .01$), precisely the reverse occurs with respect to the relationship between husbands' expectations and performance when those of their wives are partialled out ($r_{12.3} = .09$). On the strength of these findings it seems appropriate to suggest at this point that the husbands' reports of actual performance and their expectations for such performance are to a considerable extent independent of each other.[15] In addition, and most important, the expectations held by these men for their wives' role performance are, in fact, dependent upon those registered by their wives. It is also to be noted that, if the correlation coefficient between patients' expectations and performance is to be attributed to an association between gradients, the source for such a relationship is to be found in the sphere of social participation rather than in the more purely domestic realm.

Two very important inferences are to be drawn from these findings: First, the husband's expectations as determinants of role performance are less important than was expected; and second, a shift in focus is required—that is, the former patient herself is revealed as a significant factor in structuring the normative pattern to which she must relate.

TABLE 2

PEARSONIAN CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PATIENTS' AND HUSBANDS' EXPECTATIONS AND PERFORMANCE LEVELS

	Patients' Expectations		Husbands' Expectations	
Index	r	p	r	p
Domestic	25	N.S.	18	N S.
Social . .	31	< 05	21	N.S.
Psychological .	38	< 01	15	N.S.
Total . . .	48	< 01	27	< 05

Social Class, expectations, and performance.—These findings make it necessary to ask the question: What factors account for the expectations held by these women? Within the context of this research, the search for an answer begins with a consideration of the relationship between social class and expectations. The relevant data show that, although these variables

[15] Additional support for this contention is based on the fact that the correlation between husbands' expectations and patients' expectations is significantly greater than that between the latter and psychological performance ($t = 2.01, p < .025$ for a one-tail test). The formula used,

$$t = (r_{xz} - r_{yz}) \times \sqrt{\frac{(N-3)(1-r_{xy})}{2(1 - r_{xy}^2 - r_{xz}^2 - r_{yz}^2 + 2\, r_{xy} r_{xz} r_{yz})}},$$

is to be found in H. M. Walker and J. Lev, *Statistical Inference* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952), p. 257.

are differentially correlated with the reported performance of our subject group (expectations are positively and significantly related while class is not), they are positively and significantly related to each other (the correlations between the Hollingshead Two Factor Index and patients' and husbands' expectations are .33, $p < .01$, and .28, $p < .05$, respectively). This association is also obtained when class is treated as a discrete variable (Table 3). Furthermore, it should be noted that whatever differential exists between the expectations of middle-class as opposed to working-class subjects is best accounted for by differences in the social as opposed to the domestic spheres of role performance. expectation scores were then computed for each of the cells: middle class—high performance; middle class—low performance; working class—high performance; and working class—low performance. These results are presented in Table 4. These data indicate several interesting and important relationships among the variables under consideration. In the first place, the mean expectation scores show that social class most readily accounts for the previously cited relationship between performance and expectations and at the same time accounts for a considerable amount of the unexplained variance in that relationship. The women of middle-class status tend to maintain high expectations despite low performance, while the expectations of the working-class women are highly congruent with their performance level.[16] *In short, the expectations which the middle-class women hold for themselves are independent of performance, while those of the working-class women appear to be a function of their ability to perform those very same activities.* Highly relevant to these results is the previously noted fact that the differences in expectation scores were due largely to those items concerned with social rather than the more strictly domestic activities. Not only is this point substantively significant but it adds an important measure of

TABLE 3

MEAN EXPECTATION SCORES—PATIENTS' AND HUSBANDS'—BY MIDDLE- AND WORKING-CLASS POSITION

	Middle Class ($N=21$)	Working Class ($N=41$)	t	p
Patients' expectations (total)	33 67	32 12	2 56	< 05
Husbands' expectations (total)	33 57	32 39	2 09	< 05
Patients' expectations (social)	13 05	11 83	2 57	< 05
Husbands' expectations (social)	13 05	11 98	2.79	< 01
Patients' expectations (domestic)	14 71	14 49	N.S.	
Husbands' expectations (domestic)	14 52	14 27	N.S.	

A similar finding was obtained with respect to the relationship between patients' expectations and performance (see Table 2).

Given these facts—(1) that social class and performance are relatively independent of each other and (2) that expectations correlate significantly with both class and performance—it seems reasonable to suggest that expectations are a function not only of class position but of performance as well. In an effort, therefore, to assess the nature of the class-performance relationship and to determine its influence upon expectations, a further analysis of the variables was undertaken.

The procedure for this analysis involved the construction of a four-celled bivariate typology. This typology was based on the dichotomization of social class into middle- and working-class categories and total performance into high and low levels. Mean

[16] The t's reported in Table 4 for patients' expectations are supported by separate correlation coefficients between expectations and performance for the two class groupings. In the case of the middle-class women, $r = .41$, N.S. For the working-class patients, $r = .52$, $p < .01$. The correlations for husbands' expectations and performance were not significant for either class group.

validity as well, that is, the findings clearly reflect the obvious and often documented class-related bias regarding the more purely social amenities of role performance. The results presented, therefore, are not only in accord with existing knowledge of the influence of social class upon role expectations but provide an empirical point of departure for a reassessment of the criteria by which the functioning of mentally ill persons has been examined and evaluated.

TABLE 4

MEAN EXPECTATION SCORES—PATIENTS' AND HUSBANDS'—BY MIDDLE- AND WORKING-CLASS POSITION AND HIGH AND LOW TOTAL PERFORMANCE LEVEL

	Middle Class—High Performance ($N=12$)	Middle Class—Low Performance ($N=9$)	t	p
Patients' expectations	33.83	33 44	54	N.S.
Husbands' expectations ..	33 92	33 11	1 05	N.S.

	Working Class—High Performance ($N=19$)	Working Class—Low Performance ($N=22$)	t	p
Patients' expectations.....	33 58	30 86	3 10	< 01
Husbands' expectations. .. .	33 47	31 45	2 39	< 05

instrumental in accounting for relative discrepancies between expectations and performance, a demonstration of its influence as a determinant of performance was not achieved. This failure is far more significant than it would at first appear since it necessitates a closer examination of the nature and implications of the relationship between expectations and performance. The point of departure for such an examination is the finding that the poorly performing women of middle-class status, contrary to those of the working-class group, maintain this performance in the face of consistently high expectations. This finding, coupled with the fact that these women have been successful in avoiding rehospitalization, suggests four distinct but obviously interrelated propositions: (1) that middle-class families are more rather than less willing to tolerate low-level performance; (2) that the expectations to which middle-class women are subject are qualitatively different from those of the working-class women —that is, more complicated and demanding and, hence, more difficult to realize; (3) that the middle-class women are less realistic in judging their abilities and ca-

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The pattern of interrelationships found among the variables considered—social class, expectations, and the posthospital performance level of sixty-two married female mental patients—is consistent as well as inconsistent with both the findings and the inferences of other researchers in the area. On one hand, our findings strongly support the point of view that social class is a relevant factor in influencing the posthospital experiences of mental patients. On the other hand, however, our data indicate that, insofar as the subjects of this study are concerned, the influence is indirect rather than direct. That is, despite evidence which shows social class to be

pacities; and (4) that expectations provide a questionable criterion by which to evaluate posthospital patient functioning.

While this study does not permit an intensive evaluation of the relative merits of these propositions, it does, however, provide a starting point from which to proceed. Of immediate interest are those data which show that the expectations to which these women were subject are of their own making—that is, the expectations reported by the husbands were largely dependent upon those expressed by their wives. As a result it is extremely difficult to view familial role expectations as a determinant of performance. If familial expectations were as instrumental in determining performance level as they have been posited to be, they would necessarily have to occupy the status of an independent rather than a dependent variable. Such was obviously not the case for these subjects. Furthermore, serious questions about the efficacy of role expectations as an indicator of greater or lesser familial tolerance are raised.[17] In short, the relative discrepancies between expectations and performance are largely a function of the expectations these women hold for themselves and to which their husbands acceded.

This latter point raises a more general question: To what extent are these findings uniquely relevant to the posthospital experiences of these former mental patients? More specifically, is the fact that these subjects are married women equally, or perhaps even more, important in accounting for the relationships found than is the fact of previous hospitalization? One significant answer to these questions is the information which shows that the expectations which most readily distinguish between the two class groups are those regarding social participation. In the case of the middle-class subjects these are uniformly high; in the case of the working-class women these expectations vary in accordance with performance. But in both instances it is the women who appear to determine the pattern to be followed. Since the husbands permit their wives to structure these particular normative standards for themselves, it seems reasonable to suggest that they reflect a cultural tendency. In other words, in the absence of clearly defined standards by which to determine, let alone evaluate, the substantive ways and means of social participation in the first place, the freedom of movement granted their wives in these matters seems not only logical but necessary.

Of greater importance, however, is the fact that the women themselves reflect the influence of social class position upon the differential importance attributed to the social aspects of role performance. In this regard the subjects are also in harmony with the normative standards accepted by women in the general population. There seems to be little reason, therefore, not to view their actual performance in a similar manner—that is, the role performance of these former patients may indeed be representative of never before hospitalized women, or at least, does not significantly differ in fact from the way in which role demands are met by other women.[18] This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the role dimensions herein considered (domestic and social) are perhaps of secondary concern in the evaluation of the posthospital performance of these women. What could be of vital importance, however, is the fact that these former patients were hospital-

[17] It is to be noted that this criticism is applicable only if tolerance and role expectations are equated. It is not our intention to preclude familial "tolerance" as a factor in the experiences of mentally ill persons. It is our intention, however, to pose questions regarding the behaviors about which families are tolerant or intolerant.

[18] In order to empirically examine this assertion, a "control" group of 170 females who have not received any type of psychiatric treatment and their significant others have been interviewed in precisely the same fashion as the former patient population. The selection procedure involved matching each of the urban patients with a neighbor who resides ten house numbers away. The data obtained are currently being analyzed.

ized by and large for acute rather than chronic psychiatric difficulties. This suggests that the precipitating factor in their hospitalization lies primarily in the manifestation of severe, bizarre, or unusual psychiatric symptoms rather than disruption or breakdown in the more parochial spheres of role performance.

It is our contention, therefore, that the object of concern on the part of family members as well as the former patients themselves is not with whether the latter are capable of fulfilling their role obligations but whether those symptoms for which they had originally sought treatment have been effectively treated and minimized.

It is to be emphasized that we are not at all denying the crucial relationships between role performance and manifestations of disease. We are suggesting that these relationships are decidedly more complex than heretofore assumed or recognized. It could be reasonably argued, for example, that the degree to which questions of role performance assume importance is a function of the extent to which a discrepancy exists between the *capacity* for such performance and the normative demands. The more chronic the illness, the more the concern with questions of the appropriateness of role obligations and of the adaptation of abilities to the required norms. On the other hand, the more acute the illness, the greater the concern with the disease entity and its specific consequences and the less the concern with matters of role performance.

While the above is obviously a very tentative interpretation of our findings and their implications, one conclusion is clear and unequivocal: the appropriate test of the efficacy of social class and expectations as meaningful concepts in the study of the functioning of mentally ill persons awaits the formulation of an adequate frame of reference. Such a frame of reference must not only foster the recognition of the interaction of sociological and psychiatric variables but must also provide the means by which the relative importance of each may be weighted.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

FAMILY PROCESSES AND BECOMING A MENTAL PATIENT[1]

HAROLD SAMPSON, SHELDON L. MESSINGER, AND ROBERT D. TOWNE[2]

ABSTRACT

Both before and after hospitalization a type of accommodative pattern usually evolves between a disturbed person and his family and ultimately permits or forces him to remain in the community in spite of severe difficulties. It is the disruption of this pattern which eventually brings a disturbed person to psychiatric attention. Two patterns of accommodation between schizophrenic patients and their families are identified, the disruption of these patterns are documented, and the consequences of these patterns for the nature of the pathway to the mental hospital are examined.

Becoming a mental patient is not a simple and direct outcome of "mental illness"; nor is hospitalization in a mental institution, when and if it comes, the automatic result of a professional opinion. Persons who are, by clinical standards, grossly disturbed, severely impaired in their functioning, and even overtly psychotic may remain in the community for long periods without being "recognized" as "mentally ill" and without benefit of psychiatric or other professional attention. It is clear that becoming a mental patient is a socially structured event.[3] The research reported here is directed to increasing our understanding of the nature and significance of this structuring as it mediates the relations between individuals and the more formal means of social control. The research explores (*a*) the relationship between patterns of family means for coping with the deviant behavior of a member who later becomes a mental patient and (*b*) efforts of the future patient or members of his family to secure professional help.

The broad nature of this latter relationship may be inferred from a number of published findings. Yarrow and her colleagues have documented the monumental capacity of family members, before hospitalization, to overlook, minimize, and explain away evidence of profound disturbance in an intimate.[4] The post-hospital studies of the Simmons group have suggested that high "tolerance for deviance" in certain types of families is a critical determinant of the likelihood of poorly functioning and sometimes frankly psychotic former patients avoiding rehospitalization.[5] Myers and Roberts found that few mental patients or their families

[1] This report is based on a study carried out by the California Department of Mental Hygiene and partially supported by Grant No. 3M-9124 from the National Institute of Mental Health.

[2] Thanks are due to David Ross, Florine Livson, Mary-Dee Bowers, Lester Cohen, and Kate S. Dorst for their substantial contributions to the research for this study.

[3] Erving Goffman, in "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient," *Psychiatry,* XXII (May, 1959), 123–42, discusses a variety of "career contingencies" that may intervene between deviant behavior and hospitalization for mental illness. Also see the articles in *Journal of Social Issues,* XI (1955), ed. John A. Clausen and Marian Radke Yarrow, under the general title of "The Impact of Mental Illness on the Family." August B. Hollingshead and Fredrick C. Redlich (*Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958], chap. vi, "Paths to the Psychiatrist") also emphasize this point.

[4] Marian Radke Yarrow, Charlotte Green Schwartz, Harriet S. Murphy, and Leila Calhoun Deasy, "The Psychological Meaning of Mental Illness in the Family," *Journal of Social Issues,* XI (1955), 12–24. Also see Charlotte Green Schwartz, "Perspectives on Deviance—Wives' Definitions of Their Husbands' Mental Illness," *Psychiatry,* XX (August, 1957), 275–91; Hollingshead and Redlich, *op. cit.,* esp. pp. 172–79; and Elaine Cumming and John Cumming, *Closed Ranks* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), esp. pp. 91–108.

[5] See Ozzie G. Simmons, *After Hospitalization: The Mental Patient and His Family* (Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, n.d) and the several studies by the Simmons group cited there.

sought or used professional assistance before hospitalization until the problems they encountered became unmanageable.[6] Whitmer and Conover reported that the occasion for hospitalization was ordinarily not recognition of "mental illness" by the patient or his family but inability to cope with disturbed behavior within the family.[7]

These observations and our own permit two inferences. First, both before and after hospitalization some type of accommodative pattern ordinarily evolves between a disturbed person and his family which permits or forces him to remain in the community in spite of severe difficulties. Second, it is the disruption of this pattern which eventually brings a disturbed person to psychiatric attention.[8] An investigation of typical family accommodations to the deviant behavior of future patients, and how these accommodations collapse, should therefore contribute to our understanding of the ways in which individuals and the intimate social networks of which they are members are rendered less and more accessible to institutionalized devices of social control. Specifically, it should provide us with a glimpse of those dynamic family processes which determine a future mental patient's accessibility to community, particularly psychiatric intervention; these same processes determine the accessibility of the family. It should also contribute to our understanding of the meaning of such intervention to the future patient and his family. Such family accommodations pose strategic problems for the persons who constitute and man community remedial facilities. These are problems seldom taken into explicit or systematic account by such persons—problems beyond but related to the pathology of the patient.

We shall be concerned here with two phases in the relationship between the future patient and his family and with the connections between these phases and the course of events leading to hospitalization. The first phase consists of the evolution of a pattern of accommodation within the family to behavioral deviance on the part of the future patient.[9] The second phase consists in the disruption of this pattern of accommodation. Our observations are derived from a study of seventeen families in which the wife-mother was hospitalized for the first time in a large state mental

[6] Jerome K. Myers and Bertram H. Roberts, *Family and Class Dynamics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 213–20 These findings also suggest that lower-class families are better able to contain an extremely disturbed person for long periods of time than are middle-class families; the latter call on outside help more rapidly when "major psychotic decompensation" occurs. This would follow from the argument presented by Talcott Parsons and Renée Fox in "Illness, Therapy, and the Modern Urban American Family," *Journal of Social Issues*, VIII (1953), 31–44.

[7] Carroll A. Whitmer and Glenn C. Conover, "A Study of Critical Incidents in the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," *Journal of the National Association of Social Work*, IV (January, 1959), 89–94 (see also Edwin C. Wood, John M. Rakusin, and Emanuel Morse, "Interpersonal Aspects of Psychiatric Hospitalization," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, III [December, 1960], 632–41).

[8] Another inference we have made, and which we discuss elsewhere, is that an important set of effects of community devices of social control pertain to family patterns of accommodation. In important ways, it is through these that individuals are controlled, rather than by direct action (Harold Sampson, Sheldon L. Messinger, and Robert D. Towne, "The Mental Hospital and Family Accommodations" [unpublished manuscript, 1962]).

[9] This phase emphasizes one side of a complicated reciprocity between family relations and the deviance of family members. We have focused on the other side of this reciprocity—family relations as they sustain and promote deviant behavior—elsewhere (see Robert D. Towne, Sheldon L. Messinger, and Harold Sampson, "Schizophrenia and the Marital Family: Accommodations to Symbiosis," *Family Process* (forthcoming), and Robert D. Towne, Harold Sampson, and Sheldon L. Messinger, "Schizophrenia and the Marital Family: Identification Crises," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, CXXXIII [November, 1961], 423–29). There is a large and growing literature on this topic, particularly as it concerns schizophrenia, much of which is referred to in the various citations to be found in *The Etiology of Schizophrenia*, ed. by Don D. Jackson (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960).

institution and therein diagnosed as schizophrenic.[10] We established a research relationship with both patient and spouse at the time of admission and continued to see them regularly and frequently throughout hospitalization, and for varying periods extending to more than two years following first release. We conducted about fifty interviews with the members of each marital pair, including typically one or more joint interviews. Other relatives, psychiatrists, physicians, hospital personnel, and other remedial agents who had become involved with the patient or family over the years were also interviewed. Interview materials were supplemented by direct observation at home and in the hospital, and by such medical and social records as we could locate and gain permission to abstract.

These methods, which are described more fully elsewhere,[11] enabled us to reconstruct the vicissitudes of these marital families from courtship through marriage, childbearing and child-rearing, eventual hospitalization of the wife, and well into the period following the patient's first release. We shall focus here on a longitudinal analysis of two patterns of accommodation which evolved between these women and their families prior to hospitalization and the disruption of these patterns. The patterns are exemplified by eleven and four cases, respectively; two of the seventeen families do not appear to be adequately characterized by either pattern. In order to present the patterns in some detail, our analysis will be developed in terms of selected families exhibiting each type of accommodation. This does not exhaust the empirical variety to be found even in the limited number of cases studied here. In the concluding section, however, emphasis will be placed on common patterns of relationship between future mental patients and their immediate interpersonal communities, as well as on the conditions under which these patterns deteriorate and collapse.

[10] Detailed characteristics of the families studied may be found in Harold Sampson, Sheldon L. Messinger, and Robert D. Towne, "The Mental Hospital and Marital Family Ties," *Social Problems*, IX (Fall, 1961), 141–55. In two of seventeen cases, a brief psychiatric hospitalization in a county hospital had occurred earlier; in a third case, the woman had been hospitalized in a private sanitarium for one month earlier in the same year she entered the state institution.

[11] *Ibid.*

THE UNINVOLVED HUSBAND AND SEPARATE WORLDS

In the first situation, exemplified by eleven families, the marital partners and their children lived together as a relatively independent, self-contained nuclear family, but the marital relationship was characterized by mutual withdrawal and the construction of separate worlds of compensatory involvement. At some point during the marriage, usually quite early, one or both of the partners had experienced extreme dissatisfaction with the marriage. This was ordinarily accompanied by a period of violent, open discord, although in other cases, the dissatisfaction was expressed only indirectly, through reduced communication with the marital partner. Whatever the means of managing the dissatisfaction when it occurred, in each of these families the partners withdrew and each gradually instituted a separate world. The husband became increasingly involved in his work or in other interests outside the marital relationship. The wife became absorbed in private concerns about herself and her children. The partners would rarely go out together, rarely participate together in dealing with personal or family problems, and seldom communicate to each other about their more pressing interests, wishes, and concerns. The marriage would continue in this way for some time without divorce, without separation, and without movement toward greater closeness. The partners had achieved a type of marital accommodation based on interpersonal isolation, emotional distance, and lack of explicit demands upon each other. This accommodation represented an alternative

to both divorce and a greater degree of marital integration.

It is a particularly important characteristic of this type of family organization that pathological developments in the wives were for a time self-sustaining. The wife's distress, withdrawal, or deviant behavior did not lead to immediate changes of family life but rather to an intensification of mutual withdrawal. In this setting, the wives became acutely disturbed or even psychotic, without, for a time, very much affecting the pre-existing pattern of family life. This is exemplified in the following cases:

In the evenings, Mr. Urey worked on his car in the basement while his wife remained upstairs, alone with her sleeping children, engaged in conversations and arguments with imaginary others. This situation continued for at least two years before Mrs. Urey saw a psychiatrist on the recommendation of her family physician. Another two years elapsed before Mrs. Urey was hospitalized. During this period, Mr. Urey became ever less concerned with his wife's behavior, accepting it as a matter of course, and concerned himself with "getting ahead" in his job.

For two years prior to hospitalization, Mrs. Rand was troubled by various somatic complaints, persistent tension, difficulty in sleeping, a vague but disturbing conviction that she was a sinner, and intermittent states of acute panic. Mr. Rand was minimally aware of her distress. He worked up to fourteen hours a day, including weekends, in his store, and eventually a second job took him out of the home three evenings a week. On those infrequent occasions when his wife's worries forced themselves on his attention, he dismissed them curtly as absurd, and turned once again to his own affairs.

In these families the patterned response to distress, withdrawal, or illness in the wife was further withdrawal by the husband, resulting in increasing distance between, and disengagement of, the marital partners. These developments were neither abrupt nor entirely consistent, but the trend of interaction in these families was toward mutual alienation and inaccessibility of each partner to the other. In this situation, early involvement of the wife in a professional treatment situation was limited by her own withdrawal and difficulty in taking the initiative for any sustained course of action in the real world, as well as by the husband's detachment.

This pattern of mutual withdrawal eventually became intolerable to one or the other partner, pressure for a change was brought to bear, and the family suffered an acute crisis. In some cases, pressure for change was initiated by the husband. In other cases, such pressure was initiated by the wife in the form of increasing agitation, somatic and psychic complaints, and repeated verbal and behavioral communications that she was unable to go on. However the pre-hospital crisis was initiated, and whether it signaled a desire for increased or reduced involvement by the initiating partner, the change indicated an incipient collapse of the former pattern of accommodation.

In four of the eleven cases considered here, the pre-hospital crisis was primarily precipitated by a shift in the husband's "tolerance for deviance." In two of these cases, the wives had been chronically and pervasively withdrawn from role performances and at least periodically psychotic. One husband, in the midst of job insecurities and a desire to move to another state to make a new start, pressed his wife to assume more responsibility. Another husband, approaching forty years of age, reassessed his life and decided that the time had come to rid himself of a wife whom he had long considered "a millstone around my neck." These husbands sought medical or psychiatric assistance specifically to exclude their wives from the family; the two wives were passively resistant to hospitalization. The explicit attitude of the husbands was that they wished the hospital to take their wives off their hands.

In the other two cases, the disruption of the earlier accommodation was associated with the establishment, by the husband, of a serious extra-marital liaison.

Here, as in the two cases referred to above, there appeared to be no marked change in the wife's conduct prior to this indication of a desire by the husband for total withdrawal.

Virtually identical family processes were apparent in those cases where the manifest illness of the wife was itself the source of pressure for change, the harbinger of the collapse of the prior marital accommodation. The wife's illness intruded itself into family life, at first with limited impact, but then more insistently, like a claim which has not been paid or a message that must be repeated until it is acknowledged. The wife's "complaints" came to be experienced by the husband as, literally, complaints to him, as demands upon him for interest, concern, and involvement. These husbands, however, uniformly initially struggled to preserve the earlier pattern, that is, to maintain uninvolvement in the face of demands which implicitly pressed for their active concern. Thus, as the pre-hospital crisis unfolded, the wife's manifest illness assumed the interpersonal significance of a demand for involvement, and the husband's difficulty in recognizing her as seriously disturbed had the interpersonal significance of a resistance to that demand. The excerpt cited earlier from the Rand case illustrates this process if we add to it the observation that during these two years Mrs. Rand's difficulties recurrently came to the husband's attention in the form of momentary crises which compelled at least the response of curt dismissal.

In this situation, the husband initially assumed a passive or indifferent attitude toward his wife's obtaining professional help. But if she became involved with a psychiatrist, physician, minister, or social worker who took some interest in her life situation, the husband became concerned with the treatment in a negative way. The treatment "wasn't necessary," it "wasn't helping," it "cost too much money." In addition to these deprecations was a hint of alarm that the treatment would challenge the husband's pattern of uninvolvement.[12] For example, Mr. Rand, whose working schedule was mentioned earlier, worried that his wife's psychiatrist might support her complaint that he did not spend enough time at home. Thus the involvement of the wife with a psychiatrically oriented helper was experienced by the husband, at least initially, as a claim upon himself—for money, for concern, and most centrally, for reinvolvement. We have reported elsewhere[13] that there is some basis for this feeling. The treatment process, especially during hospitalization, does tend to induct the husband into the role of the responsible relative, and thereby presses for the re-establishment of reciprocal expectations which had been eroded in the earlier family accommodation.

In most of these cases, these processes led to more extreme deviance on the part of the wife which eventually came to the attention of the larger community, thereby resulting in hospitalization. For example, Mrs. Urey, who had been actively psychotic for some time, was hospitalized only after she set fire to her home. In brief, the wife's distress is at first experienced by the husband as an unwarranted demand for his reinvolvement in the marital relationship, he withdraws further, and her behavior becomes more deviant.

We may conclude this section with a few more general remarks. The pre-hospital crisis, in each of these cases, marked, and was part of, the disruption of a pattern of accommodation which had been established between the marital partners. The disruption was in effect initiated by one of the partners and resisted by the other.[14]

[12] In one case, the psychiatrist urged the husband to seek treatment for himself.

[13] Sampson *et al.*, "The Mental Hospital and Marital Family Ties," *op. cit.*

[14] Wood, Rakusin, and Morse, *op. cit.*, have arrived at a related conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the circumstances of admission of forty-eight patients to a Veterans Administration hospital. "There is also evidence to suggest that hospitalization can for some patients be a way of demanding that those close to them change their behavior, just as it can be an ex-

The former accommodation and the way in which it came to be disrupted were important determinants of the processes of "recognizing" the wife as mentally ill, of seeking and using professional help, and of moving the wife from the status of a distressed and behaviorally deviant person within the community to that of a mental patient. These processes, in fact, can only be understood within the context of these family patterns. The problems of early intervention in cases of serious mental illness and of effective intervention in the later crises which ordinarily do come to psychiatric attention cannot even be formulated meaningfully without consideration of these interpersonal processes which determine when, why, and how sick persons become psychiatric patients.

THE OVERINVOLVED MOTHER AND THE MARITAL FAMILY TRIAD

In a contrasting situation found in four cases, the marital partners and their children did not establish a relatively self-contained nuclear family. Rather, family life was organized chronically or periodically around the presence of a maternal figure who took over the wife's domestic and child-rearing functions.[15]

This organization of family life was a conjoint solution to interlocking conflicts of the wife, husband, and mother. In brief, these mothers were possessive and intrusive, motivated to perpetuate their daughters' dependency, and characteristically disposed to assume the "helpful" role in a symbiotic integration with her. The daughters ambivalently pressed for the establishment or maintenance of a dependent relationship with their mothers and struggled to break the inner and outer claims of the maternal attachment. The husbands responded to anxieties of their own about the demands of heterosexual intimacy and marital responsibility, as well as their own ambivalent strivings toward maternal figures, by alternately supporting and protesting the wives' dependence on the maternal figure. The resulting family organization, in which the mother was intermittently or continuously called upon for major assistance, represented an alternative to both a relatively self-contained, independent nuclear family and to marital disruption with the wife returning to live within the parental family.

In direct contrast to the family accommodation described in the preceding section, the wives in "triadic" families did not quietly drift into increasing isolation and autism. Here, sickness or withdrawal by the wife were occasions for intense maternal concern and involvement. This development was ordinarily abetted by the husband. The resulting situation, however, would come to be experienced as threatening by the wife. She would come to view her mother as interfering with her marriage and her fulfilment of her own maternal responsibilities, as restricting her freedom, and as preventing her from growing up. At this point a small but often violent rebellion would ensue, and the husband would now participate with his wife to exclude the mother from family life. Such cycles of reliance on the mother followed by repudiation of her recurred over the years with only minor variations.

This accommodation complicated seeking and using professional help, but in a distinctively different way than in the family setting depicted earlier. Here, the family accommodation included this patterned response to withdrawal, illness, or distress in the wife: the mother replaced the wife in her domestic and child-care functions, and established with the wife a characteristic integration involving a helpless one who needs care and a helpful one who administers it; the husband withdrew to the periphery of the family system, leav-

---

pression by relatives that they are dissatisfied with the patient's behavior."

[15] This person was the wife's mother in three cases, her mother-in-law in the fourth. This distinction is not critical in the present context, and we shall refer to "the wife's mother," etc.

ing the wife and mother bound in a symbiotic interdependency.

In this patterned response, outside help was not simply superfluous but constituted an actual threat to the existing interdependency of mother and daughter (by implying that it was inadequate, unnecessary, or even harmful), whereas in the type of family accommodation previously described, treatment was experienced as a threat to the husband's uninvolvement; here, treatment was a threat to the mother's involvement.

It was the failure of this family accommodation which led to the wife's contact with the physician or psychiatrist. This failure occurred when, simultaneously, the wife rebelled against the maternal attachment but could not establish with her husband the previously effective alternative of temporary repudiation of that attachment. The following example demonstrates these processes:

Mrs. Yale became anxious, confused, and unable to cope with the demands of daily life in the context of increasing withdrawal by her husband combined with increasing inner and outer pressure for reinvolvement with her mother. Her mother, Mrs. Brown, was living with the marital family, tending the house, caring for the child, and remaining by the side of her troubled daughter night and day. Mr. Yale had become increasingly involved in shared interests with a circle of male friends, and felt disaffected from family life.

Mrs. Brown later characterized this period to the research interviewer: "I think Mary resented me because I tried to help and do things for her. She didn't want me to help with her work. She didn't seem to want me around—sort of resented me. She kept saying she wanted to be on her own and that she didn't have confidence because I was always doing things for her. She even resented me doing the dishes. I just wanted to help out." At this point, Mrs. Brown considered her daughter to be seriously emotionally disturbed, and thought psychiatric help would be advisable.

In such cases, the behavior which led family members to doubt the young woman's sanity consisted of hostility, resentment, and accusatory outbursts directed toward the mother. In these violent outbursts toward the maternal figure, the daughter was indeed "not herself." It was at just this point that the daughter's behavior constituted a disruption of the former family pattern of accommodation and led toward involvement with outside helpers. The mother might now view outside helpers as potential allies in re-establishing the earlier interdependency. The psychiatrist, however, was unlikely to fulfil the mother's expectations in this regard, and then he became an heir to the husband in the triadic situation, a potential rival to the mother-daughter symbiosis.

Shortly after outpatient treatment began, Mrs. Brown took her daughter on an extended vacation which effectively interrupted the treatment, detached the daughter from her incipient attachment to the psychiatrist, and re-established the pattern of mother-daughter interdependency with the husband at the periphery of involvement.

We may summarize, then, certain connections between this type of family accommodation and the use of professional help prior to hospitalization. The initial response of the family to the wife's distress was to attempt to reinstate a familiar pattern: a drawing together of mother and daughter in symbiotic interdependency, and a withdrawal of the husband to the periphery of the family. This accommodation was disrupted by the eruption of the daughter's formerly ego-alien resentment toward her mother, and at this point the latter was likely to view physicians or psychiatrists as potential allies in restoring the former equilibrium. The psychiatrist, however, was unlikely to play this part and became, for the mother, a rival to the interdependency. For the daughter, also, this meaning of treatment invested it with the dangerous promise of a possible separation from the maternal figure. In this drama, the husband was likely to play a relatively passive if not a discouraging role, afford-

ing the wife little if any support in what she experienced as a threatening and disloyal involvement outside the family.

The way in which the hospitalization of the wife came about, in the collapse of this family accommodation, also provided contrasts to the processes depicted in the preceding section. As the pre-hospital crisis developed, the wife sought to withdraw from continuing intolerable conflict in the triadic situation. At first, the wife felt impelled to choose between regressive dependency on a maternal figure and the claims of her marital family, but was unable to either relinquish the former or achieve inner and outer support for the latter. Both alternatives were transiently affirmed and repudiated in the period preceding hospitalization, but in time she came to feel alienated from *both* mother and husband, and driven toward increasing *psychic* withdrawal. This process did not resolve her conflicts or remove her from the triadic field, and in time she herself pushed for physical removal.

Thus, in two of the four triadic cases, the wife herself, with a feeling of desperation, explicitly requested hospitalization. In a third case, the disturbed wife was brought to a psychiatrist in the company of both mother and husband, refused to return home with them after the appointment, and was thereupon hospitalized. In the fourth case, the wife was initially cooperative to a hospitalization plan, but equivocation by the husband and psychiatrist delayed action, and the wife gave herself and her daughter an overdose of drugs, thereby precipitating the hospitalization. This last case resembles the most common pattern described in the preceding section, in which the wife is driven to extreme deviance which comes to the attention of the larger community and compels hospitalization. But the secondary pattern, in which a husband takes primary initiative for hospitalizing a reluctant wife because she has become a "millstone around my neck," was entirely absent.

DISCUSSION

The career of the mental patient and his family ordinarily comes to the attention of treatment personnel during the course of an "unmanageable" emergency and fades from view when that emergency is in some way resolved. Prior to this public phase of the crisis, and often again after it, the disturbance of the patient is contained within a community setting. It is the collapse of accommodative patterns *between* the future patient and his interpersonal community which renders the situation unmanageable and ushers in the public phase of the pre-hospital (or rehospitalization) crisis.

Our analysis has been addressed to ways in which two particular organizations of family life have contained pathological processes, to the ways in which these organizations were disrupted, and to the links between family dynamics and recognition of illness, seeking and using professional help, and the circumstances of mental hospitalization. The analysis carries us beyond the observations that families often "tolerate" deviant behavior, may resist "recognition" that the future patient is seriously disturbed, and may be reluctant to use help, toward a systematic view of "typical" accommodations around deviance and typical patterns of crisis.

It is, of course, by no means evident how typical the patterns we have described may be. Although the analysis is confined to certain marital family organizations and does not entirely exhaust our own empirical materials, we suggest that the presentation does touch upon two common situations encountered in work with the mentally ill and their families. In the first situation, the future patient and his immediate interpersonal community move from each other, effect patterns of uninvolvement, and reciprocate withdrawal by withdrawal. The future patient moves, and is moved, toward exclusion from interpersonal ties and from any meaningful links to a position in communal reality. This situation, as we have seen, is compatible

with very high "tolerance for deviant behavior," which may permit an actively psychotic patient to remain *in* the community while not psychosocially *of* it.

The accommodation may be disrupted by a shift in the "tolerance" of the interpersonal community, however determined,[16] or from the side of the future patient by increasing agitation which signals an attempt to break out of inner and outer isolation. Here, hospitalization is a possible route toward further disengagement of the patient from his interpersonal community, or conversely, toward re-establishment of reciprocal expectations compatible with re-engagement. Whatever the outcome, a strategic therapeutic problem is posed by the chronic pattern of mutual disinvolvement and withdrawal.

In the second situation, the future patient and a member of his immediate interpersonal community become locked in mutual involvement, effect patterns of intense interdependency, and reciprocate withdrawal by concern. The future patient moves and is moved toward a bond in which interlocking needs tie the participants together rather than isolate them. This situation is also compatible with high tolerance for deviant behavior, but here because the deviance has become a necessary component of the family integration. It is this type of family process, rather than the first type, which has attracted most psychiatric interest,[17] although there is no reason from our data to suppose that it is the more common.

In the cases observed the disruption of this accommodation took the form of an ego-alien movement by the future patient against the claims of the overwhelming attachment. Here, hospitalization is at once a route of escape from intolerable conflict in the interpersonal community, and a potential pathway toward re-establishing the earlier pattern of accommodation. The strategic therapeutic problem posed is the contrasting one of modification of a chronic pattern of intense involvement.

The observations reported do not yield precise knowledge as to how psychiatric intervention might routinely be brought about early in the development of a serious mental illness, whether or when this is advisable, and how intervention might be more effective later on. The observations indicate, rather, that we must confront these questions in their real complexity, and investigate more closely and persistently than heretofore the characteristic ways in which families cope with severe psychiatric disturbances, the ways in which these intra-family mechanisms are disrupted, and the significance of the family dynamics which form the crucial background of the eventual encounter between patient and clinician.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

[16] The determinants may be extraneous to inherent family processes. Thus, in a case not included in the present sample, the movement of a family from farm to city altered the family's capacity to retain a psychotic young man and precipitated his hospitalization.

[17] See Jackson (ed.), *op. cit.*

CONFLICTING GROUP NORMS AND THE "THIRD" PERSON IN THE INTERVIEW[1]

PHILIP TAIETZ

ABSTRACT

The structure of the interviewing situation when employed as a variable in the analysis of survey data reveals lack of consensus with respect to norms of attitudes toward the extended family in a particular social system. There is a significant difference in the proportions of aged respondents favoring the extended family in the three types of interviewing situations in which a "third" person was present: spouse present only; spouse and children present; children present only. Inasmuch as a certain proportion of research interviews is conducted when a "third" person is present, the implications of this finding for social research are apparent.

This paper shows how the structure of the interviewing situation as a variable in the analysis of survey data can uncover conflicting group norms.[2] Specifically it demonstrates that the presence of a "third" person in the interview can modify the expression of attitudes in the interview and thus bias the findings.

The analysis discussed here was made by the writer during an investigation of the reported changes in attitudes toward the extended family in the eastern part of Holland. According to Dutch sociologists,[3] the extended family in this region has been viewed historically as morally obligatory. However, they contend that dissatisfaction with the extended family system is being expressed by the younger generation.[4] If these observations are accurate, then it can be expected that many aged persons who share a common residence with their children will be in a situation of cross-pressure between the traditional norms which they hold and the transitional norms of the children. The initial task of the research was, therefore, to ascertain the presence or absence of agreement between the two groups with reference to the norms of the extended family.

PROCEDURE

The data were collected in two rural municipalities in the eastern part of the Neth-

[1] The data for this study were collected in Holland in 1958 under a Fulbright Research Grant. Supplementary funds for the field work were provided by the United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands and the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Netherlands. Funds for the analysis of the data were provided by the Faculty Research Grants Committee of Cornell University. I am most grateful to E. W. Hofstee, Head, Department of Rural Sociology, Agricultural University, Wageningen, The Netherlands, for making available to me the facilities of his department and for many other courtesies. Thanks are also due G. A. Kooy for his assistance in making arrangements with officials of the two municipalities and to W. J. Vriezen who proved to be a devoted and talented research assistant. Finally, I want to thank the following for their helpful criticisms and suggestions: Bert L. Ellenbogen, William M. Evan, Rose K. Goldsen, John Harp, Gordon F. Streib, J. Mayone Stycos, and Wayne E. Thompson.

[2] For an excellent theoretical statement on conflicting norms see Samuel A. Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," *American Sociological Review*, XIV (December, 1949), 707–17.

[3] See, e.g., E. W. Hofstee, *Rural Life and Rural Welfare in the Netherlands* (The Hague: Government Printing and Publishing Office, 1957), p. 327; E. W. Hofstee and G. A. Kooy, "Traditional Household and Neighborhood Group: Survivals of the Geneological-Territorial Societal Patterns in Eastern Parts of the Netherlands," *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, 1956*, IV, 75–79.

[4] Thus Hofstee (*Rural Life and Rural Welfare in the Netherlands*, p. 327) notes: "Objections against the present situation are in the first place raised by the son and daughter-in-law, who are living with their parents, probably more in particular by the latter. The lack of intimacy within the family circle resulting from the living together with the large family group is more and more felt as a serious drawback."

erlands. The sample, consisting of 200 men and 155 women sixty-five years of age or older, was randomly selected from the official municipal register and represented one third of all persons in this age category in the two municipalities.

Eighty-five per cent of the respondents had surviving children and of these 79 per cent shared a household with one or more of their children. However, sharing a household with children does not imply dependence on the children; in fact, 70 per cent of these aged persons were the heads of households. They had a total of 692 surviving sons and 745 surviving daughters. Thirty per cent of the sons and 19 per cent of the daughters lived in the same household with their aged parents; 45 per cent of the sons and 51 per cent of the daughters lived within five miles of their parents. Seven out of every ten of the aged had a visit, at least weekly, from one of their children who lived away from home.

Thus, one ideal requirement of a study of this kind was met: the aged persons and their children should in fact share a common residence. A second ideal requirement, namely, that observations should be made of both the parent and the children, preferably in the interacting milieu of the extended family, was not part of the research design. However, 78 per cent of the interviews approximated such an interaction model in that children, the spouse, or a combination of these, were present during the interview. Thus, in four out of five cases, we had situations where interaction had a saliency which cannot be duplicated in laboratory or hypothetical situations.

Traditional extended family attitudes were measured by the responses to the following items:

1. Old people are happiest when they live in the same house with their children.
2. It is better for a young married couple to have their own home than to live in the same house with their parents.
3. To live with one's children is very desirable.
4. If you had your choice, which one of the following living arrangements would you choose for yourself? [live with children]

Agree responses to items 1, 3, and 4 and a disagree response to item 2 were interpreted to mean that the respondent was oriented to the extended family and that the responses were aspects of a traditional orientation. Negative responses to items 1, 3, and 4 and an agree response to item 2 were interpreted as being not oriented to the extended family or to the traditional orientation. The existence of agreement or lack of agreement was measured by the differences in the proportion of responses in the following interview groups: (1) respondent and spouse; (2) respondent and child; (3) respondent, spouse, and child. In all three groups the interviewer was, of course, also present.

On the basis of the substantial research on the influence of the group on the behavior, attitudes, and opinions of its members,[5] we hypothesized that the responses to attitude items dealing with the extended family would be influenced by the relationship of the "third" person to the respondent: Responses given in the presence of a spouse were expected to differ significantly from responses given in the presence of a child or when both are present. Underlying this hypothesis is the assumption that differences result from the differing values held

[5] See, e.g., George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950); Raymond L. Gorden, "Interaction between Attitude and the Definition of the Situation in the Expression of Opinion," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (February, 1952), 50–58; and the following articles in *Readings in Social Psychology*, ed. Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley (2d ed.; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952): Muzafer Sherif, "Group Influences upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes," pp 249–62; S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," pp. 2–10; W. W. Charters, Jr., and Theodore M. Newcomb, "Some Attitudinal Effects of Experimentally Increased Salience of a Membership Group," pp. 415–19; and Theodore M. Newcomb, "Attitude Development as a Function of Reference Groups: The Bennington Study," pp. 420–29.

by parents and their children concerning the extended family. Unless such a lack of agreement is found, we would have little basis for assuming that the aged in extended families were subjected to cross-pressures.

FINDINGS

The data in Table 1 offer support for our hypothesis. There is a significant difference in the proportion of aged respondents giving the traditional extended family responses in the three types of interviewing situations for each of the four items. We note, furthermore, that a significantly higher proportion of the aged give the traditional response when the children alone are present than when the spouse alone, or children and spouse are present. Thus, the aged respondents in the presence of their children more often express the view that old people are happiest when they live in the same house with their children; that it is better for a young married couple to live in the same house with their parents; that living with their children is very desirable; and that if they had their choice they would live with their children.

Additional support for the hypothesis is given by comparing the No "Third" Person Present interviewing situation (D) with the three other interviewing situations (A, B, C) (see Table 1). There is a significant difference between the Children Present Only situation (C) and all other situations taken together (A, B, D) and also between the Spouse Present Only situation (A) and all the others (B, C, D). No differences are found when the Spouse and Children Present situation (B) and the No "Third" Person Present situation (D) are similarly compared. These findings show two things: (1) it is the particular relationship of the "other" to the respondent and not the mere presence of a "third" person that is the influencing factor, and (2) the influence of the son is in a direction opposite to that of the spouse so that when the son and spouse are both present in the interview, the effect is neutralized.

TABLE 1

PER CENT GIVING EXTENDED FAMILY RESPONSE ACCORDING TO PRESENCE AND RELATIONSHIP OF "THIRD" PERSON IN INTERVIEW

Statement	Spouse Present Only (A)	Spouse and Children Present (B)	Children Present Only (C)	No "Third" Person Present (D)
Old people are happiest when they live in the same house with their children (agree)*	55† (33)§	80 (50)	88‡ (91)	79 (34)
It is better for a young married couple to have their own home than to live in the same house with their parents (disagree)‖	3# (34)	12 (41)	21# (75)	12 (32)
To live with one's children is very desirable (agree)*	24‡ (37)	36 (61)	58‡ (91)	52 (37)
If had choice, would live with children (agree)*	22† (36)	60 (62)	78† (94)	58 (36)

* Differences among interviewing situations A, B, and C significant at 001

† Difference between this and all other interviewing situations combined significant at 001

‡ Difference between this and all other interviewing situations combined significant at 01.

§ Numbers in parentheses indicate number of cases.

‖ Differences among interviewing situations A, B, and C significant at 05.

Difference between this and all other interviewing situations combined significant at 05

The finding that the aged respondents tend to give a traditional response in the

presence of their children is contrary to our expectations. This apparent inconsistency may be accounted for by the fact that social norms, as well as sanctions, may become unclear and ambiguous for a period in societies in transition. In the context of the present study, the old person is placed in the difficult position of both defending the extended family because he views it as normative and at the same time recognizing the inevitability of social change.

Faced with this anomaly the old person may fall back upon his[6] traditional role relationship to his children—that of transmitting the culture. If, as the Dutch sociologists claim, the extended family has been the normative pattern historically, then it would be reasonable to assume that the respondent had socialized his children to believe that the extended family was the best way to live. For the old parent to state in the presence of his child and a stranger (the interviewer) that the traditional family is no longer desirable would be to admit failure in the socialization of his children. Since the respondents are presently living with their children in an extended family it would be all the more incongruous if the expression of their attitudes did not conform to their behavior. In responding with a traditional extended family orientation in the presence of his children the old parent is also in a sense serving notice on them that the extended family norms are far from extinct.

In the presence of his spouse the respondent perceives the situation from the point of view of his status as spouse and his role as culture bearer. Here he does not need to maintain a point of view about the extended family which experience has shown to be in transition. His spouse, who is of the same generation, is likely to share common beliefs and values about the extended family. He can verbalize his beliefs regarding the changing function of the extended family in the presence of his spouse without feeling that he has disappointed her expectations of him.

The situation in which both spouse and children are present represents a conflict in norms between the old person's status and role as spouse and parent. Thus we would expect the responses of the aged in the presence of spouse and children together to fluctuate between the proportion of responses in the presence of spouse alone and children alone. Our expectations were confirmed. Table 1 shows that in each of the four items the proportion of traditional extended family responses in the presence of spouse and children is intermediate between that of the two other categories.

It may be asked whether the lack of intergenerational agreement concerning the extended family is perhaps indicative of a lack of general ideological consensus. To test this hypothesis, the aged respondents were asked to react to the following statement: "So far as ideas are concerned, parents and children live in different worlds." Four out of five agreed, and the proportions were practically identical regardless of who else was present during the interview. In other words, the aged respondents believe that they and their children do not share common ideologies, and they perceive that their children think likewise. This finding is supported by the theorizing of Linton that there is a tendency for members of age-sex categories to develop a sense of category solidarity[7] and by the theorizing of Mannheim that members of a particular generation or age group have characteristic modes of thought and experience.[8] Thus, the possibility of consensus regarding family values and living arrangements for the aged is more likely in the case of the old person and his spouse than in the case of the old person and his children.

[6] For the sake of simplicity the masculine pronoun is used, but it should be remembered that we are dealing with old women as well as old men.

[7] Ralph Linton, "Age and Sex Categories," *American Sociological Review*, VII (September, 1942), 580–603.

[8] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), pp. 286–320.

This study has focused its attention on the effect of the "third" person on the behavior of respondents in the interview. Although an analysis of interviewer effect is not specifically related to our concern, we are interested in the role of the interviewer to the extent that it can explain the influence of the "third" person. The interviewer, like the respondent or the "third" person, is a participant in the social interaction that takes place in the group. Further, there is evidence that the behavior of respondents is affected by the age of the interviewer.[9] In this study most of the interviewers were college students in their early twenties and in this respect resembled the respondent's children. This would seem to reinforce the aged person's perception of intergenerational differences. If this assumption is correct we would expect the responses in the dyad interviews to resemble more closely the interviews in which children were present rather than the interviews in which the spouse alone was present.

Table 1 shows that our expectations were confirmed. In each of the items the proportion of traditional extended family responses in the dyad interview is closest to the interview groups in which children are present. Conversely, the responses produced in the dyad interviews are least like the responses obtained when the "third" person is the spouse alone.

The degree to which the interviewer reinforced the respondent's perception of intergenerational differences is related to the ratio of old to young persons found in the interview situation. Table 2 shows that the interview situations in which aged persons predominate have the lowest proportion of traditional extended family responses; conversely, interviews in which the young predominate have the highest proportion of traditional extended family responses. Interview situations which are equally divided between the aged and the young are intermediate to the highest and lowest proportions.

Before considering the implications of our findings for research it is desirable to raise certain questions about the findings themselves. May it not be that the differences we found were due not to the presence of certain "third" persons but rather to other, underlying factors responsible for the presence of these persons? Furthermore, is it not possible that certain social characteristics of the aged respondents such as widowhood, being retired, or living with their children in a dependent relationship may render the aged respondents susceptible to a favorable response to the extended family items? Such considerations suggest that the institution of the extended family is of particular importance to those of advanced age, to the widowed, dependent, and retired respondents because of the greater likelihood of present or future need for living with their children. These situations would seem not only to place the aged persons in an insecure position so that they would not want to offend their children by showing lack of gratitude but also to cause them to overemphasize in the presence of their children the importance of living with them.

The impact of these situational factors

TABLE 2

RATIO OF OLD TO YOUNG PERSONS IN INTERVIEW GROUPS AND RANK ORDER OF EXTENDED FAMILY RESPONSES

Composition of Interview Group	Ratio of Old to Young Persons	Rank Order of Proportions of Extended Family Responses (Low to High)
1. Respondent, spouse, interviewer......	2:1	1
2. Respondent, spouse, child, interviewer . ..	2:2	2
3. Respondent, interviewer........	1:1	3
4. Respondent, child, interviewer	1:2	4

[9] Mark Benny, David Riesman, and Shirley A. Star, "Age and Sex in the Interview," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII (September, 1956), 143–52.

was tested in the four types of interviewing situations for each of the four items by controlling the following variables: (*a*) age (65–69; 70–74; 75 and over); (*b*) marital status; (*c*) occupational status (retired or active); (*d*) family status (head of household or dependent on child who is head of household); and (*e*) sex. The introduction of the last variable was based on the assumption that women were more likely than men to conform to the expectations of their children.

A χ^2 analysis revealed no significant relationship between the interviewing situation and attitudes toward the extended family when age, sex, occupational status, and family status are held constant. When marital status is controlled, only one of eight relationships reached an acceptable level of significance ($P < .05$). That is, the widowed more often than the married agree in the presence of their children that "old people are happiest when they live in the same house with their children."

These findings give us some assurance that it is most likely the presence of certain "third" persons in the interview rather than the situational factors that produced the noted differences in the responses.

IMPLICATIONS

This study has important implications for social research since a considerable portion of sociological knowledge is the product of the analysis of opinions and attitudes obtained by means of personal interviews. The findings serve as yet another reminder that the research interview, like any other form of social action, is dynamic. The answers which the respondent gives to the interviewer are only part of the data: They also reflect the respondent's judgment of what is appropriate behavior in view of his perception of his role and status vis-à-vis the role and status of the other persons in the interview. Furthermore, the findings should cause researchers who would overlook the non-private responses in the analysis of their data to give pause.

It should be recognized that what a person states to the interviewer in the controlled situation of the private interview is not necessarily more significant or more valuable than what he states when others are present during the interview. The assertions of the respondent may be different in the two situations: It is this difference and the factors in the interaction process which produce it that are important. For example, it may be asked: Which percentage expresses the "real" attitudes of the respondent's preference for living with children? Is it the 22 per cent who expressed this preference in the presence of their spouse? Is it the 78 per cent who expressed this preference in the presence of the children? Or is it the 60 per cent who expressed this attitude when both children and spouse were present in the interview?

The only answer that one can give at this time is that all the responses are "true" in terms of the situation in which they are produced! The pertinent fact is that the attitudinal responses will be different if other persons are present in the interview and that comparability of cases is thus jeopardized.

It is generally agreed that the research design is determined by the research problem. The interview model is likewise determined by the research problem. The research design may call for private interviews with individual respondents, or it may call for group interviews, for example, husband and wife together, or conceivably an entire family group.[10] It may stipulate that the interviews be conducted in the home, in the factory, in the office, on the farm, or in a mobile interviewing unit, to mention only a few of the possible interview settings. But since the data for most surveys are collected by means of private interviews in the respondent's home, it is inevitable that in a certain proportion of interviews persons other than the respond-

[10] See, e.g., Fred L. Strodtbeck, "The Family as a Three-Person Group," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (February, 1956), 20–29.

ent will also be present.[11] It is the thesis of this study that if private interviews are called for by the research design (whether explicit or implicit) then private interviews must be obtained or there is a possibility that comparability of cases will be jeopardized. Furthermore, our data suggest that the greatest jeopardy to comparability of cases will be in those questions which tap attitudes rather than objective data. The presence of a "third" person was found to have no statistically significant effect on objective information such as: number of years respondent has lived in municipality, place of birth, or size of farm.

In view of the strong emphasis that is placed on rigorous scientific standards in social research, it is puzzling to find so little attention paid to the importance of the private interview in the data-collection and analysis phases of the research. There has been no lack of research on the interview, although explicit definitions of the interview are rare.[12] The role of the interviewer, the sources of bias traceable to the interviewer, the consequences of disparities in group membership between the interviewer and the respondent, and other aspects of the interview have been documented in a series of studies.[13] A certain proportion of investigators is aware of the possible bias introduced by the "third" person.[14] A very few studies have reported on the effect on the respondent of the presence of the "third" person in the interview.[15] But the writer has been unable to find a published study which treats systematically (1) the extent to which privacy was violated in the interview, (2) the relationship of the "third" person to the respondent, (3) the use of the structure of the interviewing situation as a variable in the analysis of the data, or (4) attempts to explain the differences found between private and non-private interviews.

It may be of interest to speculate why there is no systematic treatment of the subject of the privacy of the research interview. First, it may be noted that it is easier to control the interviewer situation

[11] On the basis of informal inquiries among colleagues engaged in surveys it would seem that 10 per cent would be a modest estimate of the proportion of non-private interviews that occur in the typical survey.

[12] The following definition by Theodore Caplow is a good example of specificity: "The interview may be defined as a two-person conversation, conducted by one of the participants in accordance with a definite program" ("The Dynamics of Information Interviewing," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII [September, 1956], 165–71).

[13] Herbert H. Hyman, with William J. Cobb, Jacob J. Feldman, Clyde W. Hart, and Charles Herbert Stember, *Interviewing in Social Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Eleanor E. Maccoby and Nathan Maccoby, "The Interview: A Tool of Social Science,' in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), Vol. I, chap. xii; "The Interview in Social Research," Special Issue, *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII (September, 1956).

[14] See, e.g., William J. Goode, *After Divorce* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 349; Reuben Hill, *Families under Stress* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), p. 390; Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co, 1948), p. 7; Gordon F. Streib, "The Use of Survey Methods among the Navaho," *American Anthropologist*, LIV (January–March, 1952), 30–40; Kurt W. Back and J. Mayone Stycos, "The Survey under Unusual Conditions" (Ithaca, N.Y.: Society for Applied Anthropology, Monograph No. 1, 1959); Philip Taietz, *Administrative Practices and Personal Adjustment in Homes for the Aged* (Bull No. 899 [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1953]), p. 7.

[15] Bryce Ryan, who studied fertility in a Sinhalese village makes the following observation: "It was sharply evident to the interviewers that infinite numbers of children were an unqualified blessing in situations where several women were present" ("Institutional Factors in Sinhalese Society," *Milbank Memorial Quarterly*, XXX [October, 1952], 359). Maccoby and Maccoby, *op. cit.*, p. 465, cite a study of the readjustment of returned veterans: "when the veteran's wife was present during the interview, he was more likely to complain about unfair treatment by the public than if she were not present, and he was less likely to express resentment toward civilians who asked him about his war experiences if others were present."

than the interviewee situation. For example, knowing from research findings that young, educated, female interviewers are most effective in obtaining interviews in a particular research problem, efforts will be directed toward selecting interviewers with the indicated characteristics. But it is quite a different matter to change a non-private interview situation into one that is private.

Another possible explanation is that obtaining a private interview requires skill and experience which many interviewers in social research do not have.[16] It is also expensive in terms of time and cost. Furthermore, the norm of the private interview may not be taken very seriously by some interviewers who do not report deviations from the dyad model. They may do this either to protect themselves from criticism or because they are not sufficiently indoctrinated during their training with the importance of private interviews or with the importance of reporting deviations.[17]

It is likely that even with the most persistent efforts and ingenious techniques, it will not always be possible to obtain private interviews. As this paper has pointed out, the obtaining of non-private interviews can be exploited to the advantage of the study if the suggested procedures are kept in mind. Thus, the utilization of the structure of the interviewing situation as a variable in the analysis of the data may produce unanticipated insights into the structure and function of the social system under investigation. As an illustration of this phenomenon, we have attempted to demonstrate that conflicting group norms may be revealed through differences in responses which are produced when salient "third" persons are present in the interview.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

[16] An excellent, detailed account of the difficulties experienced in obtaining private interviews and of some perceptive ways of overcoming obstacles to privacy is found in Back and Stycos, *op. cit.*

[17] One way of obtaining a private interview is to engage in the common practice of substituting respondents. This results in merely substituting one type of bias for another. In this case the increase in sampling error is substituted for the bias introduced by the non-private interview.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION OF C. WRIGHT MILLS

IN MEMORIAM

IRVING L. HOROWITZ

American sociology has lost an enormous talent with the death of C. Wright Mills on March 21, 1962, at the age of forty-six. But American society lost even more—an authentic voice of an authentic liberalism. Mills's sociological imagination stood for a style of intellectual work inherited from the French Enlightenment. Like Diderot, Voltaire, Helvetius, and the men of the *Encyclopédie,* Mills saw the essential task of sociology (and intellect generally) as the confrontation of the action situation with critical intelligence. Theory was not a sop to action but, in its critical function, was itself a species of action—and a dangerous species at that.

This strong Enlightenment belief in the autonomy and utility of critical intelligence had a practical side. Just as the *Encyclopédie* was intended to cut through the morass of inherited oracular academicism, so Mills envisioned his mission as necessarily being limited only by the number of people who could be reached intellectually and touched emotionally. It is for this reason that Mills felt a keen need to relate sociological imagination to what heretofore has been a "bad word"—journalism. It is no accident that in Mills's collection of writings of political sociology and social stratification, the lead article is by Walter Lippmann. For here was the embodiment of how the journalist can function when he reaches the highest point of his profession, a scholar. Mills clearly sought to get to the same point in reverse direction—to get from sociology to his beloved "public" through the employment of journalism of Lippmann's type.[1] Sociology was good if it helped the student better understand what was going on in the world—and that world is revealed most directly and organically in the daily press.

Mills was prepared to accept the fact that almost all sociological inquiry is comparative and relative in nature. What he insisted upon was not an absolute measuring rod of a predeterminist historical variety but simply that the comparative method is itself necessarily historical in character. "To compare" means to do so in time no less than in space. His objection to "narrow empiricism" was that it compared spatially as if time had no reality or bearing on the human subject. He also remained untouched by Hegelianism—as it emerges in sociology as "grand theory"—wherein time is substituted for space, rather than the two being fused.

The uses of historical sociology (for Mills *all* sociology is historical) guarantee sociology a place in the scientific sun because it need no longer be assumed that there is an "essential human nature" or a "mysterious core" to men in their social interaction. "Abstractions" of this kind, or any other kind for that matter, disturbed Mills. He was empiricist enough to understand that what sociologists observe are men struggling, men battling, men killing, men making revolutions. The sociologist does not observe inevitabilities, equilibrium systems, or any parceling of men into neat subspecializations of sociology. This accounts in good measure for the practical need of Mills to write on revolution,[2] on thermonuclear war,[3] on minority migrations,[4] on middle-class life in America,[5] and on the growth of an elite in the American labor movement.[6]

Sociology helps men "know where they stand, where they may be going, and what—

[1] C. Wright Mills (ed.), *Images of Man: The Classic Tradition in Sociological Thinking* (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960).

[2] *Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba* (New York. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960).

[3] The Causes of World War Three (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1958).

[4] *The Puerto Rican Journey: New York's Newest Migrants* (with Clarence Senior and Rose K. Goldsen) (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).

[5] *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951).

[6] *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* (with the assistance of Helen Schneider) (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948).

if anything—they can do about the present as history and the future as responsibility."[7] Mills boldly employed the "neo-machiavellians"—the great sociologists of the Franco-Italian tradition as no other American sociologist before him. The work of Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and Sorel deeply influenced his thinking on questions, not because they demonstrated that men were often irrational in their behavioral patterns. This he knew without them. What they did was offer sociology what Freud and his circle offered psychology—a *rational explanation* for irrational behavior. What made these men important was their development of a scale of measuring irrational behavior which to his mind was unsurpassed, and was basically left unaccounted for in the calculations of the "biographers" who wrote the *Chroniques scandaleuses,* and the "historians" who wrote of ideology and *Wissenssoziologie.* That the "manipulation" of men was possible Mills did not doubt. But that the message of the great sociologists of the past, not only dealt with the *mechanisms of persuasion,* but also in this very process, provided a *system of clarification,* proved for Mills that sociology could *cure* social ills as well as account for them. And any science of human beings had to have this prescriptive value—just as does medicine and psychology.

I have saved for last an accounting of Mills's relation to Weber and Marx. Of the former, little can be added to Mills's already masterful introduction to *From Max Weber.*[8] The use of multivariate analysis in political sociology, the irreducibility of class, status, and power as sociological variables, the role of charisma and rational authority in the organization of social life, the place of bureaucracy in the modern corporate State—all of these are embodied in Mills's writings—not as formal elaborations, or as "systems of sociology," but as working tools in the analysis of observable facts of human intercourse. With Marx, the situation is different. Mills came to a serious accounting of Marx very late in his career. Only in his last work does he offer an analysis of Marx on his own terms and not simply as part of the "classic tradition."[9] And like latecomers, he tended to allow his enthusiasm to interfere with his judgment so that every nondescript piece of romantic, pre-revolutionary fancy tended to capture his fancy. For Mills the writings of the Marxists—Luxemburg, Kautsky, Bebel, etc.—were like an uncovering of the Dead Sea Scrolls.

The impact of these writings on Mills's general vision of sociology can be grasped only in light of his conviction concerning the bankruptcy of the liberal tradition with which he was in such sympathy. The blasphemy of liberalism as a credo was that it succeeded, and in its success occurred the natural history of a dominant force—a conservative bias in all critical spheres of life. To find meaning to liberalism, to redefine it in terms of modern needs, meant to turn to the Marxians.

For Mills the Marxians were *every* shading of radical opinion claiming to represent the truth of Marx and the truth of socialism. Marx was the only legitimate Marxist. The others—from Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky, to Ernesto Guevara and Mao Tse Tung—were "revisionists." And revision is a good thing to Mills. It prevents a doctrine from stagnating, it keeps alive the critical spirit. It makes for a lively dialogue. Thus, in his last period Mills became convinced that the real options for a social science still concerned with the realities of history and power were *within* Marxism, rather than between Marxism and liberalism, or Marxism and conservatism. Liberalism, in the sense of differences of opinion, concern for problems of real men, interest in problems of democracy, authority, and power, was thus embodied within the varieties of Marxism. In this sense, Mills was in his last days to become a Marxian. But this entailed no party affiliations, no ritualistic attachment to dogma, and no pieties for any one figure over another. To the end, Mills harbored deep antagonisms for Marxians of the Communist variety. In Cuba, he accused them of jingoism and cowardice for failure to go to the Sierra Maestra with his beloved "Fidel" on the limp excuse that such would be romanticism. In Russia, he accused Khrushchev and his fellow leaders of cowardice in the face of Stalinism, and calumny afterward. In fact, Mills's personal feelings ran high for the "romantic reformers" in Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Poland. In this he saw the continuation of the liberal dialogue at an-

[7] *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 165.

[8] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (edited with Hans H. Gerth) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

[9] *The Marxists* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962).

other level, suitable for another stage of historical development.

At the time of his death, Mills had several manuscripts in preparation. He was most anxious to follow his volume on *The Marxians* with one to be called *The Anarchists* and another on *The Trotskyists*. And how he adored these people, Bakunin, Sorel, Kropotkin, Thoreau, De Leon and Emma Goldman, who made up in political posture what they lacked in sociological sophistication. Another work in preparation—tentatively entitled *Tovarisch: Letters to Ivan*—was going to fuse all of this sociological understanding and anarchist philosophy into a critical statement of the Russian polity, from the viewpoint of an American radical, a free spirit, and a dedicated social scientist.

What is indisputably clear, however, is that Mills never ceased being a sociologist. True enough, he eschewed graduate teaching for undergraduate teaching (he once explained this by saying: "why should I teach three case-hardened and crystallized people when I can teach three hundred young and open minds with the same expenditure of energy?"). It is also true that he paid little heed to the politics of the American Sociological Association. But these hardly form a basis for dismissing him (symbolically, to be sure) from the sociological community. Mills offered a provocative frame of reference which demanded (and did not always receive) straight answers. He pushed his conclusions beyond the evidence because only in this way could the dialogue ("thinking in opposites") which nourishes the sociological imagination be extended. It is casuistry to say that Mills divided sociologists into camps: What he did was help make possible a sociological dialogue.

In outlining the essential content of intellectual craftsmanship, Mills reveals the motivating force behind his own work, thus providing perhaps the most fitting and the final epitaph to it:

> Know that you inherit and are carrying on the tradition of classic social analysis; so try to understand man not as an isolated fragment, not as an intelligible field or system in and of itself. Try to understand men and women as historical and social actors, and the ways in which the variety of men and women are intricately selected and intricately formed by the variety of human societies. Before you are through with any piece of work, no matter how indirectly on occasion, orient it to the central and continuing task of understanding the structure and the drift, the shaping and the meanings, of your own period, the terrible and magnificent world of human society in the second half of the twentieth century.[10]

Hobart and William Smith Colleges

[10] *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 225.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

BOSE, "PEASANT VALUES AND INNOVATION IN INDIA"

April 26, 1962

To the Editor:

Santi Priya Bose, in his article "Peasant Values and Innovation in India," concludes that "people with tradition-oriented folk-type values are more resistant to change than people with urban-oriented values." While the study is commendable for its careful design, there are methodological and theoretical blocks to this reader's acceptance of the author's conclusions.

Bose's sample was chosen randomly from a list of farmers cultivating over three acres of land. These showed a wide range in number of acres cultivated and number of years of education. They were both Muslim and Hindu, and it is not known which or how many caste groups were represented in the Hindu portion of the sample. These factors could make a large difference in the author's data in the following ways:

1. The number of acres of land cultivated per number of people in the family of the farmer might determine how much available capital the family had for investment in new techniques of farming or in education of members of the family. A farmer with three acres and a large family would be expected to have fewer innovations than a farmer with twenty acres and either a large or a small family.

2. The socioeconomic status of the individual in the community, either by caste or by economic status within the caste, may determine somewhat the extent to which a family adheres to the traditional values of the Hindu or the Muslim society. Dube (1955) has noted that adherence to traditional values is a key to upward caste mobility. The caste, income, and mobility of the subjects influence attitudes to an unknown degree.

3. The educational level of the subjects, which as reported ranges from no schooling at all to two years in college, is certain to influence the exposure to methods of improvement and exposure to rationalism, science, and the business attitude. How do attitudes correlate with the educational level? Might the latter be a third common factor which correlates highly with the other two variables? Given the lateness of the Muslim response to the Western impact in comparison with the Hindu group, might not exposure to education explain the lower Muslim scores?

Perhaps the author, with his fuller knowledge of Bengal, felt justified in omitting these factors. If so, his reasons would be welcomed by the reader.

The subjects were interviewed at the Block Development Office by the author and two agricultural officers of the region. More information would be welcomed on the nature of the Block Development Office and its formality and strangeness to the villagers, and how many, if any, were resistant to coming there; in short, what bias might have been introduced by the interview setting? It would also be helpful to know what the comparative answers and ratings were between the author and his co-interviewers. Elmo Wilson, in his article "Problems of Survey Research in Modernizing Areas" (*Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1958, pp. 231–34), notes the subtle problems of dialogue with the anxious villager. While it is recognized that agricultural officers have great knowledge of their areas, and of the possible innovations, what bias is introduced by the mere fact of their being *agricultural officers* committed to improvement? The adoption index was from interviewee response alone.

In the post test for stability, to what extent does the factor of presensitization

striving for internal consistency explain the high correlation of stability which the author obtained? Might not a different sample, matched for background, have served his purpose better?

Finally, the main block to the acceptance of the article is of a theoretical nature. Even assuming the perfect validity and reliability of the author's data, can we assume the implied causal link between attitudes and innovation? Could it not be that attitudes follow acceptance, following Festinger's theory of cognitive adjustment? Could it not be that the traditionalism of one family is reinforced as a rationalization for non-acceptance of innovation which it cannot afford; or that rationalism and scientism are reinforced as a rationalization for deviation from tradition by those who have adopted new practices for totally different reasons? Here is where educational and socioeconomic data would be most helpful in clarification of the point.

While the attempt to apply the Weberian hypothesis to the Indian society and take that hypothesis beyond the realm of conjecture is laudable and while Mr. Bose has made a brave start, this reader would beg more data before accepting the author's conclusions.

BEVERLY DODSON

Oberlin College

REJOINDER

May 11, 1962

To the Editor:

In her letter Beverly Dodson points out that size of cultivable area per person, educational level of the farmer, and caste might influence adoption of agricultural practices. With this view I would entirely agree. The study aimed at finding out if and to what extent the value system of the farmers influenced their economic behavior. The acceptance of the association between adoption and the three variables is not contradictory to our accepting the influence of values.

My colleague, Dr. A. W. van den Ban, of the University of Wageningen, worked on the correlation matrix of the variables and he wrote as follows:

"I have analysed your correlation matrix a little bit further with factor analysis.[1] This gave the results shown in Table 1.

"After some rotations and squaring the factor loadings, I got the results shown in Table 2. This means that you have been able to explain 59 per cent of the variation in the adoption scores, whereas to my knowledge the highest figure from studies published previously was 52 per cent.[2] My guess is that you could even reach a higher figure if you included situational factors, like farm size, literacy, and caste group."

In a paper published in 1961, I showed that caste and literacy were associated with adoption.[3] Charles Freeman, working with Indian data, came to the conclusion that families of upper economic status tended to accept the recommended agricultural practices more than families of lower economic status.[4] So I would not dispute the influence of the variables mentioned by Miss Dodson. All I would say is that my objective was to see whether a value system influenced economic behavior. The existence of other factors does not invalidate the conclusion arrived at. Economic behavior is determined by a multiplicity of factors, and the data, I hope, show that values constitute a major factor.

[1] See H. M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 383–89.

[2] James H. Copp, "Toward Generalization in Farm Practice Research," *Rural Sociology* (June, 1958).

[3] Santi Priya Bose, "Characteristics of Farmers Who Adopt Agricultural Practices in Indian Villages," *Rural Sociology* (1961).

[4] Charles Freeman, "Economic Status and Adoption of New Agricultural and Home Practices," in *Sociology, Social Research and Social Problems in India*, ed. R. N. Saksena (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961).

Miss Dodson states that socioeconomic status of the individual as determined by economic status or caste has a role to play in determining to what extent the individual will adhere to traditional values. In support she refers to Dube, who has noted that adherence to traditional values is a key to upward mobility. Now the "tradition" referred to by Dube is the "Sanskritic" tradition. Tribal groups and low-caste people adopt norms of the Hindu tradition so that such adoption may give them higher status. The "tradition" referred to by me is "conservatism" of individuals. These two "traditions" seem to have been confused with each other. Therefore, when we say that tradition-oriented farmers do not adopt new technology, what we mean is that individuals adhering to their own traditional norms resist change as opposed to those individuals not adhering to their own societal norms firmly.

TABLE 1

	$\lambda_1 = 3\ 40$	$\lambda_1 = 1.30$	$\lambda_1 = 0\ 79$
Business	−0 593	−0 453	−0 533
Rationality	−0 836	+0 037	+0 176
Science.....	−0 874	+0 167	+0 174
Tradition .	+0 809	+0 342	−0 102
Religion .	+0.610	−0 587	−0 274
Familism . .	+0 165	−0 761	+0 568
Adoption.....	−0 730	−0 156	−0 191

The block offices are familiar to the rural people. They visit these offices very frequently, and the absence of an official atmosphere creates a favorable situation for interviewing. Data were not recorded to show how many came willingly and how many needed persuasion. Ultimately, all the individuals in the sample came. The utilization of agricultural officers for interviewing was an advantage because they are better known to the village people than others who have more formal and official roles to play. As regards the point raised regarding the post-test for stability, I do not know what more I could do than to test the same individuals at two different dates with a long interval. It is not clear how a different sample, matched for background, could have served the purpose better. The clear objective was to see whether the values expressed at one interview changed with the passage of time or remained the same.

I now come to Miss Dodson's last and perhaps most important point. She suggests that acceptance of innovation follows purely economic laws, and values are then changed accordingly for rationalizing such action. In other words, she postulates a group of perfectly economic individuals who adopt new practices on the basis of whether they have money to invest or not. This assumes that there had been acceptance of all innovations, and this acceptance could only be translated into action by those who had money to spare. That all farmers were mentally prepared for acceptance can be rejected outright. In any case, in measuring such variables as science, tradition, and religion the questions asked had nothing whatsoever to do with farming and, therefore, the question of rationalization does not arise.

TABLE 2

	Factors			Communalities (h^2)
	I	II	III	
Business	17	− 66	.	.83
Rationality	73		.	73
Science .	82		.	.82
Tradition	− 36	31	.11	78
Religion .	− 72	.	− 07	.79
Familism.	.04	.	− 89	.93
Adoption ..	.43	− 16	..	59

SANTI PRIYA BOSE

Department of Agriculture
Calcutta

DOCTOR'S DEGREES IN SOCIOLOGY, 1961

According to reports received by the *Journal* from forty departments of sociology in the United States and Canada offering graduate instruction, 134 Doctor's degrees were conferred in the calendar year 1961.

The listing of Master's degrees in sociology has been discontinued.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Edwin J. Gross, B.A. University College of New York University, 1947; M.A. New York, 1948. "Some Further Inquiries into Personal Leadership in Marketing."

Dennis Johnston, A.B. California (Berkeley), 1947; M.A. Oregon, 1950; Harvard, 1951. "An Analysis of Sources of Information on the Population of the Navajo."

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Akinsola Ayodele Akiwowo, A B. Morehouse College, 1953; M.A. Boston, 1954. "Status Inconsistency in Relation to Social Participation in Political Activity in a Boston Negro Community"

Bertram Spiller, B.S. Northeastern, 1942; M.A. Boston, 1948. "Basis of Prestige among High and Low Delinquent Street-Corner Groups."

BROWN UNIVERSITY

Arthur Jordan Field, B S. Pennsylvania, 1947; A M. Columbia, 1948 "Ecological Analysis of a Mature Metropolitan Area: Providence, 1929–58."

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

Orville R. Gursslin, B.A., M.S.S. Buffalo, 1950, 1952 "The Formulation and Partial Test of a Class-linked Theory of Delinquency."

Robert P. Overs, A.B. Hobart College, 1935. "A Sociological Analysis of Counseling Psychology."

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY)

Irving Krauss, A.B. California, 1950; M.A. Chicago, 1955. "The Determinants of Individual Social Mobility."

Gayle Ness, A.B., M.A. California (Berkeley), 1952, 1957. "Central Government and Local Initiative in the Industrialization of Japan and India."

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (LOS ANGELES)

Egon Bittner, A B. Los Angeles State College, 1955; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1958. "Popular Interests in Psychiatric Remedies: A Study in Social Control."

Milton S. Bloombaum, A.B. California (Los Angeles), 1952; M.A. Southern California, 1958. "Resolution of Role Conflict."

Kenneth Polk, A.B. San Diego State College, 1956; M.A. Northwestern, 1957; "Attitudes and Social Organization in Correctional Institutions."

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

Dorothy Marie Crowley, B.S.N.E. St. Louis, 1950; M.S.N.E. Catholic, 1953. "The Role of the Nurse in Bedside Care of Patients."

Ann M. Douglas, B.S. St. John's, 1949; M.S.N.E. Catholic, 1950. "Social Factors Affecting Career Choice in Psychiatric Nursing."

Mary Louise Paynich, B.S.P.H.N. School of Publice Health, Michigan, 1944; M.S.N. Catholic, 1953. "The Therapeutic Role of the Visiting Nurse."

George O. Roberts, B.S. Hampton Institute, 1952; M.A. Catholic, 1955. "Cultural and Social Differentiation in Acceptance of Health and Sanitation Programs in Sierra Leone."

Sister Claire Marie Sawyer, B.A. Alverno College, 1951; M.A. Loyola, 1955. "Some Aspects of the Fertility of a Tri-racial Isolate."

Angelita Yap, B A. Assumption College, 1954; M.A. Catholic, 1957. "A Study of a Kinship System: Its Structural Principles."

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Warner Bloomberg, A.M. Chicago, 1950. "The Power Structure of 'Stackton': Patterns of Stature, Reputation, and Perception among the Leaders of an American Industrial Community."

Alexander Broel-Plateris, Matura, Saule Gymnasium (Lithuania), 1932: Diploma Jur. Vytawas University (Lithuania), 1936. "Marriage Disruption and Divorce Law."

Mary Rue Bucher, Ph.B., A.M. Chicago, 1948, 1954. "Conflicts and Transformations of Identity: A Study of Medical Specialists."

William W. Erbe, A B. Iowa State Teachers College, 1952; A.M. Iowa, 1958. "Student Integration and Departmental Cohesiveness in American Graduate Schools."

Prakash C. Mathur, B.S., M.S. Allahabad (India), 1940, 1942. "Internal Migration in India, 1941 to 1951."

Samarendranath Mitra, B.S., M.S. Presidency College (Calcutta), 1950, 1952. "The Future of Population, Urbanization, and Working Force in India."

W. Richard Scott, A.B., A.M. Kansas, 1954, 1955. "A Case Study of Professional Workers in a

Bureaucratic Setting."

Joseph Lamont Spaeth, A.B. Reed College, 1953; A.M. Chicago, 1955. "Value Orientations and Academic Career Plans."

Leo Zakuta, A.B., A.M. McGill, 1946, 1948. "A Becalmed Protest Movement: A Study of Change in the CCF."

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

Basil Joseph Sherlock, B.S. Illinois, 1955; M.A Southern Illinois, 1957. "Role Acquisition in a State Mental Hospital"

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Sidney H. Aronson, A B. Harvard, 1949; M.A. Tufts College, 1949. "Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service: The Administrations of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson."

Vernon K. Dibble, A.B. Wesleyan, 1954. "The Diffusion of the Bureaucratic Outlook: Some Reasons from the Verein für Sozialpolitik"

Ruth B. Granick, B A. Brooklyn College, 1955. "Social Isolation and Social Adjustment in Residents of a Home for the Aged."

Helen M. Hacker, A B. Chicago, 1937; M.A. Columbia, 1949. "A Functional Approach to the Gainful Employment of Married Women."

Murray Hausknecht, B S. City College of New York, 1948; M.A. Columbia, 1950. "A Description of Voluntary Association Membership in the United States."

Frank Lindenfeld, A.B. Cornell, 1955; M A. Columbia, 1958. "An Analysis of Political Involvement."

Hubert J. O'Gorman, A.B. Columbia College, 1949. M.A. Columbia, 1951. "Lawyers and Matrimonial Cases: A Study of Informal Pressures in Private Professional Practice."

Imogen Seger, B.S., M A. Columbia, 1955, 1957. "New Norms and Traditions: Lutheran Churches as Modern City Institutions."

Robert H. Somers, A.B. Antioch College, 1953; M.A. Columbia, 1956. "Latent Cogent Model of Latent Structure."

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Louis Abbott Ferman, A.B. Brown, 1952; M.A. Boston, 1953. "Religious Change on a College Campus."

Louise Elizabeth Merz, A.B. Woman's College of the University of North Carolina, 1955. "The Graduate School as a Socializing Agency: A Pilot Study of Sociological Aspects of Graduate Training in the Physical Sciences."

Donald Leroy Noel, B.A. Wisconsin, 1954. "Correlates of Anti-White Prejudice: Attitudes of Negroes in Four American Cities."

Alphonso Pinkney, B.A. Florida Agricultural and Mechnical College, 1951; M.A. New York, 1952. "The Anatomy of Prejudice: Majority-Group Attitudes toward Minorities in Selected American Cities."

DUKE UNIVERSITY

John William Merck, A.B., M.A. Georgia, 1952, 1956. "A Mathematical Model of the Personnel Structure of Large-Scale Organizations Based on Markov Chains."

Ray E. Short, A B. Willamette, 1944. "Social Control and War: An Analysis of Social Control Theory in Introductory Sociology Textbooks as Related to International Conflict."

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Charles H. Newton, B.A., M.A. Nebraska, 1956, 1958; "Patterns of Career Decisions within the Professions."

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Rev. Gabriel Lee, B.S. Marquette, 1954; M.A. Fordham, 1957 "Sociology of Conversion: Sociological Implications of Religious Conversion to Christianity in Korea."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Lindsey Crawford Churchill, A B. Yale, 1955. "Aggression in a Small-Group Setting."

Howard Schuman, A.B. Antioch College, 1953; M S Trinity, 1956. "Social Structure and Personality Constriction in a Total Institution"

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Laurence Keith Miller, B.A. Reed College, 1957, A.M. Illinois, 1959. "An Experimental Test of the Davis-Moore Theory of Reward Differentiation"

Richard Austin Peterson, A.B. Oberlin, 1955; M.A. Illinois, 1958. "Orientations to the Resolution of Interpersonal Tension."

Frieda Sophia M. Stute, B.A. De Paul, 1947; A.M Chicago, 1951. "Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in a Small Hospital."

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Elmer Wilbur Bock, A.B Florida, 1952; B.D Lutheran Theological Southern Seminary, 1955. "Correlates of the Accuracy of Role-taking and the Congruence of Self-Other Images among Married Couples."

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Wynona S. Garretson, B.A., M.A. State University of Iowa, 1948, 1951. "College as a Social Object: A Study in Consensus."

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Raymond Breton, A.B. Manitoba, 1952; M A. Chicago, 1958. "Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants."

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Thomas Hansbrough, B.S., M.A. Louisiana State, 1949, 1957. "A Sociological Analysis of Man-caused Forest Fires in Louisiana."

John Drenan Kelly, A.B. Harvard, 1950; M.A. Minnesota, 1957. "The Sociology of Stratification: A Theory of the Power Structure of Society."

Clarence Willard Ketch, A.B. Houston, 1951; M.A. Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1956. "A Situational Analysis of the Effects of Drouth as a Disaster on the Mobility of a Selected Rural Farm Population."

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Gwen Andrew, Ph.B., M.A. Wisconsin, 1944, 1945. "Criteria for Systems Models and Their Application to a Sociological Theory of Organization."

Harold F. Goldsmith, Ph.B., M.A., Chicago, 1949, 1954. "The Meaning of Migration: The Study of the Migration Expectations of High-School Students."

Savita Gupta, B.A., Agra (India), 1954; M.A. D.A.V. College (India), 1956. "Net Migration in Michigan, 1950–60: An Analysis of Population Change in Relation to the Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Occupational Variables."

James P. Harkness, B.A., M.A. Michigan State, 1951, 1953. "Hospital Organization in Transition. A Sociological Analysis of Interlocking Social Systems.

William H. Jarrett, B.S., M.A. St. Louis, 1955, 1956. "Personal Consequences of the Stress on Achievement in American Society."

R. Clyde McCone, B.A. Washington Springs College, 1946; M.S. South Dakota State College, 1956. "Mirror for Anthropology: A Cultural Analysis of the Study of Man and Culture."

Ellwyn R. Stoddard, B.S. Utah State Agricultural College, 1952; M.A. Brigham Young, 1955. "Catastrophe and Crisis in a Flooded Border Community: An Analytic Approach to Disaster Emergence."

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Clarence Dale Johnson, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1950, 1952. "Priest, Prophet, and Professional Man: A Study of Religious Leadership in a Small Community."

Ronald G. Klietsch, B.A., M.A., Minnesota, 1956, 1958. "Decision-making in Dairy Farming: A Sociological Analysis."

Virgil J. Kroeger, B.S. South Dakota State College, 1940; M.A. Minnesota, 1952. "A Study in the Classification of Delinquent Behavior."

Theodor J. Litman, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1954, 1956. "The Influence of Concept of Self and Life Orientation Factors upon the Rehabilitation of Orthopedic Patients."

Alex Simirenko, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1957, 1958. "Pilgrims, Colonists, and Frontiersmen: An Ethnic Community in Transition."

Samuel E. Wallace, B.A. William Jewell College, 1956; M.A. Minnesota, 1958. "Patterns of Interaction: The Significance of Numbers on Togetherness."

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Donald E. Allen, B.A., M.A. Ohio State, 1939, 1940. "Analysis of Public Conversation."

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Edward Rothstein, B. E. Teachers College of Connecticut, 1938; M.Ed. New Hampshire, 1940. "An Analysis of Status Images as Perception Variables between Delinquent and Non-delinquent Boys."

James Edward Teele, B.A. Virginia Union, 1949; A.M. New York, 1958. "Correlates of Social Isolation."

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Glen H. Elder, B.S. Pennsylvania State, 1957; M.A. Kent State, 1958. "Family Structure and the Transmission of Values and Norms in the Child-rearing Process."

Thomas Lee Gillette, A.B. Missouri, 1952; M.A. Kansas City, 1954. "The Working Mother: A Study of the Relationship between Maternal Employment and Family Structure as Influenced by Social Class and Race."

Paul Harold Glasser, A.B. City College of New York, 1949; M.A. Columbia, 1951. "Family Organization during Psychotherapy."

Willam Hart Gulley, A.B., M.A. North Carolina, 1947, 1957. "Relative Effectiveness of Voluntary Associations."

Fred Katz, A.B. Guilford College, 1952; M.A. North Carolina, 1956. "The Profession of Pathology: Sociological Study of Patterning in Medical Practice."

David Ray Norsworthy, B.S. Louisiana State, 1954; M.A. North Carolina, 1959. "Occupational Mobility and Migration: Evidence and Interpretation for a North Carolina Piedmont Community."

William A. Rushing, A.B., M.A. Colorado, 1956, 1958. "Professional Adaptive Problems on a Psychiatric Service."

Jean Harmon Thrasher, A.B. Drake, 1956; M.A. North Carolina, 1959. "The Role Set and Socialization of the Psychiatric Patient."

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Rev. Philip A. Hamilton, A.B. Creighton, 1940; S.T.L. Catholic, 1944. "The Influence of Social Factors on Religious Role Perception and Behavior."

Richard F. Larson, B.A. Seattle, 1957; M.A. Washington, 1958. "An Analysis of Selected Health Knowledge, Values, and Practices as Related to Social Class."

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Walter C. Kaufman, B.A. Rochester, 1950. "Social Area Analysis: An Explication of Theory, Methodology, and Techniques, with Statistical Tests of Revised Procedures: San Francisco and Chicago, 1950."

Eduardo C. Mondlane, B.A. Oberlin College, 1953; M.A. Northwestern, 1956. "Role Conflict, Reference Group, and Race."

Ernest Moore Willis, A.B. North Carolina, 1949; M.A. Northwestern, 1956. "Social Structure and Primary Reference-Group Behavior."

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

John Herman Behling, B.S. in Soc. Admin. M.S.W. Ohio State, 1954, 1957. "An Experimental Study to Measure the Effectiveness of Casework Service."

Shirley Ann Merritt Clark, B.A., M.A. Bowling Green State, 1957, 1958 "Systematic Comparison of Female and Male Delinquency by Selected Components."

Robert Martin Frumkin, B.A. Upsala College, 1948; M.A. Ohio State, 1951 "Preferences for Traditional and Modern Painting: An Empirical Study."

Richard Hammond Hall, A.B. Dennison, 1956; M.A. Ohio State, 1959. "An Empirical Study of Bureaucratic Dimensions and Their Relations to Other Organizational Characteristics."

Barbara Ann Kay, B.S. in Soc Admin. Ohio State, 1955, 1956. "Differential Self-perceptions of Female Offenders."

Samuel Aaron Kramer, B.S. in Ed. Temple, 1929; M.A. Ohio State, 1931. "Predicting Juvenile Delinquency among Negroes."

Jon Eaton Simpson, B.A. Ohio Wesleyan, 1954; M.A. Ohio State, 1958. "Selected Aspects of Institutionalization as Perceived by the Juvenile Offender."

Elizabeth Foster Smith, B.A. Western Reserve; M.A. Ohio State. "The Joint Participation Pattern of Husbands and Wives: A Study of Urban Middle-Class Families."

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

Robert Leonard, B.A. Washington, 1956; M.A. California (Berkeley), 1958. "Group Process and Leadership Behavior."

Anita Yourglich, B.S. Seattle College, 1945; M.A. St. Louis, 1948. "A Study of Role Consensus in the Family System."

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

A. Stafford Metz, B.A. Swarthmore College, 1950; M.A. Tufts, 1953. "A Comparison of Husbands' and Wives' Dissatisfactions with Marriage Partner Based on a Factor Analysis of Marital Interpersonal Behavior."

Solomon Poll, B.S. in Ed. Temple, 1955; A.M Pennsylvania, 1957. "The Economic Organization of a Religious Community."

William Ward, A.B. Muhlenberg College, 1941; A.M. Syracuse, 1943. "Continuities and Discontinuities in Denominational Loyalty: A Lehigh Valley Study of Residential Movement and Church Membership."

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

George H. Gardner, B.A., M.A. Princeton, 1931, 1955. "Some Social Correlates of the Transitional Phase of Change from the Traditional to the Modern Way of Life."

Arthur Bennett Shostak, B.S. Cornell, 1958; A.M. Princeton, 1960. "The Role and Viability of the Single-Firm Unaffiliated Union."

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Abd el-Bassit Hassan, B.A., M.A. Alexandria (Egypt), 1950, 1956. "Social Interaction between Foreign Students and Americans in a Midwestern Community."

Ephraim Mizruchi, B.A. Roosevelt, 1951; M.A Yale, 1955. "Social Structure Success Values, and Anomie in a Small City."

Eugene Smith, B.A. DePauw, 1951; M.S. Trinity, 1954. "Content Analysis of Middle-Class Women's Fiction from 1901 to 1960 as Indicative of Changing Cultural Values Related to Middle-Class Birth Rates."

RADCLIFFE COLLEGE

Janet Zollinger Giele, A.B. Earlham College, 1956; A.M. Radcliffe, 1958. "Social Change in the Feminine Role: A Comparison of Women's Suffrage and Women's Temperance, 1870–1920."

Christine Roma Kayser, A.B. Stanford, 1948; A.M. Radcliffe College, 1951. "Calvinism and German Political Life."

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Robert Lane Brown, A.B. Whittier College, 1949; M.S. Southern California, 1952. "Attitudes of Ministers and Lay Leaders of the American Baptist Convention of the State of Washington on Selected Social Issues."

Jeff Griffith Johnson, A.B. Concordia Seminary, 1946; M.A. Southern California, 1955. "An Analysis and Description of Role Expectations for Ministers of the Southern California District of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod."

Elsie Viola King, A.B. California (Los Angeles), 1948; M.A. Los Angeles State College, 1956. "Personality Perceptions—Ideal and Perceived in Relation to Mate Selection."

Sally Lee Kotlar, A.B. California (Los Angeles), 1955; M.A. Southern California, 1959. "Middle-Class Marital Roles—Ideal and Perceived in Relation to Adjustment in Marriage."

Glenn Richard Rollins, A.B., M.A. Southern California, 1952, 1954. "Normative Values of Selected Enforcement Officers and Adult Male Offenders."

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Donal E. Muir, A.B. Harvard, 1953; M.A. Marshall College, 1957. "Norms of Social Obligation."

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Ralph Gordon Connor, A.B., M A. Washington, 1949, 1953. "The Self-concepts of Alcoholics."

Delbert Stephen Elliott, A.B. Pomona College, 1955; M A Washington, 1960. "Delinquency, Opportunity, and Patterns of Orientation.

Stuart David Johnson, A.B. San Diego State College, 1949; M.A. New Mexico, 1955. "Issue Perception and Decision-making among Religious Leaders."

Richard Lawrence Meile, A.B. Illinois State Normal, 1954; M.A. Nebraska, 1956. "Performance and Adjustment of First-Year Law Students."

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Hassan N. Gardezi, A.B., M.A. Punjab (Lahore), 1954, 1957. "A Comparative Analysis of Some Structural Characteristics of Urbanism in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent and in the United States."

Richard H. Ogles, B.S. Utah, 1952; M.S. Brigham Young, 1955. "Some Methodological Issues in Sociological Theory."

Joseph B. Perry, B.S. North Texas State College, 1953; M A. Texas, 1955. "An Exploratory Study of the Mother Substitutes of Preschool Children of Employed Mothers in Spokane, Washington."

Erdwin H. Pfuhl, Jr., A.B. Whitman College, 1952; M.A. Idaho, 1955. "The Relationship of Mass Media to Reported Delinquent Behavior."

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

Rudolph A. Helling, A.B. Wayne State, 1952; M A College Wilhelmshaven, 1953. "A Comparison of the Acculturation of Immigrants in Toronto, Ontario, and Detroit, Michigan."

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Fredrick Walter Koenig, A.B. Washington (Missouri), 1951; M.S. Wisconsin, 1954. "Perception of Order and Morale in Small-Group Situations."

Charles Samuel Prigmore, A.B. Chattanooga, 1939; M.A. Wisconsin, 1947. "An Analysis of Rater Reliability on the Glueck Scale for the Prediction of Juvenile Delinquency."

Emmit Frederick Sharp, B.S., M.A. Oklahoma A. & M. College, 1948, 1951. "Item Selection for Level-of-Living Scales."

Juris Veidemanis, B.A. North Dakota, 1951; M.A. Wisconsin, 1952. "Social Change: Major Value Systems of Latvians at Home, as Refugees, and as Immigrants."

Harwin LeRoy Voss, B A. North Central College, 1954; M.A. Wisconsin, 1956. "Insulation and Vulnerability to Delinquency: A Comparison of the Hawaiians and the Japanese."

YALE UNIVERSITY

Lee L. Bean, B.A., M.A. Utah, 1957, 1958 "The Structure of Urban Residential Areas: A Study of Changing Census Tract Characteristics in Selected American Cities, 1940–50."

John G. Bruhn, B.A., M.A. Nebraska, 1956, 1958. "The Sick Role: Initial Conceptions Related to the Length and Success of Psychotherapy."

Judith N. Cates, B.S. Minnesota, 1953; M.A. Yale, 1957. "Role, Role Conflict, and Resolution in the Mental Hospital."

Harris Chaiklin, B A., M.A. Connecticut, 1950, 1952. "The House Staff of a University Teaching Hospital: A Study of Conflicting Norms."

Lionel S. Lewis, B.A. Washington (Missouri), 1957; M.A. Cornell, 1959. "A rationality in Human Behavior: A Study of Health Practices."

Joseph Lopreato, B.A. Connecticut, 1956; M.A. Yale, 1957. "Emigration and Social Mobility in a Rural Community of Southern Italy."

Dale McLemore, B.S., M.A. Texas, 1952, 1956. "Physicians' Statuses and Medical Practices: A Study of Inter-associated Relations."

John A. Ross, B.A. Ottawa, 1956; M.A. Yale, 1957. "Socioeconomic Status and Use of Medical Services."

William W. Vosburgh, III, B.A. Yale, 1950; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1952. "Social Class and Leisure Time."

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS NEWLY STARTED IN 1961*

The following list of 179 doctoral dissertations *newly started in 1961* in universities and colleges in the United States and Canada is compiled from returns sent by forty-three departments of sociology. This list includes dissertations in social work, divinity, and other related fields.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Elaine Catherine Hagopian, B.A., A.M. Boston, 1954, 1956. "Morocco: A Case Study of the Structural Basis of Social Integration."

Shirley Marion Kolack, B.S., A.M. Boston, 1955, 1957. "Status Inconsistency in the Social Work Profession."

Jaroslav George Moravec, M.A.T. Chotebor (Czechoslovakia), 1929; JUD. (Dr. of Law) Charles IV University (Prague), 1934. "Social Order through Law."

BROWN UNIVERSITY

John Casparis, A.B. North Carolina, 1959. "The Changing Structure of the Metropolitan Community."

Mary G. Powers, B.S. Teachers College of Connecticut, 1955; M.A. Massachusetts, 1957. "Demographic and Ecological Characteristics of City and Suburban Neighborhoods."

Da-Yuan Yuan, B.S. Spring Hill College, 1957; A.M. City College of New York, 1959. "Demographic Aspects of Urbanization and Industrialization in Postwar Asia, with a Case Study of Taiwan."

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

Jack L. Roach, B.A., M.S.S. Buffalo, 1949, 1954. "Socioeconomic Deprivation and Lower-Class Cognition."

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (LOS ANGELES)

Arturo Biblarz, A.B., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1955, 1960. "The Refusal To Recognize External Authorities: A Historical Study in the Sociology of Knowledge."

Robert Brickston, A.B., M.A. Colorado, 1950, 1953. "Behavior in Crisis Situations."

Martin Dosick, A.B., M.A. Boston, 1952, 1955. "The Young Auto Thief."

James A. Mau, A.B. California (Santa Barbara), 1957; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1961. "Planned Change and Social Unity in an Emergent Nation: A Study of Strategies for the Elimination of the Disruptive Effects of Social Change."

Dorothy Louise Meier, A.B., Kansas, 1956; M.A. Northwestern, 1957. "Anomie, Life Chances, Perceived Achievements, and Modes of Adaptation."

Charles C. Moskos, A.B. Princeton, 1956; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1961. "Sponsored Nationalism and the Dismantlement of an Empire: A Study of Cohesion, Disintegration, and Elites in the West Indies."

Ivar Oxaal, A.B., M.A. Ohio State, 1954, 1959. "Political Independence, Democracy, and Economic Development in Trinidad: A Study of Nationalism, Power Alignments, and the Performance of Elites."

Andrew P. Phillips, A.B., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1958, 1961. "The Political Transformation of a Peasantry: A Study of the Development of a Citizenry in Antigua."

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Anita G. Beltram, A.B., M.A. Philippines, 1954, 1957. "Social Origins and Career Preparation among Filipinos in American Universities."

Andrew M. Greeley, B.A. St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, 1954; A.M. Chicago, 1961. "Religion and the June, 1961, College Graduate."

Herbert Hamilton, A.B. Roosevelt, 1952; A.M. Chicago, 1961. "Social Structure and Informal Organization in the American Army."

Nathaniel Hare, A.B. Langston, 1954; A.M. Chicago, 1957. "Changing Occupational Status of the Negro Education."

Constance Nathanson, A.M. Chicago, 1958. "Social Structure, Commitment, and Reward in the Role Selections of Professional Women."

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Herbert Bynder, A.B. Wilkes College, 1956. "Physicians' Utilization of Medical Care."

Jerald T. Hage, B.B.A. Wisconsin, 1955. "Organization Response to Innovation: A Case Study of a Community Hospital."

James A. Jones, A.B. Harvard, 1953; M.A. Columbia, 1955. "The Juvenile Institution as a Preparatory Institution."

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

James R. Weir, B.S. Central Connecticut State College, 1955; M.A. Connecticut, 1957. "Patterns of Recreation and Leisure-Time Activities of the Farm Population."

* Previously we listed *all* doctoral dissertations in progress; beginning this year, only those dissertations which have been newly started in the past calendar year will be listed.

DUKE UNIVERSITY

Cyrus Murray Johnson, B.S. Wake Forest College, 1939; M.A.S.A. Ohio State, 1940. "Family Patterns and Occupational Success Orientation."

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Benjamin E. Haddox, A.B. Stetson, 1945; M.A. Florida, 1960. "A Sociological Study of the Institution of Religion in Colombia."

Leonard L. Linden, B.A., M.A. Florida, 1957, 1959. "A Study of Mortality Suicide Data."

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Sister M. Janelle Cahoon, O.S.B., B.A. College of St. Scholastica, 1946; M.A. St. Mary's College, 1954. "The Dilemmas Faced by Institutionalized Christianity in Contemporary United States."

Rev. John Doherty, S.J., B.A., M.A. Sacred Heart Novitiate (Philippines), 1949, 1950. "A Study of Catholic Authoritarianism."

Rev. Jos. M. Fallon, S.J., B.A. Boston College, 1939; M.A. St. Louis, 1948. "Italian-American Perceptions of the Priesthood."

Sister Cecile Agnes Forest, F.S.E., B A. Annhurst College, 1957; M.A. Fordham College, 1959. "The Religious Woman College Teacher: A Study of Adjustment to Multiple Roles."

Rev. Peter Sasaki, B.A. St. Sulpice Major Seminary, 1955; M.A. Detroit, 1959. "A Study of Psycho-social Factors Affecting Adjustment in American-Japanese Military Marriages."

Rev. Terence Sullivan, O.S.B., B.A. St. Benedict's College, 1953; M.A. Fordham, 1961. "Social Class and Catholics: A Study of Catholic Activity in the Context of Social Class."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Murray A Beauchamp, A.B., M.A. Buffalo, 1957, 1958. "Mathematical Approaches to the Social System."

Peter Carter Dodd, A.B. Princeton, 1950. "Role Conflict in the School Principalship."

Sherwin J. Feinhandler, A.B. Northwestern, 1956; A.M. Syracuse, 1958. "Concepts of Mental and Physical Illness, Magic, and the Supernatural among the Taita of Kenya."

James Howard Laue, S.B. Wisconsin State College, 1959. "The Direct-Action Phase of the Desegregation Process in America."

Rev. Jacques M. Lazure, A.B. Ottawa, 1948; M.A. Notre Dame, 1958. "Relationships between Religion and French Cultural Values."

Johannes J. Loubser, B.A., A.M. Stellenbosch, 1954, 1958. "The Development of Religious Freedom in Massachusetts."

Leon Hinckley Mayhew, B.A. California, 1956; A.M. Harvard, 1960. "The Role of Law in the Employment and Housing of Negroes in Metropolitan Boston."

Stewart Edmond Perry, B.A. Kenyon College, 1947. "Social Processes in Psychiatric Research."

Roger Boyd Walker, A.B. Magdalene College, Cambridge, 1955; M.A. Cambridge, 1959. "Communication in a Manufacturing Organization."

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Samuel Walter Byuarm, B.A. Langston, 1949; M. A. State University of Iowa, 1950. "Community Action: A Case Study in Racial Cleavage."

Harry Cohen, A.B., M.A. City College of New York, 1956, 1959. "Modification of Rules of a Bureaucracy."

Philip W. Marden, B.A. Rutgers, 1955; M.A. Illinois, 1960. "Dimensions of Role Conceptions, Associational Commitment, and Associational Satisfaction among Registered Nurses."

Michael Schwartz, A.B., M.A. Illinois, 1958, 1959. "Patterns of Authority and Reciprocity in Superior-Subordinate Relations: A Study of Group Effectiveness."

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Albert F. Anderson, B.S., M.S. Iowa State, 1956, 1960. "Theoretical Considerations in the Analysis of Migration."

Charles L. Mulford, B.S., M.S. Iowa State, 1958, 1959. "Some Relationships between Formal Organizations, Community Problems, and Leadership."

C. Harding Veigel, B.A. North Central College, 1952; M.A. Bradley, 1956. "An Experimental Study in Differential Perception of Status Criteria."

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Winfield W. Salisbury, A B., M.A. California, 1954, 1956. "The Self and Anxiety."

Merlin Taber, B. A. Penn College, 1948; M.A. Iowa, 1953. "An Ecological Study of the Development of Social Complexity through Intercity Comparison of Community Services."

David L. Thomas, B.S. Florida State, 1959; M.A. Iowa, 1960. "Working Wives: A Study in the Relationship between Family and Occupational Norms."

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Martin Levin, S.B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958. "The Political Socialization of the American Adolescent."

Moshe Sarell, A.B., M.A. Hebrew (Jerusalem), 1954, 1959. "Scientific Growth: Its Measurement and Socioeconomic Determinants."

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

Rashey B. Moten, Jr., A B., A M. Kansas, 1936, 1938. "The Negro Power Structure in Kansas City, Missouri."

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

Edward Cecil Powell, B.A., M.A. North Carolina College, 1952, 1954. "Retreatism and Occupational Aspirations among White and Negro High-School Seniors."

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Louis M. Beck, A.B. Blackburn College, 1955; M.A. Louisiana State, 1960. "An Analysis of Types of Delinquent Behavior."

John P. Reed, B.A. Tulane, 1947; M.A. Illinois, 1953. "The Effects of Jury Selection on Outcome of Trials: An Evaluaton of Trial by One's Peers."

Harley Mason Upchurch, B.A. Mexico City College, 1958; M.A. Florida, 1960. "Religion and Social Change in Latin America."

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Walter R. Banks, B A. Rutgers, 1957; M A. Michigan State, 1959. "A Study of the Sources of Northern Urban Negro Protest."

Luther Christman, B.S., Ed.M. Temple, 1948, 1952. "The Nurse in the Mental Hospital."

Donald Clelland, A.B. Calvin College, 1958; M.A. Michigan State, 1960. "Community Power Study."

Steven E. Deutsch, A.B. Oberlin College, 1958; M.A. Michigan State, 1960. "Patterns of Social Integration of Industrial Workers."

Delwyn Dyer, B.S., M.S. Michigan State, 1953, 1959. "Self Attitude, Role Saliency, and Role Internalization and Their Effect on 4-H Leader Tenure and Effectiveness."

Robert Holloway, B.S., M.A. Oregon, 1954, 1959. "Hospital-Community Relations."

Henry Holstege, B.A. Calvin College, 1954; M. A. Michigan State, 1958. "The Urban League, the NAACP, and Decision-making in Grand Rapids."

Clinton J. Jesser, B.A. Sioux Falls College, 1956; M.A. South Dakota State College, 1958. "Aspects of the Influence and Participation of Community Professionals in Four Central Michigan Counties."

Gary W. King, A.B. Grove City College, 1951; M.A. Michigan State, 1957. "A Comparative Study of Three Suburban Areas Selected by Occupations of Residents."

Angelo Lacognata, B.A. Buffalo, 1957; M.A. Rochester, 1959. "Role Expectations of Faculty and Students: A Social Psychological Analysis."

Malcolm McReynolds, B.S. Missouri, 1951; M.S. Michigan State, 1956. "Factors in Career Planning Decisions of High-School Students."

Kim Rodner, B.A., M.A. Michigan State, 1956, 1959. "Analysis of Theory in Sociology of Knowledge: Applications of Analysis to Study of Nineteenth-Century European Naturalists in the United States."

Rolf H. K. Schulze, B.S. North Dakota, 1958; M.A. Michigan State, 1960. "An Analytical Comparison of the Social and Ideological Characteristics and Behavior of German Adherents to Marxism and Other Modern Ideologies."

Norbert Wiley, B.S. Loyola, 1955; M.A. Notre Dame, 1956. "Class and Local Politics in Three Communities."

George Won, B.A., M.A. Hawaii, 1955, 1957 "Democratic Sentiments in Unionism: A Case Study of the U.A.W. Convention."

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Joan Aldous, B.S. Kansas State, 1948; M.A Texas, 1949. "Family Continuity Patterns over Three Generations: Content, Degree of Transmission, and Consequences."

Gordon Bultena, B.A. Iowa State College, 1956; M.A. Minnesota, 1959. "Role-taking and Attitudinal Structure: A Study of the Impact of the Camp Group on Self-conception."

William Burch, B.S., M.S. Oregon, 1955, 1957 "Family Camping: An Exploratory Study of Function, Stress, and Meaning in Leisure."

Peter M. Hall, B.A., M.S.W. California (Berkeley), 1957, 1959. "The Self-conception of Juvenile Delinquency—a Symbolic Interactionist Approach."

Gary D. Hansen, B.S. Utah State, 1958; M.A. Minnesota, 1960. "Social Variables Affecting Identification and Creation of Roles for Senior Citizens."

Santosh Kumar Nandy, B.A. Presidency, 1953, M.A. Calcutta, 1956; M.A. Minnesota, 1961 "The Sociology of the Constitution of India. A Study in Political Sociology."

Glenn I. Nelson, B.A. St. Olaf College, 1955; M A. Minnesota, 1960. "Social and Cultural Change in Rural Church Organization."

Thomas Philbrook, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1958, 1960. "Industrial Change and the Local Community: An Experimental Design for the Study of Industrial Change in Local Newfoundland Communities."

Ronald Pitzer, B.S., M.S. Ohio State, 1958, 1959 "The Incidence Derivation and Consequences of Marital Role Incongruity."

Jack C. Ross, B.S. California, 1949; M S. George Williams College, 1959. "Membership in Quaker Meetings."

MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY

John Dunkelberger, A.B. Franklin and Marshall College, 1957; M.A. Pennsylvania State, 1959 "Indexes of Adjustments and Adjustment Potential of Low-Income Rural Families."

Gerald Globetti, B.A. Louisiana College, 1959; M.A. Mississippi State, 1961. "The Validity of Level-of-Living Scales for Rural Families."

Raymond Sollie, A.B. Millsaps College, 1959; M. A. Mississippi State, 1961. "Role of Community in Development of Natural Resources."

John Watson, A.B. Morehead State College, 1952; M.A. Mississippi State, 1961. "Adjustments of United States Air Force Retired Officers."

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Donald P. Addison, B.S. North Carolina College, 1952; M.A. Boston, 1955. "Social Factors in Occupational and Educational Aspirations of Negro and White Students."

George W. Barger, A.B., M.A. Butler, 1948, 1952. "The Influence of the Social Gospel Movement on the Development of Sociology in the United States."

Richard L. Brown, A.B., M.A. Nebraska, 1956, 1957. "Symbolic Re-presentation of Social Themes in Literature."

Norman L. Friedman, B.S., M.A. Missouri, 1957, 1958. "The Public Junior College Instructor: A Study in Occupational Sociology."

Robert C. Sweet, B.S. Wisconsin, 1949; M.A. Chicago, 1955. "The Circus: A Study of Institutional Continuity and Change."

Edward Tomich, B.A., M.A. Northeast Missouri State Teachers College, 1954, 1956. "Relationship between Cognition Types and Observed Behaviors."

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

Laurence L. Falk, B.A. Indiana Central College, 1955; B.D. United Theological Seminary, 1958; M A. Nebraska, 1960. "Minister's Response to Perceived Role Conflict."

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Charles Wilson Estus, A.B. Drury College, 1952; B D. Duke, 1956. "Selected Factors in Decision-making of Members of Religious Organizations."

Norman Goodman, B.A. Brooklyn College, 1955; A M New York, 1961. "A Social Psychological Study of the Self-image of the Adolescent with and without a Physical Impairment."

Dorothea Hinckley Hubin, A.B., A.M. New York, 1949, 1951. "Citizens' Courts and Legal Devolution."

Tamara Krystyna Obrebska, M.Sc. Poland, 1937. "Znaniecki's Contributions to Sociology of Education."

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

David Almon Gover, A.B., M.A. Michigan, 1947, 1951. "Employment as a Variable in the Marital Adjustment of Middle- and Lower-Class Wives."

Albert Corbin Higgins, B.S., M.A. Fordham, 1952, 1956. "Sociometric Relations in a Housing Community."

Berton H. Kaplan, B.S. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 1951; M.S. North Carolina, 1952. "Social Change and Illness in a Mountain Community."

Emory Kimbrough, Jr., A.B. Davidson College, 1957; M.A. North Carolina, 1959. "The Executive and the Community: Community and Company Characteristics as They Relate to the Participation of the Business Executive in Community Affairs."

Richard A. Lamanna, A.B., M.A. Fordham, 1954, 1961. "The Role of the Negro Public School Teacher in the Process of School Desegregation."

Myron H. Levenson, B.S., M.A. Pittsburgh, 1949, 1957. "A Sociological Study of the Hospitalization of Aged Psychiatric Patients in Western North Carolina."

Hugh Max Miller, A.B., M.A. North Carolina State, 1955, 1958. "Teacher Roles and Community Organization."

Beatrice B. Mongeau, B.S., M.P.H. North Carolina, 1956, 1957. "The 'Granny Midwife': A Study of a Folk Institution in the Process of Disintegration."

Mark Cushman Thelin, A.B., M.A. Oberlin College, 1955, 1958. "Executive Characteristics and Community Involvement: A Sociological Analysis of Top Business Executives in Four North Carolina Cities."

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Troy S. Duster, B.S. Northwestern, 1957; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1959. "The Social Response to Abnormality."

Gilbert M. James, A.B. Greenville College, 1955; M A. Washington (St. Louis), 1957. "Response Set and Anomie."

Peter S. McHugh, B.A., M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1957, 1959. "Symbolic Interaction, Anomie, and the Social Order."

Peter A. Orleans, B.A. Antioch College, 1958; M. S. Wisconsin, 1961. "Non-partisan Politics in Metropolitan Areas."

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Joseph L. Albini, B.A. Pennsylvania State, 1954; M.A. Louisiana State, 1956. "An Evaluation of Therapy with Mentally Disturbed and Deficient Children."

Clarence LeRoy Anderson, B.S., M.S. Brigham Young, 1957, 1959. "Development of an Instrument To Assess Orientation toward Adult Dependence upon Public Agencies."

Walter Vladimir Babics, B.A., M.A. Kent State, 1956, 1957. "Assimilation among the Yugoslavs in Franklin County."

Alice K. Y. Chai, B.M. Seoul National, 1950; B.A. Ohio Wesleyan, 1955; M.A. Ohio State, 1957. "Kinship and Mate Selection in Korea."

Patrick Tracy Cleaver, A.B. Miami (Ohio), 1956; M.A. Ohio State, 1960. "Local Community Involvement of Industrial Manufacturing Concerns."

Giles E. Gobetz, Maturity Certificate, Yugoslavia and Italy, 1947; M.A. Washington (St. Louis), 1955. "Adjustment and Assimilation of Slovenian Refugees."

Arthur E. Havens, B.S. Iowa State, 1959; M.S.

Ohio State, 1960. "Social Psychological Factors Associated with Differential Adoption of New Technologies by Milk Producers."

Judson R. Landis, B.A. California, 1957; M.A. Ohio State, 1959. "Social Class Differentials in Self, Value, and Opportunity Orientation as Related to Delinquency Potential."

Anastassios Demosthense Mylonas, LL.B. Athens (Greece), 1944; M.A. California, 1955. "Examination of Relationships between Selected Factors and Attitudes toward Law and Legal Institutions by Adult Offenders."

Frank Roland Scarpitti, A.B. Fenn College, 1958; M A. Ohio State, 1959. "Ethnic Class Differentials in Self, Value, and Opportunity Orientation as Related to Delinquency Potential."

Thomas William Webb, B.A. Baldwin-Wallace College, 1947; M.A. Michigan, 1952. "Development of an Instrument for Measuring Teachers' Beliefs about Educational Issues."

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

Richard O'Toole, B.A, M.A. Oklahoma, 1956, 1959. "Experiments in Mead's 'Taking The Role of the Other.'"

Clyde Pope, B A. Anderson College, 1957; M.A. Chicago, 1960. "Occupational Mobility of the Eugene Labor Force."

Gary Rush, B.A. British Columbia, 1959. "The Consequence of Belief and Value Systems for Human Behavior."

Donald Spence, B A. Long Beach State College, 1959. "Role Difficulties and the Problem of Adjustment to Changing Life Conditions."

S. Lee Spray, B.S. Oregon, 1958. "An Alternative to 'Role Theory' in the Study of Executive Behavior."

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kenneth E. Burnham, A B. Berea College, 1940; M.A. Pennsylvania, 1947. "Charismatic Leadership: A Case Study of the Peace Mission Movement of Father Divine."

Jonas O. Rosenthal, A.B. Swarthmore College, 1951; M.A. North Carolina, 1955. "The Desegregation of Schools as Viewed by Organizations of Negro Public School Teachers in Ten Southern States."

K. C. Zachariah, B.Sc., M Sc. Travancore (India), 1946, 1948. "Historical Study of Internal Migration in the Indian Subcontinent, 1901–31."

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Martin D. Adler, B.A, M.S.W. Pittsburgh, 1952, 1956. "Adaptation of the Family to the Crisis of Hemiplegia."

Joseph J. Grau, B.A. Cathedral College, 1947; M.S.A. Fordham, 1953. "Social Relations of the Handicapped in a Rehabilitation Center."

Donald M. Henderson, B.A., M.A. Kent State, 1958, 1959. "Social Mobility and the Assimilation Process among Negroes in the Ohio Valley Region."

Frank J. Rubenstein, B.A. Illinois, 1949; M.S.W. Pittsburgh, 1954. "The Student Nurse: A Study of Attitudes and Role Adjustments."

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Victor A. Liguori, B.A. Haverford College, 1959; A.M. Princeton, 1961. "Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in Modern Commercial Deep-Sea Fishing."

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Milton Simon Davis, A.B. Boston, 1958; M.S. Purdue, 1961. "Factors Affecting Compliance to the Medical Regimen Established for Heart Patients by Their Physicians."

RADCLIFFE COLLEGE

Joan Ann Levin, A.B. Michigan, 1957; A.M. Radcliffe College, 1959. "The Relation of Status Consistency to Forced Relocation."

Maren Lockwood, B.Sc. University College (London), 1955; A.M. Maryland, 1957. "Social Movements That Survive: Participation in the Lily Dale Assembly and the Oneida Community."

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Charles C. Crider, A.B. Washington Missionary College, 1942; M A. Seventh Day Adventist (Washington, D.C.), 1951. "Regional Variations in the Estimation of Social Class from Auditory Stimuli."

Isis Istiphan, A.B. American (Cairo), 1947; M.A. Columbia, 1953. "Role Expectations of American Undergraduate College Women in a Western Coeducational Institution."

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Donald Floyd Allen, B.A. North Texas State College, 1951; M.A. Texas, 1956. "Changes in the Role of the American University Professor."

Beau Stanley Bittinger, B.A. Manchester College (Indiana), 1950; M.A. Notre Dame, 1951. "Professional Consultation in Community Planning: A Case Study."

Robert Cletus Brody, B.A. St. Mary's, 1956; M.A. Texas, 1957. "Review and Analysis of Talcott Parsons' Contribution to Sociological Theory."

Walter Joseph Cartwright, B.A. Southern Methodist, 1943; M.A. Texas, 1960. "The Cedar Chopper: Social Study of a Differentiated Subgroup and Its Stabilization as a 'Dispersed Community.'"

Sverre Henry Monsen, B.A. Florida State, 1957; M.A. California (Los Angeles), 1959. "Political Integration in Norway."

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Martin Robin, B.A. Manitoba, 1959; M.A. Toronto, 1960. "Labor and Politics in Canada, 1890–1914."

Elizabeth Dean Wangenheim, B.A., M.A. Toronto, 1952, 1956. "The Ukrainian Community in Toronto."

TULANE UNIVERSITY

Anne C. Fowler, "The Southern Negro in Transition."

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

Henry J. Vander Velden, B.A. (equivalent) St. Norbert Abbey, 1932; M.S.W. Utah, 1959. "Influence of Parent-Child Relationships within the Family upon the Desire of the Teen-agers To Get Out of the Family Unit."

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Verne Bechill, A.B. Ohio Wesleyan, 1954; M.A. Emory, 1956. "Role Incongruity as a Factor in Divorce."

Paul Geisel, A.B. Willamette, 1956; M.A. Vanderbilt, 1958. "Race and Mobility: Prerequisites among Southern Youth."

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (ST. LOUIS)

Mark Jay Abrahamson, A B. Illinois, 1960. "The Integration of Industrial Scientists."

Donald G. Bushell, Jr., A.B. Washington (Seattle), 1956; A.M. Kent State, 1958. "The Origins of Social Stratification."

Rodney Michael Coe, B.S. Iowa State, 1955; M.A. Southern Illinois, 1959. "Institutionalization and the Self-conceptions of the Aged."

Henrietta S. Cox, A.B., A.M. Kansas, 1942, 1945. "Value Orientations, Social Class, and Mother-Child Behavior."

Robert Coit Day, B.A. Kenyon College, 1952. "Some Effects of Closeness and Punitiveness of Supervision."

Elizabeth D. Ossorio, B.A. California (Berkeley), 1943. "Perception of Community Mental Health Resources by Physicians and Clergymen."

James Arthur Wiggins, B.S. Iowa State, 1957; A.M. Washington (St. Louis), 1959. "The Effects of Non-conformity upon Aggression."

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Norma E. Armstrong, A.B., M.A. Acadia, 1957, 1958. "Interactional Contingency, Interpersonal Prediction, and Adaptability."

Asghar Fathi, A.B. American (Beirut), 1954; M.A. Washington, 1959. "The Effects of Latent Positions on Interaction."

George Myers, A.B. Yale, 1953; M.A. Washington, 1960. "The Comparative Age and Sex Structure of American Cities."

Orjar Oyen, M.A. Washington, 1953. "Ecological Context and Individual Choice: A Study of Residential Mobility."

Ernest Palola, B.S., M.A. Washington, 1956, 1958. "Organizational Types and Role Strains."

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Leland J. Axelson, B.A., M.A. Washington State, 1949, 1958. "A Study of the Marital Adjustment and Role Definitions of Husbands of Working and Non-working Wives."

James E. Conyers, B.A. Morehouse College, 1954; M.A. Atlanta, 1956. "Attitudes of Negroes and Whites toward the Phenomenon of 'Passing.' "

Lawrence J. Sharp, B.A. Gonzaga, 1957; M.A. Washington State, 1959. "Predictions of Academic Achievement in Terms of Need-Achievement Motivation."

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Virginia May Lambert, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1952, 1953. "A Study of the Relationship between Self-conception and Social Role in a Sample of Adjudicated and Non-adjudicated Juvenile Delinquents in Wisconsin."

Lloyd Benjamin Lueptow, B.S., M.S. Wisconsin, 1953, 1957. "The Achievement Syndrome and Occupational and Academic Preferences."

Eugen Lupri, B.S. McPherson College, 1955; M.A. Wisconsin, 1959. "Values and Social Change."

Wilmer Everett MacNair, B.A. Park College (Missouri), 1953; B D. Chicago, 1956; M.S. Wisconsin, 1960. "Meaning and Conflict in the Formation of the United Church of Christ."

William Francis Stewart, B.A Southern Methodist, 1951; M.A Wisconsin, 1954. "Ecological Determinates of Resistance to Change: The Fluoridation Conflict."

YALE UNIVERSITY

C. Richard Fletcher, B.M., M.A. Montana State, 1954, 1959. "Public Identification of Mental Illness"

C. Theodore Hadwen, B.A. British Columbia, 1955; M A. Cambridge, 1961. "The Early Stages of Foreign Student Adjustment."

Robert H. Maisel, B.A. Brandeis, 1956; M A. Michigan, 1958. "Familial Attitudes and the Social Adjustment of Ex-Mental Patients."

John F. O'Rourke, B.A. Massachusetts, 1956. "Field and Laboratory: A Comparison of Selected Aspects of the Decison-making Behavior of Family and Ad Hoc Groups under Two Environmental Conditions."

Derek L. Phillips, A.B. Rutgers, 1959; M.A. Arizona, 1960. "Help Sources and Rejection of the Mentally Ill."

Margaret M. Plymire, B.S. Illinois, 1954; M.A. Yale, 1961. "Mode of Adaptation to Illness as Affected by Exposure to Medical Care."

Robert H. West, B.A., M.A. Yale, 1957, 1959. "The Hospital Admission Note and the Physician: A Study in Professionalization."

BOOK REVIEWS

Occupations and Social Status. By ALBERT J. REISS, JR., with the collaboration of OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN, PAUL K. HATT, and CECIL C. NORTH. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. vii+305. $5.00.

In 1947 Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt undertook a study of occupational prestige, utilizing the facilities of the National Opinion Research Center. A national quota sample of 2,920 respondents were asked to rate the "general standing" of ninety selected occupations on a five-point scale. A summary of the main findings was published in September, 1947, in *Opinion News* and reprinted two years later in the well-known reader by Wilson and Kolb, *Sociological Analysis.* North and Hatt had planned to publish a more detailed analysis, but because of North's retirement and Hatt's untimely death, their projected monograph was never completed. The task was subsequently intrusted to Albert J. Reiss, Jr., who had at his disposal the original punchcards, an outline of the proposed monograph, the published articles of Hatt, and a draft of one chapter by North.

Although fifteen years have elapsed since the original investigation, the present volume still appears timely because the NORC-North-Hatt occupational scores have become a sort of classic in the literature on social stratification. Meeting an urgent need for a standardized method of ranking occupational status, these scores have been widely used, sometimes rather uncritically, by later investigators. "Given the high popularity of the original investigation and the need to pursue further work in this area," Reiss felt "there would be merit in a critical evaluation of the original study together with some analysis and reanalysis of the data from it." This reviewer is inclined to agree with him.

Reiss's systematic reassessment of the methodology of the NORC study raises a number of important questions, only a few of which can be mentioned here. How did limited respondent knowledge about the nature of occupations affect the prestige ratings? What were the criteria employed by different raters? What issues governed the choice of occupations for rating? To what extent were the occupations selected representative of the total labor force? What were the methods used in weighting the scores and ranking the occupations? Do the rankings form a unidimensional scale?

Although the very thorough analysis of these problems uncovers a number of weaknesses and defects in the original study, on the whole the NORC prestige ratings of occupations stand up remarkably well under this searching scrutiny. Reiss shows that the prestige status of occupations is viewed substantially the same way by the major social groupings in American society and that there is almost complete agreement on the nature of the occupational prestige structure in this country. Despite the fact that individuals and groups differ in the way they conceive the "general standing" of occupations, their perspectives converge to such an extent that they have a very similar picture of the nature of our occupational structure.

Reiss's critical evaluation of the NORC-North-Hatt study is greatly enhanced by two additional chapters contributed by Otis Dudley Duncan, who undertook to construct a socioeconomic index of occupations based on Census data. As Reiss shows, the occupations scored in the NORC study covered less than half the aggregate labor force. This led later investigators to supplement the NORC scores in various ways in an attempt to cover additional occupations. To overcome the limitations of these more or less arbitrary procedures, Duncan employed Census information on income and education, adjusted for age, to derive a socioeconomic index for each of the 425 detailed occupations listed in the 1950 *Census of Population.* Comparison of socioeconomic index values with NORC prestige scores for the forty-five occupational titles sufficiently similar in both listings showed correlations of a very high order, thus "validating" the socioeconomic index as a predictor of occupational prestige. Despite some inherent limitations, which Duncan points out with great care, this new index undoubtedly repre-

sents the best research tool developed in this field to date. Future investigators in the area of measuring the social status of occupations will therefore benefit not only from Reiss's judicious analysis of the original NORC materials but are also offered Duncan's new index as part of the package.

A reprinting of Hatt's 1950 paper on "Occupation and Social Stratification," in which he pointed out that occupations could not be ranked in a single dimension and attempted to construct scales of occupations within situs categories, forms the concluding chapter. The book is required reading for all who are engaged in empirical research in the field of stratification.

KURT B. MAYER

Brown University

Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico. By MELVIN TUMIN, with ARNOLD S. FELDMAN. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xxvi+549. $10.00.

Tumin has made an ambitious attempt to write three books in one volume: (1) a report on a sample survey among Puerto Ricans; (2) an analysis of the main directions of social change in Puerto Rico, with emphasis on the influence of the stratification system on the "readiness for change"; (3) a contribution to the general theory of social stratification. The volume is hard to read because all three books are intermixed, and Tumin had three audiences in mind simultaneously; however, the material is important and worth the effort.

The survey was conducted in 1954 among a representative sample of one thousand heads of households in the Puerto Rican labor force; the upper educational groups were over-represented in order to have enough cases for internal comparisons, which means that generalizations to the whole population and comparisons with other populations are only legitimate when education is controlled (which Tumin occasionally forgets, e.g., on p. 445). The questionnaire contained items that permit study of the following main themes: (1) the relationships among the objective variables of position in the stratification order, such as rural-urban residence, education, occupation, and income; (2) the rates of intergenerational and career mobility; (3) the patterns of self-identification in terms of varying perceptions of the stratification order; (4) the connections between objective social position in the stratification order (as well as actual mobility experience) and subjective evaluations of the openness of the system for one's self and one's children, estimates of one's own worth, and a sense of receiving a just share of the satisfactions of life.

The sample design and the questionnaire instrument are of high quality. (However, the reader must reconstruct the questionnaire item by item, and does not learn of the sequence of items, for Tumin does not publish the instrument in either English or its original Spanish.) We can appreciate Tumin's industriousness, for we have very few studies of total societies that go beyond simple census materials or gross descriptions of social structure, to delve into elusive aspects of the relations between structural position, group and personal values, and that cluster of attitudes toward life that reflect morale and commitment and aspiration.

Some new and useful measures of value and morale are introduced. Tumin tells us that, in general, the higher one's position in the stratification order the higher one's morale, but the differences among strata are much less than he expected. He attributes this to Puerto Rico's democratic political atmosphere and to the continuance of certain traditional Latin values of the worth and dignity of the individual regardless of his occupation. Tumin further emphasizes the great importance of the rapidly expanding public school system which gives all levels of society a sense of increasing opportunity, especially for their children. Indeed, he uses commitment to the education of children as his most important dependent variable throughout the study.

The materials on class identification show that the industrial changes of recent years are producing the three-class hierarchy to be expected, and that material goods are the key symbol of position. Although most respondents identified with a class that was appropriate to their objective position and chose their friends from among equals, they showed a rather strong tendency to reserve respect and confidence for the upper classes, which is both an indication of the continuity of tradition and a hint of a lack of sharp class conflict.

Tumin's main tool of analysis is a simple cross-classification of educational level with a

series of other items, especially those indicating values and attitudes. He chooses education after he shows it to be a more powerful predictor of attitudes than occupation or rural-urban residence—the latter fact is important, for it shows that the split between the traditional and modern orders is more social than geographical. Unfortunately, Tumin usually stops after he has made this first cross-classification and thus fails to exploit his own rich data. For example, he asks on page 102: "Why do people at the same level of education and income react differently to the idea of education for their children? Why do some allot a larger share of their incomes and engage in more self-denial than others, in behalf of their children? Here are crucial questions which we cannot answer." The sad fact is that he has material that would take him toward some answers. If he held education constant and varied mobility and basic values, then he could probably come to an understanding of variations in specific attitudes. At many such points, the reader wishes Tumin had gone further in his analysis.

The importance of studying the "anomalous" cases that so often disturb Tumin is crucial to an understanding of social change, for they are often the agents that introduce new behavior (or, at the opposite extreme, are the main resisters of innovation). They are thus more interesting than the fellows who sit upon the central tendency. One is even led to hope that some future studies will be conducted in two waves, with a return for more intensive interviews among those discovered to be "anomalous."

The second book that Tumin presents, intermixed with the first, is a general description of change in Puerto Rico, in comparison with other countries, that goes beyond his survey materials and contains advice for administrators. He emphasizes a key question that is relevant for all of Latin America (and perhaps other regions as well): the impact of impersonal, market-oriented forces on the traditional, family-centered values of a semifeudal rural society. In this aspect of his writing, Tumin mentions much of the important literature on Puerto Rico and other parts of the globe, but he does not use it. He presents no systematic ethnographic or historical data to support his speculations, which are often generated by his attempts to guess at interpretations of inadequately probed survey results, item by item.

The final book contained between this one set of covers is a theoretical discussion of stratification theory in relation to social change. Starting from Parsons' essay, "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," Tumin shows that it is possible to build change into the model by recognizing that value dissensus is an ever present fact of life. In a subtle manner, he reorganizes the theory of integration of social systems, discusses systematic variation within society, moves from role theory to motivation theory, and then deduces change as part of the model instead of a disturbing influence from outside. It is a superb piece of work.

JOSEPH A. KAHL

Washington University, St. Louis

Variations in Value Orientations. By FLORENCE R. KLUCKHOHN and FRED L. STRODTBECK, with the assistance of JOHN M. ROBERTS, A. KIMBALL ROMNEY, CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, and HARRY A. SCARR. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1961. Pp. xiv+437. $7.75.

This is an unusual book in cultural anthropology. The authors present a theoretical approach to a fundamental aspect of culture; develop, from the theory, a standard measuring instrument to test some implications of the theory; report data obtained from stratified random samples of respondents; employ sophisticated and innovative statistical procedures; and check the validity of their findings not only against ethnographic observations but against predictions made *in advance!* On all of these counts the volume represents a contribution to methodology in the study of culture which, it is hoped, will have far-reaching influence.

A report from the Harvard Values Project, the book is concerned with the conceptualization and measurement of those "patterned principles" which give order and direction to behavior in the solution of common human problems. Primary theoretical emphasis is given to the assumption that value orientations are differentiated and hierarchically organized *systems*. An adequate description of any culture must describe the network of variant orientations in which a dominant value orientation is imbedded.

To tap variations in orientation to such common human problems as man's relation to nature, man's relation to his fellow men, and man's place in the flow of time, a twenty-two-item interview schedule was constructed. Each orientation was presumed to vary in three categorical ways, for example, the *time* orientation varies from past to present to future. Therefore each item provided three alternative "solutions" to a general problem which it posed, and each alternative represented a variation of the orientation elicited by the problem. The respondent rank-ordered the alternatives to each item according to which he thought the best solution.

A total of 106 subjects, approximately equal-sized samples of Spanish-Americans, Zuni, and "Rimrock" Navaho Indians, and Texan and Mormon Anglos, representing five cultures in close proximity, were administered the schedule. The rank-ordered data were subjected to a unique procedure of graphic analysis which should certainly come into wider use. The results showed statistically significant within-culture regularities (except for Zuni) and between-culture differences. The utility of the instrument and the significance of the theory were supported by these findings, by congruence of the findings with the prior predictions, and by their coherence with ethnographic knowledge.

Despite this degree of success, the research has a number of shortcomings, some of which the authors have acknowledged. First, there is a hiatus between the focus of the theoretical discussion upon *variation* and the focus of the empirical strategy upon *consistency* (within-culture regularity). The major potential contribution of the theory was simply not tested. Second, the research instrument was inadequately refined. Some of the items obviously involve more than one orientation, thereby limiting the interpretation of a response. The failure to assess the reliability of the schedule is of special concern where subjects with limited verbal skills are used and where single items, delivered orally, can run to over two hundred words. In the absence of reliability information, obtained inconsistency in results (as with the Zuni) remains ambiguous—it reflects either a characteristic of the culture or of the measure.

Third, the type of data suggested by the theory and yielded by the schedule—profiles of rank-orderings—seems limited for the desired comparative studies. Two cultures or subcultures can have identical orderings but differ markedly in *degree* of preference with which the orientations are held. This may have been the case in the Texan-Mormon comparison where, despite "conspicuous behavior differences," the two groups had nearly identical profiles. It may prove more fruitful to abandon the notion of categorical variation in favor of continuously dimensionalized variation which would allow the recovery of differences in degree of preference from data. Finally, the theory of variation in value orientation impresses this reviewer as being insufficiently analytic—a good deal of further conceptual definition seems necessary if co-ordination to individual behavior and to institutional structures is to become more precise.

If this research leads to further theoretical development and the refinement, if not reconstruction, of the approach to measurement, it will have made a substantial contribution to the study of culture.

Richard Jessor

University of Colorado

Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction. By Erving Goffman. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1961. Pp. 152. $1.95.

Here is an advanced study in sociology published in a paperback form that makes possible more extensive communication among specialized professionals. The book contains two related essays: "Fun in Games" and "Role Distance." In the first, Goffman states more systematically than he has done elsewhere a framework for analyzing "focused gatherings," which are face-to-face encounters of people in pursuit of some focus of attention such as playing a game, performing an operation, or going horseback riding. The second essay applies this framework to the analysis of role distance as it is observed in encounters on a merry-go-round and among the surgical personnel in an operating room.

An encounter is distinguished from a relationship or a group. Then the author establishes the importance of boundary maintenance to the creation and control of the type of encounter he calls a "focused gathering." In playful inter-

action, there is a balance established between providing importance to the encounter in its own right and providing recognition, within the encounter, for the desires of individuals to display attributes located outside the encounter. This balance is achieved in the creation of a focus of attention which defines some external matters as irrelevant and others as relevant to the encounter. For a specific focused gathering to achieve participant involvement, "the wider world must be introduced, but in a controlled and disguised manner" (p. 79). Goffman makes exceedingly interesting observations regarding the rules for transforming external matters into resources relevant to the situation and regarding the optimal conditions of tension and ease which, through control of these rules, maximize euphoria. The mechanisms of boundary maintenance are selective inattention, suppression, and repression of irrelevant matters. The encounter must matter enough in the external world to encourage spontaneous involvement, yet it must not matter so much that the tensions created in establishing boundaries destroy it. Fun in games appears to rest on the optimal balance of problematic outcome and controlled opportunity to demonstrate personal attributes or prowess.

With these principles for the analysis of encounters established, Goffman returns, in the essay on "Role Distance," to extend traditional role analysis. He points to actions which might have been considered out of role or ideosyncratic, but which, in his analysis, are seen to be integral to the situated role of the actor and functional within the encounter. His discussion of role distance, defined as "actions which effectively convey some disdainful detachment of the performer from a role he is performing," is an excellent contribution. The description of the demonstrations of role distance by children on a merry-go-round is delightful. That this is not ridiculous is illustrated by numerous instances of similarly sublime role distance in the performance of the surgeon in the operating room. Goffman brings role theory down to the situated behavior of individual actors—a much needed development.

The book is recommended highly to symbolic interactionist, role, and game theorists and to students of group dynamics and small-group interaction processes.

The reviewer has two mild reservations about these essays. The approach makes of the actor a more detached, self-conscious, and rational creature than he is often found to be. Second, although Goffman may be excused as a theorist and insightful observer, the substance of his proofs rests upon selected examples. What shall we do with the rest of the data?

ROBERT J. POTTER

Flint College, University of Michigan

Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change. By MUZAFER SHERIF and CARL I. HOVLAND. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. xii+218. $6.00.

This book is Volume IV in the "Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication." The first three were *The Order of Presentation in Persuasion; Personality and Persuasibility;* and *Attitude Organization and Change.* Actually two volumes properly precede these: *Experiments on Mass Communication* and *Communication and Persuasion* (the first work reporting research done at Yale and published by Yale University Press). Like all five preceding volumes, *Social Judgment* has the late Carl I. Hovland as one of its principal authors. However, unlike the others, very little of the present volume deals with experiments in attitude change.

Most of this volume is devoted, as its main title suggests, to problems of social judgment. Here "judgment" is used as in psychophysics where stimuli are judged along a particular dimension. For example, the stimulus weight is judged to be lighter or heavier than a standard one. Here the stimuli instead of being lights or weights—sense data—are attitudes or positions on issues; hence the term social judgment. Social judgment is defined as a process underlying attitude formation and opinion change. The authors point out that "one essential aspect of attitudinal reaction is a categorization process" whether consciously or unconsciously made.

Judgment processes are differentiated into discrimination among attitudes, placement of attitude items along a continuum, and the acceptance or rejection of such items. Motivation and learning factors relevant to each of these processes are discussed.

These analyses of the judgment process lead

to a whole series of scaling problems. Of the eight chapters in the book, four are devoted to problems of scaling, the first and last are general discussions, and only chapters vi and vii deal specifically with application to problems of attitude change.

With respect to discrimination, judgments are studied under well-structured stimulus conditions where induced anchors make little difference and under ambiguous stimulus conditions in which the insertion of anchors à la Asch has considerable influence. Frequently in social settings and in attitudinal matters ambiguous situations obtain, the problem of judgmental anchors is relevant, and the role of internal anchors is then examined as being most important for attitude formation. Shifts of judgment toward an internal anchor are called assimilation, while shifts away from such anchors are labeled contrast. Large discrepancies between internal anchors and series of stimuli produce contrast; small discrepancies result in assimilation. The applications of the concepts of assimilation and contrast to attitude change are especially relevant when one is studying the effects of distance between the position being advocated in the communication and that initially held by a subject. (Experiments of this sort are presented late in the volume.)

The following is an example of a problem of placement. Hinckley's data have been interpreted as demonstrating that judges can place items on a scale independently of their own positions which tends to support an assumption in Thurstone's law of comparative judgments. The present authors demonstrate that the Hinckley findings are due to the artifact of discarding highly clustered judgments as being careless ones. Sherif and Hovland demonstrate that, on the contrary, these are highly responsible, well-informed placements and when included clearly demonstrate the influence of the rater's own position on his assignment of items to scale positions.

The authors point out that a subject's attitudinal position is a region rather than a point on a scale. There is a range of attitudinal points on any scale that a given subject finds acceptable and similarly a range of positions that are rejected by him. These are labeled latitudes of acceptance and latitudes of rejection, respectively. Studies involving two different issues are cited illustrating these phenomena. The discrepancy between the empirical data cited in Table 4 and the theoretical data shown in Table 3 is sufficiently great to fall within this reviewer's latitude of rejection.

Finally, these judgmental concepts are applied to measuring the effects of communications. For example, the hypothesis is proposed that small distances between a subject's initial position and that advocated in a communication will result in assimilation and high distance in contrast. The data from the previously published experiment of Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1957) are used to confirm this hypothesis. The authors predict that increasing distance will result in increasing change up to a point (assimilation). Beyond that point rejection (contrast) should occur. Other published results and some not yet published do not always confirm this prediction. In the summary chapter, as has become traditional in the Yale communication volumes, implications for further research are pointed out.

Certainly this is a highly important contribution to communication research literature. The ideas and studies cited, some of which have already appeared elsewhere—such as C. I. Hovland's acceptance speech of the American Psychological Association's Scientific Achievement Award in 1958 published in the *American Psychologist* in January, 1959—have already been productive of considerable work.

NATHAN MACCOBY

Stanford University

The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life. By GERHARD LENSKI. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961. Pp. xvi+381. $5.95.

Though the concept religion refers to a set of phenomena, some researchers have treated it as if it had but a single referent. Indicators such as declared affiliation, church attendance, or adherence to doctrines have been used interchangeably. Lenski specifies four separate aspects of religion. Two of these refer to socio-religious groups and two refer to religious orientations. He divides socio-religious groups into the communal (the degree to which primary-type relations of an individual are limited to persons of his own group) and the

associational (frequency of church attendance). Religious orientations are subdivided into doctrinal orthodoxy (assent to doctrines) and devotionalism (frequency of private or personal communion with God). Lenski then studies the influence of each of these four factors on economic, political, familial, educational, and scientific attitudes. The study, part of the Detroit Area Study, is based on 656 interviews with laymen and 127 with clergymen.

This more precise fourfold specification of the concept enables Lenski to clarify findings of previous studies. Earlier research had shown that religion has little influence on morality and is positively or curvilinearly related to scores on the *F*-scale and to prejudice. Lenski finds that associational involvement greatly affects attitudes of individuals on moral issues on which the churches have especially chosen to take a stand, such as gambling, drinking, and birth control. Prejudice, negative images of other groups, is related to involvement in the subcommunity but not particularly to associational involvement.

As a major theme, Lenski attempts to test Weber's thesis concerning the relation of the Protestant ethic to the spirit of capitalism. White Protestants, he finds, do rise further in the occupational world than do white Catholics. He explains that Catholics are hindered in occupational advancement by being more oriented toward kin groups and by being less oriented to values of personal autonomy. Kin orientation is indicated by a response to a question showing that Catholics are more likely than Protestants to pay weekly visits to their relatives. Lenski does not allow for the fact that the Catholics were more likely to be natives of Detroit and so more likely to have relatives there, and that they are more likely to be of the working class and so do more visiting with relatives. Personal autonomy is indicated by a question about the rearing of children. Catholics thought learning obedience most important and Protestants stressed teaching children to think for themselves. Using a response to a single question as an indicator for a broad concept is generally a questionable procedure. Here, he jumps from Detroiters' responses to a single question on child-rearing to sweeping conclusions about Catholic and Protestant ethos. He also explains that a higher school dropout rate hinders Catholic occupational advancement. His explanation of the dropouts is as follows: (1) dropouts are negatively correlated with IQ, (2) children from large families have lower IQ's than children from smaller families, (3) Catholics have larger families than do Protestants, and so (4) dropouts are related to lower Catholic IQ's. He does not present evidence on Catholic IQ's. Lenski takes two propositions (religion–family size and family size–IQ) and assumes a transitivity among their terms.

The theoretical straw men of the study are called "economic determinism" and "positivism." Since pure "economic determinism" is rare in American sociology and no "economic determinists" are named, one wonders with whom he is tilting. In effect he wants to emphasize that socio-religious group membership is at least as significant as class membership in predicting responses to an attitude questionnaire. To make this point he presents a summary table comparing the influence of socio-religious group and class on each of thirty-five dependent variables. He finds that the mean percentage difference due to socio-religious groups is slightly higher than the average due to the class factor. These percentage differences are marginal. They are a function of the cutting points between his groups In addition, the socio-religious factor shows a higher average influence because of a few specific responses to items sharply influenced by the churches such as attitudes to drinking, birth control, and divorce. He would be on safer ground were he to avoid the strange arithmetic and point out that there are certain items such as voting and school segregation for which class is a better predictor. The table then shows that socio-religious group is a better predictor of job satisfaction, giving multiple reasons for saving, having relatives in Detroit, being native Detroiters, and having four or more children.

His critique of "positivism" reduces itself to an assertion of the untenability of the "environmentalist position, which explains economic behavior solely in terms of the social situation of the individual and the group." Nevertheless, his own independent variables are preponderantly environmental. Further, in his concluding chapter he explains the norms of socio-religious groups in such "positivistic" terms as communication networks, cultural transmission, and the vested interests of organizational staffs.

The book provides a number of edited quotations from interview schedules. Only those of Negro respondents are reported in ungrammatical English. At one point he labels working-class liberalism as "self-seeking." Middle-class liberalism is labeled "altruism and idealism." Little support for such loaded terms is provided in a short discussion which is an unnecessary digression from the thread of his argument.

With the above limitations in mind, the study is a contribution to the sociology of religion as it reports information on most of the topics of present concern to researchers in this field. The central contention that religion is a vital part of American life and does influence everyday attitudes is well documented

SAMUEL Z. KLAUSNER

Bureau of Social Science Research

The Achieving Society. By DAVID MCCLELLAND. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961. Pp. xvi+512. $7.95.

This book should prove a delight to any social scientist. It has a clearly stated central hypothesis; it provides extensive evidence in support of the hypothesis; it anticipates arguments that may be raised against it and provides empirical data destined to refute them; it applies the hypothesis to data taken from contemporary society and to others from past historical cases; it is well written and roams widely over the fields of social science; it even goes beyond social science and adduces materials from literature, the history of plastic arts, the analysis of religious teachings, and to some extent human biology. The author is not afraid to go "out on a limb," and he is well aware of the fact that some of the measures he uses are unorthodox, yet he attempts—often successfully—to make a case for his use of these variables rather than the less convincing, more orthodox ones. Yet the major theme of the book is in the realm of social psychology, though it is not certain whether McClelland's main contribution is likely to receive as much recognition among social psychologists as it deserves.

The central question with which the work deals is the determination of the mainsprings of economic development and growth. This problem has received ample attention in recent years and there exist many more or less well-supported suggestions on why some societies have shown so much more success in this field than others. Environmental theories, theories of social structure, of economic organization, of political power, and of a multitude of other variables have been proposed, but this is the first theory which places central emphasis on psychological factors, primarily drawn from motivational theory. Whereas almost all theories of economic growth concentrated on external factors, McClelland focuses on internal factors, values, and motives, in particular, on achievement motivation or the need for achievement (*n* Achievement, or *n* Ach).

A bare summary of McClelland's central hypothesis would run somewhat like this: As a consequence of the study of motivational orientations of American college students, the observation was made that there existed apparently a high correlation between high *n* Ach and success in economic activity, especially business enterprise. Hence the question could be asked as to what effect a concentration of people with high *n* Ach would have on a society. It was hypothesized that this situation would lead to an upsurge of economic growth in the society, and that the various past spurts of economic progress, particularly the rise of capitalism, were due primarily to the appearance of a relatively large number of persons with high *n* Ach.

This hypothesis was supported by comparing data collected by M. R. Winterbottom on the principles of rearing boys who turned out to have a high *n* Ach with the underlying motivational structure of Puritans, as described by Max Weber in his famous essay on *The Protestant Ethic.* Weber's description of the members of Calvinist sects suggests that they have a high need for achievement, and the ideology of Calvinism suggests that children were brought up with great stress on early self-reliance and mastery. But these were precisely the principles of child-rearing which had been identified by Winterbottom among the mothers who had raised boys with high *n* Ach. Hence an interdependence between certain child-rearing practices, high need for achievement, and economic success was established. It now remained to apply this paradigm to cases in which measurable economic progress took place.

Some of the most fascinating portions of the book deal with this problem. The main

obstacles, as regards past societies, arose in that psychological tests could not be given to the business leaders (and others) of past periods, because these men were dead. The device chosen was to analyze the literature and other art forms of a period with regard to their achievement imagery and to relate this to some indicator of economic growth. In this field some highly imaginative measures were developed by McClelland and his associates, ranging from coal imports to London, to the frequency of Greek potsherd remains in the Mediterranean basin, and from the literature of medieval and early modern Spain to the decorations on pre-Inca funerary urns.

It would lead too far to go into detail in discussing this part of the book. Though a valiant effort was made to get as "hard" data as could be obtained, the very brittleness and paucity of actually usable data makes the correlations which were found somewhat doubtful. Yet even the most skeptical reader must admit that the evidence adduced tends to lend support to McClelland's central hypothesis and that certainly great pains were taken to avoid bias in sampling and in the selection of indicators.

But even if the basic hypothesis is granted, that high *n* Ach is a necessary precondition of economic advancement and that emphasis on early reliance and self-mastery is a necessary precondition for high *n* Ach, the question remains as to what forces or conditions in a society tend to bring about a change in the education of children leading to a higher frequency of individuals with high *n* Ach, and what other factors lead (or have led in past societies) to a change in child-rearing practices in the opposite direction so as to make an economically highly progressive society stagnant again. It also raises the question of what social arrangements and policies should be advocated if a rapid rate of economic advancement is desired.

The answers to both these questions are much more tenuous and much less convincing than the presentation of the central hypothesis and its supporting evidence. In general, McClelland argues that the behavioral patterns which determine the incidence of conditions leading to high *n* Ach are imbedded in the total culture of a society and manifest themselves in dominant ideologies, for example, religious values, which in turn determine such attitudes as market mentality and other-directedness. But he also maintains that wars, by withdrawing fathers from the family circle, may positively affect *n* Ach by reducing the amount of father dominance, and—on the other hand—that too much wealth and hence too many servants (or slaves) may ultimately reduce the level of *n* Ach because children tend to be pampered too much. Here a general set of propositions is not available; most of McClelland's arguments are derived from the special cases he discusses throughout the book, and when it comes to policy prescriptions all he can say is that "a government or an outside agency apparently cannot do much to stimulate an increase in national *n* Achievement levels" (p. 148).

I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs what appear to me the main issues raised in the book, primarily from the viewpoint of the student interested in economic development. There is a wealth of other material in McClelland's chapters which I have not touched upon, for example, his discussion of entrepreneurship and its motivational underpinnings, his extensive presentation of his findings on national cultures through the analysis of childrens' stories, his discussion of other motivations, especially the need for power and its relation to forms of political organization. All these topics make a careful reading of the book highly rewarding. But his main significance is the stipulation of a socio-psychological variable as the chief—and perhaps overriding—condition of economic growth. Few social scientists will deny that motivational dispositions are important, but equally few will agree that they are the primary factor in economic growth. It is the great merit of the book to make such a strong case for just this interpretation. For even if many readers may feel that the case is overstated, few will be able to deny the power of McClelland's case and none will be able to adduce convincing evidence to refute the assertion that *n* Ach is one of the principal factors in economic growth. In this way, McClelland advances greatly our theoretical insight in the social and socio-psychological concomitants of the economic development process.

BERT F. HOSELITZ

University of Chicago

Industrial Growth and Population Change: A Regional Study of the Coalfield Areas of

North-West Europe in the Late Nineteenth Century. By E. A. Wrigley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. xi+193. $6.00.

This short volume consists of two long, relatively independent essays on related themes. The title indicates their common subject—population growth during the half-century, approximately, from 1850 to 1914 in what the author terms the Austrasian coalfield, which stretches from Pas de Calais in France, through southeastern Belgium, to the Ruhr in Germany.

Since in these areas, as the author shows, capital, laborers, and entrepreneurs crossed international boundaries almost as though they did not exist, and since coal could not be profitably transported very far from its source, the site and quality of this basic natural resource determined the location of the heavy industry in the three areas, and thus indirectly their social characteristics. In particular, these were the areas of rapid population growth. This argument is contrasted with well-known works by Veblen and the French economic historian Blondel, both of whom had used "national character" to explain the extraordinary rise of German industry. In Wrigley's counterargument, a crucial example is Aachen, a German industrial city that resembled the Ruhr much less than the adjacent industrial regions in France and Belgium.

Wrigley's thesis, like all examples of geographic determinism, hovers between the obvious and the indefensible. No one is likely to deny the fact that coal was important; the point is rather whether it is reasonable virtually to exclude other factors. In the Ruhr, in contrast to all the other areas, both coal production and population increased at an accelerating rate. "It is arguable," the author remarks in passing, "that the advantages of the very large scale of production were creating benefits of their own"; but if he had chosen to develop this point, his emphasis on coal deposits would have been put in a more acceptable context. A still better test of the thesis, which Wrigley passes over altogether, is the negative example of Dutch Limburg, immediately adjacent to Aachen and Liège, which began to exploit its excellent coal deposits only around the turn of the century and then only through the strong initiative of the Netherlands government. When Wrigley speaks of "establishing some general features of industrial growth," he is surely engaging in hyperbole; his thesis is not wholly true even for the region he has analyzed.

The second essay consists of a detailed analysis of fertility and mortality in the specified industrial regions of France and Germany, compared with nearby agricultural regions, remote agricultural regions, and large administrative and trading centers in the two countries. As Wrigley points out, the data available in Germany and France (though not in Belgium, and also not in England of about a century earlier) permit one to trace the demographic changes accompanying industrialization from almost the beginning of the social transformation. And the way to do this, he insists, is to use local rather than national statistics. Indeed, his results demonstrate how useful this approach can be. Propositions that have acquired, principally from frequent repetition, an almost axiomatic character—such as that the "rural" sector is relatively homogeneous in its social characteristics or that the lower fertility in textile towns derives from the employment opportunities for female laborers or that the possibility of early economic independence leads to early marriage—are all challenged and labeled "doubtful." This second portion of the book is fascinating, and chastening, reading for any social scientist who has accepted the theory of the demographic transition as a fairly accurate generalization.

The book has a number of tables, an adequate index, a useful map. It seems to be somewhat overpriced, but the second essay may be worth the money.

William Petersen

Berkeley, California

The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy. Edited by Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961. Pp. xiv+168. $4.50.

In addition to its two editors, this volume has eight authors: economists Francis M. Bator, Richard S. Eckaus, Everett E. Hagen, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, and Walt W. Rostow; political scientists Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lucian W. Pye; and sociologist Daniel Lerner. All have been or are currently senior members of the staff of the Center for International

Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The immediate incentive of the authors was a request from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for a report on "Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for United States Policy." *The Emerging Nations* is an extensive revision of their report to the Senate. The authors believe that this is an interdisciplinary analysis and to an extent it is; but a joint effort does not necessarily produce this, particularly when the non-economists are so heavily outnumbered.

Although the volume is largely economic in its orientation and its recommendations, the authors do not view the world as one in which men are essentially economic men. Many men live in societies that are not well organized for production, but yet they have come to desire not only what the traditional organization of their society offers them, but in addition, they wish to obtain the fruits of modernization—often without paying its price. Here we have a group, predominantly economists, who conceive of the problem of savings and capital as a sociological problem, at least in part, for they see the basic problem as one of creating the attitudes and institutions on which capital formation depends. They believe that billions of dollars of capital must be contributed to the underdeveloped countries by the developed countries, but they conclude that capital is not a long-run solution to the problem unless there is some assurance that it will be productively employed rather than gradually consumed. The preconditions of economic assistance are emphasized rather than economic assistance alone.

The role of the individual in economic development is stressed in *The Emerging Nations*, perhaps to a greater extent than the evidence warrants. The disruption of traditional societies and process of transformation to modern, urban-industrial society is described. Various paths to development and their probable consequences for the United States are set forth in an unusually convincing manner. The over-all objective of the United States, according to the authors, should be to help make the transition to modernization so successful that there will be neither a struggle on the part of any large groups to repress change nor attempts to promote change by ruthless and extremist measures.

The "if . . . then" propositions in this volume will be dismaying to those who proceed only from the most carefully designed experimental research findings. The authors of *The Emerging Nations* state: "The essence of the policy-maker's task is to weigh the effects which today's acts are likely to have on tomorrow's world." The problem becomes a prediction problem. Unfortunately, it appears that the world will not wait for the crucial research that must be conducted.

Some economists, sociologists, and perhaps a few political scientists would take the view that we must remain in the laboratory until more is known. Others, including the bold authors of this volume, are willing to suggest what seems to be the course of action most likely to have the desired results at this stage of the development of the social sciences. They would say that we are faced with the choice of creating foreign information and economic and military assistance programs by hunch, guess, political design, or on the best of available scientific information. The timid and the perfectionists may choose to remain on the sidelines, but others prefer to share in the policy-making function.

LYLE W. SHANNON

University of Wisconsin

Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration. By LEONARD W. DOOB. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960. Pp. xii+333. $6 00.

The aim of this book is "to formulate a first approximation of what happens psychologically anywhere during acculturation" (p. x). The author reviews the anthropological literature on acculturation, states twenty-seven hypotheses, and brings evidence collected by himself (in Africa and Jamaica) and by others (in America and the Middle East) to bear on the hypotheses. He seeks a single directional concept to comprehend the changes found among non-industrial peoples who have had contact with the West, and decides upon "becoming more civilized" as the suitable term. An entire chapter is devoted to the attributes of "less civilized" people, largely a simplified version of Redfield's "folk society." However, civilization is defined as "the culture . . . possessed by modern literate and industrial nations in

Europe and America" (p. 2) without further elaboration. Thus the author leaves largely undefined the central dimension with which the volume is concerned, and he also ignores the attempts by previous quantitative researchers (e.g., Freeman and Winch, Naroll) to develop objective cross-cultural indexes of social development and a unidimensional scale of societal complexity. He falls back upon commonsense notions of developmental variation ("the differences between people who unwittingly live next to one another in the bush and those who wittingly live on top of one another in modern apartment houses," p. ix), introducing a subjective obscurity which is not only inconsistent with the quantitative approach of the study but also leaves it open to the charge of evaluative bias which the author repeatedly anticipates and denies.

The author administered a battery of attitude items, Rorschach plates, and perception and performance tests to samples of educated and uneducated subjects from three African groups and from Jamaica, in the expectation that differences between educated and uneducated would shed light on the process of becoming more civilized. The many negative and equivocal quantitative findings are frankly attributed by the author to the questionable reliability of his data. He examines the results of other quantitative studies carried out in America and the Middle East but frequently finds that these too are not directly relevant to his hypotheses. In consequence, much of the book is taken up with discussions of anecdotal evidence culled from ethnographic publications.

The most significant feature of this book is the attempt to present a series of formal hypotheses about acculturation as a guide to future research. A formal statement is bound to stimulate thought and research in this field even if it is viewed only as something to be improved upon. Many of these hypotheses, however, suffer from excessive generality; for example: "Basic changes in personality are likely to occur as people become adequately civilized" (p. 256). This is not a testable hypothesis in its present form and does not represent a clarification of previous formulations on the subject. Altogether, this is a book of preliminary reflections on acculturation in which data and hypotheses rest uneasily and with too little relation to each other; it is not the inventory of testable propositions or the searching empirical study which we still expect from Professor Doob.

ROBERT A. LEVINE

University of Chicago

Social Change in Modern Africa. Edited by AIDAN SOUTHALL. New York: Oxford University Press (for the International African Institute), 1961. Pp. xi+337. $6.40.

This volume is composed of various papers given at the First International African Seminar organized by the International African Institute in 1959 under the theme: "Kinship, Status and Neighborhood under Modern Economic Conditions in Tropical Africa." As seems to be inevitable, the papers are of varied quality and are sometimes only marginally related to the theme, already vaguely stated. This does not detract from their overall interest.

First of all, these papers are in many cases useful preliminary reports of ongoing research. Second, they indicate that the work going on in a dozen different African states by anthropologists and sociologists of American, Belgian, British, and French nationality show remarkable similarities of sociological perspective and even theoretical concern. Most of the papers are based on empirical research. If the techniques used seem sometimes elementary, one draws the clear impression that this is due to the social difficulties in conducting more complex quantitative measurements in social structures which do not have what might be termed the "statistical infra-structure."

One of the best papers is offered by Gluckman who proposes to summarize and reflect upon the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute over the past twenty years. He restates one of his most important themes: "The starting-point for analysis of urbanization must be an urban system of relations, in which the tribal origins of the population may be regarded as of secondary interest." Lest this seem platitudinous, be it noted that a whole previous generation of anthropologists and administrators, inspired by Malinowski, did not operate by this dictum and hence constructed a wholly different way of interpreting contemporary African reality. If one starts where Gluckman does, and only then, is one able to comprehend the rationale of the patterns of

African social and political development, taking expression in the creation of modern nations. The ideological implications of this argument about sociological perspective have been debated elsewhere (notably by Gluckman in his attack on Malinowski in *Africa* in 1947). The contributors to this volume are won to the new perspective.

Another interesting theoretical paper is contributed by Michael Banton (of Edinburgh) entitled "The Restructuring of Social Relationships." Banton seeks to explore the sources of new urban norms and the consequent emergence of new institutions which teach, render explicit, and reinforce the new norms. He is interested particularly in this regard in the role of the network of voluntary associations, which separately have a high casualty rate but collectively are ever expanding in importance. It is largely through these associations, Banton contends, that social status in the towns, its rights and obligations, is being increasingly allocated on a contractual rather than ascriptive basis.

Two empirical studies underline the pitfalls of generalization at a too low level of abstraction. Edwin Ardener in his study of a plantation area in Southern Cameroons explores the severe social repercussions of this new economy despite the fact that the area is still "rural." As he notes, life in his rural area "may have more in common with that in a new Copperbelt [mining] town than has life in an old [traditional] Yoruba town." J. Van Velsen challenges the easy assertion that labor migration always tends to be destructive of a traditional tribal system. He shows that under certain conditions, among the Tonga of Nyasaland, labor migration can be a positive factor in the continuity of the tribal society. Given the combined interest of European employers, colonial administration, and Tonga leaders in maintaining tribal cohesion, and *given the "peculiar and ambivalent lives"* the Tonga lead in South Africa, to which they migrate, the urban migrant continues to depend on the village for social and economic sustenance.

J. C. Mitchell gives us a very neat short paper on the effect of social change on the stability of African marriage in Northern Rhodesia. His hypothesis is a simple one: if those traditional kinship structures where genetrical rights are acquired by groups are more stable in the rural areas, the reverse is true in the towns where these corporate groups cannot operate as well. Here duration of marriage is greater among peoples with matrilineal and bilateral systems because the stabilizing reaction which has been generated (substantial marriage payments) is even more easily operated in the urban area.

In addition to the papers, the editor offers us an introductory summary in which he seeks to demonstrate, with considerable success, how the various aspects studied of small-scale relationships in situations of modern change help in the building of an appropriate framework for a theory of social change. This is a collection worth being read by more than those particularly interested in Africa.

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

Columbia University

White Man: A Study of the Attitudes of Africans to Europeans in Ghana before Independence. By GUSTAV JAHODA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xii+144. $3.40.

This is an interesting, intelligent, useful book on a subject about which there is much discussion but relatively little empirical research: the attitudes of a colonized people (in this case, Africans in Ghana) toward their colonizers under colonial rule. Jahoda interviewed children and adolescents in primary, middle, and secondary schools in the then Gold Coast shortly before it became independent but at a time when the nationalist movement was already sharing power He also interviewed a sample of adults of various educational levels.

He asked simple questions: In what ways are Africans and Europeans the same (different)? In what ways are African (Europeans) better? He found, not surprisingly, that those Africans who had higher education and more contacts with white men had more realistic stereotypes than the others. He found that behind the concept of "European" lay three distinct images: the flesh-and-blood European of daily contact, the somewhat idealized European in Britain about whom he had read, and the European as "scheming imperialist." Jahoda argues that recognition of this divided image can contribute to an understanding of group differences in responses.

He notes above all that the stereotype has many surprising and contradictory features, and treats us to a very sensible explanation of the sources of the ambivalence Africans show toward Europeans. African attitudes about Europeans, he says, are linked with African self-images, which are in turn the product of colonial history. The colonial situation was one in which in fact the Africans did occupy an inferior status, where Europeans believed in their own superiority and taught Africans to believe in it. Only today when European fallibilities and African accomplishments are becoming clear through the rise of nationalist movements is the psychological character of African shifting from that of "dependence" and "inferiority" to "autonomy," a term for which the author notes his debt to Riesman.

This typology of "orientation to whites," he suggests, is determined largely by two interrelated variables, the value system of the individual ("tribal, divided, or integrated") and formal education ("nil, intermediate, or high"). He attacks O. Mannoni (*Prospero and Caliban*) and Sir Alan Burns (*Colour Prejudice*) for reifying respectively "dependence" and "inferiority" into permanent attitudes deriving from the innate psychology of non-Europeans. He demonstrates that the colonized can indeed escape from these alternatives of dependence and inferiority by more education, political change, and the changed nature of the education resulting from the political change.

Jahoda's basic argument is a simple one: "If the African trumpet was sometimes blown in what appeared a rather loud and shrill manner, it is as well to pause before judging and to remember that the still small voice of European superiority had been heard whispering for so long and so insistently that its message had become deeply engraved in the minds of the listeners, and therefore a great effort was required to counteract it." These words strike me as the sober contribution of a social scientist to the men who make decisions.

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
Columbia University

Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia. By ERICH H. JACOBY. 2d ed. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961. Pp. xi+279. $7.25.

Americans have been taking considerable pleasure in the fact that Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung have been having substantial difficulties with their agricultural systems. They have been quick to forget that no agricultural system works satisfactorily during the course of industrialization; we fought our only civil war over an agricultural question. This book is a study of the many ways that the induction of an illiterate peasantry into the world market has not worked in Southeast Asia, suggesting consequences of the failure and remedies. It consists of chapters surveying the problems in individual countries, with a general introduction and a short peroration, brought up to date in a rough fashion since its first appearance in 1949.

According to Jacoby, this introduction into the world market took two main forms: large-scale plantations of Indonesia and Malaya under the direct administration of colonial elites and intensive culture on small plots of (generally irrigated) land held in tenancy. He has relatively little to say about the plantation form. The structure of the situation surrounding the induction of illiterates on the world scene is compounded of colonial government, the destruction of village handicrafts by competition from European manufactures, the decay of traditional village life through wage labor, legal reform, money exchange in place of exchange in kind, and the peculiar economic structure of the tenancy system. This peculiar economic system in turn is shaped by dependence on cash crops with highly variable world prices, high population density and underemployment of labor, and low capital intensity. This means that the returns to land quite generally make up half or more of agricultural income (in the United States it generally amounts to less than a third in agriculture, and, though I have no good information on it, probably around a tenth in the urban economy), with minimal returns to labor. Traditional village devices for providing seasonal or life-cycle requirements of seed, consumption, or ritual expense, decay to be replaced by money lenders, who also often serve as mediators between the illiterate peasantry and the literate world market, and who are often recruited from Chinese or Indian minorities. When prices vary, land (the only acceptable security for loans) falls into the hands of the money lenders. This means that most agricultural in-

come ends up in the hands of "unproductive" *rentier* groups with little interest or competence in agricultural advance, and fairly often ethnically distinct from the peasantry.

This combination of forces produces a subject population with highly variable income (generally a producer of political activity), who have been convinced by colonial governments that governments can effectively intervene to change the social structure, while the rich who get the pleasure are ethnically distinct from the poor who get the blame. According to Jacoby, this is the source of the nationalistic unrest in the area, and the persistent problems that such agricultural systems produce are the main problems facing the newly independent governments. He argues that neither technical development nor social stability can take place without the effective destruction of the dominance of *rentier* elites, involving legal reallocation of rights in the land and the development of effective substitutes for the credit and marketing functions on which their power is or was based. He evaluates state activities and co-operatives in each area according to their ability to maintain a system of smallholding once it is instituted, and evaluates government policies and political developments according to how far they facilitate the destruction of the power of the unproductive elites.

This then is one of a number of recent good summaries of the agricultural development of regions of the world, roughly comparable to Doreen Warriner's analysis of the Middle East and Folke Dovring's analysis of land and labor in Europe during the first half of this century. What is most striking about it, as a "good" summary, is the massive extent of our ignorance of the problems of inducting illiterates into world agricultural markets. There is no hard information on the connection between economic conditions or social structures and nationalistic sentiment or behavior indicative of unrest. The reason is quite clear. Such data have to be created, as the studies of Daniel Lerner and others of the Middle East, or Ronald P. Dore's brilliant study of *Land Reform in Japan* have created them. There is no hard information on the effect on rates of innovation of making the adopting unit a collective one such as a co-operative rather than the individual family, rather than trying to motivate landlords and moneylenders. We do not know what differentiates co-operatives that fail and co-operatives that succeed. There simply is no data on the exact conditions in family life, value of land, changes in price, that lead specific families to get into debt that they cannot get out of at specific times, as a basis for knowing where in the "natural history of losing a farm" the process can most effectively be stopped. We can make more or less informed guesses on the basis of indirect and poor information, and Jacoby's guesses are certainly informed. But the lack of sure information on these problems—which are problems that are going to shape world history during the next half century—pose a fundamental challenge to the data-creating social sciences, of which sociology can claim to be a leading light. I both hope and urge that we get our oar into solving the problems Jacoby poses.

ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE

University of Chicago

The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times. By B. B. MISRA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. viii+438. $7.20.

The comparative study of social classes has been enriched with this well-written description of the Indian situation. Misra traces the development of the secular middle classes of India from pre-British times to national independence through their actions in trade, government, education, and industry, and their changing relations with the traditional systems of land and caste.

Although the author's prime object was to produce a "historical survey of the composition, character, and role of the Indian middle classes," he also sheds some light on variables, besides industrial development, which effect the formation of a social class. He suggests that prior to the rise of Indian industry, an important middle class had already emerged due to the changes wrought by the British in the systems of law, public administration, and education.

He contends the "ideas and institutions of a middle-class social order were imported into India." For example, the British enforcement of the right of private property reduced the seizure by despotic local government of the fruits of individual labor, thus helping en-

courage the commercial middle class of agents, stockists, and traders. He also discusses the gradual replacement in certain cities of the traditional system of land and caste with the British system of law and contract and its educated, professional class of lawyers and government workers.

When industrialism did come to India, it was the commercial and professional middle classes which became active in it. Instead of the rise of a new social class of industrial workers as predicted by some theories, the existing middle classes expanded by forming a new group of industrial entrepreneurs. However, in spite of partial industrialization, the Indian middle classes remain primarily in the financial, judicial, and governmental fields.

Due to the underlying thesis of British influence, the greater proportion of data included in the book deals with the middle classes of Calcutta and Bombay. As the author pointed out, the great rural areas of India were more or less neglected in his study since the complexities of religious and economic interaction in the thousands of smaller towns and villages deserve more thorough research and separate treatment.

The student of Indian society will find this book a useful, informative guide to the basic sources of data for this topic. In addition to an extensive bibliography, Misra makes liberal use of statistical works which would probably be helpful to those engaged in related research projects.

Misra has accomplished a great deal in taking the difficult problems of social class in a caste system, and producing a meaningful interpretation in just one volume.

ROBERT E. KENNEDY, JR.

Columbia University

Le Mode de vie des familles bourgeoises. By MARGUERITE PERROT. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1961. Pp. viii+300.

This is the fourth in a series of studies on the French economy, carried out through the Office for Studies of Economic Behavior under the auspices of the National Institute of Political Studies. Its title, *The Pattern of Life of Middle-Class Families,* is both more and less ambitious than the contents—less ambitious since it consists in a detailed analysis of budgets and has little to say about religious, political, familial and work patterns (little to say, that is, from the sociologist's perspective); and more ambitious in that the data cover a period of nearly a century, commencing in 1873. Its three sections discuss, first, the scope and methods of the inquiry; second, middle-class budgets (differences in spending patterns and the structure of middle-class budgets); third, such functions of middle-class consumption as elasticity of expenditures, rates of expansion and contraction in expenditures, and the relation of savings to income.

Such studies in the past (one thinks immediately of Le Play's *Ouvriers Européens*) were typically cross-sectional analyses of low-income sectors of the population. Perrot's is a study of 547 bourgeois family budgets (a bourgeois family is defined here as one that keeps a budget!) kept during three periods: 1873–1913, 1920–39 and 1945–53. About two-thirds of these budgets were made available to the investigator as the result of an appeal by André Siegfried in *Figaro.* They represent fifty-three families, are spread over eighty years, underrepresent the provinces, and the occupational distribution varies markedly as between these periods. Perrot enters the necessary *caveat:* these budgets cannot be taken as representing the French bourgeoisie. What we have left, then, is a careful, often ingenious manipulation of apparently excellent data, bearing on an unkown population and dealing, not with *"la mode de vie"* but with patterns of expenditure.

A first task in the analysis of budgets is to specify the consuming unit and to contrive some scale or index enabling comparison among them. As the consumer unit Perrot takes, not the single person, but the household. For the household she works out type-budgets covering nine items (food, household maintenances, wages, rent, taxes, health, parents' clothing, children's costs, and miscellaneous) for households whose incomes range from Fr. 650,000 to Fr. 10 million, and having 0–6 children under and over 10 years of age. These estimates of theoretical budgets were standardized in terms of 1956 francs. On the basis of these type budgets she develops coefficients of consumption for each budget item for each sort of family, taking expenditures for the no-child family in each income category as 100. These coefficients were then ap-

plied directly to concrete budget data, so allowing internal comparisons despite differences in family size and income. (Unhappily the basis upon which the type budgets were developed—and upon which the coefficients of consumption depend—remains altogether obscure.)

In describing the variation in individual budgeting Perrot presents thirty-two scatter diagrams relating, for the nine (and sometimes more) budget items, cost per consumer unit (x_1) and over-all expenditures (x_2) to the per cent of total expenditures invested in that budget category (y). Budget items that varied little were health, taxes, wages (for servants), and household maintenance: whereas rent, parents' clothing, children's expenses, and miscellaneous expenditures varied considerably.

To get at the over-all structure of the budgets studied, Perrot sought a valid expression of the relation between part and total expenditures. The data show that for the 1873–1913 budgets greater total expenditures are associated with decreased percentage spent on food (the same is true for the other two periods), increased percentage in "miscellaneous," in rent, and in clothing. Comparison with 1956 data shows marked similarities: almost 40 per cent of expenditures were in the miscellaneous category, food, about 25 per cent, household maintenance about 8 per cent, taxes and insurance about 6 per cent.

In the final section Perrot turns to the flexibility of expenditures for various budget items. Observing that as total expenditures vary, the amount spent on various categories does not vary in the same degree, she develops a coefficient of elasticity for each category in relation to total expenditures.

Inquiring how patterns of expenditure vary when income varies (up to this point, expenditures have been dealt with independent of income) Perrot finds very little evidence of prompt adaptation of consumer behavior to changes in revenue when studied separately for these three periods or when studied by level of income.

Finally, discussing savings and income, Perrot suggests that extent of saving does not seem to be related to variations in income or to size of family. "We are then led," she says, "to explain middle class saving patterns in terms of social rather than economic motives."

This is an unexceptionable conclusion from a sociologist's point of view. One might wish that it had been possible to go beyond the fragmentary interpretations and asides, beyond the appended notes (a letter to his niece on the proper care of an account book, the address book of a middle-class Parisian, some sketches of nineteenth-century middle-class, rural families, and food costs for certain families) to the implications of budget analyses as indexes of a mode of life. For it is altogether plausible that a man's heart lies where his treasures are. But the heart of the matter, from the sociologist's viewpoint, remains to be discovered.

Everett K. Wilson

Antioch College

Automation in the Office. By Ida Russakoff Hoos. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1961. Pp. 138. $4.50.

This book is concerned with the impact of electronic data-processing (EDP) equipment on the clerical labor force and the structure of jobs in the office, individual employees at all levels and groups of workers, and formal and informal organizational structure. It is an empirical study of the human-technical problems accompanying the introduction of EDP. The basic data were obtained through relatively unstructured interviews with nonsupervisory, supervisory, top managerial, and union personnel in more than twenty business, industrial, and governmental organizations in one large metropolitan area. The study attempts to look at this new species of technological change through a broad social perspective, using concepts from Durkheim and Weber, Mayo and Roethlisberger, Barnard and Simon.

Some of the principal points made are that automation in the office (1) reduces the number of clerical jobs, (2) does not raise the skill level or grades of jobs, and (3) does not generally provide greater job interest or challenge. The major exceptions to this are the small groups of programmers and system analysts. While these new occupational groups are higher paid and have highly exciting jobs, most other supporting jobs are monotonous and increasingly demanding as the paper-work flows become more rationalized and integrated with high-speed electronic equipment.

The redivision of labor in the office has resulted in work that is routine, pressured, and confining—providing less opportunity for social interaction and contact. It is pointed out that these developments, along with shift work and the frequent uprooting and transferring of employees from their established relationships, may lead to the development of dissatisfaction and eventually anomie.

At the organizational level, EDP is seen as having reversed the trend toward decentralization and initiated basic changes in divisional lines, promotional ladders, and formal and informal channels of communication. The "revolutionary" impact on the organization is seen as temporary, however, for the forces toward bureaucratization are predicted to become predominant again. One of the principal insights of the study is the point that, while automation in the factory seems to be leading toward job integration and perhaps more meaningful work, just the opposite appears to be occurring for many jobs in the office.

The volume makes a clear contribution to our understanding of what is happening to the jobs and work environment of the white-collar employee with the advent of EDP—an area in which there has been too much writing and too little research. Its strength lies in the breadth of coverage of organizations, its cataloguing of many of the principal human problems accompanying automation in the office, and its attempt to set these problems in a broad, conceptual, sociological framework. The volume's major weakness derives from design and methodological decisions which were natural outgrowths of a single researcher attempting to study longitudinally so many installations using unstructured interviews. It presents many useful hypotheses for careful quantitative testing. It is, however, disappointing in that it contains far fewer relatively solid facts than the reader hopes for from such a multiple-site study.

FLOYD C. MANN

University of Washington

Men at Work. By WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, Inc. and Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961. Pp. x+593. $7.95.

This book is a tribute to the extensiveness and originality of Whyte's research contributions over the past twenty years. Most of the materials presented have appeared previously, but Whyte selects, edits, and reworks in so skilful a manner that one finds oneself seeing these materials from a fresh point of view. As is customary in Whyte's works, the materials are presented largely in the form of cases, with participants named, full of verbatim quotations, and cast in dramatic form (e.g., he begins a summary of the Ronken-Lawrence study with the words: "This is the story of the Amicon tube." A summary of one of his own studies in which a man's status fell drastically is headlined: "How can a man be a hero in 1948 and a bum in 1950?"). The result is a book of great richness of research detailing which does what Whyte says he hopes it will do: enable students to "experience vicariously what life is like out in the work places." In spite of the large number of cases and research reports in the book, it is not a textbook, as Whyte himself explains, a fact which enables him to be highly selective. For example, there is a very great concentration on research on manual workers, with little attention to white-collar workers or to professionals in independent practice. But then Whyte's emphasis is not too far out of line with the actual emphasis in the field.

Whyte's originality is manifest at two levels. First, the large proportion of the book is devoted to his own research. Even those who might view that as a fault cannot fail to be impressed at how much good research Whyte has done over the years. Again and again he is able to dip into his own experience for apt illustration, comment, or quotation, a process he continues far into his "A Theoretical Restatement" which closes the book. Second, his criticisms of the ideas of others, or other points he chooses to make, are mostly original, or else he limits himself to matters on which he has something original to say. The price, of course, is a certain limitation of coverage. For example, the discussion of formal organization is rather choppy and restricted to four subjects (size, patterns of supervision, functional versus product organizations, and specialization, all briefly treated). The choice of types of organizations is also restricted, with little attention to the increasing number of excellent studies of hospitals, educational organizations, prisons, and

military and governmental organizations, which are, after all, full of men at work. Such selectivity is, however, deliberate and a consequence of his preferring to focus intensive attention on certain studies rather than seeking the diffuse coverage of a textbook.

The industrial materials are presented in terms of Whyte's adaptation of the theoretical scheme developed by Chapple, Homans, Arensberg, McGregor, and others—activities, interaction and sentiments, mediated by symbols, and viewed as a system. The scheme is handled in two ways: first, it is used to provide the central concepts in skilful case analyses, as illustrated in an excellent discussion of the barrel department of a steel fabricating plant; and, second, it is used, in the manner of Homans, to draw generalizations or state propositions. For example, an aviation gasoline case (A, B, and C are at different levels in the company, with A at the top of these three levels) leads to the conclusions:

> As B's interactions with A (in situations not shared by C) are sharply reduced and B's interactions with C are increased, we can expect these changes in sentiments: (1) to all parties concerned, the status of B in the organization will be seen as having declined; (2) B will now tend to identify himself more with C and less with A.

As is usual with Whyte, sentiments are often the dependent variable. The last sentence in the book reads: "[The manager] recognizes that if he is skilful in organizing the environmental forces, the symbols, and the interactions and activities of his organization, the sentiments will take care of themselves." New in this book is the extensive attention given to the "environmental forces" in chapters devoted to culture, the community, formal organization, the "economic environment," work flow, work skills, and technology, chapters that contain some of the best case studies in the literature. Other chapters deal with union-management relations, the managerial process, and service, staff, and control activities.

The only reservation a sociologist might have about this book—and it is a minor reservation—is Whyte's occasional practice of touching lightly or in passing on subjects of important sociological concern. For example, at the end of his chapter on the community, he refers, in a line, to the problem managers face in justifying their leading position in the community, without referring to Bendix' major contributions to this theme, or to any of the extensive literature. In a later discussion of teams of artisans, and in the contrast he draws between them and men on the motor line, Whyte is clearly dealing with the problem of alienation, but again makes almost no reference to the voluminous materials on that subject. Whyte, of course, had no intention of dealing exhaustively with those matters as subjects in their own right, but the sociological reader will at times feel that Whyte's brief comments should have been expanded so that his usually significant ideas would have been added to the literature by Whyte himself, rather than having to be added by the reader as he goes along.

The audience for this book is the sociologist. One would have to look far indeed for a better example of the power of the sociological point of view. Repeatedly we see a master-analyst utilizing sociological methods to shed brilliant light on organizational problems. This he does in his discussion of the decline of the union steward, in a critique of Worthy's conclusions on "flat" organizations, in his discussion of collective bargaining, and in a discussion of the personnel department as a social organization. One comes away convinced, if one ever doubted it, that sociologists do indeed have much to say about work organization, and it has seldom been said more eloquently.

EDWARD GROSS

University of Minnesota

The Just Wage. By MICHAEL FOGARTY. London: Geoffrey Chapman Ltd., 1961. Pp. 309 $4.20.

Equitable Payment. By ELLIOTT JAQUES. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961. Pp 336. $6.00.

Economic theory, which has dominated the discussion of wage determination for well over a century, makes the wage rate the resultant of impersonal market forces divorced from normative considerations. Fogarty and Jaques attempt, in very different ways, to introduce human and ethical considerations. From the largely neglected scholastic writings on the just wage, Fogarty draws a number of prin-

iples, for example, that compensation should qual the maximum value to society of the ervice rendered, that the individual's compensation should enable him to maintain hroughout life the economic status appropriate to his level of ability, etc. The scholastics lso held that individual justice can be chieved only within a framework of social ustice; so governmental policies which influence the environment of wage determination are brought under review, such as maintenance of full employment, provision of educational opportunity, institutions for redistributing the individual's income over his lifetime, family allowances. Apparently Fogarty elieves that the welfare state manifestation f social justice provides a framework within which pursuit of gain can lead to the ends f individual justice (the scholastic rules of wage setting), for he accepts collective bargaining and the rest of the paraphernalia of British wage determination. He finds general cceptance in Britain of the goals of wage etting enunciated in the scholastic rules, and e finds that pedestrian decisions like fitting ew jobs into the wage structure are carried ut tolerably well. The major weakness is he broad policies by which general principles the scholastic rules) must be translated into perating guides. For example, the need of n appropriate national policy toward the traditional, though irrational, differentials in pay between occupations, between regions, and between male and female rates.

Jaques does not appeal to external criteria f justice. He attempts to set up a theoretic model having a psycho-economic equilibrium olution that satisfies simultaneously the quity standards of the individual and meets he economic realities of the situation, given he assumption of certain welfare responibilities by the state. In order to reach this quilibrium position, it is necessary that wages be determined according to the rules of the model, rather than by collective bargaining or other currently used mechanisms.

Jaques, who is a psychologist, has worked or some years on compensation problems of a British firm, and has interviewed many people in a variety of occupations and organizations. On this basis he holds that the key to the employee's evaluation of the equity of his own wage rate is the time span of his job, that is, the maximum period of time during which he uses his discretion without review by his superior. Over a wide range of occupations, people with similar time spans have indicated similar rates of pay as equitable. Moreover, the equitable rate has been found to rise as the time span of the job lengthens, yielding a curve which slopes upward to the right. The curve pertains to a particular time and degree of national well-being; so its position and curvature can change. The rule of payment is that the wage for any job should be the amount appropriate to the job's time span, as indicated by the chart. Jaques holds that this wage not only satisfies the individual's sense of what is fair for his work but that it is also the sum which he is capable of spending with discrimination. Jaques also assumes at this point that the state will provide job opportunities which utilize the individual's current work capacity and family allowances, etc., which adjust for differences in requirements. Such assumptions are essential in any model which seeks to reconcile individual consumption requirements with individual contributions to production. The fact that the time-span curve changes with the general wage level and the nation's economic well-being reconciles the individually satisfying wage with economic reality.

As in all equilibrium models, displacement from the equilibrium position sets up repercussions. Unfortunately for the stability of Jaques' model, overpayment leads not only to psychological malaise in the form of insecurity, etc , which would be self-correcting, but it also stimulates a desire to improve the favored position. Imperfect markets and collective bargaining enter at this point as disruptive influences, which may drive the rate further from equilibrium. While the wage rate, like other prices, can be set according to non-economic criteria, other variables of the system are then forced to do the adjusting, and this could increase the state's difficulty in providing full employment—a point which is not considered. Both books give interesting side lights on British thinking about welfare issues and experience with determining wages.

David R. Roberts

Butler University

Population. By William Petersen. New York: Macmillan Co., 1961. Pp. xx+652. $7.95.

This text has several features to recommend it for use in an introductory course; hazarding a forecast, not a projection, *Population* will do well.

The topical organization is somewhat unusual. Except for a brief introductory chapter, the first half of the text deals with the demographic history of the United States to the exclusion of cross-cultural comparative materials. This is a considered tactic to permit a concentration on basic notions and techniques of analysis. Presumably, without the distractions of dealing with less familiar cultures, communication is facilitated.

Part II is somewhat shorter than the preceding sections on the population of the United States. The comparative cross-cultural materials are to be found here. The organization of these chapters is first along the theme of demographic evolution—from primitive societies to preindustrial to populations during the industrial revolution—but is then followed unexpectedly by two chapters, "The Population of Totalitarian Societies" and "The Population of Underdeveloped Countries." The ordering here leads to a moment of doubt quickly dispelled by the author's reason for the ordering. Nevertheless, these last two chapters are awkwardly placed. Certainly, the chapter on totalitarian states can be subsumed under population policies rather than an analysis of the policies of the U.S.S.R. However, to the reader whose tastes run in the direction of population analysis rather than formal demography, these chapters may well prove to be the most interesting. On admittedly spotty data, including anthropological digs and tombstone dates, are constructed plausible pictures of early populations. On somewhat more qualitative evidence rests the theorizing of Russian population policies, their purposes and effects.

The remainder, Part III of the book, is more conventional. The Malthusian theory and optimum population theory are presented together; then follow three chapters—the determinants of fertility, mortality, and migration.

So much on the organization of a text that ends where elementary courses have sometimes begun.

Recommending the book more strongly than its organization are several points. It is written in a clear uncluttered style that gives emphasis to general and important themes in demography. Data closely promote these themes. The chapters including population forecasts and life tables will be welcome to instructors faced with the problem of explicating, on the most elementary level, the computational side of analysis. Lastly, as a new text should be, it is up to date.

PHILIP C. SAGI

University of Pennsylvania

Religion in Primitive Society. By EDWARD NORBECK. New York: Harper & Bros., 1961. Pp. xi+318. $5.50.

This book is a delight. It also accomplishes what its author intends—to survey for students and laymen the anthropologist's knowledge of religion in simpler societies. Such a book should reflect solid scholarship but escape pedantry. It should review the major ideas and the principal evidence without losing touch with the layman's understanding or interest and without depriving him of the important knowledge to be had. It should be candid about ambiguities and controversies, yet not lose its audience in current professional subtleties. This book succeeds in these respects.

The format, like most of the field itself, is naturalistic rather than theoretical. There are, for example, chapters on the topics of origins, religious acts, supernatural beings and objects, religious practitioners, group ritual, and religious therapy. There are particularly interesting summaries of the newer material concerning "unusual psychological states," "witchcraft and ritual rebellion," and "religious movements."

A scholar with particular interests in the relation of primitive religions to such matters as aesthetics, theology, ethics, or politics might have written a more vigorous or provocative book. Indeed, the classics by Taylor, Wallis, and Lowie have those special qualities but they obtain them at the expense of balance. They give more stimulation than does Norbeck, but he offers a greater opportunity to view the evidence and make an independent selection of what is interesting and an independent judgment of its significance. Students and laymen should have both kinds of books available. The appearance of Norbeck's book now gives them this range of choice.

GUY E. SWANSON

University of Michigan

'igration and Belonging: A Study of Mental Health and Personal Adjustment in Israel. By ABRAHAM A. WEINBERG. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1961. Pp. xxii+402.

There is a dearth of empirically based udies of psychological factors in the adjustent of migrants, although, as Weinberg ints out, migration often provides an excelnt opportunity for studying factors con-:cted with human adjustment to strange or ren stressful environments. He reminds us iat, in a sense, we are all "migrating" from rth to death, not only by changing our miciles, but simply by having to adjust to vironments that change through the process ' maturation. In this book, Weinberg, who a practicing psychiatrist in Israel, is ad-ressing himself first and foremost to the sub-ct of mental health, using the adjustment ' immigrants into Israel as his medium. In oing so he has thrown light on the role of ckground, ontological developmental factors, d social attitudes in determining the inte-ation history of the migrants.

As Louis Guttman points out in his short, isp, and insightful introduction, it is unusual find a psychiatrist in private practice who sufficiently adaptable to use a generalizable ame of reference for the collection and alysis of his data, and to experiment with n instrument such as the written question-aire which is more applicable to the collec-on of comparable data from a large sample ian from individuals. The program of data ollection was as follows. A forty-five-item, ultiple-choice written questionnaire, was ad-inistered in 1954 to adult students in two lebrew language residential courses (*Ulpan*), t the beginning and again at the end of the ourse. There were 313 completed protocols. "depth interview" was also given to ninety-ine of the subjects covering various relevant reas of their life histories and tabulating their etrospections concerning their mental health nd adjustment during childhood, adolescence, nd as adults before and after migration. A llow-up interview was also given twenty-eight f the subjects four years later. The data from ne interviews and questionnaires were ana-yzed according to either subjective ratings ade by the interviewers on a five-point scale r, wherever possible, by Guttman-type scales. Ratings, wherever used, were based on one udge only, presumably the interviewer.

The major variables in the study are *mental health, general adjustment, psychosomatic complaints* and *at-home feeling in the Ulpan,* and the major part of the empirical analysis is devoted to relating these to developmental data, migration history, and also self-rated personality traits and attitudes. Here are a few of the findings relevant to the adjustment of immigrants. Good general adjustment is related to extroversion, lack of inferiority feelings, strong conscience, and good physical health; a positive relationship with the father in childhood was more important for adjustment than that with the mother, whereas the reverse is the case in determining feeling at home in the Ulpan. From such findings, Weinberg distinguishes active adjustment (derived from attitudes to father) from passive (derived from mother), and in this connection he points out that adjustment to the Ulpan, which provided a nurturant environment, is not predictive of subsequent adjustment. An interesting and important finding is that immigrants who had suffered severe persecution as Jews prior to immigration were better adjusted to Israel than were those who had merely suffered from endemic anti-semitism. Weinberg's evidence suggests that the former group were less likely to be depressed by the hardships of adaptation to a new country, since they had managed to survive some of the most extreme deprivations ever inflicted on man.

Weinberg is ever alert in his book to the implications of his findings for a theory of mental health and adjustment to life. He distinguishes between *mental health* as a state of the organism, *adjustability* as a capacity, *adjustiveness* as a process, and *adjustment* as the outcome of all these with respect to the person's environment. These and other terms used in the book are defined in a glossary as well as in various parts of the text. This reviewer, however, has serious misgivings as to the logical independence of the definitions used, and also of the operations used to measure them. The ratings of the subjects' mental health were based mainly on their own statements of their traits and mental condition, while general adjustment was supposed to be based more on questions concerning the degree to which they feel identified and satisfied with life in Israel. The author, who shows himself, generally speaking, to be aware of methodological problems, does not consider the possibility that either or both the subject and the rater could

have contaminated the two sets of ratings. Because of this probable contamination, or at least interaction, between the ratings of mental health and adjustment, the statistical analyses on their mutual relationship must be viewed with strong reservations. Such contamination influences both the value of the significance of χ^2 computations and their theoretical interpretation. Still, the reader can be grateful that a writer on migrant adjustment bothers to use statistics at all. Weinberg also deserves praise for reminding us that the homoscedastic model does not necessarily apply to co-relationships in the mental health field. For example, he argues, without actually providing the necessary scatter plots, that mental health is more predictable in the unfavorable range, and adjustment in the favorable. This and other findings, however, are all contingent on some unanswered questions regarding selection factors in the sample.

Apart from the useful concept of heteroscedacity, Weinberg uses his results to make a contribution to considerations of the relationship between adjustment, mental health, and psychosomatic disorders. Sociologists will be specially interested in his integration of Tönnies' concepts with the role of primary group relationships in mental health: "It is our thesis that man cannot be of good mental health . . . when he does not acquire, reserve, or regain in *Gesellschaft* a status or place allowing affiliation to *Gemeinschaft* or to its *Ersatz*." This is the convincing note which informs a great deal of Weinberg's orientation to the study and his discussion of its results. The implications of this approach for the mental hygiene of immigrants are obvious and they are well drawn by the author. Altogether, the book makes a worthwhile contribution to an understanding of the problems of adjustment of immigrants and of mental health generally. From these points of view, it is so interesting and stimulating that one wishes that the concepts had been more independently defined and the data analyzed with a little more statistical rigor.

RONALD TAFT

University of Western Australia

Race Relations: Problems and Theory. Essays in Honor of Robert E. Park. Edited by JITSUICHI MASUOKA and PRESTON VALIEN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961. Pp. x+290. $6.00.

The origin of this symposium is explained in the Preface as follows:

In April, 1955, Park Hall at Fisk University . . . was dedicated. On this occasion a series of seminars on "Race Relations at Mid-Century" was held to honor the memory of Robert Ezra Park. . . . A collection of essays relative to race relations at mid-century appeared to us who knew him well as the most fitting tribute to the man who contributed immeasurably to the understanding of the nature of race relations.

Of the nineteen essays included in this volume, thirteen were delivered as lectures at the dedication ceremony and are published here for the most part in their original form. The remaining six were written chiefly between 1956 and 1958, for this symposium.

The *Festschrift* character of the book is reflected in a fine appreciation of Park's contributions to the study of race relations by Ernest W. Burgess and in numerous remarks about his inspirational role in this field by other eminent contributors.

The essays may be divided into three major categories: discussions of general theoretical issues, analyses of the world trends in race relations, and studies of the changes in race relations in the United States.

The first group is represented by W. F. Ogburn's "Social Change and Race Relations," R. Redfield's "Ethnic Relations, Primitive and Civilized," Bingham Dai's "Minority Group Membership and Personality Development," and S. A. Stouffer's "Quantitative Methods in the Study of Race Relations." To this group belong also Edgar T. Thompson's analysis of language as a significant factor in race relations and especially H. Blumer's article on "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," in which he argues very cogently that "the locus of race prejudice is not in the area of individual feeling but in the definition of the respective positions of the racial groups"

The second group of essays includes, in addition to introductory comments by C. S. Johnson, "Racial Problems in World Society" by E. F. Frazier, "The Nature of Racial Frontiers" by E. C. Hughes, and "The City as a Racial Frontier" by Masuoka.

The third group of essays deals with race relations in the United States, especially in the South. A general framework for this analy-

is is provided by G. B. Johnson in his paper on "Race Conflict and Racial Movements in the South." Concerned with more specific issues are P. Valien's "The Montgomery Bus Protest," L. W. Jones's "Struggle for the Vote at Tuskegee," and V. W. Henderson's "Economic Dimensions in Race Relations." To this category belongs also a paper by Inez Adams in which she attempts to correlate the attitudes toward recent changes in race relations in the South held by the white and Negro residents of this area with their values and social status. This leads her to a suggestive classification of respondents from both racial groups into the same three basic categories: activators, ambivalents, and apathetics.

A somewhat distinct position is occupied by two essays not concerned with Negro-white relations: J. Burma's on the civil rights of Spanish-Americans and A. W. Lind's on race relations in Hawaii.

Taken as a whole the symposium is a valuable contribution to the literature on race relations, even though due to the time lag between its preparation and publication some of the essays, especially those dealing with the developments in the South of the United States and in Africa, are somewhat dated.

KONSTANTIN SYMMONS

Wilkes College

Darwin and the Modern World View. By JOHN C. GREENE. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961. Pp. viii+141. $3.50.

Darwinism and the Study of Society: A Centenary Symposium. Edited by MICHAEL BANTON. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961. Pp. xx+191.

During the last few years, a small library of books on Darwin—his antecedents, his substance, and his consequences—have appeared, centering chiefly on the one hundredth anniversary of the original publication of the *Origin of Species* in 1859. The two books under review here are scholarly contributions to this library. John C. Greene's *Darwin and the Modern World View* is a small book containing three lectures given on the Rockwell Foundation at Rice University. *Darwinism and the Study of Society,* edited by Michael Banton, is a "centenary symposium" consisting of papers presented at a conference called by the Scottish Branch of the British Sociological Association. (However, Morris Ginsberg and W. Stark seem to be the only professional sociologists included among the eleven contributors.)

Greene's book is an excellent account of "the modern world view" on three important issues: (1) the problem of the inspiration and inerrancy of the Bible, (2) the problem of "natural theology," or the reasons given for the existence of God or some other transcendent principle or being, and (3) the problem of social evolution. This is intellectual history at a very high level of scholarship; Greene gives brief but accurate reports on the history of ideas about these three issues from the eighteenth century right down to the present day. On the first two issues, the inspiration of the Bible and natural theology, he is familiar with all the latest Protestant, Catholic, and "secularist" thinking. And, on the third, the issue of social evolution, which is perhaps of the most direct interest to sociologists, his account of Comte, Marx, Spencer, Childe, Kroeber, Radcliffe-Brown, Julian Steward, and Redfield are models of lucidity and point. Any social scientist who still thinks that there are no problems about the relations between science, on the one hand, and religion and values, on the other, or who thinks that there are easy answers to these problems, will find himself facing a fundamental challenge from Greene's history and analysis. Perhaps in his very last few sentences Greene is a little too defensive about the autonomy of religion and values. But if he is, surely this is an intellectual and moral posture which is hard to avoid in a world where for so long, and in some quarters still, science has so aggressively seemed to dissolve all religion and values in its own autonomy and power. Can we not now move to an intellectual and moral position in which we see science, religion, and values, *all three,* as having each a relative but specifiable autonomy and as being, at the same time, specifiably interdependent with one another?

If Greene's book is outstanding as intellectual history, it is not quite so good as sociology of knowledge. That is to say, the analysis of just how Darwin's ideas, other men's ideas, and a variety of social-structural factors molded the modern world view is, at best, rough and unsystematic. It would be good to have a more precise sociological analysis from Greene of the sociocultural determi-

nants of such changes in the modern world view as are represented, to take only two of his subjects, by Protestant Neo-orthodox theology and the Christian evolutionism of the Catholic paleontologist, Father Teilhard de Chardin.

As for the Banton volume, J. Bronowski puts the matter succinctly in his introduction when he says that the "essays range widely," and that "ideas so diverse cannot be treated in summary." Although there is much of value, there is more of biological analogizing than there is of substantive sociologizing with regard to "the study of society." There is a somewhat "old-fashioned" atmosphere about many of the essays. Nowhere, for example, are such recent and important discussions of social evolution as those by Kroeber, Redfield, and Steward mentioned above. By contrast, the American historian Greene is much more satisfactorily informed about the very latest intellectual developments. The Banton volume is good, but not required reading.

BERNARD BARBER

Barnard College, Columbia University

The Concept of Method. By JUSTUS BUCHLER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. viii+180. $4.00.

The method of this volume is strikingly different from what sociologists are used to in their concern with "method." Buchler is neither empirical in the contemporary sense sociology is, nor does he limit himself to "scientific method," the usual concern of sociologists writing and thinking (if the two are distinct) about method. Instead, Buchler considers all sorts of "method," or evidences of method. He insists, therefore, that he is looking at the method of business, art, science, war—all methods.

In a sense, he does attempt to be empirical. He has some notion—however acquired, however verified—as to how various people go about their business. Since his references to the observable kinds of behavior to which he is responding are either absent or vague, his approach seems to be an Aristotelian type of empiricism.

This does not exactly leave him without intellectual equipment. Indeed, he presents through most of his writing a reasonably interesting account of his argument. He begins with an assessment of Bentham's notion and finds certain obvious limitations. He then assesses the argument of Coleridge who does not suffer a better fate, though for different reasons. He equates the differences between Bentham and Coleridge to the differences between the Enlightenment and Romanticism He is safe in observing that both of these presentments were limited by "metaphysical preferences."

Buchler makes references to a variety of other writers, especially John Dewey. The strategy of the argument is similar. Deficiencies are asserted regarding each position announced, and the reader is promised a solution to the various perplexities encountered.

Finally, Buchler utters his own definition "A Method," he writes on page 135, "is a power of manipulating natural complexes, purposively and recognizably, with a reproducible order of utterance: and methodic activity is the translation of such a power into the pursuit of an end—an end implied by the reproduction." He goes on then to recognize that he must face up to the idea of power. "The designation of a power as a 'method' implies the expectation of activity. A method is separable from its use, but not from the expectation of its use. The idea of a method that is not to be used is self-contradictory."

This latter statement is strange in two ways First, mankind now has a collectively defined "method" for the rapid destruction of millions of people; does this imply its eventual use? Second, he distinguishes later (p. 137) between "method" and "methodic activity," the latter implying an end "actually pursued." He recognizes the redundancy involved in the word "actually," but fails to see that he is not completely consistent with former assertions

Few readers will, in short, be satisfied with his solution to the problem of method. However, many should be willing to concede that Buchler has proposed a number of ideas that will be fruitful in both the empirical and normative assessment of scientific methodology by sociologists. He insists that man has three essential functions: statement, contrivance, and action. And that, therefore, we would find in science "assertive, active, and exhibitive" utterances which need not be verbal.

Though Buchler himself is incapable of making the distinction, he lends support to the argument that we must distinguish between

a sociological assertion as "methodology" and as "the sociology of science." Whether or not a scientist is concerned with convincing his audience depends entirely on whether one is concerned with methodology or the sociology of science. In other ways Buchler could have benefited from an understanding of contemporary sociological problems. He fails to distinguish between the values of method from its moods. His formulation of method as a "power," even when fitted to his notions of the various utterances of a method, is not empirical in the sense of flowing from behavior.

Except for the last few pages where Buchler lost me in his philosophical polemics, I found his essay readable. There are many lucid passages and a number of amusing formulations. It reads in part like a lecture being presented to devoted students. Devoted students, however, share a number of unstated premises that render elliptical statements meaningful. The result is a somewhat spotty record of difficult paragraphs.

On the whole, however, I enjoyed the experience of reading this argument and suggest that all sociologists who are concerned about the philosophical commitments of methodological assumptions would find it provocative to read this.

ROY G. FRANCIS

University of Minnesota

The Destruction of the European Jews. By PAUL HILBERG. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961. Pp. xii+788. $17.50.

Almost two decades after it reached its climax in the crematoria we still find it difficult to comprehend the frightful implications of the Nazi racial policy. Measured in the millions, murder passes beyond the range of normal human understanding. That the slaughter was the result of a systematic policy, pursued by the regime without any rational purpose and contrary to its own interest, makes the task of explanation more complex still.

Professor Hilberg's volume is enormously helpful as an approach to the problem. Its double-columned pages are packed with meticulous detail. He has carefully examined a great mass of sources and has brought his materials together skilfully. His careful, lucid unfolding of how the tragedy developed brings home its full horror as few other treatments have.

Hilberg's analysis shows that the killing process was divided into six distinct stages. First came the definition of the victims through establishment by law of their distinct identity. There followed the complete expropriation of their property that rendered them helpless and immobile. In that condition it was possible to concentrate them in confined areas so that they would be readily available for any purpose for which the state wished to use them. In 1939, the war extended German hegemony to the east; and the Nazis were able to set forth on mobile killing operations first in Poland, later in the Ukraine and Russia. That method, however, proved inefficient; it was simply impossible to dispose of enough victims quickly. There followed therefore the immense process of deportations that brought together the millions whom the Germans wished to liquidate. At the termini were established the great killing centers which performed the task with dreadful effectiveness. The process began in Germany, but it spread with the extension of Nazi influence to every part of Europe that fell under their control.

The policy developed piecemeal. The operation at each stage had a logic of its own in the course of which the groundwork was laid for what would follow; but the men involved did not anticipate what the consequences would be. They moved without awareness from one step to another.

The whole process depended upon the services of a trained bureaucracy. An elaborate administrative network transmitted, gave form to, and put into effect the orders of the Führer with mechanical efficiency. The existence of a corps of competent and obedient state servants permitted the implementation of any decision, no matter how mad; indeed the unquestioning competence of the bureaucracy eliminated the occasions for re-examining agreed-on policies.

Successful as the book is in describing how the killings were carried through, it nevertheless fails to explain why they took place. The author cannot understand the motives, either of the Nazis, or of the Germans, or of their collaborators, or of the conquered populations, or even of the Jews. Perhaps because he has so deeply immersed himself in the world of the bureaucrats, he cannot comprehend the human beings who were their victims.

Again and again Hilberg returns, as if it were critical, to the question of why the Jews failed

to resist. It is as if, knowing that the tragedy should not have occurred, he insists that someone should have stopped it—Germans, Allies, or, if no one else, the Jews. And he draws upon a far-fetched conception of historic Jewish attitudes to account for their unwillingness to resist. Out of this misconception spring serious errors in interpretation.

The unwelcome possibility, which the author does not confront, is that nothing could have prevented the holocaust once the war had begun—not the German people, nor the Allies, and least of all the Jews. In fact, the magnitude of the killing operations had no relation to the degree of resistance, but only to the extent of Nazi power in various parts of Europe. That was why more Italian than Dutch, more French than Polish Jews survived.

As an example of the supreme test of the compliance reaction in front of the grave, Hilberg cites the following eyewitness report: "The father was holding the hand of a boy about ten years old and was speaking to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed to the sky, stroked his head, and seemed to explain something to him. . . . Then I heard a series of shots" (p. 669). Perhaps no other attitude was dignified and reasonable in a world completely and brutally mad.

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

Race Relations in Virginia, 1870–1902. By CHARLES E. WYNES. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1961. Pp. ix+164. $5.00.

This study provides historical field work for C. Van Woodward's notion that relatively permissive folkways following Reconstruction were altered long after redemption by discriminatory stateways. The period covered runs from the end of Reconstruction to the 1902 constitution which disfranchised the Negro.

The author concludes that "the Woodward thesis is essentially sound" (p. 149). This was inevitable. For Wynes explains earlier that "in the very early 1870's, at least, there seems to have existed a sportsmanlike, if grudging, acceptance" of the Negro voter (p. 144). During this period sportsmen were eliminating black ballots through gerrymandering and by segregating lists of eligible voters (to facilitate the loss of Negro names). And although Wynes has otherwise drawn upon diverse sources, he persistently cites Woodward's *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* to prove the hypothesis he claims to be testing.

The main value of this work is its clear demonstration that segregation laws resulted from the machinations of an elite rather than the demands of the masses. The author shows this far more effectively than Woodward. But Wynes's finding does not, as he suggests, require a "qualification" of Woodward's hypothesis (p. 149–50): Instead it italicizes Woodward's case against Sumner.

Although the author is a historian by trade, he is grateful to sociology for the "understanding of a problem which encompasses much more than history alone" (p. iii). He is, nevertheless, content to offer bases of inquiry as statements of fact. He notes that the only forms of unsegregated entertainment available to the Negro were the carnival and circus (p. 79). But why? The reader is left to guess it was (and is still the case in parts of Virginia) because carnivals and circuses, as opposed to other forms of entertainment, achieve remoteness from the on-going system by being at once transient, outdoors, not autochthonous, and fantasy-inducing. Again, in reporting the results of a 1900 referendum to disfranchise the Negro, he notes that half of those counties with a Negro majority (which was already informally disfranchised) voted for it; while of those counties with a white majority, the vote was thirty counties for and thirty-five against. Wynes then concludes that "the counties with less than fifty per cent Negro population were not pre-eminently concerned with disfranchising the Negro, and hence more than half of them opposed the convention [which was the vehicle of disfranchisement]" (p. 59). But this overlooks thirty (or 46 per cent) of the counties. In a recent Virginia referendum, the white vote against school desegregation correlated directly with the proportion of Negroes in the county. Here, then, was a race issue; whereas it might be supposed that in 1900 there was a class issue for the whites (their lower strata expected to be disfranchised together with the Negro).

CHARLES J. LEVY

Brandeis University

Chiliasmus und Nativismus: Studien zur Psychologie, Soziologie und historischen Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen. By WILHELM MÜHLMANN and OTHERS. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1961. Pp. 472.

Of recent years the words "chiliasm" and "millenarism" have come to be used, in a sense much wider than the traditional one, to indicate any collective expectation of, or striving for, a total and definitive salvation to be enjoyed on this earth. At the same time the study of millenarism has changed from the hobby of a few ecclesiastical historians into the chief concern of a substantial number of social scientists. It is a startling transformation. A mere twenty years ago, though there were numerous monographs on individual movements, the only general survey of the subject was still the *Kritische Geschichte der Chiliasmus* by the Swiss historian and moral philosopher Corrodi—and that was published some years before the French Revolution. During the past twenty years there have appeared not only many more, and more expert, monographs, but also a dozen wide-ranging surveys, covering between them western Europe, Russia, Asia, and tribal societies in Africa, Oceania, and the Americas. The reason for this sudden preoccupation with millenarism is clear. Many of those who have written on the subject have freely admitted that what stimulated their interest was the spectacle of a world which, more than in any previous age, is convulsed by strivings for some collective terrestrial salvation. Millenarism, in a broad sense, has been seen as the common factor in revolutionary ideologies whether nationalist or internationalist, sophisticated or naïve.

It is in this context that one must view the present survey by the professor of sociology and ethnology at Heidelberg. Professor Mühlmann's book is the first volume of a series of "Studies in the Sociology of Revolution," and it is concerned with millenarism only in its revolutionary or potentially revolutionary forms. And one major criticism is that Mühlmann nowhere recognizes the existence of other, very different, types of millenarism. Is he aware, for instance, that the Irvingites in nineteenth-century England came mostly from the prosperous middle class; that the Skoptsi in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia included high-ranking officials and army officers as well as peasants; that the most influential chiliast in medieval Europe, Joachim of Fiore, was a highly respected abbot and the protégé of three popes? It is an oversimplification to say that the "ruling strata cannot, so long as they really have the power in their hands, be interested in things being changed, they can only fear it" (p. 297). The rich and privileged can have their discontents as well as the poor and oppressed.

No doubt Mühlmann would reply that only one type of millenarism, the most militant, is historically significant. And certainly as a study of revolutionary chiliasm this is a most impressive book, and as near as we are likely to get (failing some major effort in international scholarly collaboration) to a global survey. Approximately the first half of the work consists of eleven regional studies of millenarian movements in preliterate societies, all by Germans and four by Mühlmann himself. The second half is devoted to a comparative study, in which the anthropological material is reinforced by historical material (mostly concerning medieval sects and the Qumran sect), and the whole subjected to a massive interpretation which is both sociological and psychological.

Mühlmann sees revolutionary millenarism as a product of a specific religious tradition, that of Judeo-Christian prophetism, operating in social strata which find themselves in a pariah situation. This approach of course owes much to Max Weber, whose own ideas on the matter were influenced by Nietzsche's intuitions concerning the origins of Christianity. But Mühlmann develops his argument with a learning which makes it, even at this late stage, original and stimulating. I know of no other work which so clearly links the original, chiliastic teachings of Christianity with the outlook of those particular pariah groups, to be found throughout caste societies from the western Sudan to India, which specialize in various "dishonored" arts and crafts, from prognostication to carpentry. It is to Mühlmann's credit, too, that he unambiguously indicates the sinister, nihilistic implications of that sense of election without which revolutionary chiliasm is inconceivable. Above all, no other book has so strikingly illustrated the world-wide pressure of millenarism in our time, whether in the cargo cult of Melanesia, in the new pseudo-nationalisms of Asia and Africa, in nazism, in communism, or in that insatiability of material expectations which afflicts even the liberal welfare state.

As an over-all sociological interpretation of millenarism this book would not be adequate; but within its scope—which is vast enough—it displays not only wide and well-documented knowledge and outstanding powers of interpretation but also a clear-sighted appreciation of the world in which we live.

NORMAN COHN

King's College, University of Durham
Newcastle upon Tyne

Treasure in Earthen Vessels: The Church as a Human Community. By JAMES M. GUSTAFSON. New York: Harper & Bros., 1961. Pp. xi+141. $3.50.

The attempt to analyze the church as a "natural phenomenon" without antagonizing the theological reductionists is a continuing task. Gustafson makes this attempt in a small book that may appear deceptively simple because it is written in a genial, non-argumentative style. The fact is that he makes as sharp a case as has ever been made for analyzing the total Christian community as a loosely joined association of people sharing common practices, beliefs, and loyalties.

By deliberately avoiding a rigid definition of community, even in sociological terminology, the author was able to by-pass the finer problems of social solidarity (fellowship, communion, unity), both within churches and among churches, that constantly plague the sociologist of religion. He is clearly aware of the problem, however, when he points out that the community of dedicated Christian believers is smaller than the community sharing the Christian language and understanding.

The central theme here is that the Christian community has structural and functional aspects similar to those of all other forms of association. The church is human, natural, and political. Its adherents are identifiable because of a common language, interpretation, and memory. The point is that the church can be understood in sociological, as well as theological, terminology and, indeed, that the historical facts demand this "natural" understanding.

The sources and demonstrations are mainly in the Protestant experience, but they could have been fruitfully expanded with Catholic materials, especially from the growing research in Catholic institutions. Nevertheless, so much has been written about theological and doctrinal differences that it is refreshing to see Gustafson's illustrations of sociological common factors. The sociologist will happily accept these clear insights and thoughtful reflections and might hope that the book is widely read in seminaries and among theologians.

JOSEPH H. FICHTER

Loyola University of the South

Priests and People: A Study in the Sociology of Religion. By CONOR W. WARD. Liverpool. Liverpool University Press, 1961. Pp. xii+182. 25*s.*

Less than half of this slim volume is devoted to a report on a small, urban, Irish parish in Liverpool, England. The analysis provides excellent insights into the functioning of St Catherine's Parish but not really in a "novel framework of theory" as promised in the Preface. The overextended introduction on the sociology of religion is faulty in both omissions and emphases.

From the point of view of small-community studies this research report is of great value The parish represents the kind of lower-class, ethnic workers' congregation that was once typical of American big-city immigrant parishes. The solidarity of the parishioners, possible in this kind of social unit, is clearly demontrated in the research.

There are only seventeen hundred persons (seven years or older) in this small compact parish, cared for by two full-time priests, who visit every household every six weeks. In addition, a lay representative of the parish visits every home once a week. The people believe that the priest's most important task is to visit the parishioners. This is in contrast to a recent study of American nuclear parishioners, of whom two-thirds said they had a visit from the parish priest during the past year.

The priest is unquestionably the key person at St. Catherine's, and the people respond with a high degree of enthusiasm. Given the pastoral advantages of this kind of parish, all the other sociological variables are understandable: the patterns of participation, the parish societies, institutionalization of roles, the high attendance at religious services, and the description

of financial, recreational, and educational activities.

JOSEPH H. FICHTER

Loyola University of the South

Rainbow in the Rock: The People of Rural Greece. By IRWIN T. SANDERS. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+362. $7.50.

The mobile society that opened the wider world to so many generations of young Americans makes its payoff, finally, even to sociology. Over the past century Americans have gone abroad steadily at younger ages, in larger numbers, to more varied places. An especially interesting channel whereby young Americans could "work their way" in diverse regions of the world has been the American college abroad —from China to Turkey, from Beirut to Bulgaria.

Irwin T. Sanders came to know the Balkans well during six years as an instructor at the American College of Sofia (1929–32, 1934–37). As any reader of Sanders' earlier work, *Balkan Village,* will perceive, the inoculation of Balkan passion had taken. At war's end (1945–46), he returned to the region as agricultural attaché at the American Embassy in Belgrade. When a sabbatical year came due in 1952–53, "I inevitably chose the Balkans, picked Greece, and ended up studying village life." Since Sanders was schooled in classical Greek, disciplined in rural sociology, and seasoned in his beloved Balkans, the inevitable choice turns out to be a happy one for his readers as well.

Our gain is the greater because Professor Sanders—now chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Boston University—found himself "ready to move from the security of precise social-science procedures to the more vulnerable area of personal interpretation." This is salutary elder statesmanship for American sociology as it begins to move from parochialism into the larger world. From our dissertation-writers abroad, we correctly (in most cases) require samples and sets, correlations and cross-tabulations, scales and simulations. From Irwin T. Sanders, writing about "the people of rural Greece" out of a lifetime's training in rural sociology and experience in the Balkans, we need "personal interpretation." In *Rainbow in the Rock,* we get it.

The independent stance is immediately clear from the book's organization into these five parts: "Survival," "Land," "Family," "Community," "Change." No social science theory known to me directs the investigator to just these five classes of observations; nor does Sanders offer us a theory. No social science technique known to me provides the investigator a ready formula to "systematize" these five classes containing a melange of individualistic and aggregative items; nor does Sanders seek a technique. The power of this book is that it makes its contribution to the continuity of social research by experienced observation and disciplined imagination—procedures whose perpetual freshness it exemplifies. Replication may be more cumulative for sociology, but observation is usually more enlightening.

For example, the section on "Family" in rural Greece (a "male vanity culture," in Riesman's phrase, if ever a European society was one) is framed in the woman's perspective; it begins with a section entitled "'Getting Along with the Lord and Master." Deference from the female is accompanied, here as elsewhere, by routinized respect from young males. Among large groups of village boys, Sanders found only a tiny fraction who said they would smoke in front of their father. The tradition of the coffee house—reservation of married males, off-limits to boys and females—persists; and the moral hegemony of Wise Old Men over public affairs, despite occasional modernist inroads of women and children, is maintained.

Similarly, in the section on "Community," Sanders opens his chapter on the village school with the question: "What Will Happen to Us If We Can't Read?" This pervasive question conveys the poignancy of continued illiteracy in rural Greece (nearly half the village women are illiterate) as Sanders reviews the decades of international war, forced migration, chronic poverty, and guerilla communism that have afflicted living generations. Seeing the problem as real people in their own real setting does refresh our sensitivity to the tired topic of literacy—reminding us of the great psychic gulf that divides those who have it from those who do not.

An especially interesting feature of Sanders' record is his treatment, under the final section on "Change," of the "Social Consequences of Foreign Aid" in rural Greece. Postulating that "foreign aid means social change," and com-

puting the $2.5 billion of postwar aid as more money than $1 million yearly since Alexander the Great would have brought into Greece, Sanders thus reminds us of the awesome responsibility borne by United States policy—"the task of our generation is to serve as agents of international social change." His recapitulation of the changes wrought in village minds, morals, manners by the great transformation "from peasant to farmer" illuminates the contemporary drama of this historic hinterland.

This is the payoff to sociology—a valuable payoff as well to all Americans concerned with the deep human issues arising from the effort to modernize traditional lands. Sanders seeks neither to invent new theories nor to replicate old ones. With a love deepened by familiarity, an eye sharpened by experience, a mind disciplined by knowledge, he sets out for us the treasury of his lifetime's observations so that we may understand.

DANIEL LERNER

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

El Hombre de negocios puertorriqueño ("The Puerto Rican Businessman"). By THOMAS C. COCHRAN. Rio Piedras, P.R.: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1961. Pp. 209.

In this slim and unpretentious volume, Cochran looks at Puerto Rico from the perspective of American-style business management. In the first half of the book, he summarizes economic history in the island since the American victory in 1898. He shows the dominance of sugar exporting and food importing until the time of the Great Depression. Then the New Deal (both the mainland and the island versions) began, at first very slowly, to take effect, for the government became an active promoter of economic and social change. The Second World War speeded the rate of change (as it did for most of Latin America) because consumer goods could no longer be imported with secure regularity. Finally, "Operation Bootstrap" was developed with its encouragement of industrial investment by mainland companies.

With this brief summary of a half-century of business history. Cochran turns to the behavior of Puerto Rican entrepreneurs. He interviewed forty older men, mostly executives and owners of large firms, plus thirty younger men, mostly leaders of smaller firms. He reports his results without much statistical or analytical formality, but attempts to separate various influences on management style: Puerto Rican and Spanish cultural traditions and personality types; the effect of changing technological and economic forces; the impact of North American business methods; the influence of general American culture as mediated by formal education and informal relationships; the role of government action. One might attempt a summary in these words: the rapidly expanding sectors of the island economy have been led by branches of mainland firms and by those few Puerto Rican entrepreneurs in banking, trade, and manufacturing who most consciously alopted North American management practices, but the spread of these "modern" practices to other sectors of the business community has been remarkably slow, as family ties tend to inhibit professional management.

Although Cochran takes North American procedures as his model of efficiency (at least for firms that pass a minimum size and technological complexity), he recognizes that in different cultural environments alternative practices may also work satisfactorily up to a point. That point is usually phrased in terms of a small island civilization that has limited possibilities of expansion—and the whole philosophy of Yankee business methods is based on expansionism. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to move from Cochran's analysis to the larger question: How much must all of Latin America change its culture in order to adjust successfully to the demands of a modern economy?

Cochran's book (which was published in English by the University of Pennsylvania Press in 1959) is an example of business history written with the aid of certain analytic concepts concerning social structure and cultural change. It is a fusion of economics and sociology which makes no attempt to offer major contributions to theory or method but stands as an excellent case study that will be of interest to students of economic development and of Latin American culture, as well as specialists in Puerto Rican life.

JOSEPH A. KAHL

Washington University, St. Louis

CURRENT BOOKS

ABRAMOVITCH, RAPHAEL. *The Soviet Revolution.* New York: International Universities Press, 1962. Pp. xviii+473. $7.50. A history of the Russian February Revolution, the October Revolution, and the Soviet Union until 1939, written by a former leader of the Jewish Labor Board and the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

ANDERSON, NELS. *Work and Leisure.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv+266. $5.00. A wide-ranging analysis of the changing relationship between work and leisure.

ARMSTRONG, EARL M., and STINNETT, T. M. *A Manual on Certification Requirements for School Personnel in the United States.* Washington, D C.: National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards, National Education Association, 1962. Pp. vii+219. $4.00 (paper).

BARBANO, FILIPPO. *Partiti e pubblica opinione nella campagna elettorale* ("Party and Public Opinion in the Election Campaign") Torino: Giappichelli, 1961. Pp. 298. L. 2,500 (paper). A sociological analysis of the 1958 Italian elections

BARKER, ERNEST (ed). *Social Contract: Locke, Hume, Rousseau.* New York. Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xliv+307. $1 65 (paper). Consists of Locke's "An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent and End of Civil Government," Hume's "Of the Original Contract," and Rousseau's "The Social Contract."

BARNETT, ANTHONY. *The Human Species.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961. Pp. xii+354. $1.85 (paper). Reprint of a work first published in 1950, with chapters on heredity, reproduction, evolution, nutrition, population, and other topics.

BARNETT, RICHARD, and GARAI, JOSEPH. *Where the States Stand on Civil Rights.* New York: Sterling Publishing Co , 1962. Pp. 160. $2.95. Some facts on voting, education, jobs, housing, public transportation, and marriage law in each state.

BERGSTRAESSER, ARNOLD. *Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung* ("Politics in Science and Education"). Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1961. Pp 291 Essays on politics as a scientific discipline and on politics and education.

BERNSTEIN, PETER L. *The Price of Prosperity.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. xii +273. $4.50. An economist, pointing to dangers in the economy, argues with flexibility and ingenuity for increased expenditure in the public sector.

BOAS, FRANZ. *Anthropology and Modern Life.* With Introduction by R. BUNZEL. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962. Pp. 255. $1.85 (paper). Reissue of a book first published in 1928.

BREMME, GABRIELE. *Freiheit und Soziale Sicherheit* ("Freedom and Social Security"). Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1961. Pp. xv+263. DM. 29 (paper). An analysis of the determinant of the social security systems in England and France.

BUCHANAN, SCOTT. *Rediscovering Natural Law.* Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1962. Pp. 60. (Paper.) Brief historical overview of Western thought on natural law, and a discussion of certain problems in modern thought.

BURGESS, M. ELAINE. *Negro Leadership in a Southern City.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. viii+231. $6.00. Analysis of the position and activities of Negro leaders in a city of the middle South.

CARPENTER, WALTER H., JR., and HANDLER, EDWARD. *Small Business and Pattern Bargaining.* Babson Park, Mass.: Babson Institute Press, 1961. Pp. xi +243. $3 00 (paper). A report on the effects of collective bargaining decisions by large firms upon small firms, based upon interviews and published material: The rubber-tire and meat-packing industries are studied in detail.

CHAUNCEY, HENRY (ed). *Talks on American Education.* New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1962 Pp. viii+147. $1.50 (paper). Twelve radio talks broadcast on the Voice of America.

CITIZENS' HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL OF NEW YORK, INC. *Race and Housing—New York City 1961: Papers Presented at the Annual Meeting October 18, 1961.* New York: Citizens' Housing and Planning Council, 1961. Pp. 21. (Paper.)

COOK, STUART W. (ed.). *Research Plans Formulated at the Research Planning Workshop on Religious and Character Education.* New York: Religious Education Association, 1962. Pp. iii+310. (Paper.) Fifty papers outlining plans for research.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE. *Statistical Data: Population, Employment, Agriculture, Industry, Trade, Transport, External Trade, Finance (Member Countries of the Council of Europe and Overseas Associated Countries).* Strasbourg. Documentation Section, Council of Europe, 1961. Pp. cxviii+459. (Paper.)

CUBER, JOHN F., and HARROFF, PEGGY B. (eds.). *Readings in Sociology.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiii+337. $1.95 (paper). Forty-eight selections from books and articles by a wide range of authors on traditions

and issues in sociology, culture, personality, and society; brief introductory notes by editors.

DAVIS, JAMES A., with DAVID GOTTLIEB, JAN HAJDA, CAROLYN HUSON, and JOE L. SPAETH. *Stipends and Spouses: The Finances of American Arts and Science Graduate Students.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. viii+294. $5.00. A comprehensive study of graduate students' incomes, expenditures, and concerns about money, based upon a national sample.

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY. NEW YORK HOSPITAL. *History of the Behavioral Sciences Newsletter.* New York: Department of Psychiatry, New York Hospital, Cornell University Medical College, 1961. Pp. 14. (Paper.) A new informal publication, appearing irregularly, to facilitate communication among persons working on the history of the behavioral sciences.

DISASTER RESEARCH GROUP, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES–NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. *Field Studies of Disaster Behavior: An Inventory* (Publication 886.) Washington: National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, 1961. Pp. ix+78. $2.00 (paper).

DONNELLY, RICHARD C., GOLDSTEIN, JOSEPH, and SCHWARTZ, RICHARD D. *Criminal Law: Problems for Decision in the Promulgation, Invocation and Administration of a Law of Crimes* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xvi+1169. $15 00 Legislative committee hearings and reports, trial transcripts, court decisions, parole and pardon hearings, and social-science material are presented for a series of legal cases.

EKBLAD, MARTIN. *The Prognosis after Sterilization on Social-Psychiatric Grounds.* Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1961. Pp. 162. Danish Kr. 65 (paper). A psychiatric study of 225 women sterilized in Stockholm in 1951 on psychiatric and social-psychiatric grounds.

FARNSWORTH, P. R. (ed.) *Annual Review of Psychology,* Vol. XIII. Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, 1962. Pp. ix+602. $7.00. Sixteen papers on various fields of psychology and one on psychology in the Soviet Union.

FLANAGAN, JOHN C., DAILEY, JOHN T., *et al. Design for a Study of American Youth.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. 210. $1 95 (paper). Detailed description of procedures currently used in "Project Talent."

FRIEDMANN, GEORGES. *The Anatomy of Work: Labor, Leisure and the Implications of Automation.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+203 $5 00. A broad analysis of the nature of work and the effects of automation, with data drawn from England, the United States, and elsewhere.

FRIEDMANN, GEORGES, and NAVILLE, PIERRE. *Traité de Sociologie du Travail* ("Treatise on the Sociology of Work.") 2 vols. Paris: Armand Colin, 1961, 1962. Pp. 467, 439. New Fr. 37 (paper).

A comprehensive series of papers by Balan Chombart de Lauwe, Crozier, Delamotte, D Dumazedier, and others.

GEISERT, HAROLD L. *Population Problems in Development of India and South-Central* Washington: George Washington Univer 1961. Pp. 45. $1.25 (paper). General discus with tables.

GETZELS, JACOB, and JACKSON, PHILIP. *Creati and Intelligence: Explorations with Gifted dents.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. xvii+293. $6.50. Empirical data related to m theories of thinking and creativity, with a f on comparisons of children who have high but not high creativity with children wit high IQ's and with high creativity.

GJERLOV-KNUDSEN, C. O. *The Philosophy of F* Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 1962. Pp. 169. A ence of form is presented as a means to gr unity of effort among all professions and tra translated from Danish.

GOVORCHIN, GERALD G. *Americans from Y slavia.* Gainesville: University of Florida P 1961. Pp. xii+352. $8.50. An account of migration of the diverse peoples of Yugosl to the United States: their work, organizati newspapers, and other aspects of life as in grants.

GRAY, ROBERT M., and MOBERG, DAVID O. *Church and the Older Person.* Grand Ra Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 1962. Pp. 162. $3.50. A discussion of the p and function of religion in the lives of o persons; based on empirical studies.

HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL AND PSYCHIATRIC S ICE, MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL. *C munity Mental Health and Social Psychia* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University P 1962. Pp. xx+161. $3 50 (paper). Bibliogra of 1,158 books, articles, and reports with editorial commentaries.

HAUSER, PHILIP M. *Population Perspectives.* N Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1 Pp. 183. $3.50. A general discussion of the po lation explosion in the world and in the Un States.

HEXTER, J. H. *Reappraisals in History.* Evans Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1961. xxi+214. A historian dissents from some torians' use of vague concepts and swee explanations; particular attention is given to middle class in Tudor England, the gentry, the Great Rebellion.

JACQUEMYNS, G. *INSOC à quinze années d'acti* ("Fifteen Years of Operation of INSO Brussels: Parc Leopold, 1960. Pp. 225. (Pap Public opinion surveys conducted by the versity Institute of Social and Economic In mation in Belgium.

JAFFE, A. J. (ed.). *Research Conference on W men's Compensation and Vocational Rehab*

tation. New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1961. Pp. viii+148. Summaries of current or recently completed research and of discussions about needed research.

JONES, OLIVER, and GREBLER, LEO. *The Secondary Mortgage Market: Its Purpose, Performance, and Potential.* Los Angeles: Real Estate Research Program, University of California, 1961. Pp. xv+281. (Paper.) A detailed economic analysis of the functioning and imperfections of the secondary market for urban residential mortgages.

KAZIN, ALFRED. *Contemporaries.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1962. Pp. xiii+513. $7.50. Over seventy essays—on specific writers, modern society, and the critic's task.

KOENTJARANINGRAT. *Some Social-Anthropological Obervations on Gotong Rojong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java.* Translated by CLAIRE HOLT. Ithaca, N.Y.: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1961. Pp. viii+67. $2 50 (paper). A study of the actual practices of *Gotong Rojong*—popularly referring to co-operation between members of a community.

LA BARRE, WESTON. *They Shall Take up Serpents: Psychology of the Southern Snake-Handling Cult.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. Pp. 208. $3.75. History, description, and analysis of a cult in the American South which uses poisonous snakes in its rituals, and comparisons with other herpetological symbolisms in ancient Greece, Mexico, Africa, and elsewhere.

LANDMANN, MICHAEL. *Der Mensch als Schöpfer und Geschöpf der Kultur: Geschichts-und Sozialanthropologie* ("Man, Creator of and Created by Culture: Historical and Social Anthropology.") Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1961. Pp 237. DM. 15. A discussion of the implications of the uniqueness of the study of culture for the social sciences and ethics.

LEAKEY, L. S. B. *The Progress and Evolution of Man in Africa.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 52. $2.25. Two lectures delivered in 1961.

LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN, and SMELSER, NEIL J. (eds). *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp. xi+635. $7.50. A collection of sixty-four journal articles published in the 1950's. Introduction given by the editors. Topics include sociological theory and methods, culture and society, ecology and demography, economic structures and processes, the distributions of prestige, social disorganization, and social control and social change.

MACK, RAYMOND W., and BAKER, GEORGE W. *The Occasion Instant: The Structure of Social Responses to Unanticipated Air Raid Warnings.* (Publication 945). Washington: National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, 1961. Pp. xi+69. $2.00 (paper). The report summarizes and draws together three studies: W. A. Scott's "Public Reaction to a Surprise Civil Defense Alert in Oakland, California," George W. Baker's "Operation 4:30: A Survey of the Responses to the Washington, D.C., False Air Raid Warning," and Elihu Katz *et al.*, "Joy in Mudville: Public Reaction to the Surprise Sounding of Chicago's Air Raid Sirens."

MASON, WARD S. *The Beginning Teacher: Status and Career Orientations.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961. p. xiii+196. $1.25 (paper). A detailed report on a national study of the background, characteristics, preparation, teaching assignment, economic status, occupational values, satisfaction, and career commitment of beginning teachers, based upon questionnaires completed by 7,150 respondents.

MATEJKO, ALEKSANDER. *Socjologia Zakladu Pracy* ("Industrial Sociology"). Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1961. Pp. 318. Cena zl 22 (paper). A survey of the sociology of industrial work, with particular reference to the current Polish scene.

MELHORN, WILLIAM. *Tokyo Cocktail.* Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1962. Pp. 202. $2.50. Vignettes of people in Tokyo.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL WELFARE. *The Social Welfare Forum, 1961.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi+325. Eighteen papers on the elimination of poverty, social work practice, and international social welfare, plus three speeches and miscellaneous material.

NEF, JOHN U. *A Search for Civilization.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962. Pp. xii+210. $4.00. A book about wisdom, faith, beauty, and virtue and their relation to the search for perfection, the only road to civilization.

NUTZ, WALTER. *Der Trivialroman: Seine Formen und Seine Hersteller* ("The Light Novel: Its Forms and Its Producers"). Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1962. Pp. 119. (Paper). Sociological analysis of light novels, including discussions of publishers, authors, and lending libraries.

OJEMANN, RALPH H. (ed). *Recent Research Looking toward Preventive Intervention.* Iowa City: State University of Iowa, 1961. Pp. 200. $2.00 (paper.) Papers and discussion.

ORGANSKI, KATHERINE, and ORGANSKI, A. F. K. *Population and World Power.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961 Pp. viii+263. A general discussion of the population explosion and the significance of population size for international relations.

ORZACK, LOUIS H., and SANDERS, IRWIN T. *A Social Profile of Levittown, New York.* Boston: Research Institute of Boston University, 1961. Pp. 46. (Paper.) A report of a "social reconnais-

sance" of Levittown, focusing on the economic pinch, religious differences, the organizational pattern, and leadership—particularly as related to the schools.

PADGETT, L. V. (ed.). *Community Development in the Western Hemisphere: Selected Papers from Second Inter-American Seminar on Municipal Studies.* San Diego, Calif.: Public Affairs Institute, San Diego State College, 1961. Pp. iii+88. $1.00 (paper). Four papers on planning and community development decisions and six on community development and the federal concept.

PERKINS, DEXTER, SNELL, JOHN L., and OTHERS. *The Education of Historians in the United States.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. xiii+244. $4.95. A comprehensive survey of graduate training in the field of history.

PFLANZ, MANFRED. *Sozialer Wandel und Krankheit: Ergebnisse und Probleme der medizinischen Soziologie* ("Social Change and Disease: Results and Problems in Medical Sociology"). Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1962. Pp. xiii+403. DM. 34.50. Discussion of the field, review of empirical findings, and analysis of data from a questionnaire study of nineteen hundred patients at a clinic in Giessen, Germany.

PROUDFOOT, MERRILL. *Diary of a Sit-in.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. ix+204. $5.00. A day-by-day account of the 1960 Knoxville, Tennessee, sit-in, told by a professor of religion and philosophy at Knoxville College who became one of the leaders of the sit-in.

PYE, LUCIAN W. *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp xx+307. $7.50. Examination of Burma's political culture, including the society's historical evolution and psychological reactions to change; based on material gathered by the author in Burma in 1958–59.

RADZINOWICZ, LEON. *In Search of Criminology.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. vii+254. $4.75. Survey of current research and thinking in criminology in the United States and western Europe.

REDFIELD, ROBERT, and ROJAS, ALFONSO VILLA. *Chan Kom: A Maya Village.* Abridged ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. x+236. $1 50 (paper). Abridgement of a classic work first published in 1934.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Has Man a Future?* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962. Pp. 128. $0.85 (paper). Yes, if we let him.

STORING, HERBERT J. (ed.). *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1962. Pp. vii+333. $5.50. Consists of essays by W. Berns, on voting studies; H. J. Storing, on Simon; L. Weinstein, on Bentley; R. Horwitz, on Lasswell; and an epilogue b L. Strauss.

SZABO, DENIS. *Crimes et villes: Étude statistiqu de la criminalité urbaine et rurale en France et e Belgique* ("Crime and Communities: A Statis tical Study of Urban and Rural Crime in Franc and Belgium"). Louvain: Éditions Cujas, 196 Pp. 242. A detailed analysis of the correlates c various kinds of crime.

TAGIURI, RENATO (ed.). *Research Needs in Execu tive Selection.* Boston: Division of Researcl Harvard Business School, 1961. Pp. viii+13: $2.00 (paper). Nine papers on research strateg outstanding problems, methodological issue and the like.

TCHERIKOWER, ELIAS (ed.). *The Early Jewish La bor Movement in the United States.* Translate and revised by AARON ANTONOVSKY. New York YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, 1961 Pp vi+379. A one-volume revision of the Tcheri kower study of the Jewish labor movement i the United States at the end of the nineteentl century and its European background.

Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of So ciology, Vol. I: *Sociology in Its Social Context* Vol. II.: *Applications and Research;* Vol III *Abstracts of Papers and Discussions;* Vol. IV. *The Sociology of Knowledge.* Louvain· Interna tional Sociological Association, 1959, 1961. Pp ix+204; 289; v+429; xi+115. Papers and dis cussions from the Stresa conference of 1959 dealing with the theme "Society and Sociologica Knowledge."

UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961.* Washington D C.: Government Printing Office, 1961 Pp xii+ 1037. $3 50.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. *Employment and Earnings Statistics for the United States, 1909–1960: Revised on the Basis of the 1957 Standard Industrial Classification.* ("Bulletin No. 1312.") Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961. Pp. x+545. $3.00 (paper)

WEINSTEIN, EDWIN A. *Cultural Aspects of Delusion: A Psychiatric Study of the Virgin Islands* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc, 1962 Pp. 215. $5.00. Study of delusions and other symbolizations among five subcultures in the Virgin Islands, with case studies and statistical data.

WILLEY, GORDON R., and PHILLIPS, PHILIP. *Method and Theory in American Archaeology.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. ix+270. $1.50 (paper). Reprint of a work first published in 1957.

YOUNG, MICHAEL. *The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870–2033.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962. Pp. 190. $0.95 (paper). A satirical essay of the consequences of equality of opportunity for persons of high intelligence of all classes.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume LXVIII SEPTEMBER 1962 *Number 2*

COALITION FORMATION AT PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS[1]

WILLIAM A. GAMSON

ABSTRACT

A theory of coalition formation has applied to presidential nominating conventions since 1900. The unit at these conventions is designated as any group of delegates who follow the same coalition strategy for the duration of the convention. A coalition is formed between any two units when a majority of the delegates of one unit switch to another candidate and remain with him for a specified period. To operationalize the various parameters of the theory, a "presidental potential score" and an "ideology score" were developed by means of a content analysis. The theory was able to predict with modest but statistically clear success for the set of eight conventions studied.

Amid the blare of brass bands and the waving of standards at presidential nominating conventions, a process of coalition formation unravels. "The political conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties . . . are coalition games," writes John D. McDonald.[2] "Each candidate goes in generally with a number of votes short of a nominating majority. The 'game' is for each candidate to attempt to secure that majority through coalitions with other candidate groups and at the same time to break up or prevent competing coalitions."

In earlier papers, a theory of coalition formation was presented and supported by existing experimental results and in a small-group experiment designed explicitly to test it.[3] It is encouraging to find support for a theory in a controlled laboratory experiment; to be able to support it with data from the quadrennial melee from which our presidential candidates emerge would add considerable range to its applicability.

THE THEORY

The theory, briefly,[4] is intended to apply to situations which meet the following conditions: (1) There is a decision to be made and there are more than two social units attempting to maximize their share of the payoff; (2) No single alternative will maximize the payoff to all participants; (3) No participant has dictatorial powers, that is, no one has initial resources sufficient to control the decision by himself; (4) No participant has veto power, that is, no member

[1] This research was conducted under a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

[2] *Strategy in Poker, Business, and War* (New York: W. W. Norton Co, 1950).

[3] See William A Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (June, 1961), 373–82, and "An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation," *ibid.*, August, 1961, pp. 565–73.

[4] For a full discussion of the theory and its relation to existing sociological and mathematical work, see Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," *op cit.*

must be included in every winning coalition.

To predict who will join with whom in any specific instance, information is needed on the following:

1. *The initial distribution of resources.*—In any decision, there exists a weight associated with each participant involved such that some critical quantity of these weights is necessary for the decision to be made. We may call these weights *resources;* we must know for any given decision what they are and, at some starting point, how much of these resources each participant controls.

2. *The payoff for each coalition.*—The theory specifies that only one coalition wins and the payoff to all non-members is zero. Therefore, we need know only the payoff associated with each possible winning coalition.

3. *Non-utilitarian strategy preferences.*—We must have a rank ordering (with ties allowed) of each participant's inclination to join with every other player *exclusive of that player's control of the resources.*

4. *The effective decision point.*—We must know the amount of resources necessary to determine the decision.

A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition such that the defection of any member will make the coalition no longer winning. The cheapest winning coalition is that minimal winning coalition with total resources closest to the decision point. The general hypothesis of the theory states that *any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources that they contribute to a coalition.*[5]

Any participant, A, estimates the *payoff to himself* from a prospective coalition as a product of the *total payoff* to that coalition and A's expected share of that total. The total payoff is known to A, and the general hypothesis specifies the share that A will expect to give to others. Thus, A can assign to any prospective coalition a personal payoff value—his proportion of the resources in the coalition multiplied by the total payoff for that coalition. When a player must choose among alternative coalition strategies where the total payoff to a winning coalition is constant, he will maximize his payoff by maximizing his *share.* The theory states that he will do this by maximizing the ratio of his resources to the total resources of the coalition. Since his resources will be the same regardless of which coalition he joins, the lower the total resources the greater will be his share. Thus, where the total payoff is held constant, he will favor the *cheapest winning coalition.*

Finally, a coalition will form if and only if there are *reciprocal strategy choices* between two participants. To illustrate, let us assume that X's desired coalition in some three-person game is XY, and that Y's is XY or YZ, and that Z's favored coalition is XZ. Only X and Y have *reciprocal strategy choices,* that is, require the other in their preferred coalition and, thus, the coalition XY is predicted by the theory. The model envisions the process of coalition formation as a step-by-step process where the participants join two at a time. Once a coalition has been formed, the situation becomes a new one—that is, there is a fresh distribution of resources—and, in the new coalition situation, the original strategies may or may not be appropriate.

We shall consider those presidential nominating conventions of the two major parties since 1900 which meet the conditions outlined above.[6] There are only eight such

[5] Situations in which one participant has veto power are excluded, not because they are regarded as unimportant, but because the general hypothesis depends on a bargaining situation in which every participant can be potentially excluded. Otherwise, a participant in such a position could not be expected to demand only a proportional share of the payoff.

[6] This research was completed before publication of the extremely thorough studies by Paul T David, Ralph M Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), and Richard C. Bain, *Convention Decisions and Voting Records* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960). The purposes of these studies are

conventions which are applicable in whole or part: the Republican Conventions of 1916, 1920, 1940, and 1948 and the Democratic Conventions of 1912, 1920, 1924, and 1952. Many conventions are ruled out because of first-ballot nominations. While most of these are without interest, some (e.g., the 1952 Republican and the 1960 Democratic Convention) have considerable coalition action which is lost to us since the relevant agreements precede the first ballot. The 1932 Democratic Convention lasted four ballots, but it is excluded because at all times one candidate (Roosevelt) had veto power. This situation could occur in the Democratic Conventions only preceding the abolition of the two-thirds rule in 1936, and, in fact, predictions are made only for those situations in the 1912, 1920, and 1924 Democratic Conventions in which condition 4 of the theory is satisfied.

THE UNIT

One of the trickiest problems of application involves the identification of the proper unit for the convention situation. The individual delegate is too small a unit, since groups of delegates frequently act in unison in their coalition behavior. The state delegation seems more natural—especially when it operates under the unit rule. However, half the delegates may follow one strategy and the rest another. At other times, the state delegation appears to be too small a unit when several states, frequently from the same region, band together for the duration of the convention. "The pieces (at conventions) are not the delegations," David, Moos, and Goldman write, "but rather the political factions and power centers that lie back of them."[7]

Every voting bloc at a political convention is itself a coalition, of course, but *if it follows the same coalition strategy for the duration of the convention,* then it will serve as a unit for our purposes. A reasonably satisfactory unit by this criterion is the "candidate bloc"; we define a unit, then, as a group of delegates who support the same candidate at any given time, and we identify this unit with the candidate who is supported on the first ballot. A second criterion for a group of delegates to be labeled a unit is that they represent a simple majority of at least one state. This requirement is imposed to simplify and reduce the number of units and to allow us to discount the sporadic shifting of individual delegates from widely scattered states.

Closely tied to the problem of identifying the unit is the fundamental one of specifying which coalitions actually occurred. Systematic studies are available,[8] but there is considerable difficulty in adapting them to purposes for which they were not designed.

The alternative to the use of these accounts is the use of the readily available behavioral criterion of voting. State-by-state voting is available for all the conventions studied, and coalitions may be identified in the shifting from ballot to ballot. A coalition is formed between two candidate blocs if a *majority* of the votes of one candidate are shifted to the other and remain there as long as the distribution of votes remains substantially unchanged. Rarely is a candidate able to throw all his support to another nor, in fact, may he even desire the "coalition." There need not be any evidence of actual communication or agreement involved in a coalition; one group of delegates may decide independently of negotiation to switch to another candidate.

The phrase "as long as the distribution of votes remains substantially unchanged" in the above operational definition of coalition has important implications. First, a coalition is not formed if Jones's delegates sup-

different from those of the study described here, but the authors frequently confront closely related problems with generally similar resolutions.

[7] Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954).

[8] Among the best of these are David, Goldman, and Bain, *op. cit.*; David, Moos, and Goldman, *op. cit.*; and Bain, *op. cit.*

port Smith on one ballot but return to Jones on the next *without any other coalition action intervening*. Second, a unit may form more than one coalition in a convention. For example, if Smith joins with Jones but later after other coalitions have formed, he switches to Schmidt, then both Smith-Jones and Smith-Schmidt are identified as coalitions.

On any ballot several coalitions may occur. To simplify the evaluation of the results, every coalition is identified as a set of two-man coalitions. If Smith and Jones join Brown on the same ballot, then *three* coalitions are identified; Smith-Jones, Smith-Brown, and Jones-Brown. This makes the estimation of chance frequencies comparatively simple, since the number of possible coalitions is readily calculable.[9]

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

The votes of the delegates are, of course, the resources of the game. Each candidate unit has a certain number of votes on any ballot. The number of votes which any candidate possesses on any given ballot may be regarded as an *estimate* of his strength at that point. His "real" strength lies in an interval around this estimate and subsequent ballots will reveal whether the estimate is too high, too low, or about right. Thus, fluctuations *without* coalitions are to be expected from ballot to ballot. These fluctuations should not vary by more than 2 or 3 per cent of the votes; it is difficult for a candidate's support to change by more than this without involving the majority of the delegates from some state.

The initial distribution of votes does *not* refer only to the *first-ballot* distribution. Coalitions are possible on any ballot, and the initial distribution for any coalition situation is the distribution of votes on the ballot immediately preceding the one on which the coalition occurred. Within limits, we can ignore the previous history of the convention, just as we ignore the preconvention alignments of the various candidates.

Information on votes being held in reserve which may be available to the participants is not available to us. We can only assume that the various participants make identical estimates of the distribution of resources and that the balloting indicates these estimates. This assumption is necessary, and its occasional inaccuracy may account for some of the errors in prediction that we eventually encounter.

PAYOFF

While there may be some variance in the value of the nomination, depending on who receives it, in general it is safe to assume that its value *in itself* will be the same no matter who receives it. There are certainly rewards in political power even for those candidates who later lose.

The grand prize, however, is not the nomination itself but the Presidency to which it potentially leads. Again we can assume that the value of the Presidency in potential political power is the same no matter who achieves it, although there may be differences in its exercise. Where, then, are there differences in payoff to any coalition?

For purposes of simplification, we shall assume that the presidential election "experiment" has only two outcomes for any candidate—he either wins or loses. Since we earlier assumed that the total amount associated with these outcomes will be the same

[9] Occasionally, a group of delegates that meets the two requirements for a unit will not be identifiable with any candidate. This will occur when delegates who form the majority of one or more states switch from the candidate whom they originally supported but do not represent a majority of his support. Thus, in the 1952 Democratic Convention, Michigan switched to Stevenson in bloc after supporting Kefauver for two ballots but there was no general shifting of Kefauver's delegates to Stevenson. In this example, the unit may be identified with the favorite son, Governor Williams, but sometimes we must simply identify the unit by the state with the largest number of delegates involved in the shift. Why this is not as satisfactory as identifying a unit with a candidate will become clear below in the discussion of non-utilitarian strategy preference.

regardless of the candidate selected, the only variable remaining is the probability of being elected of the various coalition candidates.[10] In short, the total payoff to any coalition in a convention will be designated as the probability of that coalition's candidate being elected if he were nominated, multiplied by some constant.

The presumed candidate of any prospective coalition is any candidate with more than 50 per cent of the resources within that coalition or, if no such candidate exists, that person within the prospective coalition with the highest probability of being elected if nominated. Thus, every coalition strategy can be assigned a total payoff value if we have available information on the various probabilities of the candidates being elected.

Ideally, we would have figures representing the absolute probabilities. However, since we consider the payoff classes of alternative strategies, a rank ordering of various probabilities will be adequate. Even this less demanding requirement presents formidable measurement obstacles.

The general strategy used here was to develop a "presidential potential score" (PPS) which could be used as the basis for the desired probability ranking. In constructing it, the type of factors politicians generally consider in rating the "availability" of a candidate was used. While it is possible to identify the major factors by this means, we must make judgments of relative importance in combining the various bits of information into a single score. The reader's judgment on the "points" allowed for different factors may differ from the ones used here.

To offset the fallibility of such judgments, we will demand as little as possible from the total score on the PPS. These scores will not be used as an interval scale nor will much faith be put in very small differences. A radically different weighting system would change the relative positions of the candidates, but small differences would not generally affect the ranking. The PPS is composed of information on five different variables some of which embrace subvariables: state, personal characteristics, fame, veto-group score, and electoral record.[11]

State.—There are two important characteristics of states which make them desirable or undesirable as a place of residency for a presidential candidate—their size and their voting regularity. Candidates are most attractive when they come from a state with a large electoral vote and a record of frequent shifting from one party to another. Very few candidates have been nominated from small states and, in the past, the traditional Republicanism of a large state such as Pennsylvania handicapped its natives.

Table 1 gives a cross-break of four sizes and three degrees of party regularity; numbers in parentheses give the score which a candidate's state contributes to his total PPS. The value of residency in a particular state may shift over the years both because the population of a state may increase or decrease (California's has greatly increased) and because of party composition (Pennsylvania and Michigan are no longer "safe" Republican territory).[12]

Personal characteristics.—There are many personal characteristics which are relevant, from such obvious ones as age to intangibles such as Thomas Dewey's "brash-

[10] We make use here of the concept of "expected value." For a discussion of the precise definition of this concept see any text on probability, e.g., John G Kenemy, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald L. Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957). Note that the probability of election determines the size of the "pie" to be awarded the winning coalition For any given participant, his payoff is a product of the size of his slice and the size of the total pie.

[11] The various elements comprising the PPS will be briefly described here. For a complete discussion of how the PPS was compiled, see William A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1959). (Microfilm No. 60-1761.)

[12] David, Goldman, and Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 514, employ a system of classifying states by party alignment which is similar to the one used here.

ness" or Wendell Willkie's good humor and warmth. Some of these will be captured, hopefully, under the third variable of "fame." Here, we shall limit ourselves to the most obvious personal characteristics of age, marital status, religion, and ethnic background.

There is a "right" and a "wrong" for each of these characteristics. A candidate receives points for each desirable trait that he possesses at the time of the convention, with "desirable"[13] defined as (1) age—48 to 60 years old, (2) marital status—married or widowed, never divorced, (3) religion—Protestant, (4) ethnicity—Anglo-Saxon or indefinite.

TABLE 1

CODING AND SCORING SYSTEM FOR SIZE AND REGULARITY OF STATES

RANK IN ELECTORAL VOTE	PARTY VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS		
	1-1 or 4-2, 3-3*	0-2 and 1-5†	0-6‡
1-6	(5)	(4)	(2)
7-12	(4)	(3)	(1)
13-24 ..	(3)	(2)	(0)
25-50..... ..	(2)	(1)	(0)

* This may be read switched in last two elections or divided its vote 4-2 or 3-3 between the two parties in the last six elections

† Did not switch in last two elections and only once in last six

‡ Voted for the same party in the last six elections.

Fame.—This variable tries to capture not only how well known a candidate is but something of his "stature" or "glamor" as well. The number of articles on a candidate that are listed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* gives an estimate of how well known a candidate is nationally. To some degree, it is an index of his political "sex appeal" as well. We also ask if the number of articles is holding steady, increasing, or declining in recent years.

[13] Desirability represents the author's a priori estimate of the judgment of the average convention delegate and is, of course, made independently of any examination of the data to be analyzed.

The *Reader's Guide* covering approximately eight to ten years, or a period which includes the two previous presidential elections, was the source of the tabulation. All of the articles which appeared by or about each candidate up to the time of the convention were counted. The scoring system of Table 2 includes this variable in the PPS.

Veto-group score.—We shall not accept at face value the desirability of neutrality of the various major voting groups. Candidates sometimes draw their strength from their unusual appeal to one or another group. In fact, it is possible to distinguish at least four different relationships which candidates may have toward these groups.

A. Having special appeal for or closely identified with group.
B. Acceptable to but not identified with group.
C. Lacks appeal for group; group not hostile but suspicious.
D. Group actively hostile; special negative appeal for group.

TABLE 2

SCORING SYSTEM FOR FAME

No. of Articles*	Score
More than 200.	6
90–199.	5
70–89..	4
50–69.	3
30–49.	2
10–29	1
0–9.	0

* If no. of articles in first half of time period exceeded the no. in the most recent count, one point was subtracted from score

Each candidate is coded for five groups. The list is intended to be exhaustive but not mutually exclusive: labor (esp. urban labor); farmers (esp. midwestern and western); business (esp. eastern industry, Wall Street); ethnic groups (Negroes, Jews, immigrant groups); southerners (esp. rural).

The scoring system associated with the four-category code given above is a complex one since it must reflect two differences. First, each party draws its support in different proportions from these groups, and acceptability by labor, for example, will

not have the same importance for a Republican that it has for a Democrat. Second, the political structure of the United States has changed since 1912, and the importance of the various groups has shifted somewhat. Consequently, a four-way breakdown was employed in scoring the various code categories: Republican—after 1932; Democrat—after 1932; Republican—before 1932; Democrat—before 1932. Table 3 gives the scoring used for inclusion in the PPS.[14]

TABLE 3

VETO-GROUP SCORING SYSTEM*

Group and Period	Republican				Democratic			
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
Labor								
After 1932	0	1	0	−1	1	1	−1	−2
Before 1932	0	1	0	−1	0	1	−1	−1
Farmers								
After 1932	1	0	0	−1	1	0	0	−1
Before 1932	1	0	−1	−2	1	0	−1	−2
Business								
After 1932	0	1	0	−1	0	1	0	0
Before 1932	1	1	0	−1	0	1	0	−1
Ethnic groups:								
After 1932	1	0	0	−1	1	0	−1	−1
Before 1932	1	0	0	−1	1	0	0	−1
Southerners								
After 1932	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	−1
Before 1932	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	−1

* See text for description of ABCD code

Veto-group attitudes toward a candidate were coded from a content analysis of fifteen articles per candidate. These articles were sampled on the basis of recency and range of periodicals. Where fewer than fifteen articles were available, all articles were used; with fifteen or more articles, those written closest to the time of the convention were the starting point with earlier articles being included only when they appeared in a magazine or periodical with no more recent treatment. Naturally, no article written after the convention was used, and a new set of fifteen articles was used for a candidate who appeared in more than one convention. Where no information was available about the attitude of a group toward a candidate, he was coded "B" for that group, that is, acceptable.

Electoral record.—Most politicians regard as important some demonstration of a potential candidate's vote-getting ability in the form of electoral success. Those who have never won state-wide elections, such as Harriman in 1952, are to a large extent "untried" politically, despite what may be a considerable career in and around politics.

A second factor to be considered here is the candidate's showing in presidential primaries. It has generally been true that primaries have served more to destroy than create candidates, and this is reflected in

[14] It should be pointed out again that the scoring in Table 3 reflects my own untested assumptions about delegates' views of the meaning of connections with various groups. Thus, the scoring reflects my assumption that the hostility of a group is more injurious than its support is helpful. This yields the label "veto group." Where a group tends to have a definite political affiliation, it is most desirable to be acceptable to, but not too closely identified with, it; where it is more neutral or irregular in its affiliation, being closely identified with it is an asset. Thus, close identification with "Wall Street" is less desirable than an equally close identification with farmers.

the scoring. Table 4 shows the coding and scoring system used for this variable.

TABLE 4

ELECTORAL-RECORD SCORING SYSTEM

	Score
Election:	
Won by unusually large margin in last election or repeatedly in a non-safe state	2
Won by normal or expected margin . .	1
Never elected to statewide or national office	0
Defeated with poor showing in statewide or national election	−1
Primaries:	
Won in upset or vigorously contested primary	1
Entered no primary or won as favorite son or under favorable conditions . . .	0
Lost or did poorly under favorable circumstances	−1

Validity of the PPS.—A list of twelve Democratic candidates for 1960 were used for a comparison of the PPS with the ratings of informed observers. Both measures were calculated during the same time period prior to the convention. Three observers were given the list of candidates and asked to assume that each in turn had actually won the nomination and that Nixon was the Republican candidate.[15] They were then asked to rate each man's chance of being elected.

Kendall's τ was used as a measure of rank correlation (see Table 5). The τ between the average observer ranking and the PPS is .61 ($p < .01$). While this is less than perfect, there is no method of determining which measure is genuinely more valid. There is, for example, only moderate agreement between each pair of observers ($\tau =$ .44, .41, and .38). It seems reasonably safe to conclude that the PPS is capable of sorting the candidates into broad probability classes which are sufficient for our purposes.

TABLE 5

PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL SCORE (PPS), IDEOLOGY SCORE (IS), AND VALIDATION MEASURES

Candidate	PPS*	Average Observer Ranking	IS	IS Voting Validation	IS Rating Validation
Russell	3	11	1	40	1 0
Johnson .	14	5	2	22	2 0
Brown	13	9	2		3 3
Faubus . .	7	11	2 5		1 0
Symington	15	5	3	16	3 0
Kennedy . .	15	2	3	15	3 3
Muskie	7	9	3		3 7
Stevenson	15	1	3		3 7
Meyner . . .	12	4	3		4 0
Humphrey	14	2	4	14	4 0
Kefauver . . .	14	8	4	18	4 3
Williams . .	13	7	4		4 7

* Both PPS and observer ratings were made before Kennedy's string of primary victories. τ between the two measures, 61 ($p <$ 01)

NON-UTILITARIAN STRATEGY PREFERENCES

Ideology is foremost among the variables which operate over and above considerations of personal influence. Earlier, we identified every coalition with a candidate when this was possible. To operationalize this variable, we will assume that the candidate expresses the ideological central tendency of the unit.

[15] The raters, consisting of a professor and two graduate students in the field of American politics, were also asked to assume that Rockefeller was the Republican candidate; the *relative* position of the various candidates was not substantially different

If we further assume that each candidate unit would prefer to join with those who are ideologically closest, if other things were equal, the problem becomes one of obtaining a suitable ideology measure for the various candidates. Such a measure must be replicable and usable for conventions as far back as fifty years ago.

In the articles from which veto-group scores were coded, the various candidates were frequently characterized as "liberal," "radical," "conservative," and so forth. These characterizations were used to form an "ideology scale" (IS). Three categories were used: (1) liberal, progressive, radical, leftist, opposed by conservatives; (2) moderate, middle-of-the-road, opposed by neither or both liberal and conservative; (3) conservative, reactionary, old guard, opposed by liberals. In any sentence in which any of the candidate's ideology was characterized, that candidate was scored in the appropriate column.

At the conclusion of all the articles, we had an ideological profile for each candidate —for example, seven liberal characterizations, eleven middle-of-the-road, and two conservative. These distributions were then simplified into four classes from conservative to liberal.[16]

[16] To make clearer the individual components of the content analysis from which the ideology profile was derived, here are some illustrations with the manner in which they were coded following in parentheses:

"In a day of political moderation, [Governor Pat] Brown yields right of way to none as a middle-of-the-roadhog." (Middle)

"Politically, Brown is not too conservative to frighten California liberals and not too liberal to frighten the conservatives." (Middle)

"[Senator Estes] Kefauver has as clear and uncompromising a record of Democratic liberalism as [Adlai] Stevenson." (One liberal for Kefauver, one liberal for Stevenson)

"As to the origin and derivation of his [Elihu Root in the Republican Convention of 1916] name, I discover a strange fact: that Root springs from the Latin word radix, which is the same source that gives us the word 'radical': And that juxtaposition seemeth to me to be highly and incongruously humorous." (Conservative)

Table 5 gives the ideology score for twelve Democratic candidates for 1960, accompanied by two validation scores. The first of these, the voting validation, makes use of the congressional voting records (on forty-six "key" issues selected by *Congressional Quarterly*) of the six candidates who had been senators for the past few years. Arranging the senators in terms of their agreement with Senator Russell of Georgia resulted in almost perfect scale types in the Guttman sense. By discarding six of the forty-six votes, we were able to arrange the senators into scale types without a single "error."

The numbers under voting validation in Table 5 are the number of times each senator's vote was in agreement with Russell's on these forty votes. It is reasonable to interpret the dimension represented by these votes as conservative-liberal, and, thus, to compare it with the IS. In general, the two measures follow each other fairly closely, although Kefauver's voting record puts him in a somewhat more conservative position than he occupies on the IS.

At the same time, the three observers rated the candidate's presidential chances, they were also asked to rate them on a five-point liberal-conservative scale. Table 5 gives the average scale position for the three raters, and once again the result is closely similar to the rankings on the IS.[17]

EFFECTIVE DECISION POINT

What percentage of votes is necessary at a political convention to "stampede" the delegates for a particular candidate? Given the theoretical importance of exceeding the effective decision point by as little as possible, this is a rather crucial determination. The answer must vary between conventions where the nominee formally needs two-thirds of the votes and those in which he is nominated by a simple majority.

[17] Governor Faubus receives a unanimously conservative rating; his middle-of-the-road score on the IS reflects his pre–Little Rock reputation as a Southern "moderate," especially on racial matters.

It is rather difficult to determine in practice the exact percentage of votes at which the opposition collapsed.[18] It is, however, possible to set limits. In majority conventions, the opposition has held firm when a candidate has had as much as 40 per cent of the vote but never with more than that in the conventions studied. We are forced to draw a sharp boundary in a situation in which none really exists; for the majority convention, 41 per cent will be considered the effective decision point, that is, any coalition with 41 per cent or more is winning.

This total, just above the lower limit, may seem too low, but most conventions have a substantial percentage of relatively uncommitted delegates who are ready to swing to the apparent "choice" of the convention as soon as he clearly emerges. A candidate with 41 per cent or more of the votes when no other candidate has a total close to this generally will have demonstrated to the satisfaction of most of these uncommitted delegates that it is now only a matter of time until he secures the additional votes formally necessary for his nomination.

In conventions following the two-thirds rule, candidates have acquired as much as 59 per cent of the delegates (Roosevelt in 1932) without the immediate collapse of the opposition. Therefore, the effective decision point must be greater than this figure and we shall use 60 per cent for these conventions.

RESULTS

The payoff class in which any coalition belongs is a function of two variables—the probability of its candidate being elected and the total amount of its resources. If we divide the total resources into intervals of about 5 per cent range, then for simple majority conventions, 41–45 per cent is the most desirable, 46–50 per cent is next, and so forth. For the two-thirds rule conventions, the intervals would be 60–64 per cent, 65–69 per cent, 70–74 per cent. . . . We may designate these total resource classes from lowest to highest as A, B, C.

Similarly, we shall divide the PPS of the presumed candidates into classes: A', B', C'. . . . The payoff class of any coalition can now be ranked from the highest to the lowest as follows: (1) AA', (2) AB' or BA', (3) AC', CA', or BB'. . . . It is possible, of course, that several prospective coalitions will be in class AA'. A candidate will prefer that coalition *within* a class which maximizes the similarity to his own ideology where the ideology of the coalition is a weighted average of the ideology score of the prospective members—weighted by their percentage of resources in the coalition.

We shall evaluate the theory in terms of three criteria. Criterion 1 is the ability to predict the first choice of the various units in the formation of coalitions. Since a single preferred coalition may have several members, each person may have several "first" choices. In other words, we ask: How frequently was A among B's predicted first choices and vice versa when A and B formed a coalition? Criterion 2 also involves the choices but this time we examine the ability to eliminate certain coalitions. Instead of asking of first choices, we ask whether or not B was among A's theoretically worst choices. If we cannot predict the exact choices, we may still be successful in eliminating certain ones. Finally, criterion 3 involves predicting the actual coalition pairs which formed. A coalition is predicted between A and B, as before, if and only if they number each other among their first choices.[19]

[18] See David, Goldman, and Bain, *op. cit.*, chap. xvii, for their related discussion of the "critical ballot."

[19] Where we make N independent predictions and are correct on C of them, the expected number of correct predictions is given by

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i ,$$

where p_i is the probability of the ith prediction being correct. The standard error of Σp_i is given

Time limitations make it impossible to present the application of the theory to each convention, but an illustration from the 1952 Democratic convention may help to explicate the technique. Table 6 gives the PPS, IS, and distribution of resources at two stages which represent, with certain exceptions, the first and second ballot.[20]

TABLE 6

PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL SCORE (PPS), IDEOLOGY SCORE (IS) AND DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES AT TWO STAGES FOR 1952 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Candidate Bloc	PPS	IS	Per Cent	
			Time 1	Time 2
Barkley	12	3	4	7
Dever	7	2.5	3	2
Fulbright	7	1.5	2	...
Harriman	14	4	10	10
Humphrey	12	4	2	...
Kefauver	17	3	28	29
Kerr	4	2	5	.
Murray	6	4	1	
Russell	3	1	22	24
Stevenson	14	4	22	26
Other	....	...	1	2
Total	....	....	100	100

by $\sqrt{\Sigma p_i q_i}$, where q_i is the probability of the ith prediction being incorrect $(1-p_i)$. We can then readily obtain critical ratios for the deviation of the results from chance by:

$$\frac{C - \Sigma p_i}{\sqrt{\Sigma p_i q_i}}.$$

Events in the same convention influence each other, but there is no systematic dependence evident which would falsely increase the number of cases involved. Nevertheless, the assumption of independent cases is not satisfied perfectly and should be kept in mind in considering subsequent probability statements. It should also be noted that this evaluation assumes that where no action is taken the prediction is neither right nor wrong. This means that the prediction is taken as conditional (i.e., if A forms a coalition, he will form it with B). We have no way of knowing whether A made vigorous efforts to join with B, did nothing, or made efforts to join with someone else. I am indebted to Michael Margolis for pointing out this distinction.

Three coalitions occurred as defined here using time 1 as the initial distribution: Barkley-Kerr, Humphrey-Kefauver, and Fulbright-Russell. For Barkley, cheapest winning coalitions are possible with any of the other candidates, but only if Kefauver is the prospective candidate will the coalition be in the highest payoff class. If Kefauver is to be included, then as far as Barkley is concerned, Russell and Stevenson must be excluded since their presence will make his own contribution superfluous. Of the rest, all are included in coalitions in the highest payoff class, but Fulbright is furthest away ideologically and several class AA' coalition strategies exclude him (e.g., Barkley-Harriman-Kefauver, Barkley-Dever-Humphrey-Kefauver-Kerr, Barkley-Dever-Kefauver-Kerr-Murray). Therefore, the theory predicts that if Barkley forms a coalition, it will be with Dever, Harriman, Humphrey, Kefauver, Kerr, or Murray. He actually joins with Kerr so that this prediction is correct.

Kerr can eliminate Russell and Stevenson for the same reasons which Barkley used. Furthermore, he would like to avoid Harriman, Humphrey, and Murray if this is possible, since they are two positions removed from him ideologically. This leaves him with only one preferred coalition—Barkley-Dever-Fulbright-Kefauver-Kerr—and the theory predicts he will wish to join with any one of these for a start. Once again the prediction is correct, since Kerr actually chooses Barkley. Since both are among each other's choices, the coali-

[20] The exceptions involve certain rules which were generally applied: (1) When two candidates join, there is sometimes a residue of votes for the candidate who has shifted the majority of his votes to another. The residue is included in the total in estimating the distribution. Thus, after most of Kerr's votes were shifted to Barkley on the second ballot, we credit Barkley with his own votes plus the residue of Kerr's delegates; (2) A candidate may get no votes on a given ballot but may shift from one candidate to another on the next ballot. When this occurs, we assume that the defection of this unit is known by the delegates, and thus it supplements the balloting as an estimate of distribution of resources.

tion Kerr-Barkley is correctly predicted by the theory.

A similar analysis can be made for each of the other units and the results of this analysis in terms of first choices are given below with the actual choice in parentheses:

Dever:	Barkley, Kefauver, Kerr, Murray (None)
Fulbright:	Barkley, Dever, Kefauver, Kerr (Russell), incorrect
Harriman:	Humphrey, Kefauver, Murray (None)
Humphrey:	Harriman, Kefauver, Murray (Kefauver), correct
Kefauver:	Barkley, Dever, Harriman, Humphrey, Kerr, Murray (Humphrey), correct
Murray:	Harriman, Humphrey, Kefauver (None)
Russell:	Kefauver (Fulbright), incorrect
Stevenson:	Barkley, Dever, Harriman, Humphrey (None)

Thus, on the first round of coalitions, two of the three (Barkley-Kerr, Humphrey-Kefauver) were successfully predicted and one (Russell-Fulbright) was missed. On choices, four of six were correct.

Tables 7 and 8 present the results for individual conventions and in combination, respectively. Since the N for some of these conventions is quite small, the totals must be taken as the most adequate test of the theory in predicting the results of political conventions. Several of the conventions—notably the 1952, 1924, and 1920 Democratic conventions—are significant by themselves. Of the others, only the 1940 Republican convention has an N of greater than ten. By scanning the critical ratios (CR) in Table 7, the reader may satisfy himself that almost all of the deviations from chance are in the proper direction. On only three out of twenty-four measures does the theory do less well than chance and only on criterion 3.

Table 8 indicates that the theory is clearly an aid in predicting who will join with whom at these conventions. However, the achievement should not be exaggerated: on criterion 3, for example, we are able to make the correct prediction fifty-two out of eighty-three times (63 per cent) against a chance expectancy of forty-one (49 per cent), or slightly better than a 25 per cent improvement over random guessing.

DISCUSSION

The magnitude of the chance expectancy may be a drawback of the theory. Almost two-thirds of the units, on the average, are in the predicted set of choices; half the possible two-man coalitions are in the predicted coalition set. Much of this lack of uniqueness stems from considering only coalition pairs in the results. Even when the theory makes a unique prediction of a winning coalition, it may involve four or five participants and, therefore, no unique coalition pair. At other times, notably when there are many participants with a small percentage of votes, there is a variety of equally acceptable coalition strategies, and this must be deemed a genuine fault of the theory. Here, the theory is able only to *eliminate* certain strategies, but this is, at least, a step toward the more refined determination of coalition formation.

When an incorrect prediction is made, it may be either because the operations of total payoff (PPS) or non-utilitarian strategy preference (IS) are faulty, or because the general hypothesis of the theory has failed. Unless we can separate the respective contribution of the different parameters, it is impossible to regard successful prediction as corroboration of the general hypothesis. To meet this, one might ask how well the PPS and IS can do by themselves in predicting the coalition results of the eight conventions used here.

To generate predictions using the PPS, we will assume that each candidate bloc wishes to join with that unit whose candidate has the highest score on this measure. To generate predictions using the IS, we will assume that each candidate bloc wishes to join with that candidate whose score on the IS is closest to its own. Table 9 compares the predictions of each of these meas-

TABLE 7

RESULTS FOR EIGHT PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS

CONVENTION AND CRITERIA	No.	CORRECT	Σp_i*	$\sigma \Sigma p_i$	CR	P†
	Simple Majority Conventions					
1952 Democratic:						
1	18	13	8.36	2.06	2 25	< 02
2	18	17	11.34	1 96	2.89	<.002
3	9	5	2 36	1.37	1 93	<.03
1948 Republican:						
1	8	5	4.56	1.30	.34	N.S.
2	8	7	6.11	1 20	74	N.S.
3	4	2	1.25	.93	81	N.S.
1940 Republican:						
1	20	11	9 75	2.05	61	N.S.
2	20	13	12.71	2.11	.14	N.S.
3	10	2	2 14	1.29	− 11	N.S.
1920 Republican:						
1	10	6	5 25	1 48	51	N S.
2	10	7	6 80	1.33	15	N.S.
3	5	1	1 71	1.02	− .70	N.S.
1916 Republican:						
1	10	4	3.04	1 33	72	N.S.
2	10	7	4 86	1 40	1 53	< 07
3	5	0	.82	82	−1 00	N.S.
	Two-thirds Rule Conventions					
1924 Democratic.						
1	60	53	42 36	3 17	3 35	< 001
2	60	55	47 54	3 09	2 41	< 01
3	30	25	17.64	2.55	2 88	< 002
1920 Democratic:						
1	36	33	29 45	1 91	1 86	< 04
2	36	34	30 70	1 86	1 77	<.04
3	18	15	13 75	1 71	73	N.S.
1912 Democratic·						
1	4	4	3 27	77	95	N.S.
2	4	4	3 27	77	95	N S.
3	2	2	1 40	65	92	N S.

* Expected (see n 19)

† Based on one-tailed test of significance

TABLE 8

COMBINED RESULTS FOR SIMPLE MAJORITY AND TWO-THIRDS RULE CONVENTIONS

Type and Criterion	No	Correct	Σp_i	$\sigma \Sigma p_i$	CR	P
Simple majority:						
1	66	39	30 96	3 76	2 14	< 02
2	66	51	41 82	3 67	2 50	< 01
3	33	10	8.28	2 48	69	N S.
Two-thirds rule:						
1	100	90	75 08	3 78	3.94	< 001
2	100	93	81 51	3 69	3 11	< 001
3	50	42	32 79	3 14	2 93	<.002
All conventions						
1	166	129	106.04	5 33	4 30	< 001
2	166	144	123 33	5 20	3 97	< 001
3	83	52	41.07	4.00	2 73	< 005

ures operating alone with the theory as a whole using criteria *1* and *2* described above. The predictions using the PPS and IS ignore the resources of the candidates. Clearly, they are unable to predict coalitions in these conventions with better than random accuracy. Note that the theory presented here involved only *one* possible way of combining payoff, ideology, and resources; an alternative to the general hypothesis of the theory presented here which specifies some other way in which resources play a role might produce a model of equal or greater predictive power. However, Table 9 does seem to indicate that the "non-testable" parts of the theory embodied in the PPS and IS do not themselves account for the success of the theory in the conventions analyzed.[21]

[21] Non-testable in the sense that the theory does not specify what will determine non-utilitarian preferences of total payoff; it does specify how one will respond to different resource distributions.

TABLE 9

COMPARISON OF PREDICTIONS FROM PRESIDENTIAL POTENTIAL SCORE (PPS) AND IDEOLOGY SCORE (IS) ALONG WITH PREDICTIONS FROM TOTAL THEORY

Convention and Criterion	No	PPS			IS			Total Theory
		Correct	Expected*	*CR*	Correct	Expected	*CR*	*CR*†
1952 Democratic:								
1	18	3	3.47	−.29	8	5.03	1.59	2.25
2	18	12	11.30	.35	15	13.29	.94	2.89
1948 Republican:								
1	8	1	2.56	−1.18	1	1.60	−.50	.34
2	8	5	4.78	.18	7	6.00	.84	.74
1940 Republican:								
1	20	3	2.85	.10	5	4.19	.45	.61
2	20	16	16.61	−.37	13	12.53	.22	.14
1920 Republican:								
1	10	0	1.04	−1.07	3	2.67	.24	.51
2	10	7	7.08	−.06	9	7.47	1.18	.15
1916 Republican:								
1	10	4	1.77	1.86	0	1.85	−1.68	.72
2	10	9	7.05	1.35	8	7.75	.19	1.53
Subtotal:								
1	66	11	11.43	−.23	17	15.34	.49	2.14
2	66	49	46.82	.64	52	47.02	1.39	2.50
1924 Democratic:								
1	60	3	8.67	−2.14	16	18.24	−.70	3.35
2	60	52	44.42	2.26	46	46.85	−.27	2.11
1920 Democratic:								
1	36	10	8.04	.80	10	16.88	−2.51	1.86
2	36	27	29.65	−1.19	24	27.09	−1.22	1.77
1912 Democratic:								
1	4	1	.60	.58	2	.90	1.34	.95
2	4	3	3.40	−.58	2	2.93	−1.11	.95
Subtotal:								
1	100	14	17.31	−.90	28	36.02	−1.86	3.94
2	100	82	77.47	1.12	72	76.87	−1.19	3.11
Total:								
1	166	25	29.00	−.84	45	51.36	−1.16	4.30
2	166	131	124.29	1.27	124	123.91	.02	3.97

* Expected (see n. 19).

† Critical ratios from Table 8.

We can learn from the theory's failures. While it has certain psychological assumptions, it is distinctly sociological. Differences in motivations, for example, are ignored. We assume that the various participants differ in their goals, but that the decision around which the coalition action revolves is a common means to their respective goals. These differences may extend to means. Some delegates may prefer to see the party lose with one candidate than win with another.

Is it possible and desirable to consider such differences? One answer is that, even with motivations assumed constant, we were successful in representing the coalition behavior in conventions. Nevertheless, we might be able to improve our success if we could translate motivations into the terms of the theory. The concept of payoff class—of how large a difference makes a difference—offers one possibility for such an inclusion. Instead of a constant, we might consider it a variable for each participant. A politician who is greatly concerned with increasing his influence might be sensitive to quite small differences; one who is predominantly concerned with ideology might ignore differences considerably larger than the figure used here.

It is difficult to know what degree of results should impress us in this complex evaluation. In many ways, the modest success here in situations characterized by so many unique historical features is more satisfying than neater but more easily obtained experimental results.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

SOME FUNCTIONS OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND NORMATIVE FLEXIBILITY[1]

LEWIS A. COSER

ABSTRACT

This paper examines a series of instances which call attention to the positive functions of deviance for social structures. Among the latent functional contributions are the role of the deviant in arousing the community to the consequences of the breach of its norms, and the fact that deviance may be considered the very "ground" of normalcy. Various structural and situational circumstances which lead the group to tolerate or even to foster deviance are considered. Criminal deviance is distinguished from nonconformist innovating behavior; and various types of innovating departures from normalcy are considered from the dual viewpoint of structurally induced motivation and of impact on group structure

Most contemporary sociological theorizing about deviant behavior has tended to focus on mechanisms of social control. The analysis of instances in which behavior that violates institutional expectations may be considered functional for an ongoing social system has been largely neglected. This paper tries to highlight some functions of deviance for social structures. This does not deny, of course, the dysfunctions of deviance, but only suggests that an exclusive emphasis on these may result in inadequate and distorted analysis.

CONSEQUENCES OF DEVIANCE FOR INTERNAL GROUP RELATIONS

We have known ever since Durkheim that crime alerts the common conscience and contributes to the revival and maintenance of common sentiments by arousing the community to the consequences of infringements of rules. "Crime," he wrote, "brings together upright consciences and concentrates them."[2] It will also be remembered that Mead wrote in a similar vein: "The criminal . . . is responsible for a sense of solidarity, aroused among those whose attitude would otherwise be centered upon interests quite divergent from each other." "The attitude of hostility toward the lawbreaker has the unique advantage of uniting all members of the community."[3] Durkheim and Mead both state that, though an individual criminal act elicits negative sanctions, crime also has positive consequences for the society or group since the breach of a norm calls attention to its importance for the common weal. Like bodily pain serves as a danger signal, calling for the mobilization of energies against the source of disease, so crime, these writers argue, alerts the body social and leads to the mobilization of otherwise inactive defense mechanisms.

Durkheim and Mead are often quoted in current theorizing, yet their pertinent insight on the functions of crime has been

[1] This paper was substantially completed during the author's stay at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway, under a Fulbright Senior Research Scholarship. I wish to express my appreciation to a number of European colleagues, too numerous to mention, whose critical reading of an earlier draft of this paper was most helpful. I owe a special debt to Johan Galtung, of the University of Oslo and the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, to Yrjö Littunen, School of Social Sciences, Tampere, Finland, and to Robert K. Merton, of Columbia University, who made a number of very valuable suggestions. Several propositions of this paper were adumbrated in the author's *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

[2] Émile Durkheim, *Division of Labor in Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), p. 102.

[3] George Herbert Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIII (1928), 557–602, esp. p. 591. Cf. also Marx's parallel formulation: "The criminal produces an impression now moral, now tragic, and renders a 'service' by arousing the moral and aesthetic sentiments of the public." Quoted in Bottomore and Rubel (eds.), *Karl Marx* (London: Watts & Co., 1956), p. 159.

somewhat neglected. Thus Parsons focuses attention on mechanisms of social control which serve to check deviant behavior but fails to consider possible contributions that deviance may make to the system in which it occurs. He distinguishes types of deviance that "fall within the range of permissiveness which should be considered normal to people under certain strains" and "a vicious circle of gratification of deviant wishes [leading to the] undermining of the main value system."[4] But he does not consider those deviant acts which, though not considered "normal to people under strain," reinforce rather than undermine the social system. We shall see in a later part of this paper that different types of deviant behavior must be discussed in terms of their differential impact. Even if we should agree, for the purpose of discussion, that deviants are always motivated to defy the group's norms, nothing requires us to assume that such acts may not have the unanticipated consequence of strengthening those norms.

Durkheim and Mead see the functional consequences of deviance in the strengthening of the group which results from the collective rejection of the deviant. This assumption is indeed borne out by much of small-group research. An article summarizing much of the research findings in this field states, for example: "When a member deviates markedly from a group standard, the remaining members of the group bring pressures to bear on the deviate to bring him back to conformity. If pressure is of no avail, the deviate is rejected and cast out of the group."[5] Statements such as these seem to imply, though the authors do not explicitly say so, that deviations from group standards lead to the mobilization of the group's energies. But small-group research has not adequately considered the possibility that the repression of deviance may not in all cases be functional for the group. Moreover, it has not been shown that all types of groups will reject deviance under all circumstances. These two variables—"strengthening of the group" and "rejection of the deviant"—call attention to four possible cases: (1) the deviant is opposed and the group is strengthened—the situation discussed by Durkheim and Mead; (2) the deviant is tolerated or even accepted and the group is strengthened; (3) the deviant is rejected and the group is weakened; and (4) the deviant is not rejected and the group is weakened. The last case is relatively unproblematical, but the other three have not been given sufficient systematic attention in sociological theorizing, although empirical evidence about them is available.

1. *The deviant is opposed and the group is strengthened.* In the process of uniting itself against deviance, the community not only revives and maintains common sentiments but creatively establishes moral rules and redefines "normal" behavior. "Each time the community brings sanctions against a detail of behavior . . . it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and redefines the boundaries within which the norm exercises its special jurisdiction."[6] Thus the criminal, the scapegoat, the mentally ill, in their diverse ways, allow the group to reaffirm not only its social but also its moral identity, for they establish signposts which serve as normative yardsticks.[7] Deviance "establishes the point be-

[4] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 512.

[5] Harold H. Kelley and John W. Thibault, "Experimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Process" in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), II, 768.

[6] Kai T. Erikson, "Social Margins: Some Notes on the Sociology of Deviance" (paper read at the fifty-fifth annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, 1960).

[7] W. E. H. Lecky wrote about the prostitute: "herself the supreme type of vice, she is ultimately the most efficient guardian of virtue" (quoted by Kingsley Davis, "Prostitution" in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet [eds.], *Contemporary Social Problems* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961], pp. 262–88). Davis shows the close connection between prostitution and the maintenance of traditional family patterns.

yond which behavior is no longer within acceptable reach of the norm, and in this way gives substance and authority to the norm itself."[8]

Thus, definition of what is considered normal in the group takes place with reference to what is considered deviant, and morality is given its content through the contrast provided by that which is not moral. We touch here upon a dialectical relation which Gestalt psychology has discussed in detail with respect to perception. Figures cannot be perceived except in relation to grounds setting them off. In the same way, normalcy can hardly be perceived except against the ground of deviance; to be "good" makes sense only in relation to being "bad."

It is with the body social as it is with individuals: moral indignation against deviants serves to purge the righteous from a sense of their own sins and unworthiness and helps sustain their moral identity. Such indignation may well serve as a reaction-formation, securing the ego against the repressed impulse to identify with the criminal.[9] It is against the ground of their deviance that the righteous achieve the comforting affirmation of their normality. Inasmuch as "our" innocence is contingent upon "their" guilt, dereliction by others provides occasion for self-congratulations.

But dereliction by others also provides occasion for self-examination. Thus, when a crime is committed in the community, religious leaders use the occasion to exhort the congregation to re-examine themselves and "purify their souls." Deviance is taken as a warning that there is something foul in the state of Denmark that needs correction—correction not only on the individual level but in the social realm as well. Thus, Stewart and Helen Perry have shown that in the mental hospitals deviant patients may, by their acting out, "act as a fire alarm for the ward." By upsetting the social equilibrium of the ward, the "fire-alarm patient" may highlight such defects as understaffing, staff overwork, and the like and thus dramatize the need for remedial action.[10] Bureaucratic organizations are familiar with similar situations in which the failure effectively to control behavior in terms of official goals will be used by practitioners as a convincing means for appealing for increased resources. Thus many organizations (as well as many role incumbents) have a vested interest, though rarely acknowledged, in the very deviant behavior which they are set up to combat, for deviance provides the reason for their existence: Increases in deviance may help them to highlight the need for strengthening the organization (or the department in the organization) to cope more effectively with disturbing behavior.

2. What has been said so far about reactions to deviance—be it a spontaneous, that is, a non-deliberate "pulling together" of group members, or deliberate policy—refers to those instances in which deviant behavior leads to its rejection. The second case is that of *tolerance or acceptance of the deviant with concomitant strengthening of the group*. There are groups in which deviants provide the occasion for a reaffirmation of values without incurring rejection. Thus in a seminal paper, Dentler and

[8] Erikson, *op. cit.* Cf. also V. W. Turner's parallel formulation: "The norm derives strength and definition from condemnation of its breach in the public situations of ritual and law. The deviant, the haphazard and the contingent can only be recognized to be such where consensus to what is typical, orthodox, regular exists. And vice versa" (*Schism and Continuity in an African Society* [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957], p. 329). This is of course what Hegel meant when he asserted that "no step in philosophy was possible" unless it was recognized that the positive and the negative gain their "truth only in their relation to each other so that each contains the other within it" (*Wissenschaft der Logik,* Lasson ed. [Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923], II, 54–56).

[9] Cf. Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (New York: International Universities Press, 1946), pp. 117 ff.

[10] Stewart E. Perry and Helen Swick Perry, "Deviant Behavior, Function and Dysfunction on the Psychiatric Ward" (paper read at the Eastern Sociological Society meetings, April 23–24, 1960, Boston, Mass.).

Erikson give illustrations from Quaker work camps and Army Basic Training Squads where deviants do indeed "become critical referents for establishing the end points (of the range of possibilities judged permissible within the group's boundaries)"—the figure-ground effect discussed earlier—and where "the deviant is someone about whom something should be done, and the group, in expressing this concern, is able to affirm its essential cohesion and indicate what the group is and what it can do."[11] However, in these cases the occasion for affirmation of cohesion does not come from rejecting the deviant but rather from protecting him: he "becomes the ward of the group. . . . In a setting in which having buddies is highly valued, he is unlikely to receive any sociometric choices at all. But it would be quite unfortunate to assume that he is therefore isolated from the group or repudiated by it: an accurate sociogram would have the deviant individual encircled by the interlocking sociometric preferences, sheltered by the group structure."[12]

It would seem that in some groups tolerance of deviance is a function of a specific value system: among Quakers, "tolerance" is a salient component of the ideology. In tolerating or protecting a deviant, they practice what they publicly profess. (It may even be said that such groups do, in fact, need social objects upon whom "tolerance" can be exercised because they provide the occasion for testing and confirming their values.)

If it is objected that tolerance of deviance in army units is merely a manifestation of opposition to official army goals, that is, part of a collective effort to "get back" at army authority, this only confirms the analytical point: by setting itself off against an intolerant environment, the group exercises tolerance precisely with regard to those individuals who would otherwise be the victims of the very environment whose values the group rejects. In both cases—Quaker camps and army units—acceptance of deviance is contingent upon the value system of the group. What Kelley and Thibault say about the rejection of deviance applies to its tolerance as well: "Generally, the same factors responsible for the emergence of group standards will also in large measure be responsible for the motivations to enforce conformity to them."[13] Thus in the groups discussed by Dentler and Erikson, the practice of tolerance—whether positively stated as a "way of life" as among Quakers, or stated in opposition to the intolerance of army authorities as in army units—would seem to be a basis for the emergence or strengthening of group standards and would therefore be the guiding principle that motivates the responses of group members to non-conformity among them.

3. So far, the assertion has been made that deviants offer to group members the opportunity to reaffirm common values, be it by providing an occasion to oppose them collectively (case 1), or by bringing about a situation in which their acceptance or tolerance serves as an affirmation of beliefs held in common (case 2). In these cases, the groups were strengthened. There are groups, however, for whom *rigid and repeated rejection of deviants has serious dysfunctional consequences* (case 3). Rigidly structured sects or radical political organizations of the sectarian type provide examples in point. Even a cursory perusal of the history of the Trotskyist movement leaves no doubt about the fact that the lack of ability to tolerate deviance led to further and further fragmentation of the movement. Religious sects provide similar examples.

To be sure, in such groups each single case of negative sanctions against deviant behavior led, at the moment the act of sanctioning occurred, to a reaffirmation of values among those who remained faithful.

[11] Robert A. Dentler and Kai T. Erikson, "The Functions of Deviance in Groups," *Social Problems*, VII, No. 2 (Fall, 1959), 98–107.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[13] Kelley and Thibault, *op. cit.*, p. 766.

Yet, rejection of nonconformity as an ongoing organizational activity was disruptive as a *process* in that in the long run it weakened the group in relation to its external environment.

This calls attention to the need to consider the relation between the group within which deviance occurs and the external context.

CONSEQUENCES OF DEVIANCE FOR GROUP RELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE

In the first two situations discussed—one of rejection and the other of tolerance of the deviant—our concern was with relationships within the group. It now turns out that what may be functional for the group in one respect—that is, the reaffirmation of its norms—may turn out to be detrimental in another respect, namely, in its relation to the outside. To consider only the internal consequences of deviance and of responses to it, that is, to limit analysis to the group processes within given subsystems without paying attention to the group's relations with the outside, is a common pitfall in sociological theorizing, especially in small-group research. In contrast to much of such research, Kelley and Shapiro set up an experimental group in a situation in which the group's norms were discordant with outside reality.[14] In this situation conformity to these norms tended to be detrimental to the success of the group. (Situations similar to those contrived in the laboratory are likely to occur when disparate rates of change impinge on a group and lead to cultural lags and dysfunctional resistances of vested interests.)

It turned out that in these experimental groups deviation from the norms did not call forth rejection. This case is, in this respect, more similar to case 2 discussed above, for here also deviance is accepted. While in the Quaker camps deviance may be *implicitly* welcomed as an occasion for group members to live up to professed values, in these experimental groups deviant behavior seems to have been *explicitly* welcomed as an occasion for better adaptability to outside reality. Indeed, it turned out that in these groups persons who deviated from the group's norms were also those who were judged to be highly acceptable as co-workers.

A consideration of the external environment for the understanding of internal dynamics of deviance and responses to it makes it possible to throw more light on the behavior of the Quaker camps and army units discussed earlier. There also the relation with the outside would seem to be one important determinant of inside responses: in Quaker groups and army camps alike the norms that guide the behavior of members toward deviants seemed to consist in *countervalues* to patterns prevailing on the outside. Thus in Kelley and Thibault's groups, as in the groups studied by Dentler and Erikson, outside reality was an important determinant—whether as a spur for adaptation or for opposition to it—of the responses to deviant behavior within.

The evidence so far indicates that the widely accepted notion that groups always reject deviance is, at the least, open to question. To be sure, deviance may be *proscribed* as in the examples of criminal behavior used by Durkheim and Mead. Yet, a deviant redefinition of norms may be *permitted*, as when the value system of the group prescribes tolerance. It may be *preferred*, as when it is accepted as a means for better adaptability of the group.[15]

Deviant behavior may also be *prescribed*, as during periodic feasts when the participants are expected to infringe the norms of ordinary behavior.[16] These, however, are instances where it would be deviant not to

[14] Harold H. Kelley and Martin M. Shapiro, "An Experiment on Conformity to Group Norms Where Conformity Is Detrimental to Group Achievement," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 667–77.

[15] These variations in social control have been identified and discussed by Robert K. Merton in his "Social Structure and Anomie," *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1957), esp. p. 133.

[16] Roger Caillois, "Theory of the Festival" in *Man and the Sacred* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).

deviate; that is, they are special instances of conformity which do not concern us here.

The recognition that departure from the norms may be preferred, permitted, or proscribed raises two related problems: (1) The license to deviate is differentially distributed among members of a group. For example, there is tolerance of deviance for special role incumbents such as the "star," the "stranger," or the "fool";[17] or there is some expectation of deviance for some group leaders who are supposed to be flexible and to depart from the norms to further the tasks of the group. (2) Another important problem raised by the differential response to deviance is the need to distinguish between different types of deviant behavior.

DEVIANCE AND INNOVATION

So far the concept of deviance has been used here in accordance with its definition in most contemporary sociological work.[18] An overarching concept of this kind has the distinct merit of drawing attention to the structural similarities of a variety of behaviors which might otherwise seem but little related. Yet at the same time, it has the disadvantage of obscuring distinctions which might be crucial in certain contexts.[19] Thus Merton distinguishes nonconformity from such other kinds of deviant behavior as crime or juvenile delinquency. Criminal behavior is impelled by private and self-centered motives which are by definition antisocial. Innovating dissent of a nonconforming minority, on the other hand, may be manifestly intended to serve group interests in a more effective manner than the conforming majority. "These kinds of 'deviant behavior' differ structurally, culturally and functionally."[20]

While both the nonconformist and the criminal defy normative expectations, they are profoundly dissimilar: the nonconformist's dissent "is not a private dereliction, but a thrust toward a new morality (or a restoration of an old and almost forgotten morality). . . ."[21] I have argued elsewhere in a similar vein that "When all forms of dissent are [considered] criminal by definition, we are in the presence of a system which is ill-equipped to reveal fully the extent to which nonconformity, as distinct from crime, involves the striving forward on alternative moral basis rather than moral deviation."[22]

To be sure, the behavior of the nonconformist may bring forth community reactions similar to those occasioned by criminal violations of the norms, yet the innovations he proposes allegedly in the interest of the group's welfare are likely to be evaluated in their own right, if only by a minority. This is why, as distinct from the case of the criminal, there is likely to be buried under layers of hostility a certain measure of respect for the disinterested dissenter. Being oriented toward the collectivity, he is led to seek and to find an audience within it. The innovator sends a message

[17] Georg Simmel, "The Stranger," in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel,* trans and ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Ill : Free Press, 1950); and Orrin F. Klapp, "The Fool as a Social Type," *American Journal of Sociology,* LV (1949), 157–62.

[18] Cf Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Organization and Deviant Behavior," in *Sociology Today,* ed Merton *et al.* (New York· Basic Books, 1959), pp. 461–84.

[19] It was a distinct step forward to conceptualize the sick and the criminal as deviants from the institutionalized norms on the ground that both roles called forth social control mechanisms designed to restore "health." Nevertheless, as Vilhelm Aubert and Sheldon Messinger have recently argued ("The Criminal and the Sick," *Inquiry* [Oslo], I, No. 3 [Autumn, 1958], 137–60), these roles are also crucially dissimilar insofar as, among other things, the sick is conceived as one who cannot be held responsible for his failure to perform previously assumed roles, while the criminal is not perceived in terms of inability but rather as having been able to act differently had he chosen to do so.

[20] Merton, *op. cit.,* p 360. Cf. also his "Social Problems and Sociological Theory" in Merton and Nisbet (eds.), *op. cit*, pp. 697–737.

[21] Merton, *op. cit.,* p. 363 *et passim.*

[22] Lewis A. Coser, "Durkheim's Conservatism and Its Implications for Sociological Theory," in *Émile Durkheim,* ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961), pp. 211–32. Cf. also Roger Nett, "Conformity-Deviation and the Social Control Concept," *Ethics,* LXIV (1953), 38–45.

intended to be picked up and diffused. His behavior proceeds, so to speak, in broad daylight in order to attract a maximum audience. While the criminal seeks to minimize the chances of detection, the innovator seeks maximum publicity for his message. One may argue with an innovator but hardly with a criminal.[23]

Just as with various types of deviance, the innovations which the nonconformist proposes for the consideration of the group may be prescribed or proscribed with various degrees of tolerance, depending on the structured and normative context. Moreover, they may be wittingly favored by the group or the group may unwittingly be favored by them.

When innovation is highly valued, as, for example, in scientific societies, innovating behavior must be considered a special type of conformity rather than deviation. In the context of the institution of science, innovations and discoveries, provided they satisfy the criteria of evidence, are highly valued variants that permit the goals of the group to be more adequately met—though even here the innovator may at first encounter the resistance of vested interests.[24]

On the other hand, in groups which place no value on innovation, an innovating response will be considered truly nonconformist. In contrast to the case of the criminal, however, at least some of the group's members might perceive that the innovator intends to perform a positive task for the group. This might then lead to a conflict within the group over the issue raised. If this happens, the innovator has transformed individual nonconformity into group conflict and has raised it from tl idiosyncratic to the collective level.

Thus, pressures for innovation are like to result in the emergence of social conflic within a system. Such conflicts, as I ha shown elsewhere, may be highly function for that system.[25] Dewey has noted th "conflict shocks us out of sheeplike passi ity, and sets us at noting and contriving . . it is a *sine qua non* of reflection and ingen ity."[26] The innovator's behavior may ser to reduce the chances that adherence t the routines of yesterday render the grou unable to meet the challenges of today. Th innovator may thus be a pace-setter and setter of new standards. By attacking vest ed interests in the habitual, the innovato helps insure that the group does not stifl in the deadening routines of ritualism.

What is said here of group process indee applies to every fruitful interaction as well Interaction does not merely consist of mu tual filling of expectations but in ever re newed innovating contributions. In mucl current theorizing it is assumed that th equilibrium of a group is a function of th extent to which group members habituall conform to each other's expectations. Th maintenance of complementarity between the interaction orientations of alter and ego is said to be the mark of a stable social system.[27] "This model seems to assume," Gouldner has noted, "that each of a sequence of identical conforming acts will yield either the same or an increasing degree of appreciation and satisfaction and will thus elicit the same or increasing amounts of reward."[28] Yet, "later conforming actions are worth less than earlier ones, in terms of the rewards or propensity to reciprocate which they elicit." When con-

[23] Gandhi distinguished between criminal and civil disobedience in terms of the concept of publicity. Civil disobedience, to him, was by definition public action.

[24] Cf. Robert K. Merton, "Social Conformity, Deviation and Opportunity-Structures," *American Sociological Review,* XXIV, No. 2 (April, 1959), 177–89, esp. p. 181. Cf. also Herbert Menzel, "Innovation, Integration, and Marginality," *American Sociological Review,* XXV, No. 5 (October, 1960), 704–13.

[25] Lewis A. Coser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," *British Journal of Sociology,* VIII, No. 3 (September, 1957), 197–207

[26] John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Modern Library, 1930), p. 300.

[27] Talcott Parsons, *op. cit.,* pp. 204–5 *et passim*

[28] Alvin M. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in *Sociology Today,* pp. 423 ff.

formity is taken for granted, the propensity to reciprocate is weakened in the long run. Homans also states this principle of satiation, a version of marginal utility: "The more often a man has in the recent past received a rewarding activity from an other, the less valuable any further unit of that activity becomes to him."[29]

The Finnish sociologist Yrjö Littunen has formulated an "optimal frustration" hypothesis: "Persons who have to maintain a monotonous interaction pattern for a long period of time tend to become bored with each other. This phenomenon of *social fatigue* may be understood as a situation where there is no excitement in the interaction to maintain the cohesiveness, to increase liking."[30] Although sustained conformity may bring the reward of smooth adjustment to expectations, it also brings the penalty of boredom. That is why apathy and monotony may lead a person to "seek a frustration which his energy potential can adequately balance and overcome."[31] This hypothesis, which Littunen developed on the basis of the psychological research of Hebb and Thompson,[32] gains added theoretical relevance with Gouldner's recognition that a system built upon the habituation of conforming responses may be said to contain built-in tendencies toward a high level of entropy. It is high social entropy that the innovator, as an agent of change, helps to prevent.

[29] George Homans, *Social Behavior* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 55.

[30] *Income-Security Values at Different Levels of Frustration* (Transactions of the Westermarck Society, Vol. IV, No. 4 [Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1959]), pp. 234–35 ff. Cf. also Goethe's "Nichts ist schwerer zu ertragen als eine Reihe von schoenen Tagen."

[31] Littunen, *op. cit.*, p. 224. Cf. also Marx's statement: "The criminal interrupts the monotony and security of bourgeois life. Thus he protects it from stagnation" (*op. cit.*, p. 159).

[32] D. O. Hebb and W. R. Thompson, "The Social Significance of Animal Studies," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, I, 532–61.

NORMATIVE FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATING ROLES

In monolithic structures role requirements may be so rigidly defined that only fully conforming role performance will be tolerated; in less rigid structures, on the other hand, a measure of diversity may be tolerated at various levels in the system.[33] For example, low-ranking deviants may perform important functions for the group. This was the case in the groups discussed earlier, about which Dentler and Erikson have argued that low-ranking members who deviate from the group's norms "become critical referents for establishing the end points" of the range of possibilities judged permissible within the group's boundaries.[34]

Such considerations direct attention to the relation between status, group structure, and the acceptance of innovation by the group.

Deviant behavior as well as innovation varies within different social structures. Furthermore, the social structure puts pressure on some of its status-occupants to engage in innovating rather than in conforming behavior.[35] For example, as Veblen and Simmel,[36] among others, have pointed out, marginal individuals are likely to be highly motivated to engage in innovating behavior because they are structurally induced to depart from prevailing social norms. "With the least opportunity for full participation

[33] Daniel J. Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LVIII (1959), 170–80. Cf. also Erving Goffman's discussion of "Role Distance" in his *Encounters* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1961)

[34] *Op. cit.* Cf. also E. Paul Torrance, "Function of Expressed Disagreement in Small Group Processes" in A. Rubenstein and C. Haberstroh (eds.), *Some Theories of Organization* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1960), pp. 250–57.

[35] Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *op. cit*, pp 131–60.

[36] Georg Simmel, "The Stranger," *op. cit.*; and Thorstein Veblen, "The Intellectual Preeminence of the Jews," in his *Essays in Our Changing Order*, pp 219-31.

in the most valued activities of their own society,"[37] they may be stimulated to make new responses which depart from the habitually required. Being less tied to the system of wont and use which regulates the lives of insiders, they may see alternatives of action that escape the latter's attention. The structural circumstance of their exclusion from some of the prized values of the group may make the marginal man more sensitive to the lacunae which may well remain hidden from "well-adjusted" members of the group. If he wishes to gain acceptance among insiders, he will be motivated to propose innovating means designed to allow the group to reach its goals more effectively than before.

There are also other positions in a group than those of marginal men that motivate innovating departures from the norms. For example, the status of leader requires the ability to adjust to new circumstances. The rank and file may take the customary for granted, but a break of wont and use may enhance the reputation of the leader. The flexibility required in leadership roles may entail greater or lesser departures from otherwise expected behavior so that a certain amount of license to deviate and to violate norms is built into the very definition of leadership.

Homans, who had argued in an earlier work that "the higher the rank (or status) of a person within a group, the more nearly his activities conform to the norms of the group,"[38] stated more recently, after discussing, among others, the above-quoted study by Kelley and Shapiro, that "we now have experimental evidence that it is not just the members of low status, but members of high status as well, who are prone at times to non-conformity."[39] It will be remembered that in these groups deviant behavior helped the group to adapt to the outside. This suggests that the pressure on the leader to engage in innovating behavior may derive from the structural circumstance that he is the group's representative to the outside. He stands at the point of interchange between in-group and out-group. A leader may be considered a special case of the marginal man: having the task to relate his group to the demands of the environment, he is oriented, at the same time as he is the group's representative, toward extra-group values.

In view of these requirements of leadership, it is not always clear whether the leader's innovation can be called "deviant" at all. Though it involves adoption of new procedures, innovation in this case still takes place within normative limits. Just as with groups in which innovation is highly prized, so in situations in which the leader's departure from institutionalized procedures is part of the system of expectations, what may be considered deviation from one point of view may well be considered conforming behavior from another.

Yet leaders are often also permitted some deviant behavior that neither increases the group's adaptation to the outside nor otherwise directly benefits the group in any way. Simply by virtue of otherwise showing prized qualities, a leader accumulates

[37] H. G. Barnett, *Innovation—the Basis of Cultural Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953), p. 404. Cf. also Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1940), esp. pp 56–57, as well as Robert Park's "Introduction" to E. V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937).

[38] Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), p. 141.

[39] *Social Behavior*, p. 346. Recent experimental work throws doubt on the idea that the relation between status and conformity is ever a simple one J. E. Dittes and H. H. Kelley showed, e g, that individuals who felt acceptable in a group felt freer to express disagreements publicly, while those with a low sense of acceptance were much higher in their *public* than in their *private* conformity "Effects of Different Conditions of Acceptance upon Conformity to Group Norms," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LIII [1956], 100–107). Cf. also Herbert Menzel, "Public and Private Conformity under Different Conditions of Acceptance in the Group," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LV (1957), 398–402.

what Hollander has called "idiosyncrasy credit."[40]

One would assume that the more task-oriented a group, the less its tolerance of deviant behavior that interferes with the attainment of the group's goal. This may well be so, but if a leader is seen as important for the attainment of these goals, or even for their partial attainment, the group may tolerate individual deviation when it is seen as balanced by positive contributions. A man may lose credit for deviations, but only when his credit balance is exhausted will he be removed. If he continues to amass credit in the eyes of the members through group-approved activities, he attains a threshold permitting deviations from common expectations. This may explain, at least in part, why a leader may be given greater leeway for deviating behavior than his followers: his having accumulated highly visible merit gives him a leeway in behavior not granted to less meritorious members; the group will take from "him" what it will not take from "them." Task orientation and tolerance of deviance are therefore not necessarily mutually exclusive.

The term "idiosyncrasy credit" readily brings to mind the image of a "would-be" innovator, who is tolerated because of other contributions, yet whose innovating message is largely ignored by the group. This is not necessarily so. "Idiosyncrasy credit" because of high achievement does not merely imply tolerance of otherwise unacceptable behavior; it also implies that members of the group will listen more readily.

THE TIME DIMENSION OF INNOVATION

Innovations must not only be analyzed in terms of the structural circumstances under which they occur but also in terms of their impact over time. They must be located in social time as well as in social space.

A type of behavior which might at first be perceived by the group as an attack on its norms and values might at a later time be considered in a different light. If this happens during the lifetime of the innovator he is likely to experience a sharp change in status; he will then reap the rewards of an action which was at first negatively sanctioned. The innovator is then co-opted, perhaps even against his will, into the ranks of the upholders of conformity. If, on the other hand, he obtains recognition only after his death, the lifelong heretic becomes, in effect, a posthumous saint. The Catholic church, with its amazing flexibility, has been especially adept at this process of social transmutation in which, through a remarkable alchemy, its victims have been transformed into patron saints so that Joan of Arc in due time became Saint Joan. As Merton has observed: "In the history of every society . . . some of its cultural heroes have been regarded as heroic precisely because they have had the courage and the vision to depart from norms then obtaining in the group. As we all know, the rebel, revolutionary, nonconformist, individualist, heretic and renegade of an earlier time is often the culture hero of today."[41] The Jewish prophets, those holy demagogues, were feared, despised, and outcast by the religious and secular powers of their day. Yet, as Max Weber has noted, "it is completely inconceivable that without a profound experience of a confirmation of the prophetic words of doom . . . the belief of the people was not only unbroken by the fearful political fate, but in a unique and quite unheard of historical paradox was definitely confirmed. The entire inner construction of the Old Testament is inconceivable without its orientation in terms of the oracles of the prophets. These giants cast their shadows through the millenia into the present."[42]

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

[40] E. P. Hollander, "Conformity, Status and Idiosyncrasy Credit," *Psychological Review*, LXV (1958), 117–27.

[41] Merton, *Social Theory*, p. 183.

[42] Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), p. 334.

FOUR-VARIABLE CAUSAL MODELS AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS

H. M. BLALOCK

ABSTRACT

Simon's method for making causal inferences from correlational data is applied to the various possible four-variable causal models. Prediction equations are given for forty-one models, so that the goodness of fit of any particular model can easily be evaluated without the use of tedious computations. Certain suggestions are also made for handling problems involving a larger number of variables. The major purpose of the paper, however, is to investigate what happens to the correlation between two variables when controls are made for variables which are causally related to these variables in different ways.

In several recent papers the writer has discussed the use of Simon's method for making causal inferences from correlational data.[1] Simon's method yields results which are consistent with those obtained through partial correlations, but it also forces one to make explicit assumptions about both outside disturbing influences and the nature of the various causal links among an entire set of variables. It thereby serves to keep our attention focused on the complete network of causal relationships rather than on a single dependent variable.

But Simon's method can also be used to provide a rationale for predicting what should happen to empirical intercorrelations under various control situations. Our major purpose in systematically treating the four-variable case is to gain certain insights into what happens to a zero-order correlation when controls are introduced for variables which are causally related to the original variables in different ways. A secondary purpose of the paper is to provide a set of prediction equations for four-variable causal models for the convenience of the non-mathematically inclined social scientist, who may not wish to carry out the computations required by Simon's method.

Why focus on the four-variable case to study what happens in the controlling process? Since even the five-variable case will involve over a thousand distinct models, a systematic treatment of most of these possibilities would be out of the question. Why not merely make an exhaustive study of the three-variable case? First, the three-variable case has been more or less systematically treated in the literature, and there is no need to repeat these discussions.[2] But second, the three-variable case is too simple for our purposes. For example, we may wish to consider models in which a relationship between two variables could be partly spurious but also partly indirect through an intervening variable. Although in the present paper we cannot discuss the important problem of *when* and *why* we control in such instances, we can at least deal with the question of *what* will happen if controls are made.[3]

[1] See H. M. Blalock, "Correlation and Causality: The Multivariate Case." *Social Forces,* XXXIX (March, 1961), 246–51; "Evaluating the Relative Importance of Variables," *American Sociological Review,* XXVI (December, 1961), 866–74; and "Spuriousness versus Intervening Variables: The Problem of Temporal Sequences," *Social Forces,* Vol. XL (May, 1962). Discussions of the general method and the rationale for expressing causal relations in terms of simultaneous equations can be found in H. A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), pp. 37–49; and "Causal Ordering and Identifiability," in W. C. Hood and T. C. Koopmans (eds.), *Studies in Econometric Method* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), pp. 49–74.

[2] See esp. Simon, *Models of Man;* S. Nowak, "Some Problems of Causal Interpretation of Statistical Relationships," *Philosophy of Science,* XXVII (January, 1960), 23–38; and H. Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 275–329.

[3] Here we shall deal only with the sort of control situation in which one is interested in seeing whether or not a relationship between two variables disappears in controlling for antecedent or

RATIONALE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE METHOD

We cannot attempt a formal definition of causality without becoming involved with issues which are outside our present focus. Metaphysically, it is difficult to think without the aid of notions such as causes or forces. According to Bunge, the essential idea behind causal thinking is that of some agent *producing* some change of state in a system.[4] It is not necessary that there be a definite temporal sequence or even a constant conjunction of events, though we do require that an effect can never precede its cause in time.[5] Simon argues that the really essential aspect of a causal relationship is that it is asymmetrical in nature and not that it always involves temporal sequences.[6] In view of the difficulties in actually demonstrating causal relationships empirically, Simon prefers to confine the notions of cause and effect to *models* of the real world which consist of only a finite number of explicitly defined variables.[7] We shall follow Simon in this respect.

We begin by postulating a causal model involving a given number of variables X_i. We make certain simplifying assumptions about how these variables are interrelated and about the behavior of variables which have not been included in the causal network. In particular, we shall assume additive and linear models, as is commonly done in regression analyses. It should be specifically noted that the presence of non-linear relationships may invalidate our conclusions. We also make the explicit assumption that variables which have been left out of the causal model create "error" terms which are essentially random. Whatever factors produce variations in one of the X_i should be uncorrelated with factors which give rise to disturbances in any of the remaining X's.

In non-experimental situations, such as cross-sectional studies, this particular kind of assumption may not be as plausible as in the case of experimental designs in which randomization has been possible. Our only alternative in such non-experimental studies is to bring as many outside disturbing influences as possible into the causal picture as explicit variables. This will ordinarily necessitate the use of a larger number of variables, and more complex causal models, than would be required to handle experimental data. And, unfortunately, the more variables we use, the simpler our assumptions usually have to be about *how* these variables are interrelated. The reader is therefore cautioned concerning the possibility of reaching erroneous conclusions with the method when one or more of these assumptions are violated.

Having committed ourselves on a particular set of variables, we can then define a causal relationship in terms of manipulations that might be carried out in an ideal experiment. We shall say that X is a direct cause of Y (written $X \rightarrow Y$) if and only if we can produce a change in the mean value of Y by changing X, holding constant *all* other variables which have been explicitly introduced into the system and which are not causally dependent upon Y. Since there is a finite number of such variables, and since they have been explicitly defined, there is no problem of determining whether or not one has controlled for all "relevant" variables.

The causal notion is confined to this particular model, as is the directness of the causal relationship. The introduction of a single additional variable might therefore change a causal relationship from direct to indirect, or even to a non-causal one. By

intervening variables. In such instances, we may suspect that there is no direct link between the two variables being related and that the relationship is either spurious or can be interpreted through an intervening variable.

[4] M. Bunge, "Causality, Chance, and Law," *American Scientist*, XLIX (December, 1961), 432–48

[5] *Ibid.*, p 438.

[6] Simon, "Causal Ordering and Identifiability," *op cit.*, p. 51.

[7] *Ibid.*

an indirect causal relationship we mean one in which a change in X produces a change in certain other variables, which in turn affect Y. More precisely, we can say that X *is an indirect cause of* Y, *within a* particular causal model, if and only if it is possible to find certain variables $U, V, \ldots W$, explicitly included in the system, which are such that $X \rightarrow U \rightarrow V \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow W \rightarrow Y$.

We now write a set of equations, which must hold simultaneously, and which express the various causal relationships mathematically. In a one-way linear causal system these will be of the form

$$X_1 = e_1$$

$$X_2 = b_{21}X_1 + e_2$$

$$X_3 = b_{31.2}X_1 + b_{32.1}X_2 + e_3$$

$$X_4 = b_{41.23}X_1 + b_{42.13}X_2 + b_{43.12}X_3 + e_4.$$

These particular equations indicate that X_1 depends causally only on outside variables, the effects of which are represented by e_1. But X_2 depends on X_1 as well as outside factors, X_3 depends upon both X_1 and X_2, and finally X_4 depends upon all of the remaining X's. Such a system is referred to as "recursive," as contrasted with a possible set of equations in which there may be reciprocal causation in which X_1 depends upon X_2 and vice versa.[8] Recursive equations have the property that the various b's can all be estimated without bias by means of simple least-squares methods.[9]

A particular recursive set of equations involves the *assumption* that a given causal arrangement is appropriate. If some of the b's can be assumed to be equal to zero, certain restrictions will be imposed on the data if the equations are to be mutually consistent. For each of the b's set equal to zero we impose the condition that the comparable partial correlation should also be zero, thus obtaining a prediction which can actually be tested from the data. But setting one of the b's equal to zero is equivalent to our postulating that there is no *direct* causal link between the two variables concerned. Thus, if we set $b_{31.2} = 0$, we are saying that there is no direct causal link between X_1 and X_3 and that a partial correlation between X_1 and X_3 (in this case $r_{13.2}$) should vanish. Similarly, if $b_{42.13} = 0$, this means that we are assuming that X_2 is no longer a direct cause of X_4 and therefore $r_{24.13}$ should be zero. But X_2 may of course be an indirect cause of X_4 through X_3.

Before considering four variable causal models, one further caution should be introduced. There will always be a number of alternative models which will give the same predictions (e.g., the same vanishing partials) as any particular model under study. We can only proceed by *eliminating* inadequate models which give incorrect predictions, since it will ordinarily be impossible to rule out all the logical alternatives on the basis of the data at hand. In this sense, one can never "establish" any given causal model.

SPECIFIC FOUR-VARIABLE MODELS

Let us designate the four variables as X_1, X_2, X_3, and X_4. Since, for any given set of data, the variables can always be labeled arbitrarily, we shall suppose that X_4 cannot be a cause of the other three variables, that X_3 cannot cause either X_1 or X_2, and that X_2 cannot cause X_1. In effect, then, we are ruling out two-way causation, and we are supposing that, unless the appropriate arrows have been omitted, we are moving in the direction $X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow X_4$ rather than the other way around.

With four variables there will be six pairs of relationships. Since any given

[8] See H. Wold and L. Jureen, *Demand Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), p. 50. As Wold and Jureen point out, recursive systems can also be used to handle instances of reciprocal causation, provided that "feedback" is not more or less instantaneous. By lagging certain variables and collecting data at several points in time, we may take a given variable as independent at time t-1 and also as dependent at time t.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

arrow may be either present or absent, there will be 2^6, or 64, possible causal situations. Certain of these models can be eliminated as either trivial or uninteresting, however. If all six arrows are present, Simon's method cannot be used. Cases involving no arrows or one arrow are completely trivial. In instances where there are only two arrows, these arrows will either by-pass one variable completely, in which case we are dealing with only three variables, or they will connect two completely unrelated pairs of variables. Therefore we need be concerned only with situations in which there are three, four, or five arrows.

The various possible causal models involving three, four, and five arrows are given in Chart 1. Before discussing some of these cases individually, we should first clarify the notation and organization used. The six possible models involving five arrows have been presented at the top of the chart. These models have been labeled in terms of the particular arrow omitted from the diagram. In model A the arrow between X_1 and X_2 has been left out; in B the arrow between X_1 and X_3 is missing; and, finally, in F we are dealing with the situation in which there is no direct link between X_3 and X_4.

Single numerical subscripts have been used to denote subtypes for the four-arrow cases. For example, in model A_1 not only is there no link between X_1 and X_2 (as is true for all A's), but there is also no arrow between X_1 and X_3. Similarly, in A_2 there are no arrows between X_1 and X_2 and also between X_2 and X_3. In A_3 there is no arrow between X_1 and X_4, and so on. Notice that when we come to the B series in four arrows, there is no B_1 because of the fact that if we use the same subscripts as in the A series, a subscript of 1 would indicate no link between X_1 and X_3, and this is already covered by B. But we have used the symbol B_2 for the B model involving no link between X_2 and X_3. When we come to the C series, there will be no need for either C_1 or C_2, since both of these cases have been handled previously. Finally, there will be only one four-arrow case in the E series (i.e., E_5) and none in the F series. There are $6 \times 5/2$, or 15, four-arrow cases in all.

Double numerical subscripts have been used in the three-arrow cases in analogous fashion. For example, the symbol A_{12} is associated with the three-arrow model which represents a combination of A_1 and A_2, with arrows missing between X_1 and X_2, X_1 and X_3, and X_2 and X_3. Likewise, B_{23} is a composite of B_2 and B_3, with no arrows between X_1 and X_3, X_2 and X_3, and X_1 and X_4. Once the reader has become familiar with this particular notational scheme, it should be relatively easy to pass back and forth from one model to another whenever comparisons are to be made.


Notice that we have one prediction equation for each five-arrow model, two equations for each four-arrow model, and three for every model involving only three arrows. This is in line with the fact that Simon's method yields a prediction equation for each pair of variables which have *not* been connected by an arrow. Each prediction equation involves the disappearance of some partial or zero-order correlation between a pair of unconnected variables. For example, if X_2 and X_4 have not been linked with an arrow, then either r_{24} or one of the partials, with X_1 and X_3 as controls, will vanish. Conceivably, all correlations between X_2 and X_4 (zero, first, and second order) may be zero. But they may not, and our problem becomes that of determining exactly which ones will vanish under a particular set of causal conditions.


As we shall see in the four-variable case, and as appears to be true more generally, certain higher-order partials can always be expected to disappear. These vanishing partials involve controls for *all* variables which are either antecedent to, or intervening between, the particular variables being related, but they do *not* involve controls for variables taken to be dependent upon *both* of these variables. Thus if there were no arrow between X_1 and X_3 the value of $r_{13.2}$


CHART 1


Prediction Equations for Four-Variable Causal Models


FIVE-ARROW MODELS



















FOUR-ARROW MODELS



















THREE-ARROW MODELS












A_{15}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{13} = 0$
$r_{34.2} = 0$



A_{23}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$
$r_{14.3} = 0$



A_{24}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$
$r_{24} = 0$



A_{25}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$
$r_{34.1} = 0$



A_{34}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{14.3} = 0$
$r_{24.3} = 0$



A_{35}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{14} = 0$
$r_{34.2} = 0$



A_{45}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{24} = 0$
$r_{34.1} = 0$



B_{23}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{13} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$
$r_{14.2} = 0$



B_{24}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{13} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$
$r_{24.1} = 0$



B_{25}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{13} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$
$r_{34} = 0$


C_{35}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{23.1} = 0$
$r_{14.2} = 0$
$r_{34.1} = r_{34.2} = 0$


C_{45}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{23.1} = 0$
$r_{24.1} = 0$
$r_{34.1} = 0$


D_{45}
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{14} = 0$
$r_{24} = 0$
$r_{34} = 0$


B_3
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{13.2} = 0$
$r_{14.2} = 0$


B_4
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{13.2} = 0$
$r_{24.13} = 0$




B_5
x_1
x_2
x_4
x_3
$r_{13.2} = 0$
$r_{34.2} = 0$

CHART 1—*Continued*



should be approximately zero, but if we were to control for X_4 we would not expect the partial to disappear. Conceivably, however, the *total* association between X_1 and X_3 might be zero. In relating X_3 and X_4, supposing no direct link between these variables, the value of $r_{34.12}$ should be approximately zero. But we do not, as yet, know whether or not $r_{34.1}$, $r_{34.2}$, or r_{34} should also vanish.

The A *series.*—In all of the *A*-series models there is no direct link between X_1 and X_2, the two variables which are taken as causally prior to the remaining variables X_3 and X_4. This will mean that under these models the *total* association between X_1 and X_2 should be approximately zero, subject to the possibility of sampling error. Suppose we were to control for one or both of the two variables which are taken to be dependent upon X_1 and X_2. It can be seen that the resulting partials will ***not*** be equal to zero, except in those situations in which certain other arrows linking the first two variables with X_3 and X_4 have also been erased. An examination of the formula for a first-order partial will clarify the point:

$$r_{12.3} = \frac{r_{12} - r_{13}r_{23}}{\sqrt{1 - r_{13}^2}\sqrt{1 - r_{23}^2}} .$$

Since the denominator on the right cannot be greater than unity, it is clear that the partial will vanish only when the numerator is zero. Simon's method indicates that r_{12} should be zero, but we are asking whether or not $r_{12.3}$ will also vanish. Evidently, this can occur only if either r_{13} or r_{23} is zero, that is, if X_3 is unrelated to one or the other of the first two variables.

This in fact occurs in both A_1 and A_2, but since it does not always happen in the A series, we cannot generally conclude that the disappearance of r_{12} implies the vanishing of $r_{12.3}$ or $r_{12.4}$. This particular point should take on more meaning as we consider some of the remaining models.

Let us now turn our attention to four-arrow models in the A series. Notice that models A_1 and A_2 are basically similar, with the roles of variables X_1 and X_2 interchanged. Likewise, A_3 and A_4 are similar. It is because of the fact that there is no link between X_1 and X_2, making the question of asymmetry or temporal sequences irrelevant for these two variables, that they can be interchanged in such a manner. In A_1 and A_2 we have one of the independent variables being a direct cause of X_4 but completely unrelated to the remaining two variables. In A_1, for example, X_1 is in no way related to X_2 or X_3, and these zero-order correlations with X_1 vanish. If one were to relate X_1 to X_2, controlling for X_3, the resulting partial would also be zero, as we have just seen. But a control for X_4 would ordinarily produce a non-zero partial.

Similarly, both A_3 and A_4 represent situations in which an independent variable (i.e., X_1 or X_2) is a direct cause of only the "middle" variable in a set of three other variables. In relating this independent variable to X_4, one must control for *both* the remaining variables in order to have the association disappear. In A_3, for example, not only is the relationship between X_1 and X_4 indirect through X_3, but since X_2 is operating to produce a partly spurious relationship between X_3 and X_4, we must also control for X_2. In essence, once we have taken out the effects of X_2 on the relationship between X_3 and X_4, we can then handle the problem as though it involved only three variables, with X_3 intervening between X_1 and X_4.

In A_5 we have the case of a spurious relationship between X_3 and X_4 caused by the independent operation of X_1 and X_2. As might be expected, we would have to control for both of these variables in order to have the partial disappear. In this special case where the two independent variables are completely unrelated, we find a very simple relationship among the correlations, namely,

$$r_{34} = r_{13}r_{14} + r_{23}r_{24}\ .$$

If we examine the three-arrow cases in the A series we notice an important fact which also applies to the remaining three-arrow models. The prediction equations all involve the disappearance of either first-order partials or zero-order coefficients. It can easily be shown that the appropriate second-order partials also disappear, but we can make use of "simplified" equations which require only that the lower-order partials disappear.

We can see numerically why this will occur. If we compare, for example, A_{14} with the four-arrow model A_4, we note that for the latter model we have $r_{24.13} = 0$, whereas we need only control for X_3 in A_{14} in order to have the relationship between X_2 and X_4 disappear. This is true because in A_{14} we also have $r_{13} = 0$ (see A_1). With both r_{12} and r_{13} being zero, we then know that $r_{12.3}$ must be zero as well. But

$$r_{24.31} = \frac{r_{24.3} - r_{12.3}r_{14.3}}{\sqrt{1 - r_{12.3}^2}\sqrt{1 - r_{14.3}^2}}\ .$$

Since from A_4 we know that $r_{24.31}$ is zero, and since $r_{12.3} = 0$, we must also have $r_{24.3} = 0$. Thus the combined facts that the second-order partial is zero and $r_{12} = r_{13} = 0$ imply that the first-order partial (with X_3 as control) will likewise be zero.

Notice what has happened when A_1 and A_4 have been combined into A_{14}. We have dropped the diagonal arrows and have reduced the situation to one in which there is a single independent variable X_1 operating on only one variable (in this case X_4) of a set of variables (X_2, X_3, and X_4) which are interrelated by only two arrows. When we now obtain the prediction equation linking X_2 and X_4, we find that we can actually ignore the effects of the first

variable and still have the partial reduced to zero.

Similarly, in A_{15} we can ignore X_1 and still have $r_{34.2}$ vanish. Since X_2 affects only X_4 in A_{23}, we likewise obtain the result that $r_{14.3} = 0$. In A_{35} we see that X_1 affects only X_3, and therefore $r_{34.2}$ vanishes as well as $r_{34.12}$. These facts can easily be verified by an examination of the appropriate formulas.

The particular phenomenon we are noting did not arise in the four-arrow models because of the fact that if only a single arrow connected any one variable to the others, there must have been *three* additional arrows linking the triad of remaining variables, making it impossible for Simon's method to yield a prediction equation among these latter variables. After we have examined the *B* series, we shall be in a position to make a more general assertion about this sort of situation found in the three-arrow models.

Several of the three-arrow situations are worthy of comment. Notice that in both A_{18} and A_{24} (as well as B_{25} and D_{45}) we have trivial cases in which one variable has been completely cut out and where we are essentially dealing with only three variables. In each of these instances the prediction equations involve vanishing zero-order correlations with the isolated variable. But there are no predictions for the remaining three variables. Model A_{12} is another simple case in which we have three unrelated variables operating on a single dependent variable. In A_{34} we have two independent variables causing X_3, which in turn causes X_4. In relating either of these former variables to X_4, we may merely control for X_3 in order to have the partial vanish. It will not be necessary to control for the remaining independent variable.

The B *series.*—In the *B* series we have no direct link between X_1 and X_3, though we are now assuming that X_1 is a cause of X_2. A control for the intervening variable X_2 gives a zero partial between X_1 and X_3, but since X_4 is assumed not to cause either X_1 or X_3, directly or indirectly, an additional control for X_4 ordinarily produces a non-vanishing partial.

We see that B_2 involves basically the same type of situation as A_1 and A_2, with a variable causing X_4 completely independently of the other two variables. We again find that two total correlations (in this case, r_{13} and r_{23}) should disappear. Both $r_{13.2}$ and $r_{23.1}$ will also be zero because of the fact that X_3 is unrelated to *both* X_1 and X_2.

The situations represented in B_3 and B_5, as well as certain of the models appearing in later series, pose a more difficult problem. In B_3 the prediction equation tells us that it should be unnecessary to control for X_3 in order for the partial between X_1 and X_4 to vanish. Similarly in B_5 the partial between X_3 and X_4 (controlling for X_2) is zero even without a control for X_1. An examination of the formula for $r_{14.23}$ shows us that for B_3 the pair of prediction equations $r_{13.2} = 0$ and $r_{14.2} = 0$ automatically implies that $r_{14.23}$ must also be zero since

$$r_{14.23} = \frac{r_{14.2} - r_{13.2}\, r_{34.2}}{\sqrt{1 - r_{13.2}^2}\,\sqrt{1 - r_{34.2}^2}} .$$

Likewise in B_5 we can show that the equations $r_{13.2} = 0$ and $r_{34.2} = 0$ give us the result that $r_{34.21}$ is also zero. Notice that in both B_3 and B_5 we have two prediction equations involving first-order partials using the *same control variable* (in each case, X_2). We shall find this again happening in certain other models (i.e., C_4, C_5, D_4, D_5, and E_5).

In B_3 we see that the link between X_2 and X_4 is both direct and indirect through X_3. The numerical value of r_{24} will reflect the influence of X_3 as well as the direct effect of X_2. It will therefore be unnecessary to control for X_3 in relating X_1 and X_4. Similarly, in B_5 the relationship between X_2 and X_4 is both direct and partly spurious, and the numerical value of r_{24} will reflect this fact. We thus need only control for X_2 in order to reduce the partial between X_3 and X_4 to zero.

There is an apparent similarity between both B_3 and B_5 and two of the models in the A series, namely, A_3 and A_4. In the latter two models we have an independent variable connected to a triad of variables by an arrow to the middle variable of the triad. In relating this independent variable to X_4, the dependent variable of the triad, we found it necessary to control for *both* remaining variables in order for the partial to vanish. One might raise the question as to why it was necessary in A_3, for example, to control for X_2 as well as X_3, since the numerical value of r_{34} reflects the fact that the relationship between X_3 and X_4 is partly spurious. The essential difference between these two A models and B_3 and B_5, as well as certain other models in later series, seems to be that in both A_3 and A_4 we have two variables operating completely independently of each other on the remaining variables. Even though the diagrams may look similar to some of those for models in other series, the algebra shows that when one of these independent variables is related to the dependent variable, the effects of the other cannot be ignored if we expect the partial to vanish.

The remaining four-arrow case in the B series can be handled briefly. In B_4 the relationship between X_2 and X_4 is partly spurious and partly indirect through X_3. Controls for both X_1 and X_3 will therefore be necessary in order to reduce the relationship between X_2 and X_4 to zero. We have, here, an instance where the two control variables operate in different ways, a fact which can easily be overlooked if one does not develop the habit of drawing causal diagrams before attempting to interpret his findings.

Turning finally to the three-arrow models in the B series, we note only one new type of result. In both B_{34} and B_{45} we see instances in which *either* one of two first-order partials will disappear. In B_{34} we have a simple causal chain in which X_1 causes X_2, X_2 causes X_3, and X_3 causes X_4. When we come to the correlation between X_1 and X_4 we obtain the very simple result that

$$r_{14} = r_{12} r_{23} r_{34} .$$

A control for either X_2 or X_3, the two variables which are intermediate in the chain, will produce a zero partial between X_1 and X_4.

In B_{45} we do not have a causal chain, but it again turns out that we can control for either of the two "middle" variables and still produce a zero partial between X_3 and X_4.[10] In this particular model we also get the simple result that

$$r_{34} = r_{14} r_{12} r_{23} .$$

In the case of the three-arrow models in the A series we noted that none of the prediction equations involved second-order partials. We saw that, in instances where there was an independent variable affecting only one of the three remaining variables, the effects of this independent variable could be ignored and still have the appropriate partials reduced to zero. But actually in the A series the single independent variable always operated on a dependent or intervening variable in the triad of remaining variables. In B_{34} and B_{35}, however, we have instances in which X_1 affects only X_2, the variable which would be taken as *independent* in the triad (X_2, X_3, X_4). Nevertheless, we still find it unnecessary to control for X_1 in order for the appropriate partials to disappear.

We thus seem to have a general rule that *whenever a given variable affects directly only one of the remaining variables, its effects on the partials for the latter variables can safely be ignored.* It appears as though this general rule will also hold for more

[10] By "middle variables" we do not necessarily mean X_2 and X_3, but whatever variables are connected to two of the remaining variables. By "end variables" we shall mean the two variables, in a simple sequence, which are connected directly to only one other variable. The type of results found in models B_{34} and B_{45}, as well as C_{34} and C_{35}, seem to hold in the general case. For example, in the k variable causal chain, a control for any of the middle variables will produce a zero partial.

than four variables, though to the writer's knowledge this has not been proven mathematically.

The remaining series.—We can discuss the C, D, E, and F series much more briefly since there are no basically new problems posed by these models. In the C series there is no direct link between X_2 and X_3, these variables being spuriously related through X_1. The value of $r_{23.1}$ should be zero, although if we were to control for the dependent variable X_4 the value of $r_{23.14}$ would ordinarily not be zero.

In C_3 we have the case in which X_1 and X_4 are related indirectly by means of two intervening variables, themselves not directly related, both of which must be controlled if the partial between X_1 and X_4 is to vanish. Models C_4 and C_5 are basically the same, with the roles of X_2 and X_3 being interchanged. In each case, X_1 causes both X_2 and X_3. But in C_4 there is no link between X_2 and X_4, whereas in C_5 there is no arrow from X_3 to X_4. Examining the relationship between X_4 and whichever of these variables is *not* linked to it with an arrow, we find that when we control for X_1 the partial disappears. No control for the remaining variable is needed.

Models C_{34} and C_{35} have prediction equations which are similar to those of B_{34} and B_{45}. When relating the two "end variables" we can obtain a zero partial by controlling for either of the variables falling intermediate in the sequence. Model C_{45} represents the special case where X_2 X_3 and X_4 are all spuriously related through X_1, so that a control for this latter variable produces vanishing partials among the former variables.

In the D series, X_1 and X_4 are only indirectly related through the intervening variables X_2 and X_3. In D_4 there is no need to control for X_2 in relating X_1 and X_4 since the indirect effects of X_1 on X_3 through X_2 will be taken into consideration in the value of r_{13}. Likewise, in this same model, we do not need to control for X_1 in order for the partial between X_2 and X_4 to disappear. Essentially the same kinds of control situations occur in D_5. No special comments are necessary concerning D_{45}, which represents the trivial case in which X_4 is completely unrelated to any of the remaining variables.

Model E is the situation in which the relationship between X_2 and X_4 is partly spurious and partly indirect but with the added complication that X_1 also directly affects X_3. In F the relationship between X_3 and X_4 is spurious owing to the effects of the two related variables X_1 and X_2. In E_5 we find another example of a situation in which it becomes unnecessary to control for more than one variable in order to have a partial disappear.

EXTENSIONS TO MORE THAN FOUR VARIABLES

Considering the present stage in the development of sociological theory, as well as the fact that a number of variables in any particular study will usually be only weakly related to most of the remainder, it will probably seldom be necessary to make use of models involving more than five or six variables. By using an alternative computing routine, which will be described elsewhere, it should not be too difficult to work out the prediction equations for any particular five-variable model, although even the six-variable case begins to involve rather tedious computations.

Certain relatively simple procedures can be suggested, however, for situations in which the investigator wishes to test the adequacy of any particular causal model but is not interested in determining exactly which of the lower-order partials will disappear. First, one can often eliminate certain variables, either because of their low correlations with other variables or because they appear in positions analogous, say, to that of X_3 in model B_3 or of X_1 in model B_5. Second, one may then single out the

first four of the remaining variables, leaving out of the picture those variables which stand in dependent relationships to these four variables. The prediction equations among these four variables can then be found from Chart 1. Here, we are making use of the fact that prediction equations never involve controls for variables which are dependent, directly or indirectly, upon *both* variables being interrelated.

Finally, it can be shown for the general case, assuming one-way causation, that we may reintroduce the remaining variables, writing a prediction equation for each arrow which has been omitted when these remaining variables are related to each other and to the four variables taken as causally prior. Each of these latter prediction equations will involve the disappearance of the highest-order partials, using controls for *all* variables except those taken to be causally dependent upon the two variables being related. In any particular case, certain lower-order partials may also vanish, but it may not be feasible to carry out the algebra to determine exactly which of these partials can be expected to do so under the assumed model.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have seen that Simon's method for making causal inferences from correlational data can be used to provide a systematic basis for predicting what should happen when we control under a given causal model. The four-variable situation has been taken up in detail, and certain suggestions have been made for handling larger numbers of variables. In discussing the various specific four-variable models, we have attempted to make sense intuitively out of the prediction equations derived by Simon's method. It is possible that many, if not all, of these equations might have been developed by using "common sense." The value of Simon's method, however, is in providing a rationale for whatever intuitive ideas we may have and in giving us a check whenever common sense might lead us astray.

Strictly speaking, Simon's method provides us with such a rationale only when we have made use of interval scales and linear models. Since a dichotomy can be considered a special case of an interval scale, the rationale would also seem appropriate for attribute data, though results with such data should be interpreted cautiously in view of possible peculiarities produced by extreme marginals or the use of arbitrary cut-points.[11] At present, there seems to be no comparable rationale for making causal inferences from rank-order correlations, but even in the absence of such a rationale, one might still wish to make causal inferences on the basis of a measure such as Kendall's tau. Provided he considered the study exploratory and provided he interpreted the results with extreme caution, he might thereby gain valuable theoretical insights that otherwise would have been lost.

The problems of evaluating sampling error and developing a satisfactory set of criteria for deciding on the adequacy of the goodness of fit of a particular model to a given set of data are too complex to be discussed in the present paper. Provided one is willing to assume multivariate normality, he might make a series of significance tests for the disappearance of the various partials. However, it should be noted that (1) the researcher may often be on the wrong end of the test, actually wishing to accept the null hypothesis that a particular model is correct; and (2) the results of a significance test are dependent not only upon the

[11] For excellent discussions of causality in terms of attribute data, see Nowak, *op. cit.*, and R. G. Francis, *The Rhetoric of Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961), chap. iii. It should be noted, however, that if the concept of causality is defined or conceived in terms of attributes (e.g., in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the presence of an attribute), one runs into difficulties in conceptualizing causal relationships among continuous variates.

degree to which a particular partial departs from zero, but upon the size of the sample as well.

Finally, it must be recalled that, since a number of different causal models all yield the same set of prediction equations, the mere fact that we cannot reject a particular model does not mean that we have established its validity.[12] We can, however, determine which models successfully resist elimination.

YALE UNIVERSITY

[12] Chart 1 has been set up in such a manner that it appears as though all causal models yield different predictions. But it must be remembered that the variables could have been reordered and that the particular variable labeled X_1 might have been taken as X_2 instead.

MULTIPLE INDICATORS IN SURVEY RESEARCH[1]

RICHARD F. CURTIS AND ELTON F. JACKSON

ABSTRACT

When analyzing survey data, valuable evidence may be obtained by using several indicators of each of the conceptual variables to be related and observing the pattern of associations between each indicator of the independent variable(s) and each indicator of the dependent variable(s). These patterns of associations can help the researcher to decide whether the results are spuriously produced by a third factor and/or whether one or more of the indicators is invalid. Also, such information can show the need, and provide guidelines for conceptual reformulation. This procedure complements, but does not replace, other analysis techniques in survey research.

Questions of evidence in social research are answered by reference to the general canons of science. As in any discipline, however, special problems of evidence arise in sociology stemming from its special methods of research. Inasmuch as survey research in particular poses difficult problems in the application of "classic" canons of evidence,[2] the development of analysis techniques specifically intended for social surveys is highly desirable. Such techniques have wide applicability, since the problems of evidence presented by the survey method are fairly typical of all social science research.

One existing approach to the special problems of survey research is the use of several different indicators to represent a single underlying concept.[3] This paper suggests, in addition to the standard, combined use of multiple indicators, that the researcher observe individual associations between each indicator of the independent concept and each indicator of the dependent concept. Although this procedure dates back at least to Durkheim's analysis of suicide statistics, it is rarely used today, despite its important benefits. This paper outlines the specific advantages of this procedure and discusses the ways in which it provides evidence in combination with other techniques of survey research.

MULTIPLE INDICATORS

The use of multiple indicators is called for whenever the researcher has definite theoretical concepts which he wishes to relate, but for which he is unable to obtain or defend single, unambiguous, direct, operational definitions. Concepts such as age, sex, and group size are close to standard and agreed-upon operations, but this is not the case when studying the relationships between such variables as integration, morale, prejudice, adjustment, and so on. This situation, in which the detailed information gathered by interviewers is not *in itself* of theoretical importance, occurs with

[1] The authors wish to thank Lee Bean, H. M. Blalock, Jr., Phillip E. Hammond, and Stanley H. Udy, Jr., for their valuable criticism and advice.

[2] For a cogent discussion of the special problems of evidence in non-experimental sociological research as compared to the controlled experiment see Samuel A. Stouffer, "Some Observations on Study Design," *American Journal of Sociology*, LV (January, 1950), 355–61. More recently the problem of statistical evidence has been emphasized (see Hanan C. Selvin, "A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research," *American Sociological Review*, XXII [October, 1957], 519–27; Robert McGinnis, "Randomization and Inference in Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII [August, 1958], 408–14; and Leslie Kish, "Some Statistical Problems in Research Design," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV [June, 1959], 328–38).

[3] Certain aspects of this method, particularly the creation and selection of indicators, have recently been discussed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld (see his "Problems in Methodology," in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. [eds.], *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects* [New York: Basic Books, 1959], esp. pp. 47–67).

especial frequency in secondary analyses of survey data, since the data originally collected usually reflect only incompletely the theoretical interests of the analyst.[4] This paper will be addressed to a typical problem of this sort: the attempt to test an hypothesized causal relationship between two underlying conceptual variables.

In such a problem, the state of evidence is often confused by the inappropriate use of an hypothetico-deductive approach. The state of evidence is much clearer if the requirements of this approach are met fairly rigorously or if a frankly ex post facto analysis is thoroughly carried out for its own value. Therefore we shall propose, in our suggested use of multiple indicators, a fairly rigorous series of tests of the hypothesis. If, as may often happen, one of these tests fails, then we are thrown into an ex post facto analysis, and the problem is to extract the largest possible amount of information from the data. The goals of the suggested individual use of multiple indicators are to force non-acceptance of the research hypothesis under the first approach if any link in the chain of reasoning is inadequate, and to maximize information in the ensuing ex post facto analysis.

These goals are met, in part, by the currently standard use of multiple indicators, namely by combining indicators into composite indexes and observing the associations between such indexes. The advantage of such an analysis is based, of course, on the fact that additional indicators provide additional information. Among other things, such indexes may (1) increase the number of categories in a variable, permitting a more detailed and precise analysis, (2) increase the empirical variability of the measures to be related,[5] and/or (3) represent the underlying concept, even when none of the component indicators does so.[6] Without losing these benefits, however, additional advantages may be obtained by postponing the combination of indicators into indexes until *after* analysis of the pattern of associations between each indicator of the independent concept and each indicator of the dependent concept has been carried out. Compared to the more usual practice of relating a composite index of the independent variable to an index of the dependent variable, the requirement that each individual association must obtain is a particularly rigorous one which furnishes strong evidence of several kinds.

ADVANTAGES OF INDIVIDUAL USE OF MULTIPLE INDICATORS

The causal hypothesis relating two conceptual variables may be tested by relating each indicator of the independent variable to each indicator of the dependent variable. Consider a survey problem in which the independent and dependent variables are each represented by three indicators. A single hypothesized relationship between two concepts thus yields nine predicted relationships between indicators,[7] that each

[4] An alternative strategy in survey analysis is the attempt to build social theory around the kinds of information which are directly accessible through survey methods, thus insuring a close and reliable connection between concept and operational definition, even if at the expense of theoretical power and parsimony. The multiple-indicator procedure, on the other hand, represents an attempt to reach these scientific goals despite possible weak links between concepts and data.

[5] The proportion of the variation in a variable which can be accounted for by some other variable depends on the total amount of variation empirically present. Developing an index may produce a distribution with a higher variance than that of any of the component indicators. It may also reduce the variance, but some techniques of index construction are intended to prevent this.

[6] The way this may occur is discussed below.

[7] Occasionally, fewer than nine predictions may be warranted. If the indicator of the dependent variable is conceived of as a cause of that variable and the indicator of the independent variable is regarded as a result of that variable, then the two indicators would not be associated despite a relationship between the conceptual variables (see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Making Causal Inferences for Unmeasured Variables from Correlations among Indicators" [unpublished manuscript]).

independent indicator will be associated with each dependent indicator.

To demonstrate that this technique provides useful information rather than simply proliferating confusion in the ratio of nine to one, however, we must clarify the position of the several indicators vis-à-vis their common concept. Each indicator is (1) a unique representation of some aspect of the concept, (2) a co-representative along with other indicators of the same concept, (3) a variable which may be related to the other indicators of the same concept quite apart from their common link to that concept, and (4) a variable in its own right, a part of the variation which cannot be accounted for by either the concept or the other indicators of the concept. These characteristics form the basis for the following discussion of the advantages of the individual use of multiple indicators.

1. *Control of known and unknown third variables.*—One possible explanation for any finding, and one we would like to reject if possible, is that some known or unknown third factor is related to both indicators and is thus producing a spurious association between them. In other scientific disciplines, one may attempt to handle such third factors by holding them constant or by randomizing their effect by some such procedure as random assignment of subjects to different treatment groups. Unfortunately, in much social research, and especially in survey research, randomization is impossible and holding constant even known third factors is often hindered by small N's or by lack of data on such third factors. One advantage of the individual use of multiple indicators is that they provide some evidence on spuriousness.

In research using only one indicator of each conceptual variable, any uncontrolled factor related to both indicators could produce a spurious association without the knowledge of the researcher. However, the addition of even one indicator may improve the situation. Let us suppose that both I_{i_1} (the first indicator of the independent variable, V_i) and I_{d_1} (the first indicator of the dependent variable, V_d) are related to a third factor Z_1, in such a way that the *I-I* relationship may be spurious. Z, however, cannot be controlled because no data are available. An extra independent indicator, I_{i_2}, is then introduced. As noted above, I_{i_2} will differ from I_{i_1} in some ways, even though they are both representatives of the conceptual independent variable. Indeed, for our present purposes, the more difference between I_{i_1} and I_{i_2}, the better, for this makes it more likely that I_{i_2} is *not* related to Z_1, even though I_{i_1} is. If this is the case, and if *both* I_i's are associated with I_d, then *the results cannot be interpreted as due to the spurious influence of* Z *alone*. This is true whether the researcher knows of the existence of Z or not.

In a research situation in which three rather different indicators were employed to represent each concept and the nine I_i-I_d associations were all observed as predicted, it would be difficult to maintain that the findings are spuriously produced. A number of known third-factor Z's could be ruled out because they were not related to all of the indicators, and the chance of some unknown Z spuriously producing the findings is similarly reduced. It would, of course, be possible to interpret each association as being spurious due to a special third factor, but as many as nine Z's might then be required to explain the findings. And this is hardly parsimonious.

For example, in survey research the response set—a respondent's inclination to answer several questions in the same manner because of some characteristic of the interview setting—is always a factor which may produce spurious associations. This problem can be attacked by measuring each concept with indicators based on different methods, thus changing the character of the setting in which the response was produced.[8] Occurrence of all associations as

[8] Differently oriented questions may be asked, as in Gerhard E. Lenski and John C. Leggett, "Caste, Class, and Deference in the Research Inter-

redicted then tends to rule out response :t as an explanation.

Of course, a single third factor might ossibly account for all of the observed as- ›ciations. This is most likely to happen if ›me third underlying concept is influenc- ıg both the conceptual independent and :pendent variables. Multiple indicators ın furnish no aid in this situation. But the ·oblem here is conceptual as well as em- rical; careful conceptual preparation for ıe research should identify such third fac- ›rs so that they may be directly controlled.

Finally, it should be noted that the re- archer loses information about spurious- :ss if he combines the indicators of each ınceptual variable into a composite index ıd merely relates these two indexes. For ample, let us suppose that four of nine sociations occur as predicted. Suppose rther that the indicators involved in the ur successful associations all are plausi- e consequences of some third factor, Z, ıile the other five associations all include least one indicator which could not be lated to Z. The ex post facto interpreta- ›n most strongly suggested is that V_i and ı are not truly related, but that Z may oduce the appearance of a relationship tween them. Now, if individual associa- ›ns had not been observed, but composite lexes related, a single moderate associa- ›n would have been observed—*but the* ;*earcher would have been much less likely recognize this as a spurious result.*

This use of multiple indicators does not proach the rigor of randomization, but decreasing the possibility that certain own or some unknown third factors are .ing to produce the pattern of results, performs the same kind of function to extent not otherwise possible in survey research. Our confidence in the hypothe- sized conceptual relationship is thus in- creased. And if the study is converted to an ex post facto analysis by the failure of one or more tests, as in the example above, the pattern of results may help us identify the reasons for the failure.

2. *Validation of the indicators.*—If the concept "validity" is stripped of its meta- physical overtones, it essentially refers to the degree to which an underlying variable and an indicator categorize the units studied in the same way. Although we can- not directly bridge the gap between con- cept and indicator, that is, directly observe the degree of covariation between the two categorizations, empirical and conceptual devices have been developed to evaluate validity. Conceptually, indicators are evalu- ated in terms of their "face validity." This essentially means asking "In terms of pres- ent knowledge, is X a logical (or perhaps sensible) indicator of concept Y?" Of no greater importance, but of greater interest for the moment, are the empirical devices: how does one evaluate the validity of an indicator with data? The answer depends on the nature of the research.

Some types of sociological research—fac- tor analysis, for example—aim at induc- tively determining the nature of an under- lying variable through analysis of associa- tions among different indicators of the *same* concept. But this technique is not fully appropriate for the validation of indicators in research of the type with which this paper is primarily concerned: research which aims at testing an hypothesized re- lationship between previously defined con- cepts.[9] This is because two different indi- cators of a concept bear no necessary logi- cal relationship between themselves unless the validity of both is very high. As we have seen, indicators are only partial repre- sentations of their concept (i.e., the co- variation between underlying variable and indicator is never perfect), and different

---

ʁ," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV arch, 1960), 463–67; or entirely different meth- may be used, as in Leroy S. Burwen and ıald T. Campbell, "The Generality of Attitudes ard Authority and Nonauthority Figures," *rnal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LIV nuary, 1957), 24–31.

[9] Lazarsfeld urges this point in "Problems in Methodology," *op. cit.*, pp. 60–67.

indicators may thus account for different portions of the variation in a concept.[10] Two equally valid indicators of the same concept may therefore be strongly related to one another (making one of little practical value), or they may be totally unrelated. Valid indicators may even be inversely related to each other, paradoxical as it may seem, although both are positively related to the concept. Marital satisfaction and length of marriage might both be positive indicators of marital stability, for example, even if marital satisfaction is negatively related to length of marriage. Such indicators might be regarded as functional alternatives, or different paths to the same thing, or mutually exclusive forms of the same abstract or general phenomenon. Indicators which are unrelated or inversely related are particularly useful as separate indicators or parts of a composite index.

For research which starts with well-defined concepts, the first and most important empirical technique of validation is the use of criterion variables. From common knowledge or from previous research we know that certain things should be related to our concept, and if our indicator is not related to them we may reject it out of hand. Criterion variables are particularly useful because they help separate the identification of valid indicators from the test of the hypothesized conceptual relationship. This depends upon the extent to which indicators for V_i can be tested against criterion variables which are unrelated to V_d, and vice versa. Criterion variables, however, do not determine that a given indicator should be absolutely accepted or rejected as valid but only increase the likelihood of validity. If a criterion variable were sufficient to definitely establish validity, we would certainly use it as an indicator instead, if at all practicable.

The separate evaluation of the covariation between specific indicators and the underlying concepts they represent, however, is only part of a larger question of validity, namely, the extent to which observed associations represent the underlying conceptual relationship correctly. If indicators were perfectly valid, of course, then associations between them would always be exact representations of the underlying relationship. But any departure from perfect indicator validity may produce misleading associations. By simultaneously testing the validity of indicators and the hypothesized relationship, the use of multiple indicators evaluates validity in this broader sense.

Indicators which are not perfectly valid (they seldom are) only express a portion of the variation in the conceptual variable they represent. Similarly, some variation in the indicator is independent of the variable. This may produce misleading associations (especially when single indicators are used) in at least two ways:

a) The I_i and I_d may categorize different portions of the sample correctly. Depending on the way they each order the remaining portion, the observed association may reduce, increase, or even reverse the true conceptual relationship. For example, let us suppose that two conceptual variables are perfectly related, and that the indicator of each variable is valid to the extent that half of the variation in the indicator is attributable to, or covaries with, its conceptual variable. In the case of nominal scales, this degree of validity would be expressed in terms of agreement: each indicator categorizes half the individuals in the sample correctly, that is, in the same way that the conceptual variable would. Now if I_i correctly categorized half the sample and distributed the second half randomly, and if

[10] Several indicators may therefore be required to fully represent a concept. This suggests another benefit of the use of multiple indicators (individually or combined). If, with Louis Guttman, we think of each concept as represented by a potential universe of indicators, then the larger our sample from this universe, i.e., the more indicators employed of a concept, the greater the probability that the concept will be adequately represented in the study. This assumes, of course, that the universe of indicators is somewhat heterogeneous, i.e., that the covariations between the concept and the indicators are not all of the same kind.

I_d correctly categorized the *second half* of the sample and distributed the first half randomly, a zero association would probably result despite the perfect association between the conceptual variables. In a similar fashion a zero conceptual relationship might be reflected in at least a moderately high indicator association.

b) The indicators may categorize the same portion of the sample correctly, but the way they jointly order the other portion may alter the observed over-all associations markedly. Let us assume that our two conceptual variables are completely unrelated and that, as before, each is measured by an indicator having a 50 per cent agreement with its concept. If I_i and I_d both categorize the first half of the sample correctly, then no relationship will exist in that half. But the I_i and I_d classifications of the second half of the sample may be very similar if these two indicators are related to each other due to the idiosyncratic variation in each. Thus a moderately strong I_i-I_d association may by observed despite the total absence of any relationship between the concepts.

These errors, of course, become less likely as greater care is exercised in selecting indicators. *But even when covariation is high, serious misrepresentations may occur.* For example, two indicators may each categorize 75 per cent of a sample correctly. If I_i correctly orders the first three-quarters of the sample and I_d the last three-quarters, half the sample is then correctly ordered by both and thus reflects the true relationship. The other two quarters would each be correctly ordered by a different indicator. In this situation, a perfect V_i-V_d relationship could produce an association only half that strong. And if a relatively invalid indicator should slip into the study, much more serious distortions could occur. If single indicators or composite indexes of concepts are employed, there is no way to tell if the one observed association is of this idiosyncratic nature.

The individual use of multiple indicators, on the other hand, can increase our confidence that the observed associations represent the underlying relationship accurately.[11] If, for example, three indicators are used to represent V_i and three others to represent V_d, nine predictions are made and nine tests performed. These nine predictions follow from a system of seven propositions: three state the validity of the independent indicators, three state the validity of the dependent indicators, and one states the hypothesized relationship between V_i and V_d. If all nine associations come out as predicted, the entire system of propositions receives support. The assertion that one or more of the six indicators is invalid is thrown into doubt, for it would be difficult to conclude that a given indicator is not an accurate representation of an underlying concept when it "performs" as expected in associations with three different indicators of the other concept. It thus becomes difficult to explain the findings on the basis of idiosyncratic covariation between pairs of indicators. While such an explanation is possible, the more indicators involved the more complicated such an explanation would have to be. Certainly the seven propositions listed above constitute a more parsimonious explanation.

If one or more of the predicted associations fails, the individual use of multiple indicators provides a wealth of detailed information to guide the ensuing ex post facto analysis. In our previous example, if all nine observed associations are close to zero, the existence of the relationship becomes much more doubtful than the validity of the indicators.[12] On the other hand, the pattern of findings may indicate fairly clearly that the hypothesized relationship exists, although a specific indicator is invalid. If six of the nine associations are observed as predicted, and the three associations which fail involve a single I_i tested

[11] Although, it should be noted, this technique produces no evidence that the *sample* relationship correctly represents the universe relationship.

[12] For an example in which this procedure was used to advantage see Burwen and Campbell, *op. cit*, esp. pp. 29–30.

against three I_d's in turn, the pattern suggests that these three associations are misleading because of the invalidity of the specific I_i. On the other hand, a pattern of a single failure out of the nine observed suggests that some idiosyncratic interaction between those two indicators has produced an association which does not reflect the true underlying relationship. If multiple indicators had not been used, but only this particular pair of indicators had been chosen for the research, the peculiarity of the findings might have passed unnoticed and the association accepted as an accurate indication of the conceptual relationship.

In neither the hypothetico-deductive nor the ex post facto analysis described above would composite indexes have given us as much information as the individual use of multiple indicators, simply because only one "average" association would have been observed. It may be objected, however, that one of the special advantages of indexes discussed earlier has been lost; namely, that two indicators taken together may be a more valid measure of the underlying variable than either indicator used separately. This can occur when their joint use produces an interaction effect (in the statistical sense) which corresponds to the underlying variable.

On the other hand, this goal might better be obtained by observing, after the original analysis, the associations between pairs of indicators within categories formed by one or more other indicators. In this way, interaction effects between indicators for both the independent and dependent variables could be observed in detail. This knowledge might then guide the construction of composite independent and dependent indexes. By this procedure we may avoid a problem with some composite indexes: that the researcher does not discover whether, or what sorts of, interaction effects are influencing the validity of his measurement.

Multiple indicators, then, can provide evidence bearing on indicator validity—evidence in addition to any that can be provided when research is done with single indicators of concepts or with indicators combined into single indexes. Use of several indicators may assure the researcher that he is really studying conceptual relationships and not merely the way in which a pair of particular indicators are associated with one another.

3. *Conceptual reformulation.*—We have pointed out certain specific patterns of results that seem to call for interpretations of spuriousness or invalidity. Even when such patterns occur, but especially when

TABLE 1

TEST RESULT PATTERN WITH SIX INDICATORS
("Was Association Observed as Predicted?")

Independent Indicators	Dependent Indicators		
	I_{d_1}	I_{d_2}	I_{d_3}
I_{i_1}......	Yes	No	No
I_{i_2}.	No	Yes	Yes
I_{i_3}...	No	Yes	Yes

less clear-cut findings are observed, the researcher should consider whether a reformulation of his concepts seems to be called for. Unfortunately, when using multiple indicators, there is no tidy decision rule to indicate which particular type of ex post facto interpretation is most appropriate, but, as Blalock has suggested, whenever two equally valid indicators of the same concept produce different empirical results, the conceptual apparatus might well be at fault.[13]

If reformulation is in order, multiple indicators can provide very useful information with which to guide the task. For example, findings as shown in Table 1 would seem to indicate that the two conceptual variables we are studying each has two rather different components and that each independent component is related to only one of the dependent com-

[13] *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 11.

ponents. Multiple indicators may thus guide the researcher to fruitful ways of dividing his concepts. Also, in multivariate research, information may be obtained which would suggest that two variables should be combined or considered as one.

Multiple indicators can also be used in a replication of a well-established relationship to improve the formulation of the conceptual variables. A good example of this is Haer's study of the associations between each of five indicators of social stratification and indicators for several other variables assumed to be related to status.[14] Haer was able both to compare the utility of the indicators and to obtain guidelines for the proper conceptualization of social status.

As noted earlier, the individual use of multiple indicators is also useful in a task closely allied to conceptual reformulation—the construction of composite indexes. Observing the "performance" of several indicators should help in their selection for an index. The pattern of associations, considered together with the strengths of the associations, should suggest proper weights to assign when combining indicators. In this way the existence of a relationship between underlying concepts can be demonstrated by the individual use of multiple indicators and then described more precisely and accurately by the association between indexes of the independent and dependent variables.

As a final advantage of the individual use of multiple indicators, Blalock has recently suggested using indicators to judge the direction of the causal flow between two or more conceptual variables. He has shown how assumptions about the direction of the causal relationships between variables and their indicators together with observations of indicator associations may be used to generate inferences about the direction of causation among the concepts and also to identify conceptual relationships which are spuriously produced.[15]

MULTIPLE INDICATORS AND OTHER FORMS OF EVIDENCE

We conclude our discussion of the benefits resulting from the suggested multiple-indicator technique by considering its place among other forms of evidence available in survey research. Essentially, we increase our confidence in the truth of a hypothesis by ruling out alternative explanations of our findings. Of course, there is no such thing as complete and final proof. The problem is to extract from the data the maximum amount of evidence bearing on the relationship and to state accurately the evidence so obtained. As the implausibility of alternative explanations increases, so does our confidence in the truth of our hypothesized conceptual relationship.

The peculiar problems of evidence in the survey method stem largely from the fact that survey findings are open to many alternative explanations which are not easily rejected. Five troublesome alternative explanations often present in survey research are listed in Table 2. The table shows which procedures provide evidence bearing on the rejection of the various alternative explanations. Multiple indicators provide evidence on three types of alternative explanations, none of which can be conclusively rejected by other sources of evidence. The value of the individual use of multiple indicators, therefore, lies in complementing other methods by strengthing the evidence against alternative explanations.

Of equal interest are the kinds of evidence which multiple indicators do *not* provide. First, it is clear that the evidence supplied by multiple indicators does not have the definite character of that provided by controls of third factors, for example, or tests of statistical significance. Although we have attempted to show in this paper

[14] John L. Haer, "Predictive Utility of Five Indices of Social Stratification," *American Sociological Review,* XXII (October, 1957), 541–46.

[15] "Making Causal Inferences for Unmeasured Variables from Correlations among Indicators," *op. cit.*

that our confidence can be increased in several specific ways by the use of multiple indicators, describing the exact degree of this increase is not possible.

Second, it must be noted that multiple indicators do not provide a set of independent tests of the hypothesized relationship, as do the two types of replications. They, therefore, provide no test that the associations have been produced by sampling or other random fluctuation. If V_i and V_d are each represented by three indicators, nine tests are performed. Yet these constitute only one test of the relationship. Nine positive tests do not provide additional evidence that the relationship exists in the universe but only that it has been adequately tested once in this sample. Replications and statistical tests are still necessary.

In short, this procedure has power to produce evidence of certain types but does not excuse an investigator from performing operations to adduce other forms of evidence. Indeed, multiple indicators are most effective when used in conjunction with other procedures. For example, associations between such indicators should be examined under controls for third variables and the resulting findings should be tested for statistical significance.

TABLE 2

PROCEDURES IN SURVEY RESEARCH FOR ELIMINATING EXPLANATIONS OTHER THAN THAT HYPOTHESIZED

ELIMINATING PROCEDURES	ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF OBSERVED ASSOCIATIONS				
	Spuriously Produced by Measured Third Factor	Spuriously Produced by Unknown or Unmeasured Third Factor	Due to V_d Causing V_i	Due to Invalid Indicators	Due to Random Variation
Independent replication	Yes	Yes			Yes
Internal replication*	Yes				Yes
Controlling*	Yes		Yes		
Tests of statistical significance					Yes
Criterion variables				Yes	
Multiple indicators used individually		Yes	Yes	Yes	

* The terms "controlling" and "internal replication" both refer to examination of an association within different subsamples formed by the categories of some third variable. They differ in that the purpose of this procedure in controlling is to rule out the possibility that the third factor is responsible for the association, but in internal replication the purpose is to see how often the association is repeated in different subsamples. To determine the exact probability that such repeated associations would be produced by chance, of course, a statistical test must be applied.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has discussed the use of multiple indicators in survey research that studies the effect of one underlying conceptual variable upon another. The method is sufficiently general, however, to be extended with profit to analyses involving more than two variables and to methods of social research other than the survey. We have suggested that each indicator of the independent variable be associated with each dependent indicator in order to obtain data with which to eliminate three possible explanations alternative to the hypothesized one and to guide reformulation of the concepts if the results so warrant. One last point should be made. We have suggested that certain patterns of findings with multiple indicators lead clearly to certain interpretations. Other patterns of associations between multiple indicators

may not be so easy to interpret. Some may lead to reconceptualization of the underlying variables, but others may lead only to confusion. This should not be viewed as a disadvantage of the method, however. The individual use of multiple indicators always provides more information than do single indicators or single composite indexes, and trading this additional knowledge for more easily interpretable findings would be a bad bargain indeed.

YALE UNIVERSITY

STATUS, ANOMIA, POLITICAL ALIENATION, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION[1]

EDWARD L. MC DILL AND JEANNE CLARE RIDLEY

ABSTRACT

Low social status, anomia, and political alienation are shown to be significantly related to a negative vote and unfavorable attitude on the issue of metropolitan government in Nashville, Tennessee, for a sample of suburban residents. Anomia and political alienation interpret, to a very limited extent, the association between social status and political participation in the "Metro" issue. It is concluded that the three independent variables are, for the most part, additive in their effects on the extent and direction of participation in a local political issue.

Metropolitanization as defined by a number of students of urbanism has meant the increasing integration of social and economic activities in a complex system of interdependencies for the population living in and around large cities.[2] While the metropolitan community has been viewed as integrated at the economic level, political scientists and sociologists have been careful to point out that this economic integration has not been accompanied by political integration. Attempts to obtain political integration have met with almost universal failure,[3] even though political integration of metropolitan communities has long been pointed to by urban researchers as perhaps one rational solution to many of the area-wide problems of the metropolitan community.

The Nashville, Tennessee, metropolitan community of almost 400,000, with approximately 57 per cent of its population living outside of the central city[4] is plagued by the typical problems confronting metropolitan communities today.[5] The metropolitan area exhibits a multiplicity of governmental structures—a central city government, six incorporated suburban communities, and a county government—which has resulted in continuing conflicts of authority and responsibility. Furthermore, both the incorporated and unincorporated suburban areas generally lack urban services.[6] In an attempt to effect a solution of these problems, a referendum was held in 1958 which would have consolidated the city and county into a single unitary form of metropolitan government. In order to create this "Metro" government, separate majorities were re-

[1] The authors are equally responsible for the results and interpretation reported in this paper. They wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of James S Coleman, of The Johns Hopkins University, and Eugene A. Weinstein and Wilder Crane, of Vanderbilt University. The study was made possible by a grant from the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at Vanderbilt University and by a Research Training Fellowship awarded to the first author by the Social Science Research Council.

[2] R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933); Donald J. Bogue, *The Structure of the Metropolitan Community: A Study of Dominance and Subdominance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1949).

[3] Dade County (Miami), Florida, is one of the few examples in the United States of a successful attempt to integrate the political units of a metropolitan area.

[4] These figures are estimates for 1959, the year the present study was conducted. An extensive annexation by the city in 1960 has now altered this balance.

[5] For a general discussion of these problems, see Stanley Scott (ed.), *Metropolitan Area Problems* (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration University Extension, University of California, 1958).

[6] For a comprehensive description of the problems faced by the Nashville metropolitan area, see Daniel R. Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in Metropolitanism," *Journal of Politics*, XVII (February, 1955), 82–99.

quired in the city and county. The referendum passed in the city but was defeated in the county.[7]

The purpose of the present investigation is to isolate certain sociopsychological factors which account for variation in attitudes and voting behavior on the Nashville Metro issue by suburban residents.

METHOD

Data were obtained in the late summer and early fall of 1959 as part of a larger study of residential mobility of suburban residents of Davidson County, Tennessee. The present analysis is restricted to data obtained from 268 suburban residents who were eligible to vote at the time of the referendum in June, 1958.[8] The size of the sample somewhat restricts the analysis to rather broad categories. However, it is felt that the results presented below contribute to an understanding of a problem of increasing interest to students of metropolitan politics and thus have significance for explaining the failure to achieve metropolitan political reform in general.[9]

HYPOTHESES

Numerous recent studies in the area of political participation have shown that persons of low socioeconomic backgrounds are prone to withdraw from political activity.[10] As Thompson and Horton state: "There typically is a relatively high incidence of nonvoting and expression of disinterest among the lower socio-economic status categories."[11]

As they further point out, research along these lines has suggested that political apathy of lower-status persons is a function of a feeling of political inefficacy.[12] A feeling of political inefficacy, in turn, is linked to a feeling of political alienation. This political alienation would appear to be a reflection of a general feeling of social alienation or anomia, a *Weltanschauung* of being mastered by threatening forces beyond one's personal control.[13] Political alienation

[7] The issue has remained alive to such an extent that another vote on a charter will take place in the near future.

[8] Data for the mobility study were obtained from an area probability sample of 283 white, nonfarm households of Davidson County, excluding the city of Nashville. Structured interviews were carried out with either the head of the household or the closest relative of the head, who usually was the wife. A comparison of sample data on age and size of household with 1960 Census data indicated no significant differences. The sample was restricted to white non-farm households since nonwhites constituted only 5 per cent of the population living outside the city and farm households constituted only 7 per cent of all households.

[9] In recent years there has been accumulating in social science journals an impressive array of studies attempting to analyze the defeat of a variety of local referendums, ranging from school-bond issues to the addition of fluorine to water supplies. See, e.g., Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 190–95; Walter C. Kaufman and Scott Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 196–204; Arnold Simmel, "A Signpost for Research on Fluoridation Conflicts: The Concept of Relative Deprivation," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVII, No. 4 (1961), 26–36; and William A. Gamson, "The Fluoridation Dialogue: Is It an Ideological Conflict?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXV, No. 4 (1961), 526–37 A fairly common explanation offered by these investigators for the opposition of local electorates to these issues—an explanation which is consistent with the position taken in this investigation—is a feeling of social and political inefficacy which, if expressed at the polls, is likely to be a vote of protest against perceived sources of political power.

[10] See, e.g., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson. and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York Columbia University Press, 1948); Bernard R Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell, A. Gurin, and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co , 1954). Also see chap. xvi of Robert E Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), for an excellent treatment of the relation of social status to political participation.

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

[12] *Ibid.* Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 163–69, also presents an argument similar to this.

[13] If a feeling of political alienation is a reflection of an anomic perspective, then there should be a

involves not only apathy as a response to political powerlessness but also a general distrust of political leaders who are the wielders of this power.[14] Consequently, if feelings of political alienation find expression in voting behavior, the vote is likely to be a vote of resentment against the political powers that be. In line with this latter point, students of urban problems have argued that urban residents often tend to have an image of the city as a place of evil and corruption, "a place of deterioration and degradation."[15] With the tremendous recent growth of suburbia, a great deal of antipathy developing between city officials and suburban dwellers has been noted. It has been suggested that much of this antipathy has as its source the negative image which the suburbanite has of the city.

Some urban researchers, in reviewing the results of attempts to seek solutions to metropolitan problems through governmental reorganization, suggest that this image of the city as an evil and corrupting place has been instrumental in the defeat of such proposals. For example, in his review of the defeat of Metro in Nashville, Elazar points out that political leaders of the opposition, in their campaign to defeat Metro, appealed to *county* residents' fear of the city mayor and his political machine, their desire to escape from the city and its higher taxes and corruption, and other similar emotional symbols which would appear to comprise the negative image of the city held by many suburbanites.[16] Accepting the rationale presented above, one would argue that low-status, politically alienated persons should be the ones most susceptible to such an anti-Metro campaign.

At this point it seems appropriate to summarize the rationale for the hypotheses presented below. Given the strong interrelationship among social status and political and economic power in the contemporary American scene, a belief in the inability to control one's destiny—anomia—is likely to be associated with low social status. One aspect of this anomic perspective is a feeling of alienation from, and distrust of, the local political power structure, the prototype of which is government controlled by a powerful mayor and tightly knit organization referred to as the "machine."

In short, low social position is likely to lead to anomia and political alienation, which in turn affect political participation. Thus anomia and political alienation are posited as two intervening variables which in the present instance interpret[17] the predicted relationship between social status and voting behavior and attitude on the issue of metropolitan government. Controlling the effects of these two sociopsychological factors should therefore reduce the proportion of variation in attitude and voting behavior explained by social position. The hypotheses are as follows:

I. Persons of low social status
   a) are less likely to have voted on Metro, but if voting they are less likely to have voted in favor than those of high status;
   b) are less likely to have a clearly formulated attitude on Metro, but if they do they are less likely to have a favorable attitude than those of high status.

II. Persons who are anomic
   a) are less likely to have voted on Metro, but if voting they are less likely to have voted in favor than those who are not anomic;
   b) are less likely to have a clearly for-

significant positive correlation between the measures of the two variables. Such is the case in the present investigation. the product-moment correlation between the measures of the two variables = .62 (.001 > *p*).

[14] Thompson and Horton, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

[15] Nels Anderson, *The Urban Community* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1959), p. 483.

[16] Daniel J. Elazar, "The Defeat of the Metropolitan Government Charter in Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee" (paper presented at the American Society of Planning Officials' 25th Anniversary National Planning Conference in Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 13, 1959), p. 11.

[17] Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 276–95.

mulated attitude on Metro, but if they do they are less likely to have a favorable attitude than those who are not anomic.

III. Persons who are alienated from local (city) government

a) are less likely to have voted on Metro, but if voting they are less likely to have voted in favor than those who are not alienated;

b) are less likely to have a clearly formulated attitude on Metro, but if they do they are less likely to have a favorable attitude than those who are not alienated.

FINDINGS

In the present investigation, a slightly modified version of Srole's five-item anomia scale is used to index respondents' degree of anomia.[18] The measure of political alienation from local government consists of an adapted version of a five-item scale devised by Zimmer.[19] Finally, the educational level of the respondents is employed as the measure of social status. Data for all three independent variables were dichotomized at the medians.

A measure of the effect of the independent attribute upon the dependent one is given by the difference between the proportions positive on the dependent attribute under conditions of presence and absence of the independent attribute. This measure is labeled a_i in the tables below. The probability that the population difference, a_i^*, is greater than zero, given the observed difference, a_i is also presented in the tables.[20]

[18] Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review,* XXI (December, 1956), 709–16. Srole's first item, designed to measure that component of anomia dealing with a sense of detachment from community political leaders, was eliminated and the following item substituted for it: "I seem to get more than my share of bad breaks." This substitution was necessary in order to prevent overlapping content between the anomia scale and the political alienation scale which would have spuriously enhanced the correlation between the two scales. The substituted item represents a feeling of despair (or inability to control one's destiny) which several writers believe Srole's scale measures. See, e.g., Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell, "Anomia and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life Goals," *American Sociological Review,* XXIV (April, 1959), 189–202. To test the reliability of the anomia and political alienation scales, the Kuder-Richardson Test of Internal Consistency was employed. The resulting coefficient for the former scale was .73 and .69 for the latter scale. Coefficients of this size are *well* above the minimum acceptable level for five-item scales.

[19] Personal correspondence with Basil G. Zimmer, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. The scale follows:

1. The government of a big city like Nashville doesn't take much interest in a person's neighborhood.
2. The government of a big city like Nashville is too costly to the average taxpayer.
3. The average person can't get any satisfaction out of talking to the officials of a big city government like Nashville.
4. The government of a big city like Nashville is controlled too much by machine politics.
5. The average person doesn't have much to say about the running of a big city like Nashville.

Items 3–5 resemble some items in the "political-efficacy" scale constructed at the University of Michigan Survey Research Center for use in studies of voting behavior.

[20] The generalization of the measure to an n-attribute multivariate case can be obtained by thinking of this as a factorial design in analysis of variance with n "treatments," giving rise to a 2^n contingency table. See chap. vi of A. E. Maxwell, *Analysing Qualitative Data* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961), for a discussion of the analysis of 2^n contingency tables. (Maxwell transforms the proportions, which is only necessary when they are near zero or one, which is not the case in the present analysis.) For each attribute, i, there are 2^{n-1} comparisons between presence and absence, that is 2^{n-1} estimates of a_i. Thus, for attribute i, a partialed a_i can be calculated by taking the average of these 2^{n-1} estimates. In calculating this average, each estimate is weighted inversely proportional to its estimated variance, which gives a weighted average partial a_i' with minimum variance. As with the zero-order a_i, the probability that the population value, a_i^*, is greater than zero is given in each table along with the estimate, a_i, obtained as the weighted average. (The weight, which is the inverse of the estimate of the variance of a_i, is

$$\frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}_i^2 + \hat{\sigma}_.^2},$$

where

$$\hat{\sigma}_i^2 = \frac{p_i(1 - p_i)}{n_i}, \qquad \hat{\sigma}_.^2 = \frac{p_.(1 - p_.)}{n},$$

The relationships between each of the three independent variables and the dependent variables are presented in Tables 1-3. The findings can be summarized as follows:

1. The "low-status," "anomic," and "politically alienated" respondents are less likely to have voted on Metro, but if voting they are less likely to have voted in favor than their "high-status," "non-anomic," and "non-politically alienated" counterparts.

2. The low-status, anomic, and politically alienated respondents are less likely to have a clearly formulated attitude on Metro, but if they do, they are less likely to express a favorable attitude. All of the observed relationships are significant beyond the .05 level except one in Table 3—that of political alienation to expression of attitude.

TABLE 1

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON METRO GOVERNMENT BY EDUCATION

	Education		a_1†	Probability $a_1* \leq 0$
	Less than High School	High School or More		
Voting on Metro:				
Per cent	25	54	.29	< 0001
No. of cases	123	117		
Voters voting in favor of Metro:				
Per cent	39	63	24	= 0119
No. of cases	31	63		
Expressing an attitude on Metro				
Per cent	59	76	17	= 0020
No. of cases	121	119		
Those expressing an attitude on Metro who expressed it as favorable:				
Per cent	48	66	.18	= 0099
No. of cases	71	91		

† The a_1 indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by education See n 20 in text for an explanation of the multivariate indexes used in this and succeeding tables.

Two other related findings of interest emerge from the tables. First, an inspection of the relationships within each table shows that anomia and political alienation tend to be more highly related to direction of participation (i.e., to direction of vote and direction of attitude) than they are to participation per se (i.e., whether one voted and whether he expressed an attitude). On the other hand, education is more highly related to whether one voted than to direc-

p_i is the proportion positive on the dependent attribute with attribute i present, and $p_{.}$ is the proportion positive with attribute i absent. Finally, n_i and $n_{.}$ are the numbers of cases on which these proportions are based.) See Leo A. Goodman, "Modifications of the Dorn-Stouffer-Tibbits Method for 'Testing the Significance of Comparisons in Sociological Data,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (January, 1961), 355-63, for a discussion of this estimate of the variance. It is useful to think of the a_i's as partitioning the p's into components explained by each of the independent attributes. Thus, for the proportion voting on the Metro issue, p_{ij}, under conditions of "high education" and "not anomic," the model is $p_{ij} = a_i + a_j + r$, where r is the proportion voting that is unexplained. These estimates of effect and statistical tests were devised by James S. Coleman. The authors are grateful for his permission to use them.

TABLE 2

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON METRO GOVERNMENT BY ANOMIA

	Anomia		a_2†	Probability $a_2^* \leq 0$
	Anomic	Not Anomic		
Voting on Metro:				
Per cent	28	50	.22	= .0002
No. of cases	121	119		
Voters voting in favor of Metro:				
Per cent	38	65	.27	= .0045
No. of cases	34	60		
Expressing an attitude on Metro:				
Per cent	62	73	.11	= .0336
No. of cases	120	120		
Those expressing an attitude on Metro who expressed it as favorable:				
Per cent	46	68	.22	= 0020
No. of cases	74	88		

† The a_2 indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by anomia

TABLE 3

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON METRO GOVERNMENT BY POLITICAL ALIENATION

	Political Alienation		a_3†	Probability $a_3^* \leq 0$
	Alienated	Not Alienated		
Voting on Metro:				
Per cent	31	46	.15	= .0078
No of cases	113	127		
Voters voting in favor of Metro:				
Per cent	43	63	.20	= 0281
No. of cases	35	59		
Expressing an attitude on Metro:				
Per cent	65	70	.05	= 2033
No. of cases	113	127		
Those expressing an attitude on Metro who expressed it as favorable:				
Per cent	42	71	.29	<.0001
No. of cases	73	89		

† The a_3 indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by political alienation

tion of vote; however, there is one exception—education has almost the same degree of relationship to expression of attitude and direction of attitude.

Second, a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that anomia explains a larger proportion of the variation in direction of participation than does education; whereas education accounts for a greater proportion of participation per se. However, this pattern only partly holds true when such a comparison is made between political alienation and education (cf. Tables 1 and 3). The one inconsistency is that political alienation fails to account for a larger proportion of variation in direction of vote than does education.

These two findings might plausibly be explained as follows. Political participation[21] per se requires a certain level of what Lane refers to as social skill,[22] which low-status people often lack. This is especially true when one thinks of status in terms of level of education. Poorly educated people lack the training required to understand and deal with political issues—local as well as national. Hence one might expect that education would be more highly related to participation in the Metro issue than to direction of participation.

On the other hand, holding constant participation (i.e., if individuals do participate), their degree of interpersonal integration and political efficacy should be important in determining the direction of their participation.[23]

CONTROLLED EFFECTS OF EDUCATION AND ANOMIA AND POLITICAL ALIENATION

As noted above, an important proposition of this study is that two interpreting links (or intervening variables) between social status and participation in the Metro issue are anomia and political alienation. The data in Tables 4 and 5 permit a test of this proposition. Table 4 shows the proportion of variation in each dependent variable independently explained by education and anomia,[24] and Table 5 presents the proportion of variation in each dependent variable independently accounted for by education and political alienation.

A comparison of the size of the relations between education and the dependent variables in Table 1 with those in Tables 4 and 5 reveals that only to a limited extent do anomia and political alienation interpret the original relations.

In no instance do the original relations between education and the dependent variables disappear. However, in every instance except one—the relation of education to expression of attitude controlling political alienation—there is some reduction in the original relations.[25] In the present case, anomia and political alienation are, using

[21] Participation in this context is used in the broad sense to include what Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 28, calls representational action—perception and attitudes—as well as overt performances such as voting.

[22] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

[23] An examination of Tables 4 and 5 shows that this pattern of results persists when first-order classification is carried out. That is, even when the effects of anomia and political alienation are controlled separately (not simultaneously), education is more strongly related to participation than direction of participation. Conversely, when the effects of education are controlled, anomia and political alienation explain a larger proportion of variation in direction of participation than participation.

[24] E.g., while holding constant anomia, education explains 24 per cent of the variation in voting on Metro; when the effects of education are controlled, anomia explains 15 per cent of the variation in voting on the issue.

[25] The *percentage reductions* in the zero-order relations between education and the dependent variables as a result of controlling anomia are as follows: voting on Metro 17 per cent (i.e., the proportion of variation explained decreased from .29 to .24 or a reduction of .05 which is a *percentage reduction* of 5/29 or 17 per cent), direction of vote 13 per cent, expression of attitude 12 per cent, direction of attitude 33 per cent. The corresponding percentage reductions as a result of controlling political alienation are 7 per cent, 13 per cent, 0 per cent (no reduction), and 33 per cent, respectively.

TABLE 4

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON METRO GOVERNMENT BY EDUCATION AND ANOMIA

	Less than High-School Education		High-School or More Education		a_1'†	Probability $a_1^* \le 0$	a_2'‡	Probability $a_2'^* \le 0$
	Anomic	Not Anomic	Anomic	Not Anomic				
Voting on Metro:								
Per cent	20	37	46	58	.24	= 0002	.15	= .0116
No. of cases	82	41	39	78				
Voters voting in favor of Metro:								
Per cent	19	60	56	67	.21	= .0217	.24	= .0116
No. of cases	16	15	18	45				
Expressing an attitude on Metro:								
Per cent	56	63	72	78	.15	= 0069	.06	= 1515
No. of cases	80	41	40	79				
Those expressing an attitude on Metro who expressed it as favorable:								
Per cent	40	62	55	71	.12	= 0721	.19	= 0104
No. of cases	45	26	29	62				

† The a' weighted indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by education *independent* of the effects of anomia

‡ The a_2' weighted indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by anomia *independent* of the effects of education

TABLE 5

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON METRO GOVERNMENT BY EDUCATION AND POLITICAL ALIENATION

	Less than High-School Education		High-School or More Education		a_1'†	Probability $a_1^* \le 0$	a_3'‡	Probability $a_1^* \le 0$
	Alienated	Not Alienated	Alienated	Not Alienated				
Voting on Metro.								
Per cent	22	29	46	58	27	< 0001	09	= 0708
No. of cases	72	51	41	76				
Voters voting in favor of Metro:								
Per cent	31	47	53	68	.21	= 0242	.15	= 0749
No. of cases	16	15	19	44				
Expressing an attitude on Metro.								
Per cent	59	59	74	78	17	= .0025	02	= 3557
No. of cases	70	51	43	76				
Those expressing an attitude on Metro who expressed it as favorable:								
Per cent	37	63	50	75	.12	= 0548	.25	= .0005
No. of cases	41	30	32	59				

† The a_1' weighted indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by education *independent* of the effects of political alienation

‡ The a_3' weighted indexes represent the proportion of variation in each dependent variable explained by political alienation *independent* of the effects of education

Rosenberg's terminology, "contributory factors."[26] That is, to a *limited* extent these two factors contribute to the relation between education and participation in the local political issue.[27]

What accounts for the failure of the relation of education to each dependent variable to disappear or be considerably attenuated when the test factors are controlled? Rosenberg's comments are extremely helpful here:

> Probably the main reason that a relationship so rarely disappears when one controls on a test factor is simply that a large number of factors are implicated in most relationships. This is the most elementary principle of multiple causation in social life. Hence, it may be as difficult completely to explain a relationship between two variables by means of a third as it is completely to explain a dependent variable by means of an independent one. If we operate on the principle of multiple causation, we are driven to abandon almost all hope that a single variable will completely explain the relationship between two others, unless we are dealing with a virtual tautology.[28]

[26] Morris Rosenberg, "Test Factor Standardization as a Method of Interpretation" (unpublished), p. 1.

[27] Because the sample contains such a small number of respondents who voted on the issue, second-order partialling of the relation of education to direction of vote (i.e., simultaneously controlling the effects of anomia and political alienation) was not feasible. However, the effects of education on the other three dependent variables holding constant both anomia and political alienation are presented here:

	a_1'	$P(a_1^* \leq 0)$
Voting on Metro	24	< 0001
Expressing an attitude on Metro	15	0071
Expressing a favorable attitude on Metro	11	0808

A comparison of these results with the corresponding first-order partials in Tables 4 and 5 reveals no appreciable reduction in the magnitude of the effects of education on these three dependent variables beyond that produced by first-order partialling.

[28] *Op cit.*, p. 16.

Tables 4 and 5 also indicate that the original statistically significant relations of anomia and of political alienation to the dependent variables do not disappear and even tend to persist when education is held constant. In sum, the results of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the effects of education and of anomia and political alienation on voting behavior and attitude on the Metro issue are, for the most part, additive. More specifically, at the affective level political participation may be viewed in terms of a negative *Weltanschauung*[29] (as measured by the anomia and political alienation scales); at the cognitive level it may be viewed in terms of a lack of education with its resultant paucity of understanding of community problems. When this lack of understanding and social isolation coalesce in the same individual, the result is likely to be an utter sense of political futility or protest voting.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this investigation several factors hypothesized to be related to local political participation have been empirically substantiated. Education, anomia, and political alienation were all found to be significantly related to voting behavior and attitude on a metropolitan government issue. Specifically, these factors were found to contribute additively to an unfavorable attitude which if expressed at the polls was likely to be a negative vote.

It is unwarranted to ascribe the defeat of metropolitan government completely to a lack of awareness or comprehension of the issue, or to social isolation and distrust of political leadership. Yet, as this and other studies suggest, the uninformed, socially withdrawn, and politically alienated segment of the community must be taken into account if political change is to be effected at the local level.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

[29] Edward L. McDill, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice and Socioeconomic Status. An Attempt at Clarification," *Social Forces*, XXXIX (March, 1961), 239-45.

FAMILY GROUP STRUCTURE AND PATTERNS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION[1]

FRANCES GILLESPIE SCOTT

ABSTRACT

The interaction processes of three-generation families of three, four, and five persons are analyzed with respect to (1) the relation of family position to rates of initiated interaction, and of family position and interaction rates to patterns of support in the family, (2) median rates of support for members occupying each family position (e.g., husband, wife, aged person), and for members of different rank orders of initiated interaction, and (3) the frequencies with which various support patterns occur between family positions, and how these affect relationships between other family positions. Some of the data for three-person families replicate some of the work of Mills and of Strodtbeck. Similarities to Mills's three-person groups were found, notably in the support rate gradients; similarities to Strodtbeck's groups were also found, for example, the lack of solidary or conflicting support patterns between the two highest-ranking members. Some tentative conclusions about the effect of group size upon family interaction processes are drawn.

Although recent studies of the processes of interaction in small groups provide increasingly firm bases for making generalizations about behavior in the small group, gaps in our knowledge still remain. For example, much of the empirical work has been confined to *ad hoc* laboratory groups, often groups of the same sex, and frequently groups of college students. Without minimizing the value of these studies, questions can be raised concerning the generalizability of these findings and calling for research replications utilizing groups of differing composition.[2]

Studies dealing specifically with variables implying sociological differences in power and authority (e.g., age, sex, prestige) seldom analyze the more qualitative variable, patterns of support, but are confined to quantitative measurements of rates of interaction and numbers of decisions won or lost.[3] On the other hand, studies dealing specifically with patterns of support and the interrelatedness of these patterns among group members seem to use measures of power derived from the rate of interaction, rather than indexes generally recognized by sociologists as the bases of power differentials, for example,

[1] The National Institutes of Health, Grant M-2131, supported the larger research study of which the data reported here constitute a part A small faculty grant was also made available to the author by the Department of Sociology of the University of Michigan. The helpfulness of Jean Mann and Florence Mayer, who acted as research assistants, is gratefully acknowledged.

A version of this paper was read at the fifty-fifth annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City, August, 1960.

[2] A notable exception is Strodtbeck's research, which partially replicated Mills's work. See F. L. Strodtbeck, "The Family as a Three-Person Group," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 23–29; and Theodore M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XVIII (1953), 351–57.

[3] See, e.g., Strodtbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Revealed Differences," *American Sociological Review*, XVI (1951), 468–73; F. L Strodtbeck and R. D Mann, "Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations," *Sociometry*, XIX (1956), 3–11; F. L. Strodtbeck, R. M James, and C. Hawkins, "Social Status in Jury Deliberations," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (1957), 713–19; E. P. Torrance, "Some Consequences of Power Differences on Decision Making in Permanent and Temporary Three-Man Groups," in A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, and R F Bales (eds.), *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1955); W. E Vinacke, "Sex Roles in a Three-Person Game," *Sociometry*, XXII (1959), 343–60; R. C. Ziller and R. V. Exline, "Some Consequences of Age Heterogeneity in Decision-making Groups," *Sociometry*, XXI (1959), 198–211.

age, sex, formal position in the group.[4] Caplow raises the interesting question whether the same results would obtain in studies of coalition patterns in three-person groups if the *pre-coalition* power positions were utilized rather than the *post-coalition* distributions, measured by rates of interaction.[5]

The research reported here attempts to cast further light upon some problems raised by these considerations. The data were gathered as part of a larger study of the role structure of the three-generation family.[6] The present paper analyzes information, for three-generation family groups of three sizes, concerning: (1) the relation of family position to rates of initiated interaction, and of family position and interaction rates to patterns of support in the family; (2) median rates of support for members occupying each family position (husband, wife, aged person); (3) the frequencies with which certain patterns of support between family positions appear, and the extent to which certain of these relationships affect relationships between other family positions. Some of the data provide a partial replication of the investigations of Mills and of Strodtbeck into the processes of three-person groups.[7]

PROCEDURE

In 1958–59, thirty-five three-generation families living in the Detroit area were interviewed by the author. These families do not comprise a probability sample but are middle- and upper-middle-class families, living predominantly in the suburbs of Detroit. The criteria set by the author for interviewees were as follows: both parents, at least one child under 21, and at least one grandparent of the child be living in the home. Children under the age of twelve did not participate in the family interaction which was part of the interview. Hence the three-person families discussed here are those with younger children.

Thirty-two of the families are included in the present study.[8] Of these, fifteen are three-person interaction groups, nine are four-person groups, and eight groups contain five persons each. In the three-person groups the husband, his wife, and an aged person are always present. Technically, these are *two-generation* interaction groups, despite the fact that they are living as three-generation families. We will, however, refer to them as "three-person three-generation family groups" for ease in distinguishing them from Mills's and from Strodtbeck's three-person groups. In the four-person groups, an adolescent child is present in addition to the husband, wife, and aged person; in the five-person groups, two adolescent children are also present.

During the interview, each family member twelve years of age or older completed a version of the Value Profile inventory.[9] The interviewer then selected from this inventory four or five statements which revealed disagreement among family members. An attempt was made to select statements which did not isolate any family member more than once, but no systematic set of disagreement patterns was used. The families were asked to discuss their dis-

[4] Mills, *op. cit.*; Strodtbeck, "The Family as a Three-Person Group," *op. cit.*; Mills, "The Coalition Pattern in Three-Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (1954), 657–67.

[5] T. Caplow, "A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (1956), 489–93.

[6] F. G. Scott, "The Urban Three-Generation Family, Role Structure and Interaction Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1960).

[7] Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *op. cit.*; Strodtbeck, "The Family as a Three-Person Group," *op. cit.*

[8] Of the three families omitted, in one the aged person did not participate in the family interaction; one family was a seven-person group; and one family contained both an aged male and his wife but no child twelve years of age or older.

[9] R. F. Bales and A. S. Couch, "The Value Profile: A Factor Analytic Study of Value Statements" (paper read at the fifty-fourth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society). The version of the Value Profile used in the interview was obtained from Bales in 1958 and is not identical to the form discussed in his paper.

agreements and reach some resolution satisfactory to all. They were not pressed to come to any conclusion. This is, of course, a variation of Strodtbeck's method of "revealed differences."[10] A tape recording was made of the interaction, and each act was also categorized by the interviewer according to a seven-category modification of Bales's method of interaction-process analysis.[11] The tape was later played back as a check on the accuracy of the interaction-process recording. Interaction in each family was a minimum of twenty minutes, averaged about thirty minutes, and occasionally lasted almost an hour.

ORDERING THE DATA

The data are ordered in two different ways. For comparison with Mills's and with Strodtbeck's data, family members are arranged in rank order of their number of contributions to the interaction, that is, the number of acts originated. Since the target of the acts—the recipient—is also recorded, it is possible to arrange the data into a matrix showing the rate of support between any two persons or ranks in the group. The rate of support of member 1 for member 2 indicates roughly the percentage of acts initiated by member 2 which were supported (agreed with, rewarded) by member 1. In addition, the rate of total support output (how much support was given by a member to all other members) and the rate of total support intake (how much support was received by a member from all other members) was computed for each group member. The formulas for all support rates are given in Mills's 1953 article.[12] These are the formulas used by Strodtbeck. The modification of the interaction-process categories used in this study did not affect the application of these formulas.

The magnitude of the rates of support for any pair of members is considered an indicator of the type of relationship existing between them. If the support rates of member 1 for member 2 and of member 2 for member 1 (RS_{12} and RS_{21}) are high, a "solidary alliance" exists between them. Conversely, if these rates are both low, a "conflicting" relationship exists; they are non-supporting or rejecting each other. Furthermore, if a member receives a high rate of total support intake, this indicates his acceptance or support by the entire group; a low support intake indicates group rejection.

Consistent with other studies, median rates of support are computed for persons in rank 1, rank 2, and so on, as well as median rates of total support output and intake. This is done by forming a distribution of the rates for all cases for each pair of members (e.g., RS_{12}, RS_{13}, . . . RS_{32}), so that for the three-person groups there are a total of twelve distributions, each with fifteen cases. For the four-person groups, there are twenty distributions, each with nine cases; for five-person groups, there are thirty distributions, each with eight cases. A pair of members which manifests a support rate at the median or above is called "high"; one below the median is called "low." These medians are computed for the three-person, four-person, and five-person groups separately. They are shown in the tables below.

As Mills states in his original analysis, the categorization of support rates into "high" and "low" lends itself to classification of the relationship existing between two group members into one of four sup-

[10] Strodtbeck, "The Family as a Three-Person Group," *op. cit.*

[11] R. F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1950). The seven-category adaptation of Bales's twelve-category recording method was developed by R. D. Mann; thanks are due him for bringing it to our attention.

[12] "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *op. cit.* The formulas are based upon Bales's interaction process categories. Briefly, the rate of support of member 1 for member 2 (RS_{12}) is the weighted number of supportive (Bales's categories 1–3) minus non-supportive (categories 10–12) acts.

port patterns. A plus (+) indicates the support rate is above its corresponding median, a minus (—), that the support rate is below its median. The following four types therefore emerge:

RS_{12}	RS_{21}	Support Type
+	+	Solidary
+	−	Contending
−	+	Dominant
−	−	Conflicting

Our data for three-person groups are compared with those of Mills and of Strodtbeck on two specific points: (1) the median rates of support by *rank order* of interaction initiated by group members; (2) the frequencies with which each of the four possible support types occurs between rank 1 and rank 2 members. Since data are available for four- and five-person three-generation family groups, the effect of group size upon these two variables is also investigated. This analysis is concerned with rates of interaction and with patterns of support only by *rank* of the initiating group member, not by family position.

The data are then reordered and analyzed on the basis of family position: husband (H), wife (W), aged person (AP), oldest adolescent child (OC), and youngest adolescent child (YC). Rates of support between all possible pairs in the group, as well as rates of total support output and intake, are recomputed by family position. The rates of support in this instance are interpreted in the same way, but the status at point of reference is now *family position* rather than *rank order of initiated interaction.*

The questions investigated here concern the relation of family position in groups of different size to (1) the rank order of initiated interaction, (2) median rates of support, and (3) the frequencies with which the four support types appear among family members. In addition we examine the interdependencies of relationships in the family groups.

ASSUMED AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS

The power, or more specifically, the *authority*, structure of the family is assumed to be based upon sex and age, with the husband being highest in potential authority, the wife second, the aged person of whatever sex third, followed by the oldest child and finally the youngest child. Although there well may be variation in the individual case, this assumption is not contradictory to sociological analyses emphasizing the importance in American society of the nuclear family over the family of orientation of either of its members.[13]

FINDINGS

COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES

We first compare our fifteen three-person interaction groups, composed of a husband, his wife, and an aged person, with Mills's *ad hoc* student groups and with Strodtbeck's family groups composed of father, mother, and adolescent son.[14]

Median rates of support.—Table 1 is a matrix showing the median rates of support for the three-generation families, Mills's *ad hoc* groups composed of male students, and Strodtbeck's family groups. Since Strodtbeck did not publish the rate of total support output (RTSO) and rate of total support intake (RTSI) for his families, the comparison is incomplete.

The hypothesis Mills tested was that in a three-person group the two members ranking highest in initiated interaction will support each other and will direct more non-supportive acts toward the lowest-ranking participant. His findings supported this hypothesis. Strodtbeck, however, did

[13] T. Parsons, "The Kinship of the Contemporary United States," in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954); and "Family Structure and the Socialization of the Child," in T. Parsons and R. F. Bales (eds.), *Family: Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

[14] All but one of our fifteen three-person groups had the aged mother of either the husband or the wife as the third participant; in this one family, the aged father of the wife was present.

not find it true of his family groups. The similarity of our three-person three-generation families to Mills's students is as striking as is the difference between either of these two and Strodtbeck's family groups. Table 1 shows that the highest rates of support in our groups and in Mills's groups are between rank 1 and rank 2 members. Although most of the rates are negative in Strodtbeck's families, there seems to be no clear-cut pattern of high or low support by rank order of initiated interaction. When we correlate the sets of medians, our values compared to Mills's produce a rho of .87; compared with Strodtbeck's values, the rho is —.33. Strodtbeck reports a rho of —.67 when the set of medians for his families is correlated with Mills's set.

The most notable departure of our medians from those of Mills's groups is with repect to the position of the lowest-ranking member. It seems apparent that despite the low number of contributions, the rank 3 member is being supported by and is supporting the two higher-ranking members at a magnitude greater than his counterpart in the *ad hoc* groups. Furthermore, in the three-generation families, the RTSI of the lowest-ranking member is slightly *higher* than the others. Since Strodtbeck does not give the RTSI's, we cannot compare our families with his.

However, Strodtbeck's data indicate that in his families, while no one was supported at a very high rate, all were "non-supported" more or less equally. In our families, too, the RTSI, or total *group* support, is almost equivalent regardless of rank as initiator of interaction.

Strodtbeck's families were given a series of nine disagreements in which the isolate role was systematically rotated; they were forced to select an alternative acceptable to them all, which meant one or more of the members had to "give in." On the other hand, Mills's students were asked to create a story from Thematic Apperception Test pictures, a task which did not necessarily involve the capitulation of any member of the group in the interests of group "agreement." The three-generation families also were not forced to any decision about their disagreements, although some of them did come to an "agreement." Perhaps negative support in family groups is increased when group agreement must be achieved to accomplish a task.

The socioeconomic level of the groups and ethnic differences may also be contributing to these results. Strodtbeck's

TABLE 1

MEDIAN RATES OF SUPPORT ACCORDING TO RANK ORDER OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBERS OF THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES (T-G) COMPARED WITH MILLS'S STUDENT GROUPS (M) AND STRODTBECK'S THREE-MEMBER FAMILIES (S)

RANK AS INITIATOR	RANK AS RECIPIENT									RATE OF TOTAL SUPPORT OUTPUT		
	1			2			3					
	T-G	M	S	T-G	M	S	T-G	M	S	T-G	M	S
1				11	12	−6	8	7	−5	8	10	*
2	12	11	−5				4	4	−5	8	9	*
3	9	4	3	3	2	−2				8	4	*
Rate of total support intake	17	15	*	17	15	*	18	12	*			

* Not published in Strodtbeck's data.

groups were from three socioeconomic levels with half of Jewish descent and half of Italian descent. Our three-generation families were from a fairly high and a fairly homogeneous socioeconomic level (median income in 1957 of the thirty-five families interviewed was $10,200, compared with a median for Detroit in the $5,000–$5,999 bracket). Only two families were of ethnic origin other than native white American stock; these included aged persons who were Polish immigrants. Mills's Harvard students are probably closer to our three-generation families in ethnicity and socioeconomic level than Strodtbeck's groups. groups with Mills's and with Strodtbeck's groups. A chi-square test of the differences between the distributions shows that the three-generation family distribution does not differ either from Mills's distribution or from Strodtbeck's. While we do not know just how long Strodtbeck's groups had existed as families—undoubtedly for many years—in our families there was only one case where the aged person had been residing with the family for only one year; in all the others, the aged person had been present from two and a half to more than fifteen years. Presumably this length of time is sufficient to result in "terminal" support

TABLE 2

FREQUENCY OF SUPPORT TYPES, THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES COMPARED WITH MILLS'S STUDENT GROUPS AND STRODTBECK'S THREE-MEMBER FAMILIES

Support Type between Ranks 1 and 2 Members	T-G		M		S	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
Solidary (++)..	6	40 0	15	31 3	17	35 4
Conflicting (−−)	5	33 3	13	27 1	16	33.3
Contending (+−)	3	20 0	9	18 7	8	16 6
Dominant (−+)	1	6 7	11	22 9	7	14 7
Total	15	100.0	48	100 0	48	100 0

Since differences in rates of interaction appear to be related to socioeconomic differences,[15] it seems reasonable to suppose that differences in patterns of family interaction and support might also vary.

Patterns of support.—Mills suggested that the terminal types of relationship between the two highest ranking members in three-person groups are the *solidary* or the *conflicting* relationship, and that this would be particularly apparent in primary groups or groups of long duration. Strodtbeck found that for his families the frequency with which these two support types appear was not significantly different from the frequencies of the types in Mills's *ad hoc* groups. Table 2 shows a comparison of our three-person three-generation family patterns. The hypothesis that the *solidary* or the *conflicting* pattern is more prevalent in continuing than in *ad hoc* groups is not substantiated. It may well be that these two patterns of support are characteristic of all three-person groups.

Effect of size upon median rates of support.—Table 3 is a matrix showing the median rates of support for four-person three-generation family groups. Table 4 presents the same data for five-person groups. Caution must be employed in interpreting these rates. The lowest-ranking member in these groups often initiated very few acts, as few as five or six interactions. Hence the rates are based upon a small number of observations.

Table 3 indicates that the gradient which appeared in the three-person groups in sup-

[15] Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins, *op. cit.*

port rates between pairs of adjacent ranks is not consistent for larger groups. RS_{12} is lower than RS_{13}. The same reversal appears with respect to RS_{31} and RS_{32}, although the expected gradient appears in the rates of rank 2 and rank 4 members as initiators. Further, while the median rates of total support output range from highest for rank 1 members to lowest for rank 4, the median rates of total support intake are not of this nature. Rank 1 members are supported by the whole group at a rate only slightly higher than rank 4 members.

For five-member families a support rate gradient between adjacent ranks is even less apparent (Table 4). In addition, while the median RTSO is almost consistently lower the *lower* the rank of the initiator, the median RTSI is almost consistently lower the *higher* the rank of the initiator.

In seven of the eight five-person groups, the rank 1 and rank 2 members are parent (either father or mother) and adolescent child. The RTSI of both rank 1 and rank 2 members might be affected for the same reasons suggested above in connection with four-person families. In six families, the rank 5 member is the aged person. The very high median RTSI of the rank 5 members in five-person family groups might be interpreted to mean that the aged person is supported more frequently in larger groups, even though the amount of interaction initiated by him is still very small. This interpretation must be viewed with caution, however, for frequently the number of acts initiated by the aged person was extremely small.

TABLE 3

MEDIAN RATES OF SUPPORT ACCORDING TO RANK ORDER OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBERS OF FOUR-PERSON THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES

Rank as Initiator	Rank as Recipient				Rate of Total Support Output
	1	2	3	4	
1		7 41	10 71	0.00	7.34
2	8.96		7.14	5.56	6.02
3	1 28	4 08		0 00	3 36
4	1 30	0 00	0 00		0.00
Rate of total support intake... . .	7 69	18 18	16 00	7.14	

TABLE 4

MEDIAN RATES OF SUPPORT ACCORDING TO RANK ORDER OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBERS OF FIVE-PERSON THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES

Rank as Initiator	Rank as Recipient					Rate of Total Support Output
	1	2	3	4	5	
1.. . .		5 31	3 57	7.14	1 72	5 32
2... . ..	0.46		3.69	4.68	10.79	3 47
3... .	4 18	4 31		2 67	0 00	3 03
4	2 41	1.00	5 79		0.00	3 08
5	0 59	4 38	0 00	0.00		2 67
Rate of total support intake....	8 02	15.09	12.38	17.38	29.89	

Effect of size upon patterns of support.—Table 5 gives the frequencies of each support pattern for the three-generation families of four and of five members. Chi-square tests show the four-person group distribution does not differ from the three-person or from the five-person group distribution. However, the five-person group distribution differs from the three-person group distribution at the 0.05 level. We can speculate that the presence of adolescent children in the home leads to a certain amount of fluidity in the support patterns.

FAMILY POSITION, AUTHORITY, AND INTERACTION

We now change the focus of the analysis and examine the data from the standpoint of *family position* rather than rank order of initiated interaction. The relation of family position to rank order, support rates and support patterns, and the interdependence of support types in three-generation families of different size are analyzed. Since the number of families included in this analysis is so small, the discussion is regarded as tentative.

Mills has suggested that operationalization of power in a small group is possible by measuring (1) the relative number of contributions of a group member (his rank order of initiated interaction), and (2) the relative frequency of support given to him by others (his RTSI). If both are high, the person is in a rather strong power position.[16] These measures are used in the present analysis as indicators of intra-system power. Family position is an indicator of one's place in the authority structure of the family. Under the assumptions about family authority structure made earlier, we are hypothesizing a close relationship between family position and the two indicators of power derived from family interaction.

Family position and rank order of interaction initiated.—The measurements which determine the rank order of initiated interaction for any given member are independent of the size of the group. Hence the data presented in Table 6 are not artifacts of group size. These data indicate that the aged person is very unlikely to initiate a large proportion of the interaction in his family group, although his chances for doing so are somewhat better in smaller families. The husband or the wife is most likely

TABLE 5

FREQUENCY OF SUPPORT TYPES IN FOUR- AND FIVE-MEMBER THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES

Support Type between Ranks 1 and 2 Members	Four-Member Groups		Five-Member Groups	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
Solidary (++)	3	33 4	1	12.5
Conflicting (−−)	2	22 2	1	12 5
Contending (+−)	2	22 2	3	37.5
Dominant (−+)	2	22 2	3	37 5
Total	9	100 0	8	100.0

to be a high-ranking initiator in families of any size, although their chances are somewhat lessened when two adolescent children are present. The oldest child is much more likely to initiate a large proportion of interaction than the youngest child.

When power or authority is measured by sheer quantity of interaction in a family group, it appears the wife has the greatest "power" in the three-person group, with the husband second in command, and the aged person a poor third. In four-person family groups, the situation with respect to husband and wife is reversed, and the child has more power than his grandparent. In five-person families, it appears the oldest child has more power than either of his parents, they in turn have more than the youngest child, and the youngest child has more than the aged person.

Median rates of support.—Examination of Table 7 reveals that in three-person

[16] Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *op. cit.*

groups husband and wife support one another at median rates higher than either of them supports the aged person. The aged person supports the wife at a higher median rate than the husband. With respect to rates of total support intake, the wife's rate is highest, the husband's next, and the aged person's lowest. This indicates the power position of the wife is the highest in the family, as measured both by her level of interaction and her median support rates.

In four-person families, however, the wife does not have the highest median RTSI. Here the highest rate is that of the child, and the lowest that of the aged person, although the wife's median rate of support intake is higher than her husband's, indicating her somewhat stronger power position. Indeed, husbands support their wives at a higher median rate than wives support their husbands. The wife gives higher support to her child than to anyone else, as does the child to his or her mother. The aged person in the four-person group seems to be largely ignored—not supported nor yet positively rejected.

In five-person families both husband and wife support the two children at median rates higher than they support the aged person, but the aged person supports them at higher median rates than he does the children. The oldest child supports his

TABLE 6

CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES AND CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGES OF RANK AS INITIATOR, BY FAMILY POSITION, FOR THREE-, FOUR-, AND FIVE-MEMBER THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES*

FAMILY POSITION	RANK AS INITIATOR									
	1		2		3		4		5	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
	Three-Person Families ($N=15$)									
Husband	6	40.0	12	80.0	15	100.0	†	......	†	
Wife	9	60.0	15	100.0	.		†	...	†	
Aged person	0	00.0	3	20.0	15	100.0	†	......	†	
	Four-Person Families ($N=9$)									
Husband	6	66.7	9	100.0	.	. .	..	......	†	
Wife	2	22.2	7	77.8	9	100.0	.	.	†	
Aged person	0	00.0	0	00.0	2	22.2	9	100.0	†	
Child	1	11.1	2	22.2	7	77.8	9	100.0	†	.
	Five-Person Families ($N=8$)									
Husband	3	37.5	4	50.0	6	75.0	7	87.5	8	100.0
Wife	2	25.0	5	62.5	7	87.5	8	100.0	..	.
Aged person	0	00.0	0	00.0	1	12.5	3	37.5	8	100.0
Oldest child	3	37.5	6	75.0	8	100.0	....	....	...	.
Youngest child	0	00.0	1	12.5	2	25.0	6	75.0	8	100.0

* Cumulative frequencies and percentages are shown in the rows of the table.

† This rank not present in families of this size.

younger sibling at a median rate higher than he supports anyone else in the family, while the youngest child gives highest support to his mother. Notable, too, in the five-person families are the relatively low median rates of support between husband and wife, especially as compared to the same rates in families of size three and four.

These results suggest that, for family groups, the relative frequency of support in group interaction may be a somewhat misleading operationalization of intra-system power, especially when children are present. Furthermore, frequency of support does not have a one-to-one relationship to frequency of initiated interaction. Neither of these two intra-system indicators of a strong power position are unambiguously related to theoretically derived indicators of authority, such as age, sex, and family position. Although the wife and the husband seem to emerge as relatively more powerful than other family members, the wife seems more powerful than the husband when these two intra-system indicators are used. Children are much more powerful and aged persons much less powerful than one would anticipate on the basis of anthropological and sociological considerations of family authority structure. The position of the aged person in the three-generation family of whatever size appears to be a

TABLE 7

MEDIAN RATES OF SUPPORT ACCORDING TO FAMILY POSITION, FOR THREE-, FOUR-, AND FIVE-MEMBER THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES

As Initiator	As Recipient					Rate of Total Support Output
	H	W	AP	OC	YC	
	Three-Person Families ($N=15$)					
H	.	10 26	5.56	*	*	7 61
W	10 77	.....	3 70	*	*	7.80
AP	6 06	10 00	....	*	*	10 39
Rate of total support intake	18 18	20.00	11 11	*	*	....
	Four-Person Families ($N=9$)					
H	....	8.05	0 00	6 06	*	5 26
W	5 88	....	0 00	7 14	*	6.02
AP	1 30	1 14	....	0.00	*	0.91
OC	1.51	2 17	0 00	....	*	3 36
Rate of total support intake	7 69	8.70	0.00	16.00	*	....
	Five-Person Families ($N=8$)					
H	......	0 76	1 56	5 18	7.14	4 38
W	2 59	..	4 35	4 85	11 30	5 16
AP	1 32	3 01	..	1.08	0 00	2 52
OC	1 31	1 22	2 17	......	3.57	3 56
YC	1.94	4.16	2.94	3.47	....	2.81
Rate of total support intake	10.10	12.05	34.58	11 19	21.12	....

* This position not present in families of this size.

relatively powerless one, whether measurement is based upon rate of interaction, or rate of support, or both.

Family position, rank, and support patterns.—The following tendencies are suggested by the data presented in Table 8, although the number of cases is so small that no significant relationships appear. (1) In three-person groups, a *solidary* pattern tends to exist between husband and wife when the wife is the rank 1 initiator, and a *conflicting* pattern when the husband is the rank 1 initiator. (2) In four-person groups, there apparently is little likelihood of a *solidary* pattern between husband and wife unless the husband is the rank 1 initiator and the wife rank 2; although a *conflicting* pattern is as likely as a solidary one under these conditions, the prevalence of contending or dominant patterns when any other pair are high initiators seems more likely. (3) In five-person three-generation families, when the oldest child is the rank 2 initiator and either of his parents is rank 1, a *conflicting* pattern between husband and wife seems likely.

TABLE 8

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PATTERNS OF SUPPORT BETWEEN HUSBAND-WIFE PAIR IN THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES, FOR THREE-, FOUR-, AND FIVE-MEMBER FAMILIES, BY FAMILY POSITION OF RANK 1–RANK 2 PAIR

RANK 1–RANK 2 PAIR	PATTERN OF SUPPORT BETWEEN H-W PAIR				TOTAL
	Solidary	Conflicting	Contending	Dominant	
	Three-Person Families ($N = 15$)				
H-W	2	3	1		6
W-H	3	1		2	6
W-AP	2	1			3
Subtotal	7	5	1	2	15
	Four-Person Families ($N = 9$)				
H-W	2	2		1	5
H-C			1		1
W-H	1		1		2
C-H				1	1
Subtotal	3	2	2	2	9
	Five-Person Families ($N = 8$)				
H-W			1		1
H-OC		1		1	2
W-OC		1			1
W-YC			1		1
OC-H				1	1
OC-W	2				2
Subtotal	2	2	2	2	8
Total	12	9	5	6	32

PATTERNS OF SUPPORT AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF RELATIONSHIPS

The column subtotals in Table 8 show the frequency with which each pattern of support (solidary, conflicting, contending, or dominant) between the H-W pair appeared in three-generation family groups of three, four, and five members. A chi-square test for differences between these distributions does not reach the 0.05 level of significance. The size of the three-generation family is not related to the frequency with which any particular support pattern between the husband and wife appears.

An attempt was made to determine the association of the support pattern evident between the rank 1 and rank 2 initiators, and between the H-W pair, with the support patterns occurring between the other pairs of family members. If such associations should appear, some light might be shed upon the question of the extent to which structured relationships within a group are interdependent. This is a problem with which Mills, Caplow, and others have been concerned.[17]

Six of the three-person three-generation

[17] Caplow, *op. cit.*; and his "Further Development of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1959), 488–93; Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *op. cit.*; his "The Coalition Pattern in Three-Person Groups," *op. cit.*; and his "Equilibrium and Processes of Deviance and Control," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (1959), 671–79.

family groups exhibited a solidary pattern between rank 1 and rank 2 members (see Table 2). However, in only one family did the expected pattern of opposition and reciprocal opposition appear. In one additional family the least active member opposed rank 1 and rank 2 members, but the medium active member did *not* reciprocate. In the five three-person groups manifesting a *conflicting* relationship between rank 1 and rank 2 members, the rank 3 member opposed them both, but this opposition was reciprocated by the rank 2 member in only one case. In the one case of a *dominant* pattern and in the three families manifesting a *contending* pattern between the highest-ranking members, no light was shed upon the nature of structured interdependencies. Fisher's exact tests of all discernible relationships failed to reach the 0.05 level of significance.

In summary, we might suspect the true coalition pattern in family triads may not exist, or, if it at times does exist, the coalition may be a "sliding" one, sometimes between one pair of members, again between another pair, with no coalition remaining stable for long.

When the data ordered by family position are examined, no statistically significant sets of relationships are discernible.[18]

[18] The patterns of support between the following pairs of members were investigated: (1) for three-person groups, association of support types between H-W and H-AP and between H-W and W-AP; (2) for four-person groups, between H-W and H-AP, H-W and H-C, H-W and W-AP, H-W

TABLE 9

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION AND PERCENTAGES OF SUPPORT PATTERNS BETWEEN ALL POSSIBLE PAIRS, BY SUPPORT PATTERN OF H-W PAIR, FOR THREE-, FOUR-, AND FIVE-MEMBER THREE-GENERATION FAMILIES

Support Pattern between H-W Pair	Possible Pairs		Type of Support Pattern							
			Solidary		Conflicting		Contending		Dominant	
	No	Per Cent	No	Per Cent	No	Per Cent	No	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
	Three-Person Families									
Solidary (*N*=7)	21	100.0	14	66.7	4	19.0		. .	3	14.3
Conflicting (*N*=5)	15	100.0	4	26.7	9	60.0		. . .	2	13.3
Contending (*N*=1)	3	100.0			1	33.3	1	33.4	1	33.3
Dominant (*N*=2)	6	100.0	1	16.6	1	16.7	2	33.3	2	33.4
	Four-Person Families									
Solidary (*N*=3) . .	18	100.0	8	44.4	2	11.1	3	16.7	5	27.8
Conflicting (*N*=2) .	12	100.0	1	8.3	6	50.0	3	25.0	2	16.7
Contending (*N*=2)	12	100.0	4	33.3	4	33.4	3	25.0	1	8.3
Dominant (*N*=2)	12	100.0	3	25.0	2	16.6	3	25.0	4	33.4
	Five-Person Families									
Solidary (*N*=2)	20	100.0	5	25.0	8	40.0	3	15.0	4	20.0
Conflicting (*N*=2)	20	100.0	3	15.0	10	50.0	4	20.0	3	15.0
Contending (*N*=2)	20	100.0	9	45.0	2	10.0	6	30.0	3	15.0
Dominant (*N*=2) . . .	20	100.0	5	25.0	4	20.0	3	15.0	8	40.0

Perhaps the most suggestive trends discernible in these data are, first, a tendency for the aged person to be involved in a *conflicting* relationship with the adolescent children and, second, some tendency for the wife, more than the husband, to be involved in a number of *dominant* relationships with other family members, particularly the children.

Although no patterns of interdependencies were statistically significant, the type of support pattern between the husband and wife seemed to be the same as that between several of the other possible pairs. That is, the husband-wife support pattern appeared to be "setting the pattern" for relationships between all other pairs of family members whether or not the husband or wife were involved in these other pairs. This kind of interaction quality among members of a family is entirely in keeping with the clinical experience of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, and could be the basis for the "vicious circle" involved in instances of *folie à deux*.[19]

To discover the extent to which such tendencies are apparent, even if not statistically significant, the data were reordered, ignoring the assumptions made previously about the authority structure of the family. The *possible pairs* of relationships appearing in each of the four support patterns in groups of each of the three sizes was determined. This number of possible pairs was used as the N for computing the percentages shown in Table 9. The table gives the support pattern between husband and wife in the stub and the frequency with which each support pattern appears in all possible pairs along the axis. Examination of the diagonals for groups of each size is suggested.

In the three-person groups where the support pattern between husband and wife was *solidary*, two-thirds of 21 relationships were *solidary*. When the relationship between husband and wife was *conflicting*, three-fifths of the 15 possible pairs in the 5 families involved were conflicting. In only one family was the relationship between husband and wife *contending*, and no patterning of other pairs is evidenced. In the two cases with a *dominant* relationship between husband and wife, the most likely patterns between other pairs are either dominant or contending ones.

Similar patternings are evinced in the four-person groups, although not clearly in the five-person groups.

While it is difficult to state precisely whether the support patterns between husband and wife *cause* similar qualities of support between all family members, this causal direction can be plausibly argued on the basis of sociological assumptions about the power and authority structure of the family and of the data presented here. Our data have indicated the relatively strong power position of the wife and of the husband in the three-generation family, as well as the ambiguous power position of the children and the ineffectualness of the aged person.

DISCUSSION

Our data and those of Mills substantiated his original hypothesis that the two persons ranking highest in initiated interaction in a triad give highest support to each other and lower support to the third member of the group. Strodtbeck's data did not support this hypothesis. It is conceivable that

---

and W-C, and H-W and AP-C; (3) for five-person groups, the association of support types between H-W and H-AP, H-W and H-OC, H-W and H-YC, H-W and W-AP, H-W and W-OC, H-W and W-YC, H-W and AP-OC, H-W and AP-YC, and H-W and OC-YC.

[19] N. W. Ackerman, *The Psychodynamics of Family Life: Diagnosis and Treatment of Family Relationships* (New York: Basic Books, 1958); E. Chance, *Families in Treatment, from the Viewpoint of the Patient, the Clinician, and the Researcher* (New York: Basic Books, 1958); K. Dewhurst and J. Todd, "The Psychosis of Association—Folie à deux," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders,* CXV (1957), 451–59; H. S. Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* ed. H. S. Perry and M. L. Gowel (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953).

our differences from Strodtbeck are because the three-person three-generation families contain a respected aged person rather than an adolescent as the third member. The crucial factor, however, may be the considerable difference in task imposed upon Strodtbeck's as well as our families. We therefore hypothesize that *the highest rates of support in any triad* (*continuing or* ad hoc) *will be between rank 1 and rank 2 initiators, if the task facing the groups is equivalent. We also suggest that the true coalition pattern may not appear in continuing triads unless provoked by placing the group in a stressful task situation; even then, the coalitions formed may be unstable over time, with coalition membership constantly changing.*

If it can be shown that groups with expectations of continuity, as well as *ad hoc* groups, in fact manifest the same kinds of interaction processes under identical conditions, then results from studies of *ad hoc* laboratory groups can be generalized to all groups of the same size.

An increase in the size of the three-generation family groups seems to bring about the disappearance of the support-rate gradients noted in triads between members of adjacent rank orders of initiated interaction. That is, instead of rank 1 supporting rank 2 at a higher rate than he supports rank 3, and rank 3 at a higher rate than rank 4, and so on, no consistent gradient occurs in groups larger than triads. Is this because these are families, or would the same thing occur in other groups of the same size? Consideration of the family position of the highest-ranking members in the three-generation families—especially in the five-person groups where the two highest initiators were most often a parent and an adolescent child—leads to the suspicion that families may be unique in this respect. We therefore hypothesize that *a gradient in support rates between members of adjacent rank orders of initiated interaction will appear in* ad hoc *groups of all sizes, with the magnitude of support decreasing as the rank order of the recipient decreases; this gradient will not be as evident for continuing groups faced with identical tasks.* Research into the support rates between members of groups larger than triads merits more attention; the rates and patterns of support between group members may well furnish measurable indicators of that elusive phenomenon often called the "atmosphere" of a group.

Solidary and *conflicting* patterns of support between the two highest-ranked group members and between the husband-wife pairs in three-generation families occurred more often—each in about one-third of all cases—than the contending and dominant patterns. These findings support those of both Mills and Strodtbeck.

Dominant and contending patterns of support are, psychologically, "double-binding" or at least status-degrading to one member of the pair involved in the relationship. Such relationships are untenable for the person without emotional pathology and are probably handled in one of two ways: either the interpersonal difficulties are "worked through" and the pair become *solidary*, or the person continually non-supported becomes more assertive and less supportive and the relationship degenerates into a *conflicting* pattern. Hence dominant or contending patterns seem to be unstable over time. We hypothesize that *terminal or habitual support patterns between the two most powerful members of small groups of any size are likely to be either solidary or conflicting patterns; dominant and contending support patterns between powerful members are inherently unstable, although these patterns may stabilize between members with little power in the group.* A laboratory experiment to investigate the complex interrelationships implied in this hypothesis would not be difficult to design. It would require a number of groups of different size meeting over a considerable period of time, so that changes in support patterns could be brought about experimentally and studied, but it would add materially to

knowledge of the effects of group size and differentials of power upon the quality of support patterns.

Power as measured by indicators derived from group interaction was not found related to the authority structure of the family in the hypothesized manner. On the contrary, the wife is in a more advantageous power position than her husband, and the children exercise greater power than the aged person. The aged person and the children in three-generation families are highly *supported*, but they are not high *initiators* of interaction. This indicates a well-known difference in the quality of interaction between family and other groups: the family "cares" for the powerless individual, and he often does not *feel* as powerless in the family group as a person in a similar lowly power position feels in other groups.

The high support manifested toward the aged person and the children, and the relatively great "power" of children in family interaction, might not be so apparent if the group were involved in a true decision-making situation, especially one of great import for the family. We hypothesize, therefore, that *there is a closer correspondence between the authority structure of the family, based upon sex and age, and power as measured by processes of group interaction, when the family is required to make important decisions; less power is exercised by authority figures when the task confronting the family has no crucial consequences.* It would be valuable to know if this also holds for other continuing groups, such as committees, staff meetings, and so on.

Our findings indicate that group size is not related to the support pattern evident between husband and wife in the three-generation family, although size *is* related to the *quantity* of support. The rate of support between husband and wife is lower in the five-person families. There are few such families in the present study, but the drop in support rates is dramatic when compared to three- and four-person families. It would be of interest to investigate specifically the effect of group size upon the quantity of support not only of the husband-wife pair but of the other pairs of family members.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

OCCUPATIONS AND IDEOLOGIES

VERNON K. DIBBLE

ABSTRACT

One way of looking at the relationship between occupational ideologies and other systems of belief is to consider the conditions under which occupational ideologies will or will not be diffused beyond the groups in which they are first espoused. This diffusion is determined by numerous factors, including the rank of an occupation, the parochialism of its ideology, the intended audience, the internal organization of the occupation, relationships between practitioners and laymen, and the social position of laymen. The problems posed are relevant to understanding the flow of ideas throughout a society.

Occupational cultures have often been studied seriatim, with more attention to the distinctive features of a particular line of work than to explicit comparisons, and with little concern for the relationships between occupational ideologies and other systems of belief.[1] But since occupational ideologies are virtually ubiquitous, they must have consequences for the acceptance of political doctrines, social creeds, or generalized world views by groups which include the practitioners of different occupations. If highly developed and strongly held, they might limit the variations which are possible in trans-occupational ideologies. Or, to take a cue from Durkheim's contention that the *conscience commune* "consists increasingly of ways of thinking and of feeling which are very general and very indeterminate" as organic solidarity becomes more predominant,[2] the existence of countless occupational ideologies in a society might require that class or other transoccupational ideologies be expressed in a highly abstract form which allows for a variety of interpretations.

Such tendencies might be held in check, however, by the dissemination of occupational ideologies beyond the groups in which they first emerge. The practitioners of an occupation would then share a set of values and beliefs with others. There would presumably be less call for a more abstract system of beliefs under which the ideologies of diverse groups could be subsumed. In other words, one might return to Durkheim's problem—the conditions of cultural consensus in a highly differentiated society—from a rather oblique angle. Instead of asking how the belief systems of different substructures do or do not become linked to an over-all system, one might investigate the conditions under which consensus will or will not ensue from acceptance by some groups of beliefs which had emerged out of the conditions peculiar to other groups. For purposes of this paper, this highly general formulation becomes the question: Under what conditions is an occupational ideology disseminated beyond the occupation in which it is first espoused?

PAROCHIAL AND ECUMENIC IDEAS

Three simple ideas provide points of departure for further propositions. First, people are more likely to become aware of

[1] This description does not apply to many studies of occupational cultures. It does apply to such works as the following: Howard S. Becker, "The Professional Dance Musician and His Audience," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVII (September, 1951), 136–44; Fred Davis, "The Cabdriver and His Fare Facets of a Fleeting Relationship," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (September, 1959), 158–65; George Devereux and Florence R. Weiner, "The Occupational Status of Nurses," *American Sociological Review*, XV (October, 1950), 628–43; Ray Gold, "Janitors versus Tenants: A Status-Income Dilemma," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVII (March, 1952), 486–93; S. Kirson Weinberg and Henry Arond, "The Occupational Culture of the Boxer," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVII (March, 1952), 460–69.

[2] Émile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (5th ed.; Paris: Felix Alcan, 1926), pp. 146–47.

ideas which seem relevant to their problems than of ideas which seem irrelevant, and they tend to adopt those which seem helpful in solving their problems. Second, since people in different occupations pursue different goals and confront different obstacles, they also have different problems. The everyday worries of bankers and of bootblacks are quite dissimilar. Third, people in different lines of work therefore have different views of the life about them which in greater or lesser degree add up to distinctively occupational ideologies.

If these contentions be true, then the ideology of an occupation will not be diffused into other groups unles it contains a high proportion of ideas which are not parochial. The ideas of cabdrivers about "public transportation types" or of professors about the relative merits of teaching and research are examples of parochial ideas. Such ideas are hardly meaningful or important unless one is at least close to the occupation in question.

Somewhat less parochial are ideas which explain and justify an occupation. Lawyers do not stir up trouble. They mitigate conflict by providing orderly procedures. Accountants do not mess up straightforward notions of profit and loss with their esoteric methods. They prevent the nation's business from falling into chaos. Politicians are not out for power. They are practical men who can get things done for the common good.

Such ideas are meant to justify an occupation and its claims. But laymen can always counter with ideas of their own which justify their own occupations. These semiparochial ideas may influence laymen or clients in their dealings with the occupation in question. But it is quite another thing for laymen to bring ideas to the performance of their own roles and to the pursuit of their own goals in a variety of social relationships. For this process to take place, an occupational ideology must include ideas which are ecumenic rather than parochial. That is, it must include ideas which are relevant to the concerns of laymen entirely apart from their dealings with the occupation in question.

The legal profession provides an apt example. It has ideas on how to attain justice—and what goal could be more ecumenic than that? Some of these ecumenic ideas are answers to outsiders who question the profession's highly parochial behavior. Lawyers espouse causes in return for money, fight with each other in public, and then leave the courtroom together as friends and colleagues. Since laymen do not act that way, the attorneys' peculiar performance is suspect.

The legal profession explains this parochial behavior by showing its relationship to ecumenic goals. In the long run, it contends, justice is best served if each party to a dispute has the best advocacy he can command. This is possible only if attorneys who accept a case devote themselves unreservedly to their clients' cause. If both sides do so, then more facts, more points of law, and more questions of justice and public policy will be argued than would otherwise be possible. Hence, judge or jury have a more solid basis for making informed decisions.

This idea, clearly, is not parochial. It might be adapted by other institutions. Analogous arrangements are seen in the canonization procedures of the Catholic church. But further examples of institutionalized advocacy are rare. The idea might be taken up by ideologues concerned with justice and civil liberties. But civil libertarian concern with the right to legal counsel is restricted to a small fraction of all cases heard before the courts. When this concern does apply, as in politically controversial cases, it becomes absorbed into rights to a fair trial and to due process. It is not extended to the right to an attorney who will "hypocritically" devote himself without reservation to his client's cause.

This idea is, of course, part of a generalized outlook. Bureaucrats tend to see social reality in terms of a few fixed cate-

gories under which recurrent events and permanent situations are subsumed.[3] In contrast, lawyers regard virtually all events as at least provisionally arguable. For, in the legal outlook, there are inevitable discrepancies between general categories and particular events. Analogy, rather than simple subsumption, most accurately describes the way in which categories and events are related to each other in legal thought.[4] And analogies are notoriously arguable. But if neither the particular idea nor the general outlook is limited in relevance to the concerns of a single occupational group, they still do not become widely diffused beyond the profession in which they are held. Particular ideas and general outlooks which are not parochial seem to be a necessary but not sufficient condition under which this process will take place.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF STRATIFICATION

It is necessary to bring other variables into the argument. One such variable, itself also relevant to the degree of parochialism in an occupational ideology, is the position of an occupation in a society's system of stratification. Osgood and Tannenbaum have shown that a person's acceptance of a "message," that is, of an idea or opinion, is a function of its content, of the recipient's prior attitude toward the object, and of the recipient's prior evaluation of the source.[5] To be concrete, if Eisenhower says that the King of Thailand is a great statesman, or if Louis Armstrong says that the king is a great jazz musician, then, in the absence of any prior images of the royal person in question, one's acceptance of the message depends upon one's prior evaluations of Eisenhower and of Armstrong, respectively.

The authors cited are interested primarily in the psychology of opinion change. But evaluations of sources of messages vary with the sources' positions within social structures. It is therefore possible to examine the operation of the principles which these authors enunciate as these principles apply in a variety of structural contexts. Their applicability to the position of a "source" in a society's system of stratification is obvious. They suggest that most people will not allow themselves to be tainted with ideas and outlooks which bear the stamp of lowly origin: the downward mobility of ideas proceeds more easily and with greater frequency than their upward mobility.[6]

The relevance of an occupation's rank to our problem is somewhat complicated, however. For certain consequences of high rank erect barriers to the dissemination of occupational ideologies. It would at first seem that these consequences facilitate dissemination. First, higher ranking occupations are more likely than lower ranking occupations to have highly developed ideologies. This is relevant to our problem, for surely an ideology must exist before it can be disseminated. Second, the ideologies of higher ranking occupations are likely to be less parochial than the ideologies of lower ranking occupations. Each of those contentions can be derived from propositions which are of more general relevance than the problems discussed here and which are valid in diverse areas of social life.

On what grounds can it be maintained that higher ranking occupations are likely to have more highly developed ideologies than lower ranking occupations? People do not generally accord equal value to the various positions they hold in various

[3] This has been noted by Mannheim, Merton, and others. Cf., *inter alia,* James G. March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 39.

[4] Edward H. Levi, *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 2–4.

[5] C. E. Osgood and P. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity and the Prediction of Attitude Change," *Psychological Review,* LXII (1955), 42–55

[6] Evidence for this contention and certain necessary qualifications are found in Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

groups and organizations. The value they place upon their affiliation with a given social system varies, among other things, with the rank of their position within that system. As everyone knows, the job of chairman of the board is accorded greater value than the job of janitor. This is true with reference to two different points of comparison. First, within the economy, people in higher ranking occupations value their jobs more highly than people in lower ranking occupations.[7] Among the latter, the job is often "a necessary evil to be endured because of the weekly pay check."[8] Second, moving between the economy and other areas of society, people in higher ranking occupations value their jobs more highly than most other positions which they also occupy, while those in lower ranking occupations value other affiliations, outside the economy, more highly than they value their jobs. Friendships and other primary-group relationships, for example, are often more important in the working class than in other groups. This difference is indicated in the contrast between the working-class "ethics of reciprocity" and the middle-class "ethics of individual responsibility."[9] A number of other observations bear on the same general issue. The difference between the craft orientation of artisans' unions and the greater class orientation of the unions of lower ranking workers, and the fact that the most enthusiastic religious sects throughout history have almost invariably been lower-class movements, are both cases in point.

As these diverse examples suggest, those in lower ranking occupations may not become involved in much of anything at all beyond their immediate circle of primary-group relations.[10] But, if and when they do become involved, in a mass or organized way, their involvement will not have a narrow occupational focus. It may be oriented to class, to religion, or whatever, but not to occupation.[11]

These observations all constitute another way of stating the proposition that the higher the rank of an occupation the more likely it is to have a highly developed occupational ideology. It is possible to derive this proposition in a systematic fashion, simply by bringing together the various considerations just presented. First, a person has more ideas about the problems which are of greater concern to him and fewer ideas about the problems which are of lesser concern to him. Second, the problems posed by more highly valued social positions are of greater concern to the individual than those posed by less salient ones. Third, jobs are more highly valued by those in high-ranking occupations and are less salient to those in lower ranking occupations. It follows, therefore, that people in higher ranking occupations develop more ideas about the problems posed by their occupational life than people in lower ranking occupations. If sheer quantity of ideas measures the degree of development of an occupational ideology, then our initial hypothesis is thus derivable from these three familiar propositions.

[7] Cf., e.g., Table 1 in Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Perception, Experience, and Value," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVI (July, 1960), 1–31.

[8] Ely Chinoy, *Automobile Workers and the American Dream* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955), p 130.

[9] Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 89 and pp. 96–97.

[10] Genevieve Knupfer, "Portrait of an Underdog," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* XI (Spring, 1947), 103–14.

[11] Although direct extrapolations from experimental groups to larger social systems are often misleading, it might be noted that this contention is consistent with experimental findings reported by Harold H. Kelley. He reports that "the more unpleasant is a position in a hierarchy, the stronger are the forces on a person to communicate task-irrelevant content, this holding true whether the communication is directed to one's own level or to the other level" ("Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander [eds], *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* [Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co , 1953], p 460).

The contention that higher rank results in less parochial occupational ideologies can be derived from two propositions. First, ideas addressed to a socially heterogeneous audience are likely to be less parochial than ideas addressed to a socially homogeneous audience. This proposition is implied in Marx's observation that revolutionary classes have to propagate "ideal formulae" because they need a wider base of support than that on which the existing ruling class rests.[12] Second, higher ranking occupations feel more constrained than lower ranking ones to address their occupational ideologies to socially heterogeneous audiences. If both of these propositions are true, then it follows that the ideologies of higher ranking occupations exhibit less parochialism than those of lower ranking occupations.

First, why should higher ranking occupations feel more constrained than lower ranking occupations to address their ideologies to a heterogeneous public? As is well known, rank, power over others, and rewards bestowed by, or extracted from, others go along together. To the extent that a society is held together by consensus and not by force alone, those who do not possess power and rewards call into account those who do. Or those who do anticipate the need to legitimize their position in the eyes of those who do not. For where consensus obtains, the unequal distribution of power and rewards is the unequal distribution of values, or of access to values, which are held both by those who are in the higher ranks and those who are not. Those who have rewards from others and who control others must explain to the rest of society why they possess values which others share but are not allowed to enjoy.[13]

Second, the proposition that ideas addressed to a heterogeneous public will be less parochial than those which are not so addressed can be related to the simple contention stated above concerning the relationship between the solving of problems and the acceptance of ideas. Since problems vary with one's station in life, the more heterogeneous an audience the smaller the number of ideas which all or most people in the audience are ready to accept in common. This fact of everyday experience soon becomes known to publicists, propagandists, and the like. Hence, those who want to convince everyone in a heterogeneous audience feel constrained to broadcast ecumenic ideas. This can be done in at least two ways. One can link the parochial goals and claims of a particular occupational group to values held in common throughout a society. This practice is typical of the learned professions. Medicine is a matter of life and death, but the medical profession argues that goals which all men desire are best served if society accords to the profession that privileged position of internal autonomy which it wants. Or, instead of linking parochial ideas to generally held values, one might so generalize the ideas which emerge out of one's occupational subculture as to make them appear applicable to the society at large. This practice is typical of American business. The particular kind of responsibility, and the concomitant ethic of self-reliance and accountability, to which businessmen are subjected has become a generalized ethic, rather than simply an occupational morality for use on the job. Not only the businessman, but

others too should be self reliant and judged rigourously by their objective achievements. Those who are not called to account in the same way are morally inferior to him; politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals, academicians, reformers, union leaders. If he finds the discipline of the balance sheet an exacting one, he likes to believe that a similar discipline should and ultimately does govern affairs outside the business enterprise. Eventually everyone must be

[12] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1958), III, 47–48.

[13] On some of these points, cf. Sigmund Diamond, *The Reputation of the American Businessman* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 176–82.

brought to account: those who think otherwise are impractical and immoral.[14]

For example, although government debt and deficit financing often further the economic interests of at least some kinds of business, they are anathemas to the business creed. For they are examples of politicians getting away with practices inconsistent with a particular occupational ideology, generalized so as to apply to political institutions as well as to business firms. The ultimate stage in this process is, of course, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country," or a character named "Industry" in a newspaper advertisement saying "I am the people . . . all my brains and brawn strain for the good of the many . . . I am the American Way."[15]

These, then, are the two ways: one may link the parochial ideas of a particular group to generally held values, or one may generalize parochial ideas so as to make them applicable throughout an entire society. There are interesting differences between these two practices. The first is much closer than the second to the kind of cultural integration which Durkheim envisages in *The Division of Labor*. It implies a more "organic," even *staendisch*, image of society, for it assumes that societies consist of differentiated parts and goes on to claim that the jobs which the whole wants done can best be performed by delegating them to the various parts in which those especially suited to perform them are found. Why the learned professions should adopt this model while business, at least in the United States, uses the second technique is itself an important question. This difference in ideological practice is apparently caused by certain rather striking differences in the individual and corporate positions of businessmen and professionals. The professional man's clients acknowledge their need of him, and their inability to solve their own problems, by seeking him out: the businessman, driven by the need to maximize profits or to maintain a competitive position, must seek out customers whether they need him or not. Practitioners of a well-established profession see their position legitimized by laymen who come to them daily. They feel less need, therefore, to defend their claims by generalizing their parochial outlook into an "American Way of Life." They need only link their parochial ways to generally held values in order to legitimize a limited area of freedom and autonomy. Businessmen, in contrast, cannot rest content with a limited area of freedom and autonomy. Exercising more power in the society, being subjected to greater attack, and having more at stake in the perpetuation of a particular kind of society, they leave almost no area untouched by the generalized business creed.

For present purposes, however, both techniques can be contrasted with the predominance of parochial ideas in the explicit ideologies or in the inarticulate attitudes toward the job among practitioners of lower ranking occupations. The occupational ideology of crafts, group control over scarce opportunity, demands from others the recognition of certain claims which craftsmen set forth.[16] It does not claim that what is good for bricklayers is good for the country. On the contrary, certain functions which the ideology recognizes as legitimate and necessary, such as the investment of capital at a risk, are left for other people to perform and to think about as best they see fit.[17] Where the job is less meaningful, as among unskilled or semiskilled industrial

[14] Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, *The American Business Creed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 352. The point which follows, concerning government debt and deficit financing, is also taken from this source.

[15] From an advertisement of the General Cable Corporation in the *New York Times*, April 18, 1952, quoted *ibid.*, pp. 35–36.

[16] This characterization is taken from Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949). Perlman, writing in the 1920's, felt that he was describing the outlook of all "manualists," but he tended to extend the outlook of artisans to workers in general.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

workers, occupational ideas and attitudes are quite parochial. Chinoy's auto workers "limited their demands in the plant to adequate wages, some measure of security, and the avoidance of physical strain and discomfort."[18] Many of their standards for evaluating jobs were explicitly negativistic: they wanted jobs which were "not too heavy," "not too noisy," "not too dirty," or not too closely supervised, and they wanted to avoid jobs in which one could not smoke or go to the men's room. And, one suspects, those desiderata which are phrased in positive terms, money and job security, are really experienced with a heavy dose of negativism. Money probably means the avoidance of too much debt, just as job security means the avoidance of too much unemployment. These standards indicate how one can perhaps make the best of a bad deal. They are relevant only to the concerns of those who find themselves trapped in similar bad deals. There is a meager stock of ideas in this incipient occupational ideology, and those which do exist are all parochial. The alienation of workers from their jobs has directed their aspirations toward goals which can be realized elsewhere, and to which the weekly pay check is only a means.

The point is not only that the ideologies of higher ranking occupations are more highly developed than those of lower ranking occupations, but also that they are more ecumenic. When one adds to these conclusions the contention stated earlier that high rank per se facilitates the dissemination of one's ideas, then it would appear that the ideologies of higher ranking occupations would often be widely diffused throughout the society.

It was said above, however, that high rank seems to make for the diffusion of occupational ideologies only at first glance. Other processes set in motion by this factor erect barriers to dissemination. The most obvious point is that everything said here about one high-ranking occupation applies to all others. The job is highly valued in all of them. They all have highly developed occupational ideologies. They all attempt to propagate ecumenic ideas in order to convince a diffuse and heterogenous public. They are competing with one another in matters which are felt to be of great importance and for which highly developed batteries of ideas are ready at hand. The result is the "mild paranoia" in the images which the professions have of each other, or C. P. Snow's two cultures, or the muted suspicion with which the practitioners of the diverse social sciences view one another's work.[19]

Because of the rivalries and suspicions between higher ranking occupations, the outlook of one will not be accepted by others. And if high-ranking groups are split off from one another ideologically, then there is less likelihood that lower ranking groups will take over ideas from the ideology of any single high-ranking occupation. For they will receive contradictory, or at least different, messages from on high. Those in the higher ranks may agree on the basic outlines of the society, on morality, motherhood, and the American Way. But since they do not coalesce around any set of ideas from specifically occupational ideologies, lower ranking groups are beyond their influence so far as these kinds of ideas are concerned. Hence, although higher rank has a direct affect on increasing the likelihood that ideas will be disseminated, and an indirect effect by widening the audience to which they are addressed and by diminishing parochialism, high rank and ecumenic thinking are not sufficient to bring about the wider dissemination of occupational as distinguished from class ideologies.

PRACTITIONERS AND LAYMEN

Clearly, then, something else is needed. A relevant factor is the range of strata and subcultures in the society with which an occupation has dealings. Collectively, law-

[18] Chinoy, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[19] On the "mild paranoia," cf. Theodore Caplow, *The Sociology of Work* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 131.

yers, doctors, teachers, plumbers, and bureaucrats interact with virtually every stratum in society. Professors, interior decorators, astrologers, and governesses interact with people from very restricted subcultures. The greater the diversity of subcultures with which an occupation deals, the wider the range of opportunities it has to insinuate its ideas into other groups. What is more, the more heterogeneous the collective clientele, the less likely it is that the occupational ideology will be parochial. Those who must come to terms with a wide variety of people must adjust their ideas accordingly. But, of course, much more has to be said.

First, the ideologies of many occupations whose practitioners deal with a wide variety of groups are not taken up by others because of the low rank of these occupations. Second, the possibilities indicated above appear likely only in occupations in which the problems of managing people, and not simply the sale and purchase of goods or services, is a large segment of the total occupational task. News vendors and their customers encounter no problems in one another, regardless of the attitudes or beliefs held on either side. Third, we must look further into the structural context of interaction between practitioners and laymen.

People in modern societies occupy a number of positions in various groups and organizations, and it is important to note which one of the layman's affiliations is at stake in his dealings with a practitioner. In some cases the layman is pursuing goals which appertain to his most highly valued positions. He might be an industrialist who needs the advice of a lawyer on a business problem or the consent of a banker to a projected expansion. In other cases the layman is pursuing interests and values which do not appertain to his most salient affiliations. He might be a businessman who occasionally goes to a concert. In the former type of relationship there is greater potentiality for the transmission of ideas from practitioners to laymen than in the latter.

Once again we draw upon the proposition that a person's receptivity to an idea varies, among other things, with his prior evaluation of its source. One reason to value another person highly is that the other person is instrumental in the realization of one's own goals. This does not happen, of course, if the instrumental person is of low rank, is subordinate, or is powerless vis-à-vis one's self. In these cases other people become instruments to be wielded, organized, commanded. Where wielding is not possible, however, a high evaluation of the instrumentally significant person is likely to develop. In return for this manifested evaluation, the instrumentally significant person carries out his end of the exchange by acting to further the other's goals. In all occupations both practitioner and client are instrumentally significant to each other in some degree. But sometimes the goals at stake are not important: no one really needs the services of a pedicurist. And sometimes alternative instruments are available: you can tell your troubles to a friend, to a bartender, or to a spiritualist. The elimination of alternative instruments is, of course, an important element in the process of professionalization. When alternative instruments have been eliminated, and when the practitioner is of great instrumental significance to the client's central goals, as held by virtue of his most salient affiliations, then his receptivity to the practitioner's ideas is stronger. Executives of large corporations in twentieth-century America have taken over bits and pieces from the occupational ideologies of engineers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals on whom they must for certain purposes rely. In the case of "scientific management," for example, executives were influenced by an engineering outlook.[20] If,

[20] For a brief discussion of the relationships between executives and professionals and of the ways in which the thinking of executives has been influenced by these relationships, see Robert Aaron Gordon, *Business Leadership in the Large Corporation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 258–66. (This work was first published in 1945.)

on the other hand, a variety of instruments is available, or if the practitioner is of lesser instrumental significance, or if the goals at stake are peripheral in the client's life, then the client's receptivity to the practitioner's idea is weaker.

Even though an occupation provide the only instruments available, and even though its collective clientele be socially heterogeneous, one must still examine its internal organization. Occupations which are similar to one another in the extent to which their practitioners collectively interact with a wide variety of groups differ in their internal structure. People from every class and subculture are among the clients of physicians. But when one looks at individual practitioners, the picture immediately changes. The physician on Fifth Avenue and the physician on the Lower East Side have very different clienteles. The practitioner with the lower-class clientele has less prestige within the profession. This uncomfortable position can be mitigated if he he minimizes his ties with the elites. The elites, in turn, are happy to respond in kind.[21] This process weakens the ideological unity of a profession and makes it less likely to present a united ideological front to outsiders. Moreover, such processes may prevent the occupational ideology from becoming as fully developed as it would be otherwise. Practitioners with different clienteles must adjust to the different milieu in which they work. Those who might otherwise push for particular ideas will be held back, lest they weaken the unity of the professional group which serves to protect the profession as a whole in its assertion of claims, privileges, and rights.[22]

In law or medicine if you can get clients to support you, then you can at least survive. Success in such occupations is not completely determined by organizational superiors or by occupational elites. Where self-employment is more limited, as in science or social work, differences in clientele do not lead to the cutting of ties with the profession and to the consequences outlined above. This is even more true for academicians or bureaucrats who are employed only by formal organizations. Organizations are ranked, to be sure, and one's closest ties are likely to be with colleagues in organizations whose rank is similar to one's own. But the simultaneous existence of organizational and occupational affiliations restrains the tendencies of individuals to become absorbed into their immediate situations and into diverse clienteles.

It is only in occupations where the processes illustrated by the physician with a lower-class clientele cannot take place that the social heterogeneity of the profession's collective clientele is of great relevance to our problem. For only in such professions are practitioners with diverse clienteles prevented from becoming absorbed into the subcultures of their clients. Only with this kind of internal organization are practitioners with diverse clienteles forced to remain in sustained interaction with each other. And only in this way can diversity of clientele have strong influence upon those within the profession, who in turn take their common outlooks back to their relationships with very diverse clients.

Although our discussion has dealt primarily with the point of contact between the practitioners of a given occupation and the potential recipients of their ideology, it has been necessary also to consider the internal organization of occupational groups. For the consequences of the relationship

[21] Cf., e.g., Joe L. Spaeth, "Industrial Medicine: A Low-Status Branch of a Profession" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1958). Industrial physicians are affiliated with few hospitals and only with the less prestigeful ones. They are socially peripheral to the profession in various other ways and, concomitantly, are ideologically deviant as well. Spaeth finds that their view of their practices is more commercial and less professional than in the profession as a whole.

[22] Some of the processes mentioned here are analyzed for the legal profession by Karl Llewellyn in "The Bar Specializes—with What Results?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CLXVIII (1933), 177–92.

between professional and outsider vary with the internal organization of the profession. The same must also be said of the potential recipients. The consequences of the relationship between practitioners and laymen vary with the kind of social system from which the laymen come. The social position of the recipient becomes especially crucial when one considers the dissemination of generalized outlooks, rather than particular ideas.

IDEAS AND OUTLOOKS

We have thus far done little more than allude to this distinction, but it is an important one. Industrial workers believe that "something would happen" if they complied with the manifest wishes of management by producing and earning as much as an incentive system allows. Spokesmen for management, and some social scientists, have regarded this fear as foolish and unfounded. Here are two particular ideas which contradict each other. Each is part of a generalized outlook. The workers apparently see that the pursuit of purely economic goals must take place within a social structure. They see themselves working within well-defined hierarchies, and they perceive money and rank to be nicely correlated with each other. Hence, if they used an incentive system to make more money than the foreman, let us say, "something" would indeed have to happen.[23] In the generalized outlook of managers, however, people are classed with machines, capital, land, and raw materials as instruments of production. It is their productive activities, not their structural positions, which are crucial. Since the social structure of the plant is largely taken for granted, the generalized outlook of managers emphasizes purely economic pursuits, torn from the social context in which they take place. Hence, if a worker uses the incentive system to make twice as much money, so what? That's all to the good. There are, in short, particular ideas and general outlooks.

One would expect barriers to the dissemination of ideas to operate even more strongly in the case of outlooks which characterize an ideology as a whole. Ideas are continually bruited about. One can pick them up without necessarily accepting, or without even being aware of, the generalized outlook of which they are a part. They can then be assimilated into one's own outlook. For a particular idea may be congruent with a wide variety of outlooks. The idea that institutionalized advocacy best serves justice in the long run is consistent with a generalized view of the inherent arguability of human events, with a generalized skepticism about human motives, or with a generalized view of the frailty of human reason.

But the extent to which the same outlook can embrace different ideas or the same idea can be assimilated into a variety of outlooks soon reaches its limits. Although the idea that justice is best served by institutionalized and even "hypocritical" advocacy is relevant to the concerns of civil libertarian ideologues, the outlook of which it is a part, or those which it might imply, are not consistent with the outlook of the ideologue. Neither a generalized view of the inherent arguability of human events, nor a generalized skepticism about human motives, nor a generalized view of the frailty of human reason is consistent with the division of human events into those which conform to the true principles of justice and freedom and those which do not. With such outlooks one cannot proceed to *écraser l'infame*. Though all of the social conditions conducive to the dissemination of an idea be present, the potential recipients of the idea might still resist because it is inconsistent with their general outlooks. People avoid ideas—particular sights—which are inconsistent with outlooks—generalized ways of seeing.[24]

[23] This point was suggested by William J. Goode in a private communication.

[24] This statement refers, of course, to one variety of "cognitive dissonance" (see Leon Festinger, *A*

If this is so, then how can outlooks ever be disseminated from one group to another? Life soon wipes out any cognitive *tabula rasa* which the newborn babe might have. One must look to variations in the strength of the social constraints which bind differently situated people to their outlooks; more specifically, to variations in the controls imposed by one's immediate working environment and in the degree of specificity with which adequate performance is defined.

SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE TRANSMISSION OF IDEOLOGIES

The idea can best be stated with reference to two examples. Bureaucrats must continually interact with superiors, with subordinates, and with outsiders in their agency's jurisdiction. The norms which govern these relationships are, in large measure, formally defined. They are defined at least in part by superiors who, in speaking these norms to subordinates and to each other, are acting in terms of their own most central affiliations. Compare this situation with that of free-lance artists, of the *freischwebende Intelligenz*, or, in somewhat lesser degree, of regularly employed academicians. In these positions one's social relationships can be limited for the most part to interactions with others of one's own kind. This fact is variously referred to as Bohemia or as the ivory tower. The role expectations for the occupants of these positions, especially the first two, are vaguely diffuse in our culture. In the absence of a thought police or a Ministry for Propaganda and Enlightenment, they are not defined by occupants of particular organizational positions. Further, outsiders who define these role expectations—be they purchasers of paintings or trustees of a university—are usually acting in terms of positions which are peripheral within their own range of memberships and affiliations. They may enter into artistic or intellectual circles primarily in search of suitable adornments with which to embellish their more primary statuses. They therefore have less motivation to exert sustained and enduring control. Other controls, to be sure, are not intermittent and are not exerted by people who are acting in their more peripheral statuses. Critics, dealers, and publishers are permanently on the scene.

The point of the comparison holds up, nonetheless. Of the two groups in question, bureaucrats are subjected to more intense and more visible controls in the three respects mentioned: they must engage in more sustained interactions with a wider variety of role partners; the norms governing these interactions are formally defined; those who define the norms are permanently on the scene and are more highly motivated to exert sustained control because in the process of doing so they are performing their main job. The social relationships in which the bureaucrat participates are more tightly structured and more explicitly defined. Differences in cognitive orientations to these relationships are therefore more visible and, so far as these orientations are given normative sanction, are more quickly punished or rewarded.[25]

Since contemporary intellectuals or artists live in more loosely structured environments, the social constraints which bind them to particular outlooks are weaker. Their receptivity to other outlooks is therefore greater. They can act as catalysts, picking up outlooks present in other groups, formalizing or reshaping them, adding ra-

Theory of Cognitive Dissonance [Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957]).

[25] The notion of "tightly" and "loosely" structured social systems was presented by the late John Embree in his analyses of Thai society and was developed by Bryce Ryan and Murray Strauss in "The Integration of Sinhalese Society," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, XXII (1954), 179–227. Although the notion is used here in a slightly different sense, the suggestion by Ryan and Strauss that loosely structured systems are more susceptible to cultural influence from the outside and that these influences are less disruptive in loosely structured than in tightly structured systems is similar to the argument stated here.

tionales of their own, and presenting them in turn to whomever will pay heed.[26]

One may be subjected to close and enduring controls on the job and still be open to extra-occupational influences. This is the case when jobs are "a necessary evil to be endured because of the weekly pay check." Behavioral conformity in such instances greatly exceeds actual internalization of standards imposed by superiors, and alienation from work makes for both a greater receptivity to outside influences and for less of an occupational ideology to stand in the way of these influences.

These points are relevant to the understanding of a wide variety of typically working-class phenomena. Millenarianism or other forms of religious enthusiasm and the "ethics of reciprocity" mentioned above must stem in part from the experience of work as a necessary evil, important largely as a means to the realization of non-economic goals. Similarly, the unending quest for consumer goods—often noted among American workers today—is not a search for symbols appropriate to one's station in life, as defined by one's job. This would be the case with the corporate executive, say, who needs a larger house because he has passed beyond a certain level in the corporate hierarchy. Rather, it appears to be a search for signs of a good life which can be led apart from the world of work. Both proletarian revolutions and the sale of gadgets are furthered by the rejection of occupational life per se and by the concomitant susceptibility to wider identifications.

Numerous studies have shown that members of working classes tend to live within the narrow confines of their own immediate experience. The present argument suggests, however, that their very lack of commitment to occupational life, their alienation from the job, can sometimes make for working-class cosmopolitanism, or at least for gropings toward wider horizons. Millenarianism, revolutionary doctrines, and the new TV set can all, under varying circumstances, take on this single meaning. To the extent that such processes take place, industrial workers share with free-lance intellectuals a greater receptivity to outlooks disseminated from other groups in society. Intellectuals are less subject to sustained control and to specifically defined role expectations: workers are subject to controls in a social system which cannot capture their most basic commitments.

CONCLUSION

When one considers the full range of conditions which brings about the wider dissemination of occupational ideologies, it becomes clear that few occupations in few historical periods meet all the prerequisites simultaneously. The attempt to answer the question posed at the beginning has, in effect, answered a very different question: Why does this wider diffusion take place so infrequently? This is not to say that laymen rarely accept anything at all from occupational ideologies. Most occupations are successful in propagating the images of themselves which they wish others to hold. But these phenomena are slightly beside the point. They are quite different from the acceptance of a generalized occupational outlook by other groups which, in turn, carry this outlook with them to the performance of their own roles and to the pursuit of their own goals. It is this phenomenon which is extremely infrequent. It has nonetheless been known to happen. In various times and places one finds scientism outside of science, commercialism outside of commerce, and militarism outside the

[26] This discussion should be compared with Mannheim's treatment of "The Sociological Problem of the 'Intelligentsia' " in *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Harvest Book Edition, n.d.), pp. 153–64. This discussion is in part a restatement of Mannheim's distinction between those who "have their outlooks and activities directly and exclusively determined by their specific social situation" and those who are "enabled . . . to develop the social sensibility that was essential for becoming attuned to the dynamically conflicting forces."

ılitary. In some cases, when a particular :cupation is very powerful in a society, s outlook has in remarkable degree been iffused throughout an entire culture—as ith businessmen in the United States or rofessional bureaucrats in Imperial Gerıany. Much more frequently, one group icks up a single aspect of another's occuational ideology. Why have social workers ıken over the academicians' notion that it is important to do research while nurses, for example, have failed to do so? Why has corporate management, but not governmental or academic management, taken over aspects of an engineering outlook? Answers to these questions would shed light not only on particular occupations but also on the flow of ideas and outlooks throughout an entire society.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

ETHNOCULTURAL FACTORS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII[1]

KIYOSHI IKEDA, HARRY V. BALL, AND DOUGLAS S. YAMAMURA

ABSTRACT

This study of differential risk in schizophrenia among the Okinawan and Naichi Japanese in Hawaii directs attention to possible links between ethnicity and types of personality disturbances. Although both subgroupings within the Japanese are similar in in-hospital diagnoses of schizophrenia, the Okinawans are disproportionately higher in risk. Both in risk in schizophrenia and in general admission to a mental hospital, the introduction of control variables does not statistically control out the effects of subethnic membership. To determine the effects of ethnicity and other social-cultural influences, further study with additional comparison groups is suggested in the polyethnic Hawaiian setting.

All the theoretical formulations of "culture and personality" necessarily imply specifiable relations between ethnocultural differences and the incidence and types of "personality disturbances." Related studies have been conducted in two types of settings. The first, the typical anthropological study, is conducted in the native habitat. While these have involved high relative isolation and homogeneity, they also have been characterized by a general absence of systematic comparisons within the same or within highly similar environments. The other type of study has contrasted allegedly diverse ethnocultural groupings in varying degrees of direct interaction within a larger shared sociocultural setting.[2]

It is this latter type of study with which we are primarily concerned here. Frequently the presumed ethnocultural differences respecting the incidence and form of mental illness have been explained away with the introduction of such control variables such as social class, immigrant-native status, age, sex, and urban-rural residence.[3] On the other hand, certain phenomena, such as the symptom patterns among schizophrenics, have appeared to be linked to ethnocultural differences.[4] The conflicts, it is presumed here, are more apparent than real, and each has represented a significant contribution to knowledge. For example, the first set of findings were invaluable in assessing the relative significance of cultural and biological factors. The fact that earlier studies contained specific deficiencies has not eliminated the potential of the over-all research strategy.[5] The establishing of adequate population sites for the proper study of ethnocultural differences within a shared social context remains one of the most promising strategies for the investigation of social and cultural influences upon individual behavior.

[1] The authors wish to acknowledge the professional assistance of Andrew W. Lind, Linton C. Freeman, Mrs. Natsue S Oyasato, the late Dr. Marcus Guensberg, and the staff of the now State Hospital of Hawaii.

[2] See M. K. Opler, *Culture and Mental Health* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), for examples of both types of studies.

[3] See the literature cited in E. Gartley Jaco, *The Social Epidemiology of Mental Disorders* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960) In Jaco's own findings, ethnic effects combine with other social-cultural differentials in diverse ways as noted on pp. 109–73.

[4] J. B. Enright and W. R. Jaeckle, "Ethnic Differences in Psychopathology" (paper read at the Pacific Science Congress meetings, August, 1961) Cf. M. K. Opler and J. L. Singer, "Ethnic Differences in Behavior and Psychopathology· Italian and Irish," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry,* II (1956), 11–23.

[5] A. B. Hollingshead, "The Epidemiology of Schizophrenia," *American Sociological Review,* XXVI (February, 1961), 5–13; see also Jaco, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–87.

In keeping with such an orientation, this paper presents some of the initial findings of a study of ethnicity and mental illness in Hawaii. The comparisons presented are between the Okinawan and Naichi[6] Japanese in Hawaii. Thus, the ethnic categories represent two subgroupings of a larger "minority," each of which has been transplanted into a new and common social context.

Through 1950, the Okinawan and Naichi Japanese in their native settings were consistently said to differ significantly in both rates of mental illness and patterns of child training. An allegedly extremely low rate of mental illness among the Okinawans was attributed to a warm and permissive pattern of child training in Okinawa. The reverse was implied respecting the Naichi in Japan.[7] By contrast, an early study of admission rates to the major Hawaiian screening center for mental patients, both public and private, reported that the admission rates were high for persons of Okinawan background and low for persons of Naichi background.[8] The research reported here extended this earlier work by Wedge and employed a broader base. It extended the analysis in time and utilized the recipients of care at the only major mental hospital in the then Territory of Hawaii.

METHOD

For the purposes of this study, the *mentally ill population* consisted of 1,101 first admissions of persons of Japanese ancestry to the Territorial Hospital between January 1, 1930, to May 31, 1951. Further, 1,502 first admissions of non-Japanese persons between June 1, 1945, and May 31, 1951, are utilized in certain comparisons. Diagnoses during this latter period are considered more reliable and valid.[9]

"Incidence" is defined here as the number of new admissions in a population during a specified period of time. "Relative incidence" is defined in relation to annual rates of first admissions during these specified periods. Another comparison will involve the relative distribution of diagnoses among first admissions within the hospital population itself. This distinction between relative incidence and in-hospital proportions simply refers to two kinds of comparisons which have been utilized in most studies.[10]

Nativity, occupational level, sex, age, and urban-rural residence are introduced as controls in the comparisons between persons of Okinawan and Naichi background. Most Okinawan and Naichi immigrants came to Hawaii between 1885 and 1910. The data in the Japanese Census of 1924 suggest that the two immigrant popula-

[6] An "Okinawan" is a Japanese person whose background is derived from the prefectural grouping known as Okinawa *ken* on the island of Okinawa in the Ryukyu Island chain located at the southern end of the Japanese archipelago. "Naichi" ancestry is defined here for those Japanese persons whose backgrounds stem from the main islands of Japan, especially Honshu, Kyushu, and Hokkaido.

[7] See James C. Moloney, "Psychiatric Observations on Okinawa *Shima*," *Psychiatry*, VIII (November, 1945), 391–401. For critical reappraisals or evidence which suggest greater similarity in child-training patterns and mental illness at the present time see Takao Sofue, "Japanese Studies by American Anthropologists," *American Anthropologist*, LXII (April, 1960), 306–17. Also W. Caudill, "Observations of the Cultural Context of Japanese Psychiatry," in Opler, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–27; and E. Norbeck and G. De Vos, "Culture and Personality: The Japanese," in F. L. K. Hsu (ed.), *Psychological Anthropology* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1961), pp. 17–47, esp. pp. 37–38, on a suggested reversal of Moloney's observations in the work of T. W. and H. S. Maretzki. However, it has not been documented whether these represent a situation of where one or both native populations have changed, or whether the earlier reports were incorrect.

[8] B. M. Wedge, "Occurrence of Psychosis among Okinawans in Hawaii," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, CIX (October, 1952), 255–58.

[9] The diagnostic procedure followed that outlined in the *Statistical Manual for the Use of Hospitals for Mental Diseases 1942* (New York. American Psychiatric Association, 1942).

[10] See the analysis in A. B. Hollingshead and F. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

tions were similar regarding time of arrival, age-sex composition, social class origin, and initial urban-rural residence in Hawaii. They differed greatly as to size. Thus, in 1924 the Okinawans constituted only fourteen per cent (16,506 individuals) of the Japanese population in Hawaii.[11]

Nativity statuses are denoted as first (issei), mixed (kibei), second (nisei), and third (sansei) generation. The first generation, or the *foreign born*, represent the initial immigrant population from Japan. The mixed status of kibei represent those second-generation individuals who went to Japan temporarily, usually for educational and/or familial purposes, and returned to the immigrant setting. The "pure" second and third generation, or *native born*, refer to individuals who have spent their lives in the Hawaiian or American setting within this period of study.

TABLE 1

RATES OF FIRST ADMISSIONS TO MENTAL HOSPITAL AMONG 2,025 JAPANESE AND NON-JAPANESE BY JAPANESE SUBETHNIC STATUS AND BY DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES, 1945–51 (Per 100,000)

Ethnicity	Diagnosis*		Total
	Schizophrenia	Non-schizophrenia	
All Japanese†	40‡	35	75
Okinawan	90	71	161
Naichi	31	28	59
Non-Japanese	29	98	127
Total	33	74	107

* All estimates of relative incidence for the present study are calculated for the population fifteen years of age and above. Estimates of general population proportions are derived from the U.S. Bureau of Census, *U.S. Census of Population 1950*, Vol. II *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 52, *Hawaii* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), chap. C.

† All who died during the period covered and twenty-one Japanese of unknown prefectural origin are excluded from the present analysis. Non-Japanese cases include all first admissions to Territorial Hospital for the period June 1, 1945, to June 1, 1951.

‡ For the Okinawan, Naichi, non-Japanese comparisons by diagnostic types $\chi^2 = 335.8$, $p < .01$, with 5 degrees of freedom.

[11] From N. Muramatsu, "Japanese in Hawaii According to Prefectural Origin" (unpublished manuscript, Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, August, 1924). The data are from the Japanese Consulate Census, Hawaii, 1924.

Urban-rural differences are defined in relation to the permanent residence of either the individual or his family in either Honolulu (urban) or non-Honolulu (rural) areas. Until 1950, Honolulu represented the major urban center in the then Territory of Hawaii. Following U.S. Census classification procedures, four occupational categories are used to identify the individuals or heads of households: professional-managerial, laborer, service, and non-employed.

FINDINGS

Diagnostic proportions.—Within the hospital population for the period June 1, 1945, to May 31, 1951, the diagnostic patterns of the Okinawan and Naichi were very similar, but each differed significantly from the pattern of the non-Japanese hospital population. Thus, 54 per cent of the 152 Okinawans and 53 per cent of the 364 Naichi first admissions were diagnosed as schizophrenic, in contrast to only 23 per cent of the 1,502 non-Japanese first admissions. Schizophrenia was clearly the illness of the Japanese in the hospital population.

Relative incidence.—For the period 1945–51, the rate of first admissions of the Japanese is lower than the rate of the non-Japanese as a whole in total admissions regardless of diagnosis. Where the rate for the total population in Hawaii is estimated at 107 per 100,000 population, the Japanese rate is 75 per 100,000 and the non-Japanese rate is 127 per 100,000. However, when the subcategories of Japanese are identified, the Okinawans have a rate of 161 per 100,000, the Naichi, a rate of 59 per 100,000 population. Of all groupings, the Okinawans have the highest rate of admissions, the Naichi, the lowest (see Table 1).

The Japanese as a whole are underrepresented among this mentally ill population in general. However, they are higher in the rate of admissions of those diagnosed as

schizophrenic. Of the first admissions diagnosed as schizophrenic, the Japanese rate is 40 per 100,000, where the non-Japanese rate is 29 per 100,000. As shown in Table 1 the high rate of admission among the Japanese is accounted for by the Okinawan admissions. Where the Naichi rate of schizophrenic admissions is close to that of the non-Japanese (31 to 29 per 100,000, respectively), the Okinawan rate is 90 per 100,000. If any Japanese were admitted to the mental hospital, the most likely diagnosis was schizophrenia; but if a new patient was diagnosed "schizophrenic," it was disproportionately likely that this patient would be Okinawan-Japanese.

The difference among the incidence rates of schizophrenia between the Okinawans and Naichi is not eliminated by the introduction of the factors of time period, nativity, residence, age, or sex. As shown in Table 2, the Okinawans remain highly overrepresented in rates relative to the total Japanese rate, where the Naichi are typically below or close to the total Japanese rate of 109 per 100,000 population for the period 1945–51.

Despite the imputed shortcomings of diagnoses for the period 1930–44, a similar analysis of rates suggests that the differences are not specific to only one time period. It appears that the Okinawans have been overrepresented and the Naichi close to expectation over the whole twenty and one-half year period. It is true that there seems to be slight reversals of somewhat higher rates among the women in both groups in the 1930–44 period and lower rates in both groups in the 1945–51 comparisons. This trend, however, does not explain away the generally high rates among the Okinawans and the lower rates among the Naichi for the total time period. In short, the ethnocultural linkages have been quite stable for the total time period, despite the simultaneous introduction of control variables.

Total incidence, 1930–44.—To establish the stability of the findings noted above, additional time-period and multiple control comparisons were made. As shown in Table 3, the Okinawans were consistently high in rate in every five-year period between 1930 and 1951, while the Naichi were consistently low in rate of total admissions regardless of diagnosis.

As indicated in Table 4, this pattern of high risk among the Okinawans and low risk among the Naichi remains stable for

TABLE 2

RATES OF SCHIZOPHRENIA AMONG OKINAWAN AND NAICHI SECOND-GENERATION MEN AND WOMEN, AGES 15–34, OF RURAL AND URBAN BACKGROUNDS ADMITTED TO TERRITORIAL HOSPITAL, 1930–44 AND 1945–51*
(Per 100,000)

Characteristics	Okinawan ($n=119$)	Naichi ($n=285$)	Total Japanese ($n=404$)
	1930–44†		
Rural:			
Male‡. . . .	28	14	16
Female.	40	18	21
Urban:			
Male.	38	15	18
Female. . . .	40	19	22
Total.	37	16	19
	1945–51§		
Rural:			
Male.	264	111	132
Female	230	81	102
Urban:			
Male	344	95	129
Female.	162	66	79
Total.	246	87	109

* The first-generation categories and those aged 35 and older contained too few cases to warrant separate analysis.

† $\chi^2 = 18.00$, 7 degrees of freedom, $p < .05$ for 1930–44. What is being tested is "goodness of fit" between an independently estimated and an expected distribution of cases from the general population characteristics and the observed distribution in the hospital. At no point do the marginal totals in the hospital sample enter into the calculation of the expected frequencies. Thus, in this section and other sections in Tables 2 and 4, only one degree of freedom is fixed in the total distribution of frequencies. See the discussion and illustrations in G. W. Snedecor, *Statistical Methods* (4th ed.; Ames: Iowa State College, 1946), pp. 54, 197.

‡ Expected frequencies obtained by estimation from data in the U.S. Census materials from the 16th and 17th Census of the United States, Territories and Outlying Possessions, 1940 and 1950, respectively.

§ $\chi^2 = 80.73$, 7 degrees of freedom, $p < .01$ for 1945–51.

TABLE 3

RATES OF FIRST ADMISSIONS OF 1,102 OKINAWAN AND NAICHI JAPANESE IN HAWAII TO TERRITORIAL HOSPITAL, FIVE-YEAR COMPARISONS BETWEEN 1930 AND 1951
(Per 100,000)

Period	Okinawan*	Naichi	Total Japanese
1930–34†.....	115	41	52
1935–39 .	65	38	42
1940–44	93	39	47
1945–49......	114	50	59
1950–51 .	212	58	80
Total.......	104	43	51

* Expected frequencies estimated by multiplying obtained values by percentage of Okinawan (14 per cent) and Naichi Japanese (86 per cent) in the total Japanese population of Hawaii.

† χ^2 = 48 6 (1930–34), 10 4 (1935–39), 39 4 (1940–44), 51 0 (1945–49), and 71 5 (1950–51), at 1 degree of freedom for all comparisons. All values are $p <$ 05 or above.

all admissions between 1930 and 1944 wh the control variables of nativity, age, s and residence are introduced. There are instances of the Naichi rate approachi that of the Okinawan rate in the approp ate comparisons, except among the ru second-generation males.

Where a crude attempt has been ma to control the occupational background individuals admitted to the hospital f the period 1930 to 1951, again the ra differences are outstanding. The rates the professional-managerial grouping a low relative to the other groupings, but t subethnic difference remains stable (s Table 5). Both the Okinawan and Naic Japanese rates are responsive to the co trol variables of age, residence, sex, ar

TABLE 4

FIRST-ADMISSION RATES AMONG 607 OKINAWAN AND NAICHI JAPANESE TO TERRITORIAL HOSPITAL, BY NATIVITY, RESIDENCE, SEX, AND AGE, 1930–44
(Per 100,000)

Residence and Age	Okinawan		Naichi		Total Japanese		Total
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
			Foreign Born‡				
Rural:							
15–44	326†	98	36	48	77	55	64
45+ . .	101	62	25	17	36	41	37
Urban:							
15–44 . .	410	167	109	42	151	69	106
45+ . ..	73	62	47	38	50	42	47
Subtotal .	210	84	40	33	56	40	49
			Native Born‡				
Rural:							
15–44..	35	42	31	26	32	28	30
45+.... .	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Urban:							
15–44.	56	79	37	34	40	41	40
45+...... ..	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Subtotal...	44	57	34	20	35	33	34
Total....	85	67	36	31	43	36	40

* χ^2 = 261 11, 17 degrees of freedom, $p <$ 01, for foreign-born comparisons.

† The expected values estimated from the U S. Census materials in the 16th U.S. Census, Territories and Possessions, 1940.

‡ χ^2 = 26.28, 7 degrees of freedom, $p <$ 01, for native-born comparisons The forty-five-plus age groups had only four Naichi cases and no Okinawan cases.

occupation. However, what is of note in all of these comparisons is that in no single instance is the Naichi rate higher than the Okinawan rate for the comparable subpopulation involved.

DISCUSSION

These data delineate two questions as focal points for future research: (1) Why have the Japanese as a whole manifested a proneness toward schizophrenia? (2) Why has the incidence of mental illness been significantly higher among the Okinawans than among the Naichi? Let us discuss each in turn.

The propensity toward schizophrenia might represent an ethnocultural effect, or it might represent a response to shared discriminatory treatment by others. Hawaii represents an excellent site for research aimed at disentangling these effects. In addition to the Japanese (Naichi and Okinawan), there are numerous other ethnocultural groupings who also emigrated and were the general recipients of discriminatory treatment during roughly the same time period. These include the Portuguese, Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Samoans, and Puerto Ricans. There is also a small population of American Negroes, most of whom emigrated since World War II, who constitute a minority among those of mainland American background. If emigrant experiences of this type are conducive to schizophrenic responses, diagnostic proportions within the hospital should be similar among these groups. The recent findings of Enright and Jaeckle suggest that the Japanese have not changed in diagnostic proportions since 1945–51. The Filipinos in their study differ significantly from the Japanese. Against an equally proportionate distribution of cases in each subdiagnosis in schizophrenia among the Japanese, the Filipinos are high in non-schizophrenic diagnoses of a paranoid type and, if they are diagnosed schizophrenic, are also diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic.[12] This differential cannot be "explained" merely as a reaction to immigrant-minority status experiences.

[12] Enright and Jaeckle, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

In similar fashion Hawaii is well suited for further inquiries into why the incidence rate was so much higher among those of Okinawan than those of Naichi background. One possible explanation lies in ethnocultural differences between these subgroups. Another plausible explanation is that the Okinawans, as "a minority within a minority," were more exposed than the Naichi to extreme role strains. There is some evidence that the Naichi in Hawaii were able to re-create and to maintain all of their major traditional institutions, thus gaining temporarily a rather high degree of "insulation" from the larger community. On the other hand, the Okinawans, perhaps due to smallness of numbers, to their distance from idealized Naichi values and norms, to competition with and rejection by the Naichi, seem to have been unable to re-create the major integrative institutions

TABLE 5

RATES OF FIRST ADMISSIONS TO TERRITORIAL HOSPITAL AMONG OKINAWAN AND NAICHI MALES, BY OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS, 1930–51

(Per 100,000)

Occupational Class*	Okinawan ($n = 191$)	Naichi ($n = 441$)	Total Japanese ($n = 632$)
Professional-managerial	36†	21	32
Laborer	93	26	48
Services	267	84	150
Non-employed	185	96	148
Total	165	62	77

* Occupational class distribution estimates from the U S Census for 1940, Territories and Possessions *Professional-managerial* includes professional, technical, and kindred workers, managers, officials, and proprietors, including farm owners. *Laborers* include all laborers; clerical and kindred workers; operatives; and excludes service workers except those in public utilities *Non-employed* persons include all males above fifteen years of age who do not belong in any of the above classifications and include students Women are excluded from this analysis because of the lack of Census data for estimating the category of housewives Finer breakdowns by age, nativity, and residence are not made here because of the lack of adequate estimates in Census data.

† $\chi^2 = 401.1$, 7 degrees of freedom, $p < .01$.

to the same extent.[13] Because of this lack of integration into a larger Japanese community, urban Okinawan females seem to have had a special escape. They could and disproportionately did marry out of the Okinawan group.[14] This is consistent with lower rates of admissions among the Okinawan urban female schizophrenics. However, this second explanation represents another example of the frequent tendency in sociology to establish differential risks or life chances among social categories without attempting to explain why a particular deviant response pattern is "selected" over other alternatives.

The problem for future research, therefore, is to investigate each of these hypotheses. In Hawaii there are a number of other minorities within minorities, such as the Portuguese among the Caucasians, the Illocanos among the Filipinos, the "pure Hawaiians" among the Hawaiians. Each is similar to the other regarding this dimension of double minority status, but each is different with respect to ethnocultural background. Because of this comparable situation, Hawaii offers an ideal site for further investigations of this question as well as of the first question which has been examined in detail here.

Oberlin College
University of Wisconsin
and
University of Hawaii

[13] A. W. Lind, *An Island Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 201, and his *Hawaii's Japanese* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 14–15; see also H. Toyama and K. Ikeda, "The Okinawan-Naichi Relationship in Hawaii," *Social Process in Hawaii*, XIV (1950), 14–18.

[14] G. K. Yamamoto, "Some Patterns of Mate Selection among the Naichi and Okinawans on Oahu," *Social Process in Hawaii*, XXI (1957), 44.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

ZELDITCH, "SOME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF FIELD STUDIES"

April 30, 1962

To the Editor:

I have a few comments on Morris Zelditch's excellent article in the March, 1962, issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

It is certainly true, as Zelditch points out, that a field approach is not necessarily simply quantitative or qualitative. However, perhaps a more crucial issue is not the degree of quantification as such, but rather the question of whether one has direct knowledge of some behavior rather than second-hand or third-hand knowledge. If one is interested in finding out about some complex social interaction, certainly it is much better to observe it and record it directly than it is to give people questionnaires (or other "instruments") through which they may tell about their behavior at a later time. True, the observer must select and interpret from what he observes and must then make inferences about the observations. But when he studies the same behavior through later questioning of the behaving subjects, he introduces just another step of selection, interpretation, and drawing of inferences (that is, the interpretive process of the subjects themselves) and thus puts off the original behavioral data one more step. Of course, this approach is frequently necessary for economy of time or other reasons, but we should not pretend that it is just as good or better than direct observation of the original behavior. This has nothing to do with quantification, since one may make counts and measure at least as accurately while making direct observations as when gathering second-hand information from interviews.

The differences of approach are nicely illustrated by Zelditch on page 570 with his two statements about the Navaho. The "second-hand data-gathering procedures" are most likely to lead to more or less valid statements of the No. 2 type. My impression in reading social science literature is that, while authors often use procedures and give a formal statement to indicate that they are going to make a No. 2 type statement, they actually end up talking as if they are making a No. 1 type statement. It is precisely this aspect of many research reports that I object to.

Zelditch's statement on the informant as a surrogate census taker (p. 571) is an exceptionally fine presentation of the subject of question-asking and shows how even second-hand data-gathering properly done may sometimes closely approximate first-hand observation.

Zelditch's figure on page 575 is a very neat and comprehensive analytic scheme. What disturbs me about it is that it does not seem to have any place for gathering information about a social process over a period of time. It seems to me that it is precisely in this area that direct, intimate observation of behavior has the greatest advantage over other research methods now used. Zelditch's statement is by far the most comprehensive treatment of field study methods that I have yet come across. I would wish that his scheme could be expanded still further to include such process data.

With regard to the section on page 575 on "Readily Verbalized Norms and Status," I would simply like to point out that people may act according to norms which they

do not recognize themselves and therefore would be unable to supply to an interviewer. Such "as if" norms must be discovered by making inferences about the behavior of the people involved. Thus, we may discover that they are behaving as if they were following a given norm, even though, if we bluntly state this norm to them, they might not recognize it and might even deny it.

JULIUS A. ROTH
New York School of Social Work

REJOINDER

May 14, 1962

To the Editor:

Mr. Roth and I basically agree. For example, I agree that questionnaires and interviews often put the respondent in the role of sociologist, explicitly or implicitly requiring him to interpret and analyze his behavior, and that this is a difficult and important methodological issue. Further, although I did not pretend to completeness, my intention was to define "incident," "history," and "participant-observation" so as to say roughly, as Mr. Roth puts it, that direct observation is the best way to study a social process through time. I suspect that my presentation was clumsy and obscured the point.

Both Mr. Roth and I are wrong, however. Trow's pertinent comment to Becker and Geer (see n. 5 of my paper) is that in calling participant observation better than interviewing for studying an "event," their definition of an "event" is parochial. Not all events are directly apprehensible—suicide rate is an example. Not all complex social interactions nor all social processes through time are directly apprehensible either. The politics of choosing a national committeeman may be directly observed as a whole: the process of secularization of a society over a century is not only not directly apprehensible as a whole but may be so imperceptible within a brief interval (say, two years) that it cannot be directly observed at all. Had I not come across Trow's comment so long after my paper had already taken its basic form (I saw the comment shortly before submitting my paper), I would have tried to develop its implications there. As it is, my paper was not sufficiently clear, I believe, in carefully specifying the terms "event" and "incident."

MORRIS ZELDITCH, JR.
Stanford University

BOOK REVIEWS

Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology, 1959. 4 vols. Louvain: International Sociological Association, 1959–61. Pp. 1037. $25.50.

The World Congress of Sociology, held triennially since 1950, has a character quite unlike that of annual meetings of the American Sociological Association. It is not merely that the participants come from many countries and report from diverse backgrounds. It is rather that the contributors are much more inclined to survey and to evaluate, and not merely to report highly specialized researches. The theme of the 1959 Congress, held at Milan-Stresa, was "Society and Sociological Knowledge," which gave special emphasis to a sociology of knowledge approach; but even the preceding congresses stood off to take a long perspective on whatever topics they dealt with. There is no separation of sociological processes from political and economic ones, just as there is no separation of pure from applied knowledge, so the conception of sociology is Durkheimian in scope.

The first volume surveys the present state of sociology in eleven countries, preceded by a general discussion of sociology in its social context. The second volume presents ten summary papers on the application of sociological knowledge to specific "action" fields, three papers on sociological aspects of social planning, plus three papers on the development of sociological methods. The third, and longest, volume offers the presidential speech by Professor Georges Friedmann (France), a general report on the Congress by Secretary T. B. Bottomore (United Kingdom), a summary of the approximately one hundred specific papers on thirteen fields of applied sociology and on ten types of methods of research, as well as a report on the discussions held in all sessions of the Congress. Volume IV contains papers and discussions on the sociology of knowledge.

The whole presents the basis for an admirable perspective on sociology throughout the world today. It offers a world tour of sociology and sociologists. Many papers—notably that of Raymond Aron (France)—are incisive and comprehensive analyses of the field and subfields; others are pedestrian and provincial.

But it is the discussions—the formal ones at each session and the informal ones called *ad hoc* to discuss some particular issue—that one finds the heart of the Congress. It is here, for example, that Professor Fedoseev (U.S.S.R.) deplored "cold-war language" and said, "we can agree with sociologists from the West on methods of research, but we have our own Marxist theoretical point of view." The East-West tension manifested itself in many ways—the argument over whether the Congress rules should be modified to permit simultaneous translation into Russian as well as English and French, the Russians' failure to applaud the address of Professor Ossowski (Poland), the denunciation of American culture by an unscheduled speaker, P. A. Baran (United States). The discussions in the smaller, specialized sessions were almost equally interesting and probably more useful to sociological researchers. In many cases there was a real exchange of information and techniques; in other cases the cultural and political barriers to communication offer data for the world sociologist of knowledge. Some of the discussions are so lacking in content and meaning as to suggest either that the *rapporteur* did not grasp what was said or that the speaker came from a country in which sociology was underdeveloped.

With an interpretive summary by a sympathetic sociologist of knowledge who actually attended the Congress, one could get a fairly comprehensive view of sociology throughout much of the world. This seems least true—although I could be biased—for the United States, for the range of sociological research, theory, and method in this country is so great that it cannot be comprehended in the short span of a leisurely eight-day congress. The result is that the non-American's view of American sociology is highly selective, according to who happens to speak for developments in the United States. This is much less true for sociology in other coun-

tries, as a large *proportion* of the sociologists from all other countries attend, although the absolute *number* of American sociologists at the Congress was greater than that for any other country.

The net impression of one who has attended all but the first of the congresses is that sociology is gaining increasing acceptance in many countries, that sociologists from the "less sociologically developed" countries have been learning avidly from those from the more developed, and that there is a growing scientific and intellectual maturity to the field.

ARNOLD M. ROSE

University of Minnesota

Traité de sociologie ("An Overview of Sociology"), Vol. II. Edited by GEORGES GURVITCH. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960. Pp. 466. New Fr. 20.

"French sociology as we see in the *Traité de sociologie*," Raymond Aron says, "is neither Soviet nor American. It tries to retain certain aspects of the analytic-empirical schools (while, to be sure, being quite critical); and to preserve something of the synthetic and historical interpretation without winding up in a doctrinaire philosophy of history" (*Les Grandes doctrines de sociologie historique* [Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1960]). This work reflects a middle position in many ways: The various essays stand between past developments, which they review, and the future, for which research possibilities are sometimes suggested.

The *Traité* is in the middle, too, between theory and data, failing generally to meet Simiand's injunction: "Pas de faits sans idées, pas d'idées sans faits." It will doubtless be contended that this is inevitable in a perhaps impossible undertaking: an objective overview of the field of sociology, as Gurvitch puts it. But this "middleness" may derive not only from the nature of the work but also from the ambivalent nature of French sociology, split as it is between provincial departments of philosophy and Parisian research centers.

There are oversights in this overview. Little attention is given to work outside France, the United States, England, and Germany. The field of deviant behavior and social disorganization is very lightly treated. Virtually nothing is reported or reviewed of the considerable work done in studies of race and ethnic relations. Studies in the sociology of education, of medical organization, of mass communications are almost completely untouched.

But what is touched is, nonetheless, considerable. Volume II consists of essays by eighteen scholars writing on political sociology (political systems, parties, and voting behavior), the sociology of cultural products (sociology of religion, knowledge, morality, law, literature and the arts, criminology, and the problems of cross-cultural contact), collective and social psychology ("total psychic phenomena"; group psychology; the psychology of interpersonal relations, social classes, large collectivities; and the problem of basic personality, sociology, and psychoanalysis), and finally, the problem of contact between so-called primitive and modern societies (the concept of a primitive society, changes in relationships between primitive and technologically advanced societies).

The essays on political sociology cover familiar ground, except perhaps Goguel's useful review of French and Belgian voting studies.

In other sections we come to matters more traditionally French, the sociology of cultural products (*des oeuvres de civilisation*). Gabriel Le Bras offers a lucid and modest essay, sketching problems in the sociology of religion. Gurvitch follows with three essays treating the sociology of knowledge, of morality, and of law. Each contains a historical note with critical comments followed by a systematic discussion revealing Gurvitch's propensity for taxonomies and typologies. This, in turn, is followed by a fitting of the system to historical modes of social organization, and at three or four levels from small groups, classes, and categories to the global level. For example, Gurvitch specifies seven types of knowledge; cross-cuts these with six dichotomized orientations or emphases. The task is then to apply this 7×6 matrix to types of social orders—for example, theocratic, patriarchal, feudal, precapitalist, etc. One is impressed with the deft taxonomic legerdemain, and struck with the cavalier sweep across data-free centuries. Henri Lévy-Bruhl concludes this part with a graceful essay on the history, objectives, and methods of the study of criminal

conduct. Where Part VII deals with cultural imperatives (cognitions and rules, moral and juridical), Part VIII treats expressive needs and preferences and the means of inculcating them. Piaget writes on socialization. There follows a gem of lucid compression in which Georges Granai discusses the sociology of language and communication. In successive chapters, Francastel and Memmi lament the inadequate development of the sociology of art and literature, respectively, and suggest programs for research. (Stipulating the conditions for a sociology of literature, Memmi sets down some guidelines reminiscent of Durkheim's *Rules*) An finally, speaking in the tradition of French sociology, which has never separated the realms of cultural anthropology and sociology as we have, Bastide concludes this section with a discussion of intercultural contact

Bastide appears again in Part IX (social psychology) to highlight a handful of important problems in the relationship of sociology and psychoanalysis, suggesting bridges by way of theory and method. Gurvitch's introductory chapter proposes that the notion of "total social phenomena" should be balanced by the concept of "total psychic phenomena," embracing things now discrete or confused: different levels of awareness, different disciplines (social, individual, and collective psychology), concrete and conceptual elements of self, etc. (Tidying up one's intellectual house is an unexceptionable counsel of perfection. It is not clear how Gurvitch's specific injunction might lead us to clarity and understanding *en profondeur.*) Jean Stoetzel, director of the Centre des Recherches Sociologiques, describes and assesses the converging streams of interest in problems of interpersonal relations—from general psychology, sociology and ethnology, and social psychology, rather shortchanging in the process the symbolic interactionists (or transactionists, as Dewey and Bentley might prefer). Bourricaud, in a chapter on group psychology, adds to a discussion of Bales and of Moreno (who seems to be a sociometric star in France) a warning to the effect that popularity, attraction, and repulsion—sociometric analyses—are scarcely enough to explain the social structure. In an essay on the psychology of social classes, Lefebvre, starting with the assertion that empirical techniques or fragmentary analyses of the social structure are not enough, proceeds to hang some plausible propositions about the psychic concomitants of bourgeois, working-class, and peasant behavior on a Marxian framework. And finally, Dufrenne reviews and discusses some of the material in the personality and culture field, the study of national character, and the problems of such inquiries.

The last section is devoted to the study of primitive societies. Cazeneuve writes a short essay on the criteria of primitiveness (*sociétés archaïques*) emphasizing, with Gurvitch, awareness of the possibility of innovation as a useful criterion. Paul Mercier has a cursory note on the cross-fertilization of ethnological and sociological methods. And Georges Balandier concludes the volume with a discussion of change in primitive societies. He points to the need and promise of analyzing change not only to see, as Boas emphasized, how a society came to be what it is, but to see it in its becoming its probable future, and in so doing, to understand its current structure.

EVERETT K. WILSON

Antioch College

Gesellschaft und Freiheit: Zur soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwart ("Society and Freedom: A Sociological Analysis of Our Time"). By RALF DAHRENDORF. Munich: R. Piper & Co. Pp. 455.

This collection of essays, several of which originally appeared in American publications, places its author in the very first ranks of German, and indeed international, sociology. Dahrendorf's range of interests and concerns is wide indeed; he exhibits an admirable ability to move from relatively abstract theoretical problems to empirical studies and discussions of social policy. He is equally at home in German and in Anglo-Saxon sociology.

The richness of the subject matter discussed and the apparent heterogeneity of the topics makes it difficult to do justice to this book in a short review. Yet it would seem that one major theme runs through most of these essays: Dahrendorf sees himself primarily as a *sociologue engagé* whose central concern is with the social conditions that make a free society possible. Whether he discusses the functions of social conflicts and polemicizes against certain conservative assumptions of Parsons' social theory, whether he analyzes

recent changes in Germany's social structure, whether he discusses the dangers of "democracy without liberty" or the possibility of a value-neutral sociology, he is always preoccupied with accumulating knowledge about the possibility of freedom in our time. "The decisive problem for the social scientist concerned with freedom," he writes, "lies in the social preconditions of political democracy." Though Dahrendorf's approach differs in many ways from Max Weber's, he is yet writing in the grand tradition of the author of "Politics as a Vocation."

Many of these essays are polemical in nature. While the polemical sallies are often illuminating as well as entertaining, they sometimes lead the author into unduly exaggerated statements and rather careless formulations. He frequently has the annoying habit of greatly simplifying the position of an adversary so as to be able to demolish him with somewhat too easy a flourish. "Does the only sociologically relevant consequence of a strike or a revolution," writes Dahrendorf, polemicizing against a functionalist straw man of his own creation, "lie in the establishment of a relationship between the contending parties? To ask the question is to deny it." Indeed, but where under heaven or on earth has anybody ever asserted such an absurd proposition? This reviewer holds no brief for functionalist orthodoxy, but there are places in this book where he could not help but feel that some of Dahrendorf's blows were hitting the victim below the belt.

But these are relatively minor flaws in what, all things considered, is a major achievement. The book contains most valuable contributions to social theory, to political sociology, and to the sociology of conflict. One can only hope that an English translation will soon make it more widely available to American sociologists.

Lewis A. Coser

Brandeis University

Man, Play, and Games. By Roger Caillois. Translated by Meyer Barash. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. ix+208. $5.00.

Caillois has written an old-fashioned book, one in which a fugue is played upon a few simple themes elaborated by material from great variety of cultures. One no longer wri on *The Play of Man* as did Groos, to wh Caillois refers, on *Marriage and the Family* did Westermarck, or on *Secret Societies* did Webster. We run to monographs in whi the institutions of a given people are seen their relationships to one another, althou there is new cross-cultural study by comput And we lean toward study of particu changes rather than to speculation abo gradual, universal evolution.

In another sense, the book is quite "ne fashioned." Recent studies are considere there is reference to the new economics games, to new social movements and n theories. It is a curious mixture of a co parative theory of human societies and descri tions of games, carnivals, and rites, with c tail carried beyond the point of usefulness

Play—in fact, social life—Caillois propos consists of competition (*agôn*), chance (*ale* simulation (*mimicry*), and vertigo (*ilin* Earlier cultures depended upon simulation a vertigo; advanced urban cultures are order by impersonal competition and chance. Ca lois works these out in various combinatio in a fashion comparable to Parsons' workin out of his pattern variables. He contends th simulation (the mask) and the ecstasy it i duces are complementary forces binding t gether earlier societies, but that those wl use the mask (magicians, priests, the elder can fool the people only if they themselv see through the mask. Only thus can succee ing generations have the gullibility to be d ceived as well as the wit to perpetuate a use the deceit. That is perhaps not quite ju to Caillois, but it is nearly so. The puzzle belief in liturgical roles (for which masks a worn) is indeed difficult.

He also notes that chance and competiti —both impersonal principles—compleme each other. Chance can never be complete eliminated: it exists in whether one is bo to wealth or to culture, both of which great affect one's ability to win in impersonal co petition. Some of the book's most brillia passages have to do with the interplay of the factors in advanced, equalitarian societies.

There are also brilliant passages on t various mixtures of these four principles. N matter how rational a society the principl of mimicry and vertigo (ecstasy) still turn

—as in the devotion of movie stars or to a Hitler—perhaps in a perverted form. One of the most intriguing passages has to do with the pathological devotion to chance—in the form of mass gambling—in societies which are caught between the primitive combination of mimicry and ecstasy and the modern, industrial one of rational competition and chance. Caillois sees this as the fate of countries where industrial civilization comes quickly to poverty-stricken simple peoples.

This is a book to be read for ideas, for imaginative hypotheses (not all of which will hold water), for breadth of view of human society. It is part treatise, part essay, part social science fiction. And blessings on the translator for having done it and for having done it with finish and clarity.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

Brandeis University

Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel. With a Translation of His Essay on "The Decomposition of Marxism." By IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. New York: Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. viii+264. $6.00.

Though in recent years the enigmatic and contradictory thinker, Georges Sorel, has been the subject of a number of excellent critical books—by Meisel and Humphrey in America, and by Freund and Barth in Germany and Switzerland, among others—there is still considerable room for new interpretations. Hence, Mr Horowitz's work is most welcome.

This is not a full-scale treatment of the whole of Sorel's work, but rather a critical discussion of his syndicalist period, from 1898 (when he started writing on syndicalism) to 1908 (when his most influential books appeared—the *Reflections on Violence* and *The Illusions of Progress*). Accordingly, the author is mainly concerned with Sorel's theory of myth as the basis of a pragmatic and irrationalist politics, and neglects some Sorelian notions (e.g., the concept of *diremption*) that are of special interest to the sociologist. But within his self-imposed limits, he has made a valuable contribution. After discussing three of Sorel's contemporaries who deeply influenced his theories—Charles Péguy, Fernand Pelloutier and Henri Bergson—Horowitz proceeds to a treatment of Sorel's critique of the state, state socialism, and bureaucracy. Subsequent chapters deal with the Sorelian distinction between factual history and history as myth, with Sorel's cult of the virile and ascetic hero of action and his celebration of the *élan vital* of the proletariat informed by the myth of the general strike. A final chapter considers the collapse of Sorel's pragmatic and irrationalist socialism and his failure to come to grips with the modern world of industrialism and technology.

The author sees Sorel as an acute critic of the over-rationalistic aspects of previous socialist theory, as one of the *fin de siècle* thinkers who attempted to account for the nonrational and irrational springs of human behavior. He criticizes him, however, for constantly shifting from the descriptive to the prescriptive. Sorel did not limit himself to noting the role of violence in history; he advocated it. Hence his quest for a new heroic morality ended in an apologia for a kind of visceral and instinctivistic politics.

Horowitz brought to this study a background of wide reading in philosophy and the social sciences. His interpretations are informed by his extensive knowledge of the intellectual scene in France and in Europe around the *fin de siècle*. However, the book suffers from one drawback. If Sorel was indeed a most unsystematic thinker, this does not give his commentators a license to emulate him in this respect. Horowitz has the annoying habit of straying continuously from the subject at hand, and of skipping from a particular point in Sorel's work to a discussion of Marx or Lenin or Freud, and a host of other thinkers. He sometimes seems to proceed by free association. And his laudable effort to show the contemporary relevance of certain of Sorel's ideas sometimes leads him to treat his subject as if he were a contemporary political antagonist rather than a long-dead theorist who must be understood within the context of his times.

This book is, despite its flaws, an important contribution to the understanding of Sorel. Its value is enhanced by the excellent translation of "The Decomposition of Marxism," an important companion piece to the *Reflections on Violence,* hitherto the only work of Sorel's available in English translation.

LEWIS A. COSER

Brandeis University

The Political Context of Sociology. By LEON BRAMSON. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. 164. $4.00.

This is an interesting and, in many ways, a valuable book. Concerning itself generally with the problem of the intellectual contexts of sociology—those provided by the social and political philosophies of an age—it deals specifically with the development of the ideas integral in the perspective of mass society. This perspective first came into being shortly after the French Revolution, largely under the influence of Conservatives and Romantics. Both groups saw in the aftermath of the Revolution not a new order but a new disorder, one characterized by rampant economism, loss of community, and alienation of the individual. These ideas have remained essential ideas in the history of modern conservatism, especially in Europe.

What the sociologists did—beginning with Tocqueville and continuing through such men as Tönnies, Simmel, Weber, and Durkheim—was to work objectively, and often empirically, with insights based upon these conservative ideas. Without sharing all the value assumptions of the political conservatives, it was possible for European sociologists to add a new dimension to social understanding by emphasizing the rise of mass society and its impact upon traditional institutions and values. As the author rightly observes:

> The theory of mass society suggests a crystallization and convergence of the major themes of nineteenth century sociology. This helps us to understand the curious circumstances under which thinkers of both Right and Left are united in agreement on the fundamentals of the mass society theory. Both sociologists of conservation and sociologists of change hold these ideas in common. The emphasis on order which is fundamental to sociology is brought to a focus in the theory of mass society.

It is, as Mr. Bramson also suggests, essentially this preoccupation with mass society that explains the difference between the conception of sociology that first flourished in Europe and that in the United States. To a large extent, the origins of sociology as an academic discipline in the United States are to be found within the social problems courses of the late nineteenth century. Occasionally these were supplemented by courses of a philosophy of history character, based upon Comte, Spe cer, Ward, and a few others. But it is the soci problems emphasis that is oldest and most co tinuous in American sociology.

This emphasis was radically altered, ho ever (as the author points out), by the wo of such men as Sumner, Cooley, Small, Par and Thomas early in the twentieth century. A were familiar with the European tradition sociology, and it is to them that we are large indebted for the gradual shift of emphas from social problems as ends in themselves social problems dealt with as aspects of soci structure and social process. Through the efforts, particularly Park's, the perspective mass society became, in an adapted way, pa of American sociology. Particular attention given in the book to research in mass comm nications and the ways in which the America critique of mass society, as we know it, h been formulated. The final sections of the boo are devoted to a cogent analysis of both th proponents of mass society theory—in th country and in Europe—and those who hav been critical of it.

It is a useful volume for anyone intereste in a sophisticated way, in the developmer of central tendencies in modern sociolog Throughout, Bramson shows himself in pos session of a sense of that most charming academic paradoxes: that a discipline whos individual members are today earnestly an overwhelmingly liberal in social and politic matters should rest upon ideas and perspective that came in the first instance from the monu mentally non-liberal. *Respice finem!*

ROBERT A. NISBE

University of California, Riverside

The Prophets of Paris. By FRANK E. MANUEL Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universit Press, 1962. Pp. 349. $7.50.

In this exciting and brilliantly written vo ume, Frank E. Manuel, to whom we alread owe the definitive work on Saint-Simon, pro vides a reassessment of those seminal thinker who have been the major formulators of th philosophy of progress, French style (H promises to follow this later by a Germa series and perhaps an English one.) Most soci ologists, I fear, are familiar with Turgot an

Condorcet, with Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians, with Charles Fourier and even, perhaps, with Auguste Comte, only through secondary readings. They are hence prone to conceive of them in rather stereotyped ways. It is not the least of Manuel's merits to make the reader aware how wide off the mark may be some of the received notions; how each of these thinkers, when approached with fresh eyes, fails in many ways to conform to the *imago* which later generations have created of him. For example, Turgot, in his idea of progress, did *not* imply that all nations or all spheres of culture were progressing in a straight line and at an even tempo. In Saint-Simon's mature thought, scientists would *not* alone dominate the world of the future; rather, they would have to share elite positions with the administrative directors of society and with the moralist leaders of the New Christianity.

Manuel's book provides a lesson in humility; much that is currently in vogue is already adumbrated in the writings of the Prophets of Paris. Condorcet advanced the notion that the calculus of probabilities can be used to study trends of opinion; Comte taught about the contemporaneity of the primitive—the idea that earlier stages of human consciousness, far from being sloughed off forever, continued to operate beneath the surface so that when a man fell victim to a psychic disturbance he might regress to fetishism. And some of Fourier's conceptions about, for example, the nature of repressions adumbrate not only Freud but certain contemporary reinterpreters of psychoanalysis such as Herbert Marcuse or Norman Brown.

Manuel has succeeded in demonstrating the continuity as well as the diversity of the philosophy of progress from Turgot to Comte. He shows the degree to which each successive thinker fashions to his own uses a heritage handed down to him within this tradition; how, with building blocks provided by his predecessors, he builds a system which is peculiarly his own. Each system reflects, Manuel shows, the needs of the author's psyche even as it reflects current preoccupations among wider circles of intellectuals. Manuel holds a nice balance between those who would concentrate on the typical and those who are fascinated by the unique in intellectual history.

While these interconnected essays are not, and are not meant to be, the final word on the thinkers discussed, they open up new perspectives on all of them. One need not agree with all of Manuel's judgments. This reviewer, for one, is not convinced that the totalitarian potential in the Saint-Simonians' doctrine is only of minor importance because they preached universal love; such lovers, I fear, had they gained power, might have smothered mankind in their embrace. Yet such minor disagreements do not detract from one's admiration of the book. It represents, in fact, a magnificent achievement. Any sociologist who fails to read it will be the poorer for it.

LEWIS A. COSER

Brandeis University

The Papers of Maurice R. Davie. Edited by RUBY JO REEVES KENNEDY. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii +311. $5.00.

This volume contributes substantially to our understanding of the growth of sociology during the last forty years. At the time of his retirement in 1961, Professor Davie was the third chairman in a sociology department which had its beginning when William Graham Sumner offered the first sociology course in any university in the world. The history of sociology at Yale University is bound in with developments in the field in the United States.

A lineal intellectual descendant of Sumner and Albert G. Keller, Davie expanded their ethnographic and cultural approach to the science of society to include data from contemporary, industrial urban societies. His 1932 paper, "The Nature and Scope of Sociology as Conceived at Yale," also stresses the close affinity between anthropology and sociology, with George P. Murdock initiating what has come to be known as the cross-cultural survey.

Davie's contributions lie in the areas of demography, urbanization, and human ecology, and the parts of this volume follow these main content areas: "Immigration and Population," "The City," "Refugees," and "Minorities." These are preceded by a section on the "History of Sociology at Yale" and are followed by a section on miscellaneous topics. Since his writings should be well known to students and fellow scholars, this reviewer will mention only selected features of Davie's work.

The methodology reported in his studies,

"The Pattern of Urban Growth" and "The Structure of the Modern City," deserves serious consideration today. Before American cities were census-tracted on a large scale, municipal records, maps, and personal observation in urban subsectors were considered necessary parts of urban analysis. As one reviews the vast literature based on census tract statistical analysis, one wonders that the methods of urban analysis often result in research reports which sound as if no one really lives in cities. This reviewer suggests that we are, perhaps, being unduly swayed by the easy accessibility of census tract statistics and ignoring personal observation, municipal records, and land-use maps as useful research tools.

Davie's shorter writings reveal his interest not only in the advance of professional scientific sociology but also in the application of sociology to social problems in a language understandable by non-sociologists. "What Shall We Do about Immigration?" first appeared in 1946 as a "Public Affairs Pamphlet" and was later reprinted in the proceedings of a congressional committee. Other articles have appeared in the *Weekly Review, Scientific Monthly,* and a miscellany of other periodicals. In the instance of Davie, not only does scholarly writing make a distinct contribution to the science of sociology, it also directly contributes to society's deliberations of social problems.

A number of names appear in the text and in footnotes which facilitates insight into the history of sociology. In 1940, Talcott Parsons is reported to have said that much of the trouble in the social science field has been due to the fact that we have fixed our attention on too broad a level of generalization and deal too much with abstractions of universal compass.

Although one misses an index, this volume is "must" reading for those historians of sociology who trace the Sumner-Keller tradition into the post–World War I era, and it should provoke much methodological soul-searching by those currently doing research in urban sociology, minority-group relations, and immigration.

The Papers of Maurice R. Davie does not end an era, however, for Davie's ranging interests and careful scholarship will continue to provide us with further insights into the science of society.

JOHN H. MABRY

University of Kentucky

Philosophy, Science, and the Sociology (Knowledge. By IRVING LOUIS HOROWIT Foreword by ROBERT S. COHEN. ("Americ Lecture Series," No. 442.) Springfield, Ill Charles C Thomas, 1961. Pp. xiii+169. $7.7

"The growth of a science," Horowitz write "involves an ever deepening immersion in co crete problems." The sociology of knowled has moved in the opposite direction. Marx ar Mannheim, for example, even at their most al stract, always attempted to grapple with tl concrete. Latter-day writers of treatises and treatises about treatises in the sociology knowledge have neglected all that is concrete i the works of their predecessors in favor of a that is abstract. This book does little, except b exhortation, to reverse the trend.

The author touches on numerous issues, bot procedural and substantive. A dip into the pr history of the sociology of knowledge, with ref erences to classical Chinese thought, Plat Lucretius, Bacon, Hume, and many others, followed by a plea for this field to continu shedding its metaphysical inheritance. Since cannot do so unless sociologists of knowledg use appropriate methods, Horowitz devot much of his book to procedural issues.

He discusses dialectic, pragmatic, and pos tivist methodologies, finds each of them want ing in some particulars, and goes on to argu that the sociology of knowledge "necessaril employs a method common to all science." De spite the differences between philosophic an scientific methods, however, Horowitz urge that "the real future of sociology depends upo its willingness to submit its methods and as sumptions to philosophic analysis." For "whe crises in social theory reveal themselves in th practice of prediction, explanation, and contro . . . philosophy may act as a cleansing agent fo the logic and language of sociology." The book procedural discussions also include a critica review of the six "instruments employed by th sociology of knowledge (in common with so ciology in general)." These are said to be statis tical and mathematical analysis, functionalis theory, paradigms and linguistic typologie field theories, ideal typologies, and historica models. Horowitz, who might be described as procedural pluralist, opens this critical revie with a denial of "the false assumption that a sci entific explanation can be arrived at by onl one type of method" and concludes with a de

tense of the "multiplicity of laws and levels in social theory."

In his more substantive discussions the author takes up some of his topics in sufficient detail to make one wish that he had written a book on only one of the many things which interest him instead of on a dozen or so. One does not know quite what to make of his substitution of "utopia and counter-ideology on one side. and counter-utopia and ideology on the other" for the familiar formula, ideology and utopia. Where would these categories take us if we ever did get around, finally, to that "ever deepening immersion in concrete problems?" The discussion of coercive, permissive, and libertarian utopias is more tantalizing.

In coercive utopias men conform to the requirements of order and "securing hierarchical secular order becomes the chief aim of the perfect commonwealth." Such utopias, as in Plato or Hobbes, are envisaged when order is of central value and is thought to be based on power. In permissive utopias, where law conforms to the needs of men and the "auto-regulation of the rational individual" is preferred, "authority is said to come into play only to mediate the claims of conflicting ego motivations." Such utopias, as in one passage in Durkheim, are envisaged when personal happiness is of central value. In libertarian utopias force has an instrumental rather than an ethical value and auto-regulation is the result of economic plenty rather than the result of education. Such utopias, as in Lenin's discussion of the transition from capitalism to communism, are based on a faith in the "strict correlation of economic equality and political democracy" and on the belief that the need for coercion "vanishes along with human want and misery." There is more meat in the single chapter on "The Structure of Utopianism" than can be mentioned here and, to this reader's taste, more than in all other chapters combined.

In brief, most of this book presents precept rather than example. Since one can hardly argue with the precepts, let's put them in brackets, stop talking about them, and get on with the job. There is little reason to argue in detail with various objections to social science in general and to the sociology of knowledge in particular when one believes, in the author's words, that "only one kind of reply is completely satisfactory, skill and craft in applying the canons of science to urgent human issues." There will be ample time for further discussions of this type after our visions and programs are actually carried out.

VERNON K. DIBBLE

Columbia University

The Long Revolution. By RAYMOND WILLIAMS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv+370. $5.00.

This latest work by Raymond Williams stands as almost a companion volume to its immediate predecessor, *Culture and Society;* it reads like something of a workbook from which some bright and hard-working disciple could have derived the earlier work. However, not enjoying the arbitrary unity that historical analysis provides, *The Long Revolution* turns out to be a far more controversial, a far more interesting, and a far more uneven performance. *The Long Revolution* in a more general way covers much of the same material treated in *Culture and Society:* the industrial and political revolutions marking recent English history seen through the focus of the cultural revolution. ("This deeper cultural revolution is a large part of our most significant living experience, and is being interpreted and indeed fought out . . . in the world of art and ideas. It is when we try to correlate change of this kind with changes covered by the disciplines of politics, economics and communications that we discover some of the most difficult but also some of the most human questions.")

The very range of topics that Williams selects, the area of art and ideas as both the mirror and instruments of basic societal dynamics, as well as the stress upon terms such as community and communication, suggests a striking parallel with the overly neglected work of Kenneth Burke. Williams writes: "To see art a particular process in the general human process of creative discovery and communication is at once a redefinition of the status of art and the finding of a means to link it with our ordinary social life. . . . Everything we see and do, the whole structure of our relations and institutions, depends, finally, on an effort of learning, description and communication. We create our human world as we have thought of art being created. Art is a major means of precisely this creation." This point of view one might easily attribute to Burke.

A second parallel is found in the fact that both writers are committed to offering new programs and perspectives to the political left; and, within this common function, both share a common heresy: commitment to what is in essence a consensual model. This is somewhat more pronounced in Williams who, after all, writes in the context of Britain's welfare state. (An unfortunate dissimilarity involves a matter of style; Williams' heavy humorless style suggests that he is eminently capable of authoring a work expressly for sociologists.)

The Long Revolution is divided into three sections. The first of these contains four largely theoretical essays ("The Creative Mind," "The Analysis of Culture," "Individuals and Societies," and "Images of Society"), all of which manage to spill over into areas of basic interest to many sociologists. The four essays are, however, irritatingly innocent of contact with anything resembling the recent professional literature; once again one encounters the slow changing public face of our discipline: Kroeber, Kluckhohn, Benedict, Sorokin, Riesman, Mannheim, Fromm. Yet, beyond the irritation, one must recognize that such works as Williams' serve as correctives to what otherwise becomes overly inbred discourse: innocence raising what we have collectively agreed to merely assume or ignore. This, for example, out of the essay on "Individuals and Societies" becomes a very suggestive typology of social (relational) types (member, subject, servant, rebel, exile, and vagrant); such a typology, discursively spun out, serves to remind us of what might have been lost in typologies created out of elegantly neat cross-classification of two concepts or dimensions.

The second part contains a number of attempts at a sociohistorical analysis of several British cultural institutions: the development of education, the popular press, dramatic forms, standard English, etc. Necessarily brief, occasionally shallow, these essays still are fully suggestive in their own right, and they serve to remind one of the broad considerations of large-scale structural change that were once far less occasional a part of our exercise.

It is in the concluding section, on Britain in the 1960's, that Williams understandingly becomes most programmatic, addressing himself most explicitly to his fellow intellectuals in and around the British Labour party who find themselves trying to resolve the problems of political identity in a period where many of the more objective goals that were part of the traditional Socialist vision have been realized. While acknowledging the more traditional evil of the absence of social control and direction of many institutions, Williams' real point of departure lies in his desire to see an abandonment of the old rhetoric of class struggle in favor of a quest for techniques that might lead to a renewed sense of community (essentially pastoral relationships in an industrial setting). Class as a concept (an outmoded habit of mind and speech) replaces any particular class as the enemy; the goal is seen in terms of optimum creativity and mental health. Unhappily there are moments, accentuated by his lack of humor, when Williams begins to sound very much like a Norman Vincent Peale for the intellectual set.

Aside from the question of Williams' politics, this concluding section represents a valuable contribution to the growing discussion of the politics and social life of industrial societies; though perhaps as much as a symptom of the later stages as the "long revolution" as an analysis of it.

In summary, *The Long Revolution* might be considered more as a stimulant than a direct contribution to sociology. But, on this level, it is a very important and impressive one.

WILLIAM SIMON

National Opinion Research Center

What Is History? By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962. Pp iii+209. $3.50.

Once upon a time, some fifty to seventy-five years ago, historians lived in an Eden where the view went unchallenged that there could be a "scientific history." One of the chief priests in this paradise, a priest who had many disciples in America, was Von Ranke. In England, another chief priest was Acton, who, in 1896, as editor of the first edition of the *Cambridge Modern History*, spoke with complete conviction of an "ultimate history." This Eden for historians was destroyed by a number of historical events and by a variety of intellectual developments. The First World War, in which "scientific" historians contradicted one another; the rise of Soviet Russia as an apparent

justification of the Marxist doctrine that history was merely ideology; the emergence of the sociology-of-knowledge doctrine that ideas were influenced by social roles and cultural values; the growing awareness in natural science itself that its knowledge was not final and absolute but tentative and approximate; the social and cultural relativism that were manifested in Hitlerian Germany, the world-wide depression of the 1930's, and Rooseveltian America—all these events and ideas made historians flee from their paradise in horror, convinced now of just the opposite belief, that "scientific history" was utterly impossible. In America, this belief was only most powerfully expressed in Carl Becker's American Historical Association Presidential Address, "Everyman His Own Historian."

Hardly a historian is now alive who was not brought up in this new and bedeviled world in which only creatures of evil, often calling themselves sociologists, dared to claim that the social world, past as well as present, could be the subject of continuing and valid scientific study. At the level of practice, historians insist upon their "objective" research; but, at the level of general commitment and aspiration, they are frightened of all suggestions that science is possible for them. Although a great deal of excellent research on many historical subjects has been carried out during the last thirty years, resulting in what a sociologist would readily call scientific "progress," the historians reject any general scientific credit for their achievements. Even the particular historians who are responsible for the "more scientific" understanding of some set of historical events, say, the causes of the English Revolution, or the Reconstruction period in the United States, refuse to believe that any scientific "progress" has been made; they will only admit to "a *change* of interpretation." While they work away with enormous energy, zeal, and often brilliance to be "more objective" than their predecessors, at the ideological level historians still believe in the anti-scientific doctrine of "everyman his own historian."

But now there comes a blast of protest that has been heard round the historians' world. It is contained in E. H. Carr's penetrating little book, *What Is History?* which consists of six essays originally given as the George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures in the University of Cambridge, later delivered over the BBC, and now published in this country by Alfred A. Knopf. Carr has the English academic's polemical talent in full measure, and its display is not stinted here. Carr's substance is so sound, his style so charming, that no "social scientist," whether he calls himself sociologist or historian, should wait long to delight himself with, and profit from, this book.

Only a brief description of Carr's essential argument is possible here. In the first essay, "The Historian and His Facts," Carr develops the theme that "the historian is engaged on a continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other" (p. 34). The second essay, "Society and the Individual," holds that history—"meaning both the enquiry conducted by the historian and the facts of the past into which he enquires—is a social process, in which individuals are engaged as social beings; and the imaginary antithesis between society and the individual is no more than a red herring to confuse our thinking" (pp. 68–69). In the third essay, Carr suggests that "nowadays both scientists and historians entertain the more modest hope of advancing progressively from one fragmentary hypothesis to another," and he meets a variety of common objections against the view that history can be scientific. One of his statements in this essay is of special interest to sociologists: "For the rest, I would only say that the more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both. Let the frontier between them be kept wide open for two-way traffic" (p. 84). The fourth essay, "Causation in History," argues that it is "the special function" of the historian to investigate the causes of social-historical events; Carr forcefully refutes all extreme "free will," "accidental," and "meaningless" views of history. In the fifth essay, "History as Progress," Carr presents a subtle definition of social progress and accepts "Acton's description of progress as 'the scientific hypothesis on which history is to be written' " (p. 176). And finally, in the last essay, "The Widening Horizon," Carr movingly maintains that the social revolution of our times consists in the universal expansion of reason and calls our attention to "two things both of which we are badly in need of today: a sense of change as a progressive factor in history, and belief in

reason as our guide for the understanding of its complexities" (p. 204).

All these views will be more acceptable to most sociologists than to most historians, but even the sociologists will delight in the lucidity, the controlled moral fervor, and the humor with which Carr elucidates an intellectual and moral stance which we can only hope the historians will once again adopt. Without such a stance, the historians often waste much of their talent; and we badly need that talent for faster progress in the understanding and control of human behavior.

BERNARD BARBER

Barnard College
Columbia University

Trends in Social Science. Edited by DONALD P. RAY. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961. Pp. 169. $4.75.

This little book contains six papers presented at a special symposium of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science held in Washington, D.C., in 1958. The authors are all well-known figures in contemporary social science—Kenneth E. Boulding, Harold D. Lasswell, Edward A. Shils, John W. Tukey, Ralph W. Tyler, and Harry Alpert—and there is an introduction by the editor.

Boulding, always stimulating, writes about the present state of research in economics. He discerns a shift from "macroeconomic" to "microeconomic" problems, suggests that economics is approaching a stage when it can collect its own data and need no longer rely on extraneous sources of information, puts in an approving word for interdisciplinary work with the caution that a "true synthesis" has not yet arrived, and sees the current period in economics as one of hesitation.

Lasswell exhibits his usual ingenuity and intellectual force in asserting that the purpose of research is the "realization of human dignity," in defending the importance of a contextual and systematic approach (in contrast to discrete case studies) in political science, and in warning against both "an excess of scholasticism on the one hand and the impatient rejection of theory on the other."

Shils, discussing "consensus and dissensus in the larger society," invites the dissensus of his readers by insisting that society, as contrast with particular social institutions, is a neglect subject in contemporary sociology. The nam of Sorokin and MacIver, to mention no other have apparently not occurred to him in th connection, and one might suggest in additio that he take a look at any textbook in the fiel

Tukey's piece on statistical and quantitati methodology merits the highest marks for i penetrating observations on the somewhat ur easy relations between mathematics and statis tics and for its generally wise and incisive com ments on such methodological matters as math ematical models and the principle of parsi mony.

In the two concluding essays, both highl competent, Ralph W. Tyler discusses some o the achievements and purposes of the Cente for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science and Harry Alpert supplies important facts o the financial support of social science researc in the United States. Although publication is little late, one cannot doubt that the sympo sium was a success.

ROBERT BIERSTED

New York University

Family Structure in Jamaica: The Social Con text of Reproduction. By JUDITH BLAKE New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc 1961. Pp. viii+262. $6.00.

This is a first-rate study. Within its deliberately modest framework, it would be difficult to suggest how it could be improved.

Jamaica's population growth is rapid, but its fertility is substantially below that of comparable underdeveloped countries. About seven births in ten are illegitimate, but by the age of sixty-five three-quarters of all males and two-thirds of all females are married. The usual explanation of this remarkable pattern has been simply to rationalize it. Thus, according to T. S Simey, in a passage that Miss Blake quotes: "No precise information is available, but it appears to be obvious that the loose association of concubinage is preferred by many women as well as men. [It is] deeply rooted in tradition." Similarly, it used to be assumed that since peasant peoples have large families they prefer to have them; but this facile explanation has been challenged by a number of attitude sur-

veys in such widely divergent places as India and Puerto Rico. In some respects a continuation of these earlier studies, this work is also in many ways an improvement on them.

Miss Blake's small sample of about a hundred lower-class women and half as many men was intelligently chosen to get the maximum generality, but her analysis is never pushed beyond its empirical base. The interviewers were carefully selected and given two weeks of intensive full-time training. The interview schedule was semistructured, with each broad question probed until the response became relevant to her theory of how family structure and fertility are related. Note that this is a *sociological* theory, so that in this case an attitude survey is not the equivalent of psychological reductionism. And, in a final contrast with too many analyses of public opinion, the book is written in English, unpretentious but also unjargoned.

Reproduction and child-rearing, according to Miss Blake's thesis, must be institutionalized to be effective. The prevalence of illegitimacy in Jamaica, then, is not simply a cultural variant from this universal norm but the consequence of social disorganization, which perpetuates itself from one generation to the next. Lower-class Jamaican girls are brought up like proper Victorian ladies, in ignorance of sex and sequestered from male company until they are married. To realize this pattern, however, demands a duenna or, at the very least, a father and brothers to protect the girl. Instead, she is typically reared in a quasi-family, watched over by only her mother or a mother-surrogate, who must also earn her own living. The adolescent female, innocent and lonely, for whom every contact with a male short of marriage is forbidden and thus "romantic," is an ideal victim of a somewhat older, experienced male. She becomes pregnant from a casual contact, and thus "shames" herself and her mother, losing her chance of an early marriage. Later she usually sets up a common-law household with another man, but both regard this as a second-best substitute for the "respectable" marriage that most eventually achieve, too late to affect the dominant pattern of illegitimate reproduction.

Neither males nor females want illegitimate children, nor even as many offspring all together as are typically born. That contraceptives are not used is not because of any antipathy to their use as such. Ignorance and superstitions, the lack of suitable facilities, the indifference of irresponsible males—these are factors that a family-planning program could overcome, given the general desire to limit births. "What is holding back the widespread dissemination of knowledge and materials to these peoples is not so much *their* values as those of the Western industrial nations," which inhibit the spread of effective contraceptives because of their own "traditional" values. The fact, however, that young females are celibate between successive mates reduces their fertility, according to Miss Blake's estimate, by almost a third.

This book's excellence derives in part from the author's insistence on relating her specific data to the most general family theory. Would a similar analysis of another group with a high incidence of illegitimacy—say, a South American country or lower-class American Negroes—produce a similar result? One cannot be sure, but this is a model study, certainly worth replicating.

WILLIAM PETERSEN

University of California, Berkeley

Growing Old: The Process of Disengagement. By ELAINE CUMMING and WILLIAM E. HENRY. New York: Basic Books, 1961. Pp. xvi+293. $6.75.

Growing Old, by Elaine Cumming and William E. Henry, presents a theoretical interpretation of the psychological aspects of aging in the United States and other Western societies. The theory is developed from analyses of data gathered in a study of "adult life" in Kansas City, Missouri.

Cumming and Henry believe that aging is accompanied by "disengagement," "a process in which many of the relationships between a person and other members of society are severed and those remaining are altered in quality." Such disengagement may be initiated by the individual, or by society, or by both simultaneously. The authors believe that retirement is a key event in either initiating or accelerating disengagement for men, and that widowhood fulfils this same function for women. They find no difference, however, between the psychological state of very old men

and very old women. The very old of either sex, defined as those over 80, are described as "dependent," "self-satisfied," "self-centered," and "placid."

As individuals age, their "social sphere," those persons with whom they have some social contact, is said to shrink. Older people, according to Cumming and Henry, withdraw from interpersonal relationships. There are some persons, however, from whom older people do not withdraw. These persons are intimate kin. Cumming and Henry, like other students of the social and psychological aspects of aging, including the reviewer, find that as persons age, association with intimate kin —children and siblings—becomes more intense and more important.

Cumming and Henry stress that they are presenting hypotheses, that these hypotheses were developed from the same data used to illustrate their theory, and that they view their theory as provisional, not final. It should be noted, however, that certain assumptions, basic to their theory, have been reported independently by other investigators. For example, Jack Weinberg, Alvin I. Goldfarb, and other psychiatrists interested in older people have reported a reduction in ego strength of the aged.

The hypotheses presented in *Growing Old* are interesting, provocative, and worthy of further investigation. Are we exerting pressure on older people to maintain activities which they would prefer to abandon? Cumming and Henry suggest that we are. If people really seek to withdraw from interpersonal relations as they age, then much of the energy now devoted to providing "activities" for the aged should be channeled into other directions.

Growing Old is a serious attempt to explain what happens as people age. A great deal more work remains to be done in testing the hypotheses presented in this book, however, before the disengagement theory can be fully accepted as proved.

ETHEL SHANAS

University of Chicago

The Church and the Older Person. By ROBERT M. GRAY and DAVID O. MOBERG. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 162. $3.50.

This is a disappointing book because it claims to be undertaking an important task and then does not really begin it. In the Preface the authors state that the book is "a survey of present knowledge about the church and older people in contemporary American society" and that its "general objective [is] to contribute to systematization in this area by the coordination and integration of current pertinent research efforts of several disciplines concerning this problem." In view of these objectives the reader has a right to expect a thorough review of the relevant literature in several disciplines and an analysis of the agreements, disagreements, gaps, and problem in the research reviewed. Unfortunately, this sort of analysis is almost completely missing.

For example, many of the studies discussed include measures of "adjustment" based on the Burgess-Cavan-Havighurst Activities and Attitudes Schedule. Some of the investigations used only the Attitude Inventory, some used the combined Schedule or items from it, and one study apparently used the summary Cavan Adjustment Rating Scale. Yet the book contains no discussion of the different conceptions of "adjustment" involved in expressions of feeling and measures of social participation; in fact it shows no awareness that there are problems in the attempt to measure adjustment or in the comparability of findings based on different measures.

The same failure to see the relationship between technique and interpretation makes the review of research (and even the authors' reports of their own work) of very limited value to anyone beginning his own integration of research findings. The reader must go too often to the works cited to find out what the authors did and exactly what their findings were. Surprisingly, the studies reviewed do not adequately represent recent and relevant work, even though many of the most obviously missing items are mentioned in Moberg's very recently published *The Church as a Social Institution.*

Rather than being a work of analysis and synthesis the book actually falls into four parts: two introductory chapters; a chapter reviewing material on the religious behavior of older people and on associations between their religious behavior and measures of adjustment to old age; four chapters presenting

findings of the authors' research on "the problems of old age in relation to religion and the church"; and two chapters summarizing the authors' research-based suggestions "for the church and the older person."

Although all the authors' findings are derived from data long in their possession and many have already been published, the chapters reporting the authors' research do not show evidence of reconceptualization or new analysis. In view of this and of the general character of the book, I can only conclude that two busy colleagues simply put together a book much too fast.

LATHROP V. BEALE

Grinnell College

The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg. By SOLOMON POLL. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+308. $5.50.

Religious communities that have managed to hold themselves aloof from the assimilation process are not at all rare in the United States. The Doukhobors, the Mennonites, the Amish, to some extent the Mormons, some German Catholic communities in Iowa—all have proved that the fires which heat the melting pot are not enough to melt the norms which keep these communities substantially different from the larger society. However, one would not expect to find such a community in the midst of a large metropolis; much less would one expect to hear the claim that this particular "unmeltable" group showed less tendency to disintegrate than any other of the separatist communities.

The Hasidim are the ultra-orthodox remnants of Hungarian Jewry who came from the concentration camps to the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn after 1945. Horrified by the apparent laxity of even those Jews who considered themselves Orthodox, the Hasidim set about the construction of a community which would be almost hermetically sealed from the corruption of the "goyisch" world—and most Jews were little better than the "goy." Poll contends that the success of this experiment in separatism is based on a rigid socialization process and an economic organization which reinforces community ties and norms. Although some attention is paid to the socialization methods, especially through the long years of "parochial" schools, the main emphasis in his present volume is on the economic organization of the community. The demands of the Hasidic ritual provide a certain number of jobs for those who must manufacture the clothes, the candles, the paraphernalia of ritual. Yet another group—the highest ranking in the Hasidic status hierarchy—are the professional religious functionaries, the rebbes, the ravs, and their assistants. Finally all kinds of occupations—such as the sale of hardware—have taken on a semi-religious tone so that the good Hasidim only patronize their own members.

The larger Jewish community protects the Hasidic separatists both by shielding them from the demands of the gentile society and also by availing themselves of the Orthodox professional services which the Hasidim do so well. Indeed the leaders of the Hasidic community will admit that in Israel where everyone is a Jew they would find it much more difficult to avoid the defilements of the secular world.

Thus the interlocking of creed, economic activity, and ethnic pride makes the Hasidim an extremely tight community. Poll apparently sees little chance that community controls will weaken. Indeed the process of sacralizing secular functions—such as the sale of hardware—seems likely to work in directions opposite to the assimilation processes.

I am not altogether convinced. If there are three elements at work in assimilation—the internal ideology of the group, the educational processes of the larger society (formal and informal), and the experiences of the occupational world, we are forced to admit that on the basis of Poll's report the Hasidim have pretty well controlled the first two. The third element, the one with which the book is principally concerned, must remain in doubt. We do not know what proportion of the wage earners in this community of 12,000 is actually engaged in the economic activities which the community's ritual and creed have generated. This is not Poll's fault since the Hasidim are not likely to be very co-operative with survey research at this point in their history. Since, however, the community is increasing rapidly (large families being a major goal of Hasidic family life), one is inclined to suspect that an increasing number of its members will have to seek secular employ-

ment and perhaps secular education. It is clearly too early in the history of the Williamsburg group to say that they have found the answer to assimilation; although it must be admitted that in the first fifteen years of their history they have done a rather impressive job.

We have not heard the last of the Hasidim. Such an interesting group located close to several major universities will be unable to escape constant investigation. Further research may be more statistically detailed than Poll's, but it is unlikely that any further studies will surpass his work for the sheer power of fascination in the story of this unusual group of human beings.

ANDREW M. GREELEY

National Opinion Research Center

Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times. By JACOB KATZ. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi+200. $3.40.

Professor Jacob Katz, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, brings to this study of the norms of behavior of Jews toward gentiles in medieval and modern Europe (to the nineteenth century) quite unusual qualifications. He is not only a competent rabbinic scholar and critical historian but also a sociologist of the German school and a disciple of Max Weber. He approaches the problem of this book as a study in social history and in the history of ideas.

What this implies methodologically is defined by Katz in an essay on "The Concept of Social History" in *Scripta Hierosolymitana* (1956). Social history is "written . . . by viewing society as a single functioning whole in which the various strata [of political, social and economic institutions] influence, and are influenced by, one another." Consequently, unlike standard political history (which is particularizing), it is generalizing and typological in its approach and essentially concerned with institutions, not with concrete actions of concrete persons or collectivities. The "history of ideas" is even more abstract, as it confines itself to what "is common to the whole nation and to which it owes its whole impetus, that is to say, its historical consciousness."

In spite of the conscious search for the general and typical, the present study does not exhibit any such attempt at systematic rigor as was characteristic of Weber's historical studies. A major part of the volume is devoted to an analysis of the attitudes toward gentiles of various Jewish "types": the martyr and the apostate, the pietist and the disputant, the traditionalist and the enlightened. These types are not defined more closely than the common-sense, intuitive meanings of their titles, even though some sort of implicit phenomenology of the roles, attitudes, and situations involved seems to underlie the typologies. So, too, Katz consciously seeks to derive the *generally* held attitudes and *operative* norms from his study and interpretation of rabbinic texts. But his conclusions on these points are based on no specific procedure of induction or hypothetico-deductive method. In spite of his German training, he is closer to the British school of social history than to his master, Weber. This is essentially the work of a historian who has been exposed to sociological insights rather than of a sociologist intent on a systematic analysis of historical processes.

It may be added that the most obvious influence of Max Weber on this book is not necessarily the most fruitful. Katz's thesis concerning Jewish attitudes toward gentiles in the medieval and early modern (or ghetto) period is an affirmation of Weber's "double ethic" theory. Important as this work is as a corrective to apologetic trends in past discussions by Jewish scholars, it fails to follow a line of analysis suggested by the distinction made by Katz between "judicial" and "moral"—or, to provide the implied social correlates, reciprocal and non-reciprocal—norms. The distinction between law and ethics is admittedly difficult in the case of Judaism; but that only makes it the more regrettable that so exceptionally well equipped an analyst was diverted from the task by adopting Weber's imprecise terminology.

The full value of this work will only be obvious and can only be properly appraised in the detailed interpretation of texts. An amateur in this field can only register his impression that Katz's sociological bent has enabled him to see problems and connections of striking significance. It has also enabled him to produce a work on the norms and values of

traditional Jewry that will enlighten the general student of history and social institutions with an insight more intimate and unobstructed and from a vantage point more central than has hitherto been available.

BEN HALPERN

Brandeis University

Plainville Fifteen Years Later. By ART GALLAHER, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi+301. $5.00.

An anthropologist who signed himself James West studied a rather poor and isolated Missouri community in 1939–40 and published the results in a book entitled *Plainville, U.S.A.* in 1945. Gallaher studied the same community in 1954–55 and has now published his findings, with a foreword by Carl Withers (the James West of the original study). Gallaher thinks of his study not as a critique of, or checkup on, the earlier work but as a study of change using the earlier work as a base line.

After an introduction on his field procedure, the author describes the setting and then presents the economy, social organization, religion, and status-ranking. In a final chapter he summarizes the comparison of his findings with those of Withers and analyzes the changes that have occurred.

The Plainville of 1955 is much less isolated from the main stream of American life and culture than that of 1940. Farming has become much more commercial and requires more capital in the form of machinery and livestock. The products are sold in a larger market and for much larger sums of money, and the farmers buy farther from home. Exchange of labor among farmers and the trading or selling of dairy products by the women to the local merchants for pin money have disappeared. The local merchants thus have lost much of their place in the economy. There is some compensation for them in the fact that large proportions of the village population live "out of the post office"—from pension checks—and spend their meager but certain cash income in the village. The material standard of living has much improved. Yet the social structure seems not to have changed greatly. Social distinctions are made along the same axes as before—work, income, morality. Gallaher does not find, as Withers did, a clear class distinction, but rather a "status-rank" continuum. He believes that perhaps there may have been some tendency toward such a distinction, but that the changes of the intervening years have checked its further development. The speech of the local people, which Gallaher reports with care, is still strongly regional with a grammar all its own and full of the wit that—in a but slightly refined form—Harry Truman brought to the White House. One must add that the ambitions of the local youngsters, and of their parents for them, are not high. School appears to be thought a good thing, provided there is not overmuch of it.

There are many Plainvilles, varying somewhat in local color, ethnic composition, degree of isolation, and measure of change. Gallaher has done a good job of describing this one and of comparing its recent culture with that of the base line at the end of the depression but just before the war.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

Brandeis University

Decisions in Syracuse. By ROSCOE C. MARTIN, FRANK J. MUNGER, and OTHERS. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi +368. $6.95.

This is the first of a series of projected studies by political scientists and economists on so-called metropolitan problems in America —new welfare, health, educational, and economic growth problems that many metropolitan communities must deal with on a more centralized basis than heretofore. Although Syracuse is atypical in some respects (a highly industrialized city under Republican party control), it reflects the perennial difficulties of metropolitan areas in effecting co-operative action among interdependent, local communities.

The study is an attempt to identify the forces that facilitate and discourage such co-operative action. An introductory section provides an intelligent review of the literature on community power. This is followed by a useful descriptive discussion of the political, economic, and demographic features of the area.

The main body of the report consists of twenty-two case studies of decision-making on such metropolitan problems as sewage disposal and lake pollution; water supply; health, welfare, and educational reform; county government reorganization; and economic development. A final chapter sums up the case studies and suggests some issues they raise for the study of community power.

The empirical materials represent competent reporting but, characteristic of so many case studies written in a public administration tradition, they are descriptive rather than analytic. No consistent framework is used, thus making comparison somewhat difficult. In brief, they suggest that such factors as indifference of the electorate to metropolitan problems, a preference for local control and fear of centralized government on the part of influentials in fringe towns and villages, and a conservative and obstructionist spirit in the county organizations have led to many failures in the attempted solution of collective problems. Most of the successes were due largely to the intervention of Republican party leadership, which has in recent years lost its political effectiveness with the demise of its mayor–county chairman.

This is a worthwhile book in the community power field if only for the introductory and concluding chapters by Munger which all but rescue the study when it seems to be floundering amid a maze of names, dates, events, and low-level descriptions. His contributions are many, and I would single out the following for special praise: First, power is conceived as a process which includes a network of complementary roles-initiators (idea men), experts (those who formulate policy), publicists, brokers (intermediaries who effect compromises among various interest groups), and transmitters (government officials who are the final decision-makers). Most community power studies, attempting to locate influentials, have not made such valuable distinctions among various power roles. Second, Munger presents a very useful "score board" with quantitative evidence on the major interest groups in Syracuse in terms of their successes, failures, and extent of non-participation in the decisions studied. This should prove valuable for comparative purposes. Finally, there is a suggestive discussion of types of intercommunity power relations with some notions on the conditions that give rise to each. So n studies in this field have taken a single (munity as a point of reference with littl no discussion of environmental factors, not least of which are outside political syst All these points are well developed and re sent significant innovations.

Let us hope that the proposed future stu will be as rich analytically as Munger's (tributions and that the empirical materials more thoughtful than those presented in book.

DAVID ROG

Columbia University

Negro Leadership in a Southern City. M. ELAINE BURGESS. Chapel Hill: Uni sity of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. +231. $6.00.

This book applies certain techniques of co munity power analysis to the Negro subco munity of a middle-sized southern city. ' result is something of a mixed blessing. offers some new material for the seemin interminable debate over the methodology community power studies, but it is not mediately clear to which side of the deb this evidence contributes the most. The bo also raises some absorbing substantive iss but does not, generally speaking, provide a answers.

Since this is a sociology journal, the me odological matters will be treated first. T author identifies Negro leadership by us both the power attribution or reputatio method and the case-study or decision-mak approach. Twenty-eight "power nomine were specified by asking "experts" and "k informants" to nominate "community leade who in turn were asked to designate the "m influential" among themselves. This list persons reputed to wield power was check against those who in fact wielded power in f issues involving important Negro intere which were taken to be representative of the issues facing the community in a thr year period. Two other sources of leadersh nominations were also canvassed. A sam (283, or about 1 per cent) of Crescent Cit Negro population was interviewed to disco who the rank and file felt to be leaders. F ther, twenty white leaders—themselves chos

by the reputational method—were asked who they considered to be the leaders of the Negro community.

The most important finding is that all four sources were in substantial agreement. Negroes, both leaders and led, generally agreed with each other and with reputed white leaders as to who the "most influential" Negroes were, and 71 per cent of these "power nominees" were "power leaders"—that is, active in most of the five concrete issues examined. Further, the leadership tended to remain the same regardless of the content of the issue, although some specialization was evident.

Substantively, the findings are also provocative. By almost any standard, Crescent City's Negroes present a remarkable picture of unity, initiative, resourcefulness, and influence. A single organization—the Crescent Negro Council—dominates Negro civic life. Most leaders are active through it and with striking effect. There is little evident difference in goals, means, or style. Negro political power is used effectively to punish enemies and reward friends and to extract concessions from whites on various issues. Bloc voting is extensive. The Negroes prove to be astute tacticians and bargainers. On most issues, they have made substantial progress and, although Black Muslims and militant sit-in activists are found in Crescent City, the established leaders seem to have firm mass support. And all this is accomplished without the rise of a Negro political machine.

The major difficulty with the book is that it does not offer a systematic explanation for these striking phenomena. There are, of course, several possibilities, most of which the author suggests but does not develop. Crescent City may be of such size and character that there is a traditional, highly integrated leadership group in both the Negro and white communities. Although so-called economic dominants make up less than one third of the Negro "power leaders," it is probably of considerable significance that the city has a sizable Negro upper class with a strong economic base. In fact, the largest local firm in Crescent City—an insurance company with assets of over $65,000,000—is Negro-owned. The presence of three colleges and universities in the city may contribute to the leadership potential. Perhaps the stability and cohesiveness of Negro leadership is partly a product of success, and that success, in turn, is partly a result of the existence of a moderate, reasonable white leadership which excludes the extremists and racists.

The best and most vivid parts of Burgess' book are the case histories of the issues on which Negroes were active, but these fill only one-fifth of the pages in a short book. I suspect that it is in this direction, and not in the tests for ρ, that one might search for a fuller understanding of the remarkable character of Negro civic life in Crescent City.

James Q. Wilson

Harvard University

Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France: French Catholic Groups at the Threshold of the Fifth Republic. By William Bosworth. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xv+407. $8.50.

This book is a wide-ranging study of French Catholic groups primarily in terms of their relevance for French political life. Apart from the extensive secondary literature, the major sources of the data for the study are the archives, files, and publications of the groups, and interviews with national officials of the groups and with leadership elements of the clergy involved in them.

The author, a teacher of political science at Hunter College, divides the groups into four categories. The central category is the clergy itself, which is termed the "ecclesiastical nucleus"; the others—Catholic Action groups, Catholic "social action" groups, and groups of "Catholic inspiration"—are defined in terms of their "distance" from the "ecclesiastical nucleus." By "distance" the author appears to mean the degree of formal contact with, and recognition by, the Church, and the degree of religious as opposed to temporal orientation in their activities. However, the clergy and that category of groups "closest" to it, Catholic Action, appear to constitute the "basic Church political impact on France."

The discussion of the groups within each category (including the clergy where applicable) permits one to locate them on several rough dimensions: type and scope of activity, socioeconomic milieu, degree of independence from the clergy, social doctrine,

geographical distribution, and size. Some useful information is brought forth on these points, and it in part makes up in breadth of coverage for what it lacks in depth. Indeed, this comment could stand as a general note on the book. One wishes, for example, that more were offered on the nature and recruitment of the leadership elements including "militants," as well as on the clergy itself. Canon Boulard, who, along with Gabriel le Bras, has done some very valuable work in the field of religious sociology in France, offers interesting data on the recruitment and training of the clergy in France which, with profit, might have been used here, especially if complemented with similar information on the present bishops. This is particularly so when the differences of action and social doctrine in the clergy are discussed. These differences and cleavages are more than reflected among the groups, and we get here a very good presentation of the extent to which the "fragmentation" generally noted of French society extends to even such an institution as French Catholicism. This should startle no one, since it has long been a matter of comment, but here the picture is sharpened and the position of the groups relative to one another clarified, particularly in terms of the Left-Right continuum on social doctrine.

To assess the political positions and significance of the groups, the author examines their opinions and activities on such issues as public aid to church schools, and Algeria and the 1958 regime crisis. The emphasis is largely on opinions since, with the exception of the parents' association on the school question and such "marginally Catholic" groups as MRP and CFTC, most of the groups either cannot or are not meant to engage in direct political action, and some do not even speak out on political events. Hence, a main part of the study is perforce occupied with examining the generally non-political activities of the groups in terms of their indirect political significance through their impact on individuals and social classes. This analysis, combined with the amount and nature of political pronouncement and the discussion of the groups as training grounds for future leaders of non-Catholic groups, constitutes a good prima facie case on the political impact of French Catholic groups. But on the specification and development of how much impact and on what aspects of political life, this study does not take us much farther than the already available evidence on such questions as voting, party structure (except for the leadership of the MRP), and the recruitment of political decision-makers.

Indeed, the scope of the study and the level at which it is focused in part prevent this. Its "immediate aim," the author states, is to "catalogue the constituent elements of French Catholicism with political significance" to facilitate future research. It is a sweeping view which, coupled with an excellent bibliography and information on sources, achieves this aim. The author concentrates his research on the national levels of the groups, clergy, and political system in keeping with the broad picture he seeks to present. One wishes, however, that he had spent some time in one or two departments at the local level for the ideas and insights this could have lead to. Many of the questions asked in this study, much of what it says, points explicitly or implicitly in this direction as the field for further research on the groups themselves as well as on their political impact. This book should facilitate such research.

REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW

University of Chicago

Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. By LUCIAN W PYE. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. xx+307. $7.50.

The process of political modernization in a newly developing nation like Burma is for the political scientist a many-splendored theoretical puzzle. Like other nations recently sovereign, Burma's attempts to build a modern state system have been checkered with episodes of civil strife, military rule, and charismatic political leadership. This near-typical career of a new nation, the seeming inability of the political elite to build a political structure capable of welding the population into a nation with orderly, rule-bound contests over political power, sets Pye's problem: Why do "transitional" societies like Burma's have such great troubles in the development of a modern nation state? Burma is the exemplar of the sea of troubles to which

new nations are heir, and the hearth on which some new variables are forged.

Pye takes for granted the manifest difficulties of a new nation—lack of highly skilled personnel, deficiencies of the social structure, inadequate educational facilities, the distortions in the transmission of "modern industrial" culture, and the inexperience of the political elites and the peasants they govern with consensual politics. But these variables or conditions, he maintains, are not enough to account for the state of Burma—its movement toward an authoritarian state, its reliance on military rule, and its turn from the modern world toward regressive nationalism. Pye invokes the concepts of political culture and personality formation to explain the pattern of political development. For him the heart of the problem of nation-building lies in the interrelationships of personality, culture, and polity.

Political culture is a concept developing as political scientists undertake the sort of research Pye reports. It is an idea born of the necessity to come to terms with political processes not handled by the traditional language and concerns of orthodox political science. Pye gives a bold and schematic description of the political culture of Burma. Based on the available history and anthropology of Burma, it is a plausible approximation of Burmese sentiments about the use and meaning of power and authority.

From description of the political culture, he moves to a description of the socialization process. This is underpinned by a few anthropological field studies; further research may bring larger or smaller changes in the understanding and analysis of this aspect of Burmese life. But Pye's main contention is that the sentiments and attitudes instilled in the process of socialization are inadequate and even antithetical to the process of nation-building. The Burmese search for identity as a person and as a national collectivity is based on a series of psychological orientations inimical to the generation of attitudes and beliefs capable of sustaining large and flexible organizations.

Two things are at stake, theoretically, in this apprehension of the political development of Burma. The first is the problem of relating psychological and personality data to the structural and cultural aspects of a social system. The coincidence of behavior at the family level and at the level of national politics can be tied together by the socialization process and the personality forms that engenders. But there are many problems of method and reliability of inference which Pye leaves untouched. Perhaps he is right in leaving this problem in the hands of sociologists and anthropologists, whose normal *bête noire* it historically has been. The second problem is the assumption that the set of sentiments and attitudes *now* characterizing the politically developed nations are in fact those needed by new nations like Burma if they ever expect to achieve the exalted status of a modern nation. Such a large assumption—the specificity of a particular cluster of values, personality types, and orientations to the world—would be tenable only if much more were known about the process of political development. It seems a theoretically open question. The range of psychological variables, sentiments, and attitudes capable of serving as the raw material for the nation-building is uncharted, and theoretically the way stations to a modern national state have not even been sketched.

The real strength of Pye's book lies in its challenging use of the armory of the social sciences for the attack on a problem of political science. Political development in the new states is a problem which requires all the skills of social science, and Pye shows in a bold and provocative manner how many of the newer tools of social science may be welded into a scholarly and penetrating attack on an important and refractory area of research.

MANNING NASH

University of Chicago

Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. By ROBERT A. DAHL. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. vii+355. $7.50.

Anyone interested in the many problems involved in studying power should read this book, the first of a trilogy on the power structure of New Haven. Both in historical and methodological depth the study far surpasses most previous research efforts in the field. The thorough and painstaking procedures Dahl employs to ascertain who prevails on issues of conse-

quence in New Haven politics are in refreshing contrast to the reputational and positional methods all too frequently utilized in many community power studies. That readers may nevertheless raise questions regarding some of the author's methods and conclusions (as the present reviewer in fact does) should not prevent this from becoming a hallmark in nonpamphleteering and scholarly studies of power.

In an opening section Dahl provides an illuminating historical analysis of changes in the power structure since the city's incorporation in 1784, from an oligarchy ruled by a patrician elite to a pluralistic system, dominated by several elites. He relates this development to changes in access to such resources as wealth, status, office, control over votes and over various local organizations, such as educational, religious, and others.

Remaining sections deal with such questions as who rules, what are the sources of their power, and what are the conditions for stability or change in the power structure. In summary, we find that in three issues—political nominations, urban renewal, and public education—a small number of persons, namely the mayor and his lieutenants (co-opted from various interest groups and strata) have direct influence "in the sense that they successfully initiate or veto proposals for policies" (p. 163). The mayor, as both political broker meting out rewards to groups that count and as entrepreneur willing to innovate and take risks by pushing an urban redevelopment program that had never got off the ground in previous administrations, seems to be the "prime mover" in the community. At the same time, however, due to a value system stressing democratic procedures in the relationship between leaders and constituents, and the mayor's interest in re-election, the citizens in New Haven supposedly have considerable indirect influence.

Some fairly compelling questions are not dealt with too explicitly. Despite the excellent historical section, this reviewer would want more on the comparative implications of the study. Much of contemporary New Haven politics seems to be explained in terms of a "great man" theory with little discussion of the conditions under which such an "executive-centered" system is likely in other communities. Furthermore, with reference just to New Haven, there is no discussion as to why other issues were not included in the study. The ones selected were obviously of some significance by any criteria one chooses to adopt. But is this then a study of the total community power structure as is frequently implied? Why not take a wider range of issues, for all the expense it entails, if one is to generalize as the author does about New Haven politics. Also, we find little mention of the complex relations of the community to outside social systems, for example, state or federal governments, which may play an important role in shaping the local power structure.

Perhaps most basic of all, how much pluralism actually exists in New Haven politics? Dahl makes a most useful distinction between direct and indirect influence. From his evidence on the former, one might well conclude that at least on the three issues studied the mayor and a few lieutenants ruled the roost. To suggest that such community leaders are constrained by a concern for the zone of indifference, so to speak, of their constituents is an important question. Dahl presents some evidence on this. I wish he had presented much more.

Despite such criticisms I think this is a book from which sociologists have a lot to learn. In the rapidly expanding field of community power studies which I am convinced is more than a fad, as well as in political sociology and social stratification more generally, this may well become a classic alongside the pioneering Middletown studies of an earlier generation.

David Rogers

Columbia University

Floating Voters and the Floating Vote. By H. Daudt. Leiden, Holland: H. E. Stenfert Kroese N V., 1961. Pp. 171. Gld. 10.

This book assesses the "fit" between what the author terms the "classic" theory of the democratic man and the empirical findings of selected English and American surveys of voting behavior. Daudt states the problem of democratic electoral systems and the voter simply (perhaps too simply): the minority must be free to become a majority when they are dissatisfied with existing political arrangements

It is with this framework that Daudt examines Lazarsfeld's summary statement of the 1940 Erie County, Ohio, survey ("Social char-

acteristics determine political preference"). For if Lazarsfeld is "right" then there is little hope for the voter to shift his loyalties because his social characteristics are stable. Daudt contrasts the "sociological viewpoint" against that of the democratic political theorist. The political theorist, and Daudt, see the individual voter's choice of party as "neither the outcome of group influences nor predictable with the aid of a few attributes. This view assumes that the voters do not react automatically, but by reason of their judgment of political events and the political parties" (p. 161).

The focus of the book is on the floating voter and although all varieties of shifting voters are mentioned the author's real question concerns the factors behind a change in a voter's choice of party from one election to the next, rather than his changes during an election period. He asks his selected survey groups what they can tell him of the between-election floating voter. It is not too surprising that since none of the selected studies were designed to answer this question, the answers Daudt finds to his question are somewhat disappointing. In the absence of multiple cross-tabulations that might sharply distinguish floating voters from non-floaters the author turns to the question of whether voters are stable at all. If the voters are not stable between two election periods then the sociologists are "wrong." Just how one would determine the cutting point between stable and free floating is not mentioned, but he feels that the data from the Survey Research Center's 1952 nation-wide sample as reanalyzed by Janowitz and Marvick disproves the claims of sociologists. The table (p. 75) reveals that 48.5 per cent of the total sample voted for the same party in 1952 as they *remembered* they voted for in 1948. An additional 20.3 per cent of the voters remained stable in their non-voting habit in the two elections. Exactly 31.2 per cent of the voters shifted parties. Daudt takes this as evidence that the claims of sociologists that both parties can rely on a stable block of partisans have been disproved. In his concluding statement Daudt says: "It has been demonstrated that a social or psychological attribute by means of which floaters can be distinguished from consistent voters or non-voters has not yet been discovered" (p. 160). Such a statement could only be made by selecting the studies the author selected and interpreting the results of these studies according to his personal criteria.

The book does, however, have some fine moments. When Daudt tries to see just how many of a given sample of voters are being correctly placed by either a sociological or a motivational voting disposition index, the author correctly concludes that neither model comes off very well, although he expresses a preference for A. Campbell's work. Schreier (*Human Motivation*, 1957) did an intensive and more systematic analysis of this same Survey Research Center data.

His discussion of the concept of cross-pressures is a fine effort to clarify a concept introduced some twenty-eight years ago into the literature on voting. This concept has been refined in the meantime by American methodologists (e.g., James Coleman's concept of attachments and Coleman's application of this view to individual voting behavior goes unmentioned by Daudt). In like manner the distinction between "real"—interacting or politically relevant groups—and categoric or statistical groups will not be new to most sociologists. Like many points made by the author we must agree that the point is well made and well taken, but it is not new, nor does it open the way to the solution of questions the author himself raises.

To the extent that the book will focus the attention of sociologists on the very real problem of the floating voter it will make its major contribution to voting literature.

PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT

Dartmouth College

Power and Democracy in America. Edited by WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO and HOWARD J. EHRLICH. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. 181. $4.50.

This book results from a symposium at the University of Notre Dame. The three main contributors are Peter Drucker, Delbert C. Miller, and Robert A. Dahl. The editors add two chapters of comment, including a report of the oral discussion among all the contributors.

The main theme is the challenge that the growth and centralization of social power presents to American democracy. The editors point

to the growth of power of governments, corporations, labor, professional associations and institutions such as universities, and they ask (p. xv): "Are the mechanisms of our democratic system sufficiently flexible to accommodate to this new bigness?"

Drucker is concerned with the American government's growing tendency to "operate" the society instead of regulating and guiding other agencies in their performance of necessary functions (pp. 13–14). This tendency, he says, makes government weaker as it becomes bigger. He is also bothered by the demand of large organizations for the loyalty of individuals (p. 20), which he regards as inappropriate, rather than merely "faithful performance of duty" which is a legitimate demand by an employer. Aside from institutional safeguards for personal freedom, Drucker suggests that the individual can help maintain his freedom by a strong "religious and spiritual life" and by developing his self-mastery in "intellectual and esthetic life" as well (pp. 20–21).

Miller asks whether it is true, as many observers argue, that the local community has lost "its social solidarity," its "identity as a physical reality," "most of its effective leaders," and whether "its political institutions are weak," and power does not lie in a "small, inner circle of power leaders outside of official governing bodies." On the evidence of his own research and that of others, he asserts that most of these charges are not proved (p. 61), yet he seems also to argue that local government is in fact weak (p. 62) and that the local community is dominated by business influence that is not directly responsible politically (pp. 50, 61). Miller thus finds that our "achievements" do not "measure up" to our "ideals" of a "democratic community life" (p. 70).

Dahl takes another point of view. Instead of comparing practice with ideal, he compares present practice with earlier practice and, as usual, this kind of historical criterion permits greater optimism. Some things, like "social solidarity," he says may not be lost because it may never have existed (p. 73). he finds that community leadership is not lost (p. 74) and that the "typical American community" is pluralistic rather than monolithic in its power structure (p. 75).

These three differing emphases and conclusions give the editors a welcome opportunity to contrast, compare, point up, combine, separate, etc. They do a good job but I wonder if this book is not as overorganized as some of its contributors say our society is. It has a foreword that points up and summarizes. The editors then write an introduction that summarizes, contrasts, and compares, and—inevitably—raises questions. At last the three basic essays come. But the editors are not yet finished. One of them follows with some more summary, more raising of issues, and then a confrontation of the three contributors. He is next joined by his co-editor in another summing-up and appraisal. Finally, they offer a bibliography in political sociology. I wonder, too, whether it is appropriate for the two editors to refer to the contribution of one of them as "a challenging and penetrating analysis" (p. xvii).

MORROE BERGER

Princeton University

Histoire générale de la population mondiale. By MARCEL R. REINHARD and ANDRÉ ARMENGAUD. Paris: Éditions Montchrestien, 1961. Pp. v+597. New Fr. 50 (paper).

This is less a revision of the 1949 work by the senior author than a new book on the same subject. Large portions have been added, the bulk of the earlier book has been completely rewritten from new sources, and sections have been much abridged or dropped. The range of the thirty-eight chapters is merely suggested by the titles of the four parts: "From Prehistory to the 19th Century," The Growth of Europe's Population during the Century of Liberalism," "European Emigration and Its Demographic Consequences (1815–1914)," and "Demographic Disequilibrium during the Century of Mass Culture." No pair of scholars, obviously, could have independent competence over this mass of material. The work is what in the United States would be termed a textbook—that is, mainly a compilation of the findings of specialized monographs, and usually the best and most recent works: Beloch and Russell on ancient Rome, Mols on early modern Europe, Davis on India, Ho on China, Irene Taeuber on Japan, and so on.

To do full justice to so large a subject would require twenty volumes, and what appears in only one depends on the authors' principle of selection. The main trouble with the book is

that they had none. Their obvious intention—to include everything—was realized in a sense, but the cost is that almost nothing is analyzed in depth. Pages are filled with figures of dubious accuracy, without informing the reader how they were derived, how great a range exists among responsible estimates, why this rather than another was chosen, or even in many cases what the data signify. Demographic history has a methodology of its own, but these authors show little interest in it. One expected the historical analysis of a Mols, say, before he cited the number of persons per hearth in any town, or of a Ho before he passed on the population statistics of China. It is significant that the only chapter on population data and techniques is on the beginnings of numeration in the ancient Near East.

Nor is there a theoretical thread holding the book's diverse facts together. As Sauvy remarks in the Preface, all French demographers have been either more or less pronatalist, but never Malthusian. The earlier book of Professor Reinhard could fairly be described as anti-Malthusian; the present one lacks even that framework. "Sometimes history validates Malthus," the authors write, "sometimes Condorcet. It can even validate both simultaneously, depending on whether one observes one civilization or another, one social class or another." This may be true, but if so, it is no more illuminating than any other version of cautious eclecticism.

Nor does the work stand up as an annotated glossary of fact. Like virtually all French books, it lacks an index, which means that it would be hard to find any particular datum. More important, the standard of accuracy is lamentably low. As one index of this, perhaps one name out of every four non-French authorities is misspelled—Rostototzeff for Rostovtzeff, Mackenrodt for Mackenroth, Samson for Sansom, Thomas Griffith for G. Talbot Griffith, F. Wilcox for Walter F. Willcox, Welpton for Whelpton, Burgdorfer for Burgdörfer, even Kingsley Davies.

Perhaps a better image can be given by summarizing one section—say, that on the population of the United States. This constitutes fourteen pages and together with twelve pages on Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, comprises a chapter entitled "The Anglo-Saxon Worlds." It begins with a still more simplistic interpretation of "the frontier" than that by Turner himself. There were "hardly any" immigrants up to 1840 (the record, undoubtedly far short of the actual number, shows 599,000). Between 1840 and 1860 the country absorbed about four million immigrants, mostly British with "occasional Germans" (the record shows 800,000). During these two decades "Mac Cormick" took out his first patents (McCormick's first patent was in 1834). These immigrants settled mostly in the growing cities of the East, which must be contrasted with "truly American cities" like Cincinnati. From 1865 on, new states were admitted to the Union: "Nevada, Montana, Arizona, Kansas, Wyoming, Nebraska, etc." (These are in no particular geographical order, and the dates of their admission, respectively, were 1864, 1889, 1912, 1861, 1890, and 1867.) By 1880, with growing immigration, the heterogeneity of the population "began to attract attention, but the proportions did not yet threaten to change the fundamental characteristics of the founding population"—this concerning a period when Know-Nothingism flourished. And so on—a wrong fact here, an irrelevant one there; a half-page devoted to the "elimination of the Indians," and no mention of metropolitan areas, the baby boom, or prospective growth.

The day of the lone encyclopedist is past, even in France, the birthplace of encyclopedists.

William Petersen

University of California, Berkeley

Problems in Stable Population Theory. By Alvaro Lopez. Foreword by Ansley J. Coale. Princeton, N.J.: Office of Population Research, Princeton University, 1961. Pp. ix+107. $4.00.

Henceforth the students of mathematical theory of stable population must include in their lists of references the name of Alvaro Lopez. In this book he has made three important contributions. First, he has shown that the existence, validity, and uniqueness of Lotka's stable population model are mathematically correct in the demographic context, that is, for a finite age span, and more specifically, for a finite upper bound of fertile ages. Second, the continuity assumption of fertility and mortality can be dropped, and Feller's probabilistic theory of discretely recurrent events can be ap-

plied to show the stability of age structure and a constant rate of growth. Third, Lopez has proved for discrete cases that age structure at any time is unrelated to that of the remote past, that is, age structure is completely determined by the fertility and mortality history of the preceding years. For this he has considered, for successive years, transition matrixes of vital rates having $\beta + 1$ rows / columns, β being the upper age limit of fertile period. The first column of the matrix consists of successive age-specific fertility rates starting from age 0, the element in the $(i, i + 1)$th cell denotes the probability that an individual aged $i - 1$ will survive one year, and all other elements are zeros. The essence of the proof lies in showing that the product of an indefinite number of such matrixes (whose elements change with time) will be a positive matrix of unit rank. Lopez has therefore rightly pointed out that, unlike stable population model, we need not confine ourselves to closed populations alone, because the survivorship probabilities in the transition matrixes can be suitably adjusted to account for migratory movements.

So far so good. It would have been better for Lopez to stop here. Perhaps to attain a book size he has, in the last thirty pages, devoted himself to a defensive discussion of the ɔractical usefulness of stable population models ınd applied it to derive the parameters for the Colombian population, quite unrelated to his najor theoretical contribution. The procedure, ɔreviously used by Coale in projecting the Indian population, has been followed in utilizing he reported age distributions only to justify tability or quasi-stability and then the same listributions have been rejected on the ground ıf misreporting.

The following questions can be raised:

1. Is it justifiable to assume that the reorted age distribution is farther from reality han the distribution derived under the assumpon of stability, particularly when the surivorship functions are derived from unrelated ɔurces, for example, model life tables?

2. It may be true that the age structure gen-ated by unchanging fertility and declining ıortality tends to differ very little from a able age distribution determined by ultimate ortality conditions. But is it also true that ıe appropriate growth rate can be obtained r comparing the population size at some convenient time in the past with that reached ultimately?

3. Further, it is conceptually clear that given a stable age structure the stable birth rate b should not be allowed to vary with the growth rate r because, theoretically at least, b has to be unique.

It is, of course, understood that there is difficulty in estimating the stable birth rate from a grouped age distribution, but at the same time the solution obtained by making b dependent on r is also open to criticism.

S. Mitra

Indian Statistical Institute

Population Perspectives. By Philip M. Hauser. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961. Pp. 183. $3.50.

This small book has much to say about one of the world's leading problems, the population explosion. It is ironic that the population problem as perceived only fifteen years ago and as still formulated in classrooms perhaps as recently as ten years ago was a concern about a low and still declining birth rate in Western society. Little attention was concentrated on what was regarded as the relatively stationary populations in most of the rest of the world. Now with the rapid rates of increase resulting from sustained high birth rates in most of the English-speaking countries of the West and the still accelerating rates of increase caused by rapidly declining mortality in the newly developing areas of the world, the nature of the "population problem" has changed dramatically. At present the population of the United States and of the entire world as well is increasing at or near 2 per cent annually, a rate that if continued would double the size of the population in just thirty-five years. This is the fact around which Hauser organized a series of lectures (the Brown and Haley Lecture series presented in March, 1960, at the University of Puget Sound), subsequently elaborated into this book.

About half the volume is devoted to analysis of the causes of rapid population growth in the world, in the United States, and especially in metropolitan areas. The remainder is a more speculative discussion of the eco-

nomic and social consequences of this growth. Hauser's analysis of the dimensions of the problem includes not only the total growth rate but changes in age structure and racial composition as well. The Negro population in the United States, for example, has been experiencing a growth rate 60 per cent higher than that of the white population.

The economic and social implications of rapid population growth in the underdeveloped areas of the world have been commented upon by numerous writers but, except for observations on the problems engendered by urban and metropolitan growth, there has been little concern (aside from problems of school facilities) or research devoted to the significance of such growth for the United States. In Hauser's view, the current growth rate in the United States is economically desirable only in the short run. Over the long term both social and economic consequences are regarded as negative. Among other results, Hauser perceives the necessity for increasing governmental intervention, increased friction in daily life resulting from higher density, problems of housing, taxes, transportation, and a long list of other consequences.

Although somewhat pessimistic, the general tone of the book is reasonably well balanced. Its main usefulness will be for the educated general reader who wants a quick informative overview of the population question written with a breezy style in non-technical language. One fundamental dissatisfaction provoked by this book actually stems from ignorance in the social sciences. The proposition that present and prospective rates of population growth cannot be sustained in the long run is essentially a debater's point, useful but not enlightening.

CHARLES F. WESTOFF

Princeton University

Great Books and Small Groups. By JAMES A. DAVIS. With the assistance of RUTH URSULA GEBHARD, HERBERT HAMILTON, CAROLYN HUSON, and JOE L. SPAETH. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. xiii+237. $6.00.

Although sociologists are concerned with groups and their effects upon individuals, the number of quantitative studies dealing with real groups is relatively small. In the past decade survey analysis has been used, notably by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, to study groups and group influences upon people. Davis' monograph is the latest addition to this tradition. It is based on a survey of 1,909 members of 172 Great Books study groups conducted by the National Opinion Research Center for the Fund for Adult Education.

A vast amount of data is crammed into this small volume, but its chief virtue is its methodological sophistication rather than its findings. Here are complex tables in which the units are groups as well as tables in which the units are individuals classified not only by their own characteristics but by the properties of the groups to which they belong. Sociometric data are used to study group structure and to test in a natural setting hypotheses derived from laboratory studies. Within groups, comparisons are made between leaders and followers and between husbands and wives. Only the failure to carry out a true panel study prevents Davis from realizing the full potential of the survey method. But the time dimension is not completely ignored. One year after the original survey, Davis and his colleagues returned to the field and found out which respondents were still members of the study groups. This last datum provides the substantive theme of the book—the analysis of dropouts.

The first three chapters set the stage for the development of this theme. Chapter i contains a clear exposition of the technique of studying group and individual characteristics simultaneously—what Davis calls the study of compositional effects, which is one type of contextual analysis. The second chapter describes the sample in terms of the characteristics to be explored in the study of the dropouts. Students of small-group research will be most intrigued by the third chapter, which we are told is primarily the work of Ruth Ursula Gebhard. Here the role structures of the study groups are analyzed through self-ratings and sociometric data identifying "task" and "socioemotional" leaders. One of the more interesting findings is that the same people tend to play both kinds of roles contrary to the role differentiation found in some laboratory studies. In a most ingenious analysis it is shown that the amount of participation

by wives in the discussions is conditioned by that of their husbands.

The next three chapters present a detailed analysis of the group and individual factors which differentiate the dropouts from the others. Three group characteristics are shown to have a major effect on retention: the degree of outside contacts among the members, the quantity of discussion activity, and the intellectual impact of the discussions. Even the individuals who do not exhibit these characteristics are likely to remain members if most of their colleagues have them. Davis then explores the effects of numerous other variables, studying them as individual and group characteristics, showing their relationships to the major determinants, and the effects they have when these variables are controlled. The analysis gets rather sticky as Davis bravely comes to grips with five- and six-variable tables. He ends with a list of some twelve characteristics which seem to contribute to retention. Few of these have unambiguous effects. For example, the list includes a *touch* of sociability, a *slight* majority of Democrats, and a high level of education provided there are frequent outside contacts. Unfortunately, Davis is unable to evolve an interpretative scheme into which most of his findings can be fitted.

One merit of this book is that it involves the reader in the research strategies employed and stimulates him to consider alternatives. For example, if Davis is really serious when he announces that his book is about group survival, I wonder why he does not study this problem rather than focusing exclusively on individuals who drop out? At one point we learn that twenty-seven groups failed to survive the year. Certainly Davis should tell us something about them if his formulation of the problem is to be taken seriously. For that matter, it is strange that he never analyzes the dropout *rate*, his only indicator (although an imperfect one since the groups recruit as well as lose members) of group survival. A number of ecological tables are to be found, but none deals with the dropout rate.

Since few of the contextual tables yield consistent results, I wish Davis had considered the possibility of deviant groups. When groups of varying size are classified together because of similar rates of some attribute, it is always possible in contextual analysis that a few large but deviant groups are distorting the pattern. The best way to handle this knotty problem has still to be worked out. Also Davis never tells us that his sample does not include all the group members but only those who happened to be present at the time of the survey. We learn this indirectly from a table showing that even some study leaders were absent. More than the usual problem of sample bias is at stake here, since all the group variables are rates computed on the members in the sample. If, as seems likely, the absentees are similar to the dropouts, the errors in classification can produce very misleading results.

The reader will come across many signs of hasty editing, for example, mislabled tables, garbled sentences, erroneous references to previous chapters; and some readers will find Davis' breezy prose more distracting than refreshing. But this book deserves careful reading by all those interested in quantitative research. Students of small groups may find chapter iii alone worth the price.

DAVID CAPLOVITZ

Columbia University

Creativity and Intelligence: Explorations with Gifted Students. By JACOB W. GETZELS and PHILIP W. JACKSON. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xvii+293. $6.50.

This is a research report comparing two groups of adolescents ($N = 26, 28$) in the University of Chicago Laboratory Schools who earned high scores on one of two sets of ability tests. The report is fascinating and deplorable, fascinating because it contains provocative results, deplorable because faulty design and inadequate reporting convey false impressions and leave one uncertain of which findings to trust.

The jacket summarizes the book's message: "Creative ability and high IQ are by no means one and the same. Indeed, the authors show that highly creative and highly intelligent children differ significantly with respect to personal values, imaginative productions, career goals, and family background." Group A (pupils with high IQ's) are preferred by teachers; they value traits related to conventional adult "success"; they bind their fantasies closely to

external stimuli; they eschew humor. The B's are unconventional: the ranking of traits in their composite self-ideal correlates 0.25 with the desirability ranking they attribute to teachers (cf. 0.67 for the A's). Their thematic productions are uninhibited, playful, bizarre, and violent: "She wore so much cold cream her head would skid across the pillow and hit him." A dozen possibly significant differences between the parents of the A's and B's are extracted from interview data. An appended study compares two other groups with "high morality" and "high adjustment."

The authors have been admirably ingenious in their selection and handling of dependent variables. But almost everything is wrong with the selection and description of the groups. The A's are selected as high in IQ and low on creativity measures; B's have the reverse pattern. Intelligence is appraised by a not necessarily recent Binet test. Where this was not available, a regressed Henmon-Nelson score is substituted, which introduces a systematic distortion (an equipercentile conversion is required). The five "creativity" measures include unusual uses, hidden figures, and a test in which pupils invent arithmetic problems using given data. These tests do not cohere and cannot all be measures of the same thing. It is regrettable that the authors did not investigate which of the tests is associated with the main group differences. These tests have much in common with mental ability: The authors obtain unduly low correlations by correlating the separate tests with IQ, thus partialing age out of one variable and not the other. Groups A and B are more similar in *true* IQ than the authors recognize. The characteristics of the A and B groups are inadequately reported; we know nothing, for example, about their age distributions, which perhaps differ. For no good reason, all high-morality and high-adjustment cases were culled from the groups before proceeding. Finally, the decision not to investigate the sixty children high on *both* tests impoverishes the study: It is this group, if any, that promises genuine creativity.

The authors continually speak of differences between "highly creative" and "highly intelligent" adolescents, in a manner certain to mislead a large part of their audience. There is no population to which their design permits them to generalize, and they have left out of consideration the more typical gifted cases in the high-high cell. They give quite inadequate attention to the fact that validity for the creativity tests is purely an assumption. One contribution is their exploration of two syndromes, but their presentation is marred by the undefended implicit judgment that the B's are highly commendable. The *Mad Magazine* mentality of the B's could easily be called childish and irresponsible; they are strongly reminiscent of the ill-adjusted late maturers of Jones and Bayley. If the study had included pupils high on both tests, the reader might be left wondering how the syndrome of the B's could be cured rather than how it could be "fostered." By the same token, the authors' A syndrome is atypical of high intelligence; they have studied force-fed and sterile conformers who would surely suffer by comparison to the high-high group.

Subsequent investigators can be counted upon to determine what ideational fluency tests measure and what social value if any this talent has. They will be helped by the techniques Getzels and Jackson have invented and by the truly striking hypotheses offered by their work.

But there is a larger issue to consider. We see with increasing frequency books which serve as primary outlets for research studies and at the same time try to reach a non-scholarly public. This book is not atypical, with its catchy title, its failure to dispel the connotations that arise in the lay mind when Group B is labeled "highly creative," and its failure to present sufficient data to permit another scholar to evaluate the conclusions. Is it too much to ask that publishers who publish primary reports of research impose editorial standards equal to those of a scholarly journal?

LEE J. CRONBACH

Bureau of Educational Research
and Department of Psychology
University of Illinois

The Social Epidemiology of Mental Disorders: A Psychiatric Survey of Texas. By E. GARTLY JACO. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960. Pp. 228. $3.50.

In this study Dr. Jaco has undertaken to establish incidence rates of mental illness in the Texan population and a number of its subgroups. These rates are based on cases that

received professional psychiatric care in public and private institutions and by psychiatrists in private practice. In dealing with so large a population a total incidence rate (treated and untreated cases) could hardly have been provided without psychiatric evaluation of the mental status of a sample of the population. This, however, would not have so readily permitted Jaco to assemble rates for various population subgroups, at least not without a prohibitively large sample. It is not possible to say how many cases relevant to a total incidence rate were not included. It might have been worthwhile to pursue the institutional and private practice survey on a diminished scale (perhaps half of Texas would have sufficed) in order to preserve some resources for estimating the extent of non-coverage.

While it is clear that Jaco's cases all involve persons who have received professional psychiatric treatment, it is not clear that he has provided an incidence rate for this treatment group. Jaco correctly defines incidence as the number of new cases occurring within a specified time period (p. 13). However, his formal definition of cases admitted to the study group is "all bona fide residents . . . who sought psychiatric treatment for the first time in their lives during 1951 and 1952. . ." (p. 22). Clearly those who sought treatment for the first time in 1951 and 1952 are not necessarily those who had their onset, that is, became new cases, during those years. However, in Jaco's concluding chapter we find the following statements: "About two-thirds of the time devoted to this project was spent in determining whether or not the patient became ill for the first time during the two-year study period. . . . While complete accuracy in establishing within reasonable limits the time of the onset of psychosis was attempted, it was not always accomplished. In many cases when no contradictory evidence about onset at a time other than the study interval was found, the assumption was made that the case was 'new.' The two-year study period, however, should help to mitigate the inclusion of invalid cases" (p. 180). It appears, then, that Jaco's formal definition of cases admitted to the study group is in error and that the actual practice was to exclude cases known to have had their first psychiatric treatment in 1951–52 but an onset period prior to 1951. However, just as it was necessary for an incidence rate to *exclude* these cases, so it was equally necessary to *in* cases of onset in 1951–52 which received chiatric treatment for the first time ir years *subsequent* to 1952. But Jaco states he excluded all cases that "received psych treatment at a time other than during the s period" (p. 23). Published onset data su that Jaco's procedure probably led to an (sion of roughly 25 per cent of the cases pı to an incidence rate for his treatment gı Oddly enough, had Jaco adhered to his d tion of cases admitted to the study he prob would have arrived at more accurate incid rates. For by including in his study all t who sought psychiatric treatment for the time in 1951–52 (even though their onset in a prior year), he would have compens for his omission of cases with onset in 195 but which did not receive treatment until a 1952.

Jaco reports a psychosis incidence rat 73 per 100,000 population per annum. points out that had institutional sources a been used only three-quarters of this would have been accounted for. It is appa then, that his private practitioner cases co tute a substantial part of the total group that the arduous work of assembling t cases was eminently worthwhile.

Jaco provides separate incidence rates population groups distinguished by age, ethnic origin, migration, urban-rural and gional residence, marital status, occupat and education. These rates are provided several diagnostic groups and for private public patients. The findings that are perl most noteworthy are that migrants to Texa not show a higher rate than non-migra Spanish-American males in Texas have a substantially lower than other ethnic grou and the professional and semi-professi male group has a higher incidence than occupational group except the unemployed is unfortunate that the large amount of (bearing on the population subgroups is so p ly presented. The book has the not uncom failing of repeating the tables verbally in g detail. Little of the text goes beyond what reader can more readily acquire from the bles themselves.

HERBERT GOLDHA

The RAND Corporation

People of Cove and Woodlot: Communities from the Viewpoint of Social Psychiatry. By CHARLES C. HUGHES, MARC-ADELARD TREMBLAY, ROBERT N. RAPOPORT, and ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960. Pp. 574. $10.00.

This is the second volume of the Stirling County study of psychiatric disorder and sociocultural environment. The title refers to the occupations of fishing and lumbering carried on by the Acadian Catholic and English Protestant groups of a Canadian Maritime community. The Acadians are described as maintaining identity mainly through ethnic origin, religion, and the institutional aspects of the family. The English are more individualistic, with a "Protestant ethic" orientation toward work and personal accomplishment. These two groups, representing a high order of social integration, are compared to neighboring "depressed areas" chosen as providing conditions of social disintegration.

The major theses are that the extent of psychiatric disorder will parallel the degree of anomie and that there may be a relationship between the cultural milieu and the type of mental illness. While the psychiatric data are reserved for a third volume, it is evident that there is a high incidence of sociopathic forms of disorder in the depressed areas. This confirms the findings of other studies published since the Stirling County project was inaugurated in 1948. The authors recognize that, in correlating such deviant forms of behavior as delinquency, alcoholism, and mental deficiency with social background, one is largely restating in individual terms what one has said about the society. They make the important points that certain forms of mental illness are due to direct damage to the nervous system, and that sociocultural factors are significant in determining both the susceptibility to noxious agents and the adaptation to limited capabilities.

The authors have little expectation of finding relevant correlations between the forms of mental illness and cultural differences in well-integrated societies. This does not mean that such correlations do not exist but rather that it may be a matter of conceptual orientation. The book takes a psychobiological view of personality in which the organism interacts with, but is separate from, the environment. Symbols derive significance from underlying motives, and mental illness is regarded as resulting when aggressive, sexual, and other basic drives are frustrated. An orientation that holds more promise for social psychiatry considers a self as part of the environment and the social unit as the significant point of reference. Here symbols acquire meaning from their place in a social pattern. Thus the authors indicate that the Acadians will have more paranoid behavior in their mental illnesses than the English because of the outward direction of hitherto controlled hostility. Yet paranoid reactions are also predicted for the depressed-area groups where hostility is anything but controlled. A more economic formulation would be that Acadians habitually structure reality in "concrete" symbols concerning ethnic group, history and tradition, ritualized religion, and the family, and that in situations of stress even more rigidly condensed and stereotyped symbolic systems develop. This is the basis of paranoid thinking and feeling.

The problem of evaluating personality traits on an individual basis is indicated in the finding that English mothers have lower self-esteem than do their Acadian counterparts. The judgment is made on statements indicating doubts as to performance as a mother. Yet the English mothers took more unaided care of their children. Thus "low self-esteem" may not be a character attribute so much as a culturally patterned mode of expression.

The book is beautifully written and the extensive material is well organized. Concerning its contribution to social behavior and its pathology, one must await the final volume.

EDWIN A. WEINSTEIN, M.D.

Washington School of Psychiatry

CURRENT BOOKS

ABRECHT, PAUL. *The Churches and Rapid Social Change.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961. Pp. 216. $3.95. A discussion of church and mission policies in the face of political, economic, and social change.

AIRD, JOHN S. *The Size, Composition, and Growth of the Population of Mainland China.* ("International Population Statistics Reports," Series P-90, No. 15.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961. Pp. vi+100. $0.55 (paper).

ARGYRIS, CHRIS. *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness.* Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962. Pp. xi+292. $6 50. A model of the relationship between executives' values concerning effective human relations and how their effectiveness was used in planning and administering a program of change.

BAIRD, ANDREW W., COLE, LUCY W., and KAUFMAN, HAROLD F. *Development of Human Resources in Alcorn County, Mississippi.* State College: Agricultural Experiment Station of Mississippi State University, 1961. Pp. vii+75. (Paper.)

BARBU, ZEVEDEI. *Problems of Historical Psychology.* New York: Grove Press, 1961. Pp. x+222. $1.95 (paper). The author sets out to answer: "How and to what extent is the human mind influenced by history?" The study focuses on changes in the perceptual field of the individual in history, the individual of ancient Greek civilization, and English national character.

BAUM, SAMUEL. *Population, Manpower, and Economic Development of Eastern Europe.* Washington: Department of Sociology, George Washington University, 1961. Pp. 47. $1.25 (paper).

BEIJER, G., FRIJDA, N. H., HOFSTEDE, B. P., and WENTHOLT, R. *Characteristics of Overseas Migrants.* The Hague: Government Printing and Publishing Office, 1961. Pp. xv+319. Gld. 20 (paper). Report on background, motivations, and characteristics of Dutch emigrants to overseas countries and a follow-up investigation on their economic and social integration.

BENNETT, JOHN C. (ed.). *Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. Pp. 191. $3.95. Seven papers on the strategic, scientific, and moral issues associated with nuclear weapons.

BERNARD, JESSIE, and JENSEN, DEBORAH. *Sociology.* St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1962. Pp. 356. $6.00. New edition of sociology textbook for student nurses.

BERREMAN, GERALD D. *Behind Many Masks Ethnography and Impression Management in a Himalyan Village.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Society for Applied Anthropology, 1962. Pp. 24. $1.50 (paper).

BESHERS, JAMES M. *Urban Social Structure.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. ix+207. $5.50. An attempt to integrate a wide variety of sources of data to develop a theory of urban facts.

BEYER, GLENN H. *Economic Aspects of Housing for the Aged.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for Housing and Environmental Studies, Cornell University, 1961. Pp. viii+59. $2.50 (paper). Detailed information based upon interviews with a sample of Old Age and Survivors Insurance beneficiaries.

BIEBER, IRVING, *et al. Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study of Male Homosexuals.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962. Pp. vii+358 $8 50. Systematic quantitative analysis of data derived from psychoanalytic sessions.

BIRNBAUM, NORMAN (ed.). *The Sociological Study of Ideology, 1940–1960.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962. Pp. iii+81. $1.50 (paper). Trend report and bibliography.

BORKO, HAROLD (ed.). *Computer Applications in the Behavioral Sciences.* Englewood Cliffs, N J Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. 633. $8 75. Explanation of computers and illustrations of their use.

BOSKOFF, ALVIN. *The Sociology of Urban Regions* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, 1962. Pp. xiv+370. $6.00. Survey and analysis of literature.

BRANDON, S. G. F. *Man and His Destiny in the Great Religions: An Historical and Comparative Study Containing the Wilde Lectures in Natural and Comparative Religion Delivered in the University of Oxford, 1954–1957.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Pp. xi+442. $6 50

BROOKS, LEE M., and BERTRAND, ALVIN L. *History of the Southern Sociological Society.* University University of Alabama Press, 1962. Pp. 76. $1.25 (paper).

BROWNE, ROBERT S. *Race Relations in International Affairs.* Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. iv+62. $1.00 (paper). A discussion of the shifting power of white and colored peoples in the world and of the implications of race relation patterns in the United States for America's international role.

CALIPPE, ABBÉ. *Journal d'un prêtre d'après-demain*

("Journal of a Priest of the Day-after-Tomorrow"). Paris: Casterman, 1961. Pp. 259. New Fr. 13.50 (paper). The journal of a priest, with a 200-page introduction providing a context for analysis of social Catholicism.

CAVAN, RUTH S. *Juvenile Delinquency*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1962. Pp. x+366. $7.00. A textbook survey of delinquency—its definition, development, patterns, controls, and treatment, and legal methods of dealing with it.

CERECEDA, RAUL. *Las Instituciones politicas en America Latina* ("Political Institutions in Latin America"). Bogotá: Oficina Internacional de Investigaciones Sociales de Feres, 1961. Pp. 256. (Paper.) A review of developments and present functioning of political institutions in Latin America.

CHAFETZ, MORRIS E., and DEMONE, HAROLD W., JR *Alcoholism and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 319. $6.95. Survey of current knowledge concerning alcohol and alcoholics.

CHRISTENSON, REO M., and MCWILLIAMS, ROBERT O (eds.). *Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. ix+585. (Paper) More than one hundred selections by a wide range of authors.

CLARK, THOMAS D. (ed.). *Travels in the New South: A Bibliography*, Vol. I.: *The Postwar South, 1865–1900: An Era of Reconstruction and Readjustment;* Vol. II.: *The Twentieth-Century South, 1900–1955: An Era of Change, Depression, and Emergence*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. Pp. xvi+267, xiii+301. $20 00. Detailed annotations of a wide range of travel books, letters, and other writings.

CLÉMENS, RENÉ. *Contributions à l'étude de l'entreprise et de la distribution des pouvoirs de décision* ("Contributions to the Study of the Enterprise and the Distribution of the Powers of Decision"). Liège: L'Institut de Sociologie de l'Université de Liège, 1961. Pp. 359. (Paper.) Analysis of industrial organization in Belgium.

CORMACK, MARGARET. *She Who Rides a Peacock: Indian Students and Social Change*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. xiii+264. $5.75. Research on young Indian intellectuals.

CORREDOR, BERTA, and TORRES, SERGIO. *Transformación en el mundo rural latinoamericano* ("Transformations in the Latin American Rural World"). Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales Serie Socio-Economica II, 1961. Pp. 148. (Paper) Economic and social consequences of the agrarian structures.

DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, WARREN SPRINGS LABORATORY. *Register of Research in the Human Sciences, 1960–61*. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1962. Pp. viii+123. 10s. (paper).

DESMONDE, WILLIAM. *Magic, Myth, and Money: The Origin of Money in Religious Ritual*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xv+208. $5.00.

DETHINE, P. *Aspects économiques et sociaux de l'industrialisation en Afrique* ("Economic and Social Aspects of Industrialization in Africa"). Brussels: Centre de Documentation Économique et Sociale Africaine, 1961. Pp. iv+136. Belg. Fr. 200 (paper). Bibliography.

DEWEY, ALICE G. *Peasant Marketing in Java*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xxi+238. $6.00. On the basis of extended field work, an analytical description of the trading patterns in a town of 18,000 in Java.

DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O. *Democracy's Manifesto*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. 48. $2.00. A program for revamping the role of the United States in the world.

DUFFY, CLINTON T. *88 Men and 2 Women*. With AL HIRSHBERG. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. 258. $4.50. The former warden of San Quentin's account of the ninety executions he witnessed.

EIDUSON, BERNICE T. *Scientists: Their Psychological World*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962. Pp. xvi+299. $6.50. The personalities of research scientists as contrasted with those of artists and businessmen.

ENNIS, MERLIN (collector and translator). *Umbundu: Folk Tales from Angola*. With a Comparative Analysis by ALBERT LORD. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. xxix+316. $7.50.

ENNIS, PHILIP H., and WINGER, HOWARD W. (eds.). *Seven Questions about the Profession of Librarianship: The Twenty-sixth Annual Conference of the Graduate Library School, June 21–23, 1961*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. v+104. $3.75. Consists of papers and discussions by Goode, Hughes, Parker, Reagan, McGlothlin, Henkle, Mahar, Lancour, Rossi, Ellsworth, Clift, and the editors.

ESCARPIT, ROBERT. *Das Buch und der Leser* ("Books and Readers"). Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961. Pp. 132. DM. 15.50 (paper). Sociology of literature.

ESSIEN-UDOM, E. U. *Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+367. $6.95. A study of the Nation of Islam—a Muslim movement led by Elijah Muhammad—based upon observation and informal discussions with leaders and members.

ETZIONI, AMITAI. *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy*. New York: Collier Books, 1962. Pp. 285. $0.95 (paper). A critical analysis of alternatives to international peace and the suggested gradualist alternative.

FAIRCHILD, HENRY W., and HAQ, SHAMSUL. *A New Rural Co-operative for Comilla Thana: First*

Annual Report Rural Co-operative Pilot Experiment, July 1961. Comilla, East Pakistan: Pakistan Academy for Village Development, 1961. Pp. iii+88. Rs. 2.00 (paper).

FARON, L. C. *Mapuche Social Structure: Institutional Reintegration in a Patrilineal Society of Central Chile.* ("Illinois Studies in Anthropology," No. 1.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. xvi+247. $3.00 (paper).

FERRAROTTI, FRANCO. *La Sociologia come partecipazione e altri saggi* ("Sociology as Participation and Other Essays"). Torino: Taylor, 1961. Pp. 241. (Paper.) Essays on the community, trade unions, technology, and work relations, and other topics.

FINLEY, M. I. (ed.). *Slavery in Classical Antiquity.* Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1960. Pp. v+255. 15*s.* (paper). Collection of papers.

FISER, WEBB S. *Mastery of the Metropolis.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+168. $1.95 (paper). Focuses on potentials of cities and how institutions can be modified to realize them.

FISHEL, WESLEY R. (ed.). *Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam since Independence.* New York Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv+233 $6.95. Papers from a conference.

FORD, THOMAS R. (ed.). *The Southern Appalachian Region.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962. Pp. xv+308. $10.00. A survey conducted in 1958, with papers on the region's population, economy, institutions, and culture.

FRANCES, SIMONE. *Ou va l'artisanat français?* ("Where Is the French Artisan Going?") Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1961. Pp. 131. New Fr. 16. A study of the life and ideology of the cabinetmakers of the Seine

FRIIS, H., and MANNICHE, E. *Enlige Aeldre: En undersøgelse af enlige aeldre på Vesterbro i København med saerlig henblik på deres samvaer med andre mennesker* ("Old People in a Low-Income Area in Copenhagen"). Copenhagen: I Kommission Hos Teknisk Forlag, 1961. Pp. 47. (Paper.)

GALTON, FRANCIS. *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences.* With an Introduction by C. D. DARLINGTON. New York: Meridian Books, 1962. Pp. 446. $1.45 (paper).

GARFIELD, VIOLA E. (ed.). *Symposium: Patterns of Land Utilization and Other Papers; Proceedings of the 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Ethnological Society.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961. Pp. vi+119. $3.50 (paper).

GARRE, WALTER J. *Basic Anxiety: A New Psychobiological Concept.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. 123. $5.00. Charting a new psychiatric approach.

GELDARD, FRANK A. *Fundamentals of Psychology.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. 437. $7.50. Introductory textbook in general psychology.

GLICK, IRA O., and LEVY, SIDNEY J. *Living with Television.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co 1962. Pp. 262. $4.95. A discussion of television's audiences, programs and performers, and commercials.

GOLDBERG, HARVEY. *The Life of Jean Jaurès: A Biography of the Great French Socialist and Intellectual.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. 590. $12.00.

GOLEMBIEWSKI, ROBERT T. *The Small Group: An Analysis of Research Concepts and Operations* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp xii+303. $6.00. Survey and analysis of literature

GORER, GEOFFREY, and RICKMAN, JOHN. *The People of Great Russia: A Psychological Study.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962. Pp. 236 $1.65 (paper). A reissue, with a new introduction by Gorer.

GREER, SCOTT. *The Emerging City: Myth and Reality.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc, 1962. Pp. v+232. $5.75. General discussion of the characteristics of metropolitan areas.

HAIRE, MASON (ed.). *Organization Theory in Industrial Practice: A Symposium of the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. x+173 Papers by individual managers.

HALBWACHS, MAURICE. *Sources of Religious Sentiment.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc, 1962. Pp. 109. $4.00. Re-analysis of Durkheim's *Elementary Forms.*

HAMMEL, EUGENE A. *Wealth, Authority and Prestige in the Ica Valley, Peru.* Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1962. Pp. 110 $2.00 (paper). Field study conceptualized in terms of the three structures indicated in the title.

HARDIN, EINAR, EDDY, WILLIAM B., and DEUTSCH, STEVEN E. *Economic and Social Implications of Automation: An Annotated Bibliography, Literature 1957–1960,* Vol. II. East Lansing: Labor and Industrial Relations Center, Michigan State University, 1961. Pp. 78. $1.50 (paper).

HAUSER, PHILIP M. (ed.). *Urbanization in Latin America.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. 331. $4.50. Proceedings of a seminar jointly sponsored by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and UNESCO (in co-operation with the International Labour Organization and the Organization of American States) on urbanization problems in Latin America.

HAVEL, J. E. *La Condition de la femme.* Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1961. Pp. 221. New Fr. 4.50 (paper). The place of woman through the ages.

HEARD, ALEXANDER. *The Costs of Democracy: Fi-*

ncing American Political Campaigns. Garden y, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. xiii+ ;. $1.95 (paper).

, JAMES. *Teaching Secondary School Social idies.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. . xii+481. $6.95. On teaching methods.

NER, JOSEPH. *Industrielle Revolution und re- öse Krise* ("Industrial Revolution and Reli- us Crisis"). Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1. Pp. 66. DM. 7.25 (paper). A report of dies of the religious conduct of Catholics in rmany and France.

ANS, GEORGE C. *Sentiments and Activities: says in Social Science.* New York: Free Press Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. 326. $6.50. Collection industrial work groups, medieval studies, an- opological issues, and behavior as exchange.

ER, EDGAR M., and VERNON, RAYMOND. *Anat- y of a Metropolis.* New York: Doubleday Co., 1962. Pp. ix+338. $1.45 (paper). The inging distribution of people and jobs within New York Metropolitan Region.

ARD, PETER. *Frank Buchman's Secret.* Garden y, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. 142. 75. A popular account of the initiator of oral Re-armament written by a co-worker.

TING, ROGER B., and NEUWIRTH, GLORIA S. *to Sues in New York City? A Study of Auto- bile Accident Claims.* New York: Columbia iversity Press, 1962. Pp. xii+186. $6.50.

s, K. S. *The Stuart Case.* New York: Cam- dge University Press, 1962. Pp 321. $6 50. A ailed account of the trial of an "aborigine" the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl South Australia; reveals aspects of the po- cal and judicial system.

RNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE. *Employment Objec- es in Economic Development: Report of a eting of Experts.* Washington: International bor Office, 1961. Pp. xi+255. $2.75 (paper). eport by Campos, Higgins, Marsan, Pajestka, l Raj on the problems of employment crea- n in the context of economic development, h suggestions for expansion of employment portunities.

BERT, FRANÇOIS-ANDRÉ. *Christianisme et classe vrière* ("Christianity and the Working Class"). ris: Casterman, 1961. Pp. 259. New Fr. 12 aper). A historical-sociological study of the nch working class and religious behavior.

U, NONI. *Drawn in Color: African Contrasts.* w York: St Martin's Press, 1962. Pp. xii+ . $4.50. A personal account of experiences l impressions of life in East and South Africa.

UEMYNS, G. *L'O.N.U. au Congo: Ses interven- ns vues et jugées par les Belges* ("The U. N. the Congo: Its Intervention as Seen and dged by the Belgians"). Brussels: Parc Léo- ld, 1961. Pp. 156. (Paper.)

, DEWITT, and CANHAM, ERWIN D. *The Christian Science Way of Life* and *A Christian Scientist's Life.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. viii+246. $3.95. The meaning of the Christian Science way of life discussed by two Christian Scientists.

KIENER, FRANZ. *Hand Gebärde und Charakter* ("Hand Gestures and Character"). Munich: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1962. Pp. 366. DM. 24. A contribution to knowledge of the expressions of the hand and its gestures.

KIERNAN, THOMAS P. (ed.). *Aristotle Dictionary.* With an Introduction by THEODORE E. JAMES. New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. 524. $7.50.

KLAPP, ORRIN E. *Heroes, Villains, and Fools: The Changing American Character.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+176. $3.95. Analysis of American slang and what it reveals about changes in American character.

KLUCKHOHN, RICHARD (ed.). *Culture and Behavior: The Collected Essays of Clyde Kluckhohn.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. viii+402. $6.75. Collection planned by author before his death in 1960.

KORNHAUSER, WILLIAM. *Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. xii+230. $6.00. Analysis of four areas of strain; based primarily on interviews.

KRAMER, BERNARD M. *Day Hospital: A Study of Partial Hospitalization in Psychiatry.* New York: Grune & Stratton, 1962. Pp. xiv+103. (Paper.)

KULKARNI, P. D. *The Central Social Welfare Board.* New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. 92. $3.00. Evaluation of a semipublic institution in India.

LANG, KURT, and LANG, GLADYS ENGEL. *Collective Dynamics.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1961. Pp. xii+563. $7.25. A comprehensive analysis of the processes by which collectivities in many contexts are transformed.

LARSEN, OTTO N., and CATTON, WILLIAM R., JR. *Conceptual Sociology: A Manual of Exercises Relating Concepts to Specimens, Principles, and Definitions.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. x+276. (Paper.)

LASSWELL, HAROLD D., and CLEVELAND, HARLAN (eds.). *The Ethic of Power: The Interplay of Religion, Philosophy, and Politics.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xvi+509. $7.50. Conference papers on the interplay of the great traditions and politics, interconnections between justice and ethical norms, and contemporary societal norms and issues.

LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS H., and FESTINGER, LEON. *Deterrents and Reinforcement: The Psychology of Insufficient Reward.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi+180. $4.75. Continuity in the theory of cognitive dissonance.

LEDERER, IVO J. (ed.). *Russian Foreign Policy: Es-*

says in Historical Perspective. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. xxiii+620. $10.00. Essays by George F. Kennan and eighteen others on Russian foreign policy over the last century.

LEE, FRANK F. *Negro and White in a Connecticut Town*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961. Pp. 207. $5.00. A study of the extent of Negro exclusion or participation in different areas of behavior relative to white people and the means of controlling and perpetrating the race relations pattern in a small northern town.

LEYBURN, JAMES G. *The Scotch-Irish: A Social History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. xix+377. $7.00. An account of the Scots in 1600 and later in Ireland and of their settlement in the American colonies.

LICHTER, SOLOMON, RAPIEN, ELSIE, SEIBERT, FRANCES, and SKLANSKY, MORRIS. *The Drop-outs: A Treatment Study of Intellectually Capable Students Who Drop Out of High School* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xii+302. $5.50. Report of research conducted by a counseling agency specializing in the treatment of emotional and educational problems of adolescents.

LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN, TROW, MARTIN, and COLEMAN, JAMES *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. xxvi+512. $1.95 (paper). A reprint of the 1956 edition.

LUKÁCS, GEORG. *Literatursociologie* ("On the Sociology of Literature"). Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961 Pp. 568. Representative selection of Lukács' writings.

LUSCHER, KURT. *Junge Auslandschweizer zwischen Ursprungs- und Wohnland* ("The Ties of Expatriate Swiss to Their Place of Origin and Place of Residence"). Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1961. Pp. 123 Swiss Fr. 8 80 (paper) Empirical study of the ties of Swiss living in other countries to Switzerland and their present country.

MCLOUGHLIN, EMMETT. *Crime and Immorality in the Catholic Church*. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962. Pp. 288. $4.95. Highly critical of influence of Catholicism.

MCNICKLE, D'ARCY. *The Indian Tribes of the United States: Ethnic and Cultural Survival*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 79. $1.75 (paper).

MARTINDALE, DON. *Social Life and Cultural Change*. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962. Pp. xii+528. $9.00. Describes the kind of social thought which arises in the formation of communities.

MOLNAR, THOMAS. *The Decline of the Intellectual*. Cleveland: World Publishing Co, 1961. Pp. 369. $1.75 (paper). History and analysis of contemporary trends.

MOTWANI, KEWAL. *Integration: A Programme of Education*. Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1962. Pp 114. (Paper.) Plea for reorientation in Indian education.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH. *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors*. Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xi+635. $12.50. Twenty-three papers, primarily by economists, on the inventive process in relation to economic growth, research and development, and "non-market" factors.

NIXON, RICHARD M. *Six Crises*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. xvi+460 $5.95. Turning points of his life written by a man who does not think the battle is over for him.

OLMSTED, DONALD W. *Social Groups, Roles, and Leadership: An Introduction to the Concepts* East Lansing: Institute for Community Development Continuing Education Service, Michigan State University, 1961. Pp. vi+55. $1.50 (paper)

PERLOFF, HARVEY S. *A National Program of Research in Housing and Urban Development: The Major Requirements and a Suggested Approach* Washington: Resources for the Future, Inc, 1962. Pp 32. $0 50 (paper).

POLL, SOLOMON. *The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+308. $5.50. Examination of a negative case of the melting-pot theory

REDFIELD, ROBERT. *A Village That Chose Progress Chan Kom Revisited*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+187. $1.25 (paper) Paperback reissue.

RISCHIN, MOSES. *The Promised City: New York's Jews, 1870–1914*. Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp xvi+342. $7 50 Historical change among Jewish immigrants to New York.

ROGERS, CYRIL A., and FRANTZ, C. *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behavior of the White Population* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp xviii+427. $6.75.

RUITENBEEK, HENDRIK M. (ed). *Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy* New York E P Dutton & Co., 1962. Pp. xxvi+262. $1 75 (paper) Twelve papers on the influence of existentialism on modern psychoanalysis.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Power*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962. Pp. 206. $0.95 (paper). Reprint of 1938 classic.

SALZMAN, LEON, and MASSERMAN, JULES H. (eds) *Modern Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. New York Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. 210. $4 75. Appraisals of achievements of psychoanalysis in a dozen essays by various authors.

SCALAPINO, ROBERT A., and MASUMI, JUNNOSUKE *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. ix+190. $3.75. Historical and survey approach combined to study impact of cultural values on political institutions.

SHIMONY, ANNEMARIE ANROD. *Conservatism among the Iroquois at the Six Nations Reserve*. New Haven, Conn.: Department of Anthropology, Yale University, 1961. Pp. 302. $4.00 (paper).

SHIPMAN, GEORGE A., LAMPMAN, ROBERT J., and MIYAMOTO, S. FRANK. *Medical Service Corporations in the State of Washington: A Study of the Administration of Physician-sponsored Prepaid Medical Care*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xi+215. $6.50.

SIEGEL, BERNARD J. (ed.). *Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1961*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. 338. $7.50. Second volume in series.

SKÅRDAL, OLAV. *Towards a Theory of Occupational Orientation: A Sociological Inquiry into the Principles Governing Recruitment to Role-Positions*. Oslo: University of Oslo, 1960. Pp. 98. (Paper.)

SMITH, A. ROBERT. *The Tiger in the Senate: A Biography of Senator Wayne Morse*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. 455. $4 95

SOLLIE, CARLTON R., and BAILEY, WILFRID C. *Delineation of Trade Areas and Communities in the Yellow Creek Watershed*. State College: Agricultural Experiment Station, Mississippi State University, 1961. Pp. 26. (Paper.)

STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES *La Situation des logements des travailleurs dans les industries de la C.E C.A*. ("The Housing Situation of the Workers in the Industries of the European Coal and Steel Community"). Brussels: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1961. Pp. 287. (Paper.)

STONE, JULIUS. *The International Court and World Crisis*. New York: International Conciliation, 1962. Pp. 64. $0.35 (paper).

STOUFFER, SAMUEL A. *Social Research To Test Ideas· Selected Writings of Samuel A. Stouffer*. With an Introduction by PAUL F. LAZARSFELD. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xxxi+314. $8.50.

STROTHER, GEORGE B. (ed.). *Social Science Approaches to Business Behavior*. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962. Pp. vii+183. $5.00. Papers by Dubin, Argyris, Warner, Whyte, Luce, and Haire.

SUTHERLAND, ROBERT, HOLTZMAN, WAYNE, KOILE, EARL, and SMITH, BERT (eds.). *Personality Factors on the College Campus: Review of a Symposium*. Austin: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health and the University of Texas, 1962. Pp. 242 $1 50 (paper). Contributions by N. Sanford, T. McConnell, C. Pace, E. Hilgard, T. Newcomb, D. Farnsworth, F. Sanford, R. Peck, and M. Trow.

SWADOS, HARVEY. *A Radical's America*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1962. Pp. xvi+347. $5.00. A collection of essays on work, popular culture, and other aspects of American life.

SWANSON, BERT E. (ed.). *Current Trends in Comparative Community Studies*. Kansas City, Mo.: Community Studies, 1962. Pp. 101. $2.00 (paper). Report of conference.

SYSIHARJU, ANNA-LIISA. *Equality, Home, and Work: A Socio-psychological Study on Finnish Student Women's Attitudes towards the Woman's Role in Society*. Mikkelissä: Oy. Länsi-Savon Kirjapaino, 1960. Pp. 220. (Paper.)

THOMAS, BRINLEY. *International Migration and Economic Development: A Trend Report and Bibliography*. Turin: Fratelli Pozzo (for UNESCO), 1961. Pp. 85. (Paper.)

TIEN, H. YUAN (ed.). *Milwaukee Metropolitan Area Fact Book, 1940, 1950, and 1960*. Madison. University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. x+437. $6.00 (paper).

TIRYAKIAN, EDWARD A. *Sociologism and Existentialism: Two Perspectives on the Individual and Society*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+176 $1.95 (paper). A discussion of the differences between sociology and existential thought and the way in which they may complement each other.

TURNBULL, JOHN G., WILLIAMS, C. ARTHUR, JR., and CHEIT, EARL F. *Economic and Social Security*. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1962. Pp. v+552. $8.00. A discussion of the public and private measures for extending economic security.

TURNER, ROY (ed). *India's Urban Future*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. xv+470. $7.00. Collection of studies of urbanization.

WASKOW, ARTHUR I. *The Limits of Defense*. With an Introduction by DAVID RIESMAN. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. 119. $2.95. Blueprint of steps toward disarmament.

WATKINS, CHARLES, and PASAMANICK, BENJAMIN (eds.). *Problems in Communication*. Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 1961. Pp. 131. $2.00 (paper). Collection of papers.

WATSON, BRUCE A. *Kunst, Künstler und soziale Kontrolle* ("Art, Artists, and Social Control"). Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961. Pp. 107. DM. 15 (paper). Analysis of the elite in art in terms of social control.

WEIDNER, EDWARD W. *The World Role of Universities*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. xii+366. $6.95. Study of international exchange programs.

WHITE, LYNN, JR. *Medieval Technology and Social Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xii+194. $6.00. Influence of

technology on various social classes and on pre-capitalist development.

WHITMAN, HOWARD. *The Sex Age*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. xii+247. $4.50. A popular discussion of sex in America.

WIESE, LEOPOLD VON. *Herbert Spencers Einfuhrung in die Soziologie* ("Herbert Spencer's Introduction to Sociology"). Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960. Pp. 32. DM. 3.80 (paper). The German dean of sociology "does" read Spencer and evaluates him for us.

WILLIAMS, OLIVER P., and PRESS, CHARLES (eds.). *Democracy in Urban America: Readings on Government and Politics*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1962. Pp. xii+561.

WILSON, FRANCIS G. *A Theory of Public Opinion*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962. Pp. xii+308. $7.00. A political scientist discusses the emergence of public opinion, methods of its study, and its proper role in contemporary society.

WILSON, JAMES Q. *The Amateur Democrat*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xv+378. $6.95. Research on clubs in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles conceptualized in terms of a theory of organizational rewards.

WINGO, LOWDON, JR. *Transportation and Urban Land*. Washington: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1961. Pp. viii+132. $2 00 (paper). A study of the residential use of urban land using a partial equilibrium model.

WOLFGANG, LEONHARD. *The Kremlin since Stal* Translated by MARIAN JACKSON and ELIZABE WISKEMANN. New York: Frederick A. Praeg 1962. Pp. vii+403. $7.75. An account of politi and social developments in the U.S.S R. fr 1952 through 1960.

WOOLF, HARRY (ed.). *Quantification*. Indianapol Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962. Pp. 224. Essays on t history of quantification in the various scienc including one on sociology by Lazarsfeld.

YALE UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST ASIA STUDIES. *E trepreneurship and Labor Skills in Indonesi Economic Development: A Symposium*. Intr duction by BENJAMIN H. HIGGINS. New Hav Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studi 1962. Pp. 140. (Paper.) Consists of Hawkin "The Batik Industry: The Role of the Javan Entrepreneur," Palmier's "Batik Manufactur a Chinese Community in Java," and Guthri "The Development of a Skilled Labor Force Indonesia."

YOUMANS, E. GRANT. *Economic Status and Att tudes of Older Men in Selected Rural and U ban Areas of Kentucky*. ("Progress Repor No. 105.) Lexington: University of Kentucl Agricultural Experiment Station, 1961 Pp 4 (Paper.)

ZINKIN, TAYA. *Caste Today*. New York Oxfo University Press, 1962. Pp. xi+68. $1.50 (pa per). Description of Indian caste system.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume LXVIII NOVEMBER 1962 Number 3

STUDIES ON FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

AN EDITORIAL FOREWORD

The study of formal organizations has received increasing attention from sociologists in recent years. It may not be too much to expect that research in this field will expand as dramatically in the 1960's as research on small groups expanded in the 1950's. Indeed, this would be a logical next step in the advancement of systematic sociological inquiry from simpler to more complex social structures. Some indications of this trend are already evident. The proportion of articles dealing with problems of bureaucracy or formal organization in the two major sociological journals has doubled between 1940 and 1960, and a considerable number of books specifically devoted to this topic have been published in the last year or two. Even more impressive than the sheer quantity are the scope and quality of the work in the field.

Theories of bureaucracy, notably Max Weber's, exerted much influence in sociology, but an interest in empirical research developed considerably later in this field than in most others. Although numerous empirical investigations were carried out in industrial organizations in the 1930's these were concerned with the psychological problems of worker morale and motivation and not with the sociological analysis of complex formal organizations. Empirical research explicitly oriented to problems of bureaucratic organization began to appear only after World War II, primarily in the form of case studies, such as Selznick's study of the TVA and Gouldner's study of an industrial bureaucracy. Case studies of organizations have increasingly substituted rigorous methods of inquiry for impressionistic observation, an outstanding example being *Union Democracy*, by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman. An inherent limitation of the case-study approach is that it focuses attention upon internal comparisons between work groups or segments in the organization, whereas the investigation of some of the basic theoretical problems of bureaucracy requires comparison of different formal organizations. An important advance on this front has been made in some recent research where systematic comparisons of samples of organizations are used to deal with such problems as the influence of size on bureaucratization or the relationship between authority structure and specialization.

While we consider the recent trend toward systematic comparative research on organizations of particular significance, it is by no means the sole noteworthy development in the field. Another is a growing tendency to attack the very problems that researchers have often neglected in the past, for example, organizational change or

the relationship between organizations and their environment. There is also some interest in replication where the findings of one study are tested in a different context and thereby extended or refined. Most promising, finally, is the fact that this growing body of systematic research is not divorced from, but has remained closely connected with, the developing theory on formal organizations.

These trends are illustrated in the papers in this issue. Several articles are based on quantitative comparisons of different organizations. Thus, Faunce's research on UAW locals challenges Michels' thesis that large unions are mostly oligarchic by showing that the large union locals do not only contribute more to democratic processes in the national parent union but are probably also more democratic internally. Udy, continuing his research on non-Western production organizations, analyzes the interdependence of various aspects of complexity and rationality in organizations. He also deals with the relationship between an organization and its environment, and so does Thompson in a theoretical analysis. Udy's findings indicate that complex rationality in production is impeded by ascriptive institutions and furthered by an organization's relative independence from its community setting. Thompson develops an analytical typology of the transactions that occur between a member of an organization and an outsider on the basis of the specificity of the role prescriptions that govern the behavior of either.

Pearlin is concerned with resistance to change in organizations. He shows that the actual introduction of changes in policy decreased resistance to further change in the mental hospital under observation, and he analyzes how social position and orientation to patients combined to influence attitudes toward change. The implications the changes Pearlin discusses have for the authority structure of the organization are analyzed in Zald's comparative analysis of five correctional institutions. His findings suggest that therapeutic goals, compared to custodial ones, promote decentralization of power. Evan proposes the patron-artist relation as a model for the researcher in large organizations in order to avoid the role strain inherent in other types of relationships. Kriesberg, in a replication, confirms Grusky's finding that managerial succession is more rapid in large organizations and goes on to show that this is probably the case because, and only if, their managers are oriented to itinerant careers.

Peter M. Blau
Editor-on-Leave

Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

SIZE OF LOCALS AND UNION DEMOCRACY[1]

WILLIAM A. FAUNCE

ABSTRACT

Various studies suggest that the size of local unions affects the nature of internal political processes at both the local and the national union level. Data collected from delegates to the 1959 Constitutional Convention of the UAW indicate that large locals contribute more to democratic processes in the national union. The data also suggest that small locals may be less democratic internally than large locals but raise some questions regarding the applicability of customary indexes of democracy to small local unions.

INTRODUCTION

The size of an organization has an important bearing upon the nature of its control structure. Both the necessity for formal mechanisms of control and the character of authority relations within an organization are affected by its size. This paper is concerned with the relationship between local union size and the internal political structure of a trade union. Because local unions are in some measure autonomous political units, union government may be studied at either the local or the national union level. Data regarding political processes at both levels were collected in this study. The data permit analysis of the contribution of larger and smaller locals to democratic control of the national union as well as analysis of the extent of democracy within locals of varying size.

There is some agreement among students of union government that small locals tend to be more democratic internally than large locals but contribute less to democratic processes at the national union level. Large locals are seen as a force for democracy in the national union primarily because they are less dependent upon the national office and therefore in a better position to express opposition to it. Organized party conflict, which is more likely to occur in large than in small locals, may produce pressures that also result in more active opposition to policies of the national officers. It has also been suggested that members of small locals are less likely to be exposed to, and are less well informed about, opposing views on political issues at the national union level.[2]

The proposition that large locals are less democratic internally than small locals is based primarily upon their lower rate of rank-and-file participation in union politics and lower rate of turnover of officers.[3] According to this view, officers of large locals are more likely to use undemocratic means to stay in office because the rewards of office are much greater. Their success in subverting democratic procedures results from greater control of means of communication, a more complete monopoly of political skills, and less rank-and-file concern

[1] I am indebted to Professors Jack Stieber and William H. Form, Michigan State University, and to Professor George Y. M. Won, University of Hawaii, who worked with me on this project.

[2] Cf. Joel Seidman, *Democracy in the Labor Movement* (Bulletin 39, February, 1958 [Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1958]), pp. 19–36; Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 364–90.

[3] Cf. Seidman, *op. cit.*; Lipset *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 14, 78; George Strauss, "Control by the Membership in Building Trades Unions," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (1955–56), 527 ff.; Joel Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh, and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo, *The Worker Views His Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 185–219; Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, *The Local Union* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), pp. 238–58; Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, *Participation in Local Unions* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958).

with union affairs. Seidman summarizes this point of view as follows:

> Conditions are most favorable for the development of local union democracy in a small organization, of several hundred at the most, all of whose members are employed in a single plant. There the members are likely to be in daily contact with each other and also with their officers. Typically, they work side by side because the organization neither needs nor can it afford the services of a full-time official. In these circumstances the union officer can have no greater income, not much more prestige, and little more power than the rank-and-file membership. The factory worker is hired by management and, assuming proper conduct on his part, his job lasts for a relatively long period of time so he enjoys a reasonable degree of economic security. As a union member he has little reason to be fearful of his union official or dependent upon him. The officer, in turn, has little reason to seek to perpetuate his stay in office by undemocratic means and little opportunity to accomplish that objective should he have the desire. The rewards of offices of this type are meagre, the annoyances many, and relatively few wish to perpetuate themselves in office. Contests for this type of office are frequent and turnover is high.[4]

The results of the study reported in this paper support the view that large locals contribute more to democracy in the national union. They cast some doubt, however, upon the assertion that small locals are more democratic than large locals and raise some questions regarding the meaning of democracy under the conditions described above by Seidman.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data bearing on the relationship between local size and union democracy were collected from two sources. The first was a study conducted at the Seventeenth Constitutional Convention of the United Auto Workers in 1959. A questionnaire was distributed to all delegates in attendance on the second day of this convention. Although not all the delegates were present at these sessions, completed questionnaires were obtained from 1,815 delegates representing 753 UAW locals. Approximately three-fourths of all delegates who attended the convention are included in our sample. The various geographic regions of the UAW, locals of various sizes, and cities of various sizes are represented in almost exactly the same proportion among our respondents as in the total delegate population.

Questions dealing with delegate attitudes toward the convention, delegate election procedures, and general background characteristics of delegates were included in the questionnaire. The number of votes allotted each local at the convention was used as the basis for classifying locals according to size.

After the convention, an intensive followup study of delegates from locals in Lansing and Flint, Michigan, was conducted: 108 of the 112 delegates from these two cities were interviewed. The emphasis in this study was upon varying orientations to the delegate role. Information was also collected regarding the delegates' experience at the convention, their experience upon reporting back to their locals, the general level and nature of political activity within each local, and opinions regarding the extent of democratic control of the convention and of the policy-making process generally at the national and local union levels. While it cannot be assumed that the Lansing and Flint locals are representative of all locals within the UAW, there is no apparent reason to assume that differences observed between large and small locals in these two cities would not be found elsewhere. The limitations of the sample should be kept in mind, however, in interpreting findings from this study.[5]

[4] Seidman, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[5] For reports of other findings from these studies see William A. Faunce, "Delegate Attitudes toward the Convention in the UAW," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XV (1962), 463–73; George Y. M. Won, "Democratic Sentiments in Unionism A Case Study of the UAW Convention" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1962); and Jack Stieber, *Democracy in the UAW* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962)

FINDINGS

The focus of these two studies upon a constitutional convention provided an opportunity to study the relationship between local size and local contributions to democratic policy-making processes at the national union level. In principle, at least, the convention has primary responsibility for determining UAW policies. The national officers and executive board are elected by the delegates and presumably operate within a broad policy framework established by the convention. Observation of the convention in operation and data collected from the delegates suggest that the 1959 UAW Convention functioned democratically in the sense that important issues were brought before it, were thoroughly debated with opposing views freely expressed, and were resolved in favor of the majority view. The extent to which delegates from larger and smaller locals participate in this process is one index of their respective contributions to democratic union government.

While there are many informal channels of communication between UAW locals and the national office, the convention is the only *formal* structure in the UAW through which local views on general policy issues are expressed. One way in which these views may be presented is in the form of resolutions submitted to the convention. Resolutions are sent to the national office at least three weeks before the convention begins and may be considered by the convention whether or not the locals submitting them are represented at the convention. Table 1 indicates that resolutions are submitted almost exclusively by the larger UAW locals.

Whether or not they initiate policy issues, small locals may have their views represented at the convention if their delegates participate in debate on issues with which they are concerned. Data in Table 1 indicate, however, that smaller locals are less likely to even send a delegation to the convention.[6] If it can be assumed that small locals have some common interests that are different from those of large locals, at least these interests may be served to the extent that they are actively pursued by delegates from those small locals that are represented. Data from both the questionnaire and interview studies suggest, however, that the size of the local the delegate represents affects his views of the purpose for the convention, his definition of the delegate role, and, consequently, the

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED TO 1959 UAW CONVENTION AND OF LOCALS NOT SENDING DELEGATES TO CONVENTION, BY SIZE OF LOCALS*

Size of Local	No (N = 1,239)	Per Cent	Percentage of Resolutions Submitted (N = 339)	Percentage of Locals Not Sending Delegates
149 or fewer members	443	35 7	1 5	51 7
150–1,049	535	43 2	6 8	17 9
1,050–1,549	59	4 7	1 5	5 1
1,550–4,049	145	11 7	44 2	4 1
4,050 or more	57	4 8	46 0	0 0

* Because number of votes at the convention was used as the basis for classifying locals according to size, the intervals in this table and subsequent tables reflect the formula used in the UAW for distributing votes among locals Locals are allotted one vote for the first one hundred or fewer members and an additional vote for each additional hundred members or major fraction thereof

[6] Small locals are also underrepresented at conventions of the International Typographical Union (cf. Lipset *et al., op. cit.*, p. 370).

nature of his participation in the convention proceedings.

The delegates at the convention were asked to rank various purposes for the convention in order of their importance. Table 2 indicates that delegates from large locals are significantly more likely to regard the primary function of the convention as the determination of UAW policy. Among the 125 delegates from the smallest locals in our sample, 27.7 per cent indicated that the convention's primary purpose was "to make sure that members back home are informed about UAW policies." Only 18.6 per cent of the 501 delegates from the largest locals gave this response. The desire to simply keep the membership informed, or in fact any view of the convention that excludes policy-making as its most important function, is unlikely to serve as a motive for active participation in the business of the convention.

TABLE 2

FUNCTION ATTRIBUTED TO CONVENTION BY DELEGATES FROM LARGE AND SMALL LOCALS

Local Size	Function of Convention*	
	Policy-making	All Others
1,049 or fewer members	290	329
1,050 or more members	609	478

* $\chi^2 = 13.33$; $P < .001$

Data from the Flint and Lansing interviews also suggest that there is a difference between delegates from large and small locals in their conception of the delegate role. The UAW constitution specifies that convention delegates are not bound by local instructions on any issue they may vote on at the convention. There are variations, however, in the extent to which delegates feel a personal commitment to act in accord with the wishes of their constituents. Delegates from small locals are, first of all, less likely to have even received any instructions regarding local preferences on issues to be considered by the convention. Of the twenty delegates from locals having 2,300 or fewer members, almost three-fourths indicated they had not received any instructions prior to the convention while only a little over one-third of the eighty-eight delegates from larger locals indicated that this was the case. Among delegates who were instructed how to vote on any issue, half of those from the smaller locals but over two-thirds from the larger locals indicated that they felt bound by these instructions when they went to the convention. Most of this difference is accounted for by the responses of the forty-seven delegates from the two largest locals in our sample, 81.5 per cent of whom felt that they should vote as instructed. When asked how they had actually voted at the convention, 66.7 per cent of delegates from the smaller locals and 87.2 per cent of those from larger locals answered that they had voted in accord with what a majority of the local membership wanted.

A much higher proportion of delegates from large locals indicated that important issues should be decided by a referendum rather than by the convention. This may be interpreted as another indication of greater concern on the part of these delegates with rank-and-file views. In this instance, however, it may also reflect a greater willingness to oppose the administration of the national union. Use of the referendum became an issue during debate on a proposed dues increase. The International Executive Board, which favored the dues increase, argued that the issue should be decided by the convention. Almost two-thirds of the forty-seven delegates from the largest locals in our sample indicated that "important issues like the dues increase should be decided by a referendum." A considerable majority of delegates from smaller locals supported the International Executive Board's position.

There is other evidence that delegates

from large locals are more willing to oppose national officers. The Flint-Lansing delegates were asked which caucuses, if any, they attended at the convention. The few delegates who reported attending an anti-administration caucus were exclusively from large locals. They were also asked whether they felt that the national officers had a right to expect them to support proposals they favored. Well over half the delegates from the largest locals indicated that the officers had no right to expect delegates to vote the way they wanted them to while only a third of the delegates from the smallest locals reported this view. When asked about the legitimacy of rank-and-file expectations, half the small local delegates indicated that their constituents had "every right" to expect them to vote for proposals they favored. This view was reported by more than three-fourths of the delegates from the largest locals. Responses to questions dealing with the kinds of pressures the national officers might use during a convention to get support for resolutions they favored suggest that delegates from large locals are more aware of the existence of such pressures but less concerned with them. Their awareness of these pressures may result from greater political sophistication while their lack of concern may reflect the greater autonomy of large locals.[7]

Delegates from small locals who are less likely to regard policy-making as the purpose of the convention, who are less concerned with representing rank-and-file views in this process, and who are more willing to simply accept the International Executive Board's program could be expected to be less active at the convention. There is some evidence that this is the case. Of delegates from Flint and Lansing locals with 2,300 or fewer members, only 16.7 per cent reported having addressed a general session of the convention while 25.8 per cent of those from larger locals reported having done so. Delegates from small locals also appear to be less active in convention politics. Over half these delegates reported that they had not attended any caucuses at the convention while two-thirds of those from large locals indicated that they had attended at least one caucus.

The findings from these two studies appear to be consistent with the position that large locals contribute more to democratic processes at the national union level. We will turn now to analysis of political processes at the local level. If we rely solely upon the customary indexes of union democracy, rates of rank-and-file participation and turnover of leadership, our data would support the hypothesis that small locals are more democratic internally than large locals. The delegates at the convention were asked to estimate the percentage of the membership of their unit or local voting in the delegate elections for the 1959 convention. Table 3 shows a strong relationship between local size and rank-and-file participation in the elections with the greatest participation occurring in the smallest locals.[8] Data from the followup interviews indicate that small locals may have better attendance at local meetings as well as a higher proportion voting in elections. Almost two-thirds of the delegates from small locals reported attending all local meetings while less than one-third of those from large locals reported doing so. Both studies also suggest more frequent turnover of leadership at least in the delegate role in small locals. Data from the questionnaire study indicate that 57.4 per cent of the 125 delegates from the smallest

[7] Difference in size of locals is likely to have a greater effect upon local autonomy in industrial unions like the UAW than in most craft unions where fewer decisions are made at the international level.

[8] Because the questionnaires were completed independently, the extent of agreement among the estimates of delegates from the same local provides some indication of the accuracy of these estimates. The mean deviation among estimates in each local and the average mean deviation in all locals were computed. Since there is a limited range of possible estimates, the maximum possible mean deviation could also be computed. The average observed deviation for all locals was less than 9 per cent of this maximum.

locals and 40.2 per cent of the 501 from the largest locals were attending their first convention.

Rank-and-file participation in union politics and turnover of leaders are used as indexes of democracy under the assumption that they produce leadership that is more responsive to the wishes of a majority of the members. For this assumption to hold, it is necessary that elections involve a choice of candidates. The data in Table 4 show that there is a much higher proportion of *uncontested* elections in small locals. In addition, if it is the election process that is responsible for turnover in the delegate position, we would expect that there would be delegates at the convention who had previously run for this position and lost. The relationship between this variable and local size is clearly shown by the data in Table 4.

These findings plus the fact that delegates from small locals are less likely to regard the convention as having a policy-making function suggest that the delegate selection process in these locals may involve something other than a choice among candidates advocating differing positions on policy matters. While we do not have data bearing directly upon this interpretation of these findings, it is possible that turnover in the delegate position in some small locals simply reflects the distribution of an honorific title (and a trip to Atlantic City) among a local elite. Turnover of leadership may have a different meaning and greater relevance to democratic decision-making processes in large UAW locals where there is more likely to be an active, internal political structure with an organized party system.[9]

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERSHIP VOTING IN DELEGATE ELECTIONS IN LOCALS OF VARYING SIZE

Membership Voting (Per Cent)	Percentage of Locals*				
	149 or Fewer Members (N = 143)	150–1,049 (N = 320)	1,050–1,549 (N = 51)	1,550–4,049 (N = 132)	4,050 or More Members (N = 55)
0–25	19.6	23 5	29 4	32 6	41 8
26–50	23 1	30 0	31 4	31 8	27 3
51–75	26 6	24 4	13 7	25 8	23 6
76–100	30 8	22 2	25 5	9 8	7.3
Total	100 1	100 1	100 0	100 0	100 0

* Totals may not add to 100 due to rounding

TABLE 4

LOCALS WITH UNCONTESTED ELECTIONS AND DELEGATES WHO HAD RUN FOR ELECTION PREVIOUSLY AND LOST, BY SIZE OF LOCAL

Size of Local	Locals in Which Elections Were Uncontested		Delegates Having Previously Run and Lost	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
149 or fewer members..........	143	35.0	154	9 1
150–1,049....	311	21 2	484	18 6
1,050–1,549....	52	3 8	139	21.7
1,550–4,049....	131	3 8	495	27 1
4,050 or more ..	54	3.7	500	29.0

[9] The differences in internal political activity between large and small UAW locals are somewhat similar to those found between large and small shops in the ITU. See Lipset *et al.* (*op. cit*, pp 150–97), who also report a curvilinear relationship in which the highest level of political involvement occurs in medium-sized shops employing between one hundred and two hundred ITU members. Our data do not show a pattern of this sort although it is possible that it is obscured by the greater size of political units in the UAW and by differences in the measures of political activity used in the two studies.

Differences in the internal political climate of large and small locals are clearly in evidence in the Flint and Lansing locals. Political party systems exist in virtually all locals with 4,000 or more members but in only one-third of the locals with 750 or fewer members. Even where there is a party system in smaller locals there are less likely to be separate slates of candidates run at elections than in large locals. Delegates from small locals also report that the opposition party is less active between elections, that the same groups do not oppose each other at all elections, and that there are less likely to be recognized leaders of the opposition party. These findings suggest that whatever factionalism exists in small locals is less likely to be institutionalized. A much higher proportion of delegates from large locals report that there is some tie-in between their local parties and parties from other locals or factions in the national union. These relationships may be a source of strength for opposition parties within large locals and may also strengthen their position should they decide to oppose some policy of the national officers.

Rank-and-file participation in elections and turnover of elected leaders may have no relevance at all to union democracy if elections and other formal procedures are not important aspects of the control structure of the union. If policies are formulated and leaders selected as a result of informal social relationships on the job, the formal structure of control may serve only to legitimate these decisions.[10] The number of uncontested elections and the absence of a formal party system suggest that this may be the case in small UAW locals. There is some additional evidence that supports this position more directly. The Flint-Lansing delegates were asked whether or not they would be affected in any way if a majority of their constituents were dissatisfied with decisions made at the convention. Over three-fourths of the twenty delegates from locals with twenty-three hundred or fewer members reported that they would not be affected in any way. Less than half of the eighty-eight delegates from larger locals gave this response. Among those indicating that they would be affected, there is a difference by size of local in the type of anticipated response of the membership. The delegates were asked in what ways they would be affected by unfavorable reactions to convention decisions. Their responses were classified as either formal controls, like being voted out of office, or informal controls, such as those involved in interpersonal relationships in the plant. The delegates from small locals were concerned almost exclusively with informal controls while a majority of those from large locals were concerned with the possibility of not being re-elected. There is some related evidence from the responses to a question that asked for a definition of union democracy. Delegates from large locals were much more likely to include formal structural guarantees of democracy like free elections in their definitions while small local delegates were more concerned with certain individual rights like freedom of speech. One reason for the greater concern among delegates from large locals with the election process and with formal accountability to their constituents may be the fact that they are more interested in maintaining the positions that they occupy in their locals. Almost two-thirds of the delegates from large locals and less than half of those from small locals reported that keeping the office they hold in the local is very important to them. If the election process is to contribute toward making leaders more responsive to their constituents, it would appear that their responsiveness would have to be motivated by desire for re-election. The data reported above suggest that this motive is more likely to be found in large than in small UAW locals.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Data collected from delegates to the 1959 Constitutional Convention of the UAW suggest that small locals contribute less than

[10] For an excellent discussion of this process see Joseph Kovner and Herbert J. Lahne, "Shop Society and the Union," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, VII (1953), 3–14.

large locals to democratic policy-making processes at the national union level. Small locals are less likely to be represented at the convention, they infrequently initiate proposals on policy matters, and their delegates are less actively involved in the convention proceedings. A possible explanation for these differences is that delegates from small locals are less likely to regard the convention as having a policy-making function, are less concerned with representing rank-and-file views at the convention, and appear to be more willing to simply accept the position of the UAW International Executive Board on policy issues.

The data regarding political processes within local unions suggest that rates of rank-and-file participation and leadership turnover may not be appropriate indexes of democracy in small political units. The small locals in our sample had a higher proportion of members voting in elections and more frequent turnover in the delegate position. These locals, however, also had fewer elections that were contested and were less likely to have an active opposition party to represent minority views on local issues. In addition delegates from small locals appeared to be less responsive to rank-and-file wishes and less concerned with accounting to their constituents for actions at the convention. In general, the data suggest that formal control structures have a different and perhaps less important function in small local unions.

These findings have a number of implications for studies of union democracy. First, definitions of democracy are often phrased in terms of formal structural characteristics. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, for example, define union democracy as "the possibility that an official can be defeated for re-election."[11] There is a variety of structural forms that may contribute to achieving democratic objectives. Indexes of democracy that measure the existence of particular structural forms may or may not be measures of the achievement of these objectives. Further analysis is needed of t variables that determine the effectiveness different structural arrangements in achie ing and sustaining union democracy.

Our data suggest that organizational si is one of these variables. An understandin of democratic processes in large local an national unions requires analysis of form policy-making and policy-implementing pr cedures. When indexes of democracy base upon these procedures are applied to sma local unions, they generally indicate th small locals operate more democraticall than large locals. High rates of particip tion in elections and at meetings in sma locals may, however, be accounted for b the nature of interpersonal relations i these locals and may have little or no bea ing upon the policy-making process. Turnover of elected officials may reflect only th desire of the local elite to distribute onerou duties or to share more rewarding ones lik attendance at a convention. If, as Seidma and others have suggested, officials of smal locals do not wish to perpetuate themselve in office, at least one motive for responsiveness to majority views is eliminated.

More frequent interaction between officers and rank-and-file members in smal locals may help to keep local policies consistent with majority views. Frequent interaction is not in itself, however, a guarant that this will be the case, and primar group relationships in small locals may generate coercive pressures that prevent thos with minority views from voicing their opposition.

Among the primary objectives of a democratic form of government is an orderl resolution of conflict of interest in whic majority views prevail but in which th right of the minority to oppose these view is protected. Analysis of the structure o informal, interpersonal relations may contribute more than formal structural analyses to our understanding of the way i which these objectives may be achieved in small local unions.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

[11] Lipset *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALITY, SOCIAL SETTING, AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

STANLEY H. UDY, JR.

ABSTRACT

A scale of structural requisites of administrative rationality is hypothesized, tested with a sample of thirty-four organizations in varied social settings, and interpreted as measuring cumulative specificity of organizational roles and their motivation by internal organizational devices. Institutional correlates of the scale are explored and suggest that independence from the social setting is positively correlated with rationality. Ascriptive elements in the social setting are found to be negatively related to rationality. Certain hypotheses concerning organizational development are proposed in light of the findings.

Few if any concepts employed in social science are fraught with so many difficulties as is the concept "rationality." It is used in a bewildering variety of ways, each of which seems to involve its own plethora of philosophical, psychological, and sociological problems. For present purposes we shall let the chips fall where they may and consider social behavior to be *rational* insofar as it is purposefully directed toward explicit empirical objectives and planned in accordance with the best available scientific knowledge.[1] Brushing aside, for the time being, the question of uncertainty—which, though of crucial practical importance, merely complicates the problem in a formal sense—one may say that the most severe difficulties with this concept from a sociological viewpoint seem to appear in situations where it is applied simultaneously to individuals and collectivities in the same context. Historically the classic instance is perhaps the "problem of order" in utilitarian social philosophy; namely, the problem of accounting for the existence of society assuming it to be composed of discrete individuals striving rationally for the same ends in a context of scarce resources. The solution to this problem, of course, as has been widely pointed out, is that neither the individual nor society—particularly the latter—is so rational in its behavior as the utilitarians had supposed. Cultural values distribute ends among categories of persons differentiated in the social structure and, at the same time, motivate "non-rational" behavior in given circumstances. Social integration is hence possible because there is no reason to suppose that it must occur relative to explicit over-all objectives. Not all behavior need be rational; indeed, on the societal level it cannot be.[2]

In the analysis of formal organizations, however, the problem of rationality arises again in a somewhat different form. One may define a *formal organization* as any social group engaged in pursuing explicit announced empirical objectives through manifestly co-ordinated effort and, at the same time, describe an entity that appears to be culturally universal.[3] A striking feature of such organizations is that the individuals in the system qua members as well as the system as a whole are expected to behave in a rational manner. The classical "problem of order" suggests that this state of affairs is by no means easy to attain; we may reasonably expect some formal organi-

[1] Based on Marion J. Levy, Jr., "A Note on Pareto's Logical-Nonlogical Categories," *American Sociological Review*, XIII (December, 1948), 756–57. The problem of uncertainty of information is, of course, extremely important in other contexts. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York John Wiley & Sons, 1957), pp. 241–60.

[2] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 87–94, 697–719.

[3] Stanley H. Udy, Jr., " 'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959), 792 (hereinafter cited as "*BR*").

zations to come closer to it and, in this sense, to be "more rational" than others. Such "dual rationality" can be approximated in the case of formal organization only because the members of the organization are at the same time members of a larger society where integrative values can find expression independently of administrative structure.

We may thus presume rationality to be present in a formal organization to the extent that role expectations are based on planning for organizational objectives.[4] In a more sophisticated statement, Cyert and March characterize a rational system as being oriented to produce choices through standardized search procedures in such a way as to "maximize the expected return to the system" in terms of "a well-defined preference ordering over possible future states."[5] Two major determinants of the degree of administrative rationality in an organization thus suggest themselves: The first is the extent to which the structure of the organization defines and motivates planned collective behavior; the second is the degree to which behavior in the social setting is independent of behavior in the organization, from the standpoint of the individual member. This paper will thus first attempt to isolate organizational-structural requisites of rationality and to analyze their interrelations. It will be found that the requisites herein isolated form a Guttman scale in terms of which the organizations studied can be compared as to degree of rationality. Second, we shall explore relationships between the rationality scale and the institutional and social settings of the organizations studied, in an attempt to assess the independence from societal ascription of organizations lying at different points on the scale. Finally, we shall propose some hypotheses about the development of rationality in organization.[6]

[4] Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "Technical and Institutional Factors in Production Organization," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVII (November, 1961), 248 (hereinafter cited as "*TI*").

[5] R. M. Cyert and J. G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., forthcoming).

DATA AND METHODS

Data are drawn from thirty-four formal organizations engaged in the production of material goods in thirty-four non-industrial societies; information is based on anthropological monographs and the Human Relations Area Files. The method of cross-cultural comparison was used in order to maximize variation in both internal structure and social setting of the organizations studied. It was also decided to limit the

[6] Rationality is here treated as a *function* of organizational and social structure. In two previous papers we treated rationality as a *structural* category by operationalizing it in terms of presumed structural correlates. In *BR*, Weber's conception of administrative rationality was found to involve limited objectives, a performance emphasis, and segmental participation, as those terms are defined in the present study. In *TI*, degree of rationality was operationalized in terms of the presence or absence of limited objectives and segmental participation, as those terms are herein defined In view of present considerations these earlier characterizations seem misleading. As indicated below, orientation to limited objectives appears to be the only one of these characteristics that properly forms a part of rationality per se, functionally considered. Performance emphasis, in view of the way it is operationalized, is more properly part of the reward system, and is so considered in *TI* Segmental participation, along with a new item herein introduced, "specificity of role assignment," may be viewed structurally as an aspect of what one might term "role differentiation and assignment."

These changes, which allow the structural requisites of rationality to cut across the scheme presented in *TI*, suggest some revisions in the model presented there. Briefly, the category "role differentiation and assignment"—with particular reference to its degree of specificity—replaces what is there termed "rationality," and is defined somewhat differently, as indicated above Assuming more precise ways of measuring it than are presented here, "rationality" could be considered a criterion variable relative to the entire model presented in *TI*. The relationships indicated in *TI* probably remain generally the same despite the change in the one category, although the present results raise some questions about their validity under certain conditions and suggest that some of the operational items are more important than others.

analysis to organizations having three or more levels of authority, inasmuch as previous work suggested that only such organizations would be of sufficient complexity to be of interest for present purposes.[7] The thirty-four organizations studied are part of a sample of 426 organizations in 150 societies assembled for an earlier, more general study of work organization in non-industrial culture, and were drawn in accord with the criteria set forth by George P. Murdock for his "World Ethnographic Sample."[8] Fifty-six of the original 426 cases proved both to have three or more levels of authority and also to offer sufficient data for purposes of the present analysis. Twelve of them, however, had already been employed in an ex post facto extrapolation of a scale containing four of the seven items used in the scale developed in the present study.[9] Since one of our desires was to test the previous result, these twelve cases were dropped, leaving forty-four organizations representing thirty-four societies. Under the not entirely realistic assumption that organizations in different societies represent independent events while those in the same society do not, only one organization per society was finally used, it being drawn at random when the society offered more than one potentially usable case on the basis of a survey of pertinent ethnographic material. Of the resulting thirty-four organizations representing thirty-four societies, eleven are African, twelve North American, and the remaining eleven are distributed over the Circum-Mediterranean, Insular Pacific, East Eurasian, and South American regions.[10] The geographical distribution of the sample is therefore unfortunately somewhat unbalanced. The extent to which this imbalance reflects the actual distribution of complex production organization as opposed to complete data is not known, except that it may be noted that materials on South American societies are quite sparse.

[7] *TI*, pp. 247–54.

[8] *American Anthropologist*, LIX (August, 1957), 664–87.

[9] Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucratic' Elements in Organizations," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (August, 1958), 415–18 (hereinafter cited as "*BE*"). In this earlier study, these characteristics were termed "bureaucratic" elements. It has since seemed appropriate to refer to them as aspects of "role differentiation and assignment" associated with rationality, and to treat "bureaucracy" as another dimension of organization entirely (see *BR*).

ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALITY AND ITS STRUCTURAL REQUISITES

We shall assume that rationality as herein defined minimally involves orientation to *limited objectives,* defined for present purposes as objectives explicitly restricted only to the production of certain products. This simple criterion of rationality is, of course, far from ideal but represents the closest operational approach possible of our data to "explicit announced objectives" or to "a well-defined preference ordering of future states."[11] We shall thus assert that "highly rational" organizations possess limited objectives in this sense, by definition. The problem now becomes one of exploring the structural requisites of an organizational orientation to limited objectives. In an earlier study it had been found that all organizations with limited objectives also involved *segmental participation*—that is, explicit definition of the terms of participation by some mutual contractual agreement—but that not all organizations with segmental participation had limited objectives.[12] Since a reasonable common-sense interpretation of this relationship is at hand (unrestricted terms of participation seem likely to invite goal displacement) it was decided to hypothesize that segmental participation precedes limited objectives at the upper end of the rationality scale. Reference was then made to another previous study[13] that found (in a sample different from the present one) the following characteristics to be

[10] Murdock, *op. cit.*

[11] Cyert and March, *op. cit.*

[12] *BR.*

[13] *BE.*

related to segmental participation on a scale in the following descending order: *Performance emphasis* (expected dependence of the quantity of the reward on the amount and/or quality of work done); *specialization*[14] (the concurrent performance of three or more qualitatively different operations by different members); and *compensatory rewards* (allocation of money or goods in kind by members of higher authority to members of lower authority in return for participation).[15] Reasonable theoretical interpretations seemed possible for these findings as well. Segmental participation would seem to be difficult without some explicit attention being drawn to performance. Similarly, unless roles are specialized relative to one another such that the particular content of each is stable and discretely identifiable, any emphasis on performance would seem tenuous. Specialization, in turn, is always potentially difficult to institutionalize, since it is always at least partially determined by technical considerations. Functionally, compensatory rewards constitute a mechanism whereby specialization can be "artificially" institutionalized by management through its control over the reward system. Furthermore, there is some reason to believe that compensatory rewards constitute the *only* mechanism that can reliably do this. Empirically, there appear to be only two possible alternatives: manipulation of already-existing social obligations, and the use of force.[16] The first of these alternatives presupposes a fortuitous and highly improbable identity of technical activities and social roles; the second is subject to serious limitations as a continuous mode of control, particularly in organizations that are at all complex. If this line of reasoning is correct, compensatory rewards are requisite to specialization, except under extremely improbably social conditions.

A review of pertinent literature on administration revealed that the items so far mentioned are often assumed to be structural correlates of administrative rationality and suggested two further items on which data were available: *specific job assignment* (continuous assignment by management of particular people to particular roles), and *centralized management* (the existence of a single internal source of ultimate authority).[17] The former was placed on the scale between specialization and performance emphasis on the grounds that roles had to be specialized to be assigned and that particular people had to be associated with particular roles to be rewarded for performance in a consistent fashion. Centralized management was placed at the beginning of the scale on the grounds that management could not consistently allocate compensatory rewards without being centralized.

The scale suggested by the preceding arguments was tested over our sample with

[14] We have elsewhere defined "specialization" as a continuous variable (i.e., the number of different operations performed simultaneously by different members; see my *Organization of Work* [New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1959], pp. 22–23). In a social context of the type discussed here, however, it seems proper to regard specialization as discontinuous; the number "three" was chosen as the cutoff point because three is the smallest number of roles in one system wherein ego is faced with the problem of defining relationships between two alters in a way independent of ego's relationship with either of them.

[15] See Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Howard M. Chandler, 1962), pp. 205–6, 224–25. Blau and Scott regard this characteristic as indicative of "hierarchical dependence." We find that compensatory rewards indeed do represent hierarchical dependence but only one possible form which it may take. Other possible forms would be the use or threat of force, manipulation of approval needs, etc. We would argue that if organization is to be rational it is important that hierarchical dependence be restricted to compensatory rewards.

[16] Udy, *Organization of Work*, chap. vii.

[17] See, e.g., Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 225–26; *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 196 ff.; *General Economic History* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. 95; James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), pp. 12–33; and Chris Argyris, *Understanding Organizational Behavior* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1960), pp. 12–13.

the results shown in Table 1: "X" denotes the presence of a characteristic, "O" its absence. In general, the results are consistent with the hypotheses proposed.

Since much of the theoretical basis of this scale is probabilistic, one would expect some exceptions. Deviant cases were thus examined in detail, and proved to be of two general types. The first involved the absence of expected specialization or performance emphasis—the apparent loci of most of the deviance. The reason why so much deviation centers on these characteristics seems to be that the presence or absence of each of them, in contrast to the other items, is in part a function of purely technical considerations. Certain kinds of tasks, as for example many involving agriculture or construction, are by nature cumulative and do not lend themselves particularly to specialization, although there is no reason why they cannot be otherwise rationally organized. The Tallensi, Tarahumara, and Camayura cases appear probably to be of this variety. They suggest that rationality involves specialization only where the latter is clearly relevant technologically. Similarly, whether or not rationality involves a performance

TABLE 1

ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALITY IN 34 NON-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS*

Organization	Limited Objectives	Segmental Participation	Performance Emphasis	Specific Job Assignment	Specialization	Compensatory Rewards	Central Management
Iroquois	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Navaho	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Paiute	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sanpoil	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sinkaietk	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Nambicuara	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Otoro	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Hopi	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Tikopia	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Kabyles	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Jukun	0	0	x	0	x	x	x
Tallensi	0	0	x	x	0	x	x
Haida	0	0	0	x	x	x	x
Haitians	0	0	0	x	x	x	x
Dahomeans	0	0	0	x	0	x	x
Tarahumara	0	0	0	x	0	x	x
Turkana	0	0	0	x	0	x	x
Camayura	0	0	0	x	0	x	x
Betsileo	0	0	0	0	x	x	x
Trobrianders	0	0	0	0	x	x	x
Pukapukans	0	0	0	0	x	0	x
Malay	0	0	0	0	x	0	x
Bemba	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Crow	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Ifaluk	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Ila	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Kikuyu	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Lobi	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Papago	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Sotho	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Winnebago	0	0	0	0	0	x	x
Dogon	0	0	0	0	0	0	x
Tarasco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tibetans	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* Coefficient of reproducibility = .95.
For references see Udy, *Organization of Work*, pp. 139–58 ff.

emphasis appears to be technologically relative. Where activities are highly routinized with a minimum of uncertainty involved, performance seems less likely to be emphasized, despite the presence of other rational characteristics. The Nambicuara, Otoro, and Hopi cases may well be of this variety. In sum, it appears that specialization and a performance emphasis tend in effect not to be a part of rational administration unless their presence clearly contributes to technical efficiency in the physical sense.

The other class of exceptions may be purely a function of the research methodology and are thus possibly more apparent than real. A characteristic was coded as "absent" not only when its existence was explicitly denied but also in instances where it was simply not reported, provided the context was such that it seemed reasonable to assume that the ethnographer would have reported it had it been present. This procedure of course tended to result in "overreporting" absences. On this score the single deviant omissions for the Sinkaietk, Dahomeans, Pukapukans, and possibly the Turkana are dubious; the "absent" characteristics may actually be present. By the same token, the Betsileo case may involve specific job assignments; the description is not entirely clear on this point. General explanations for other exceptions are not apparent.

The results were adjudged to be consistent with the hypothesis, although our interpretation of some of the exceptions suggests the desirability of complicating the model with some contextual variables deriving from technology. We suggest that the scale items indicate a cumulative emphasis on specificity of organizational roles and decision rules such that (1) explicit limits for individual rationality are established and motivated, and (2) interrelated procedures relative to collective rationality are established.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RATIONALITY

We now wish to explore and explicat the hypothesis that administrative rational ity involves relative independence of th organization from its social setting. Centra to this hypothesis is the idea of social in volvement, developed in a previous paper *Social involvement* is defined as the institu tionalization of participation and motiva tion in the organization through expecta tions and obligations existing independentl of the organization in the social setting.[18] One would expect socially involved organi zations to be less rational on the grounds that they are less independent of the socia setting. The presence in the organization o opportunities to express general social values would inhibit the development of highly specific roles and procedures. In addition one would expect organizations that are not socially involved to be highly rational under an assumption of structural substitution: that is, if functions are not performed in the setting they would presumably have to be built into the organization.

Rationality was run against a modified version of a social involvement rank order developed in a previous study.[19] The thirty-four organizations studied were ranked in presumed order of increasing social involvement according to how participation is institutionalized as follows:

1. Participation expected on the basis of voluntary self-commitment and self-defined self-interest.
2. Participation based on voluntary self-commitment defined as a kinship or community obligation.
3. Participation required by compulsory reciprocity.
4. Participation required by compulsory kinship ascription.
5. Participation required by compulsory political ascription, usually sanctioned by bodily punishment.

Results are shown in Table 2. They are consistent with the hypothesis both as to tendency and symmetry, except that the

[18] *TI*, pp. 248–49.

[19] *Ibid.*

three "compulsory" social involvement categories do not appear to differ from one another in effect.

For further exploratory purposes, the eight *most rational* organizations (those with segmental participation with or without limited objectives) were compared with all other organizations. Another measure of whether or not the organization is institutionalized as independent from its setting is the separation of ownership from management. Table 3 compares organizations having *independent proprietorship* ("ownership" separated from "management" in that control over the ultimate disposition of the means of production is not vested in management) with all other organizations with respect to rationality. All the most rational organizations in the sample have independent proprietorships; most of the other ones do not; the relationship is significant at the 05 level.

We thus conclude that the mechanisms by which rational administration is institutionalized are such as to produce an independence, or segmentation, of the organization from its social setting. As is the case with individual members relative to the organization, so is the case of the organization relative to its social setting; rational administration requires that an "area of discretion" be defined within which manipulative planning is free to occur.

THE SOCIAL SETTING OF RATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The preceding discussion suggests that it is more difficult for rational administration to develop in social settings that emphasize traditional ascriptive relationships. Previous research suggests that this may be especially likely where differences of power and status are ascribed, since such differences seem particularly likely to be part of social involvement patterns.[20] Accordingly, the settings of the most rational organizations were compared with the settings of all other organizations with respect to three presumed indexes of the general presence of

TABLE 2

RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT*

Social Involvement†	Scale Type							
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Compulsory political ascription	2	0	4	3	0	0	0	0
Compulsory kinship ascription	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Compulsory reciprocity	0	0	4	1	0	1	0	0
Self-commitment, kinship or community obligation	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0
Voluntary self-commitment, self-defined self-interest	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	6

* "Compulsory" social involvement categories collapsed and scale types 0–3, 4–5, and 6–7 combined. $\chi^2 = 62.79$, $P < 001$; degrees of freedom = 4

† As indicated by basis of participation

TABLE 3

RATIONALITY AND PROPRIETORSHIP*

	Most Rational Organizations	Other
Independent proprietorship	8	0
Other	7	18

$Q = +1\ 00$
$\chi^2 = 9.93$
$P < 01$

* One case was omitted owing to lack of data.

[20] *Ibid.*

ascription in the society concerned: (1) the presence of a hereditary stratification system with at least three classes or castes; (2) the presence of hereditary political succession; (3) the presence of slavery in any form.[21] Combined results appear in Table 4. The hypothesis is rather weakly confirmed; none of the relationships is statistically significant at the .05 level, but all are in the expected direction, and the stratification relationship approaches significance. None of the most rational organizations in the sample existed in a setting with a complex stratification system. Furthermore, Table 5 indicates what at first glance seems to be a surprising finding— rational organization is negatively associated with the existence of a centralized government transcending the local community. The relationship, however, is not statistically significant. We report it because, in the type of society dealt with here, strong central government indicates a hierarchical feudal order wherein political power permeates the entire social order, and is hence probably simply another index of ascription. If so, this result is consistent with our hypothesis.[22]

DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

It is very hazardous to attempt to extrapolate hypotheses concerning organizational evolution or development from cross-sectional data of the type on which this study is based. As our earlier theoretical argument indicates, a scale does suggest a structure of requisite elements. It does not, however, indicate prerequisites. One cannot conclude from our scale, for example, that centralized management must precede compensatory rewards in a temporal sequence of development. Similarly, a scale per se implies nothing about causal relationships among the items in it. It simply describes a modal static state of affairs.

One can, however, use such a scale to

TABLE 4

RATIONALITY AND ASCRIPTIVE ELEMENTS IN SOCIAL SETTING*

	Complex Hereditary Stratification		Hereditary Political Succession		Slavery	
	Present	Absent	Present	Absent	Present	Absent
Most rational organizations	0	7	4	3	2	6
Other organizations	10	15	16	7	11	14
	$Q = -1\ 00$, $\chi^2 = 2\ 42$, $P > .10$		$Q = -.26$, $\chi^2 = .02$, $P > .98$		$Q = -\ 40$, $\chi^2 = .29$, $P > 50$	

* Cases lacking data omitted.

TABLE 5

RATIONALITY AND GENERAL CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT*

	General Centralized Government: Present	Absent
Most rational organizations	1	7
Other organizations	12	13

$Q = -.73$
$\chi^2 = 2.33$
$P > .10$

* One case omitted owing to lack of data.

[21] Data are drawn from Murdock, *op. cit.*

[22] It should perhaps be pointed out that political conservatives have been alleging this relationship for some time, though the applicability of the present data to such an argument is probably questionable for the reasons suggested.

predict types of problems that different developmental sequences will probably entail. For example, if specialization should be the first rational characteristic to develop in an organization, the scale implies that such an organization if it is to be stable must immediately develop a centralized management and compensatory rewards. Unless it proves to be the case that rational administrative characteristics are likely to develop simultaneously—and we shall presently see that at least in many cases this is highly unlikely—one may hypothesize that a developmental sequence that follows the scale pattern will probably entail fewer problems and tensions than one which does not.[23]

It is further possible to infer certain constraints and problems that seem likely to arise at specific points in organizational development. First, the institutional system appears to be markedly discontinuous relative to administrative rationality. An increase in rationality beyond specialization evidently involves a radical change in institutional arrangements; ascriptive social involvement is abandoned in favor of self-commitment. Similarly, an increase beyond a performance emphasis involves another such change—the introduction of the norm of self-defined self-interest in commitment, as well as the separation of proprietorship from management. But between points of discontinuity, it appears possible for rationality to fluctuate independently of the institutional system, provided the requisite pattern suggested by the scale is maintained. Thus, for example, given an institutional adjustment to specific job assignments, performance can either be emphasized or not, with no institutional implications one way or the other. By the same token an organization with no rational characteristics at all can develop a centralized management, compensatory rewards, and specialization without encountering institutional difficulties. But if either of these organizations were to proceed further in rational development, its mode of institutionalization would have to change considerably.

The fact that Table 2 is symmetrical suggests that the converse of the preceding argument may also be valid, insofar as obligation to participate is concerned. It appears that if participation is institutionalized as voluntary commitment based on self-defined self-interest, the organization must at least involve segmental participation plus, in principle, the five other characteristics lower on the scale. Also, participation based on self-commitment in a context of kinship or community obligations implies an organization at least sufficiently rational to possess specific job assignments, together with specialization, compensatory rewards, and a centralized management. On the other hand, where participation is purely ascriptive or based on compulsory reciprocity, no rational elements need necessarily be present.

One may next ask: In what kinds of societal settings is administrative rationality, together with its requisite institutional arrangements, most likely to be found? Owing to gaps in the data, our analysis at this point is necessarily quite fragmentary. In complex hereditary aristocracy, the existence of slavery, hereditary succession to political office, and complex government are viewed as rough indexes of an ascriptive emphasis in the culture concerned. Tables 4 and 5 suggest, as one might suppose, that organizations in settings where ascription is stressed are themselves likely to be highly socially involved, and hence possess nonrational administrative systems. It is particulary noteworthy that complex hereditary stratification is absent from the setting of all the most rational administrative systems. But this relationship is not symmetrical, and the situation with respect to the other social setting variables is not nearly so marked. One infers, therefore, that, to some extent at least, fairly rational organizations can be institutionalized in quite "hostile" settings. Also, it would appear that a propitious setting does not in itself

[23] On the other hand it may be impossible to develop administrative rationality without generating problems and tensions.

guarantee rational administration. Why might this be so?

We have already seen that certain elements of rationality—notably specialization and performance emphasis—are at least partially functions of technical, as opposed to institutional, influences. If in a more general sense it is the case that administration tends to be no more rational than is technically necessary, one would indeed expect to find instances of relatively non-rational administrative systems in settings where rationality would in principle be possible, merely because in the instances concerned rationality would be technically unnecessary.

A second reason may stem from the type of ascription present in the social setting. Stinchcombe has suggested that where rationality is a general cultural value, ascription may not markedly inhibit rationality in administration, on the grounds that the major effect of ascription is to infuse the organization with general cultural values.[24] It is possible that the Iroquois case in our sample partially illustrates this type of situation. It is known that Iroquois culture placed a high valuation on efficiency and achievement, with socialization measures taken to assure the differential competence of hereditary political officials. And the Iroquois organization in our sample is highly rational, yet exists in a society with a complex government involving hereditary political officials. Complex hereditary stratification is absent, however. Furthermore, participation is based on self-defined self-interest. It may be that a general valuation of rationality simply tends to make possible non-ascriptive recruitment in otherwise ascriptive settings. Modern industrial society may largely fit in this category. For even in the presence of a high cultural valuation on efficiency and rationality, ascriptive recruitment can still be disruptive to organizational operations by introducing competing goals and loyalties, however "rationally" they are individually viewed. It would seem that there are limits to the extent to which the effects of ascription on administration can be offset by institutional arrangements.

[24] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Comment," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (November, 1961), 255–59.

CONCLUSIONS

In a sample of thirty-four non-industrial production organizations, seven organizational characteristics associated with administrative rationality were found to scale in a cross-sectional comparative analysis in such a way as to suggest that rationality involves a cumulative emphasis on specificity of organizational roles and decision rules. The rationality scale was further found to be highly negatively associated with the degree to which the organization is socially involved with its setting; administrative rationality appears to require some modicum of organizational independence Rationality was somewhat less closely negatively associated to settings having traditional ascriptive elements. From these findings it was possible to infer certain differentials in problems of organizational development under varying conditions.

YALE UNIVERSITY

ORGANIZATIONS AND OUTPUT TRANSACTIONS[1]

JAMES D. THOMPSON

ABSTRACT

Four types of output roles, designed to arrange for distribution of the ultimate products of complex organizations, are identified. Each is boundary-spanning, defined in part by reciprocal roles of non-members Each pair of roles is built into a transaction structure. Secondary data are analyzed in relation to the typology, and behavior contingencies are hypothesized for each type of transaction sequence. Finally, some larger consequences of output relationships for organization structures are suggested.

Complex purposive organizations receive inputs from, and discharge outputs to, environments, and virtually all such organizations develop specialized roles for these purposes. *Output roles,* designed to arrange for distribution of the organization's ultimate product, service, or impact to other agents of the society thus are *boundary-spanning* roles linking organization and environment through interaction between member and non-member.

Organizational output roles are defined in part by reciprocal roles of non-members. Teacher, salesman, and caseworker roles can only be understood in relation to pupil, customer, and client roles. Both member and non-member roles contain the expectation of closure or completion of interaction, leading either to the severance of interaction or bringing the relationship into a new phase.[2] Each output role, together with the reciprocating non-member role, can be considered as built into a *transaction structure.*

Because output roles exist in structures that span the boundaries of the organization, they may be important sources of organization adaptation to environmental influences. Empirical studies reflect this fact more than do theories of organization.

Classic bureaucratic theory is preoccupied with behavioral relations ordered by a single, unified authority structure from which the client is excluded,[3] and only recently has an explicit correction for this one-sided approach been introduced by Eisenstadt's theory of debureaucratization.[4] Another strain of organization theory, following Chester Barnard, clouds the significance of input-output problems by lumping investors, clients, suppliers, and customers, as members of the "co-operative system."[5] The developing inducements-contributions theory of March and Simon has so far been directed primarily at the problem of recruiting and motivating members or employees.[6]

One purpose of this paper will be to focus theoretical attention on boundary-spanning behavior by way of output roles.

[1] I am indebted to my colleagues—Robert Avery, Carl Beck, Richard Carlson, Joseph Eaton, Robert Hawkes, Axel Leijonhufvud, Morris Ogul, and C Edward Weber—for helpful reactions to earlier versions of this paper.

[2] Role theory has devoted much more attention to structure-maintaining behavior than to transaction behavior, in spite of the variety and quantity of transaction in modern societies. See, however, William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review,* XXV (August, 1960), 483–96; George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Form* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1961), and John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959).

[3] Max Weber, *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), and Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed.; Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), chap. vi.

[4] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* IV (1959), 302–20.

[5] *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).

[6] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

A second will be to indicate that there are several types of transaction structures, each having peculiar significance for the comparative analysis of organizations. A third aim will be to indicate that transaction processes can be studied profitably through sequential analysis. Finally, some larger consequences of output relationships will be suggested.

Consideration will be limited to those transaction structures that call for face-to-face interpersonal interaction between member and non-member, thus ignoring the cigarette "salesman" who may periodically load a vending machine without seeing his customers or knowing who they are, and the soldier who may deliver destruction to an enemy he neither sees nor could identify. Consideration will also be limited to those cases in which the output role is occupied by an employed agent of the organization.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSACTION STRUCTURES

For any transaction structure there appear to be three possible transaction outcomes: (1) *completion* of a transaction as defined by organizational norms, (2) *abortion,* in which interaction is terminated without completion of the transaction, or (3) *side transaction,* in which member and non-member complete an exchange not desired or approved by the organization.[7] Which of these three outcomes emerges will in part be determined by the desires, attitudes, and actions of the two parties involved. But the likely paths from initiation of interaction to termination, and the branching points which lead to one or another outcome, are largely defined by the type of transaction structure.

ELEMENTS OF A TYPOLOGY

The organization cannot predict in advance of any specific encounter just what desires, attitudes, or actions the non-member will bring to the transaction structure, but the organization can estimate in advance with reasonable accuracy two things: (1) the extent to which it has armed its agents with routines, and (2) the extent to which the non-member is compelled to participate in the relationship.

The first dimension will be labeled one of *specificity of control over member.* Undoubtedly this forms a continuum, but it will be discussed here only in its extremes. At one extreme the member is equipped with a single, complete program—a standard procedure which supposedly does not vary, regardless of the behavior of the non-member. At the other extreme, the member's behavior is expected to be guided primarily by the behavior of the non-member, although always in relation to some organizational target or goal.[8] The supermarket check-out clerk approximates the *programmed* role, while the social caseworker illustrates the *heuristic* variety.

The second dimension, also a continuum but here dichotomized, will be labeled *degree of non-member discretion.* At one extreme the non-member finds interaction *mandatory,* at the other it is *optional.* It may be presumed that the prisoner, for example, finds interaction with the guard mandatory. To be sure the prisoner may evade interaction by escape or by behavior which results in transfer to another cell block or prison. But short of these extremes, the prisoner cannot choose whom he will interact with or whether to interact: the relationship is mandatory.

The optional state is exemplified by the salesman-customer relationship under conditions of "perfect competition," where the prospect has a wide choice of salesmen. Not only does the customer have discretion over whether to interact, but he also may termi-

[7] This concept was suggested by that of "side payment" as developed by R. M. Cyert and J. G. March, "A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives," in Mason Haire (ed.), *Modern Organization Theory* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959).

[8] March and Simon make a similar distinction by referring to programs specifying activities (means) and programs specifying product or outcome (ends). They observe that the latter allow discretion to the individual (*op. cit.,* p. 147).

nate it at will, before completion of a transaction.

When these two dichotomized dimensions are combined, four types of output structures emerge:

Degree of Non-Member Discretion	Specificity of Organizational Control	
	Member Programmed	Member Heuristic
Interaction mandatory . .	I	III
Interation optional.	II	IV

Temptation to label each cell is strong, since there are familiar categorizations readily available which appear to correspond to each. Cell I, for example, might be considered "clerical," Cell II "commercial," Cell III "semi-professional," and Cell IV "professional." The temptation has been resisted, however, because casual, traditional categorizations may in fact hide some of the distinctions which this typology attempts to bring out. Thus, transactions which might typically be lumped under the term "commercial" may, in fact, appear in any of the cells defined here.

OCCURRENCE OF TRANSACTION STRUCTURES

Organizations which develop elaborate programs for those in output roles appear to be those that either (1) provide services for large numbers of persons and, therefore, face many non-members relative to each member at the output boundary, or (2) employ a mechanized production technology which places a premium on large runs of standardized products, attaches heavy costs to retooling, and, therefore, depend on a large volume of standardized transactions per member at the output boundary.[9] The first condition seems appropriate for clerical activities, such as the issuance of licenses or permits by a government bureau, and is especially likely when the organization holds a monopoly position, as a government often does. This seems to correspond to Cell I in the typology above, and to classic bureaucratic theory.

The second condition seems to describe commercial transactions of mass-produced products under competitive conditions and corresponds to Cell II in the typology. When competition is removed, as in the seller's market for automobiles after World War II, the role of salesman can be redefined into a clerical role, with the salesman merely writing orders and adding names to the waiting list—and perhaps adding a side transaction to give the customer a priority rank in exchange for private payment.[10] Under competitive conditions, however, the sales person expresses one or more organizational programs governing size, style, color, price, terms, delivery schedules, and so on, and the customer either takes it or leaves it to search among other organizations for a more suitable program.

Neither of these transaction structures is appropriate for the organization which must "tailor" its output, for here the exigencies make it impractical if not impossible to develop standard programs in advance. Instead the organization must rely on the judgment of the member at the output boundary. Such roles tend to be assigned to professionally trained or certified persons, for it is believed that the professional type of education qualifies individuals to make judgments or exercise discretion in situations appropriate to their specialization.

When non-member participation is mandatory the transaction structure corresponds to Cell III in the typology above. Examples would include the therapy-oriented prison and the military hospital, the public school, and the *public* (as distinguished from "voluntary") welfare agency. In each case, the non-member (prisoner, patient, pupil, or applicant) is obliged to participate in the structure, and in each

[9] I am indebted to Axel Leijonhufvud for contributing this insight from economic theory.

[10] When competition returned to this field, dealers complained frequently that their "salesmen" had forgotten how to "sell."

case the member is expected to vary his behavior to suit the particular condition of the non-member.

When interaction of the heuristic variety is optional for the non-member, the transaction structure corresponds to Cell IV in the typology. This would encompass the "voluntary" (non-governmental) welfare agency and the voluntary hospital. Many of the services which fit this category are dispensed by private entrepreneurial arrangements—by private practitioners—rather than in large-scale organizational contexts. It appears that this reflects the relative complexity of the process in this kind of transaction structure, which makes it especially difficult when subjected to the additional constraints of an organizational context.

It is suggested that in the order listed above, and numbered in the typology, the four types of transaction structures are increasingly difficult to operate.

TRANSACTION PROCESSES

The same three types of outcomes—successful transaction, abortion, and side transaction—are available for all of the transaction structures, but significant contrasts appear in the possible courses of interaction. The final state, and the paths to it, *depend in each case on contingencies and on responses to contingencies.*

Our conceptual apparatus for analyzing contingent interaction is ill-developed, since interaction theory has been preoccupied with structure-maintaining behavior, that is, with behavior conforming to stable norms and with social control mechanisms to correct deviation. The contingencies and possible paths of interaction, therefore, will be shown in flow diagrams. These are offered as hypothetical, for literature search did not reveal sufficient data to "test" them, but illustrative citations will be made.

For illustration, the possibilities for Type I, where the member is programmed and the non-member finds interaction mandatory, are shown in Figure 1. Once contact is made, the non-member may respond in one of three ways, and each, in turn, presents several response possibilities to the member. *If*, following initial contact, the non-member responds appropriately by offering necessary information, the member may routinely complete the transaction. Instead of responding appropriately, however, the non-member may resist or offer a bribe. *If* the non-member resists, the member applies punishments, and the non-member may respond by increasing resistance, by co-operating, or by offering a bribe. The bribe attempt thus may be made immediately upon initial contact or following an exchange of activity. In either case, however, the member may elect one of three alternative responses to the bribe offer: accept it, apply additional punishments, or explore the pros and cons of the bribe possibility. And so on, as is indicated in Figure 1. In each flow diagram we have attempted to depict as the central pattern that course of interaction most desired by the organization. In each, however, there are several possibilities for the interaction to digress from the desired path, swinging either to the right or left. In the more complex transaction structures, the course of interaction may swing from one stream to the other several times before the final outcome is reached, and one of the major problems for the member is to counter each digression so that it returns to the central path and ultimately results in a successful transaction.

Why members and non-members elect one route rather than another at each switching point is a subject for microanalysis and is beyond the scope of this paper

The number of "ifs" or contingencies—even in this simplest type of transaction—is impressive when diagrammed, but too large to make verbal reproduction possible The following discussion will focus, therefore, on certain implications of contingencies for behavior within each type of transaction structure.

INTERACTION IN TYPE I STRUCTURES

Here the non-member's participation is andatory, the member is programmed, nd the organization expects a large num-er of output transactions from the member see Fig. 1).

The course of interaction is simplest if the non-member chooses to complete the transaction speedily, for he appears to the member to be co-operative. The member scores a completed transaction in a minimum of time, which contributes toward maximizing the number of transactions in serial and not only puts the member in line




FIG. 1

for organizational rewards but may provide the personal satisfaction of a "job well done." Blau, for example, noted that employment interviewers in a government agency avoided operations that took time without helping to improve their statistical records. Since the records served as the basis for evaluating performance, concentration on this goal made interviewers "unresponsive to requests from clients that would interfere with its attainment."[11]

If the non-member chooses to seek concession from the member, he must offer personal satisfactions sufficient to induce the member to risk penalties that the organization can apply if deviation from programs is detected. Blau found that at times the social reward of the client's appreciation led governmental employment interviewers to offer extra help,[12] and students of prisons have reported favored treatment by guards of prisoners who could exercise (or withhold) informal control over other inmates.[13]

That the opposite result—penalties for seeking too much help—can occur is suggested by the analysis of another employment office. Francis and Stone note that the client's eligibility for unemployment compensation is in effect determined by the interviewer's report, and that this report reflects the interviewer's *judgment* as to whether the claimant has given an accurate or exaggerated account of his history and present circumstances.[14] Blau also reports the use of punitive measures to vent *antagonism against aggressive clients.*[15]

The bribe attempt involves risk for both member and non-member. If the inducements offered by the non-member are insufficient, the member may regard him as unco-operative and therefore apply penalties. If, on the other hand, the non-member's offer is sufficiently inducing, the member must somehow hide his deviation from the program, and runs the risk of being caught. The bribe attempt, therefore, often calls for a rather delicate "sounding out process."[16]

If neither party is able to marshal enough power to bring a transaction or a side transaction to a conclusion, this mandatory relationship is likely to settle into a going-through-the-motions, with each party seeking to maximize his rewards or minimize his costs.[17] From the standpoint of official organizational goals, then, the transaction is aborted. If interaction must be sustained, as in the prison, it is likely to become a struggle for control. That the struggle for control can be most subtle is brought out by Gresham Sykes' study of the corruption of authority in the maximum security prison.[18]

INTERACTION IN TYPE II STRUCTURES

In this case the non-member's participation is optional, the member is programmed, and the organization expects a large number of output transactions from the member (see Fig. 2).

Since the relationship is not mandatory,

[11] Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 43, 70.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[13] See summary in Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Sociology and the Field of Corrections* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1956), pp. 20–21.

[14] Roy G. Francis and Robert C. Stone, *Service and Procedure in a Bureaucracy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 83–84.

[15] *Op. cit.*, pp. 24, 87.

[16] For analysis in another context of the "sounding out process" see James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (February, 1958), 23–30.

[17] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), reports an unusual case. This involved a club for motorists, and the membership card identified the holder as a person who would keep quiet if his bribe offer was accepted by a policeman. Schelling also reports, however, that if the police could identify card-carrying motorists by sight, they could concentrate arrests on card-carrying drivers, threatening a ticket unless payment were received! (See pp. 140–41.)

[18] "The Corruption of Authority and Rehabilitation," in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *Complex Organizations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 191–97.

the organization usually develops an *array* of programs, one to appeal to each class or category of potential customer. The non-member, in interacting with this organization, is foregoing interaction with another, and hence seeks to determine rapidly whether a satisfactory program is available. The "gambit," or "opening move," is therefore a crucial issue in this interaction process. Lombard reports some of the difficulties salesgirls faced in "sizing up" prospective customers. In a children's clothing department, for example, "each customer presented . . . a different set of values that determined her taste in the clothes she bought for her children." Knowledge of style was not alone sufficient to make a sale, for the salesgirl could not express this in a way that criticized the customer's taste. With respect to price, the store suggested that "unless a customer made some other request, a salesgirl would do well to show her clothes in a middle price range."[19]

The simplest situation in this output transaction occurs when the gambit is successful, either because the non-member offers enough accurate information or the member "sizes up" the non-member correctly. On either basis the most suitable program is offered and the non-member accepts or rejects. The transaction has been completed successfully in short order, or has been aborted clearly and speedily, permitting the member to devote attention to other prospects and the non-member to seek a more satisfactory supplier.

A complication arises when the member selects from his repertoire of programs an unsuitable one because of inaccurate "size up," incorrect interpretation of the information given by the non-member, or false or misleading information offered by the non-member. The result may be (*a*) further exploration until a fitting program is identified, which is relatively costly to both parties, (*b*) withdrawal of the non-member from the output structure, in which case a potential transaction is lost to a competitor, or (*c*) continued interaction on the basis of false optimism, with mounting frustration for one or both parties as they




FIG. 2

find the investment mounting and the possibility of satisfaction dwindling.[20] In the latter case, the eventual abortion of the

[19] George F. Lombard, *Behavior in a Selling Group* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1955), pp. 176–80.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 177. When "merchandise which a customer liked was not available in the desired color or size, the situation could quickly become most difficult for both salesgirl and customer."

transaction is likely to be unpleasant, reducing the possibility of future interaction between member and non-member. It is in this frustrating situation that the member is most likely to deviate from approved programs, misrepresenting the product, offering inferior substitutes, or finding ways of offering arrangements not approved by the organization, such as special deliveries or price reductions by shaving commissions. Another possible outcome of this situation is for the non-member to reduce his standards—accepting another color, style, or settling for a different size, delivery date, and so on. When this occurs, the transaction is completed, although perhaps at the expense of future transactions.

Because prolonged search behavior is "costly," requiring investment of the time and energy where the outcome is problematic, ability to "close the deal" as early as possible becomes almost as crucial as the gambit.

INTERACTION IN TYPE III STRUCTURES

Here the non-member's participation is mandatory, the member must tailor his service to the particular needs of the non-member, and the organization must therefore judge the member's performance in terms of results rather than in terms of conformity to prescribed procedures (see Fig. 3).

The straight-forward and relatively easy case occurs when the non-member elects to complete the transaction with least effort and responds appropriately. The ability of the non-member to take *active* part in the heuristic process seems frequently to be important, and especially so in comparison with the Type I output structure. Nurses were found to prefer an active patient who could make his needs and wants known, if for no other reason than to help his own treatment. In contrast, ward aides, whose duties defined the patient as "something like a necessary evil, preferred the passive patient above all others."[21]

When the non-member's responses are appropriate, both parties achieve a satisfactory outcome at minimum cost, and the member has the additional reward of evidence that his skills were instrumental—that he did a job well. But what happens when the response of the non-member is inappropriate?[22] The inappropriate response might come either from a non-member with a sincere desire to co-operate or from a non-member who is resisting. Co-operation by the non-member does not guarantee his appropriate response, for he may be incapable of articulating appropriate information, may not understand which responses are desired by the member, or may zealously offer a flood of irrelevant information. Extreme status differences between member and non-member, often found in the "helping professions," can lead to this situation. Fanshel concludes that casework help is tailored more for the verbal, communicative group than it is for "the significantly large group of clients who find difficulty in expressing their feelings and their basic ideas about the problems that bring them to the agency."[23]

When an inadequate or inappropriate response is made, therefore, the member must form a judgment (or leap to a conclusion) about the reason. If he defines the non-

[21] Reported in Leonard Reissman and John H Rohrer (eds), *Change and Dilemma in the Nursing Profession* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1957), p. 143.

[22] This dilemma frequently arises in treatment-oriented organizations which also have a custodial responsibility. Oscar Gursky notes that if an inmate in a traditional prison system violates the rules, the guard simply writes up a "ticket" and the inmate is punished by a central disciplinary court or a disciplinary officer; the transaction fits our Type I. However, if the same violation occurs in a treatment-oriented prison, it complicates the guard's response and creates conflict, for he must decide whether he ought to write up a ticket or whether, for treatment reasons, he ought to let the inmate "express his emotions" (see "Role Conflict in Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. III [March, 1959]).

[23] David Fanshel, "A Study of Caseworkers' Perceptions of Their Clients," *Social Casework*, XXXIX (December, 1958), 543–51.



KEY
SEQUENCE FLOWS FROM TOP TO BOTTOM
ARROWS INDICATE POSSIBLE PATHS OF INTERACTION
M INDICATES ACTIVITY OF MEMBER
NM INDICATES ACTIVITY OF NON-MEMBER
INTERACTION INITIATED
NM OFFERS INFORMATION
NM OFFERS SIDE PAYMENT
M SEARCHES
M APPLIES PUNISHMENTS
NM RESISTS
NM OFFERS INFORMATION
NM OFFERS SIDE PAYMENT
M APPLIES PUNISHMENTS
M SEARCHES
M APPLIES PUNISHMENTS
NM RESISTS
NM OFFERS INFORMATION
NM OFFERS SIDE PAYMENT
M APPLIES PUNISHMENTS
M SEARCHES
M APPLIES PUNISHMENTS
NM GOES THROUGH MOTIONS
NM OFFERS INFORMATION
NM OFFERS SIDE PAYMENTS
NM GOES THROUGH MOTIONS
M ACCEPTS
TRANSACTION ABORTED
TRANSACTION COMPLETED
SIDE TRANSACTION COMPLETED

FIG. 3

member as unco-operative he may apply punishments, while if he defines the non-member as sincere but inept, he may search for relevant information by seeking to educate the non-member to the appropriate role. This educational activity under such circumstances is clearly brought out by Israeli responses to large numbers of immigrants who had yet to learn client roles,[24] but there is no reason to believe that it does not occur in more "normal" or less striking situations.

Whether the member will search for information or, rather, punish the non-member for inappropriate responses, will depend largely on the member's conclusions regarding the reasons for inappropriate responses. If the non-member's search for the proper role is unsuccessful, or if he responds to punishment by resisting (or increasing resistance), the interaction process in this output structure is likely to degenerate into a struggle for control. This would appear, perhaps, in the relationship between high-school students and teachers, in the therapy-oriented prison, and in the therapy-oriented mental hospital.[25] Often the non-member will resist "help" but will "go through the motions," appearing to co-operate to escape punishments. Eaton has suggested that for the social caseworker the client may effectively control the relationship by "presenting a challenge," by "showing appreciation," or by promising to change his behavior at some future time—provided that the caseworker keep trying.[26]

The abortive struggle for control can als occur when the non-member offers inade quate bribes for a side transaction. A brib offer that is rejected, however, gives th member added leverage in avoiding th stand-off and, instead, completing a trans action successfully. Blau reports that bein offered a bribe constituted a special tacti cal advantage for the field agent of a la enforcement agency. A non-member wh had violated one law was caught in the ac of compounding his guilt by violating an other one. He could no longer claim igno rance or inadvertence as an excuse for hi violations, and agents exploited this situa tion to strengthen their position in negotia tions.[27]

INTERACTION IN TYPE IV STRUCTURES

Now the interaction is heuristic, the rela tionship is optional for the non-member and the member must attract clients an maintain interaction before he can com plete a transaction (see Fig. 4).

Whether interaction is initiated by th member or by the non-member, making th initial contact is likely to be a difficult ex perience. Lack of knowledge of appropriat role behavior may indeed lead many in dividuals who need "professional help" t avoid interaction with appropriate profes sionals. In a sample survey seeking to de termine "normal" American attitudes to ward mental health, "lack of knowledge about means" of seeking professional hel was a major reason given by those who fel they could have used help but did not seek it.[28] A study of "well-trained" life insuranc underwriters concluded that "anxiety ove intrusion on prospect privacy" was a majo deterrent to making contacts,[29] and it ha been reported that "a salesman of acciden and health insurance is expected to mak at least 36 prospect contacts by cold can

[24] Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. V (June, 1960).

[25] Morris S. Schwartz and Gwen Tudor Will describe "mutual withdrawal" in a mental hospital ward, with the withdrawal of the nurse perpetuating the withdrawal of the patient and the withdrawal of the patient reinforcing the nurse's withdrawal. Withdrawal in this case was described as affective, communicative, and physical (see "Low Morale and Mutual Withdrawal on a Mental Hospital Ward," *Psychiatry*, XVI [November, 1953], 337-53).

[26] Joseph W. Eaton, private conversation.

[27] Blau, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[28] Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and Sheila Feld *Americans View Their Mental Health* (New York Basic Books, 1960), chap. xi.

[29] Herbert E. Krugman, "Salesman in Conflict," *Journal of Marketing*, XXIII (July, 1958), 59-61



KEY
SEQUENCE FLOWS FROM TOP TO BOTTOM
ARROWS INDICATE POSSIBLE PATHS OF INTERACTION
M INDICATES ACTIVITY OF MEMBER
NM INDICATES ACTIVITY OF NON-MEMBER
INTERACTION INITIATED
N M OFFERS INFORMATION
M OFFERS INFORMATION
M QUESTIONS SUCCESS, SEARCHES
N M QUESTIONS SUCCESS; SEARCHES
N M OFFERS INFORMATION
M OFFERS INFORMATION
M QUESTIONS SUCCESS, SEARCHES
N M QUESTIONS SUCCESS, SEARCHES
N M OFFERS INFORMATION
M OFFERS INFORMATION
M QUESTIONS SUCCESS, SEARCHES
N M WITHDRAWS
N M OFFERS INFORMATION
M WITHDRAWS
SIDE TRANSACTION COMPLETED
TRANSACTION COMPLETED
TRANSACTION ABORTED

Fig. 4

vass each week. If he can sell four of these, he is regarded as performing very well. Thus he must steel himself to an average of 32 rejections 50 weeks in the year."[30]

Initial contact, at best, simply sets the stage for further exploration. Friedson concludes that the first visit by urban patients to a medical practitioner is often tentative, a tryout. Whether the physician's prescription will be followed, and whether the patient will come back, seem to rest at least partly on his retrospective assessment of the professional consultation.[31] Kadushin reports a considerable amount of shopping around by individuals undertaking psychotherapy.[32] The organizational counterpart of shopping around is exercised, for example, by the intake committee of the psychiatric clinic that, on the basis of initial exploration, may select those most likely to succeed as patients.[33]

Nevertheless, both parties enter this transaction structure with a measure of uncertainty, because the behavior of each must be keyed to information possessed by the other. The potential client seeks a personalized transaction for which there may be no standard pattern, and hence, no readily available schedule of costs or of probabilities of satisfactory outcome. The member's diagnosis and prognosis depend on the unfolding of information during the interaction process; hence the member cannot at the outset guarantee success, nor can he predict the complete costs to the nonmember. The member must hold out enough hope of results to maintain interaction in the face of uncertainty—but he also needs "escape clauses." The client likewise must disclose enough information and motivation to enable the member to make estimates—but without irrevocable commitment to the transaction.

If the non-member becomes fully committed to the transaction he can make few choices and exercises little control. Friedson notes that when the patient penetrates into "organizational practice" such as found in hospitals, he is well into the professional referral system, which involves maximal restriction on client choice of services, and his efforts at control are most likely to take the form of evasion.[34] In other words, when the client becomes fully committed to the transaction, the transaction structure is converted into a Type III structure.

Short of this conversion, however, there is a fully developed sounding-out process. In the early stages of interaction, a large proportion of behavior of both parties is oriented toward establishment of *rapport* and a small proportion to the substance of the transaction relationship. As the interaction process nears successful achievement the proportions are reversed, but en route the joint search may yield information that changes the prognosis of one or both parties, either making costs appear higher than anticipated or making success appear less likely. When the unfolding of the relationship in this way changes the conditions for the client, the transaction may be aborted. Each successive time the relationship is thus challenged by the unfolding of information which bears on costs and rewards, *rapport* must be re-established. Eaton notes that an evaluation of the actual results of treatment is often impossible until a good deal of time has elapsed. "Along the way, during this protracted search for happiness, both practitioner and client want to know if there is evidence of progress, and often a judgment is made with an implied presump-

[30] Robert N. McMurry, "The Mystique of Super-Salesmanship," *Harvard Business Review,* XXXIX (March–April, 1961), 113–22.

[31] Eliot Friedson, "Client Control and Medical Practice," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXV (January, 1960), 374–82.

[32] Charles Kadushin, "Individual Decisions To Undertake Psychotherapy," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* III (December, 1958), 379–411 (see also his "Social Distance between Client and Professional," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXVII [March, 1962], 517–31.

[33] Kadushin, "Individual Decisions To Undertake Psychotherapy," *op. cit.*

[34] *Op. cit.*, p 381.

tion that the *quality of the therapeutic relationship* is predictive of its outcome."[35]

Each successive time that the relationship is questioned, additional investment has been made and thus the magnitude of the dilemma is greater. This may be true for the member as well as for the non-member, for crisis over rapport is likely to be personally dissatisfying to the practitioner as well as threatening to his organizational rewards; thus, he may be reluctant to alter early diagnosis and prognosis (in a direction more costly to the client) so long as there appears to be a possibility of success on the original terms. This would operate, then, to diminish the heuristics of the interaction process; the early prognosis becomes a program not easily disrupted.

The possibility of a side-transaction occurs when the member has exclusive access to something desired by the non-member, such as drugs that only a licensed physician can prescribe, or when the non-member seeks some form of attention rather than technical treatment. In medicine, under these circumstances, the placebo may satisfy the patient's need for attention and maintain the physician-patient relationship. Friedson notes that whether their motive be to heal the patient or to survive professionally, physicians dependent on the lay referral system will feel pressure to accept or manipulate lay expectations by administering harmless placebos or by giving up unpopular drugs.[36]

Because of the uncertainties of the heuristic transaction process and the difficulties of establishing and maintaining rapport, it would appear that the distinction between a process leading toward side transaction often is difficult to distinguish from one leading toward transaction. For this reason, Figure 4 does not distinguish a separate flow for transactions and side transactions.

[35] Joseph W. Eaton, "The Client-Practitioner Relationship as a Variable in the Evaluation of Treatment Outcome," *Psychiatry*, XXII (May, 1959), 189.

The theme of the Type IV transaction structure thus appears to be rapport, and members must not only be able to establish and maintain rapport but, it would seem, to "cool out" the non-member if rapport cannot be re-established at one of the crisis points;[37] that is, when the transaction is aborted, the member needs some means of convincing the disappointed non-member that the attempt was a reasonable one.

DYNAMICS OF OUTPUT RELATIONS

Because disposition of its product is imperative for any complex, purposive organization, the transaction structure is crucial. It may dictate or place significant constraints on (*a*) the acquisition of necessary inputs by the organization, (*b*) the internal arrangements for allocation and coordination of resources and activities, and (*c*) the political or "institutional" requirements of the organization. The pivotal nature of the output relationship thus claims the attention not only of those in output roles but also of those at the several administrative levels.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SUPERVISION

At the technical level of the organization is found not only the output role but, inevitably, a supervisory role—charged with direct responsibility for evaluating, facilitating, or modifying the behavior of those in output roles vis-à-vis non-members. The foregoing analysis has suggested differences in the role of the supervisor for each type

[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 378.

[37] The "cooling out" concept appears to have been first introduced into sociological literature by Erving Goffman in his analysis of confidence games, in "On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptations to Failure," *Psychiatry*, XV (November, 1952), 451–63. The concept appears to be relevant to other types of activities where, acting in good faith, the practitioner must disappoint the client and faces the need to "let him down gently." For the application of the cooling-out concept in the junior college see Burton R. Clark, "The 'Cooling-Out' Function in Higher Education," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (May, 1960), 569–76.

of transaction structure. For the Type I structure, supervisory responsibility revolves around enforcement of conformity to program and detection of deviation. The supervisory focus on the Type II structure is on subordinates' skills in gambits and in closing transactions. For the Type III structure, the supervisory problem centers on the maintenance of heuristics—and preventing the development of *ad hoc* programs. For the supervisor of a Type IV relationship, the concern is with balancing rapport and treatment.

Though the content of the supervisory role differs from one type of structure to another, its significance is common to all; the supervisory role reinforces the organizational dimension in the definition of the output role. Since the non-member also is important in defining the role of member, the stage is set for a three-person game, with the supervisor having to make sure that the coalition always is between himself and the member in the output role, and not between member and non-member, that is, a side transaction.

Even when the coalition includes the supervisor, however, satisfactory disposal of output is not assured, for performance at the output boundary always is subject to the constraints of the transaction structure. If the structure departs from one of the "pure types" discussed above, members at the technical level can only adapt to those impurities, but administrators at other levels of the organization may have the resources necessary to reinforce or "purify" the structures. If it is to the organization's advantage to convert from one type of structure to another, that too must result from administrative decision and action. Finally, if the organization faces a changing environment for which existing transaction structures are inadequate, the necessary adaptation can come only from administrative action.

MIXED STRUCTURES AND MANAGERIAL ACTION

Poetic license was exercised earlier to deal only with the polar extremes of two variables that in reality are continuous. The four pure types yielded by this maneuver may indeed describe the "ideal models" toward which organization strive—but often only approximate. Impurities may stem from the situation of the non-member or of the member.

Non-members may be *more or less* under compulsion to interact with members, rather than at the mandatory or optional poles. Even where the government has a monopoly on licensing certain activities, the potential non-member may choose to risk illegal activity rather than to negotiate for a license. The member in the output role and his supervisor are powerless to combat this. If the transaction structure is to be reinforced in this case, it requires managerial policies and commitment of resources to find and punish evaders. Prisoners may be unable to effect escape, but the fact that they are *batched*[38] makes rioting possible, and the fact that they and their guards engage in a prolonged series of transactions gives prisoners a certain subtle bargaining power that can place limits on the complete arbitrariness of the prison.[39] If the transaction structure is to be reinforced in this case, it requires managerial policies and commitment of resources to provide for segmentation of prisoners or rotation of guards.

Potential customers may, of course, "do without" or find alternative sources of supply, but there are inconveniences of time and place involved in both alternatives. Potential clients may have a choice of suffering without professional help or seeking out other professionals, which often is difficult for the layman, and there are costs attached to these alternatives also. If the transaction

[38] See Goffman, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions," *Proceedings of the Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry* (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1957).

[39] For a discussion of the substitution of functional diffuseness and particularism for functional specificity and universalism under similar conditions, see Peter B. Hammond, "The Functions of Indirection in Communication," in James D. Thompson *et al.* (eds.), *Comparative Studies in Administration* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), pp. 183–94.

structure is to be purified in these cases where the non-member's discretion is limited, policies stressing service or professional norms must be adopted and emphasized by managers.

Impurities can be introduced into the transaction structure from the organization's side also. The programmed member can be furnished with such a large number of programs that he must, in face, behave heuristically. If this situation is to be purified, it must be through managerial action to reduce the number of programs or, more likely, to departmentalize, with non-members initially screened and routed to the appropriate department. Scarcity of prospects, in the Type II structure, also leads to impurities, for this structure operates on a statistical rather than an absolute basis, that is, a percentage of interactions are expected to abort. When prospects are scarce, members in the output role may be reluctant to permit an abortion, seeking instead to complete a side transaction. If this situation is to be purified, it is likely to be through managerial action to increase the flow of prospects. Advertising, extension of credit, or emphasis on convenience are among the tactics employed.

An overload on the member in the structure calling for heuristics also introduces impurities by limiting the time available to engage in heuristics and encouraging the use of *ad hoc* programs. Here again, if impurities are to be removed, managerial action is required. In the Type IV structure managerial policies can turn away prospective clients, but in the Type III structure the most likely course is to increase the size of the output staff.

MANAGEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL POSTURE

Managerial or administrative influence over transaction structures rests less on authority to dictate standards or procedures than on ability to negotiate changes in *organizational posture,* that is, a relationship between the organization and its relevant environment resulting from the joint action of both.[40]

Hawkes has shown, for the psychiatric hospital case, how the contractual negotiations of the administrator can significantly influence transactions at the boundaries. Both patient input and patient output are affected by the administrator's activities outside the hospital.[41] Levine and White have indicated that administrative negotiations can affect the *domain* of a welfare agency within the larger welfare system, and hence affect what are here termed transaction structures.[42] Economic evidence clearly indicates that administrative negotiation can arrange for monopoly or cartel systems, which in turn have important implications for output relationships.

While most of the illustrations given above were of actions that rectify some imbalance caused either by (*a*) a positive advantage held by the prospective non-member or (*b*) a disadvantage imposed on the member, administrative maneuvers can sometimes result in a posture more favorable to the organization than to the non-member. It can be hypothesized that organizations faced with Types II or IV transaction structures will attempt to reduce the freedom of prospective non-members, thus converting the structures into Types I or III. Achievement of a monopoly, of course, accompolishes this immediately.

While monopoly is illegal for certain types of American organizations, many others are not subject to such constraints. Governments usually operate monopolistic agencies, and public school systems are monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic. Hospitals, clinics, and voluntary social welfare organizations are monopolistic in many

[40] For a discussion of the concept of organizational postures see James D. Thompson, "Organizational Management of Conflict," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* V, No. 4 (March, 1960), 389–409.

[41] Robert W. Hawkes, "The Role of the Psychiatric Administrator," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* VI (June, 1961), 89–106.

[42] See Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* V (March, 1961), 583–601.

non-metropolitan settings. In larger cities they may achieve monopoly or near-monopoly by actions of the referral system, if referring agencies recognize the organization's claim to exclusive domain or jurisdiction for certain types of cases.

Even in the commercial sphere where legal codes prohibit economic monopoly, social-psychological monopoly can be achieved or approached through extension and control over credit purchasing, through brand-name advertising, or by the achievement of *extrinsic prestige* by the organization.[43]

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this paper has called attention to the need for further consideration by organization theorists of the output relationship, by showing that it occurs in transaction structures built in part of elements not within the organization and hence that it cannot be authoritatively dictated.

Finally, it is hoped that a case has been made for the necessity of developing or adapting analytic tools—such as flow charts—for the investigation of contingent interaction in social roles.

Administrative Science Center
University of Pittsburgh

[43] For the concept of extrinsic prestige and its implications for output relationships see Charles Perrow, "Organizational Prestige: Some Functions and Dysfunctions," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (January, 1961), 335–41.

SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO CHANGE IN A MENTAL HOSPITAL

LEONARD I. PEARLIN

ABSTRACT

The resistance of nursing personnel to proposed changes in the care of hospitalized mental patients is examined from questionnaires and from information about the wards to which personnel are assigned. Among those in higher positions, resistance is aroused when the changes are seen as interfering with desired relations with patients. Lower placed personnel view change from a different framework; this group opposes change when it is seen in conflict with the performance of ward maintenance functions. Resistance is least likely to be found on those wards where there is some advanced patient-care policy coupled with a leadership friendly to change.

Change is an ever present part of the scene of any human organization. It is a natural process that can gain impetus from many quarters: the organization's network of ties to the broader community and society; the constant realignments that take place between the various social and personality components of the organization; the conflicts and adjustments between formal and informal structures; and shifts in organizational functions and goals. Changes can occur very subtly. They can also be brought about purposefully and dramatically. It is planned, intended change, initiated through the establishment of new and explicit policy that will be the concern of this paper. Specifically, we shall deal with the anticipatory acceptance or resistance to such change among the members of the nursing force of a large mental hospital.

The initiation of change through conscious decision and its subsequent course are matters of interest to students of most types of human organization.[1] It is certainly an issue of crucial relevance to mental institutions. With a pace that has gained momentum over the past decade mental hospitals have been reappraising their performance and reassigning priorities of their various functions.[2] But the attainment of a goal does not automatically follow from its high priority, its clarity, or its wisdom. Not uncommonly, hospitals defer the introduction of new patient care policies and programs because widespread support for them is lacking. There are also instances where initiated changes fall short of the goals for which they were intended because of the opposition they encounter after they are introduced. Both the initiation of change and the achievement of its intended effects are determined in part by attitudes toward the change. The sources of resistance to change, therefore, represent a matter of great concern to mental institutions, as well as to other human organizations.

Two general points of view used to speculate about resistance to change in the mental hospital can be identified. One of these is psychological and emphasizes

[1] The processes and consequences of planned change might be quite different under the direction of an outside expert than when it receives its impetus and guidance exclusively by members of the organization. For studies and discussions of planned change see Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, *The Dynamics of Planned Change* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958); Cyril Sofer, *The Organization from Within* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961); F. L. W. Richardson, *Talk, Work, and Action* (Monograph 3 [Ithaca, N.Y.: Society for Applied Anthropology, Cornell University, 1961]), and a symposium in *Human Organization*, Vol. XVII (Spring, 1959).

[2] For examples of work reflecting this reappraisal see Maxwell Jones, *The Therapeutic Community* (New York: Basic Books, 1953); Milton Greenblatt, Richard H. York, and Esther Lucille Brown, *From Custodial to Therapeutic Patient Care in Mental Hospitals* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955); and Milton Greenblatt, Daniel J Levinson, and Richard H. Williams (eds.), *The Patient and the Mental Hospital* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 20–35, 197–230.

resistance as a characteristic response to any modification of the environment by individuals with certain kinds of personality structures.[3] The second view takes as its point of departure the bureaucratic nature of the institution. It also stresses indiscriminate opposition to change but as it is rooted to an organizational structure that engenders and perpetuates ritualized routine.[4]

Both points of view suffer from an overstatement of their cases. While it is probably true that characteristics of individuals prompt their resistance to change, this relationship can apparently be attenuated or enhanced under different organizational conditions. At the same time, while the hospital is bureaucratically organized, within its generic structure there are situational variations that can create greater or lesser resistance.

SETTING AND METHOD OF STUDY

The subjects of the study are all members of the nursing service below the supervisory level at Saint Elizabeths Hospital.[5] This is a federal institution that draws most of its patients from the District of Columbia. The hospital has about 7,500 inpatients and is organized into 12 services and 156 wards.

Two data-collection instruments were used. One was a self-administered questionnaire addressed to 1,315 individuals, of whom 1,138 returned usable questionnaires; the other was a form that asked for demographic characteristics of ward patient populations, the distribution of certain psychiatric characteristics, and the employment of various ward programs and policies and was filled out by the persons in charge of each of the 156 wards. These two instruments enabled us to examine both the characteristics of individual hospital workers and the characteristics of the wards to which they are assigned.

Three ranks are represented in this study; each differs in responsibilities, authority, and rewards. In the lowest rank are nursing assistants; next are charge attendants who, on the basis of experience and demonstrated ability, are given charge of wards in the absence of a registered nurse; third, and smallest in number, is the group of registered nurses who have authority over the preceding ranks and are usually responsible for running the wards. These three groups are collectively referred to as nursing personnel: 40 per cent are males and 60 per cent are females.

Resistance was assessed through five items proposing diverse changes. While these changes appear to be unrelated, reactions to them form a Guttman scale, indicating unidimensionality and suggesting the presence of a general attitude toward change rather than series of specific feelings about discrete innovations. For each of the five items that make up the scale, respondents were asked whether the proposed policy "should definitely be done," if they "wouldn't mind seeing it tried out," or if they "would be against it." The items, all dichotomized between the second and third response categories, are presented below in scale order:[6]

[3] This point of view is no stranger to the mental hospital with its psychiatric perspectives. There is a tendency in such a setting to look exclusively "inside" the participants for explanations of behavior Alfred H Stanton and Morris S. Schwartz discuss this proclivity and the use of *ad hominem* arguments by psychiatric staffs (*The Mental Hospital* [New York: Basic Books, 1954], pp. 247–48).

[4] Peter M. Blau's studies of public bureaucracies tend to refute this view; he discusses the structural features of bureaucracies that make it a type of organization that can easily accept and accommodate to change ("Bureaucracy and Social Change," in *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955], pp. 182–200).

[5] The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Winfred Overholser, superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, and Miss Lavonne Frey, director of nurses, for their help and support of this study. Responsibility for the data and their interpretation are the author's alone.

[6] The reproducibility of this scale is .92, its scalability is .72. In the tables presented, respondents scoring 0 or 1 are categorized as showing "strong" resistance; 2 to 3 "moderate" resistance, and those scoring 4 or 5 are "low."

1. Pay patients for the work they do.
2. Open the locked wards.
3. Put the most disturbed and least disturbed patients together on the same wards.
4. Let patient groups decide when patients should be discharged.
5. Have males and females on the same wards.

The suggested policies, it might be noted, are not untried or chimerical. They are in effect in some hospitals in various parts of the country, and some are in practice in limited areas of the hospital under study. Nevertheless, the nursing personnel who accepted all items represent vanguard advocates of change toward the creation of what they hope is a therapeutic hospital milieu. The dimension on which the scale rests is a willingness to move from tradition in patient care. It is to be noted that the above scale aims only at patient-care policy. Despite this, there are, we think, processes involved that operate with other types of change as well.

POSITION AND PRECEPT

Most sources of resistance that are examined in this paper can be understood only by taking into account the positions of personnel in the nursing order. Position is central to resistance in two distinct ways. On one hand, resistance increases markedly from the higher to the lower ranks. On the other hand what constitutes a significant source of resistance for one echelon can be quite irrelevant for another. Thus, the ranks differ both in the proportions of individuals who strongly resist change and in the factors revelant to such resistance. Because of its centrality to the acceptance of, or opposition to, change, position will be taken into consideration throughout the following discussions.

In an examination of the variations in resistance to change that occur between the nursing ranks, it is seen that, of the three ranks represented, resistance is greatest among nursing assistants, the lowest rank, and is least likely to be found among registered nurses (see Table 1). A number of factors undoubtedly contribute to these positional differences, including the level of general educational attainment and the duration and intensity of occupational training.

Another factor that we wish to examine is the influence of professionalization inasmuch as the nursing profession, largely through the various organizations it has established, is an important source of values regarding the treatment of patients.

TABLE 1*

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE, POSITION IN NURSING FORCE, AND MEMBERSHIP IN NURSING ORGANIZATIONS

	No.	Resistance to Change (Per Cent)		
		Strong	Moderate	Low
Position in nursing force:†				
Registered nurse	157	46	27	27
Charge attendant	173	59	24	17
Nursing assistant	736	67	23	10
Membership in professional nursing organizations:‡				
None	93	54	28	18
1	26	31	38	31
2 or more	27	33	22	45

* This table, as well as those that follow, does not include "No answers," resulting in slight variation in totals from table to table

† $\chi^2 = 36.2$; 4 degrees of freedom; $P < .001$.

‡ $\chi^2 = 10.6$, 4 degrees of freedom; $P < .05$.

The norms and values supported by nursing organizations emphasize practices that stand in marked contrast to custodialism and, generally, are compatible with the directions embodied by our measure of resistance. One probable reason that registered nurses offer relatively little resistance to change, therefore, is because of their exposure to values that are in sympathy with changes of this sort.

If this is so, then we should expect that the more fully a nurse participates in professional organizations the more likely she will accept change. Table 1 compares nurses on the basis of their affiliations with such

organizations and shows that nurses having no affiliation are quite similar to charge attendants; resistance decreases, however, among affiliated nurses. It can also be noted that nurses graduating from a university with a Bachelor of Science degree are less resistant than those having only a nursing diploma. Nurses who are most professionally active and who carry the most professional credentials, therefore, take over the current treatment values that prevail in nursing and the psychiatric community. These values constitute the standards by which a favorable evaluation of the changes is produced. It is this process, apparently, that accounts for much of the difference between the positions in resistance to change. There may be some filtering down of the treatment values to charge attendants, but the values do not appear to touch the nursing assistants. Consequently, the lowest group does not possess the same standards by which change is favorably assessed. In the absence of such standards, many hospital changes appear whimsical to them and are therefore resisted.

Exposure to and internalization of advanced treatment values are only part of the story. We would also assume that higher and lower personnel vary in the proportions who resist change because of differences in more specific precepts they hold regarding patients. In this connection, beliefs about the social distance that should properly be maintained with patients were examined. Staff-patient distance is especially pertinent, for this aspect of relations with patients is closely bound to changes of the kinds with which we are dealing. As will be shown, it can be difficult to enlarge the autonomy and decision-making powers of patients while desiring great distance from them.

Two conceptions are considered, both of which entail the social distance which staff members psychologically put between themselves and patients, with each concept in a separate dimension. The first—personal distance—refers to the extent that personnel regards patients impersonally and without affective attachment. The second—status distance—refers to the case in which one sets himself apart from patients by elevating himself above them along an inferior-superior dimension.[7] As expected, we find that (1) resistance tends to increase with both personal and status distance, and (2) nursing assistants on each dimension are more distant than the higher nursing groups. These facts would lead us to believe that the greater opposition to change of assistants may be due to their greater desire to maintain distance between themselves and patients. But what is actually found is that distance is related to opposition only among charge attendants and registered nurses and not among assistants. While these somewhat surprising findings preclude personal and status distance as factors contributing to positional differences in resistance, it will be seen that they nevertheless help to explain the sources of resistance to change.

Let us look at personal distance in de-

[7] Each dimension of distance is measured by a Guttman scale. The items making up the scale of personal distance are: (1) I often find pleasure in talking about myself to patients, (2) I often become quite personally attached to patients on my ward, and in a way am sorry to see them leave the ward, (3) Whenever possible, it is fun to sit down with a patient and just pass the time of day talking, (4) One patient is more or less the same as any other, and (5) When I get to know a patient well, I find I talk to him just as I would anyone else. Status distance is measured by the following items: (1) If you get too friendly with patients, they often lose respect for you, (2) It's a bad idea to get too friendly with patients, (3) You have to keep your distance from mental patients, otherwise they are liable to forget you are a nurse or nursing assistant, (4) It's hard to be friendly with patients without it becoming too personal, (5) One of the problems in getting friendly with patients is that patients don't know where to draw the line, and (6) It's all right to get friendly with patients but not too friendly. A detailed description of the construction and uses of these scales is found in Leonard I. Pearlin and Morris Rosenberg, "Nurse-Patient Social Distance and the Structural Context of a Mental Hospital," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February, 1962), 56–65.

tail. Table 2 shows that personal distance has a pronounced association with resistance among those in the higher ranks while there is almost no relationship at all with the assistant group. Considering for the moment only the higher groups, we should recall the nature of the proposed changes in order to understand this association. As do most efforts to make the hospital a "therapeutic milieu," these changes stress the personal qualities of patients as persons. In contrast, highly distant personnel regard patients with little affect and with marked impersonality. The changes, therefore, are sharply inconsistent with an impersonal view of patients. As a result of the dissonance that exists between the precept and the change, the change is rejected.[8]

The same sort of finding emerges with reference to status distance (see Table 2). Although assistants are again more inclined to be high on this measure, status distance bears no relationship to their attitudes toward change. Among the charge attendants and registered nurses an association is once again found. For these groups conceptions of patients built around status difference are not supported by the kinds of changes in patient care that are at issue. The changes constitute a challenge and threaten their belief that patients are status inferiors; consequently, the changes are likely to be resisted. It would appear that, where the meaning attached to these changes is dissonant with the feelings and beliefs held by individuals, resistance is more readily aroused. But this is true only under certain conditions. For although distance from patients is more prevalent among the assistants, it plays no appreciable part in their feelings toward change.

Dissonance between the precept and the change will not produce resistance, we believe, unless the precept is relevant to the work roles and occupational self-images of personnel. Matters of proper distance from patients, along with broader issues of staff-patient relations, are much more likely to be imbedded in the thinking and work of those in the higher positions. Following from the widely held view that functional psychoses represent a maladjustment to painful interpersonal experiences, there is a corresponding stress placed on staff-patient relations as powerful conditions for social relearning. The training of many nurses, their literature, and their reference groups all contribute to an acute aware-

TABLE 2

POSITIONS OF PERSONNEL, THEIR PERSONAL AND STATUS DISTANCE FROM PATIENTS, AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

	No.	Resistance to Change (Per Cent)		
		Strong	Moderate	Low
	Personal Distance			
Charge attendants and nurses:*				
0–1 (high)	33	64	30	6
2	69	64	19	17
3	113	53	26	21
4–5 (low)	113	43	28	29
Nursing assistants:†				
0–1 (high)	104	70	19	11
2	206	69	23	8
3	223	69	20	11
4–5 (low)	201	61	26	13
	Status Distance			
Charge attendants and nurses:‡				
4–6 (high)	112	64	22	14
2–3	128	48	29	23
0–1 (low)	86	45	26	29
Nursing assistants:†				
4–6 (high)	154	65	23	12
2–3	239	68	21	11
0–1 (low)	341	67	23	10

* $\chi^2 = 13.7$; 6 degrees of freedom; $P < .05$
† Not significant.
‡ $\chi^2 = 10.5$; 4 degrees of freedom, $P < .05$

[8] Many of our interpretations are based on the theoretical, and empirical treatment of dissonance and its role in attitude change by Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957).

ness of their relations with patients and the possible therapeutic consequences of these relations. Because relations with patients tend to be important problematic issues of work to the higher personnel, their beliefs as to what forms these relations should properly take can result in resistance when these beliefs are dissonant with the change.

By contrast, it is apparent from Table 2 that such aspects of relations with patients are not influential factors in assistants' reactions to change because they are tangential to the central work performed by this group. Assistants' beliefs about the distance they should properly maintain with patients cannot be considered as either consonant or dissonant with the proposed changes; instead, they are irrelevant to these changes.[9] Before dissonance will produce resistance to change, there must be some investment in the precepts involved. Investment, in turn, is created when the precepts are meaningfully tied to the tasks that confront personnel. For assistants, meaningful ties between their work and properly gauged distance in dealing with patients evidently do not exist.

TABLE 3

POSITIONS OF PERSONNEL, RANK ORDER OF PREFERENCES FOR PATIENTS WHO FACILITATE WARD MANAGEMENT, AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Position and Ranking	No.	Resistance to Change (Per Cent)		
		Strong	Moderate	Low
Charge attendants and nurses:*				
First	8	50	25	25
Second	25	56	16	28
Other	296	51	27	22
Nursing assistants:†				
First	22	86	5	9
Second	83	71	23	6
Other	600	66	23	11

* Not significant.

† $\chi^2 = 13.7$; 4 degrees of freedom, $P < .01$.

The precepts of assistants that do bear on their resistance to change, therefore, must be of a different order. Just as notions of proper distance are relevant to the resistance of the higher groups, because such precepts are bound to central elements of their work roles, so it is that precepts among assistants derive their relevance from being linked to tasks demanding a major part of their attention. Given the nature of the daily tasks for which they are responsible, it could be expected that certain problems of patient and ward management would be salient elements of their work roles and that resistance would depend on whether the proposed changes were seen as potentially interfering with the discharge of these tasks. This line of inquiry can be followed by examining answers to a question in which respondents were asked to rank the types of patients they prefer to work with. Four such types are relevant here: "a patient who does a lot to help with the work on the ward," "a patient who is neat and clean," "a patient who doesn't cause much fuss or trouble," and "a patient with good manners."[10] When one of these types of patients is given top ranking, it indicates that the respondent views patients in terms of how they facilitate or, at least, do not hamper the execution of tasks relating to patient and ward management.

In Table 3 respondents are categorized according to whether they ranked facilitating patients first or second or whether they give these ranks to other types of patients. The manner in which the rankings bear

[9] Festinger notes that by no means are all cognitive elements related; he refers to such cases as "irrelevant relations." We are dealing with a situation where two elements are irrelevant for one group but quite relevant for others (*ibid.*, pp. 11–12).

[10] There are four additional types on the list: "a patient who really needs and wants your help," "a patient who appreciates what you do for him," "a patient who has a pleasant personality," and "a patient who means well underneath." These are distinguished from the types enumerated above by their emphasis on personality qualities of patients

on resistance to change for different positions is a complete reversal from those revealed in Table 2. Here a relationship is found between preferences for facilitative patients and resistance, although such preferences make no difference to the feelings of the higher groups. The assistants giving the high priorities see in the changes an altered role for patients that clashes with their present conceptions, for these are patient-centered rather than task-centered changes. But it is essential to note that by itself a high priority attached to facilitative patients is not sufficient to produce resistance; it is also necessary that there be an investment in those conceptions which, in the present instance, stems from the realities and demands of work roles. Ward maintenance duties are of greater relevance to assistants than to charge attendants and registered nurses. The same considerations unequally influence feelings toward change among personnel, for they are not of equal relevance to members of different ranks. Relevance, then, is a condition for dissonance and the subsequent rejection of change.

EXISTING PATIENT-CARE POLICY

It was just seen that the things with which people are actually occupied in their work determine the relevance of their precepts to proposed change. This directs our attention to broader conditions of work and suggests that the situations in which personnel are located and the experiences allowed by these situations can themselves constitute sources of resistance to change. Indeed, from our examination of some situational factors, it appears that from the working environment stem events that can exert a powerful influence on these attitudes. Policies and programs of patient care, to the extent that they set the structure of the situation and thus create conditions out of which experience flows, have important consequences for attitudes toward change.

We shall consider three policies here: (1) the existence of patient government on the ward; (2) whether the ward doors are open or locked; and (3) the occurrence of regular staff-patient meetings. Although not coextensive with our scale of resistance to change, these policies rest on the same continuum and, in the case of open-locked doors, overlap it. On one hand, the policies are indicators of conditions of patient freedom, autonomy, and decision-making actually extant on wards; on the other hand, the scale asks staff members how far they are willing to go in accepting changes along these lines. Therefore, we are asking, essentially, whether personnel working under the conditions set by the three policies accept change more readily than those working under other conditions.

Table 4 reveals that this is the case.[11] The table shows that personnel of all ranks are most likely to resist change strongly when they are assigned to wards where these procedures are not followed. This is true in all six combinations, five of which are statistically significant. While we are suggesting that these relationships signify that the absence of the policies produces the resistance, the reverse could be argued; that is, resistance precludes the employment of such patient-care policies. It can be pointed out in this regard, however, that the personnel included in this survey do not make decisive policy. While some, particularly the registered nurses, might exercise influence in establishing programs, it is typically the nursing supervisor or ward psychiatrist who institutes such policies. It is evident, then, that the de facto state of affairs constitutes a foundation for attitudes toward change and not the other way

[11] The tables have a total N considerably less than the 1,138 included in the survey. The reason for this is that over 40 per cent of the nursing personnel are regularly assigned to more than one ward. In cases of staff having multiple assignments, it would not be possible to use a given ward policy in accounting for resistance. Only personnel with single assignments, therefore, figure in tables using ward information. Their total number is 647.

around.[12] When existing conditions are such that there is a discernible continuity between one's present experiences and the changes he anticipates, relatively little opposition is likely. But when conditions provide no bridge to future expectations, resistance becomes more probable.

The above findings bring into question the typical views of change in our society. From both moral conviction and practical considerations, it is usually felt that desired changes should be preceded by favorable attitudes among the people to be affected by the change. Our evidence suggests, however, that a condition for the breakdown of resistance to change is through change itself. This conclusion is consistent with that of Clark, drawn from his review to desegregation through 1953, "the use of necessary power and authority to change the structure of the situation results initially in behavioral changes. These behavioral changes then compel compatible attitudinal accommodations which are required to preserve the assumption of personal rationality and adjustment."[13] It will be seen in the case of the institution under study, however, that the structure of the situation most effectively brings about attitudes favorable to change only where there is a supporting leadership.

TABLE 4

POSITIONS OF PERSONNEL, WARD PATIENT-CARE POLICIES, AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Position and Policy on Ward	No	Resistance to Change (Per Cent)		
		Strong	Moderate	Low
Charge attendants and nurses:*				
Patient government	73	45	29	26
No patient government	112	66	21	13
Nursing assistants:†				
Patient government	149	56	32	12
No patient government	279	70	21	9
Charge attendants and nurses:‡				
Open wards	21	43	38	19
Closed wards	163	60	22	18
Nursing assistants:§				
Open wards	39	48	31	21
Closed wards	386	67	23	10
Charge attendants and nurses:‖				
Regular staff-patient meetings	78	46	28	26
No meetings	107	66	21	13
Nursing assistants:#				
Regular staff-patient meetings	155	56	32	12
No meetings	273	71	20	9

* $\chi^2 = 8.4$; 2 degrees of freedom; $P < .02$.
† $\chi^2 = 10.1$; 2 degrees of freedom; $P < .01$.
‡ $\chi^2 = 3.0$, 2 degrees of freedom; $P < .30$.
§ $\chi^2 = 6.8$; 2 degrees of freedom; $P < .05$.
‖ $\chi^2 = 8.1$; 2 degrees of freedom; $P < .02$
\# $\chi^2 = 9.6$; 2 degrees of freedom; $P < .01$.

OPINION LEADERSHIP

It would appear from the foregoing tables that the work situation has a direct impact in shaping the attitudes of personnel toward change and that this impact is exercised independently of position. There is evidence, however, that the influence of the situation can be intensified or vitiated by the opinions of people in positions of leadership. In this connection we refer specifically to the leadership of the registered nurses over their nursing assistants. As previously noted, registered nurses, on wards on which they are found, are usually responsible for the care given to patients by their staffs. By virtue of these responsibilities, they have a good deal to do with setting the pace and tone of their wards. Also, because of their authority and relatively high status, their behavior and attitudes can be taken as a model on which

[12] It is possible that psychiatrists seek out the most receptive wards on which to introduce programs or, upon meeting resistance, they might arrange to have the recalcitrants transferred to other wards and replaced by more accepting personnel. Either of these selective actions would contribute to the observed relationships; if such actions do occur, however, they probably contribute quite minimally to the variance.

[13] Kenneth Clark, "Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence," *Journal of Social Issues*, IX, No 2 (1953), 74.

those working under them pattern themselves.

One question we should ask is whether the nurse has a role in imparting to subordinates her own resistance to or acceptance of change. For this purpose the nurses' attitudes are simply compared to those of the nursing assistants assigned to the same wards. Table 5 would suggest that the assistants do tend to take over the attitudes of their nurses.[14] Thus, assistants working on wards with nurses who strongly resist change are themselves likely to express the same stand; they are far less likely to be strong resistors if the nurses for whom they work are low in resistance. It is apparent that there is a close association between the opinions of nurses and their assistants.[15]

The opinions of nurses must also be considered in conjunction with existing ward policies known to create a favorable disposition toward change. By examining these two factors simultaneously we can assess the interplay between conditions of the work situation and opinion leadership as they effect the resistance of assistants. The practice of regular staff-patient meetings is taken for this purpose, since it affords the best distribution of cases. The results of these comparisons are also presented in Table 5. It is apparent that the influence of the existing condition in breaking down resistance to change among assistants is exercised only where it is reinforced through the favorable opinions of the nurse: it has no effect by itself. On the other hand, when the nurse is favorably disposed toward change, this will have no influence on her assistants in the absence of the disposing situational condition. From these findings it would appear that, where existing policies are influential in reducing opposition, the opinions of key personnel are the vehicles through which the influence is exercised. But when these personnel are located in situations whose realities do not support their opinions, the effects of their opinion on the attitudes of assistants are lost.

[14] The small N of the first part of this table results from the limited number of registered nurses with single ward assignments who have assistants exclusively assigned to their wards.

[15] The association in the second part of Table 5 probably derives from opinion leadership rather than from exposure of both groups to a shared environment; for when the attitudes of charge attendants toward change are compared with those of the assistants working under them, no relationship appears, despite the fact that these two groups are in a common environment.

TABLE 5

ATTITUDES TOWARD CHANGE OF NURSES AND THEIR ASSISTANTS

	No.	Assistants' Resistance to Change (Per Cent)		
		Strong	Moderate	Low
Registered nurses who are:*				
Strongly resistant	54	70	17	13
Moderately resistant	39	67	23	10
Low in resistance .	36	33	53	12
Assistants' attitudes toward regular staff-patient meetings on wards having:†				
Favorable policy and favorable nurses	37	27	54	19
Favorable policy but unfavorable nurses	26	69	23	8
No favorable policy but favorable nurses	23	78	22	....
No favorable policy and unfavorable nurses	43	70	14	16

* $\chi^2 = 16.2$; 4 degrees of freedom, $P < .01$.

† The first combination is significantly different from the remaining three, in each case beyond the .001 level. There are no significant differences between the remaining three combinations

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

There is little doubt of growing unwillingness to let change take its own time and directions. Although attempts are increasingly being made to initiate and guide change along a purposeful course it is readily apparent that wanting particular changes and achieving them can be quite unrelated. Antagonisms emerge and become

barriers to desired ends, or desired changes are held in abeyance out of fear of arousing hostile opposition. This paper attempted to trace some sources of resistance to rather extreme but realistic changes in patient care policies.

Attitudes toward change were found to be related to the values and precepts of personnel and to their positions in the nursing force. Registered nurses, having access to a body of treatment values sympathetic to the orders of changes dealt with here, are least resistant to change. The influence of these values is pointed up by the fact that nurses who, as a result of active professional identification, are likely to adopt and espouse advanced views of patient care are also most inclined to accept change. The specific precepts found to be related to resistance did not hold across the different ranks. Among those in higher positions, conceptions of social distance that should properly be maintained between themselves and patients were associated with their attitudes toward change. What matters to the resistance of assistants, however, is the extent to which they want patients to serve as instruments of ward maintenance functions. Precepts and desiderata, therefore, will have a bearing on resistance only under conditions of relevance. What appears to determine the relevance of these precepts is their centrality to what personnel actually do in their jobs and to the issues they deal with in meeting the demands of their work.

Certain patient-care policies were taken for a more detailed examination of the conditions under which personnel work. These policies, each reflecting the degree of autonomy accorded patients, are consonant with the proposed changes and were found to have an attenuating effect on resistance. But this effect apparently does not come about directly with all personnel. It reaches the assistants through the mechanism of opinion leadership of the head nurse for whom they work. Thus, the resistance of assistants remains high unless the policy is backed by a disposition favorable to change on the part of the nurse.

The data contain a number of implications for strategies of planned change. These begin with the scale devised for the measurement of resistance, which provides a guide to the rank order of acceptability; it indicates empirically the sequence by which changes can be introduced with a minimum of resistance arousal. There is also evidence indicating that the introduction of the most acceptable change might reduce opposition to the changes that originally were less acceptable. Resistance to change can be overcome through change itself, particularly when supported through the feelings of key personnel. The findings further indicate that any effective attempt to alter attitudes toward change through persuasion must take into account what is meaningful and relevant to different personnel. In the case of the mental hospital, it might be effective to stress the somewhat abstract aspects of staff-patient relations when appealing to the higher placed staff. It would be our prediction, however, that the lower groups would be more responsive to appeals that discuss change in terms of everyday ward maintenance.

Finally, the fact that those lowest in position are also most resistant represents a barrier to change. These individuals are most remote, both in position and identification, from the professional goal-setters of the institution. At the same time, a great deal of reliance is placed on them for the achievement of the institution's goals. The organizational separation of goal-setters and goal-getters cannot work effectively, however, as long as they are oriented to different ends. In order to overcome opposition, an institution must recognize and deal with such elements of its structure, either by having the lower groups participate more actively in plans for change or by having the goal-setters participate more actively in the implementation of their goals.

Laboratory of Socio-environmental Studies
National Institute of Mental Health

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURES IN FIVE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS[1]

MAYER N. ZALD

ABSTRACT

In institutions for delinquents pursuit of custodial or treatment goals leads to differences in organizational control structures. In a study of five institutions it was found that treatment institutions as compared to custodial institutions had more complex departmental structures requiring a greater sharing of executive power. Moreover, differences in goals were associated with differences in this balance of power among groups; emphasis on treatment leads to a more powerful social service staff, relative to cottage parents and teachers. Among treatment institutions, those that focus on milieu treatment are likely to have a different control structure from those that focus on individual treatment.

Like universities and mental hospitals, most correctional institutions are organizations that have multiple goals. One can characterize the goals of any given correctional institution in terms of the relative importance of custodial or treatment purposes; some institutions have almost purely custodial goals, some have "mixed goals," and some have almost purely treatment goals.

Custodial goals are operative when an organization devotes a large part of its energies and resources to the control and containment of inmates; treatment goals are operative when a large part of organizational resources and energies are devoted to the rehabilitation and positive social change of inmates.

Organizational goals are conceptualized as the analytic independent variable; action necessary to implement custodial or treatment goals leads to, or requires, differences in organizational control structures.

Two institutions whose goals are approximately the same might differ sharply in structure and practice, however, if they employ different methods. A mental hospital, for example, which utilizes mainly electro-convulsive and other neurological therapies has different staff-patient relationships and practices than one using primarily psychotherapy. In treatment institutions for delinquents there are important differences in structure required by individual treatment (psychotherapy, casework, or counseling) as contrasted with milieu treatment (interpreting behavior and changing the individual through his relationship with others).

This paper concentrates on the relationship between custodial and treatment goals and aspects of organizational control structures—the pattern of departmentalization and the distribution and balance of power among executives and employees of five institutions for delinquents.[2] My central as-

[1] This study was done as part of a larger study of institutions for juvenile delinquents directed by Robert D. Vinter and Morris Janowitz under a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (M-2104), United States Public Health Service. The data reported here are drawn from "Multiple Goals and Staff Structure: A Comparative Study of Correctional Institutions for Juvenile Delinquents" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1960), esp. chaps. iv and v, pp. 84–167.

Morris Janowitz and Harrison White have greatly aided the author by their criticism of an earlier draft of this paper. The Elizabeth McCormick Memorial Fund of Chicago provided fellowship support.

[2] There have been few studies from a sociological point of view of institutions for delinquents. For a case study see Robert D. Vinter and Roger Lind, *Staff Relationships and Attitudes in a Juvenile Correctional Institution* (Ann Arbor: School of Social Work, The University of Michigan, 1958). For current approaches to the study of prisons and mental hospitals, see George Grosser (ed.), *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison* ("SSRC" Pamphlet, No. 15 [New York:

sumption is that implementation of custodial or treatment goals requires different relationships between institutions and the local community, between various groups of employees, and between employees and inmates. These differences directly affect the control structure of the institution.[3]

The control structure of an organization can be described in terms of the distribution of power and the channels for utilizing power.[4] The pattern and amount of departmentalization and interdepartmental relationships are part of the structure of control because they reflect the way in which responsibility (and control) is delegated. The balance of power among executive and staff groups reflects both the formal delegation of control and the informal seizure of control by some executives and groups. My general thesis is that institutions with dominant treatment goals differ in their control structure from those with dominant custodial goals; the more complex departmental structure and tasks require a wider distribution of power among the executives and a different allocation of power among both executives and staff groups.

Two major hypotheses are examined: Hypothesis 1: *In mixed-goal and treatment institutions power is distributed among executives; whereas in more custodial institutions power is not distributed, only the superintendent possesses power.* Internal practices required in treatment institutions are more complex, less routinized, and more individualized than those in custodial institutions. Similarly, because he must obtain a larger amount of resources per inmate than his counterpart in custodial institutions, and because he must defend the relatively open quality of his program, the superintendent of an institution with treatment goals must concern himself more with external affairs than his counterpart in a custodial institution.

Differences in the relative dominance of custodial and treatment goals among institutions lead to differences in the substantive bases of decisions and imply differences in the importance attached to various activities (e.g., containment, counseling, etc.). Therefore, aside from the extent to which executive power is shared, difference in goals between institutions leads to the allocation of power to executives who differ in their values and goal commitments, that is, to a difference in the balance of power. In a mixed-goal institution, the executive responsible for internal activities is likely to pursue custodial goals and the executive concerned with external affairs ostensibly will pursue treatment goals. Such an arrangement placates the demands of specialized publics for a rehabilitative program at the same time that it insures attainment of basic custodial goals. In a treatment institution, however, the executive responsible for internal control must be fully committed to treatment goals.

Differences in the basic goals of the in-

Social Science Research Council, 1960]); Donald Cressey (ed.), *The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organization and Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961); and Milton Greenblatt, Daniel J. Levinson, and Richard H. Williams (eds.), *The Patient and the Mental Hospital* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

[3] Goals also have more indirect consequences for the attitudes of employees toward inmates, the amount and pattern of conflict, and the role problems of employees. On the patterns of conflict in correctional institutions see my "Power Balance and Organizational Conflict in Correctional Institutions for Delinquents," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VII (June, 1962), 22–49. On the role problems of employees see Cressey, "Contradictory Directives in Complex Organizations: The Case of the Prisons," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (June, 1959), 1–19.

[4] The concept of organizational control structure used here is more inclusive than that used by Arnold Tannenbaum and his associates. They include only the distribution of influence among groups in their definition of the control structure, in effect assuming or ignoring the patterned channels through which influence is utilized. See Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert L. Kahn, "Organizational Control Structure: A General Descriptive Technique as Applied to Four Local Unions," *Human Relations*, X (May, 1957), 127–40; and Tannenbaum and Basil Georgopoulos, "The Distribution of Control in Formal Organizations," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (October, 1957), 44–50.

stitution lead not only to differences in the criteria on which decisions are based but also to differences in the amount of power held by various groups within the institution, because custodial and treatment goals require different staff groups to be in control of decisions about discipline and activities for inmates.

Hypothesis 2: *In custodial institutions the influence and authority of the cottage parent is likely to be relatively high and that of a social service worker relatively low. The reverse will tend to hold true in individual treatment institutions; since milieu treatment attempts to involve more of the staff in the decision-making process, a "team" concept results and a general sharing of power is likely. In all institutions teachers are relatively isolated from the major operating problems of the organization and are likely to have little influence.*

Although social service workers have power in both the individual- and milieu-treatment institutions, they differ in their relationship to the other staff members. In a milieu institution the social service staff can make its influence felt only through other staff members; in individual-treatment institutions social service workers may function relatively independently of the rest of the staff. I will explore both the power of staff groups and the kinds of relationships existing among staff groups.

Before the data pertaining to these hypotheses are presented, the sample institutions must be briefly described.

THE SAMPLE INSTITUTIONS

From a large number of institutions whose goals were known on a reputational basis by experts,[5] five were selected for intensive study.[6] In Table 1 the goals, number of inmates and employees, and type of control (public or private) of each institution are shown.

TABLE 1

FIVE SAMPLE INSTITUTIONS, BY GOALS, SIZE, AND CONTROL, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE

Goals	Size	
	Small	Large
Custodial....		*Dick Industrial School* 260 inmates 65 staff members Public
Mixed.......	*Regis Home* 56 inmates 13 staff members Private	*Mixter Training School* 400 inmates 177 staff members Public
Treatment...	*Inland School* 60 inmates 40 staff members Private	*Milton School for Boys* 200 inmates 117 staff members Public

Each of these institutions, particularly those with treatment goals, had been sub-

[5] One representative of the United States Children's Bureau and a professor of social work interested in correctional institutions helped to pick the initial sample. They were asked to name a wide variety of institutions with specific reputations for emphasis on custodial or treatment programs. The reputations of institutions are obviously composites of their goals and their operating procedures. The use of reputations as an index of goals would make my argument circular because I would be using a consequence of structure analytically as a determinant of structure. Institutional goals were independently and directly measured by using data obtained from official statements of goals, interviews with executives, and staff responses to questionnaire items. These measurements indicated that my judgments of goals based on reputations were largely supported (see "Multiple Goals . . . ," *op. cit.*, pp. 64–114). Furthermore, if one uses as a measure of treatment goals the input of treatment personnel, it is clear that our most custodial institution had the lowest ratio of social service workers to inmates, 1 to 125, whereas our most treatment-oriented institution had a ratio of 1 to 12. The underlying model is a rational and unfolding one; persons in authority have responsibility for implementing goals and take action to pursue those goals, including hiring appropriate personnel. Personnel in interaction then help to change definitions of goals.

[6] The selection of institutions met four requirements: (1) an array of institutions among the cus-

ject to processes of change and conflict in recent times. All of them formally stressed some form of rehabilitation goals (as has been true historically for institutions for delinquents). But institutions with such older or traditional concepts of rehabilitation as "training" also stressed custodial aims. The description of each institution which follows locates the goals with reference to the relative dominance of custody and treatment and highlights important features of each institution's operation.

Dick Industrial School[7] stressed discipline, training, and containment in its goal statements. Operating its own farm, Dick was an isolated, custodial institution.

Regis Home, the smallest institution in the study, was run by a Catholic religious order. Although some boys received individual counseling, Regis aimed primarily at educating and training the boys. The Home was located in an urban community and sent its boys to twenty schools in the community.[8] Discipline was firm, although less punitive than at Dick, and all counseling, especially in regard to sexual practices, had to conform to the tenets of the governing religious order.

*Mix*ter, a *mix*ed-goal institution, was the largest in the study. Mixter represents a benign custodial type which minimizes repressive sanctions while not fully developing a treatment program.

*Mil*ton, which stressed a *mil*ieu approach, and *In*land, which stressed *in*dividual treatment, were the two institutions in the sample with relatively dominant treatment goals. They differed from each other in that Milton was a large public institution while Inland was a small private institution. Milton had changed to a milieu approach after a decade and a half of growth and conflict. Its milieu approach was intended to eliminate tensions between professional and lay personnel by having them consult often with each other as well as to implement treatment philosophy.

Because Milton was a public institution and had to accept all delinquents sent to it, it was not able to dispense with custodial goals as completely as Inland. Inland defined itself as a "residential treatment center" and its personnel placed a great deal of stress on the delinquent's progress in counseling.

To summarize, I consider Dick to have had the most custodial goals of the institutions in the sample, followed by Regis and Mixter. Although Inland was able to dispense with custodial emphases to a greater extent than Milton, both Milton and Inland were clearly institutions with dominant treatment goals. With this array of institutions it is possible to compare smaller institutions with larger; public institutions with private; and institutions with custodial, mixed, and treatment goals.[9]

---

todial-treatment dimension; (2) institutions of different sizes as a control measure; (3) both public and private institutions; and (4) institutional goals related to the action program of the organization.

I did not attempt to select a representative sample but aimed instead at maximizing comparison of the effects of goals. Comparison of the five institutions to the universe of institutions in the United States indicates that, in fact, they are not representative of the universe of institutions. Institutions with low inmate-staff ratios and high per capita costs are overrepresented, indicating most likely an overrepresentation of treatment institutions (*ibid.*, pp. 51–54). But the institutions selected do fulfil the requirements of my comparative design.

[7] The institutions have been given false names to preserve guaranteed anonymity. The first two or three letters of each name serve as a mnemonic device for some salient aspect of the institutional program.

[8] Since there was no attempt to contain delinquents at Regis, its inclusion in the study might be questioned. To fill the required cells of the design of my study a small institution emphasizing containment was sought. Since none was available, excluding Regis would have left an important gap in the comparisons. Its small size permits comparisons with Inland School, and its emphasis on education and respect reflects a parallel with older concepts of rehabilitation.

[9] The absence from the sample of large private or small public institutions means that comparisons for the variables of size and control are con-

DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER BALANCE

The hypothesis that power is more widely distributed among executives in treatment institutions than in custodial ones rests on the greater complexity of organization tasks and on the greater external demands on the superintendent in the former. Without delegating authority, the superintendent would have an overextended span of control. Formal delegation of authority often takes place through the creation of departmental structures, and institutions with different basic goals and methods set up different types of departmental patterns. Since departmental structures also affect the relations among staff groups, before presenting data which bears directly on the first hypothesis, I will discuss the departmental structures of the five institutions as they relate to correctional institutions in general.

Such custodial institutions as Dick and, to a lesser extent, Regis operate on a routine and repetitive basis and require little departmentalization.[10] When containment and control of inmates are achieved, organizational goals are fulfilled. Thus, the co-ordination of the staff is required primarily for physical movement of inmates and for rotation of personnel shifts. The executive can easily maintain an extended span of control.

Both Dick and Regis had simple formal structures. Of course, Regis' small size as well as its basically routine operation accounted for its lack of departmentalization. Dick was partially departmentalized; only the academic school and the farm had effective departmental heads. Even though each of the five cottages had a nominal leader, all cottage parents often reported directly to the superintendent. No attempt was made to delegate control of the cottages to a department head, and there was little supervision of cottage parent activity. Furthermore, the departmentalization of the farm did not stem from a desire to implement more complex programs for the boys or to control employee relations with inmates; it occurred only after Dick's farm production was criticized by a citizen's committee and was an attempt to insure an adequate variety of food. Although Dick was larger than Inland, it had less departmentalization, suggesting that size alone does not account for the degree of departmentalization. Moreover, the superintendent and assistant superintendent at Dick had little difficulty in meeting role demands, indicating that under prevailing conditions further departmentalization was not required.

In contrast to custodial institutions, such mixed-goal and treatment institutions as Mixter, Milton, and Inland cannot operate as routinely, and more complex combinations of personnel must be co-ordinated. Both Mixter and Inland had multiple department structures, a form which is most likely to occur when each of the diverse tasks of the institution is relatively autonomous. In an institution with mixed goals, for instance, cottage life, education, treatment, recreation, and maintenance might each be in a separate and unintegrated department. Such an institution as Inland, operating under individual treatment philosophy, also allows departments to function independently, since the relevance of activity in the school or cottage to the rehabilitative process is not stressed, and high integration of departments thus is not required.

Although the larger size of Mixter resulted in more subsystem divisions than at

---

founded. My primary comparisons, however, deal with the custodial-treatment dimension, and I believe these missing data do not seriously affect the basic analysis of the effects of custodial and treatment goals.

[10] A department is defined as a relatively self-contained subsystem of an organization. A group of workers can be considered members of a department when there is a designated liaison or responsible supervisor for the group. Workers performing similar tasks but relating individually to the superintendent, assistant superintendent, or another executive are not considered members of a department.

Inland, the basic structure in both institutions was similar. Social service, training and education, cottage life, and business and maintenance each comprised separate departments, no one of which had control over the others. At Mixter the superintendent took responsibility for integrating the activities of the various departments, while at Inland the assistant director performed this function.

The departmental structure at Mixter permitted the superintendent to have a reasonable span of control, while at Inland the assistant superintendent was not so fortunate. The emphasis on individual relations to inmates, inmate voluntarism, and non-routinized programs, as well as his role as chief disciplinarian, overextended the range of control of the assistant superintendent. Although Inland had less than one-fourth the number of employees of Mixter and two-thirds as many as Dick, and although its over-all departmental structure was similar to that of Mixter's, the lack of a highly routinized program led to continuous operating pressures on the assistant superintendent.

Milieu-treatment institutions operate on criteria that are more consistently applied throughout the institution than in either mixed-goal or individual-treatment institutions, in this respect resembling custodial institutions. But the milieu institution differs from the custodial institution in its attempt to rationalize greater areas of organizational activity, in the complex combination of personnel, and in the substantive bases of the decisions it makes.

Milton was divided into two major divisions, the business and maintenance division and the clinical division. Under the direction of a psychiatrist, the clinical division had responsibility for all activity with the inmates. The social service staff, which in multiple departmental structures usually gives direct service to clients but only consultant service to the rest of the staff, assumed responsibility for the supervision of the cottage staff. The social service staff and the cottage parents worked together on cottage committees to make decisions about the boys. The basic therapeutic role was not defined as a one-to-one relationship between a clinical staff member and a delinquent but was, theoretically, the relationship between the boy and all staff members with whom he had contact. But, although the school and vocational training areas were under the direction of the clinical director, they were not as fully incorporated into the unitary authority structure as the cottage area. The "dual-division" structure that operated at Milton permitted to a greater extent than a multiple-department sructure the centralized control over all activity in which inmates are involved. Personnel dealing with treatment were placed directly in control of the day-to-day operating staff of the institution.[11]

These patterns of departmentalization establish the official range of hierarchical positions in an institution, but they do not reveal the actual amount of power or influence that a group or individual may exercise. My first proposition deals with the distribution of power among executives.

In my analysis I was able to compare the staff members' perceptions of the distribution of power among executives within an institution as well as to compare the power of executives in similar positions in different institutions.[12] Employees of the institutions

[11] In "The Reduction of Role Conflict in Institutional Staff," *Children*, V (1958), 65–69, Lloyd Ohlin has described a similar structural development in a girls' training institution; caseworkers were given administrative responsibility for the management of the cottages. One result of such a change is to partially shift conflict from an interrole to an intrarole level.

[12] Several kinds of data were collected in all five institutions. (1) Historical records and institutional publications were examined. (2) Loosely structured observations of organizational practices and conferences were carried out over a two-week period in each institution. (3) Extended interviews with members of the executive core (the superintendent, assistant superintendent, and heads of major departments) were conducted. (4) Questionnaires were distributed to all staff members, yielding a response rate of 85 per cent or more in

were asked to rate the amount of influence possessed by each of the members of the executive core.[13] Table 2 presents the proportion of staff attributing "high influence" to each of them.[14]

In Dick and Regis, the more custodial institutions, a large proportion of the staff thought only the superintendent had "a great deal of say," while in Mixter, Milton, and Inland, the staff believed that the superintendent and at least one other member of the executive core had a great deal of influence. In fact, the data in Table 2 indicate that at Inland and Milton a larger proportion of the staff regarded the assistant superintendant rather than the superintendent as having "a great deal of influence." These data add credibility to our first hypothesis. It may be noted that both the school principals and social service directors were consistently perceived as having little power.

One might ask, however, if these findings necessarily related to the goals and departmental structures of these institutions or were merely accidentally associated in these institutions. The personalities of the superintendents, the size of the institutions, and —in the case of Regis—the structure of the religious order were variables which might have contributed to the great amount of power attributed to superintendents at Dick and Regis and to the smaller amount of power attributed to them at Mixter, Milton, and Inland.

In accounting for the magnitude of difference between the treatment and custodial

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED EXECUTIVE POWER: STAFF PERCEPTION OF HIGH INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE CORE

EXECUTIVES RATED	PER CENT OF HIGH INFLUENCE*				
	Dick	Regis	Mixter	Milton	Inland
Superintendent	79	100	59	52	62
Assistant director	34	11	23	65	81
Head of social service	11	0	19	12†	19
Head of cottage parents	10‡	§	52	26	3
Principal of school	15	§	8	7	5
Total no.	(62)	(9)	(155)	(108)	(37)

* Percentages are given for the highest point of a five-point scale ("A great deal of say").
† Business manager substituted for head of social service at *Milton*.
‡ Farm manager substituted for head of cottage parents at *Dick*.
§ No head of cottage parents or school principal at *Regis*.

---

each of the institutions. The interrelationship of measures and observations is stressed. In no case was a datum accepted as veridical when it did not jibe with other data.

[13] Respondents were asked: "In general, how much say or influence in the way——is run would you say each of the following individuals or groups has? (Put one check on each line.)" Respondents checked a five-point scale.

[14] To the extent that "real power" is overtly expressed, employee ratings of the power of executives is a legitimate reflection of the amount of power wielded. To the extent that power relations are masked or indirect, we would expect employee perception of power to be based on the actual amount of influence of the executive core, and power to be conceived of as a "whole"—as a general attribute. Herbert Simon ("Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX [1955], 431–51) and Nelson Polsby ("Community Power: Three Problems," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV [1959], 796–803) have both argued that a general influence rating may conceal the differentiated power wielded in different contexts. Nevertheless, a general measure of attributed power has some validity and has the merit of methodological simplicity.

superintendents one cannot ignore these factors. The small size of Regis minimized the need for delegation and decentralization of decision-making, while the particular personality of the superintendent at Dick contributed to the staff perception of his role as highly concentrated in power.

While the personality attributes of the superintendents of custodial institutions contributed to the image of their high power, the converse seemed to be true in the treatment institutions. The superintendent at Milton felt that his training did not qualify him to make decisions about the treatment of children, leading him to defer often in judgment to the professionals on his staff. On the other hand, although Inland's director had training that might be considered appropriate, his interpersonal relations were characteristically very tense, and the assistant director instead gained the allegiance and loyalty of the staff.

To say that such factors minimize the magnitude of the difference in patterns of power between custodial and treatment institutions is not to vitiate the over-all pattern. The creation of more than one office with authority in treatment institutions necessitates a wider distribution of power. To act effectively each department must have the right to make some decisions, and professional treatment personnel in particular must be given more power. Furthermore, the superintendents may have to spend a good deal of time on matters not directly concerned with the internal operation of the institution, such as the relationship of the institution to the community, etc.

If executive power is shared in mixed-goal or treatment institutions, among whom is it shared? The clinical director and assistant director at Milton and Inland, respectively, were attributed high power by the staff, while at Mixter the head of the cottage-life department was perceived as the second in command. The attribution of high power to the clinical director at Milton and to the assistant director at Inland was in line with their official status, and both attempted to implement treatment goals. But the division of power between the superintendent and the head of cottage life at Mixter did not correspond to their official status, and might appear to have indicated a bifurcation of power between rehabilitational and custodial goals, the superintendent representing rehabilitative programs and the head of cottage life custodial programs. But this separation was more apparent than real: although the superintendent claimed to be committed to rehabilitational goals, in practice he concentrated his attention on benign custodial aims. Moreover, the head of cottage life, though custodially oriented, was opposed to using means which he considered overly repressive. In fact, there was little conflict between the superintendent and the head of cottage life; the superintendent felt that the head of cottage life was doing a much better job than two social workers who had previously held the position and "couldn't stand the pressure." Contrary to my expectations, the two men's approaches were not so far apart—I underestimated the pressures for consensus among major executives.

The attribution of high power to the head of cottage life at Mixter was due to his official position inasmuch as the training director was officially the second in command (52 per cent attributed "a great deal of say" to the head of cottage life, whereas only 23 per cent attributed "a great deal of say" to the training director). Power was given to the head of cottage life because he guaranteed control and containment in a situation in which repressive sanctions were banned. The head of cottage life and his assistants acted as roving police, backing up the cottage parents in their decisions and controlling situations beyond the scope of cottage parent power. Of course, the director of cottage life also had to co-ordinate a staff of approximately seventy men. But the problems of co-ordination were relatively routine and were partly delegated to the assistant cottage-life supervisors. By itself, the role of co-ordinator would not have called for grant-

ing a high degree of power to the head of cottage life.

I have argued that the clinical director at Milton, the assistant director at Inland, and the head of cottage life at Mixter were in particularly central positions for organizational control; but except for discussing the position of the training director at Mixter, I have not analyzed why other executives were not attributed high power. In all of the institutions the school principal and the director of social service influenced the over-all operation of the institution only by their consultant relationship to the superintendent or assistant superintendent. Although they could influence considerably the operation of their own departments, their influence on the rest of the institution was indirect.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the principals or the social service directors were powerless or that their positions did not vary somewhat from institution to institution. Approximately 50 per cent of the staff at Mixter and Inland perceived the heads of social service to have "a great deal of say" or "considerable say," the highest two categories in our list of alternatives. Field observations indicated that the assistant director at Inland relied on the head of social service for many clinical decisions, while the superintendent at Mixter consulted more with the head of social service than he did with the training director. The influence of the social service director, especially at Inland, was related to the importance of his position for pursuing treatment aims.

THE BALANCE OF POWER OF STAFF GROUPS

The balance of power among cottage parents, social service workers, and teachers, like the balance of power among executives, is a function of the goals of the organization. I hypothesized that the influence of social service personnel is likely to be higher in *treatment institutions* than in *custodial institutions*, while the power of cottage parents is likely to be higher in custodial than in individual treatment institutions. Since the milieu institution requires a team organization, a more general sharing of power is likely.

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED GROUP POWER: STAFF PERCEPTION OF HIGH INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL SERVICE WORKERS, COTTAGE PARENTS, AND TEACHERS

Groups Rated	Per Cent of High Influence				
	Dick	Regis	Mixter	Milton	Inland
Social service	39	22	49	76	76
Cottage parents	50	33	34	70	8
Teachers	23	*	11	17	19
Total no.	(62)	(9)	(155)	(108)	(37)

* No teachers at Regis.

To measure the power of the various groups in making decisions about clients, I asked the staff of each institution to judge the amount of influence cottage parents, social service workers, and teachers had in making judgments about how the boys should be handled (Table 3).[15]

The statistical differences clearly indicate that a larger proportion of the staff attributes high influence to social service workers

[15] Respondents were asked: "How much influence do each of the following groups have in making decisions about *how the boys should be handled?*" Respondents checked a four-point scale.

in treatment institutions than in custodial institutions. The smallest proportion attributes high influence to social service workers at Dick and Regis, a larger proportion attributes high influence to them at Mixter, and the largest proportion attributes high influence to social service workers at Inland and Milton. Cottage parent power tends to decline as we move from custodial to individual-treatment institutions; however, the cottage-committee structure at Milton, where cottage parents shared in decision-making, led to the cottage parents there being thought of as having high influence by a larger proportion of the staff than at any of the other institutions.

On the other hand, teachers were attributed a relatively low amount of influence in all the institutions. Data in Table 2 indicate that the school principals also were seen as having little influence in the institutions, suggesting that the academic schools had little over-all authority or control in operating the institutions. The school personnel were not central to the definition of institutional philosophy and were restricted to an unproblematic area of institutional operation.

It was originally anticipated that within custodial institutions a larger proportion of the total staff would believe the cottage parents have high influence. This was not so perceived by the social service staff. As it turned out, only 11 per cent more of the staff at Dick perceived the cottage parents to have "a great deal of influence," while at Mixter 15 per cent attributed more power to social service than to cottage parents. Two factors may account for my incorrect prediction. First, as low-paid, low-status staff at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, the cottage parents tended to make decisions within the bounds of discretion set by the administrators. Although cottage parents in custodial institutions had more discretion about discipline and more influence on the discharge of inmates, they did not formulate basic rules and procedures. On the other hand, even in the custodial institutions the higher salaried and more educated social service staff members, although they did not make decisions about individual boys, were able to influence the executives in the formulation of policy.

Second, although in the more custodial institutions cottage parents had high discretion to discipline and grade the boys, this power was shared with other staff members who worked with the boys. At Dick, any person who worked with the boys was allowed to paddle or punish them. At Mixter, while the cottage parent gave each boy 50 per cent of his monthly grade (which was the basis on which he was discharged), teachers and detail supervisors made up the rest of the grade. By contrast, at Milton the cottage committee meted out serious discipline, and the cottage parent on duty had a range of possible sanctions not available to teachers or supervisors.

It is interesting to note that the over-all amount of power attributed to all staff groups was higher at Milton than at any other institution, and lowest at Dick and Regis. (The question permitted all groups to be ranked high, under the assumption that more or less power may be mobilized, depending on both the number of decisions and the number of people involved in decisions in an organization.) This may indicate that milieu treatment requires more decisions and involves more people than custodial institutions, leading to a higher actualization of potential power within the organization.

The data in Table 3 quite clearly indicate the power of social service workers in treatment institutions. Role definitions, however, vary in different institutions so that power expresses itself or is used in very different ways. In the individual-treatment institution the authority of social service is based to a large extent on the staff perception of the prevailing treatment philosophy and on the social service workers' control over decisions made about individual clients. In the milieu institution, although so-

cial service workers can make many decisions, they also are required to work through and with other staff members.

In Table 4 are given the proportions of (*a*) all staff and (*b*) cottage parents alone at Milton and Inland who viewed social service advice as helpful.[16] The data clearly indicate the utility of social service to other personnel at Milton. The entente that existed between cottage parents and social service workers in the milieu institution was especially strong; over twice the percentage of cottage parents at Milton as compared with cottage parents at Inland found social service guidance to be of help. Although the ratio of clinical personnel to other personnel was approximately the same at Milton and Inland, the constant attempt of clinical personnel at Milton to accomplish their aims through the milieu program led them to be useful resources for others.

Through a comparative study of five institutions for delinquents I have explored the effects of goals and related methods on organizational control structures. After describing the five sample institutions and their departmental structures my analysis based on questionnaire and field data has supported two propositions. (1) As organizational complexity increases and organization-community relations lead to greater external commitments by the superintendent, the chief executive must share power. In a mixed-goal institution it is likely that power is shared with a person with basically custodial aims, while in institutions with dominant treatment goals power must be given to a person concerned with treatment goals. (2) The balance of power among groups is also a function of organizational goals: social service personnel acquire great influence in treatment institutions, while cottage parent influence is less, except when the major focus of the institution is on the group-living situation, as in the milieu institution.

This analysis has assumed that the structure of control evolves to solve problems of goal implementation; without an organizational structure to support and control staff behavior, organizational objectives are not met. My analysis has been primarily static, comparing institutions at one point in time. A study of any one institution would show that goals are often in flux as forces internal and external to the organization press for redefinitions or extensions of emphasis. Moreover, in correctional institutions movement toward greater treatment or custodial emphasis brings about opposite pressures from groups with divergent perspectives. Even though the basic pattern of departmentalization may be relatively stable, an ebb and flow of power among groups and among executives is likely to occur as compensating policies and mechanisms are introduced.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL STAFF AND OF COTTAGE PARENTS AT MILTON AND INLAND PERCEIVING HIGH DEGREE OF "HELPFULNESS" OF SOCIAL SERVICE ADVICE

Group	Milton	Inland
Total staff:		
Total no......	108	37
Per cent.....	61	43
Cottage parents:		
Total no......	35	7
Per cent.....	71	29

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

[16] Respondents were asked: "How much help are the people in social service in advising how to work with the boys?" Three alternatives were used

ROLE STRAIN AND THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY IN RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS[1]

WILLIAM M. EVAN

ABSTRACT

Organizational pressures are found to be highest in the development department of an industrial research organization, next highest in the applied department, and lowest in the basic research department. A test of the hypothesis that there is a positive and linear relationship between organizational pressures and role strains yielded the unexpected finding that there is more role strain in the applied department than in either basic research or development. To explain this finding, the norm of reciprocity is examined in relation to the functions of the three departments. The dysfunctions of the norm of reciprocity and the problem of role strain in research organizations imbedded in different institutional contexts are considered. Three role models, whose underlying norms bear a different relation to the norm of reciprocity, are analyzed: the employer-employee relationship, the professional-client, and the patron-artist

In any formal organization, the goals as reflected in the system of functional differentiation result in a distinctive pattern of role differentiation. In turn, role differentiation, whether viewed hierarchically or horizontally, leads to what Mannheim has called "perspectivistic thinking," namely, incumbency in a particular status induces a corresponding set of perceptions, attitudes, and values.[2] In an organization, as in a society as a whole, status occupants tend to develop a commitment to subunit goals and tasks—a commitment that may be dysfunctional from the viewpoint of total organizational goals. In other words, "perspectivistic thinking" may interfere with the co-ordination of effort toward the accomplishment of total organizational goals, thus generating organizational pressures to insure adequate levels of performance.

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the differential distribution of such pressures in a research organization and their relation to role strains. It should be emphasized that the focus of this paper is on the ideas that emerged in the course of research rather than on the specific findings. The data to be presented are admittedly fragmentary. Their chief value, as we shall see, is not as evidence for the testing of hypotheses, but as a point of departure for what may prove to be a fruitful way of exploring the relationship between role strain and the norm of reciprocity in research organizations.

ORGANIZATIONAL PRESSURES

The research on which this paper is based was conducted in a relatively small industrial chemical research organization which is part of a large chemical company. Three structural components of this research organization will be the focus of our attention: a basic research department, an applied research department, and a development department.[3] These three units

[1] Revised version of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York City, December, 1960. The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to the National Institute of Mental Health for a grant that facilitated the research reported in this paper. He is grateful to Mrs. Rita Weisbrod for many valuable comments.

[2] Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1936), pp. 51, 91–96, 239, 244.

[3] The terms used here refer to the following definitions:

Basic research.—Includes original investigations for the advancement of scientific knowledge that do not have specific commercial objectives, although such investigations may be in fields of present or potential interest to the reporting company.

Applied research.—Includes investigations di-

may be conceived as constituting points on a continuum of distance from the primary organizational goal, with the development unit being closest to the organizational goal and the basic research unit being farthest from it. The primary goal of the research organization is presumably to assist the manufacturing divisions of the parent corporation in producing chemical products at a profit. Accordingly, we expected that organizational pressures—which may be defined as efforts on the part of management to insure a level of performance consonant with organizational requirements—would be higher the more proximate the unit's position is to the organizational goal, that is highest on the development unit, next highest on the applied research unit, and lowest on the basic research unit.

Organizational pressures may take various forms (such as determining the duration of projects, setting deadlines for projects, or allocating of research funds). The first of two crude indicators of organizational pressures available to us is the proportion of projects in a department initiated and sponsored by the manufacturing divisions as compared with the research organization itself. Sponsorship of projects by manufacturing divisions may engender greater pressures to produce a "useful" result in a given time than does sponsorship by the research organization itself. As shown in Table 1, the development unit, in contrast to the basic research unit, is engaged almost exclusively in work initiated and sponsored by the manufacturing divisions of the parent corporation, whereas the basic unit devotes one-half of its project time to studies initiated and sponsored by the research organization itself; the applied research department—at least in this particular organization—has virtually the same proportion of its projects as the basic research unit sponsored by the research organization.

The second indicator of organizational pressure is the mean number of projects per chemist per unit of time. Admittedly, projects differ in degree of complexity and amount of time required for completion.

TABLE 1

PROJECTS SPONSORED BY MANUFACTURING DIVISIONS AND THE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, BY DEPARTMENT, 1958*

Department and Source of Sponsorship	No.	Per Cent
Basic research:		
Research organization	12	50
Management divisions	12	50
Applied research:		
Research organization	23	48
Management divisions	25	52
Development:		
Research organization	9	15
Management divisions	51	85

* Source: Administrative records of the research organization

Bearing this qualification in mind, the development department again appears to be subject to a greater degree of organizational pressure than either of the other departments: the mean number of projects per chemist in 1958 was 1.7 for the development department, 1.5 for the applied department, and 1.3 for the basic research department. In short, our expectation that organizational pressures would be differentially distributed in the three functionally distinct departments appears to be borne out.

ROLE STRAINS

Role strain, according to Goode, is the "felt difficulty in fulfilling role obliga-

rected to the discovery of new scientific knowledge that have specific commercial objectives with respect to products or processes.

Development.—Includes technical activities of a non-routine nature concerned with translating research findings or other scientific knowledge into products or processes. Development does not include routine technical services to customers or other items excluded from the above definition of research and development (National Science Foundation, *Funds for Research and Development in Industry 1957* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960], p. viii).

tions."[4] As in the case of organizational pressures, role strains may also take various forms. For example, some types of role-set[5] relations may entail conflicting obligations; and inconsistent rank orderings on various dimensions of a role, such as autonomy, prestige, rewards—that is, "status incongruency"—may engender tension.

We shall focus only on those role strains that have their source in organizational pressures, our hypothesis being that there is a positive and linear relationship between organizational pressures and role strains. The first of two measures of role strain consists of conventional morale indicators, such as absenteeism, turnover, and accident rate. The distribution of role strain, as measured by these indicators, for the three departments is shown in Table 2. The applied research unit is consistently higher in its rates of accidents, absenteeism, lateness, and labor turnover than the other two units, the basic research and development units being approximately equal on the morale measure of role strain. Thus, our prediction of a linear relationship between organizational pressure and role strain as measured by these indicators was not confirmed; the actual relationship appears to be roughly curvilinear—using the terms "linear" and "curvilinear" very loosely since our data are not metrical and we have a "sample" of one of the three types of departments.

TABLE 2

MORALE INDICATORS, BY DEPARTMENT, 1958*

MORALE INDICATOR	MEAN NUMBER		
	Basic Research ($N=18$)	Applied Research ($N=31$)	Development ($N=35$)
Accidents	0 06	0 23	0 14
Absences (days)	4 33	6 53	6 17
Punctuality:			
Late arrivals	14 44	19 68	15.03
Early departures	2 05	9.06	1 77
Turnover (dismissals and resignations)	0 06	0 45	0 26

* Source: Administrative records of the research organization.

When we turn to the second measure of role strain—the degree of discrepancy between a scientist's actual research project and his ideal research project—our data become even more fragmentary: we are dealing here with only fifteen chemists divided into three subgroups, one for each department. Each chemist was asked to give a technical description of the major research project on which he was currently working and a technical description of his ideal research project, assuming no organizational limitations on time and money. The pairs of statements of actual and ideal research projects were compared and rated independently by three judges, all of whom hold doctorates in chemistry and have several years of research experience. The ratings were in terms of what is considered basic research in chemistry, and scored in one of three ways: Whether the actual project and the ideal project are the same or equal in such terms; whether the actual project is closer than the ideal project to basic research; or whether the ideal project is closer than the actual project to basic research. We assumed that either of the two forms of divergence between actual and ideal research would indicate role strain

The statements of nine chemists were rated as congruent; those of the remaining six were rated as incongruent—from which we infer that the latter are subject to the task-dimension of role strain. The cases of role strain distributed themselves with the mode at the department of applied research —one case (out of three) in basic research, four cases (out of seven) in applied research, and one case (out of four) in development. Given the small sample sizes, we may merely suggest that a higher pro-

[4] William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (August, 1960), 483.

[5] Cf. Robert K. Merton, "The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory," *British Journal of Sociology*, VIII (June, 1957), 106–20.

portion of chemists in the applied research department have role strain than do those in either basic research or development.

A possible interpretation of the role strain of the chemist in the applied research department is that he may subjectively experience a greater amount of relative deprivation compared to members of the basic research and development departments. On the one hand, since his training is roughly comparable to that of the chemists in the basic research department, he may wish to pursue problems more deeply than he does. On the other hand, although he is expected to obtain research results of potential value to the company, his work is not as close to the goal of the organization as is that of the chemist in the development department; nor does he generally learn of the use to which his results are put by the manufacturing divisions. Hence, he may feel deprived both of the opportunity of engaging in basic research as well as of the gratification of contributing directly and visibly to the accomplishment of the mission of the organization.

We may also liken the position of the applied researcher in the industrial research organization to that of a foreman in a production organization: Both occupy an intermediate position that has conflicting or ambiguous expectations and orientations. The foreman, as the lowest man on the managerial ladder, hardly feels part of the management; nor does he feel part of the group of workers. Analogously, the applied researcher feels that he is not part of either the basic research or the development group.[6]

The frequent inadequacies of existing theory and the difficulties of applying it to the solution of novel and practical problems suggest that the task of the applied researcher is fraught with more ambiguity than the tasks of those engaged in either basic research or development. If inquiry establishes that applied researchers—in general and not only in this particular research organization—perceive greater ambiguity in their task than either basic researchers or those engaged in development work, this would throw some light on the finding of greater role strain among this group of chemists.

THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY

The two possible interpretations set forth above of the finding that applied chemists exhibit more role strain than either basic research or development chemists may be formulated in terms of the "norm of reciprocity" cogently analyzed by Gouldner.[7] For the applied researcher, the norm of reciprocity as it pertains to his relationship with his employer may be more salient than for either the basic research or the development chemist.

All institutionalized role relationships, whether employer-employee, husband-wife, parent-child, teacher-student, etc., are grounded in a set of mutual expectations. As part of conforming with one another's normative expectations, the role partners share in common a moral norm of reciprocity. This norm obliges Ego to give benefits to Alter from whom he has received benefits.

Hobbes includes reciprocity as one of his "laws of nature."[8] And according to Westermarck, reciprocity is a universal norm. "To requite a benefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is probably everywhere, at least under certain circumstances, regarded as a duty."[9] There is

[6] Cf. Burleigh B. Gardner and William F. Whyte, "The Man in the Middle: Position and Problems of the Foremen," *Applied Anthropology,* IV (Spring, 1945), 1–28; Fritz J. Roethlisberger, "The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk," *Harvard Business Review,* XXIII (Spring, 1945), 283–98; Donald E. Wray, "Marginal Men of Industry: The Foreman," *American Journal of Sociology,* LIV (January, 1949), 298–301.

[7] Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," *American Sociological Review,* XXV (April, 1960), 161–78.

[8] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Parts 1 and 2 (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p 125.

[9] Quoted in Gouldner, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

obviously no need to view reciprocity as an instinct. Rather, it may be viewed as a tendency generated by the common social and cultural attributes of all human role relationships. To the extent that this norm is internalized by members of a society in all their role relationships, it is obviously an important mechanism of social stability. This, however, does not preclude the possibility that the norm of reciprocity may under some conditions have dysfunctions in some role relationships, which possibility Gouldner recognized but did not examine in his analysis.[10]

In the case of the scientist engaged in basic research in industrial organizations the goals of the role partners may be *perceived* as divergent even if in actuality they are not. The scientist, focused on contributing to scientific knowledge per se, becomes cognizant of the fact that this does not contribute—at least not always in the immediate or forseeable future—to the principal goal of the company, which is profit. Accordingly, he may feel that he is not "earning his keep." To counterbalance this disquieting feeling, the basic researcher may seek refuge in his status as a member of a scientific community with its norms of contributing to the body of scientific knowledge. In addition, to reduce his dissonance, accentuated by his awareness that he is in effect not conforming to the moral norm of reciprocity, he is impelled to "adjust" his research to increase the chances of a "useful end result" emerging, thereby reciprocating the benefits bestowed upon him by his employer.

This process of "adjusting" one's research interests to insure compliance with the norm of reciprocity may prove more difficult for the applied research chemist than for the basic research chemist. The former may not be more socialized into the value of providing his employer with a service than the latter, yet his work is supposed to show more promise of a "payoff." In view of the nature of his training, he may have a degree of identification with the scientific community comparable to that of the basic researcher; hence, the norm of reciprocity confronts him with a conflict of loyalties to competing reference groups: the scientific community versus the employer or employing organization. The chemist engaged in development work probably experiences no such difficulties in his role performance. His task is explicitly structured to promote the employer's interests and hence he is not likely to perceive the norm of reciprocity as imposing any burden on him. The different responses to the norm of reciprocity appear to be a function of the type of role a scientist performs vis-à-vis his employer.

ALTERNATIVE ROLE MODELS

Sociologists studying research organizations tend to conceptualize the position of the scientist as a "professional" whose goals and values are in conflict with those of his status as a "bureaucratic employee."[11] This, however, implies that the scientist has a professional-client relationship with his employer, which is not true of the scientist interested in basic research, though it may be true of the engineer and of the scientist engaged in applied research and development. For, by definition, a professional is one who provides a service based on established knowledge to someone—namely, a client—who requests his specialized service. However, the scientist interested solely in creating new knowledge, who is employed by an industrial research organization, is in fact not performing the role of a "professional" vis-à-vis the impersonal client, the organization. Only if he abdicates his scientific role of

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[11] See, e.g., Simon Marcson, *The American Scientist in Industry* (Princeton, N.J.: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1960), David N. Solomon, "Professional Persons in Bureaucratic Organizations," in *Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry, 15–17 April, 1957* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp 253-66; and the special issue on the administration of research in *Administrative Science Quarterly* Vol. I (December, 1956).

discovering new knowledge and seeks to *apply* existing scientific knowledge to the solution of the organization's problems is he acting as a "professional" with reference to his employer, the client. In all probability, a substantial proportion of scientists employed in industry are engaged in activities which might be characterized as applied research and hence are actually providing a "professional" service to their client. An even higher proportion of scientists are probably engaged in development work and perform a role akin to that of an "employee" vis-à-vis an "employer" in that they are "assigned" projects with detailed specifications as to the end product desired, and have no autonomy with respect to the research process. And only a relatively small proportion of scientists are conducting basic research in industry.[12]

Neither the "employer-employee" relationship nor the "professional-client" relationship appears to be a functional role model for the basic research scientist employed in industry. Since the number of such scientists in industry is increasing as the size of basic research budgets grows from year to year, a clarification of this role relationship is of practical as well as theoretical significance.

An alternative role model for the basic researcher in industry is that of the "patron-artist" relationship. This model, as we shall see, seems more functional than either that of the "employer-employee" relationship or that of the "professional-client" relationship.

The ideal-typical patron-artist relationship is one in which the patron affords the artist the freedom to pursue, in his own manner, his artistic impulses. The conception of "an autonomous, non-utilitarian art enjoyable in itself" or "art for art's sake"—already familiar to the Greeks but forgotten in the Middle Ages—was rediscovered in the Renaissance.[13] To be sure, patrons in the Renaissance and thereafter have tried to influence the work of the artist—against the latter's wishes—in a variety of ways. Since the Renaissance patrons have tended to deviate in at least two directions from the ideal-typical patron-artist relationship: They have assumed either the status of an "employer" vis-à-vis the artist or that of a "client," so to speak. In both cases these forms of deviation from the ideal type impair the autonomy of the artist. In the status of an "employer," the patron feels that he has the right to specify precisely the end product of the work of the artist by virtue of his formal or informal contractual relationship. He believes that he is entitled to dictate not only what the employee should do but how he should do it. Indeed, in the pre-Renaissance period, artists had a status comparable to employees; in fact, they were commonly called "artisans" rather than "artists." And their work was closely regulated by the dictates of the Church and the guilds.[14]

In the status of a "client," the patron throws himself, as it were, on the mercy of the artist in the hope that the artist, in the capacity of a competent "professional," will provide him with the best possible service. He trusts that the artist can discover what he, the client, really wishes and needs. In this type of relationship, the artist also has to relinquish his own independent artistic

[12] These imprecise statements are due to the absence of data on the distribution by function of the 149,000 scientists employed in industry. They are inferred from some data on the allocation of funds in industry to basic research (3 per cent), applied research (21 per cent), and development (75 per cent); and from some very gross information on the functions performed by scientists grouped together with engineers. For the source with respect to allocation of funds see National Science Foundation, *Funds for Research and Development in Industry 1957* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. ix; for the source regarding functions performed by scientists and engineers see National Science Foundation, *Scientific and Technical Personnel in American Industry* (Washington, D.C.. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 11.

[13] Arnold Hauser, *The Social History of Art* (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), II, 74.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 51–84. See also Germain Bazin, *A History of Art* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 198.

judgments and impulses on behalf of the aesthetic needs—as he divines them—of the client.

Clearly, the ideal-typical "patron-artist" relationship, in contrast to the "employer-employee" and "client-professional" relationships, fits the requirements of the basic researcher in industry. In all likelihood, many industrial research organizations accord scientists the status of "professional" vis-à-vis a "client"; some persist in assigning them the status of an "employee" vis-à-vis an "employer"; a few are experimenting with a new role relationship which we may interpret as being modeled after the kind of patron-artist relationship we have discussed —a role relationship in which the basic research scientist, like the artist, is granted the right by his patron, the industrial organization, to pursue his research in accordance with his own scientific interests and standards.

In some large industrial laboratories, all three analytically distinguishable work relationships may be found. The "employer-employee" relationship may apply not only to manual and clerical employees but also to engineers and scientists engaged in development work; the "professional-client" relationship may apply to legal and medical personnel as well as to applied researchers; and the "patron-scientist" relationship to those engaged in basic research.

The status sequences of scientists employed in industrial research organizations may entail movement from basic research to applied research and thence to development, or from the role of a "scientist" to a "professional" and thence to an "employee." The frequency of different status sequences of scientists in industrial research organizations is, of course, an empirical question. Barring movement out of research into administrative work, a one-step sequence from basic research to applied research or from applied research to development is probably more common than a two-step sequence from basic research to applied research and from applied research to development. Some "virtuosos" may resolve their role strains and conform to the norm of reciprocity by alternating in their performance of the roles of "scientist," "professional," and "employee."

Each of these three ideal-typical work relationships is presumably governed by a distinctive and dominant norm: In the employer-employee relationship, the norm of obedience to a superior is fundamental; in the client-professional relationship, it is the norm of service to a client; and in the patron-patronee relationship, the governing norm is that of autonomy for the patronee to pursue his work as he sees fit. The norms underlying each of these role models stand in a different relationship to the norm of reciprocity: The norm of obedience in the employer-employee relationship is compatible with the norm of reciprocity; the norm of service to a client in the client-professional relationship intensifies the bindingness of the norm of reciprocity, as our findings on the applied research chemist suggest; and the norm of autonomy in the patron-patronee relationship is incompatible with the norm of reciprocity. The incompatibility between the norm of autonomy and the norm of reciprocity points to a condition under which the alleged universal norm of reciprocity may prove dysfunctional.

A plausible hypothesis may be advanced that the norm of reciprocity in the industrial employer-scientist relationship functions as a mechanism for diverting research energies from basic research to applied research. If this hypothesis is confirmed, it would point to a built-in pressure for the erosion of basic research in industry. Since the amount of basic research conducted in industry is now relatively small, but growing because of technological requirements and developments,[15] the pressure upon the basic research scientist stemming from the

[15] For data on the percentage increase in funds of basic research in industry during 1953–58 see National Science Foundation, "Funds for Research and Development Performance in American Industry, 1958," *Review of Data on Research and Development*, No. 20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960).

norm of reciprocity may become increasingly problematic and dysfunctional for science as well as industry.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF ROLE STRAIN

The problem of role strains of the scientist and of the potential dysfunctions of the norm of reciprocity is very likely not confined to the industrial research context. In other institutional contexts, academic and government, similar problems may arise. The university scientist who applies for a grant to a public or private foundation may "custom tailor" his project to what he takes to be the practical or applied interests of his prospective grantor or patron. After receiving the grant, he may feel an obligation to express his gratitude to the foundation by focusing on the applied rather than on the theoretical aspects of his research, though the latter may in fact be of more interest to him. In a series of conferences on interdisciplinary team research in social science, it was recently observed:

> Often the researcher fears that the person or organization making the grant will be annoyed that he is not working on the problem as set forth in the application for funds. . . . It was agreed that the grantor has a right to know what is going on in the research and to exercise a modicum of control over it. . . . And when an investigator begins a search for funds, he gives up some of his freedom.[16]

In a study of research in an academic setting, Bennis found that a university research group financed on a year-to-year basis by a private foundation was "market-oriented," whereas another research group with a four-year contract was "task-oriented." As one member of the former research group put it:

> The main problem here is doing research and justifying ourselves to the foundation. The thing that's annoyed me the most is that we spend so much time looking at our navel without doing anything—except justifying our existence.[17]

Similarly, government scientists, supported by taxpayers and answerable yearly to Congress when it makes its appropriations, may feel that they should "justify their existence" by producing something of practical value. Moreover, the specific missions of the parent agencies of government laboratories, whether it be in the field of health, defense, agriculture, etc., may tend to restrict the selection of research problems.[18]

Judging from an unpublished report by an official of a government-granting agency on the state of a particular field of science in Europe, this problem is by no means unknown there.

> The scientist in Europe builds his academic career by dedicating himself early to an established institute or institute director. He works his way through the ranks, always at the service of the director. He cultivates the friendship of other institute directors, thereby hoping to establish himself in the good graces of those who will pass upon his application for promotion and tenure.

This suggests a guildlike, master-journeyman relationship which requires the scientist to express his fealty to the institute director. In this feudal atmosphere, we would also expect to observe instances of wholly extraneous considerations brought to bear on the selection and conduct of research. The scientist is here enmeshed in a social system in which the norm of reciprocity is crucial to his continuing role as a scientist.

CONCLUSION

There are some signs of progress toward the institutionalization of the role model of the "patron-artist" for the employer-scientist and the grantor-scientist relationship.

[16] Margaret Luszki, *Interdisciplinary Team Research Methods and Problems* (New York: New York University Press, 1958), pp. 283–84.

[17] Warren G. Bennis, "The Effect on Academic Goods of Their Market," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXII (July, 1956), 30.

[18] Cf. Allen V. Astin, "Basic Research in Government Laboratories," in Dael Wolfle (ed.), *Symposium on Basic Research* (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1959), pp. 154–55.

For example, the National Science Foundation is by federal mandate interested in the advancement of basic research. Unlike other federal agencies concerned with the promotion of science, this foundation has no specific mission other than the advancement of basic research. Recognition of the need for freedom to pursue research without interference is also expressed in the Public Health Service, as evidenced by the following statement of two of its officials that the investigator "must also be free in the use of the funds granted to change his research as desired, to permit follow-up of any new and promising leads. Public Health Service research grant policy does permit this sort of freedom and encourages the investigator to use the research funds for the most important research purposes he determines."[19] Both of these public foundations have recently begun to award relatively long-term research grants.[20] Similarly, some private foundations, such as the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, have initiated a program of flexible grants to promising scientists without regard to the merits of the projects to be undertaken.[21]

A small though increasing number of industrial organizations are evidently experimenting with programs of basic research—that is, with acting as a patron to the scientist. To be sure, only the larger and financially more secure corporations can afford such a venture, since the return on such an investment is uncertain and remote in time.

The further institutionalization of the role model of the "patron-artist" for the employer-scientist and the grantor-scientist relationship would probably reduce organizational pressures on the scientist and, in turn, reduce his role strains. As progress is made toward a social redefinition of the role relationship of the scientist to his employer or grantor, the potentially dysfunctional consequences for basic research, due to particular social structures, will diminish. The crystallization of the new "patron-artist" role model would probably throw in relief the old role model of "professional-client," thereby possibly facilitating the socialization of the applied researcher who, in discharging his "professional" obligations to his client, would thus experience less role strain.

School of Industrial Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

[19] Quoted in Alan C. Ronkin, "The Administrative Process of Contract and Grant Research," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I (December, 1956), 292.

[20] Small wonder that the Public Health Service and the National Science Foundation have a highly prestigious standing among scientists. In an unpublished survey on attitudes toward sources of research funds, a non-random sample of eighty-nine prominent scientists were asked to rate the desirability of six sources of funds, assuming that all of them are willing to provide the desired support in the same amount and according to their present policies, as these are understood by the respondents. The resulting rank order was as follows: (1) National Science Foundation, (2) National Institutes of Health, (3) Rockefeller Foundation, (4) funds from your own institution, (5) American Cancer Society, (6) Atomic Energy Commission.

[21] Cf. Warren Weaver's Preface to Wolfle (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. xi–xii.

CAREERS, ORGANIZATION SIZE, AND SUCCESSION

LOUIS KRIESBERG

ABSTRACT

The analysis is based upon data from a national study of heads of public health and mental health programs at the state and local levels. Consistent with Grusky's findings, heads of large public health and of large mental health departments at the *state* level tend to have shorter tenure than heads of small departments. Although the positions are filled by political appointment, the professional requirements are sufficiently important that the mechanisms discussed by Grusky can operate. Furthermore, the kind of career line, itinerant or home guard, also is relevant; this helps explain the findings that at the *local* level length of tenure is not inversely related to organization size.

Grusky has presented evidence that "frequency of administrative succession at the top is directly related to size of firm."[1] Data collected in a recent National Opinion Research Center study make it possible to test this generalization for another kind of organization and occupational category and with different measures of organizational size and succession.[2] The NORC study was concerned with the relations between public health and mental health personnel and programs at the state and local level. The respondents were: (1) heads of state public health departments and heads of state community and/or institutional mental health programs, (2) heads of local (city, county, or regional) public health departments and heads of local mental health departments or centers, and (3) other state officials responsible for special public health, community-based mental health, and hospital-based mental health programs; these other state officials will not be considered in this research note.

Each respondent was asked how many persons he had under his direction and the number of years he has been in his present position. For the state and local heads, the number of persons under the respondent's direction is probably a good approximate measure of the size of the organization which he heads and will be used as such here. Grusky used the twenty-six largest and the twenty-seven smallest firms of the *Fortune* list of the five hundred largest corporations as his large and small firms. As a measure of succession, the number of years an official has been in his present position will be used here. Grusky used information showing whether or not there had been a change in the incumbents of key job titles in a ten-year period. Grusky's data pertain to top managers in large private firms; the data presented here refer to public officials in state and local public health and mental health departments.

Despite these differences in method and in organization and occupation being studied, the results among state public health and mental health heads are similar to those reported by Grusky. Heads of large public health or of large mental health departments tend to have been in their present position for a shorter period of time than are heads of small departments (see Table 1).

It might be argued that the tenure of the heads of these state programs or departments is affected by partisan politics and that in states with changing political party leadership tenure will be shorter; changing

[1] Oscar Grusky, "Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (November, 1961), 269.

[2] Louis Kriesberg, "Mental Health and Public Health Personnel and Programs: Their Relations in the Fifty States" (National Opinion Research Center, Report No. 83, 1962), see Vol. II, Appendix A, for a description of the selection of respondents. The original study was sponsored by the Professional Services Branch, National Institute of Mental Health, conducted under a contract with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health. I want to thank Seymour Warkov for his comments on reading this paper.

political leadership is more likely in urban states and they are also the ones which have large public health and mental health programs. As a measure of political party stability we may use the extent of single-party domination of the state legislature. Using this measure, it is true that in states with single-party-dominated legislatures, tenure of heads of these departments or programs is somewhat longer than in other states. Furthermore, mental health heads have fewer persons under their direction in states which have a single party dominating the legislature than do those in other states; but this is not true for heads of public health departments. In any case, holding party domination of the legislature constant, there is still clearly longer tenure in small departments than in large departments or programs (see Table 2).[8]

Thus far the evidence is remarkably consistent with the findings of management succession in large corporations: tenure is shorter, and presumably turnover is higher in large public health and mental health agencies than in small ones. The fact that we find this in the case of public officials who are trained in public health and mental health professions argues for the importance of organizational size as a determinant of the rate of succession of leadership. But additional considerations must be introduced to explain how this relationship functions. Apparently, the professional requirements for the public offices being considered here are sufficiently important that political appointment of the heads does not vitiate the relevance of organizational size as a determinant of the rate of succession. In this case, then, professionalization is a requisite for the operation of the mechanisms described by Grusky.

Another implication follows. The kind of professional career line which the heads of these departments tend to exhibit may also be relevant. Hughes has pointed out the importance of the "itinerant" and the "home-guard" career lines: "The home-guard are the people who make their careers with little or no itineracy; the itinerants progress by moving from one place or

TABLE 1

TENURE AND SIZE OF STATE ORGANIZATION

	State Organization Size			
	Public Health		Mental Health	
Tenure	Under 500 Persons	500 or More Persons	Under 500 Persons	500 or More Persons
Per cent less than five years...	34	44	36	60
Per cent five–nine years.....	17	39	28	30
Per cent ten or more years....	49	17	36	10
Total per cent............	100	100	100	100
No. of cases................	24	18	36	37

TABLE 2

TENURE, SIZE OF STATE ORGANIZATION, AND SINGLE-PARTY DOMINATION OF STATE LEGISLATURE (PER CENT WITH TEN OR MORE YEARS TENURE)

	State Organization Size			
	Public Health		Mental Health	
Party Composition of State Legislature*	Under 500 Persons	500 or More Persons	Under 500 Persons	500 or More Persons
Single party dominant.........	56 (9)	14 (7)	42 (17)	15 (13)
No single party dominant......	46 (13)	18 (11)	31 (16)	5 (21)

* Two states, with non-partisan elections, are omitted.

[8] Holding constant the respondents' age does not change the relationship between organization size and tenure.

institution to another."[4] Perhaps the larger departments are particularly likely to recruit itinerants—persons who have national reputations and who then continue to advance by moving to other places or institutions. If this is the case, the character of the career line meshes with the organizational requirements and they complement each other.

There is one kind of data collected in the NORC study which supports these interpretations. The officials were asked what they considered to be their major professional field. Most of the public health officials answered, "public health," and most of the mental health officials answered, "psychiatry"; but there were others who answered "administration." Let us assume that those who said administration are somewhat more likely to be itinerants—they are identifying themselves in terms of skills which are particularly transferable. Although this professional identification has other meanings, the analytical results are at least consistent with the inference being made. We find that heads of large mental health programs are more likely to say that their major professional field is administration than are heads of small mental health programs; there is no relationship in the case of public health officials and departments.[5] We also find that public health and mental health "administrators" have shorter tenure than non-administrators. Although some of the percentages are based upon few cases, it appears that this pattern persists if we hold organizational size constant in the case of public health departments, but not in the case of mental health programs and departments (see Table 3). There is, then, some indirect evidence that type of career line is relevant for explaining leadership succession.

Although the evidence concerning the relevance of career line is hardly overwhelming, the preceding discussion should prepare us for another set of findings. Among local public health officials, there is no relationship between organization size and tenure, and among local mental health heads, the relationship appears to be inverse from what we have seen at the state level; now tenure is somewhat longer in large organizations (see Table 4).[6]

We may conjecture that heads of local public health and mental health programs and departments are less likely to have itinerant careers than are heads of state departments or programs. Presumably, local heads are more likely than state ones to build up their local programs rather than move up in a bureaucratic ladder or move from one institution to another. There is some evidence that supports this interpretation. There is a tendency at least for local

TABLE 3

TENURE, SIZE OF STATE ORGANIZATION, AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTIFICATION (PER CENT WITH TEN OR MORE YEARS TENURE)

	State Organization Size			
	Public Health		Mental Health	
Professional Identification	Under 500 Persons	500 or More Persons	Under 500 Persons	500 or More Persons
Administrator	20 (5)	.. (4)	22 (9)	15 (20)
Non-administrators	58 (19)	21 (14)	41 (27)	6 (17)

[4] Everett Cherrington Hughes, "The Making of a Physician," *Human Organization*, XIV (Winter, 1955), 21–25; reprinted in E. C. Hughes, *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 129. For an analysis of the itinerant career line of city-managers, see George K. Floro, "Continuity in City-Manager Careers," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (November, 1955), 240–46.

[5] Large mental health programs are more likely to be institutional or combined institutional and communty mental health programs, rather than only community mental health programs.

[6] Holding constant the officials' age does not change the patterns.

public health heads to have longer tenures than their state level counterparts; for example, among local public health heads, 42 per cent have been in their present position for ten or more years; among the state public health heads, 35 per cent have had such a long tenure. Furthermore, fewer local heads give "administration" as their professional identification than do state heads. Thus, 21 per cent of the state heads of public health and 40 per cent of the state heads of mental health say "administration" is their major professional field; while 12 per cent of the local public health and 5 per cent of the local mental health heads say "administration." Again, as among state heads, local heads who consider administration their major professional field appear to be more likely to have short tenure in their present job compared to those who give another professional identification.[7]

It might be argued that the lack of relationship between organization size and tenure at the local level is due to the small size of all the organizations being considered; after all, we are calling thirty or more persons a "large" organization. Perhaps, when organizations are so small the mechanisms by which organization size affects rate of succession are no longer operative. There is one bit of evidence from the NORC study which supports the interpretation that the differences in career pattern between state and local levels rather than the differences in organization size account for the lack of relationship between organization size and tenure at the local level.

The local mental health heads are a heterogeneous category in terms of the kinds of organizations they direct. A few are heads of government bureaus or departments of mental health; the others are directors of mental health clinics or centers—some of which are associated with medical schools. We find that among the heads of government agencies, there is a tendency for heads of large organizations to have shorter tenure than do heads of small organizations (three out of four heads of organizations with thirty or more persons have been in their present position less than two years compared to one out of nine heads of small organizations; none of the heads of local government mental health agencies have been in their present position for ten or more years). Apparently, the itinerant career pattern is more typical of heads of government agencies than of directors of mental health centers or clinics. It is among the directors of such centers that we find a tendency for heads of large

TABLE 4

TENURE AND SIZE OF LOCAL ORGANIZATION

	Local Organization Size*			
	Public Health		Mental Health	
Tenure	Under 30 Persons	30 or More Persons	Under 30 Persons	30 or More Persons
Per cent less than five years..	43	31	56	47
Per cent five-nine years.	11	29	27	18
Per cent ten or more years...	46	40	17	35
Total per cent.......... ..	100	100	100	100
No. of cases...	(35)	(77)	(97)	(17)

* In the original study there are 240 local mental health and public health respondents; but 14 respondents who are not heads of departments or programs are excluded from this analysis.

[7] The number of "administrators" is very small; therefore, the findings must be interpreted cautiously. The percentage of each category of heads who have been in their present position for less than five years is as follows (the number of cases upon which the percentage is based is in parentheses): among local public health heads who are administrators, 67 per cent (6); among those who are not administrators, 54 per cent (108); among local mental health heads who are administrators, 54 per cent (13); and among those who are not administrators, 32 per cent (99).

organizations to have longer tenure than heads of small organizations.[8]

In conclusion, this secondary analysis indicates that the rate of succession among heads of organizations is directly related to organization size in at least certain public agencies as well as in private corporations. The analysis also suggests a possible modification of the explanation of this relationship based upon the assumptions that "greater size necessitates increased bureaucratization and this, in turn, increases the likelihood that succession will be rationally treated by being routinized."[9] Perhaps the career patterns of the occupants of such leadership positions also affects the rate of succession. In certain kinds of organizations or industries, such personnel may be more or less likely to expect to move about in order to advance and to think this is appropriate.[10] It might be conjectured, and I feel that such conjecture would be supported by research, that where turnover is high the incumbents tend to develop career patterns which are consistent with that reality. Nevertheless, insofar as factors in addition to size of organization in which employment occurs affects the likelihood of itinerant careers, then this variable may have some independent effect upon rates of succession. It is not difficult to list many variables which may affect the likelihood that an occupation develops an itinerant pattern: the number of organizations in which the members of the occupation can be employed; the competition for their services; the stability of the organizations in which they are employed; the range of alternative employment; and the ease of establishing one's own organization.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

[8] Although I do not have data concerning this possibility, it is likely that at least some of the directors are founders of the clinics or centers. In a study of small firms it was found that presidents who are founders of the company tend to have longer tenure than non-founders (see Donald B. Trow, "Executive Succession in Small Companies," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* VI [September, 1961], 228–39).

[9] Grusky, *op. cit.,* p. 269.

[10] Of course, successors may come from within the organization as well as from outside. In kinds of organizations in which successors are likely to be insiders, of course, the relevance of itinerant career lines would be less; but these would obviously also be organizations in which the heads did not follow itinerant careers. For an analysis of inside and outside successors among school superintendents, see Richard O. Carlson, "Succession and Performance among School Superintendents," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* VI (September, 1961), 210–27.

BOOK REVIEWS

Organizational Measurement and Its Bearing on the Study of College Environments. By Allen H. Barton. With an Introduction by Paul E. Lazarsfeld. New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961. Pp. ix+82. $2.00 (paper).

The impetus for this brief monograph was provided by the College Entrance Examination Board's interest in learning more about those processes that determine "what kind of person is likely to have what kind of success in what kind of college." This being a complex question, a series of publications is projected to deal with the several problems and their interrelation. Barton's efforts are directed specifically toward exploring the phrase, "what kind of college"; but like the good sociologist he is, Barton generalizes the question to: How does one measure organizational characteristics?

To answer this question, Barton undertakes a unique survey of the empirical literature, attempting to discover what kinds of measures have been utilized in past studies of organizations. His survey is structured through the use of a three-dimensional category system, organizational characteristics being classified by the substantive attributes measured (e.g., social structure, member attitudes, outputs), by the nature of the measures employed (here Barton adopts Lazarsfeld's typology of individual and collective properties), and by the source of the data (e.g., institutional records, informant reports, surveys of member attitudes, and behavior).

The body of the monograph is in the form, figuratively speaking, of a classification table where the rows are defined by the various kinds of substantive attributes and the columns by the types of measures employed. The cell entries are, of course, appropriate empirical examples culled from the organizational literature. This format allows the author to quickly and concisely present a large amount of diverse material. The category system is a useful one, and in Barton's capable hands the basic differences and similarities of many measures of organizational variables are revealed. Fortunately for the sake of the reader, Barton includes in his examples not only the subject, the type of measure, and the source of data, but also a sample finding or two The tabular organization of the book has its drawbacks, however. The reader is deluged by examples all too briefly described; and while many interesting and complex methodological problems dealing with the relation of individual and group data are raised, they are quickly dropped, and the march across the rows and down the columns is resumed.

In his introduction to the work, Lazarsfeld cautions potential readers that the monograph is no "cookbook" providing detailed instructions for the study of colleges. This warning is appropriate. What Barton has done is to construct a tempting menu complete with an analysis of ingredients, which will probably start the mouths of educators (and many sociologists) watering but in and of itself provides only a promise of future nourishment.

W. Richard Scott

Stanford University

The Organizational Society. By Robert Presthus. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1962. Pp. xv+323.

The past few years have witnessed a plethora of books on organizations. The present volume is a far-ranging synthesis which combines uniquely the basic contributions to organization theory of Max Weber, the interpersonal theory of psychiatry of Harry Stack Sullivan, aspects of a number of learning theories, research on authoritarianism, and on occasion, a polemic reminiscent of C. Wright Mills.

Although the author suggests otherwise in the Preface, his approach cannot be tested by empirical research. Nevertheless, the book does provide a useful device for looking at important aspects of our society; this is justification enough. Unfortunately, it seems that either the book was published too hastily or it was

written too hurriedly, or both. It is disquieting to encounter misspelled names, incorrect and confusing footnoting, and repeated definitions of the same concepts. Even more serious are the frequent and unnecessary overstatements (and occasional misstatements). Some examples (italics mine): "Since we *know* that a fear of failure is common among successful executives . . ." (p. 172); "It seems *undeniable* that our typical upward-mobile has an exceptional drive for power" (p. 172); "We *know* that adaptive anxiety is largely an upper and middle-class phenomenon" (p. 262); "Although the upward-mobile type is often authoritarian and seems to fit well into *authoritarian occupations* such as business, medicine, the military, police work, and religion . . ." (pp. 170–71); "Meanwhile, we are confronted at this critical juncture with *incontrovertible* evidence of our declining superiority in atomic weapons . . ." (p. 288).

The author begins with the work of Weber. Large organizations have the characteristics of specialization, hierarchy, status, oligarchy, cooptation, efficiency, and rationality. An outstanding chapter points up the sociological, political, and economic factors which since 1875 have led American society to new levels of bureaucratization. The treatment of personality and organization is an eclectic and skilful blending of recent theory and research. The individual conforms to authority in organization in order to avoid anxiety. Since organizational stimuli are "patent, stable, and compelling," they constitute a "structured field." Predispositions to accept authority, already built up from family experiences, are evoked, and the organization's requirement of complete loyalty is heavily reinforced. Naturally then, authoritarian individuals have an affinity for large-scale systems. The status system rewards loyalty in a manner similar to that of the authority system. And the dynamics of small groups likewise function to produce commitment among members to majority demands. In sum, Presthus gathers extensive support from social science for Whyte's notorious caricature of Organization Man.

But he accomplishes much more. The most original and useful contribution lies in his typology. Three ideal types of adaptations to the organization are distinguished, the upward mobile, the indifferent, and the ambivalent. The first type are motivated by a strong fear of failure. They have great respect for organizational authority, fully commit themselves to the organization, avoid controversial causes, are highly self-controlled, and act in an impersonal and instrumental manner—all characteristics that define them as perfect for key positions in a system which values conformity and loyalty above all else. While the upward mobiles benefit greatly from their middle-class training, the indifferents must suffer the pangs of a working-class or lower-middle-class origin. They hold white-collar positions, typically do not enjoy their jobs, and therefore focus on leisure-time satisfactions. They tend to be alienated from community and political concerns and evince little loyalty to the firm that employs them. The ambivalents are described as neurotic, introverted, marginal men of middle-class background. They have limited talents in interpersonal relations, are intellectually oriented, resist conventional values, and are torn by a fundamental ethical conflict which emerges from the nature of the demands made upon them by the bureaucracy, demands frequently incompatible with their own highly individualistic and democratic values. These are the men of ideas, the organizational innovators. The organization frustrates terribly these poor heroic souls. Using the case of scientists in government, Presthus attempts to demonstrate (I think unsuccessfully) that big organization, in destroying the creativity of research scientists, retards seriously our defense effort.

The first time I read this book I was disappointed. The second time I was considerably more pleased and felt well rewarded for the time spent. This is an imaginative book—speculative and often overstated but nevertheless provocative. Sociologists' feelings about this study are likely to be ambivalent but certainly not indifferent.

OSCAR GRUSKY

University of California
Los Angeles

Organization Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership. By ROBERT HENRY GUEST. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, Inc., and Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961. Pp. xii+180. $5.00.

This book is a short and useful case study of an industrial plant. The central theme is quite simple. Under the managerial reign of

Stewart, things are terrible in Plant Y: The staff and workers are unhappy and generally insecure and "general efficiency" is lower than at any of five comparable plants in the division. One of the "villains" of the piece is the division manager who supervises Stewart very closely. Naturally, this makes the plant manager exceedingly tense, and so he responds by supervising closely or "putting the heat on" his subordinates. Apparently, Stewart is in no way appreciative of the possible effects of his leadership style on the organization. Eventually, a new manager (Cooley) is appointed, but he is given a great deal of leeway to run the plant as he sees fit. Hence, pressures from the division manager decline. The successor is a smash hit with his staff and even with the workers. He acts on their problems sympathetically and receives co-operation in return. Organizational effectiveness soon goes up and everyone is quite happy, even after Cooley leaves to accept a promotion.

An apparent inconsistency mars the presentation of Cooley as a natural leader and at the same time perhaps reveals some of the inherent dangers of relying too heavily on informants. In the text, Cooley is described as having been highly successful in his former job: "Cooley had been given considerable latitude in running production operations at Plant A and had demonstrated his ability to increase efficiencies" (p. 41). Yet when the six plants are compared on an index of general efficiency prior to the succession, Plant A is fifth, the closest to Plant Y (p. 99).

Like most case studies, this one must be viewed as a source of ideas rather than as a means of testing hypotheses. At first glance, the study appears to provide an exception to the frequently supported proposition that administrative succession leads to organizational instability. In this instance, succession led eventually to the exact opposite—higher morale and increased productivity. Why? Perhaps it is not really a clear-cut deviant case after all. Although complete data were not available, morale may have been low initially, since some management were reported to be somewhat fearful of their jobs immediately after the succession. Also, informal group stability was disrupted as new coalitions among the staff emerged. A strategic replacement—the production manager—was made, and numerous lateral job shifts took place. Nevertheless, this study suggests importantly that the generalization relating succession and instability requires re-examination and qualification. Not only must short-term and long-term consequences of top-level succession be distinguished, but also the level of organizational effectiveness under the predecessor must be taken into consideration. The low effectiveness of Plant Y under Stewart probably reduced Cooley's role strain, at least over the short run. Hence high organizational effectiveness under the predecessor's administration may increase the successor's role strain which may then be transmitted down the line with disruptive effects. And conversely, low effectiveness under the predecessor provides low performance expectations for the successor, thereby reducing his role strain and facilitating viable superior-subordinate relationships. Although the study seems to be directed more toward business executives than social scientists, both audiences should find it a profitable resource.

OSCAR GRUSKY

University of California
Los Angeles

Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness. By CHRIS ARGYRIS, with a chapter by ROGER HARRISON. Homewood, Ill. Dorsey Press, Inc., and Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962. Pp. xi+292. $6.50.

Argyris and his colleagues at Yale have for many years been engaged in examining interpersonal relations in a variety of organizational settings. This study, however, is only incidentally concerned with the further analysis of these relations. In the author's words: "After years of diagnosing human problems of organizations, we felt we were ready to begin to study how to solve them." The major portion of this report is therefore devoted to the description of a training program directed toward increasing the interpersonal competence of a group of eleven high-level corporation executives and to an assessment of the consequences of this program.

Building on his earlier work (especially *Personality and Organization*), Argyris outlines a large set of assumptions about both the nature of healthy interpersonal relations and the basic characteristics of modern organizations. His conclusion is that many organizational characteristics curtail development among their members of "authentic" relations—that is, the

kinds of encounters "in which an individual enhances his sense of self- and other awareness and acceptance in such a way that others can do the same." Specifically, organizations support values that emphasize rationality and technical competence but inhibit the expression of feelings and the development of interpersonal competence. Argyris argues that behavior reflecting these values will decrease organizational effectiveness by fostering mistrust, conformity, and dependence, on the interpersonal level and by interfering with decision-making and increasing defensiveness and rigidity, on the organizational level.

Through observing committee meetings and interviewing executives in the corporation selected for study, Argyris gathered data to indicate the applicability of the foregoing model and to provide materials to guide a feedback session with top executives focused on the factors that inhibited their effectiveness. As a result of this session, it was decided that eleven of the twenty top executives would participate in a week-long training period, the remaining nine to be used as a control group. The major training technique was the T-group, whose modest objectives were "to provide maximum possible opportunity for the individuals to expose their behavior, give and receive feedback, experiment with new behavior, and develop everlasting awareness and acceptance of self and others."

Consequences of the training program were assessed in a variety of ways. The values of group members were tested before and after the training experience and were compared to those of executives in the control group. Participating executives were again observed and their subordinates were interviewed. In addition, an independent study comparing experimental and control group members as to the types of adjectives used to describe characteristics of colleagues was conducted by Harrison. In general, the evidence suggests that the training group did function to increase concern with interpersonal relations among executives but that situational factors were such in the company that the new values could not always be implemented, and over time there was a reversion on the part of many to earlier behavior patterns.

So to the literature attesting to the failure of training programs for first-line supervisors, we can now add this document reporting the qualified failure of training for top executives. If changes in values are to endure, training programs must apparently include personnel at all organizational levels. And these educational efforts must be supported by a transformation of organizational structure, including changes in formal job definitions, authority relations, evaluation criteria, formal rules, and objectives.

As scientific research, this study has many defects. Argyris himself admits that the needs of research were often subordinated to those of training. The small group of subjects, the significant differences between the experimental and control groups (the former were top-level executives while the latter held relatively subordinate positions), the paucity of systematic data, the large number of variables under discussion—these and other factors reduce the confidence one can place in the conclusions drawn. However, those interested in changing executive values or in finding a detailed account of the operation of a T-group should consult this volume.

W. Richard Scott

Stanford University

Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker. By Nigel Walker. Chicago. Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. viii+302. $6.00.

Nigel Walker, currently reader in criminology at Oxford University, reports on his studies of white-collar workers in government ministries and private firms in England, a report that is enriched by Walker's fifteen years' experience as a civil servant himself. After a critical examination of the welfare officer and management training, he looks at morale as a concept. Two approaches are described. One he calls the "condition with symptoms theory" —the theory that morale is an existent thing (like disease germs) whose relative presence is detectable by symptoms such as degree of efficiency, job satisfaction, pride in the work group, cohesiveness, etc. The other approach is the "composite theory" in which morale is considered to *be* efficiency, plus job satisfaction, plus pride in the work group, etc. He considers neither approach acceptable, preferring to eschew definition in favor of using

morale to refer to "things like" efficiency, job satisfaction, etc. Basically, he feels, management must give primary attention to efficiency, while workers will inevitably care more about job satisfaction. The relation between these two variables is one of Walker's preoccupations throughout the book.

After interviews in a "factory office" in Benton where he describes a records branch of the government that involves much repetitive work, the desire to increase the size of his sample led Walker to turn to a "postal" (mailed) questionnaire in two government ministries (one with 12,000 employees, the second with 2,000 to 5,000) and two private firms in London. This comparative framework is adopted to be sure the conclusions describe what is peculiar to civil servants' behavior and attitudes rather than what is merely "human." He sketches carefully and in detail each step of his procedures, some of which will be of interest to students of research methods. For example, he tells how he deliberately used an extreme response alternative in order to make the actual alternatives he wished subjects to use seem less extreme, a practice he calls "adding a false bottom."

His main findings (apart from the many "no relationships found") are: (1) Subordinates of women supervisors, whether male or female, have lower job satisfaction than do subordinates of men. (2) Job satisfaction is lower in the civil service than in private firms. (3) Civil servants complained more about promotion than did employees of private firms even though (perhaps because) promotion was more systematic in the civil service and there was much less tendency to fill vacancies by appointing outsiders. (4) Job satisfaction rises with level in the hierarchy owing to higher estimated status and "interest of the work." In the end, the case for a positive relationship between efficiency and job satisfaction is as shaky as ever. Yet, Walker feels, increasing job satisfaction may have indirect effects, such as encouraging civil servants to urge others to make a career in the civil service.

As useful as his findings are Walker's many insights and his highly intelligent interpretations of puzzling findings. For example, he reports an inverse relationship between civil service grade and uncertified sick leave, a finding one might be tempted to relate to factors associated with stratification or similar sociological variables. After examining several of these (including medical service itself), he concludes that the relationship is most likely a consequence of the fact that as one rises higher, one works in smaller and smaller groups, till one gets a private office. There is, hence, less and less exposure to disease-carriers (most uncertified sick leave is due to colds and influenza).

Walker, in the best British tradition, is an extremely careful scholar who stays close to his data. For example, one of his reasons for studying the British civil service was his feeling that conclusions from studies of American factory workers can hardly be generalized to British office workers. At times, however, the examination of *implications* of his data runs into the danger of what I call the Transitivity Fallacy. Transitivity implies that if $a = b$, $b = c$, and $c = d$, then $a = d$. But for such transitivity to hold, the relationships must be those of equality or near-equality. The fallacy lies in assuming transitivity still holds when the correlations between the variables are low. For example, Walker reports these findings in serial order: (1) The lower a man's grade the lower the supervisor's efficiency rating of his men. (2) The lower a man's grade the higher the men's self-rating of their efficiency. (3) The higher the self-rating of efficiency the lower the job satisfaction. From these three relationships, Walker infers: "It may well be that this divergence between the respondents' own estimates of their capabilities and their superiors' estimates is important to an understanding of the dissatisfaction of office workers at the lowest levels." But such an inference could only be made with safety if the three reported relationships were very close, and they are far from it. I hasten to add that Walker is careful to point out that he is only speculating.

The book is much enlivened by wit and good humor. After all the attention American researchers have given to the relationship between productivity and whether the supervisor takes an interest in his men, it is fun to read: "Time and again in discussions with Clerical Officers, Executive Officers and administrators I led the conversation round to the question whether their superior took enough personal interest in them. In almost every case their reaction was that he had more sense." Altogether, I strongly recommend this book to students of industrial soci-

ology and social organization. It is one of the best conceived and carefully designed and reported scholarly surveys of white-collar workers now available.

EDWARD GROSS

University of Minnesota

Robotnicy Warszawskiej Fabryki Motocykli ("Workers of the Warsaw Motorcycles Factory"). By JAN MALANOWSKI. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Science, 1962. Pp. 98.

This study is one of the sociological series published under the editorship of Professor Jan Szczepanski. The study is scheduled to be repeated after ten years from 1957 when the data were collected in the Warsaw Motorcycles Factory which at that time employed 2 237 persons. A sample of 257 workers' families was drawn from two income strata. The study provides descriptive data on social characteristics of the workers' families; thus one can read that 68 per cent of workers were born in workers' families; that 50 per cent felt that there had been no change in the quality of their housing as compared to prewar living quarters; that the majority of wives did not know the exact amount of the husband's paycheck; that only 46 per cent of apartments had running water; that a worker possessed on the average two pairs of shoes and seven shirts; that only 16 per cent participated in vacation trips organized by the labor union during the past thirteen years; that the majority of families did not have close neighborhood relations for fear of being gossiped about; that 45 per cent did not read books and only 5 per cent did not read newspapers, etc. In general, because of these concrete data Malanowski's study would lend itself to cross-cultural comparisons.

In his conclusion, the author interprets his descriptive findings as an evidence for the thesis that the workers' class is not one homogeneous integrated collectivity (*"zbiorowosc"*); Malanowski stresses that the political change in Poland removed many former leaders out of the workers' milieu, thus depriving it of natural leaders. Differentiation among workers is drawn first among those who are of urban or rural descent. The urban group is composed of a smaller "workers' elite," and the large group of standard workers, and of "common laborers." While the standard workers do not participate in public life of the factory and are also not interested as well as poorly informed about political-social events, the "common laborers" have even a hostile attitude toward any kind of public activities, ridiculing them while finding an outlet in alcohol. The picture presented by Malanowski appears to be realistic and should be welcome because it inaugurates a new factual approach toward the problems of the working class, whose image was formerly distorted and idealized. This reviewer would, however, point out that the data presented in the study do not provide sufficient evidence for the three-groups model of Polish workers. Either Malanowski did not present all his data, or he derived the model from other sources, or he relied more on an impressionistic judgment. It would be desirable to know how the respondents in his study would be classified percentage-wise in the three workers' groups.

JIRI KOLAJA

University of Kentucky

Work and Leisure. By NELS ANDERSON. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv+266. $5.00.

Calling attention to the tendency of students of work to ignore leisure, and vice versa, Anderson addresses himself to the relationships between work and leisure. Although the book has a structure, it does not have any one thesis: much of it might be regarded as essays on various aspects of work and leisure, written in an urbane, leisurely manner and usually making good sense as the author offers insights or calls attention to paradoxes or inconsistencies in the arguments of others. Anderson himself presents four conclusions from his examination of the literature and his own thinking: (1) Although "leisure" usually implies time free from work (he quotes, with apparent approval, Joffre Dumazedier's definition: "Leisure is activity to which the individual may freely devote himself outside the needs and obligations of his occupation, his family and society, for his relaxation, diversion and personal development"), attention must be paid to "non-work obligations," such as time given over to household gardening,

political meetings, civic service, etc. As time devoted to work (in the economic sense) declines, time devoted to such obligations may increase to the point where one has no more "free" time than before. (*2*) The increased time given to leisure seems to increase rather than decrease the time spent at home, and the home becomes a repository of leisure-use things. (3) Although there is evidence that workers have little ego involvement in their jobs, this is not necessarily cause for alarm. Rather, the worker simply sells his time and skill in a business-like manner, ceasing to think about it after hours. "He is not bored with his job; he has come to terms with it." This is eminently sensible and rational. (4) The notion that people are helpless in the face of the great wave of leisure now sweeping over them is exaggerated if not false. Rather, man's cultural level (compared to 1850) has risen, and his inventiveness in his work will surely be applied to his leisure. These conclusions do not form the subject of particular sections of the book; they are touched upon in several places and may be said to emerge from the book as a whole.

Two valuable features of the book stand out. It is probably the most thorough coverage of the literature on leisure study, particularly the European materials, now available. Again and again one is impressed with the great volume of research going on in Europe, much of which, unfortunately, cannot be read by "English-only" sociologists. Nor is the defense that "the really good stuff will be translated" satisfactory, for most of it is not that good: It is simply *as* good as most American research and therefore no more likely to be translated. The coverage seems equally good for American materials, with the surprising omission of the work of Weiss and Morse.

The other especially valuable feature of the book is the many "essays." The book is full of insights which could in their own right form the subjects of research or even of books. For example, Anderson points out that we owe the increase in leisure to the Protestant ethic, which made intense concentration on work a virtue. Yet this very gift becomes a "problem" for one's success in work incapacitates one for enjoying the free time. Hence it is not really free but must be used to improve one's ability to work even more successfully. With reference to the complaint that people are becoming too passive in their leisure, Anderson wonders whether "to live in a civilization so intensively stimulating as ours one [may] *need* . . . to acquire a degree of passivity or immunity." In his discussion of leisure among the aged, he reminds us that the use of time is a problem only among those without wealth and power. Leaders in many of the most important activities are usually old for example, top diplomats, top church leaders, and top leaders in women's organization, trade unions, large corporations, and universities. This is not a new idea, but it deserves greater attention. Perhaps the major problems of the aged are not leisure problems, but those of insufficient wealth and power.

Anderson's coverage of the main issues in the study of leisure is as wide as his coverage of the literature. But he omits, as do most students of leisure, a discussion of the "leisure workers"—the operator of the bowling alley, the golf pro, the theater usher, and, of course, the actor. They work so that others may play, and often their work is the play of others. The occupational community that Lipset, Trow, and Coleman found among printers is certainly more widespread.

The book is well written and combines intensive examination of the research and a judicious explication of the findings from it. At the same time, the wide scope and originality of this volume make it required reading for students of work and leisure.

EDWARD GROSS

University of Minnesota

Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. By ERVING GOFFMAN ("Anchor Book"). Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961. Pp. xiv+386. $1.45.

Sociologists scarcely need an introduction to these often brilliant and always provocative essays. The book begins with a reprinting (from Cressey's *The Prison,* 1961) of the longer version of Goffman's classic treatment of the characteristics of total institutions. The focus then narrows more specifically on the patient, first in terms of his moral career (reprinted from *Psychiatry,* XXII [1959], 123-42), and next on his ways of making out in the underlife of the hospital. The final essay considers the lack of appropriateness of the

medical-service model for characterizing the relation of professional psychiatric staff and patients within the context of the mental hospital. The book as a whole provides a full treatment of Goffman's analysis of the mental hospital and of his use of it as one illustrative case in the development of the concept of total institutions and of a set of ideas concerning the structure of the self.

Goffman gathered the material for his essays during a year of observational study at St. Elizabeths Hospital. He self-consciously restricted the bulk of his observations to patients, and he says: "To describe the patient's situation faithfully is necessarily to present a partisan view" (pp. ix–x). The reader is thereby warned that the description of life in the hospital is through the patient's eyes as seen by Goffman, but the analytical and theoretical ideas arising from the descriptive materials are adequately shorn of this limitation on perspective and stand clear by themselves. Perhaps in the future the other role groups in the hospital will be found by their Goffman.

Two central themes run throughout the book—the concept of total institutions and the structure of the self. Of these two, the presentation of total institutions is clearer, while the ideas about the self seem to me to be ambiguous and in need of further clarification.

Goffman defines a total institution as "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life" (p. xiii). In addition to mental hospitals, examples of total institutions are prisons, army barracks, ships, boarding schools, and monasteries.

The process by which an individual comes to enter a total institution is discussed by Goffman for mental hospitals in his second essay under the concept of career contingencies. The concept is apt because, as Goffman points out, "in the degree that the 'mentally ill' outside hospitals numerically approach or surpass those inside hospitals, one could say that mental patients distinctively suffer not from mental illness, but from contingencies" (p. 135). There follows a sharply written description (esp. pp. 140–41) of how a person can be stripped of his rights and liberties without quite knowing this is happening, and end up as a patient in a hospital with a next-of-kin transformed into a guardian.

Once an individual is admitted to a total institution, Goffman believes that he undergoes a process of mortification in which "he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self" (p. 14). Partly in response to these processes of mortification, Goffman sees the inmates as developing what he calls secondary adjustments which, collectively, form the underlife of the institution. Thus, secondary adjustments are defined as "any habitual arrangement by which a member of an organization employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the organization's assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence what he should be" (p. 189). "These practices together comprise what can be called the *underlife* of the institution, being to a social establishment what an underworld is to a city" (p. 199).

In general, with regard to the concept of the total institution, I agree with Goffman when he says: "We now have a sizable literature on these establishments and should be in a position to supplant mere suggestions with a solid framework bearing on the anatomy and functioning of this kind of social animal" (p. 123). But I disagree with the strong implication in his writing that an individual is unlikely to come through the experience of life in a total institution, and especially a mental hospital, somewhat the better (rather than the worse) for it. The basis for my disagreement lies in my negative reaction to Goffman's rather peculiar, and I think confused, view of the self. The ideas about the structure of the self shift and change from one essay to another and do not form as coherent a whole as do those about the total institution.

In his Introduction, Goffman says: "A chief concern is to develop a sociological version of the structure of the self" (p. xiii). This is a reasonable goal, but even a sociological self ought to have an inner as well as an outer face, and Goffman's self in his first essay strikes me as having a blank inner face. Along these lines, one of the steps reported in the process of mortification is the stripping from the individual of his "identity kit" which consists of "cosmetic and clothing supplies" that the individual needs "for the management of his personal front" (p. 20). My point is that life in any society always requires a set of

somewhat standard uniforms and behaviors, and an "identity kit" is necessary to maintain these, but certainly a person's "identity"—in the sense this term has come to have in current professional literature—goes deeper than a painted front. Goffman does not touch upon the point that an individual might not really need such a kit to maintain his identity.

In the second essay, in contrast to the first, Goffman says he will look at internal (or more personal) as well as at external (or more public) aspects of the self with regard to the moral career of the patient. He says: "One value of the concept of career is its two-sidedness. One side is linked to internal matters held dearly and closely, such as image of self and felt identity; the other side concerns official position, jural relations, and style of life, and is part of a publicly accessible institutional complex" (p. 127). Goffman would seem to be talking to a degree about the more personal and internal aspects of the self when he says that a mental patient can free himself of the definition of self provided by the institution "when he learns that he can survive while acting in a way that society sees as destructive of him" (p. 165). And yet a few pages later Goffman seems to deny the possibility of such a personal achievement:

> The self, then, can be seen as something that resides in the arrangements prevailing in a social system for its members. The self in this sense is not a property of the person to whom it is attributed, but dwells rather in the pattern of social control that is exerted in connection with the person by himself and those around him. This special kind of institutional arrangement does not so much support the self as constitute it [p. 168].

I think there is the possibility of real confusion here. Does the self about which Goffman speaks have an inner part or is it solely defined by patterns of social control? In his third essay on the underlife of a total institution, Goffman clarifies this question, and at the end of the essay gives the fullest statement in the book concerning his ideas about the self:

> The practice of reserving something of oneself from the clutch of an institution is very visible in mental hospitals and prisons but can be found in more benign and less totalistic institutions, too. I want to argue that this recalcitrance is not an incidental mechanism of defense but rather an essential constituent of the self.
>
> Sociologists have always had a vested interest in pointing to the ways in which the individual is formed by groups, identifies with groups, and wilts away unless he obtains emotional support from groups. But when we closely observe what goes on in a social role . . . we always find the individual employing methods to keep some distance, some elbow room, between himself and that with which others assume he should be identified.
>
> . . . Perhaps we should further complicate the construct by elevating these qualifications to a central place, initially defining the individual, for sociological purposes, as a stance-taking entity, a something that takes up a position somewhere between identification with an organization and opposition to it, and is ready at the slightest pressure to regain its balance by shifting its involvement in either direction. It is thus *against something* that the self can emerge. . . . I have argued the same case in regard to total institutions. May this not be the situation, however, in free society, too?
>
> Without something to belong to, we have no stable self, and yet total commitment and attachment to any social unit implies a kind of selflessness. Our sense of being a person can come from being drawn into a wider social unit; our sense of selfhood can arise through the little ways in which we resist the pull Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while our sense of personal identity often resides in the cracks [pp. 319–20].

There are more cogent ways of conceiving of the self than in this discontinuous fashion where one is presented with a rather bland social self and, apparently, a somewhat harried and antagonistic personal self that "resides in the cracks." If life entails being against something, if it is seen as a game in which one is always busy presenting a front, then there is little time to integrate the part of the self that faces outward with that which faces inward, or even to conceive of a reconciliation between these two.

In general, then, what evaluation is to be made of this book? It is a good book, good mainly because of its clearness in looking at mental hospitals as one type of total institution and in providing biting concepts by means of which to see such institutions. Such clearness is, however, muddied by the almost endless provocative descriptive comparisons of mental hospitals with jails, seedy boarding schools, poorly run ships, and so on. A few sharp comparisons are fine; fifty piled one on top of the other serve to cloud the argument.

It would be possible to understand such a proliferation of descriptive comparisons in terms of human outrage on the part of an observer initially working in a large mental hospital, but, in Goffman's presentation, there seems to be something more implied—a general view of society and the self.

WILLIAM CAUDILL

National Institute of Mental Health

The Church as a Social Institution. By DAVID O. MOBERG. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. vi+569. $10.00.

The subtitle of Dr. Moberg's text is *The Sociology of American Religion,* although a more accurate subtitle might have been *The Sociology of American Church Organizations,* since the author's primary concern is with the forms of institutionalized religion in the United States. The book is divided into seven substantive sections: "Characteristics of American Churches," "Types of Churches," "Social Functions and Dysfunctions of the Church," "Social Processes and the Church," "Inter-Institutional Relations," "The Social Psychology of American Religion," and "Professional Leadership in the Church."

As a textbook for college and first-year graduate school courses in the sociology of religion, the volume is admirable, but one suspects that it will see its most frequent use in seminary courses. Moberg's treatment of the materials under consideration is concise and comprehensive, his judgments balanced, and his familiarity with the literature encyclopedic. Although some sociologists may have doubts about a book on religion by one who believes in religion, there seems little reason to question that *The Church as a Social Institution* is far and away the best available text in the field. The only serious omission of which the reviewer is aware is the lack of any reference to organized labor in a chapter on "The Church and Social Problems"; the Social Gospel movement is discussed in another chapter, but nothing is said about the labor teachings of the National Council of Churches and the only allusion to the labor theories of the Catholic church is a footnote reference to an extremely unfavorable article.

Like all textbooks Moberg's volume labors under the faults that are inevitable in textbooks. It is not able to incorporate the latest research findings; for example, there is some recent evidence that American Catholics are no less achievement-oriented than American Protestants. The book is forced to limit itself to documentable propositions; thus, on decisive matters such as the direction of the development of American pluralism or the emergence of a religion of Americanism, the author cannot speculate but must be content with quoting Will Herberg. It is obliged to strive for balance and therefore run the risk of being bland; for example, the chapter on "Interfaith Conflict" treats the problem adequately but does not seem to get at the core of the problem, whatever that core may be.

A second series of difficulties may arise from the nature of the subject. In his Introduction Moberg suggests that the non-believer may lack the empathy required to understand what a religious organization is. One might further ask if a member of one religious organization in our society has the empathy necessary to master the complexities that are at work in other organizations, even if he has read all the literature. Moberg is obviously very much at home with American Protestantism; however, despite a high degree of sophistication about the other two major religious groups he does not always seem to be insightful when discussing them. Thus his treatment of the fundamentalist-modernist controversy within American Protestantism would appear to this outsider to be excellent, but his discussion of modernism within Catholicism and Judaism strikes one as less than perceptive. In addition, Moberg is occasionally guilty of such factual lapses as equating the Society for the Propagation of the Faith (a fund-raising organization) with groups that are actually engaged in missionary activities, such as the Maryknollers.

These mild reservations should not obscure the fact that *The Church as a Social Institution* is a major contribution to a rapidly developing branch of sociology.

ANDREW M. GREELEY

National Opinion Research Center
University of Chicago

Urban Social Structure. By JAMES M. BESHERS. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. ix+207. $5.50.

This treatise examines the social structure of urban areas in terms of two related problems; first, the utility of studying social characteristics of residential areas as indicators of urban social structure; second, the influence of residential segregation on urban social structure.

In chapter i various approaches to the city are reviewed and their shortcomings indicated. Invidious comparisons of urban life with rural life are criticized as is the view of the city as a center for social disorganization. The connection between abstract social theory and action programs is also demonstrated in this chapter.

The relationship between human ecology and functionalism is the subject of chapter ii. An effort is made to integrate these two approaches and a rather reasonable series of criticisms of functionalism is included (pp. 27–30). Unfortunately, much of the discussion is only remotely related to *urban* social structure as a specific subject of inquiry. Included in this chapter is a typology of three modes of orientation in terms of which decisions are made. The section concludes with the following:

> We now have a sufficient conceptual apparatus to proceed to more direct analysis of our problem. The relationships between social structure and residential area can be expressed in the terminology now available to us. The distinction between ecology and functionalism at a theoretical level is no longer an obstacle and empirical materials gathered in terms of either conceptual scheme can be utilized in the remainder of this essay [p. 34].

What is urban structure and is there a distinct urban social structure? Chapter iii, "Urban Social Structure," begins with the promise of "preliminary answers" to these questions. After defining social structure as "a set of persistent patterned social relationships among persons or positions," social stratification is viewed as a subclass of structure. A lengthy discussion follows of social class, stratification, and power. Two systems of urban social structure are developed: the total system of symbols used in a city to rank its residents and the systems peculiar to the subcultures of the city. Residential areas of the city are viewed as a useful indicator of social position. In addition to defining concepts and criticizing contemporary work, the chapter presents "a formulation of a synthetic theoretical approach combining elements from diverse traditions."

The next three chapters, "Historical Processes," "Social Structure and Residential Areas," and "Consequences of Spatial Distributions," are devoted to reviewing data relevant to the approach developed. The first discusses the influence of the past—both of Europe and the United States—on the urban social structure of this nation. Included is a discussion of the two generalizations that have been made about western Europe's social structure, those by Sir Henry Maine and Karl Marx. The political structure of medieval cities is examined in light of the emergence of legal equality. The second proposition, the creation of economic inequality by the bourgeoisie, is demolished. The role played by the middle class in the emergence of working class is also considered. Finally, the similarities and differences between western Europe and the urban social structure of the United States is examined. This includes a discussion of scapegoating.

Chapters v and vi are, in my opinion, the most useful in the book. Factors operating to lead to the differential distribution of a city's population are considered. The principle of "social desirability" is developed to account for variations in the residential segregation of ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups. The consequences of segregation are examined in references to research on the influence that location has for friendship formation in housing projects, residential propinquity and mate selection, and the subcultures of cities. A convincing case is made for the thesis that the spatial distribution of social characteristics influences the social structure. While this thesis is far from novel to human ecologists, it deserves greater recognition from other sociologists than has thus far been the case.

A theoretical model for urban social structure is the goal of chapter vii. The model, which is mathematically formalized in an appendix to the volume, involves and explains intermarriage, status symbols, power relations, and scapegoating. As far as I can tell, its use is not restricted to urban social structure but can also be applied to various additional problems including the decline of feudalism, the coalition structure of revolutions, the decline of Stalinism, and coalition in American politics.

The final chapter, "Urban Social Organization," covers power and politics—some of which is directly relevant to urban areas. With the exception of the two chapters noted earlier and an occasional passage elsewhere, this reader can find little to recommend to students of urban social structure.

STANLEY LIEBERSON

University of Wisconsin

The Joiners: A Sociological Description of Voluntary Association Membership in the United States. By MURRAY HAUSKNECHT. New York: Bedminster Press, 1962. Pp. 141.

Certain sociological problems are less likely than others to be studied through primary field research. Some deal with topics that do not seem important enough to warrant the expense of a full-scale field inquiry; others treat subjects about which most people believe the facts are known; some involve events and opinions in the past which cannot be measured among current populations. Under these and other circumstances a partial solution to the problem is sometimes provided by secondary analysis—the re-examination of data that were collected for another purpose in order to illuminate a new problem and test new hypotheses. *The Joiners* presents an excellent example of the kind of problem that sociologists can explore profitably through secondary analysis of past public opinion polls and social surveys.

Membership in voluntary associations rarely has been the central focus of primary research, at least on a nationwide scale. It is a subject about which there are many popular beliefs (e g., that we are a nation of joiners). It has been discussed by sociologists concerned with urban life, political sociology, social organization, and other areas. It has been treated theoretically by Wirth, Williams, Rose, Barber, and others. Finally, there are several primary studies, usually limited to local populations, that provide empirical generalizations about memberships which bear upon hypotheses that can be tested by secondary analysis of survey data from larger, general populations. Therefore the data which the author presents in *The Joiners* are welcome additions to the growing literature on voluntary associations.

The data come from two national surveys that contained incidental items on the voluntary association memberships of adults: one conducted in 1954 by the American Institute of Public Opinion and the other in 1955 by the National Opinion Research Center. The analysis treats the relationships between membership and stratification, urbanization, sex, age, marital status, and social integration. Information is provided on membership in a variety of types of associations and certain consequences of membership. The discussion concludes with a chapter on the functions of voluntary associations.

Forty-seven pages of tables are presented. This is fortunate, for it enables the reader to study the data and interpret them. It is important that the reader do so because there are a number of unfortunate discrepancies between the data in the tables and their description and interpretation in the text.

In certain places errors in reporting the base for percentages result in serious misstatements about the findings. To illustrate, the text (p. 79) states that 43 per cent of the respondents in heavily populated areas join civic and service organizations; but Table 5: 7 shows that the 43 per cent is not based on the total respondents in these areas but on persons who are members of any association. Recalculation shows that 14 per cent of the total respondents in these areas belong to civic organizations, not 43 per cent as reported. The text (p. 93) states that 51 per cent of *non-members* with elementary education read no magazines; in Table 6:5 the 51 per cent is based on *members*. The text (p. 98) reports that "of those who *thought* they knew the sponsor [of March of Dimes] 14 per cent of the non-members . . . with an elementary school education answered correctly." But Table 6:12 actually shows that 14 per cent of *all* the non-members with elementary education answered correctly. Recalculation of the proportion who gave correct answers among those non-members with elementary education who *thought* they knew the sponsor gives 74 per cent, not 14 per cent as reported. Other instances could be provided. Since the tables are grouped at the end of each chapter it is not always easy for the reader to spot such discrepancies.

At other places certain interpretations of the data are questionable. As an example, the text (p. 33) states that Table 3:6B shows a general tendency for men up to the age of 44 to have a higher rate of membership than women. But the data in the table do not appear to support this statement. In interpreting certain other tables the analyst fails to take account of the marginal frequencies, with misleading consequences. Consider, as an example, the discussion of educational status and organizational membership (p. 80) in the light of the marginals at the bottom of Table 5:9. At times the interpretation and the discussion are confused by the inconsistent treatment of the same variables as independent and test factors, reversing them here and there, and not introducing the proper test variable at the appropriate place in the discussion. Examples are found in the treatment of sex and age (p. 33) and home ownership and age (p. 48) in relation to membership. Finally, there are unexplained discrepancies among the tables themselves. To illustrate, the total number of cases shifts from 853 to 799 to 839 to 853 among Tables 5:1 through 5:4.

This reviewer regards the types of errors illustrated above as especially regrettable because, on the whole, the book presents a valuable set of data about American life and many interesting cross-tabulations by important sociological variables. The findings suggest areas for further research and point to parts of our current theories that need to be re-examined. To illustrate, one survey shows a *negative* relation between membership and size of community—contrary to what might be expected on the basis of urban theory. Obviously this finding needs to be followed up, either directly or by additional secondary analyses. (The second survey is not so clear on this relationship. Indeed, there are several differences between the findings from the two surveys that could be examined in more detail.)

The book is beautifully printed: the tables are neat and clear and the figures are easy to read. These are welcome and genuine virtues in the publication of a research monograph.

CHARLES R. WRIGHT

University of California
Los Angeles

Mastery of the Metropolis. By WEBB S. FISER. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+168. $1.95 (paper).

Anatomy of a Metropolis. By EDGAR M. HOOVER and RAYMOND VERNON. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. ix+338. $1.45 (paper).

Increasing urbanization has necessitated a detailed analysis of the changes and problems existing in the metropolis. Although speaking to different audiences, both of the books discussed here address themselves to this task. *Anatomy of a Metropolis,* the first volume of the New York Metropolitan Region Study, is for the sociologist the more important of the two. The book is comprehensive in scope; the authors examine employment (locational pressures, special industries, the white-collar corps, and the "pursuit of consumers") and the people (their distribution in terms of needs for spacious living versus easy access). Always, too, they anticipate future interrelations between jobs and people. Particularly noteworthy is the authors' cognizance that what happens in New York turns in good part on what happens in the rest of the country—something often missed by the sociologist generalizing about the city. The book as a whole must be commended as an excellent account of New York and its environs, rich both in detail and illustration.

Mastery of the Metropolis is written on another level. It is Professor Fiser's thesis that institutions and citizens form the key to cities "realizing their potentials." Rather than giving spot "emergency" attention to single problems (e.g., transportation, parking, shopping, and the like), Fiser wants city planners to treat the metropolitan region as a whole. Thus, to take one example, urban renewal is viewed on the individual level, while at all times the economic, educational, and social implications for the entire city are considered. Certainly, city planners realize this; and, from the criticism of redevelopment in the popular press, this is an idea to which little more than lip-service has been given. Because Fiser's volume is based on secondary sources and is footnoted only sporadically, the extent to which his work meets this need must be questioned. But this may be unfair in that the book is a theoretical one. In enumerating concepts in terms of the individual values held by

urbanites as well as in terms of the total metropolis, Fiser has taken a fresh approach. In fact, in this field where the theoretical is often equated with the non-empirical, Fiser has perhaps laid the basis for a cogent theoretical approach to the metropolis and its problems.

In conclusion, the reading of these books side by side illustrates the need for the integration of theoretical, empirical, and applied work in urban planning and thought. This, of course, is not a novel idea. The increasing division of urban sociologists into tight categories, however, makes it a point that can bear repetition.

FRANK J. ZULKE

Community and Family Study Center
University of Chicago

Slums and Suburbs: A Commentary on Schools in Metropolitan Areas. By JAMES B. CONANT. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961. Pp. 147. $3.95 (cloth); $1.95 (paper).

This book alerts boards of education and suburban book-buyers to the differences between high schools in urban slum districts and in wealthy suburbs. The "facts" about each school situation are followed by changes recommended to help remove inequalities. At first reading this little book rings true. It reads easily and seems to treat sensibly one dimension of a national social problem. Only on closer inspection do its failures cancel out these virtues. The facts are too often incomplete and the recommendations superficial.

Conant contrasts schools located in the low-rent districts of the ten largest cities in the nation with schools located in the *wealthier* suburbs adjacent to these cities. Conant warns that he is "presenting the picture only of the extremes," yet by the time he has warmed to his exposition he neglects the narrow restrictions of this sample. His ten cities are all northern. Evidence from Project Talent (a 4 per cent sample of the nation's high schools) reveals that the multiple correlation of achievement on per capita income, per pupil expenditure, and per cent urban, was .90 in 1960. Per capita income accounted for well over half the variation in achievement. The important differences in income as in achievement occurred between the *southeastern* and northeastern schools.

Conant has focused on a problem, but its national significance dwindles when the findings from a national probability sample are considered. Take, for example, the difference between education in high-income versus low-income sectors of the largest cities. Project Talent placed the mean on ability for students in high-income, big-city schools at the 73d percentile for the national sample. The mean for students in low-income areas in the same cities is at the 47th percentile. This difference seems small when the mean for low-income areas in the urban Southeast (the 6th percentile) is introduced!

Conant's facts about wealthy suburban schools are accurate as far as they go. One wonders about the scope, hence the national significance, of this category. Project Talent found that suburban schools generally do *not* differ from the moderate-to-high income districts in the cities they surround. And, the per pupil expenditure for suburban schools averages little more than the average for all high schools. Only 4–5 per cent approximate the popular image of the rich Eastern suburban high school.

Slums and Suburbs, then, describes a selected handful of public high schools. It tells us that students in most Harlem schools do not receive educational services even roughly equivalent to those received by students at Scarsdale High. It informs us that the slow or indifferent learner is in serious trouble in both schools. Unemployment stalks the one; the shadow of parental frustration the other.

Citizens are urged to find "non-political honest school boards composed of high-minded citizens who can differentiate between policy-making and administration." Will changes in leadership modify the economic and social structures that reinforce indifference toward the urban ethnic slum and excessive concern with formal education in the wealthy suburbs? To reduce the dropout rate, Conant recommends increased vocational guidance in the slum schools. The external barriers to employment—economic instability, job automation, racial prejudice—are to be breached through improved public relations between schools, employers, and unions.

This book will be bought by suburbanites and cited by school superintendents. Its influ-

ence will stem from Conant's prestige and esteemed honesty and from the lean fluency of his prose. Except as a signpost on the superhighway of the Great Educational Debate, this book contains no important news for sociologists.

ROBERT A. DENTLER

Teachers College
Columbia University

The Politics of Urban Renewal: The Chicago Findings. By PETER H. ROSSI and ROBERT A. DENTLER. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. ix+308. $6.00.

Of the manifold problems that face the modern American metropolis, that of urban renewal has been the focus of considerable attention. It is therefore fitting and timely that Rossi and Dentler's book is available to social scientist and urban planner alike.

The book is a case study of the planning process in the Hyde Park–Kenwood "community" of Chicago. This particular sector, which includes the main campus of the University of Chicago, "experienced 'blight' as the class composition shifted toward the lower end of the spectrum" (p. 22). The central problem is "to understand the part *actually* played by citizens in affecting renewal planning" (p. 2) in this area.

We have here a study containing a good deal of descriptive data on how one community sought to cope with urban renewal. The book contains some intriguing, perhaps serendipitous, findings. It is one of the rare books that discusses the political role of a university (in this instance the University of Chicago) in purposive revision of the urban landscape. Although the authors believe that this university, with its long-standing ties with the broader community, constitutes a somewhat deviant case insofar as American cities are concerned, the discussion suggests some interesting facets of the possible relationships of universities or colleges to their host community. So too the analysis of the part played by the Catholic church in the planning process in the Hyde Park–Kenwood community brings to the surface aspects of the religious power structure in American cities, a subject sociologists tend to shun. Furthermore, sociologists concerned with the role of urbanites in "political action" will find here much food for thought. The data are particularly instructive for those who have been unaware of the complex web of interaction between the citizenry and the urban leadership—the "give and take" that occurs in the striving for some kind of consensus.

At the same time, Rossi and Dentler may leave some readers—as they did this reviewer—a bit baffled. For although their emphasis is upon the role of the citizens in urban renewal, they observe that the University of Chicago (the prime mover in the renewal effort) "shied away from the local scene and its inhabitants and concentrated mainly on moving the power centers in municipal government" (p. 99) Inasmuch as the authors do not probe deeply enough into the university's role, one must question whether the residents played quite the part that the authors indicate.

The relatively descriptive nature of the study presents problems of its own. Certainly, descriptive materials are useful in their own right, for scholars of divergent theoretical leanings can profit from them; and the authors observe that their community was not typical of Chicago, or of other American cities, and this seems to be one reason they did not relate their findings more explicitly to a given theory or set of hypotheses. Yet, had Rossi and Dentler gone further in spelling out the implications of their findings (they suggest a few in the last chapter) for current theoretical issues in sociology, the book's value would have been enhanced After all the deviant case can play an important role in theory-building. Some of the data, for example, on urban power relationships, currently the subject of considerable debate have direct relevance for decision-making, especially in social planning. So too some of the materials bear directly upon theoretical controversies in the field of human ecology for instance, they lend support to aspects of Form's analysis of land-use change.

Nevertheless, this book is worth reading. he who reads it will become sensitized to a wide range of issues regarding political activity in an urban community.

GIDEON SJOBERG

University of Texas

oss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership. By ALEX GOTTFRIED. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+459. $6.50.

Politics in Chicago have received more cholarly attention than in any other city, so uch so that the Chicago Democratic mahine is probably the single most widely nown organization of its kind in the country. 'et there have been practically no studies hich have described the formation of that rganization or the career of the man who reated it: Anton J. Cermak. Today, Cermak remembered, if at all, only because he was hot while standing beside President Frankin D. Roosevelt in Miami; few recall that he powerful organization inherited by Pat Nash, Edward Kelly, Jacob Arvey, and Richrd Daley was the handiwork of Chicago's irst and only foreign-born mayor.

Professor Gottfried's book is a detailed and nformative biography of the man supplemented by an analysis of the organization he rought together and some speculation on the sychological roots of his behavior. It is an xhaustive effort; although it has weaknesses, most of them are ones the author could not void Writing this kind of history must be a maddening enterprise, for there are rarely any ecords, letters, diaries, journals, or first-hand ccounts on which the biographer can draw. Machine politicians are a taciturn lot, rarely allowing their affairs to be either observed or recorded, and Cermak was even more secretive than most. The author was forced to rely largely on newspaper accounts supplemented by interviews with persons who had known Cermak twenty or thirty years before. Thus, there are important gaps in the story. What went on behind the scenes must often be left to the imagination; in stimulating our imagination, Gottfried is generally adroit and levelheaded.

Cermak remade the politics of his city so successfully that, thirty years later, when Tammany Hall was collapsing in New York City, the Chicago machine was still vigorous and united. Before Cermak's rise to power, both parties in Cook County were split into factions led by a variety of powerful personalities, each of whom had a limited base of power in some patronage-rich office. The factional warfare that resulted led to a kind of bipartisan politics in which each faction made interparty alliances in order to maintain itself against intraparty challengers. It was an era of incredibly complicated intrigues and treachery in which party labels counted for little. And it was an era which permitted the rise of a demagogue, William Hale ("Big Bill") Thompson.

Cermak ended the bipartisan factionalism and thus ended Thompsonism. To do this he created the first unified county-wide Democratic organization the city had known. And to do this, he had to defeat the Irish political elite that dominated the party. This was accomplished by bringing together for the first time the city's foreign born—Czechs, Poles, Germans, and Jews—into a voting alliance that the warring Irish leaders were forced to join on its terms. The organization which later gave the Irish undisputed control of the city was created against their will by a man born in Kladno, Czechoslovakia.

The best parts of the book are the accounts of the character of Czech community life in Chicago and of the tactics used by Cermak to acquire control first of the Cook County Board of Commissioners and then of the Democratic party. The weakness of the book is in part the weakness of all biographies: there is too little systematic analysis of the structural and social forces at work. There is, for example, no satisfactory account of the nature and sources of the various Democratic factions, particularly those of Roger Sullivan and George Brennan.

In an appendix Gottfried offers a "psychosomatic analysis" of Cermak's political behavior based largely on the work of Franz Alexander. It is hard to know how seriously to take this: at one point (p. 366), we are told that this medical information provides a "key" to Cermak's "specific emotional needs," which in turn "were responsible" for his entire political role; at another point (p. 373) the author disclaims any intention to "explain" Cermak by his medical history. In any case, Cermak's ulcerative colitis is related to his "power urge" and his desire to control others. All the objections to post factum explanations are relevant here: the hypotheses are plausible but they cannot in principle be disproved, and alternative, equally plausible hypotheses are not systematically explored and compared. Ex-

plaining the transformation of Democratic party politics in Chicago will, one suspects, require more than a clinical look at the boss's bowels.

James Q. Wilson
Harvard University

Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America. By E. U. Essien-Udom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+367. $6.95.

This is a book few persons save its author could have written. No qualified researcher—whatever his skin color—could easily gain such intimate access to the inner sanctum of the Nation of Islam, the social movement under study. The Muslims, led by Elijah Muhammed, seek to withdraw physically and politically from existing society, awaiting the destruction of the Caucasian race and its Christian civilization. Essien-Udom, a Nigerian, while a graduate student at the University of Chicago spent two years in "continuous observation" of these black segregationists. He tells us that "suspicion, fear and the apparent atmosphere of secrecy" made it impossible to secure exact data on membership and finances, but he had access to early literature usually kept under lock and key and to directives available only to "registered" Muslims. He also frequently refers to visits and excursions with Muhammed and was present at a strategy meeting that took up a letter sent by the Ku Klux Klan to the New York Police Commissioner. The author's intimate acquaintance with the sectarians yielded valuable data but may also have influenced some of his interpretations.

The book provides absorbing descriptive and analytical material on the Muslim eschatology, organization, recruitment and initiation, educational institutions, rituals, and ceremony. It demonstrates the appeal and personal value of the movement to the *socially mobile* lower class. Though better documented, the author's interpretations of these aspects do not differ essentially from those already published.

Most novel—and the point at which the author parts company with C. Eric Lincoln and others—is his positive evaluation of the Nation of Islam. He is not uncritical of the sect —he thinks the ideology and taboos limit its growth potential. Yet he frankly admires the inner core of leaders, assuring us they are "sincere." He judges the movement "at least a partial answer" to the search for an identity which he calls the "Negro dilemma." He sloughs off the fears of "alarmists": the Muslims do not advocate violence as claimed (but the non-Muslims may yet provoke violence if they expect it). The antisemitic, racist ideology espoused is only a means to an end, more symptomatic and symbolic than crucial in itself. Charges of foreign and segregationist support are dismissed as "without foundation."

The book becomes most stimulating, but also most controversial, when the author discusses the movement in its larger social and political context. Only through communal initiative he believes can the Negro masses emerge from the deplorable conditions of the ghetto. They can look neither to the Negro middle-class leadership (which he castigates) or to the whites (whose attitudes remain essentially unchanged in the vital areas of housing, employment, etc., even in the North). Thus the author looks favorably at the Muslims as offering a viable appeal to communal initiative. This appeal is successful because it destroys self-hatred and promotes a positive self-image through its rejection of the "American Negro subculture" and its turn toward the African past.

Thus the author joins a flock of other writers who are currently making the "Negro middle-class leaders" a fashionable whipping-boy. In their despair these critics fall into the trap of speaking of "black" and "white" as if the significance of these categories were indeed biological rather than sociological. The author appears to be particularly sanguine concerning the larger ramifications of the movement's support of the segregationist cause and the more subtle influences of "Buy Black" movements, hate talk, etc., on responsible Negro and non-Negro leadership. Like others, he rationalizes any potential dangers from extremist solutions by pointing to the evils that led up to them and the good to which they may lead. The same rationalizations have been made for other movements buttressed by racial ideology whose leaders were, no doubt, also "sincere."

The book is important and certainly required reading for all those concerned with race relations, political sociology, and the dynamics of collective behavior.

Gladys Engel Lang
Queens College

The Story of Fabian Socialism. By MARGARET COLE. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. xv+366. $6.50.

"The Fabians," wrote the British historian G. M. Trevelyan, "were intelligence officers without an army . . . , but they influenced the strategy and even the direction of the great hosts moving under other banners." Through patient and plodding permeation and penetration of the seats of power, they, like the Benthamites of an earlier age, helped to shape and change the body politic of England. It is impossible to write the history of the British welfare state or of the modern Labour party without allotting a large share to the influence of this small band of dedicated intellectuals who through propaganda, research, and practical and often unobtrusive advice to the men of power, helped to remake the social history of England.

Considering the importance of the Fabian movement, it is all the more surprising that it has been little studied so far. The last edition of the pioneering history of Fabianism, by its long-time general secretary, E. R. Pease, was published in 1924. And Anne Freemantle's *This Little Band of Prophets,* though published recently, concentrates on the "heroic period" of the Fabian Society and neglects the last thirty years of its course. Margaret Cole's book, which brings the story up to date, is therefore most welcome. The author brings to her subject an incomparable inside knowledge. She has been one of the leading members and officers of the Fabian Society for many years. In fact, she and her late husband, G. D. H. Cole, played a similar key role in the thirties, forties, and fifties to that Sidney and Beatrice Webb had played before the First World War.

Nearness to one's subject has advantages but also drawbacks. Mrs. Cole provides us with a wealth of intimate detail and shares with the reader her first-hand familiarity with the day-to-day activities, internal feuds, intrigues, and upheavals of the Society; but she has not succeeded in writing a genuinely critical history or in assessing the Fabians' impact within the wider context of English politics. The later chapters especially read, in part, like mere catalogues of officers, publications, and research activities. While this is thus not yet the definitive history of the Fabian Society, it is an important book that certainly provides ample data for future historians.

One can only wish that the publication of this work will stimulate students of social movements as well as sociologists interested in the role of intellectuals in politics to concern themselves with the Fabians. They contributed significantly to that transformation of law, government, and public opinion that changed the England of Gladstone into the England of Attlee and Macmillan. In the light of this historical example, it is hard to maintain that intellectuals are always powerless people, incapable of influencing the course of political events. Boring from within the house of power, the Fabians, these "Jesuits of Socialism," did not conquer the state, but they twisted it considerably to their own ends.

LEWIS A. COSER
Brandeis University

Changing Patterns of Military Politics. Edited by SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. ("International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research," Vol. III.) New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. 272. $7.50.

The greatly increased efforts in social research require new forms of scholarly communication. The "yearbook" that has been standard for some years in other social science disciplines is beginning to develop at the borders of sociology. It is designed as an alternative to the standard scientific journal whose format requires unrelated and brief reports.

The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, under the general editorship of Heinz Eulau, describes itself as an interdisciplinary forum for political scientists, sociologists, and historians concerned with "theory, empirical research and scientific method." Samuel Huntington has edited Volume III on *Changing Patterns of Military Politics,* so as to produce a balance of theoretical and empirical essays. The result is an important volume reflecting the convergence of present thinking without any effort to produce a rigid intellectual approach to a complex problem area.

The basic issues that the seven original studies focus on include (*a*) analysis of the forms of revolutionary and peripheral warfare of the last decade; (*b*) the changing role of the military in domestic affairs; and (*c*) the presentation of materials for the sociology of the mili-

tary profession in Great Britain and France. These latter materials are of special importance for sociologists concerned with cross-national comparisons. In addition, one of the most revelant aspects of the Yearbook is Samuel Huntington's bibliographic essay entitled "Recent Writings in Military Politics—Foci and Corpora," in which he effectively organizes a wide range of materials for students of political sociology and the social consequences of military organization and war.

Three contributions deal directly with theoretical considerations. Huntington himself seeks to update a classic theme in social and political theory, namely, nationalism and warfare. In his essay, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," he traces how wars of "national liberation," often supported by third parties, have become the main form of violence during the period of the development of thermonuclear weapons.

Harold Lasswell re-evaluates his classic concept of the garrison state which he formulated over a quarter of a century ago. Along with the concept of "militarism" he draws upon the notion of "civilianism" as it has come to be used by scholars concerned with the military establishment. Civilianism involves the trend by which the military absorb some of the values of civil society. There is an impressive body of observation and data which indicates that within the military establishment there has been a growth of heterogeneous values and a deglamorizing of the role of violence as an end in and of itself. It is even possible to speak of the decline in belief in the inevitability of violence as evidence of this civilianism trend.

But Lasswell is aware that a partly civilianized military establishment does not automatically adapt itself to the pragmatic requirements of modern international relations. It does not necessarily convert itself from a traditional force into a constabulary force required to reduce the probability of thermonuclear war. Thus, Lasswell, looking back over the last twenty-five years, suggests that the relevance of the garrison-state concept has been enhanced because it has operated as a self-denying prophecy. He suggests that it can function in the same fashion in the next twenty-five years.

The third theoretical essay, by David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," centers on another traditional theme; namely, what forms of military service assist the development of democratic political institutions. He offers the distinction between the "praetorian state," in which an elite operates the instruments of violence and the "nation in arms," where there is widespread involvement in military service. Unfortunately, the number of historical cases investigated is too small to test the meaningfulness of this distinction as a basis for understanding the preconditions for the emergence of political democracy. In fact, it is my belief that the development of political democracy cannot be linked historically to the proposition that mass populations serving in the armed forces strengthen democratic institutions. A more important process is the institutional differentiation of the forces concerned with war and the external enemy and those concerned with domestic police activities and internal order.

The two empirical studies on the military profession in Great Britain and France are valuable because they challenge the simplistic view current in comparative sociology that similar technology produces similar social structures and similar organizational arrangements. These studies underline the extent to which the political system and political events fashion the social stratification and internal organization of the military establishment. In England, the military profession has moved in the direction similar to that of the United States (both becoming more civilianized and more interdependent within the larger society) but presumably at a rate slower than in the United States. In France, the military profession has withdrawn on itself and become much more self-contained and thereby more detached from the fundamental institutions of society.

The essay on the military profession in Great Britain, "Democracy, Technology and the Retired Officer," prepared by Philip Abrams, a young historian with an interest in sociology, deals mainly with the British army officer, and is particularly concerned with the retired officer. He explicitly applies the basic propositions of *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* to the British experience and in general finds them applicable, but at a much slower rate of social change. He is to be commended for the empirical data he has collected, even though necessarily there

are some gaps. His essay represents the movement of literate British gentleman scholarship toward systematic sociological analysis. His findings can be summarized as follows:

1. The British military profession, like the American profession, has moved toward a managerial format and thereby the skill differential between the armed forces and civilian occupations has narrowed. Again, as in the United States, this more so in the Royal Air Force than in the British Army.

2. The authority structure in the military establishment relies more on persuasive techniques; however, the author does not explore this in any depth.

3. The military profession has developed a more explicit political ethos, as in the case of the United States. But it appears that the pressure group and public information activities of the profession are much more limited in England presumably because of the effectiveness of civilian political institutions.

4. On the proposition that there has been a broadening in the social basis of recruitment into the officer cadres, unfortunately the data presented are incomplete. In effect there are two elements in the hypothesis concerning the broadening of the base of social recruitment into the military. First, it deals with the trends within Great Britain. The author does not present adequate trend data, particularly historical comparisons with the period before World War II. The only empirical data he presents on social recruitment are grouped data on the predominance of public school versus grammar school background for the period 1947–58 for entrants to Sandhurst. These data do not include the alternate routes of entrance, the impact of the National Service Act, or recruitment from the ranks. Since the turn of the century, the bits of available data lead to the hypothesis that there has been a gradual decline in the number of upper-class recruits and an increase in the number of middle-class recruits, including the lower-middle-class recruits, into the British military profession. The second element in the hypothesis is the comparison with the United States and here Abrams' point is on sounder ground although adequate data are still required. As compared with the United States, recruitment into the military profession (and one could add other professions as well) from the working class is much more restricted. Thus, although the trend has been toward a broader social basis, it has not penetrated as yet as deeply into the working class as in the United States. This observation is important in view of the popular sociological belief in the United States that the rates of social mobility in the United States and Great Britain are equal.

The most systematic aspects of Abrams' research deal with the employment opportunities of the retired army officer. His findings indicate that while rank is important prior social background also bestows on the retired officer an important advantage. Nevertheless, he concludes that the military profession in Britain is and will have the same difficulties in recruitment and retaining personnel as in the United States. One reason is that the profession itself does not have the necessary social status, but that social status of its members is derived from prior social and family connections.

By contrast, Raoul Girardet's historical essay on "Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic" presents the dramatic story of the strain of the French Army with civil society under the impact of continuous warfare since 1945. As a result the military no longer draws its officers from relatively broad strata of French society. By 1958, half the graduates of St. Cyr came from military families. Self-recruitment can also be seen from the fact that the percentage of captains who rose from the ranks increased from 5.4 per cent in 1949 to 35.8 per cent in 1958. The detachment of the French military from French society is to be measured not only by the process of self-recruitment, but by the profound sense of frustration, a sense of frustration that was elaborated in an ideological theory of revolutionary warfare that had little grounding in the pragmatic realities of military professionalism.

Laurence I. Radway's essay, "Military Behavior in International Organization: NATO's Defense College," analyzes the role of this supernational institution in developing a European community. The author's basic point is that experience at such an educational establishment, rather than service at an international headquarters, broadens officers' perspectives and identification.

Finally, Martha Derthick writes about "Militia Lobby in the Missile Age: The Politics of the National Guard." She points out that the effectiveness of the National Guard lobby is

not based on pressure-group tactics mainly, but on the fact that in the past the National Guard had a military role to play in a nation that was opposed to universal military service.

MORRIS JANOWITZ

University of Chicago

Raum-Staat und Geschichte: Grundlegung der Geopolitik ("Political Space and History: Principles of Geopolitics"). By ADOLF GRABOWSKY. Cologne and Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. Pp. 263.

In this book the distinguished editor of the *Zeitschrift für Politik* and a leading representative of *Geopolitik* gives a concise outline of *Geopolitik* as a scientific method for a study of the role of the dynamic space factor in human history, and particularly in political processes and changes.

The important role of space factor in historical events was already noted in antiquity, but a systematic study of it began only in the nineteenth century (F. Ratzel, R. Kjellèn, and others). This scientific work was replaced, under the Nazi regime, by a pseudo-scientific *Geopolitik* reduced largely to an irrational ideology of justification of Hitler's policies (K. Haushofer & Co.). Fortunately, Dr. Grabowsky and other scholars continued their scientific studies of the complex role of space factor and development of scientific *Geopolitik*. This book is a concise summary of Grabowsky's contributions to this field published by him in several previous volumes. It is also possibly the best account of today's state of scientific *Geopolitik*. According to this account, *Geopolitik* is not a special scientific discipline but a special method of investigation of historical processes generally and of political ones particularly. It views these processes from the standpoint of the "variable of Space" not as a mere empty extension but as a dynamic, living space inherently woven with, and ever present in, all historical processes. This dynamic space incessantly varies in its social and political constructions in accordance with a given constellation of the dynamic forces of history.

This somewhat abstract thesis is brilliantly developed and in a concrete detail documented in the book through careful analysis of the past, but especially of the recent states and of the how and the why of their being such as they are and of the changes in their structures and interrelationships. Among many enlightening analyses of political realities particularly significant is Grabowsky's geopolitical interpretation of our time as the epoch of the imperialistic world powers whose "social imperialism" is quite different from previous forms of imperialistic policies. In the light of this interpretation both the United States and the USSR appear to belong to this class of "socially imperialistic powers," whose visible space (territory) is enormously extended by the invisible "spheres of interests."

In a short review it is quite impossible to do justice to the extraordinary richness, originality, erudition, and astounding range of the problems discussed in the book. It suffices to say that it is a work to be studied by political scientists and practical politicians as well as by sociologists and social scientists.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

Research Center in Creative Altruism Harvard University

The International System: Theoretical Essays. Edited by KLAUS KNORR and SIDNEY VERBA. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1961. Pp. 237. $5.00.

This book is a collection of ten essays by ten distinguished writers in the field with a brief introduction by the editors. It is impossible to do justice to such a work in a brief review, for each one of the ten essays deserves examination at length. Perhaps, however, what a work in this field requires is not justice but mercy. The editors point out timidly that "the road to a theory of international relations will be a long one. This volume leaves us still far from the goal but, hopefully, somewhat farther along on the journey" (p. 5). With the first of these propositions there will be little dissent.

The essays fall into three main groups. The first consists of three essays centering on game theory, by Arthur L. Burns, Thomas C. Schelling, and Richard E. Quandt. Considering the reputation of these authors, the essays are disappointing. I would recommend both Burns and Schelling to the parlor-game market, but neither of them explained what they have

learned, if anything, from their ingenious exercises. As Quandt remarks, "models of this kind are quite far removed from the realities of international relations" (p. 74), but even Quandt does not offer anything better.

The second group of essays—by Morton A. Kaplan, J. David Singer, and Fred W. Riggs—might be described as methodological. Here again, the level of performance seems to fall below the capabilities of the authors. There seems to be something about methodology in all fields that produces quite astonishing corruption of the linguistic medium. With Riggs this corruption develops into something that can only be called *neologarroea*—an uncontrollable output of new words, coupled with an unrestrained astonishment at the mysteries of ordinary meaning; thus we have "Using Lasswell's terminology, let us call those who exercise effective control in a body politic *rulers* and those whom they rule, the *ruled*" (p. 150). By the time we have shouldered our way from fused, prismatic, and refracted societies, through Olipolar and Polypolar systems, to the subtle but important concept of the "clect" the reader is apt to emerge slightly shaken. This is a pity because Riggs almost certainly has something important to say if he can once find his way through the dark taxonomic wood. He at least peoples the international stage with a much more exciting cast of characters than is usually presented. I cannot ascertain from Kaplan's essay whether he has anything to say—if he has, our wavelengths differ. Singer's essay is thoughtful, sensible, and the best written of the group and makes one simple and effective point: that international systems can be studied either from the point of view of the single nation or from the point of view of the system as an interacting whole.

The third set of essays, and to this reviewer's mind the best, consists of four essays on particular problems. There is a sensible piece by the coeditor, Sidney Verba, on rationality and non-rationality in international systems that perhaps should be put in the second of my three categories. There is a thoughtful piece by George Modelski on "Agraria and Industria" which puts the international system in its social and economic setting. There is a perceptive essay by Charles A. McClelland on "The Acute International Crisis," as a species in the international system fauna, and there is a thoughtful but depressing essay on "International Systems and International Law" by Stanley Hoffmann.

It is a hopeful sign that these essays were written and published at all in view of the all-too-recent antitheoretical bias of the study of international relations. It is hopeful, too, that the essays betray a certain air of feverish search which often presages a major theoretical advance. There is clearly a struggle going on to define the relevant concepts and the right levels of abstraction. A process like this has to go up a good many blind alleys, of which one suspects the power concept and the game concept may be examples. One is struck by the total absence of spatial concepts in view of the highly geographical nature of the field and also by the almost complete absence of any concepts that could be subject to quantification. There is an absence also of any sense that international relations might be part of a general theory of conflict. We can at least, I think, give the editors and the authors an A for effort and two cheers for going in the right general direction.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

University of Michigan

Caste, Class and Occupation. By G. S. GHURYE. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961. Pp. xvi+356. Rs. 20.00.

The Scheduled Tribes. By G. S. GHURYE. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959. Pp. xvi+288. Rs. 18.75.

Gods and Men. By G. S. GHURYE. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1962. Pp. xii+300. Rs. 20.00.

In 1923 G. S. Ghurye wrote a paper on "Ethnic Theory of Caste" as one of the papers required for the Ph.D. at Cambridge. Now, as professor emeritus of the University of Bombay, he is still working on the same complex of problems. One might say that he has spent his career on a growing book. *Caste and Race in India* (1932) became in a later edition *Caste and Class in India*. Occupation has now been added to the title, and is the subject of a chapter. New material has been added on the Scheduled Castes, formerly known as the depressed or untouchable classes; on class and on the future of caste.

Ghurye's theories concerning the relation of

race and caste are already well known. He has not altered them. In more recent editions what he has done is to broaden the field of his work so as to make it in effect the social structure of India and to bring his facts and his ideas in line with the many great changes which have occurred during his career. The reader will find in the present edition an informative chapter on the caste composition of certain occupations and on the occupational distribution of some castes. The Brahmins, who are thought of as at the top, reach down to all levels of work. Some castes of lower standing also show a wide occupational spread. Yet there is a strong representation of some castes in the traditional occupation. The effect appears that of some dispersion, a breaking-down of boundaries, around several tough cores.

Perhaps the strongest impression one gets from Ghurye's work is that of a complex living society which was never as rigid as pictured, but in which many traditional sentiments and practices stubbornly persist. A new Constitution provides that no one is to be discriminated against because of caste; but there are riots when untouchables try to draw water from the village well. Need one mention another equalitarian Constitution often observed in the breach! Yet other evidence is given showing that the fictions of purity and pollution are rapidly disappearing in many groups and places.

Ghurye has lately revised and renamed another of his books. *The Aborigines—"So-called"—and Their Future* (1943; reviewed in this *Journal*, L, 158) has now become *The Scheduled Tribes*, in keeping with a change in name and policy under the independent government of India. In the original Ghurye protested against treating these peoples as poverty-stricken museum pieces, an attitude which he insisted lay in the very name *aborigines* as well as in British policy toward them. Under the new Constitution they are renamed, and a policy of integrating them into Indian society and economy has been declared. The tribes of yesterday are apparently, in India as elsewhere, the social problems of today.

One always finds in Ghurye's works a tremendous erudition and a spirit of comparison. He knows Western sociological and anthropological works thoroughly and uses ideas and data from them to enliven his work on India. One also finds a deep human concern for the people of India, of all ranks and conditions, combined with a sobering objectivity concerning the directions and rates of change.

When I say that Ghurye has spent his life cultivating one book—on Indian social structure and its changes—I do not mean to overlook or belittle the many volumes he has written on other topics, including Indian art and costume. Indeed, he has just now published *Gods and Men*, an erudite discussion of the special nature, social functions, and ethnic and social origins of the Hindu gods. I merely mean to emphasize that his main contribution has been a developing analysis of the social organization of India.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

Brandeis University

The Sacred Complex in Hindu Gaya. By L P VIDYARTHI. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961. Pp. xxiv+232. $4.50.

In his *Peasant Society and Culture* Redfield has described the relationship between the great tradition and the little tradition in a civilization. Following this model Professor Vidyarthi has studied the sacred complex of Hindu Gaya which is one of the important places of pilgrimage in India. The sacred complex consists of the sacred places of worship, sacred performance, and the sacred specialist. The author has set up three hypotheses: (1) that the sacred complex of a Hindu place of pilgrimage reflects a level of continuity, compromise, and combination between great and little traditions, (2) that the sacred specialists transmit certain elements of the great tradition to the rural population, (3) that the sacred complex has been in the process of modification and transformation as a result of general developments in Hindu civilization.

The work gives the results of an investigation in the city of Gaya in 1952–56. Indeed, the book is not a mere description of a Hindu complex but is an attempt to fit the data to a series of hypotheses that have been set up As such the book is of considerable theoretical interest.

The numerous sacred centers within the city have been described. It is stated that many of these centers are Sanskritic and consequent-

ly belong to the great tradition. There are others which have grown out of folk or little traditions. The existence of all these together within sacred segments is cited as evidence of "an intricate combination of the great tradition with the little tradition." Moreover the existence of some places of worship with folk origin within the greater sacred World of Gaya has been taken as evidence of a continuity of little tradition with great tradition. But in order to establish the combination and continuity, it is necessary to go to the folk areas of origin and to trace the entire process by which folk elements of tradition have found their way to the sacred city and have themselves been transformed to a higher synthesis through the agency of the sacred intelligentsia.

The role of religious teachers who have visited Gaya has been described as being one of disseminator of sacred knowledge. On the one hand, they have influenced the Gaya priests, and, on the other, have kept the current of religion flowing in the Hindu world. It appears that the Gaya priests, known as the Gayawal, have hardly any part to play in this process of spreading the great tradition. As such, the second hypothesis, that the sacred specialists transmit elements of great tradition, is not substantiated.

The author is on firm ground when he describes the effect of changes in modern India on the Gayawal and his sacred way of life. There has been an increased secularization under the influence of Western urbanism so that fewer and fewer people feel the need for visits to Gaya. The Gayawal themselves lose faith in their sacred performances, and many look for alternative means of livelihood. The secular changes are natural. But it is doubtful that the different kinds of relationship described as Sanskritic, feudal and proletarian, can be phases of a linear development.

The book ends with seven case studies which are quite interesting and informative. These would be more valuable if an analysis were given. As they are presented it is hard to tell what these case studies signify.

SANTI PRIYA BOSE

Socio-agro-economic Research Organization
Department of Agriculture
Calcutta

Peasant Marketing in Java. By ALICE G. DEWEY. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xxi+238. $6.00.

This book is the third in a series of publications arising out of the research of the MIT Center for International Studies, Indonesia Field Project. It is an essay in economic anthropology of the new type—the study of an advanced society more or less typical of a country's majority population. For while the field work was limited to "Modjokuto" (pseudonym for a small city in East Java), much of what Dr. Dewey describes can be found throughout east and central Java. In her preface, Miss Dewey explains why studies of this kind are so rare: Economists have thus far been interested in the over-all problems of underdevelopment, compared with which "peasant markets are obscure," while anthropologists "have worked mostly with culturally primitive people living in small self-contained groups." Miss Dewey's study is all the more welcome because it addresses itself to some of the questions which plague the economist interested in underdeveloped countries.

It would be too much to expect for Dr. Dewey's economic analysis to be impeccable throughout. Her discussion of factor proportions is rather confused. The market system, she says, is adjusted to the factor endowment; and while it is "technologically inefficient," it it "economically efficient" because it substitutes cheap resources for scarce and expensive ones. But if it is really the least expensive form of organization, what makes it technologically inefficient? In saying that the system is less capital-intensive than the Western ones, does she mean that the capital-labor ratio is lower, or that the capital-output ratio is lower? Studies in other countries have shown that in many fields of economic activity the technology with the lower capital-labor ratio has a higher capital-output ratio and is therefore inefficient in terms of economizing on the use of scarce factors. Is the same true of the Javanese market? If it is not true, and capital-output ratios are low, how can it be regarded as technologically inferior?

Miss Dewey also gets herself into trouble in talking about the "need for cash." At times she seems to use "cash" in the Keynesian sense of "finance," or liquid capital; according to Miss Dewey, this function gives cash "a higher

value for many purposes than would be indicated by simply assessing the purchasing power in relation to the common staples." How is this "higher value" measured? At other times, she speaks of a "need for cash" simply in terms of a desire for higher income. "Since barter is virtually nonexistent, needs can only be met with an outlay of cash, and cash is perennially in short supply among Javanese." In this sense, cash is perennially in short supply in the United States as well; very few people have all the money they want. "The Javanese," she continues, "are caught between their own rising aspirations and a deteriorating economic situation. Since most of the newly acquired wants are for western-style goods which can be acquired only through the shops and markets, the demand for cash increases while income decreases." If she means here the demand for cash as an asset, on the liquidity or transactions motive, the statement is just plain wrong. The Javanese peasants do not want more cash to hold as an asset in the face of falling incomes. What this statement presumably means is that the Javanese, like anybody else, feel more sharply the need for a higher income when their incomes fall. A somewhat more meaningful interpretation of "demand for cash" would be the supply of effort. Falling incomes may result in an increase in the supply of effort, as people move downward along the backward-bending portion of their supply curve. The main point, however, is that Dr. Dewey provides no evidence for her observations about demand for cash, and indeed ordinary anthropological research could hardly provide it.

Other observations on economic activity, while not wrong, seem uninteresting because they apply equally well to advanced societies. In Manhattan as well as in Java "wage labor takes on a special significance in view of high unemployment and the desire for cash." In Mississippi as in Java a farmer who wastes time doing nothing does so for the simple reason that there is no remunerative work to be done. In almost any society many people prefer to invest in real estate because "it cannot be lost, stolen, or destroyed and owning land in itself often confers prestige." And the purchase of clothes and jewelry with surplus income is certainly not unknown in Washington and New York.

What can economists learn from a study of this kind? To the reviewer the main lesson is that economists ought not to worry too much about assumed differences in economic behavior as between one society and another, particularly as between advanced and underdeveloped countries. Most of the behavior described by Miss Dewey fits perfectly well into orthodox economic analysis. She appears to agree with this assessment of her own results. In her Appendix A, which the reviewer found the most interesting part of the book, she rejects Boeke's thesis that Western economics is inapplicable in Asian societies. She also takes the reviewer to task, with complete justice, on two points. First, she chides me for assuming that the extended family necessarily dilutes incentives to save, invest, work, and restrict family size. Second, she denies that "the attitude that a gentleman does not sully his hands in trade" is always discouraging to the emergence of a capitalist class. In self-defense, I can only say that when I wrote the offending paragraphs, many economists were saying the same, and there were not as yet good anthropological studies to offset them. Dr. Dewey will find neither of these comments in my more recent writings.

With the closing remarks in this Appendix, the reviewer is in complete agreement:

> This study demonstrates again that economic theory is not only useful but essential to any analysis of nonwestern economic systems. In applying this theory it is necessary to use great care in ascertaining the facts, however, for appearances may be deceptive.

B. HIGGINS

University of Texas

East Indians in Trinidad: A Study of Cultural Persistence. By MORTON KLASS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. xxvii +265. $6.00.

This well-written volume describes life in an East Indian community of more than 4,000 persons in Trinidad, British West Indies. Klass lived for almost a year in 1957–58 among these descendents of nineteenth-century immigrants from India. During this period he collected an enormous amount of village gossip and other information through the usual techniques of

anthropological field work. But to his credit he went further than this, conducting a census of the village and interviewing a 15 per cent sample of households. Longer interviews were held with numerous persons of importance in business, professions, and government. Unfortunately, we have no idea how systematic his questioning was in either the short or long interviews.

The aim of the author is to explain how East Indian culture traits have survived for so long and become a part of the present-day social organization of the community. There are chapters on the village, the community at work, marriage and the family, religion, and community organization.

In his foreword to this fascinating little volume Conrad M. Arensberg concludes: "The usefulness of community studies is the usefulness of any scientific tool: to document the real and help us discover the unexpected. Art and method must conspire if the promise is to be fulfilled. I think they have conspired here." To call community studies a scientific tool is perhaps misleading: A community study is not a scientific tool. Several other statements by Arensberg are meaningless. Klass was sometimes a participant observer and sometimes a non-participant observer. How he differs from the journalist or historian lies in the conceptual framework within which he has made his observations.

East Indians in Trinidad would better have stood alone without the assistance of a foreword containing so many misconceptions about the nature of scientific social research and the role of community studies. Sociologists and anthropologists are aware of the fact that two participant observers or non-participant observers can place their hand on the pulse of the community for a year and that they are no more likely to be in agreement in their conclusion than are two psychiatrists who have ministered to the same person. Fortunately, Arensberg points out that the claims he has made for *East Indians in Trinidad* go beyond the modest goals set forth by its author.

Without pretense of doing more than he has done, Klass has simply presented what he has learned about the social structure of a community of East Indians who live in semi-social isolation from the West Indian villages surrounding them and who have an economic basis for the independence that they claim to value so highly.

This volume has an attractive format and is strikingly illustrated by Angela Conner.

LYLE W. SHANNON

University of Wisconsin

Africa: The Politics of Independence. By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN. New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. xv+173. $1.25.

The pace of events in Africa these past few years has been so swift that surveys of its political conditions have to tumble over each other to keep up. Professor Wallerstein is right in thinking that there was room for a quick survey such as he offers here upon developments in Africa in the early aftermath of the attainment of independence by major parts of it. Very rightly he insists that the story must begin in the precolonial period. It is a pity, however, that he should lend credence to the notion that in the more modern period African "nations" have "regained" their independence (p. 12), since this is a basic misconception. The major truth about African politics today is rather that they are engaged in the painful task of reducing their number from (on a conservative estimate) 600 to 700 to about 30 or 40. Much of the "politics of independence" is about precisely this, as Wallerstein knows well; for, in another place, when talking about political leaders, he makes the excellent point that "the hero helps to bridge the gap to the modern state. The citizens can feel an affection for the hero which they may not have at first for the nation." He also makes the important point that "popular participation [in the political arena] is one of the tools the party uses to achieve national integration."

It is here, and elsewhere, that he presents a summary of present understandings about the political tempo of Africa that is at once readable, useful, and informative. Thus he discusses Pan-Africanism and, rightly too, the very important strands of cultural revival. But he is somewhat chary of novel and arresting comments upon such phenomena; yet they are plainly linked; they are both concerned with establishing (in Nkrumah's phrase) a "personality" which shall be distinctly African;

and they are aimed at filling that aching void, which an Indian, for example, fills from his own so very much more patent religious, philosophical, cultural, and historical heritage with so very much less difficulty.

There is one aspect of the "politics of independence" which Wallerstein virtually ignores—the ordinary African peasant. The suggestion is that he is the object of manipulation by parties and heroes on behalf of ideologies like nationalism, Pan-Africanism, etc. This is in the best tradition of "bourgeois" political science: "know the leader, know the party, and you know the country's politics." I can only speak with any confidence about East Africa; but there the vital importance of the distinctive interests of the peasantry is overlooked at peril. May it not be so in other parts of Africa?

D. A. Low

Australian National University

The Konkomba of Northern Ghana. By David Tait. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xviii+255. $6.75.

We sometimes forget how little ethnographic work has been done. Whenever we turn to these monographs for data to enable us to study comparatively the functions of a given social institution, or the process of social change and modernization, or the history and present social structure of a contemporary nation, we are caught up short by the gaps in research, the unequal quality of the work, the difficulties of matching the various terminologies.

When, therefore, the academic world loses at an early age a gifted ethnologist, it is a real loss and should be noted as such. Such a man was David Tait, whose special interest was in a relatively neglected people, the Konkomba who live in northern Ghana and Togo. We should be thus especially grateful to Jack Goody, himself an ethnologist of distinction who has been working in the same general geographic area, that he has made available to us in collected form some of the work Tait was able to complete in his seven years in Ghana.

The Konkomba are a society with a minimum of political structure, whose standards and sanctions "were at no time laid down by a legislature, are not interpreted by a judiciary and are not enforced by an executive." The Konkomba system is "a segmentary system of long-enduring, unilineal descent groups which are localized, corporate units with political functions."

This book serves then as a good reference work on one tribal group. Tait treats the political system (including relations with neighboring peoples, the territorial organization, the clan and lineage system, the tribal system), the domestic organization, and some ritual institutions. The book also includes a bibliography of other writings on the Konkomba.

Unfortunately there is comparatively little discussion of the impact of the colonial system on the Konkomba, although some reference is made to the effect of the growing trade carried on in Konkomba markets.

Unfortunately also, unless one is reading such ethnology in search of specific comparative data or because of interest in a particular area or people, such works tend to be limited in their intellectual stimulation.

Immanuel Wallerstein

Columbia University

Projective Techniques and Cross-cultural Research. By Gardner Lindzey. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961. Pp. ix +339. $6.50.

This volume originated at the invitation of the former Committee on Social Behavior of the Social Science Research Council, though it has had additional sponsorship between that time and its completion. Its intention is to examine the problems and the contributions stemming from recent extensive use of projective techniques in cross-cultural research While the book is essentially addressed to the use of these techniques in anthropological research, it has considerable relevance for anyone in the broader behavioral science field who attempts to deal with both cultural variables and personality variables and who contemplates the use of projective instruments. Its treatment of the definition and nature of projective techniques, its discussion of the efforts to relate these instruments to psychological theory, its analysis of nonpersonality factors influencing responses, its consideration of precautions in interpretation—all of these issues broaden the

volume and make it as important for the psychologist in a specific clinical setting as for the anthropologist undertaking cross-cultural work on broader theoretical issues.

As Lindzey comments, the book is somewhat of a survey, in that it summarizes a great deal of research in this area; it is in part a critique, in that it identifies misuses and special problems of the techniques; and it is also a cookbook, in that it provides the research person with information about the advantages and the hazards of undertaking cross-cultural research with these methods. While only occasionally does the point arise—and then only regarding other methods in comparison with projective technique data—the points made often have considerable relevance for all data-gathering devices in the cross-cultural field.

These various objectives should not lead one to anticipate a scattered or diffuse volume, however. The treatment of review, criticism, and advice has been excellently integrated around a well-developed, and interestingly written, plot line which leads the specialist, as well as the non-specialist, through this complex field with surety. The author first traces the introduction of projective instruments into anthropological research, identifying various theoretical issues and specific research topics responsible for this convergence of interests. The discussion here revolves around the joint interest of psychologist and anthropologist in psychoanalytic theory, in a holistic view, and in the subjective reality of events, the environment as it is perceived by a subject. In terms of content the author notes the convergence of interest around the study of culture and personality wherein the empirical study of cultural variables has been joined with the study of personality variables.

In the immediately following sections, Lindzey presents a fully developed discussion of the characteristics of the projective techniques as stimulus situations and a categorization and description of various available instruments. These two sections will be of importance for the specialist as well as the novice. The chapter dealing with the theoretical foundations of projective instruments will perhaps convey more to the psychological specialist than to others, and for him it will be an important chapter. In it, Lindzey describes various efforts to relate projective techniques to broader bodies of theory—centrally psychoanalytic, stimulus-response, and perception theory—and to certain assumptions involved in the use of the instruments. The gist of this chapter is that various theories of projective techniques bear a clear relationship to general psychological thinking at certain points, but at no point is there a coherent and explicit statement integrating psychological theory with practice and findings in the area. The interpretive process is then reviewed. Here the central focus is upon the linking of variation in test response to appropriate determinants or antecedent conditions. This leads the author into specific discussion of chance factors determining response, to the influence of temporary affective states, to determinants residing in the stimulus itself (as opposed to internal personality determinants stimulated by it), to response sets and to other situational factors, including those of the relation between examiner and subject. In sum, Lindzey concludes that it is hazardous to interpret projective techniques without considerable information about the circumstances under which the responses were gathered and that it is imperative to examine the influence of non-personality factors. In a chapter focusing specifically upon the case against projective techniques in cross-cultural work, Lindzey does a particularly important service in distinguishing between proper and pointed criticisms in the contemporary literature and criticisms that are either unwarranted by logic or evidence or so general as to apply to most data-gathering circumstances.

In his longest and most detailed chapter on the actual applications in cross-cultural work, the author reviews large body of published studies. His list is extensive but is limited to studies using projective techniques in a non-literate or cross-cultural setting, excepting those studies which deal exclusively with European or modern American societies. In this analysis he uses the issues which developed from his previous commentaries on the nature of projective techniques and of the various factors possibly determinant of response. Each study is reviewed in terms of the questions: (1) Is there a full description of the circumstances of the testing? (2) Is a language interpreter employed? (3) Is the relation between the testing situation and the cultural context of the study explored? (4) Is the process of making personality inferences specified? (5) Is the projective technique scored according to a scheme which has some demonstrable sensitivity and stability? (6) Is the presentation of

nd they are aimed at filling that aching void, which an Indian, for example, fills from his wn so very much more patent religious, hilosophical, cultural, and historical heritage with so very much less difficulty.

There is one aspect of the "politics of independence" which Wallerstein virtually ignores—the ordinary African peasant. The suggestion is that he is the object of manipulation by parties and heroes on behalf of ideologies like nationalism, Pan-Africanism, tc. This is in the best tradition of "bourgeois" olitical science: "know the leader, know the arty, and you know the country's politics." can only speak with any confidence about ast Africa; but there the vital importance f the distinctive interests of the peasantry overlooked at peril. May it not be so in ther parts of Africa?

D. A. Low

ustralian National University

---

he Konkomba of Northern Ghana. By David Tait. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xviii+255. $6.75.

We sometimes forget how little ethnographic ork has been done. Whenever we turn to iese monographs for data to enable us to udy comparatively the functions of a given icial institution, or the process of social iange and modernization, or the history and esent social structure of a contemporary ition, we are caught up short by the gaps in search, the unequal quality of the work, ie difficulties of matching the various terminologies.

When, therefore, the academic world loses an early age a gifted ethnologist, it is a al loss and should be noted as such. Such man was David Tait, whose special interest as in a relatively neglected people, the Konmba who live in northern Ghana and Togo. 'e should be thus especially grateful to Jack oody, himself an ethnologist of distinction io has been working in the same general ographic area, that he has made available to in collected form some of the work Tait is able to complete in his seven years in iana.

The Konkomba are a society with a minium of political structure, whose standards d sanctions "were at no time laid down by a legislature, are not interpreted by a judiciary and are not enforced by an executive." The Konkomba system is "a segmentary system of long-enduring, unilineal descent groups which are localized, corporate units with political functions."

This book serves then as a good reference work on one tribal group. Tait treats the political system (including relations with neighboring peoples, the territorial organization, the clan and lineage system, the tribal system), the domestic organization, and some ritual institutions. The book also includes a bibliography of other writings on the Konkomba

Unfortunately there is comparatively little discussion of the impact of the colonial system on the Konkomba, although some reference is made to the effect of the growing trade carried on in Konkomba markets.

Unfortunately also, unless one is reading such ethnology in search of specific comparative data or because of interest in a particular area or people, such works tend to be limited in their intellectual stimulation.

Immanuel Wallerstein

Columbia University

Projective Techniques and Cross-cultural Research. By Gardner Lindzey. New York. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961. Pp. ix +339. $6.50.

This volume originated at the invitation of the former Committee on Social Behavior of the Social Science Research Council, though it has had additional sponsorship between that time and its completion. Its intention is to examine the problems and the contributions stemming from recent extensive use of projective techniques in cross-cultural research While the book is essentially addressed to the use of these techniques in anthropological research, it has considerable relevance for anyone in the broader behavioral science field who attempts to deal with both cultural variables and personality variables and who contemplates the use of projective instruments. Its treatment of the definition and nature of projective techniques, its discussion of the efforts to relate these instruments to psychological theory, its analysis of nonpersonality factors influencing responses, its consideration of precautions in interpretation—all of these issues broaden the

volume and make it as important for the psychologist in a specific clinical setting as for the anthropologist undertaking cross-cultural work on broader theoretical issues.

As Lindzey comments, the book is somewhat of a survey, in that it summarizes a great deal of research in this area; it is in part a critique, in that it identifies misuses and special problems of the techniques; and it is also a cookbook, in that it provides the research person with information about the advantages and the hazards of undertaking cross-cultural research with these methods. While only occasionally does the point arise—and then only regarding other methods in comparison with projective technique data—the points made often have considerable relevance for all data-gathering devices in the cross-cultural field.

These various objectives should not lead one to anticipate a scattered or diffuse volume, however. The treatment of review, criticism, and advice has been excellently integrated around a well-developed, and interestingly written, plot line which leads the specialist, as well as the non-specialist, through this complex field with surety. The author first traces the introduction of projective instruments into anthropological research, identifying various theoretical issues and specific research topics responsible for this convergence of interests. The discussion here revolves around the joint interest of psychologist and anthropologist in psychoanalytic theory, in a holistic view, and in the subjective reality of events, the environment as it is perceived by a subject. In terms of content the author notes the convergence of interest around the study of culture and personality wherein the empirical study of cultural variables has been joined with the study of personality variables.

In the immediately following sections, Lindzey presents a fully developed discussion of the characteristics of the projective techniques as stimulus situations and a categorization and description of various available instruments. These two sections will be of importance for the specialist as well as the novice. The chapter dealing with the theoretical foundations of projective instruments will perhaps convey more to the psychological specialist than to others, and for him it will be an important chapter. In it, Lindzey describes various efforts to relate projective techniques to broader bodies of theory—centrally psychoanalytic, stimulus-response, and perception theory—and to certain assumptions involved in the use of the instruments. The gist of this chapter is that various theories of projective techniques bear a clear relationship to general psychological thinking at certain points, but at no point is there a coherent and explicit statement integrating psychological theory with practice and findings in the area. The interpretive process is then reviewed. Here the central focus is upon the linking of variation in test response to appropriate determinants or antecedent conditions. This leads the author into specific discussion of chance factors determining response, to the influence of temporary affective states, to determinants residing in the stimulus itself (as opposed to internal personality determinants stimulated by it), to response sets and to other situational factors, including those of the relation between examiner and subject. In sum, Lindzey concludes that it is hazardous to interpret projective techniques without considerable information about the circumstances under which the responses were gathered and that it is imperative to examine the influence of non-personality factors. In a chapter focusing specifically upon the case against projective techniques in cross-cultural work, Lindzey does a particularly important service in distinguishing between proper and pointed criticisms in the contemporary literature and criticisms that are either unwarranted by logic or evidence or so general as to apply to most data-gathering circumstances.

In his longest and most detailed chapter on the actual applications in cross-cultural work, the author reviews a large body of published studies. His list is extensive but is limited to studies using projective techniques in a non-literate or cross-cultural setting, excepting those studies which deal exclusively with European or modern American societies. In this analysis he uses the issues which developed from his previous commentaries on the nature of projective techniques and of the various factors possibly determinant of response. Each study is reviewed in terms of the questions: (1) Is there a full description of the circumstances of the testing? (2) Is a language interpreter employed? (3) Is the relation between the testing situation and the cultural context of the study explored? (4) Is the process of making personality inferences specified? (5) Is the projective technique scored according to a scheme which has some demonstrable sensitivity and stability? (6) Is the presentation of

the findings quantitative or qualitative? (7) Does the investigator make a serious attempt to assess the role of non-personality factors? (8) Are the findings explored from the point of view of alternative hypotheses? (9) Is the analyst familiar with the culture? (10) Is the analyst aware of the prior hypotheses or expectations of the study? (11) Are the personality findings integrated with other data and findings?

It should be understood that Lindzey does not apply this list of criteria slavishly, nor does a "No" answer to any single one lead to his dismissal of the study as pointless. This chapter gives the fullest and most explicit summary of such work available in the literature, an analysis made especially pointed by the framework of queries indicated above.

From a purely evaluative scientific viewpoint, Lindzey concludes that the projective techniques are insufficient for those with "a cathexis for rigor and empirical control." On the other hand, for those who are interested in sensitive speculation, the projective techniques "have made defensible contributions to anthropological research and . . . their continued use is fully warranted. While he observes that such examples are few in number, he expresses the personal feeling that "studies involving the most sophisticated use of these instruments . . . provide a clear justification for the anthropologist displaying a renewed interest in projective techniques."

In a volume so exhaustive in its inclusions and in its analysis of the pros and cons, criticism seems almost pointless, as well redundant. The reviewer would, however, call attention to three points which seem to him undertreated by Lindzey. The first is that the analysis of the situational and other non-personality contributions to response deals primarily with studies in which the variations noted stem from counts of specific content variables and not from studies in which situational variations produce inconsistent *interpretation* differences While the evidence for it is lacking, it seems possible to wonder to what degree some, but only some, of the variations would disappear where the criterion for sameness or difference resided in personality interpretations as opposed to response content. Related to this is a second broader issue of the contribution to validity (or its absence) made by the conceptual framework of personality or social variables in terms of which the projective technique is analyzed. This framework, intervening between response and finding, becomes particularly crucial when data from another source are to be compared for purposes of determining the interrelations of instruments or the soundness of findings.

Third, and perhaps ungraciously considering the tremendous task actually so successfully done, the volume is essentially psychological in nature rather than anthropological. This is entirely reasonable in the light of the discipline base in psychology of the projective techniques and of many of the investigators whose work is reviewed. However, ethnographic data have most frequently been used as criteria for validity, and Lindzey points specifically to the desirability of the tie-in to ethnographic data In fact, prominent among the studies which he views as most successful are those characterized by a systematic relating of personality and ethnographic information. The nature and problems inherent in these criterion data and in the field-work setting in which they are collected, however, seem somewhat lightly treated.

This book is an important one for the cross-cultural research field and for projective techniques, both in their cross-cultural and domestic use. It points up, mercilessly but without malice, the past faults and inadequacies At the same time it describes precisely the desiderata for future work. These faults and desiderata reside within both the projective and the anthropological fields. Their presentation in this pointed and lucid form should result in future collaborative work more specific and purposeful with regard to the scientific issues in the area of culture and personality

William E. Henry

University of Chicago

Crimes et villes: Étude statistique de la criminalité urbaine et rurale en France et en Belgique ("Crimes and Cities: Statistical Study of Urban and Rural Criminality in France and in Belgium"). By Denis Szabo. Louvain: Éditions Cujas, 1961. Pp. 242.

This is a very dull and relatively unimportant book, in which masses of statistics are combined with ex post facto explanations in a

manner unlikely to excite most American sociologists.

The book is Szabo's doctoral dissertation at Louvain, conducted in the style, but without the skill, of Durkheim. Crime and urbanism in France and Belgium are compared with a large number of other social variables, generally by means of the visual inspection of graphs, and the correlations observed or not observed are explained.

The principal methological contribution of the book is the Adjusted Urbanization Index (*TUA*), which is meant to comprehend the "essential elements" in the definition of urbanism. It is computed for a (French) region by dividing the proportion living in centers over 5,000 population by the proportion engaged in agriculture, all multiplied by an arbitrary coefficient varying with the size and number of towns in the region. The Index is obviously affected by the size of the unit being measured, among other things. For reasons only vaguely conveyed, Szabo uses the density of the principal center, rather than size and number of towns, in computing the arbitrary coefficient for Belgium. The correlation of the Index with its individual components is never given, and this reviewer wonders if the assumed advantages of the *TUA* over a simpler index compensate for its complexity.

The dependent variable—the crime rate—is measured by proportion of criminal convictions [*sic*] in the total population over eighteen years of age. If criminal statistics in the two countries studied approximate those in the United States, a suspicion of correlations with this index is certainly warranted.

Szabo finds a rank correlation of .57 between crime and urbanism. Significant positive correlations are also found between crime and the population living by transport and industry, the divorce rate, infant mortality, the standard of living, the proportion of foreigners in the population, and tuberculosis. Negative correlations appear between crime and sparseness of population and religious occupations. There are no significant correlations between crime and mental illness, illiteracy, the number of children, suicide, alcoholism, and Communist or MRP votes. Urbanism is correlated positively with employment in transport and industry, divorce, standard of living, tuberculosis, Communist votes, infant mortality, and proportion of foreigners; negatively with sparse population, religious occupations, mental illness, and alcoholism. Each correlation is discussed in detail, but the explanations are unconvincing. For instance, the lack of correlation between crime and the number of children is explained by the speculation that large families may come about for reasons of carelessness or religious practice. Evidently, says Szabo, those families that are large because of carelessness are crimogenic, but the resulting crimes are balanced by the good behavior of the religious families.

Szabo also inquires into specific types of crimes. In France, urbanism is positively correlated with crimes against property and negatively with crimes of violence. Crimes against the family, those related to occupations, those related to "underdevelopment" and those against property show little or no correlation with urbanism.

Correlations between the factors are compared over time, between France and Belgium, and within smaller regions. Szabo concludes that the relation between crime and urbanism varies with the temporal, regional, and national context. The increasing social integration of the cities and the diminution of the differences between city and country are supposedly diminishing the association of crime and urbanism.

In several instances, correlations claimed by Szabo on the basis of his graphs are apparent to the reader only with great generosity and self-persuasion. Misspellings, mislabeling, and numerical misprints add to the frustrations of reading this book.

H. LAURENCE ROSS

New York University

In Search of Criminology. By LEON RADZINOWICZ. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. vii+254. $4.75.

This is an impressionistic report of the state of criminology in selected countries of Europe and in the United States. It is based upon first-hand discussions with numerous informants, upon memoranda obtained by correspondence, and upon a variety of published and unpublished materials. The content is divided into eight chapters, followed by many pages of detailed notes, three appendixes, and a bibliog-

raphy. There are some rare items of historical interest; a considerable number of specific references to unfamiliar names, conferences, research projects, action programs, institutes, and publications; plus some free-wheeling criticism and a few constructive ideas. Although the subject matter lacks popular appeal, the report is of sufficient value to be worthy of public record.

In general, the findings of the "international" survey suggest that the advancement of criminology as an academic field is shackled by a maze of outmoded thinking, vested interests, short-sighted economic practices, intellectual immaturity, and the mass production of unimaginative writings. Each nation visited by Radzinowicz was found wanting, although there were some signs of forward movement.

Italy, the homeland of Lombroso, Garofalo, and Ferri, is content to subordinate the study of crime to the more urgent subject of law, the latter continuing to be rooted in classical notions of free will and individual responsibility. In Austria, criminology achieved academic recognition some fifty years ago through the persistent efforts of Hans Gross. Unfortunately, Gross was a detective at heart, a fact which together with the entrenched position of law explains the lack of enthusiasm for the broad purposes of criminology. West Germany has a national and several regional institutes of criminology, but because of the dominance of the law schools, such institutes are little more than "expanded seminars." France, which produced the important Napoleonic Code, as well as such important people as Guerry, Quetelet, Lacassagne, Tarde, Durkheim, and Joly, has a series of institutes attached to law schools, but these have been fruitful only indirectly. An otherwise dismal situation in Belgium is brightened by noting the recent establishment of a center in Brussels for the study of juvenile delinquency. Holland, Norway, and Denmark exhibit a growing interest in criminology, although little in their past history deserves more than passing mention save for the works of Adriaan Bonger of Holland.

A disproportionate amount of space is devoted to the United States. The author traces the development of criminology in this country through what he calls the imitative, germinal, consolidation, and expansion phases. Reference is made to a fair sample of past and present projects in criminology which have emerged from the "vast laboratory" which is America. On the negative side, it is suggested that despite the great potential for solid contributions to criminology, there are only a few pearls of great price hidden in an unending mass of trivia. The author deplores the neglect of criminal law, the lack of financial support from Congress toward advancing the cause of criminology, and the failure to accord criminology independent recognition in higher education.

In the final pages the author reveals what he believes to be essential considerations in the approach to criminology in general, ideas which one assumes are being taken seriously at Cambridge University. Briefly stated they are: (1) recognize the interdependence of criminology and other behavior sciences; (2) reject a unilateral view of causation; (3) adopt a pragmatic image of etiology; (4) pursue explanations applicable to smaller, homogeneous units of criminal behavior; (5) recognize that meanings of variables in crime are subject to change; (6) accept different methods and techniques of research in criminology; (7) achieve certain objectives in criminology through interdisciplinary co-operation; (8) create a setting within which criminology can develop as an independent discipline, not subordinate to law or sociology; (9) obtain adequate financial support, largely through applied research; (10) remember that criminology is still in the adolescent stage and must be pushed toward further maturity; and (11) avoid a crusading zeal as well as a tendency toward dogmatism.

Whether or not one agrees with the author's varied comments and interpretations is perhaps less important than the possibility of being moved to self-examination. If this happens, the publication of the report needs no other justification.

JOHN D. LILLYWHITE

Washington State University

Urban Research Methods. Edited by JACK P. GIBBS. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961. Pp. xxii+625. $12.00.

This book of readings, focused on urban demographic and ecological phenomena, was designed for introductory students at the college level. It is not a systematic sourcebook of

demographic or ecological research methods but is a collection of writings by some twenty scholars, none of whom had the slightest idea that his article was destined to take its place as one of "the most relevant writings on the ways of obtaining and utilizing basic data on cities." The articles which form the backbone of the book are focused on concrete problems and are not concerned with teaching introductory students about urban demographic or ecological methodology. Editor Gibbs makes a strong effort to give some coherence to the readings by writing and collecting several original pieces and providing several programmatic statements concerning various problem areas and the importance of systematic study of urban phenomena. He fails, however, because the method chosen to achieve the goal is not appropriate.

The exciting materials in the book are substantive articles for which the beginning student may or may not be prepared when he comes to them. In general the student will have learned little of methodology, demography, ecology, or urban life if and when he completes this book.

PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT

Dartmouth College

Population and World Power. By KATHERINE ORGANSKI and A. F. K. ORGANSKI. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961. Pp. viii+263.

Publications on world population problems and on the so-called population explosion have become numerous. Most of these have been concerned with the welfare aspects of the problem, namely, the relation between population growth and material well-being. Katherine and A. F. K. Organski take up a neglected aspect, namely, what are the implications of current population trends for changes in the locus of political power?

The book is refreshingly free of doctrine with reference to the implications of the "population explosion." The authors take a reasoned middle position of moderate optimism with reference to the possibility of meeting the needs of rapidly growing populations in the underdeveloped areas, but do so without overestimating the capacity of science and technology to meet unbridled growth.

If there is a doctrine of this book it is a sort of demographic determinism—the thesis that power will inevitably be attracted to the countries of large population, as technological progress and industrialization spread to all peoples. "Once the whole world has achieved industrial status and shares the same technology, population size will become the major determinant of power" (p. 33). The authors picture a drift of power to the "East," but with some ambiguity as to whether this means primarily the Communist world or Asia, Communist and non-Communist. There is a tendency to oversimplify the world situation as a power struggle betweeen the West and the Communist world, without adequate attention to the tensions within the Communist as well as within the free world.

The book is not written for the demographic or social science specialist but rather for the "intelligent laity." The handling of demographic materials is balanced and without serious technical flaws. The handling of the relation of demographic changes and economic development also reflects acquaintance with more sophisticated literature. Thus the authors correctly point to rate of growth, not to population density, as the key factor in this relationship. Nevertheless, this book is not as claimed on the jacket, "one of the most comprehensive books to be found on the subject of population."

The major headings are conventional, including such topics as "Population and Power," "The Population Explosion," "Birth Control and Economic Development," "Population and the Problems of War and Peace." But within these titles the authors make interesting excursions into such subjects as automation, missile warfare, and colonialism. In their backgrounds, the authors bring together the rather unusual combination of sociology and international relations.

The book is unusually well written for a work on this subject, and adds a useful dimension to the growing literature of this field.

DUDLEY KIRK

Population Council

Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia. By ARTHUR P. MENDEL. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. viii+310. $7.00.

The aftermath of the Second World War has brought an intensified interest in Russian studies and in comparative studies of a large number of nations variously called "underdeveloped," "developing," or "new." During the last few years a combination of these interests has been effected by several studies which treat Tsarist Russia as the "underdeveloped" country of yesterday and find numerous parallels between the experience of transition in nineteenth-century Russia and in the "new nations" of our day. Professor Mendel's work is a contribution to this third group of studies, taking its place alongside such other works as those of Haimson, Malia, Riasanovsky, Venturi, von Laue, and others.

Mendel takes for his subject the writings of "legal populists" such as Mikhailovsky, Vorontsov, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, and Struve and of their antagonists, the "legal Marxists," especially as represented by Plekhanov. He reviews their arguments in considerable detail, emphasizing especially the idealism and individualism that were basic motifs in the writings of the first group, however much some of them temporarily dallied with Marxism, and the determinism and scientism characteristic of Marxist writings. Of special interest from a comparative viewpoint are several points. The arguments of the legal populists concerning the economic development of Tsarist Russia are strikingly similar to many current views of the economics of development and apparently are as unresolved now as they were then. A basic motivation of the legal populists was the sense of guilt with which these intellectuals of middle- or upper-class background contemplated the fate of the people. A basic motivation of the Marxists, and a major reason why they prevailed, was their elitist conviction that they were in possession of a scientific, and hence of the only correct, theory of history and economic development. This position enabled the Marxists to look with equanimity upon the misery of the masses as the inevitable price that must be paid for progress. The legal populists lacked a comparable singleness of purpose, being more tender-minded (as William James put it) but also having a more penetrating insight into the "dilemmas of progress" facing their country.

In this sense Mendel's book has a contemporary appeal, not only in the parallels it suggests between then and now, but also in its intimation of the larger paradox that a "scientistic" and dogmatic conviction possesses more inherent historical momentum than a relatively balanced and necessarily uncertain appraisal of a country's potential for development.

But in what sense is it good intellectual history? Though not a Russian expert, this reviewer wonders whether a summary presentation of ideas is sufficient, however competently it may be assessed, as is the case here. The author may be justified in confining himself to a presentation of ideas which are unfamiliar to his readers. But intellectual history is an especially difficult medium in which to work, and measured by the highest standards in this field one misses an effort to relate ideas to their ideational and social setting, except insofar as the writers reviewed do so explicitly themselves. Yet even in the field of ideas it is necessary for the analyst to bring to his subject matter a perspective of his own, and to this end the contemporary preoccupation with "developing countries" may not be sufficient.

REINHARD BENDIX

University of California
Berkeley

Education, Economy, and Society. Edited by A. H. HALSEY, JEAN FLOUD, and C. ARNOLD ANDERSON. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. ix+625. $7.50.

Reviewing anthologies is almost as problematic as editing them, though this one is excellent in many respects. Ostensibly the forty-one essays, articles, and chapters of this reader are ordered into six parts. The first four of these deal with the consequences of economic change, with the contributions of education to social mobility and of social stratification to education, and with social factors in educational achievement. Then the scene shifts. Two different topics conclude the book: nine papers are addressed to the changing social functions of schools and universities. These include David Glass's cool plea for a reappraisal of British education in the name of social diversity, justice, and coherence, and Talcott Parsons' analysis of American public schools as they deal with the changing demands of individuals and institutions. The final half-dozen papers are concerned with teachers. Actually these fifteen essays contain fine leads for a

comparison of England, Germany, and the United States. They are more the beginning of a second and different reader than the appropriate conclusion to the present one. George Baron and Asher Tropp, for instance, seize upon one element of a teacher's work—authority—and then ask three questions about England and America: How are school, family, and community related in each case? How do their educational patterns as such differ? What scope do teachers have in the respective professional and occupational spheres of these two societies? The speculative results are surely worth further and empirical refinement. How true is it, for instance, that in America "decision making is assumed to lie, not with the teacher, but with parents, students or community; and it is for the teacher to meet the needs thus made evident" (p. 550), while in England a teacher derives his authority from "well established sources within the educational structure, notably the universities, which through their control of major school examinations and their more recently acquired responsibilities for teacher training, lend their considerable prestige to the underwriting of what is done in the schools" (p. 551)? Actually this essay is ultimately of a piece with an essay by Ralph Turner placed near the beginning of this assembly. Turner's ideal types of "contested" and "sponsored" mobility, for which again England and America provide the concrete experience will, I sense, be often reprinted—deservedly. It is an imaginative guide in that ubiquitous, yet defeating business of social ambition and selection. The German material in the last two parts of the book ranges from Schelsky's general observations (woven around the argument that the school has become "a decisive agency managing the status and life chances of the individual" (p. 417) to Kob's rather specific dissection of German secondary-school teachers. Provisionally Kob contrasts two types of teachers: those more interested in pedagogy and those more committed to some specific academic substance. In addition, in Part VI Jean Floud and W. Scott provide a very careful report on recruitment to teaching in England and Wales: Increasingly teachers now come from non-manual families; teachers in different kinds of schools increasingly come from socially more similar backgrounds; and grammar school teachers are more frequently drawn from lower-middle-class circles. Caste is breaking down.

The first two-thirds of the reader are clearly focused on the relations between economy, education, and stratification.

Actually this is the reader's avowed and organizing concern. A good introduction makes this clear. In it Floud and Halsey conceive of education as a "crucial type of investment for the exploitation of modern technology" and as an element in a juncture, novel in its intensity, of economic calculation, social status, and required training. They see the process of industrialization, with its cumulative dependence on institutionalized innovation, eventually providing the educational system with "a strategic place as a central determinant of the economic, political, social and cultural character of a society" (p. 3). About this the editors should and could have written a book of their own, *incorporating* the materials of this reader. What they gave us instead will serve, though not as well. The plausibility and ambiguity of their thesis comes to life. The materials selected by a trinity of well-disciplined and equally well-informed editors show how important ability, and therefore education, is to a modern economy. Having a rather definite focus, this reader avoids the recurrent weakness of many anthologies—anomie—yet even in the name of its "major theme" ("the analysis of educational institutions under conditions of rapid social change," p. 12), more scope might have been given to a discussion of *kinds* of ability, including creativity (as different from intelligence) and *kinds* of education within modern economies (from conventional to autodidactic forms). This way we might have moved closer to those who are in fact being or to be educated. This would have balanced the reader's legitimate interest in the providers of education and the consumers of its "products." Still, with a few exceptions of selections that seemed more suitable for an evening's radio listening, this is a durable assembly of contributions and generalizations on the sociology of talent.

KASPAR D. NAEGELE

University of British Columbia

Learning and Living, 1790–1960: A Study in the History of the English Adult Education Movement. By J. F. C. HARRISON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961. Pp. xv+404. $6.50.

This book traces the English adult-education movement from the conditions of the first industrial society in 1790 to the conditions of the welfare state of 1960. The material for the study is drawn from Yorkshire, and the proof is indeed in the pudding. Such seemingly diverse phenomena as Chartists, Owenites, Mechanics Institutes, Methodism, Victorianism, Fabian socialism, trade unionism, Oxford and Cambridge, and the Workers Educational Association are related to four central aspects of the movement: its voluntariness, its goals of freedom and liberation of a personal and social nature, its comparative seriousness in contrast to the "learning for leisure" approach, and its elite character.

In spite of the claim that the central theme of the book is "the growth of democracy in England . . . a continual widening of the areas of democratic participation, an unfolding of new opportunities—political, social and cultural—for an increasing number of people," the adult-education movement is clearly presented as an elite movement, not a mass movement. It has been marked by repeated attempts on the part of the English middle class to make over the working class in its own image and the resistance of the working class to the blatant use of education as a means of social control. Middle-class educational idealism and reform have had to combat both the middle-class belief that educating workers might help the spread of radical ideas (and is a radical idea itself) and the working-class utilitarianism and suspicion. The paradox is that the social reform goals have been met even though the movement continually fails to reach or educate the working class, at whom it is largely directed.

It is rather obvious from the few figures Harrison provides on participation that the movement itself has not been directly responsible for instituting the many social reforms in England since 1890. However, it is tempting to speculate on the sifting mechanism of a working class that has rejected the so-called cultural subjects, but has by some two or more step flow of diffusion taken on and voted for welfare state values. As of 1960 the adult-education movement is seen as experiencing the "dilemma of the left" and as a movement in search of new goals to replace the old ones that have been met. Meanwhile, the cultural subjects and intellectual goals continue to be rejected by the English working class, but interesting innovations have emerged such as residential education where "the experiences of living together are often more valuable than the acquisition of knowledge."

Anyone who tries to make order out of the confusing, erratic, and sometimes contradictory events in the history of English adult education should be encouraged. Harrison should be especially commended for writing a history that, though consciously limited in scope, manages to relate events to social structure so that they make sense.

DAVID E. WILDER

Bureau of Applied Social Research

The Dropouts: A Treatment Study of Intellectually Capable Students Who Drop Out of High School. By SOLOMON LICHTER, ELSIE RAPIEN, FRANCES SEIBERT, and MORRIS SLANSKY. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. vii+302. $5.50.

This study is restricted to intellectually normal and gifted high school students in Chicago public schools who were referred to a social work agency because they were likely to drop out of school. The book is primarily useful for those engaged in treatment of potential dropouts and stresses the importance of working closely with parents and schools

Most of the clients were of middle-class origins (and one guesses, from occasional references, that quite a few were Jewish). The applicability of the book is, thus, largely restricted to a minority of dropouts; it should be pointed out, however, that at least in some communities, middle-class dropouts are 20 per cent of all dropouts. While there is some reference to social class, it is never explored as a conditioning variable For example, we cannot learn from the appendix tables whether working-class youth do as well as middle-class youth in the treatment process. Nor is there any indication that it is necessary to modify standard psychoanalytic concepts to make them useful in interpreting working-class behavior.

Interestingly, boys improved more in school than girls. The latter, who typically did not exhibit behavior hard to take by adults until they reached high school, had problems which

were broader than school. The boys' problems were more centered around school, a finding attributed by the authors—two social workers, a clinical psychologist, and a psychoanalyst—to the greater stress on educational and occupational achievement among boys. Girls were largely involved in sexual provocativeness and aggressive behavior in school. It turns out that these so-called "acting-out" girls were virgins despite their sexual flaunting. Perhaps middle-class girls are different from working-class and lower-class girls in this sexual area even when they become preoccupied with it. A more important issue is whether the "acting-out" concept, as suggested by Fritz Redl and Frank Riessman, has been overused and inadequately understood. The glib use of "acting-out," "internalization," and "externalization" may impede dealing with the problems of dropouts.

The richest part of the book is the discussion of cases. The earlier rotelike outlining of concepts may appall even the most partisan of the psychoanalytic school, but the description of problems and how they were handled by counselors suggests that very sensitive and unmechanical people were at work here. The analysis of the different syndromes among the youth reaffirms the importance of cutting away from thinking of *the* dropout and recognizing that there are many different types of dropouts and that they probably take different social routes in later life. Those far away are seen as a blob; one sign of understanding is the recognition of the strands of diversity.

S. M. MILLER

Syracuse University

She Who Rides a Peacock: Indian Students and Social Change. By MARGARET CORMACK. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962 Pp. xiii+264. $5.75.

Few sociologists would disagree with the proposition that there is considerable difference of opinion between the social scientist and the social practitioner. As Durkheim noted nearly 100 years ago the breach is perhaps greatest between the sociologist and the "educator." This mutual antagonism stems, at least in part, from the fact that both have failed to admit shortcomings and identify or accept the role each might play in the functioning and understanding of educational systems. While this review will no doubt do little to improve relations, it should point out the need for greater harmony between the two disciplines, at least at the research level.

In this study of social change and education the author seeks to determine the Indian students' "conscious awareness of an attitude toward the social change related to traditional India becoming modern." The author makes apparent her attachment to India and leaves little doubt that her twenty-one years in that country may have colored her observations somewhat. It is in all likelihood this dedication to India and its young people that leads the author to make statements which are not fully supported by the data presented in this book. In addition, and here the author notes both the difficulties of this kind of research and the limitations of her own investigation, the sample of Indian students involved in this study can hardly be the basis for such statements as "no subject is so vital as marriage to Indian students" or "most Indian students are justifiably proud of India's international stature."

Moving to certain quantitative and tabular portions of the text additional limitations can be noted. First, different N's are given for the same groupings. On page 50, for example, the total sample size is given as 404 but when the author dichotomizes by marital status the N drops to 383, and for family type it moves up to 403. Similarly, percentages which should total 100 range in one instance (p. 139) from 85 to 110 per cent. Case bases are rarely presented and the reader is never really certain as to how many respondents are actually answering each of the questions.

Although the author recognizes the importance of certain near-demographic factors on the perceptions of her respondents she rarely moves beyond the showing of two-variable tables. All tables show relationships between the respondents' sex and some second variable such as political affiliation, attitude toward marriage, and so forth. Little attempt is made to determine the impact of such factors as religion, caste, region of origin, or academic standing. Finally, the author combines the responses of male and female students to show the total strength of particular attitudinal items. In so doing she distorts her data since

there are significant differences between the responses of males and females (p. 126).

Given these methodological limitations, the book itself should be of value to those concerned with understanding the dynamics of social change. The substitution of keen insights for "hard data" has certain benefits, and the reader is able to better understand the conflicts facing a traditional people who now find themselves in a relatively fluid social system.

DAVID GOTTLIEB

Michigan State University

Medieval Technology and Social Change. By LYNN WHITE, JR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xii+194. $6.00.

This book considers three groups of medieval technical inventions—in warfare, agriculture, and mechanics—and their effects on the economy and society of medieval Europe.

In warfare the crucial invention was that of the stirrup. Probably invented in China, where it was in common use by the fifth century A.D., it reached northern Europe by the eighth century. The use of stirrups enabled an armored horseman, carrying a lance at rest under his right arm, to brace himself in the saddle so firmly that the shock of his attack could combine the momentum of horse and rider. This feature made the mounted knight the most powerful instrument of medieval warfare, rendering obsolete the older Roman and Germanic military tactics of fighting on foot in close order. Since it took a great deal of capital to maintain a knight, and since land was the predominant form of capital, the new military technology demanded that land tenure be reorganized, each unit of tenure being required to maintain a certain number of knights. This requirement was a key factor in the development of classic feudalism. Since skill in the management of horse and lance could be acquired only through long professional training, the new technology created a new aristocracy, the knightly class, which dominated the later middle ages. Chivalry is unthinkable without the *cheval.*

Such is the argument, and there is much to be said for it. But it is oversimple. If the stirrup alone was enough to create feudalism, why did it not do so in its native China? Chinese feudalism—if it may properly be called feudalism—was dead long before the fifth century, when the social organization of China was that of a centralized empire.

Consider also the European evidence. Professor White believes that in the eighth century the early Carolingian monarchs reorganized their military establishment so as to base it on the mounted knight. Yet later Carolingian France was almost at the mercy of the Vikings, who moved to battle on horseback or on splendid ships, but who dismounted and fought on foot. If the new technology was all that superior, why should this have been the case? It was not until the Norman knights beat the English housecarles, fighting on foot in the shield-wall at Hastings, three hundred years after the introduction of stirrups, that the supremacy of the new tactics became fully recognized. Even then the Bayeux Tapestry shows some of the Normans, in what should have been very poor form, brandishing their spears over their heads instead of nestling them under their arms. The English might even have won Hastings if they had had better archery support. When their descendants had developed the long bow, they showed at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt what slaughter dismounted knights and bowmen, in a strong defensive position, could wreak on the mounted chivalry of France.

No doubt stirrups made possible the knight, and the knight was a factor in feudalism. But feudalism was also conditioned by other features of the social order, and even the success of the knight was made possible by the relative backwardness of other elements in military technology.

In agriculture White has to deal not with a single invention but with a group of inventions, including the mold-board plow, the three-course rotation of crops, the increased planting of soil-restoring legumes, such as peas and beans, and the gradual replacement of the ox by the more efficient, iron-shod horse as a draft animal. According to White, these developments made possible an increased exploitation of the heavy, wet soils of northern Europe and an increase in population and in the area under cultivation, which went on until the end of the thirteenth century, and a shift of the economic weight of Europe from the Mediterranean toward the North. Again, there is much to be said for this argument, and since White is concentrating on the effects of technological change he cannot be blamed for

neglecting other factors. At the same time, the unwary reader should be reminded that there *were* other factors in the expansion of the North. Much influence could be claimed for the establishment of relatively peaceful conditions under relatively strong governments from the tenth century onward.

In the field of agrarian history, White indulges in some unjustified speculations. He believes that the heavy plow drawn by eight oxen was introduced into England by the Scandinavian invaders of the ninth century. One of his arguments is that the English word *plow* may have derived from a Scandinavian form. He might as well argue that the Scandinavians brought law to England because *law* derives from a Scandinavian form. Another argument is that the basic tenement unit in northern England, part of which (but only part) was occupied by Danes, was the *plowland* divided into eight *oxgangs,* and that this system was "in complete contrast" to other English systems of land assessment. He even claims this reviewer asserted this to be the case. I never said any such thing. All the English systems of land *assessment*—though not all of land *use*—were variations on the same theme. All the basic tenement units were of the same order of magnitude, characteristically 120 acres. All except the East Anglian *plowland* were subdivided into named quarters or eighths, corresponding to the four yokes or eight oxen of the standard plow team. An example is the Kentish *sulung* (plowland) divided into four *yokelets.* The only difference is in terminology. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this kind of evidence is that all the Germanic invaders of England, and not just the Danes, used a heavy plow drawn by a big team of oxen.

In spite of a disclaimer or two, White also seems to believe that the heavy plow and the three-course rotation of crops tended to have some necessary connection with the special type of big-village, communal agriculture called the open-field system. "For its most efficient use the new plow demanded open fields." "An isolated family could not use it; the normal hamlet of four to ten families would find it difficult to manage such a venture." For these assertions there is no evidence whatever. Some of the areas of northern Europe that supported the largest populations—parts of southeastern England, Flanders, and the Netherlands—knew the heavy plow and the three-course rotation without being organized according to the open-field system. In some cases their settlement pattern was that of joint-family hamlets. White's fallacy here is of course a common one: the notion that a single set of technological procedures necessarily determines a single type of social organization.

The third group of inventions the author considers were devoted to the exploitation of new sources of power and new mechanical principles: wind and water mills, guns, springs, cranks, the flywheel, the spinning wheel, clocks, and complicated forms of gearing. Though some of these inventions, like the crank, were of Far Eastern origin, the bulk were not. In our admiration for the achievements of the clever and inscrutable Chinese, we sometimes forget how far, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Europeans had outstripped the Chinese and Hindus as mechanics. Why this should have been the case is not at all clear. But the fact goes far to explain later differences in the development of the two areas: industrial capitalism may have owed more to cannon than to Calvin.

Though I disagree with some of the details of White's interpretation, the main lines of his argument seem to me sound, and his book makes good reading, full of fascinating information. Though he tends to oversimplify the effects of technological and social change, there is no doubt that the effects are important. White has demonstrated their importance for a culture and a period of history about which most sociologists are badly informed. They ought not to be, for the society of medieval Europe is the principal ancestor of our own.

George C. Homans

Harvard University

Essays on African Population. Edited by K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+336. $7.50.

Unlike some of the world's former colonial territories, those in tropical Africa lack the tradition of careful data-gathering that would serve both as a source for research and as a basis for the development of modern statistical systems. The study of African populations,

therefore, has been taken up largely with the tasks of estimating and assessing the quality of estimates of total populations of areas and tribes. The essays in this volume are a varied selection, reflecting the paucity of demographic knowledge of Africa.

The editors of the volume are geographers, and several of the essays are concerned with progress and problems in mapping population distribution. The technical discussions of map construction will not interest sociologists, but anyone wishing to use African statistical data can gain from these essays additional insight into the problems of data collection and into the contributions that geographers are making to the development of statistical systems. Another group of essays surveys in a routine fashion the censuses and in some cases the basic facts of numbers, growth, and composition, of West Africa, British East Africa, and Central Africa.

Six of the fifteen essays are substantive, putting to use both census and other types of data. Four of these are by geographers. Two present discussions of the relationships between population density, patterns of settlement, and resources in northern Nigeria and in central Sudan. A third essay, on Yoruba towns, has some interesting comments on an unusual indigenous pattern of urbanization. Most of the cities in tropical Africa, however, developed in large measure under the influence of exogenous peoples. The brief comparative survey of these cities—their nature, historical development, current distribution, reasons for growth, and physical, economic, social, and political problems is the sociologically most interesting of the geographers' contributions to this volume.

The two remaining essays, focused on population movements and labor migration, hold the greatest interest for sociologists. One on Central Africa, by J. Clyde Mitchell, has several insightful passages, as in the comparison of the pattern of circulation of labor in contemporary Africa with the pattern of migration of labor accompanying industrialization in England. On the whole, however, the data are presented as an example of the general patterns discussed elsewhere by Wilbert Moore and others, and Mitchell does not carry the specification of relationships beyond that already in the literature. A. W. Southall's chapter on "Population Movements in East Africa" is also presented as a set of illustrations of the variety of general causes of migration, but his careful conceptualizations and his imaginative use of the limited types and quantity of data are indicative of the contribution that demographic analyses can make despite the statistical underdevelopment of the areas.

The failure of the present editors, like others before them, to find native Africans able to contribute essays on African population is not a good omen. A handful of interested and dedicated European researchers cannot by themselves provide either the academic fraternity or the African countries themselves with the basic demographic analyses that must underlie knowledge of the rapid processes of social change now taking place.

KARL E. TAEUBER

University of Chicago

The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy. By AMITAI ETZIONI. New York: Collier Books 1962. Pp. 285. $0.95 (paper).

The title and subtitle of this book, written by a sociologist, raise the hope that it will deal with the contribution of social scientists capable of rising above national loyalties to the establishment of a world order where the "revolution of rising expectations" can be fulfilled, and the threat of nuclear destruction eliminated.

After an impressive analysis of tried and untried political-military policies relating to the threat of nuclear war the author states that "a politically feasible policy for a peaceful 'settling' of interbloc conflict exists. It is a policy that may not succeed, but involves so few risks that it ought to be tried prior to either a deadly multi-deterrence or submissive unilateralism." Labeled "Gradualism," this proposed policy involves mainly political-military measures in the form of unilateral *symbolic steps* (by the United States) to reduce international tensions, with the expectation that after American *concessions,* the Russians would *reciprocate,* leading to ultimate *multilateral negotiations.*

In terms of the title, it is disappointing that the book turns out to be a logical extension and elaboration of present American foreign policy directed toward winning the Cold War A better title might be: "The Way to an American Peace: Strategy of Political Con-

flict with Russia." The strategy largely omits consideration of the peoples who want no part of the American-Russian conflict, but who must take the fearful risk of "annihilation without representation."

Significantly, the author gives short shrift to the present United Nations, hope of half the world for meeting the problems of rapid social, economic, and political change. Economic development programs to meet and stimulate social change are subordinated to the demands of the Cold War, not geared to the requirements of a world in the throes of revolution and "struggling to be born."

More—far more—is needed than what is called for by the author: "A Political Breakthrough" on a *gradual* and *Western* basis. A *social science* breakthrough might well begin with a shift from the ethnocentric assumption that we can "win" the Cold War to a determination to find ways to resolve problems created by rapid social change, of which the Cold War is a symptom, and the nuclear terror is an urgent fact moving mankind toward annihilation. Such a breakthrough would imply loyalty to mankind rather than to the American tribe as the guide to research and strategy recommendations.

BYRON FOX

Syracuse University

Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Action. By KARL N. LLEWELLYN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. viii+531. $8.95.

Until his recent death, eight days after completing the Preface to this volume, Karl Llewellyn had been for almost half a century a controversial and increasingly distinguished figure in the American law school world, a leader of the irregular and disparate group known as legal realists. As he himself might have put it, were he writing this review, monumental men, men of that measure, men of that mold, men who deal with life-stuff and not just rule-stuff, you do not find many of them around anymore. Karl Llewellyn was clearly not an organization man, cut on a mass-produced pattern. Although I never enjoyed the experience of meeting him, I know that much from his writings. These are some of his papers, selected by himself: the University of Chicago Press has printed and bound them beautifully, as for a fitting final volume.

Llewellyn divides his papers (twenty-nine in all) into four parts entitled "Realism," "Institutions, Rules and Craft," "Controlling Behavior: How and Why?" and "Men." The last section is a coda, an expression of esteem for Hohfeld, Pound, and Holmes, no doubt the three men whose ideas and styles of thinking most influenced Llewellyn, and whom he most admired in American jurisprudence.

In most of the essays, Llewellyn presents the thesis that law is behavior, not rules in books, and that to understand the operation of the judicial process, as well as the functions of law in society, the scholar—especially the legal scholar, although others are invited to join him—should observe the law in action. For this reason, and also because he performed the rare feat of actually collaborating with a social anthropologist (E. Adamson Hoebel in the classic, *The Cheyenne Way*), Llewellyn has always been a congenial figure to the sociologist interested in law. His essay, "Law and the Social Sciences—Especially Sociology," which appeared in both the *Harvard Law Review* and the *American Sociological Review*, is reprinted in this volume. I think, however, that the most interesting paper here for the sociologist is the one on unauthorized practice of law. It deals with the question of why lawyers should be given a monopoly over certain subject matters and is called "The Bar's Troubles and Poultices—and Cures?"

But in evaluating the volume as a whole, I have come to the conclusion that most of the essays are of secondary interest to the sociologist because Llewellyn was only secondarily interested in the sociology of law, for example, the consequences of legal rules for different groups and institutions, the nature of legal as compared with other norms, the relationship between social change and legal change. Llewellyn's primary interest is in the judicial process and, even more narrowly, in the business of predicting and understanding appellate judicial decisions. It is true that he asserts a rough correlation between styles of judicial decision-making and historical time periods. He shows, however, more interest in the consequences of alternative styles for legal outcomes than in the question of why different stylistic traditions existed in particular socio-historical contexts.

Recently, Llewellyn returned to his first love

and had written a book on judicial decision-making (*The Common Law Tradition—Deciding Appeals*). In that book Llewellyn's position appears to change from the early essays on this topic (included here) in which he emphasizes the discrepancy between rules and behavior. In his book he observes more uniformity and constraint in what he earlier might have called "paper rules." Certainly in this later work Llewellyn retreats from the early "realistic" essays; but it is impossible to say just how much and where.

His approach to handling subject matter is best summed up by himself in characterizing American jurisprudential writing: "American jurisprudes are case-trained lawyers. Case-trained lawyers are trained to think with the middle of an idea, with its core; they have the case-law habit of using words very loosely around the edges of an idea. Their arguments are built to the issue in hand, and their dicta, if only the dicta help argue the issue in hand, can be grandly obiter, giving no indication at all of what they have any intention of standing to, when some *different* case or issue may be in hand. Our judges write law thus, and thus our jurisprudes have written jurisprudence. It makes for lively reading; it also makes for inexactitude, and it makes for very easy misconception."

JEROME H. SKOLNICK

University of California
Berkeley

The Charities of Rural England, 1480–1660: The Aspirations and the Achievements of the Rural Society. By W. K. JORDAN. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1961. Pp. 484. $7.00.

This is the last of Professor Jordan's studies of English philanthropy in the "early modern" period, and its virtues and faults are essentially the same as those of the previous ones (see my review of two of the earlier studies in this *Journal,* May, 1962). Having surveyed England as a whole in his first volume, and having examined the dominant role of London in the second, Jordan then examined certain parts of England in detail: A study of western England appeared in 1960, one of Kent in 1961, and in that year also the present study of Buckinghamshire, Norfolk, and Yorkshire. These three counties are all thoroughly "rural," yet they differ significantly: Buckinghamshire is "one of the most classically rural counties in the whole of England" (p. 18), in that it is stable, conservative, prosperous, and not affected by its proximity to London, nor by a cathedral town, nor by monastic establishments, nor by industrial development; Norfolk is "the almost perfect microcosm of England" (p. 18), being rich, self-sufficient, and dominated by a true city, Norwich; Yorkshire is poor, sparsely populated, economically and culturally backward, and strongly affected by the Reformation, in which its large monastic properties were up for grabs.

Though Jordan shows no great sociological sophistication in his analysis of the differences of these counties, clearly their social structure is *different,* and it might have been possible to construct interesting hypotheses about the effects of these differences on the patterning of philanthropy. Unhappily, Jordan's reams of "comparative" data serve to test no hypothesis, and they are so presented that they do not even properly illuminate local differences. His method is heavily descriptive in emphasis—he goes into case after case after case in minute detail, rather than using cases for illustration—and his "analysis" consists of endless computations of relative and absolute amounts given for charitable purposes. After describing his three counties, one by one, he does not even have a conclusion that summarizes their differences with regard to philanthropic giving. As Jordan piles case on case and volume on volume it becomes more and more clear that sheer quantity of data is no substitute for imaginative analysis.

ELINOR G. BARBER

International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences
New York

CURRENT BOOKS

ABOU, SÉLIM. *Le Bilinguisme Arabe-Français au Liban: Essai d'anthropologie culturelle* ("Arab-French Bilingualism in Lebanon: An Essay in Cultural Anthropology"). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Pp. viii+502. (Paper.) The social morphology of, and historical basis for, philosophical, pedagogical, literary, and linguistic conflict.

ALBORNOZ, ORLANDO. *La Sociologia en Venezuela* ("Sociology in Venezuela"). Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela Facultad de Economica, 1962. Pp. 240. (Paper.) A description of the current state of the Social Sciences in the University of Venezuela and in the secondary schools.

ALEXANDER, FRANZ. *The Scope of Psychoanalysis, 1921–1961.* New York: Basic Books, 1962. Pp. ix+594. $12.50. Selected papers.

ALLARDT, ERIK, and LITTUNEN, YRJÖ. *Sociologi* ("Sociology"). Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1962 Pp. 288. Swedish kr. 32. An introductory textbook.

BARBOUR, K. M., and PROTHERO, R. M. (eds.). *Essays on African Population.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. x+336. $7.50. Fifteen papers by ten geographers and statisticians

BAUGHMAN, E. EARL, and WELSH, GEORGE S. *Personality: A Behavioral Science.* Englewood Cliffs, N J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. 566. $7.25. An introductory text. Covers personality development, personality description and assessment, and other themes.

BEAL, GEORGE M., BOHLEN, JOE M , and RAUDABAUGH, J NEIL. *Leadership and Dynamic Group Action.* Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1962. Pp 365. $6 00. Popular applications of group dynamics.

BENEDICT, BURTON. *Indians in a Plural Society* London· H.M. Stationery Office, 1962. Pp. 168. 25s. Field study of ten villages and an Indian urban area of Mauritius

BERGER, JOSEPH, COHEN, BERNARD P., SNELL, J. LAURIE, and ZELDITCH, MORRIS, JR. *Types of Formalization in Small Group Research.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. x+159. $4.50. Exposition of three types of models, with an annotated bibliography of research on mathematical models and small groups.

BIDWELL, PERCY W. *Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs.* New York: King's Crown Press, 1962. Pp. viii+215. $5.00. Report of a survey on formal courses in, and student knowledge of, foreign affairs.

BLANCKENBURG, PETER VON. *Einführung in die Agrarsoziologie* ("Introduction to Rural Sociology"). Stuttgart: Verlag Eugen Ulmer, 1962. Pp. 170. Sociological analysis of rural population in industrial society.

BLOCH, HERBERT A., and GEIS, GILBERT. *Man, Crime, and Society.* New York. Random House, 1962. Pp. xi+642. Classification and analysis of forms of criminal behavior.

BLOOD, ROBERT O., JR. *Marriage.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xix+515. $6.00. Text.

BRAIDWOOD, ROBERT J., and WILLEY, GORDON R. (eds.). *Courses toward Urban Life: Archeological Considerations of Some Cultural Alternates.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. ix+371. $7 50. Seventeen area specialists describe man's history from the late Stone Age to the threshold of the urban civilizations.

BREDEMEIER, HENRY C., and STEPHENSON, RICHARD M. *The Analysis of Social Systems.* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962. Pp. xii+411. $5.75. Introductory text: a structural-functional analysis.

CALDER, RITCHIE. *Common Sense about a Starving World.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp 176. $2.95. On the relationship between population growth and food supply; for the layman.

CARMAN, J. NEALE. *Foreign-Language Units of Kansas: Historical Atlas and Statistics.* Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962 Pp vii +330. $10.00. Comprehensive maps, lists, and statistics pertaining to the "history of the linguistic assimilation of myriads of early settlers of Kansas and their descendants, who in the beginning habitually used some language other than English."

CLARK, BURTON R. *Educating the Expert Society.* San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. xi+301. $2.75 (paper). The sociology of education; covers the structure of educational control, formal organization of school and college, student culture in high school and college, and other themes.

CLEVELAND, HARLAN, and LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (eds.). *Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political, and Military.* New York: Harper & Bros , 1962. Pp. lxv+542. $7.50 Twenty-seven papers presented at the sixteenth Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life.

COLE, WILLIAM E. *Introductory Sociology.* New York: David McKay Co, 1962. Pp. xii+369. $7.00. A textbook.

COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER HAUTE AUTORITÉ. *Grève et Lock-Out* ("Strikes and Lockouts"). Luxembourg: Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de L'Acier Haute Autorité, 1962. Pp. 399. (Paper.) Six authors consider legal aspects of strikes and lockouts in Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

COSER, ROSE LAUB. *Life in the Ward.* East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1962. Pp. xxxi+182. $7.50. Based on participant observation and fifty-three interviews concerning "the social role of the patient in the general hospital, institutionalized behavior patterns and value systems that prevail in the ward, and relationships that develop among the patients and between patients and hospital staff."

CRONER, FRITZ. *Soziologie der Angestellten* ("Sociology of the White-Collar Worker"). Koln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1962. Pp. 310. Analysis of white-collar workers—their position in contemporary society, with data from Sweden, in particular, and other western European countries.

CROSSCURRENTS PRESS. *The Soviet Stand on Disarmament: A Collection of Nineteen Basic Soviet Documents on General and Complete Disarmament, the Termination of Nuclear Weapons Tests, and the Relaxation of International Tensions.* New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1962. Pp. 150. $1.00 (paper). The documents cover the period from March, 1958, to February, 1962.

DAVIS, F. JAMES, FOSTER, HENRY H., JR., JEFFERY, C RAY, and DAVIS, E. EUGENE *Society and the Law: New Meaning for an Old Profession.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. vi+488. $6.95. Two sociologists and two lawyers examine the following themes: law and social organization; law and social change; and lawyers as a professional group.

DAVIS, KEITH. *Human Relations at Work.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. xi+642. $7.95. Revised edition of text.

DE GRAZIA, SEBASTIAN. *Of Time, Work, and Leisure* New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. Pp. 559. $6.00. A political scientist looks at the nature of leisure in industrial society.

DEVRIES, EGBERT. *Man in Rapid Social Change.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. 240. $4.50. Study of transformation of traditional ways in Asia, Africa, and South America.

DÍAZ, DEMETRIO. *La Educación en Brasil* ("Education in Brazil"). Madrid: Centro de Información y Sociología de la Obra de Cooperación Sacerdotal H. Americana, 1961. Pp. 114. (Paper.) Description of educational institutions, students, and instructors from elementary schools to universities.

DIESING, PAUL. *Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and Their Social Conditions.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Pp. 262. $5.75. Analysis of technical, economic, social, legal, and political rationality.

DUNCAN, HUGH D. *Communication and Social Order.* New York Bedminster Press, 1962. Pp. xxx+475. A "sociological theory of social action can be created only if we show how *forms*, as well as contents, of symbolic expressions are used to create and sustain social order."

DUNNING, WILLIAM A. *Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865–1877.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. 378. $1.95 (paper). Reissue of book first published in 1907.

DUVALL, EVELYN MILLIS. *Family Development* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1962. Pp. x+532. $6.95. Revised edition of 1957 text.

DYKEMAN, WILMA, and STOKELY, JAMES *Seeds of Southern Change: The Life of Will Alexander* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 Pp. xvi+343. $5.95. Biography of a white Southerner who championed the cause of Negro rights.

ELLIS, ALBERT. *The American Sexual Tragedy* New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962. Pp. 320. $5.00 Revised edition of book first published in 1954

ELLIS, ALBERT. *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy.* New York Lyle Stuart, 1962. Pp 442 $10.00. The history, principles and application of the "rational-emotional" approach to psychotherapy.

FOSTER, GEORGE M. *Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change.* New York Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xiii+292. $6.00 Anthropological analysis of cultural change in terms of "barriers," "stimulants," and "motivations"

FYVEL, T. R. *Troublemakers: Rebellious Youth in an Affluent Society.* New York: Schocken Books 1962. Pp. 347. $4.95. A cross-national perspective on juvenile delinquency.

GARNER, WENDELL, R. *Uncertainty and Structure as Psychological Concepts.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. ix+369. $8.95. Application of the mathematical basis of information theory to psychological problems.

GHURYE, G. S. *Gods and Men.* Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1962. Pp. x+300. Rs. 20.00 An analysis of the Hindu ideas of godhead related to the climate, age, and social structure

GLUECK, SHELDON and ELEANOR. *Family Environment and Delinquency.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. xi+328. $6.50. The effects of fourty-four environmental factors and sixty-six physiologic, neurologic, psychologic, and psychiatric traits on delinquent behavior. A sample of five hundred delinquents and a like number of "matched" non-delinquents was employed.

GOODY, JACK. *Death, Property and the Ancestors: A Study of the Lodagaa of West Africa.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962 Pp. x+452. $8.50. On social structure and religion; based on two years of field work in northern Ghana.

GOTTFRIED, ALEX. *Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+459. $6.50. Study of first Democratic machine in Chicago.

GREENBERGER, MARTIN (ed.). *Management and the Computer of the Future.* Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1962. Pp. xxvi+340. $6.00. A series of eight lectures and discussions held in the spring of 1961 sponsored by M.I.T.'s School of Industrial Management.

HAGEN, EVERETT S. *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins.* Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962. Pp. xvii+557. $7 50.

HAMMOND, KENNETH R., and HOUSEHOLDER, JAMES E. *Introduction to the Statistical Method: Foundation and Use in the Behavioral Sciences.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962. Pp. xvi+412. An introductory text covering standard topics· central tendency, variability, correlation, probability, etc.

HARRISON, JANE E. *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion and Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion.* New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1962. Pp. lvi+600. $10 00. This is the first American edition of a work originally published in England in 1921.

HERBERT, W. L., and JARVIS, F. V. *Dealing with Delinquents* New York: Emerson Books, 1962. Pp 208. $3 75. Two British social workers describe the casework approach to treatment of delinquents.

HEWLETT, RICHARD G., and ANDERSON, OSCAR E., JR. *The New World: 1939–1946* ("A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission," Vol. I). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962. Pp. xv+766. $5.50. Based on official files and interviews.

HODGKINSON, HAROLD L. *Education in Social and Cultural Perspectives.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. ix+243. $3.95. Implications of several areas of social science research for education and discussions of stratification, social mobility, social change, motivation, and learning; written for teachers and prospective teachers.

HOLAS, B. *Changements sociaux en Côte d'Ivoire* ("Social Change on the Ivory Coast"). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Pp. 117. (Paper.) Influence of socioeconomic change on initiation ceremonies.

HUNT, ERLING M., *et al. High School Social Studies Perspectives.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. ix+344. $3.75 (paper). Social science disciplines and area studies are considered by thirteen authors for the edification of high-school teachers.

JÜRGENS, HANS W. *Asozialität als Biologisches und Sozialbiologisches Problem* ("'Asociality' as a Biological and Social-biological Problem"). Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1962. Pp. viii+176. DM. 28 (paper).

KENNY, MICHAEL. *A Spanish Tapestry: Town and Country in Castile.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. Pp. x+243. $5.00. Anthropological study of Madrid and a village parish.

KOCH, SIGMUND (ed.). *Psychology: A Study of a Science,* Study II: *Empirical Substructure and Relations with Other Sciences.* ("Biologically Oriented Fields: Their Place in Psychology and in Biological Science," Vol. IV). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. xxxix+731. $12.50. A collection of papers reviewing the relationship between psychology and genetics, neurophysiology, and other biological specialties.

KÖNIG, RENÉ. *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung in Zwei Bänden* ("Essays on Various Methodological Topics and Research Procedures"). Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1962. Pp. xvi+649 DM. 100.

LANGLOIS, FRANÇOISE. *Les Salaries agricoles en France* ("Salaries in Agriculture in France"). Paris: Armand Colin, 1962. Pp. xi+220. New Fr. 25. Analysis of trends.

LASKI, HAROLD. *Introduction to Politics.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962. Pp. 91. $0.95 (paper). Reprint of work originally published in 1930.

LAUERHASS, LUDWIG, JR. *Communism in Latin America: A Bibliography: The Post-war Years (1945–1960).* Los Angeles: University of California Center of Latin American Studies, 1962. Pp. x+78. $3 00 (paper).

LEGUM, COLIN. *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide.* New York· Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. 296. $5.75. The original growth of Pan-Africanism, with an apendix containing twenty-five documents.

LÉVY-BRUHL, HENRI. *Sociologie du droit* ("Sociology of Law"). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961. Pp 127. (Paper.) Introduction.

LINDSEY, ALMONT. *Socialized Medicine in England and Wales: The National Health Service, 1948–1961.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. xii+561. $8 50. Based on six months of field work which included interviews and analysis of documents.

LLEWELLYN, KARL N. *Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. viii+531. $8.95. Twenty-nine essays on institutions, control of behavior, etc., from the perspectives of legal realism.

MCCANN, RICHARD V. *The Churches and Mental Health.* New York: Basic Books, 1962. Pp. x+278. $6 00. Describes trends in pastoral training and counseling of the mentally ill.

MCNEMAR, QUINN. *Psychological Statistics.* New

York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. vii+451. $7.75.

MARDIN, SERIF. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. viii+456. $10.00.

MARROW, ALFRED J. *Changing Patterns of Prejudice: A New Look at Today's Racial, Religious and Cultural Tensions.* Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1962. Pp. xv+271. $6.95. Analysis of policy recommendations by a former chairman of New York City's Commission on Intergroup Relations.

MASSERMAN, JULES H. (ed.). *Current Psychiatric Therapies,* Vol. II. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1962. Pp. xi+289. $8 75. Thirty-five papers on principles, techniques of psychotherapy, treatment of psychoses, legal psychiatry, and other topics.

MEMMI, ALBERT. *Portrait of a Jew.* Translated by ELISABETH ABBOTT. New York: Orion Press, 1962. Pp. 326. $4.95. The autobiography of a Tunisian-born novelist.

MILLETT, JOHN D. *The Academic Community: An Essay on Organization.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. x+265. $5.95. Conflict and consensus among faculty, students, alumni, and administration.

MOBERG, DAVID O. *The Church as a Social Institution: The Sociology of American Religion.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. vi+569. $10.00. Review of literature with descriptive analysis.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TEACHER EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. *New Horizons: The Becoming Journey: Official Report of the Sixteenth Annual National Conference.* Washington: National Education Association of the United States, 1962. Pp. vii+167. $2.00 (paper).

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY. *Current Projects in the Prevention, Control and Treatment of Crime and Delinquency.* New York: National Research and Information Center on Crime and Delinquency, 1962. Pp. 659. $6.75 (paper). Lists 500 projects of which 385 are described in detail.

PARKER, BEULAH. *My Language Is Me: Psychotherapy with a Disturbed Adolescent.* New York. Basic Books, 1962. Pp. viii+397. $8.50. A case study, with detailed description by a psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapist.

PILGRIM PRESS. *Not Many Wise: A Reader on Religion in American Society.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1962. Pp. vi+169. $2.25 (paper). Articles by religious leaders

PRESTHUS, ROBERT. *The Organizational Society: An Analysis and a Theory.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962. Pp. 323. The effects of large-scale organizations on individual behavior.

PYKE, MAGNUS. *The Science Myth.* New York. Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. 179. $4.00. A wry, satirical prospectus of the manifold follies modern man is heir to.

RAMBAUD, PLACIDE. *Economie et sociologie de la montagne* ("Economy and Sociology of the Mountain Region"). Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962. Pp. 292. New Fr. 25 (paper). Social history and demography of the rural community of Albiez-le-Vieux.

RIEMER, NEAL. *The Revival of Democratic Theory.* New York· Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962. Pp. xi+190. $1.95 (paper). Analysis of role and decline of political theory.

ROTHBARD, MURRAY N. *Man, Economy, and State A Treatise on Economic Principles.* 2 vols Princeton, N J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962. Pp 987. $10 75.

ROWELL, HENRY THOMPSON. *Rome in the Augustan Age.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962 Pp. xv+242. $2.75. Historical treatment of political, social, and ideological aspects of the Augustan Age.

RUITENBEEK, HENDRIK M. (ed.). *Psychoanalysis and Social Science.* New York: E. P Dutton, 1962. Pp xxvii+226 $1 65 (paper). Essays by Lasswell, Parsons, Róheim, Erikson and Erikson, Seeley, Meerloo, and five others.

SALISBURY, HARRISON E *A New Russia?* New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Pp. 143. $3.50. A description of current trends, based on another trip by the New York Times correspondent

SARASON, IRWIN G. (ed.). *Contemporary Research in Personality.* Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962. Pp. xii+411. $7.00. Forty papers on personality measures, assessment, development, perception, learning, deviant behavior, and other topics.

SARTORI, GIOVANNI. *Democratic Theory.* Detroit Wayne State University Press, 1962. Pp. xvi+479. $8.50. Based on the author's translation of *Democrazia e definizione* (2d ed.; Bologna· Il Mulino, 1958).

SCOTT, WILLIAM G. *Human Relations in Management: A Behavioral Science Approach* Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962. Pp xiv+442. $7.50. Text for business-school students.

SELIGMAN, BEN B. *Main Currents in Modern Economics: Economic Thought since 1870.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xiv+887 $11.75. "The evolution of recent doctrine in terms of responses required to face the challenge of an ever-shifting environment."

SIEGEL, LAURENCE. *Industrial Psychology.* Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962. Pp. xvi +414. $6.95. An introductory text.

SINHA, SASADHAR. *Social Thinking of Rabindranath*

Tagore New York. Taplinger Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. xv+198. $6.75.

SLESINGER, JONATHAN A. *Personnel Adaptations in the Federal Junior Management Assistant Program* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute of Public Administration, 1961. Pp. vi+146. $2 50 (paper). Report of questionnaire responses.

SMITH, ERNEST A. *American Youth Culture: Group Life in Teenage Society.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp vii+264. $5.00. A structural analysis of youth culture.

SMITH, M. G. *West Indian Family Structure.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. Pp. vi+311. $6.00. Principles governing family relations in West Indian societies.

SOFER, CYRIL. *The Organization from Within: A Comparative Study of Social Institutions Based on a Sociotherapeutic Approach.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962. Pp. xiii+178. $6.50 Theory and practice of social consultancy formed on the author's experience in an industrial concern, a medical research center, and a teaching institution.

SOWLE, CLAUDE R. (ed.). *Police Power and Individual Freedom: The Quest for Balance.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 287. $7.50. An international survey of current problems in the administration of criminal justice. Forty papers, covering Canada, England, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Norway.

STEINER, JÜRG. *Die Anteilnahme der Stimmburger am politischen Leben ihrer Gemeinde* ("The Participation of Voters in the Political Life of Their Community"). Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1961. Pp. 104. DM. 10.80 (paper). A study of factors influencing political participation in a community in the Canton of Berne, Switzerland.

STEINHILBER, RICHARD M., and ULETT, GEORGE A. *Psychiatric Research in Public Service.* Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 1962. Pp. 166. $2.00 (paper). Programs, current and planned, together with some research that has been produced.

STOODLEY, BARTLETT H. (ed.). *Society and Self: A Reader in Social Psychology.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. 713. $7.50. "By postulating social structure as the major focus, this reader does not seek to exhaust personality but to explore the significance of social structure for individual enterprise." A collection of fifty papers.

SWEETSER, FRANK L. *The Social Ecology of Metropolitan Boston: 1950.* Boston: Division of Mental Hygiene, Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, 1961. Pp. iv+231. $2.85 (paper). A detailed statistical handbook.

THE AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume LXVIII JANUARY 1963 *Number 4*

THE EPIGENESIS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL[1]

AMITAI ETZIONI

ABSTRACT

A model for functional analysis of social change is provided to supplement the Parsons-Bales-Smelser differentiation model. Epigenesis deals with the formation of units that acquire functions not previously serviced by the unit. The development of international systems that become supranational communities is a major example of an epigenetic process. A model of epigenesis includes statements about the sector in which the process starts; the functional sequence in which other sectors are added; and the relationship between growth in performances, power, and communication capabilities.

I. A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION

A. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY UNIFICATIONS

So long as international relations are governed by highly calculative orientations, or by the exercise of force, there is relatively little that sociology can contribute to their study. However, during recent decades international relations seem to have changed: Ideology became a major force; non-rational ties among nations were more common; and, recently, institutional bridges became more numerous. Thus, international relations gradually have become more amenable to sociological analysis. Of these trends, probably the most interesting to the sociologist is the formation of new unions whose members are nations (e.g., the European Economic Community [EEC]).

The EEC is by no means an extreme case. There have been many "historical" unions in which units that were previously autonomous merged to such a degree that today they are considered as one unit (e.g., Switzerland, the United States, Italy, Germany); and there are quite a few contemporary unifications where the new community is just emerging and is far from complete (e.g., the Scandinavian community; East European one), exists as a treaty and formal organization rather than as a full-fledged sociological entity (e.g., the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, the Latin American Free Trade Area), or is so tenuous that it is more likely to collapse than to reach fuller integration (e.g., the Federation of Nyasaland, Rhodesia).

The emerging communities are frequently referred to as supranational communities, a term that is misleading since it implies that the merging units are nations. Actually, many of the historical unifications occurred before the units were sanctified by nationalism (e.g., the Italian cities; the

[1] This article was written while the author was on the staff of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.

American colonies), and even contemporary unions are not necessarily unions of nations (e.g., the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, the formation of the Federation of Nigeria, and the merger of Southern Cameroons with the Cameroon Republic). Moreover, analytically the emergence of a nation state from several tribes, villages, or feudal states—let us say in contemporary Ghana, India, or late medieval France—is in many ways similar to supranational unification. Hence, our concern is with unification of political units that previously shared few or no political bonds. The degree to which these units have been foci of identification for their populations and the degree to which the normative substance of this identification was secular-historical of the kind that marks nationalism are two variables of our analysis, not part of the definition of the concept. Therefore, we refer to the emerging entities simply as political communities and to the process as one of unification. The term "unions" refers to entities that seem to develop in the direction of a political community but have not reached such a high level of integration.

B. EPIGENESIS VERSUS PREFORMISM

A strategy often used in sociological studies of international relations is to draw on theories developed in the study of interaction among other social units, bearing in mind the special nature of the subject to which they are applied, and checking whether additional variables have to be introduced or whether the theories require revision in view of the new data. Here we draw on a sociological theory of change.

Most studies of social change presuppose the existence of a unit, and ask: How does it change, why, and in what direction? The analytical framework frequently used for this analysis of social dynamics is the *differentiation model,*[2] which assumes that the "primitive" social unit contains, in embryonic form, fused together, all the basic modes of social relations that later become structurally differentiated. While relations originally fused gain their own subunits, no new functions are served or new modes of interaction are molded. There are, for instance, some universalistic relations in the most primitive tribe. According to this viewpoint, every social unit, if it is to exist, must fulfil a given set of functions, those of adaptation, allocation, social and normative integration. On the individual level, the evolution from infancy to maturity can be analyzed in terms of the differentiation of the personality.[3] On the societal level, the evolution of a primitive society, from a traditional into a modern one, is also seen as a differentiation process. All societal functions are fulfilled by the primitive tribe; they merely become structurally differentiated; that is, they gain personnel, social units, and organizational structures of their own. Religious institutions gain churches, educational institutions gain schools, economic institutions gain corporations, and so forth.

Philosophers and biologists have long pointed out that there is an alternative model for the study of change. While Bonnet, Haller, and Malpighi represented the differentiation (or preformism) approach

[2] This model is applied to the study of small groups by Robert F. Bales and Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Decision-making Groups," in Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, and Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); to socialization process by Parsons, Bales, *et al.*, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), chap. iv; to industrialization by Neil Smelser, *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); to the study of the family by Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family: A Comparative Study," in *Family, Socialization . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 307–51, and by Smelser, *op. cit.*, chaps. viii–x; to the study of elites by Amitai Etzioni, "The Functional Differentiation of Elites in the *Kibbutz*," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIX (1959), 476–87; and to the study of underdeveloped countries by Neil Smelser, "Toward a Theory of Modernization," in Amitai and Eva Etzioni (eds.), *Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

[3] *Family, Socialization . . .*, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

according to which the first unit or seed possesses in miniature all the patterns of the mature plant, Harvey, Wolff, and Goethe advanced the accumulation (or epigenesis) approach, according to which "adult" units emerge through a process in which parts that carry out new functions are added to existing ones, until the entire unit is assembled. Earlier parts do not include the "representation" of later ones.

The two processes are mutually exclusive in the sense that new units are either institutional "embodiments" of old functions or serve new ones. They may occur at different times in the same social unit: for example, a unit may first follow a preformistic model of development, then shift to an epigenetic model (or the other way around); or it may simultaneously develop some subunits following one model and some following the other. But unlike the particle and wave theories, which are used to explain the same light phenomena, the change pattern of all sociological units of which we are aware follows at any given period either a differentiation *or* an accumulation model.

Until now sociology focused almost exclusively on differentiation models. There are, however, several social units whose development cannot be adequately accounted for by a preformistic model. This article presents an outline of an alternative model, drawing for illustration on the formation of various social units, in particular, international unions. The following questions are asked: (1) Where is the power located that controls the accumulation process? (2) What form does the process itself take? (3) What sector is introduced first? (4) How does this affect subsequent development of sectors? (5) What sequences does the entire process follow? (6) What kinds of "products" do different accumulation (or epigenesis) processes produce? It is essential to bear in mind constantly the peculiar system reference of this analysis; it is a system that does not exist but which the potential members are gradually building up. It is like studying the effect of social relations among students in their postgraduate life before they have graduated.

II. POWER AND EPIGENESIS

A. LOCUS OF POWER: ELITISM AND INTERNALIZATION

The main distinction between preformism and epigenesis is the function that new subunits serve; that is, old functions versus new ones. Determining the structural location of the power that controls the development of a social unit, especially that of new subunits, is essential both for distinguishing between units whose development follows one model and for differentiating between those of one model and those of the other. We need to know whether or not any one, two, or more elite units specialize in control functions; that is, whether or not control is equally distributed among all or most units. This will be called the *degree of elitism*. To the degree that there are elites, the question arises whether they operate from within or from without the emerging union. This dimension will be the *degree of internalization* (of control).[4]

1. *Degree of elitism.*—Organizational analysis shows that there are two major ways of forming a new corporate body: An elite unit may construct the performance units, or several existing organizations that have both elite and performance units may merge. On the international level, a new community is formed in the first way when a nation more powerful than the other potential members "guides" the unification process. Prussia played such a role in the unification of Germany; Ghana, in the formation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union; Egypt, in the late UAR. The cases in which one nation played a central role are so numerous that Deutsch *et al.* sug-

[4] I found this dimension of much value in analyzing the relationship between specialized units and parent organizations (see "Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV [1959], 62–67).

gest that unification requires the existence of one "core" unit.[5]

While many organizations and communities are established by one or a few elite units, the control center of others is formed through a merger of many units, each contributing a more or less equal part. The power center of the emerging community is a new unit rather than an existing unit subordinating the others. One might refer to the first as elitist, to the second as egalitarian, unification. A study of the Northern Baptist Convention in the United States provides a fine illustration of egalitarian unification.[6] The development of the Scandinavian union appears to follow an egalitarian pattern also. While Norway was initially less supportive of the union than Sweden and Denmark, the differences in their support to, and in their control of, the emerging union (and the Nordic Council, its formal instrument) comes close to the egalitarian ideal type.[7]

The degree of elitism (or egalitarianism) should be treated as a continuum. In some nation unions one unit clearly plays a superior role (England in the early Commonwealth); in some, two or more countries are superior (Brazil, Argentina, and to a degree Chile, of the seven members in the Latin America Free Trade Area); in others, participation, contribution, and power are almost evenly distributed among all participants (as in the Scandinavian union).

The degree to which one or more units control the unification process versus the degree to which it is an effort of all participants is closely related to the means of control used. At the elitist end of this continuum we find mergers in which one country coerces the others to "unify." It seems that on the international level cases of elitist and coerced unification are much more frequent than egalitarian, voluntary unions, especially if we regard the extensive use of economic sanctions, not just military force, as resulting in a non-voluntary unification.[8] At the egalitarian end, use of normative means, such as appeal to common sentiments, traditions, and symbols, plays a much more central role than coercive means or economic sanctions. Economic factors operate here more in the form of mutual benefits derived from increased intercountry trade than sanctions or rewards given by one country to the others.

This raises an empirical question: How effective are the various means of unification? One is inclined to expect that unification that begins with coercion ends with disintegration. But the Roman empire, despite its coercive techniques, lasted for about five centuries before it finally collapsed. Nor was the German union weak or ineffective because of the methods employed by Bismarck to bring it about. Quite possibly the line that distinguishes effective from ineffective unification efforts lies not between coercion and non-coercion but between high coercion (of the kind used to keep Hungary in the Communist bloc in 1956 or to hold the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland together in 1961) and lesser coercion.[9] Effectiveness seems also to be highly determined by the degree to which coercion is coupled with other means—for instance, with propaganda.

2. *Degree of internalization.*—Collec-

[5] Karl W. Deutsch *et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 28, 38–39.

[6] Paul M. Harrison, *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).

[7] Frantz Wendt, *The Nordic Council and Co-operation in Scandinavia* (Copenhagen: Mumsgaard, 1959), pp. 98–100 (see also Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Cooperation in Scandinavia," *International Organization,* XI [1957], 597–614).

[8] The infrequency of voluntary unions is stressed in Crane Brinton, *From Many to One* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 49 ff.

[9] For an outstanding discussion of the Soviet bloc from this viewpoint see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. xii, and his "The Organization of the Communist Camp," *World Politics,* XII (1961), 175–209.

tivities whose developments follow an epigenesis model can be effectively ordered by a second dimension, namely, the degree to which the elite unit (or units, if they exist) controls the emerging union from the outside or from the inside. This is not a dichotomous variable, for there are various degrees to which an elite unit can be "in" or "out." An elite might be completely "out," encouraging or forcing the merger of two or more units into a union which it does not join, sometimes relinquishing control once unification is initiated. Colonial powers brought together, frequently unwittingly, subordinated units, only to have to withdraw once their union was cemented: For example, resisting the British control was a major force in bringing together the thirteen American colonies, the various tribes in the Gold Coast that became Ghana, and the Jewish colonies in Palestine that formed the Israeli society. On the international level, the United States required some degree of intra-European economic co-operation as a condition for receiving funds under the Marshall Plan; it encouraged the union of the six countries that formed the European Economic Community, and is now encouraging the EEC to include Britain, without having joined these unions. Britain was the major force behind the efforts to launch a Federation of the West Indies and the formation of the Federation of Nigeria. In all these cases the center of power was with a non-member, external unit.

In other cases, the elites that initiate and support unification do not stay entirely out of the emerging community, nor are they a fully integral part of it. The United States, for instance, is an "informal but powerful" member of CENTO. It signed bilateral pacts with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, the three members of CENTO, which in 1961 showed signs of becoming more than just a treaty.[10] Similarly France, while not a member of the Conseil de l'Entente (a loose West African custom, communication, and, to a degree, military union of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey), still is an active participant in this union through various treaties.[11]

Finally, in still other cases, the elite is a full-fledged member of the union as Britain was in the European Free Trade Area and Prussia in the unification of Germany.

3. *Power, capability, and responsiveness.*—The units that control the epigenesis of political communities differ not only in their degree of elitism and internalization but also in their communication capabilities and degree of responsiveness to the needs and demands of participant units.[12] Deutsch pointed out that when all other conditions are satisfactory a unification process might fail because the *communication capabilities* of an elite are underdeveloped. This was probably a major reason why empires in medieval Europe were doomed to fail; they were too large and complex to be run from one center given the existing communication facilities.[13] Sociologists have concerned themselves extensively with communication gaps, but studies frequently focus on the interpersonal and small-group level (even in many of the so-called organizational studies of communication). Sociologists are often concerned with the structure of communication

[10] The Ministerial Council of CENTO decided in its meeting in Ankara in April, 1960, that a shared military command would be developed; intercountry roads and telecommunication improved; and economic and cultural ties increased (*New York Times*, April 29, 1961). Projects already completed include a new Turkish-Iranian railway, a new road linking the CENTO countries, as well as a microwave communication network (*International Organization*, XV [1961], 523).

[11] Immanuel Wallerstein, "Background to Paga," *West Africa*, July 29, 1961, p. 819, and August 5, 1961, p. 861, and Walter Schwartz, "Varieties of African Nationalism," *Commentary*, XXXII (1961), 34.

[12] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), pp. 65, 143.

[13] Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954), pp. 13–15.

networks (two-step communication systems,[14] as against chain systems[15]) rather than with the articulation of these networks with the power structure.[16] For students of political systems and of complex organization, ideas such as "overloading" of the elite (presenting it with more communication than it is able to digest; requiring more decisions per time unit than it is able to make) is an interesting new perspective that connects communication studies with power analysis much more closely than the widespread human-relations type of communication analysis.

The concept of *responsiveness* further ties communication analysis to the study of power by asking to what degree does the power center act upon communication received and digested in terms of reallocating resources and rewarding the compliance of sectors.[17]

Thus to analyze epigenesis effectively, we must know not only who has how much power over the process but also what are the communication capabilities and what is the degree of responsiveness of the various power centers.

B. PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL: A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE

The performance, power, and communication elements of a social unit developing epigenetically do not always develop at the same rate. As the limbs of an infant develop before he has control over them so new performances might be taken over by the accumulating unit before its power center gains control over them. Frequently, part of the performances of an accumulating unit are controlled by another unit, at least temporarily. The industrial capacity of colonies often developed before they gained political control over industry.

New communities, whose development follows the pattern suggested by epigenesis rather than that of preformism, tend to develop new performance abilities first and to internalize control over these activities later.[18] Just as a child first learns to walk, then gains the right to decide when and where to walk, or as military units in basic training first learn to act as units under the control of the training ("parent") unit's instructors and sanction system before acquiring their own command, so some countries engage in some collective activity under the control of a superior, non-member power.[19] Later, control is internalized by the evolving supranational system, and a supranational authority is formed, which regulates collective activities previously controlled by the superior external power.

It is the existence of a supranational authority—at first limited, then more encompassing—that distinguishes *unions of nations* from *international organizations*. Unions have at least a limited power center of their own, whose decisions bind the members and are enforcible; they have internalized at least some control. International organizations, on the other hand, are run by intergovernmental bodies, whose "decisions" are merely recommendations to the members and are not enforcible.[20] They

[14] Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

[15] Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-oriented Groups," *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America*, XXII (1950), 725–30.

[16] For one of the few studies that successfully ties the two see R. H. McCleary, *Policy Change in Prison Management* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1957).

[17] Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 143 (see also his *Political Community at the International Level*, p. 37).

[18] "Internalize" means here the transfer of power from external elites to internal elites.

[19] It should be pointed out that on the international level the power of a new union is more often generalized from its constituent units—"pooling of sovereignty"—than internalized from superior power. From the present viewpoint this distinction is not relevant; the question is: Who controls the collective action—the unit itself or other units (without regard to whether they are outside or constituent units)?

[20] For an outstanding discussion of the differences between intergovernment and supranational decision-making bodies, see Ernst B. Haas, *Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University

have, in this sense, no power of their own.

The special importance of the High Authority, a governing body of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is that its decisions directly bind the steel and coal industries of the six member nations and it can levy fines on industries that do not conform to its rulings (though national police forces would have to collect the fines, if they were not paid). Moreover, individuals, corporations, and states have the same status before the Court of Justice of the ECSC; they all can sue each other, an individual suing a state, or the High Authority suing a member state.[21]

Until the ECSC was formed in 1952, almost all European co-operation, such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and NATO, was intergovernmental. In 1952 the High Authority was formed; this was the first major step toward self-control of the evolving supranational community. (Interestingly, this is also the year NATO developed a supranational authority with the formation of SHAPE, which provided a supranational headquarters for the multination armies.)[22] In the following years functions and powers of the High Authority gradually increased. In 1957 the more encompassing common market (EEC) was established, which has its equivalent of the High Authority, the Economic Commission, except that its supranational powers cover more "performances"—much of the intercountry economic actions—than does the High Authority, which is limited to matters related to steel and coal.[23]

Attempts to develop supranational control over shared political activities, in which the members of the EEC do engage, have not yet succeeded. Whatever collective political action the Six take is based on intergovernment consultations of these countries, not supranational direction. *Thus, in the development of this union of nations, as in the epigenesis of many other social units, collective performances expand more rapidly than collective control.* (It should be noted that while frequently performance accumulation occurs before power internalization, the reversed sequence might occur, too. Power *capabilities* can be built up before performance. Modern armies, for instance, train groups of officers in headquarters work before they are given command of military units.)

We saw that communities are built up by accumulation of *new* performances (e.g., military ones) and control over them. We now turn to the dynamics of accumulation, recognizing three problems as basic to the analysis of all accumulation processes: (*a*) Under what conditions does the process start? (*b*) What factors contribute to its expansion and pace? (*c*) What is the sequence in which the functional sectors that make a complete community are assembled? The rest of this article is devoted to these problems.

III. INITIATION, TAKE-OFF, AND SPILL-OVER

A. BETWEEN INITIATION AND TAKE-OFF

The concept of take-off, borrowed from aerodynamics, is applied to the first stage of epigenesis to distinguish the initiation point from that where the continuation of the process becomes self-sustained. The image is one of a plane that first starts its engines and begins rolling, still supported

Press, 1958), chaps. xii, xiii. The following discussion of the High Authority draws on Haas's work.

[21] In March, 1961, the Economic Commission—which is roughly, to the EEC what the High Authority is to the ECSC—brought the Italian government before the court of the EEC for violation of an article of the Treaty of Rome concerning a ban on subsidies for trade in pork. This was the first such action taken since the formation of the EEC (*New York Times*, March 27, 1961).

[22] See Andrew J. Godpaster, "The Development of SHAPE: 1950–1953," *International Organization*, IX (1955), 257–62, and William A. Knowlton, "Early Stages in the Organization of SHAPE," *International Organization*, XIII (1959), 1–18.

[23] William Diebold, Jr., "The Changed Economic Position of Western Europe," *International Organization*, XV (1960), 1–19, esp. p. 12.

by the runway, until it accumulates enough momentum to "take off," to continue in motion "on its own," generating the forces that carry it to higher altitudes and greater speeds. The analogue is that through accumulation, while relying on external support, the necessary condition for autonomous action is produced. Also during "take-off" the pilot, released from airport tower control, gains control of his plane. (This control take-off might occur before or after the performance take-off.)

Economists use this concept in the study of industrialization, especially in reference to foreign aid. An underdeveloped country requires a certain amount of investment before its economy reaches the level at which it produces a national income large enough to provide for current consumption and for increased investment which, in turn, provides for additional growth of the economy.[24] An economy has taken off when additional growth is self-sustained; when no external investment or externally induced changes in saving, spending, or work habits are needed.

The concept of take-off can also be used in studying political, communication, and other social processes. A group of leaders, some labor unions, or "reform" clubs, join to initiate a new political party. Again, "to initiate" has two meanings, to which the concept of take-off calls attention: There is the day the leaders decide to launch the new party, a day that, if the launching is successful, will be known as the party's birthday. However, the new party initially draws its funds, staff, and political power from the founding leaders and groups. Gradually, as the party grows, it accumulates followers and contributors directly committed to it, and if it is successful, it eventually reaches the stage at which it can do without the support of its initiators and continue growing "on its own." While this point is far from being sharply defined, obviously it rarely coincides with the actual birth date. Much insight can be gained by comparing different polities with regard to the lapse between their initiation and their take-off points. For instance, the greater the lapse the more difficult it is for small or new groups to gain political representation. On the other hand, if the lapse is very small, entering the political competition becomes too easy, and it will be difficult to find a majority to establish a stable government.

In many countries there is a formal barrier that has to be surmounted before political take-off. Parties that poll less than a certain percentage of the votes are denied parliamentary representation. Frequently founders' support is given until the election day; then the party either gains representation and becomes a political factor in its own right or it flounders; it either takes off or crashes. One of the special characteristics of the American political system is that the take-off point for participation in national politics is remote from the initiation point. Many "third-party" movements that polled many hundreds of thousands of votes still could not continue to grow and to become permanent participants on the federal level.[25]

Take-off is especially important for the study of social units that are initiated by charter, enactment of a law, or signing of a treaty. While sometimes these "paper" units might be an expression of an already-existing social unit, often the formal structure precedes the development of a social one. While it has been often pointed out that an informal structure is likely to evolve, turning the formal one into a full-fledged social unit, we do not know under what conditions these informal processes take off, as against those conditions under which they never reach such a point. Clearly not all formal structures become functioning social units. This applies in particular to international relations where the supranational take-off, that is, the transition

[24] W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4, 7–9, 36 ff.

[25] Daniel Bell (ed.), *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955).

from a formal, intergovernmental structure to self-sustained growth toward a political community, is quite infrequent.[26] Under what conditions, then, does take-off occur?

While these problems still require much research, there appears to be one central factor bringing unification movements to take-off: the amount of decision-making called for by intercountry *flows* (e.g., of goods) and by *shared performance* (e.g., holding a common defense line) that, in turn, is determined by the scope of tasks carried out internationally. If the amount is large, intergovernment decision-making will prove cumbersome and inadequate and pressure will be generated either to reduce the need for international decision-making —by reducing the international tasks—or to build a supranational decision-making *structure*, which is a more effective decision-making body than are intergovernmental ones.

The central variable for the "take-off" of supranational authority is the amount of international decision-making required. This, in turn, is determined largely by the amounts and kinds of flows that cross the international borders (e.g., tourists, mail) and the amounts and kinds of shared international activities (e.g., maintaining an early-warning system). It should be stressed, however, that each flow or shared activity has its own decision-making logarithm. Some flows can increase a great deal and still require only a little increase in international decision-making; others require much more.[27] Moreover, the relationship seems not to be linear; that is, some increases in a particular flow (or shared activity) can be handled by the old decision-making system, but once a certain threshold is passed, some supranational authority is almost inevitable.

It seems also that expanding the power and scope of a supranational authority is easier than to form the first element of such an authority. Initially a supranational authority is often accepted on the grounds that it will limit itself strictly to technical, bureaucratic, or secondary matters, and that the major policy decisions will be left in the hands of a superior, intergovernment body. This was the initial relationship between the High Authority and the Council of Ministers of the ECSC; between the Economic Commission and the Council of Ministers of the EEC; and between NATO's SHAPE and NATO's conferences of ministers.

Once such a bureaucratic structure is established, a process often sets in whereby full-time, professional bureaucrats tend to usurp functions and authority from the part-time, political, "amateur" superior bodies, thereby expanding the scope of the supranational authority. At the same time, the very existence of supranational control in one area tends to promote such control in others. The concept of spill-over, or secondary priming, which is used here to study the epigenesis of nation unions, is applicable to the study of accumulation processes in general.

B. SECONDARY PRIMING OF CHANGE

"Spill-over" refers to expansion of supranational performances and control from one sphere of international behavior to another. It was introduced by Haas to refer to expansions within the sector in which unification originally started (e.g., from coal and steel industries to transportation) and from sector to sector (e.g., from the economic to the political).[28] Spill-over refers only to secondary priming; that is, to processes—in our case, unifications—that have been initiated or have taken off be-

[26] See Deutsch *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–87, on supranational take-off.

[27] Hence the fact that a mere increase in flows is not related to increase in supranationalism does not reject the hypothesis that these variables are positively related. Cf. I. Richard Savage and Karl Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, XXVIII (1960), 551–72; Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of Communication Flows," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XX (1956), 143–60.

[28] *Uniting of Europe*, *op. cit.*, chap. viii.

cause of epigenesis in *other* social sectors. NATO, for instance, unifies the military organizations of fifteen nations, and the EEC integrates the economies of six of the NATO countries. While these processes probably support each other, only a little spill-over has taken place. Basically the military unification did not initiate the economic one or vice versa.[29] There was original priming in each area. Both unifications may have had certain common sources (e.g., the conflicts between the United States and Soviet Russia) and maybe mutually supportive, but they did not trigger each other. On the other hand, the integration of the economies of the Six generates pressures toward integration of their governments, though so far political unification is mainly a "grand design."[30]

It follows that one can hardly understand supranational spill-over without studying the internal structure and dynamics of the participating societies. This must be done from a dynamic perspective, for spill-over raises the following questions: Under what conditions and at what level of change does unification of one sector lead to the exhausting of its "degrees of freedom" and trigger unification in other sectors?[31] Which sector is likely to be affected first, second, and *n*th? Which sector will be affected most, second, and *n*th?

[29] Diebold (*op. cit.*) points to the reasons why efforts to base economic integration on NATO have been unsuccessful. Kissinger, on the other hand, believes that NATO could serve as the basis of an Atlantic confederacy (*Reporter,* February 2, 1961, pp. 15–21). Deutsch *et al* pointed out that where the initial unification efforts were based on military integration half of these efforts failed (*op. cit.*, p. 28).

[30] On spill-over from the economic to the political area see essays by Paul Delouvrier and by Pierre Uri in C. Grove Haines (ed.), *European Integration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).

[31] In other words, up to a point each institutional realm changes independently, but, once that point has been reached, further change affects another institutional realm.

IV. THE SEQUENCE OF EPIGENESIS

A. CLOCKWISE AND COUNTERCLOCKWISE SEQUENCES

The concept of take-off suggests that epigenesis has to gain a certain momentum before it becomes self-sustaining. However it does not suggest in what sector accumulation takes off, or what the effects of the selection of a particular take-off sector are on the probability that general unification will ensue. Similarly, the study of spill-over traces the relation between sectors once take-off in one sector has occurred, but it does not specify either in which sector accumulation is likely to start or in what order other supranational sectors are likely to be built up (since it does not account for primary, simultaneous, or successive priming). To put it in terms of the accumulation model, we still have to determine: Which part is assembled first, which ones later?[32]

A hypothesis defining the sequences most functional for the epigenesis of nation unions can be derived from an application of the Parsonian phase model.[33] Parsons suggests that the most functional cyclical fluctuations in the investment of resources personnel, and time follow one of two patterns: either a clockwise sequence (adaptive, allocative, socially integrative, and normative integrative), or a counterclockwise sequence.[34] The two patterns can be applied to the study of epigenesis. They suggest that it is most functional for a new community to assemble its subunits and its

[32] Note that though sector spill-over occurs in the member societies, it leads to expansion in the scope of the supranational community.

[33] Parsons *et al., Working Papers . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 182 ff.

[34] Here, as well as in an earlier work, I found it fruitful to apply Parsons' concepts with a certain amount of liberty. A long conceptual quibble seems unnecessary. The use of allocation instead of "goal attainment" and of normative integration instead of "pattern maintenance and tension-management" may serve as a reminder to the reader concerned with such conceptual subtleties that Parsons is not responsible for my way of using his scheme.

self-control from the adaptive to the normative, or the other way around; and that all other sequences are less functional.[35]

Before we turn to express this hypothesis in more substantive terms the difference between the application of the Parsonian phase model to preformism and its application to epigenesis should be pointed out. The phase model, as such, concerns the movement of an existing system, not its pattern of growth or change in its structure. Unless other processes take place, after a full round of the phase movement the system is the same as it started. Moreover, while each system is once accumulated or differentiated, the phase movement can continue ad libitum.[36]

Parsons also suggested a pattern for the analysis of social change, that of differentiation, according to which fused units bifurcate first into expressive and instrumental elements; then, each of these splits. Expressive elements are divided into social and normative ones; instrumental into adaptive and allocative ones. This, like all preformism models, is a pattern according to which functions that were served by one, fused structure, become structurally differentiated; that is, they gain their own subunits.[37] The accumulation model, on the other hand, knows no bifurcation, but suggests an order in which new structures serving new functions are conjoined. For example, countries that shared only a common market also establish a common defense line; that is, the union acquires a new function, not just a structural wing. The order we expect to be functional for unification movements to follow is either from the adaptive to the normative or the other way around.

In more substantive terms, the major question raised by the hypothesis concerning the sequence of accumulation is this: Is unification initiated in a particular sector more likely to lead to complete unification (to a political community)? If so, which is it: the military, economic, political, or ideological? Is the probability of success higher if accumulation follows a certain sequence? Which sequence (if any)? And is the most effective sequence the same for all types of unifications? (See below.)

On the basis of the study of ten historical cases Deutsch and his associates reached the following conclusion:

> It appears to us from our cases that they [conditions of integration] may be assembled in almost any sequence, so long only as all of them come into being and take effect. Toward this end, almost any pathway will suffice.[38]

They added, however, that:

> In this assembly-line process of history, and particularly in the transition between background and process, timing is important. Generally speaking, we found that substantial rewards for cooperation or progress toward amalgamation had to be timed so as to come before the imposition of burdens resulting from such progress toward amalgamation (union). We found that, as with rewards before burdens, consent has to come before compliance if the amalgamation is to have lasting success.[39]

Deutsch's distinction between sequence and order in time seems unnecessary for our purposes. Especially after examining his important book, *Backgrounds for Com-*

[35] This is one of those statements that sounds tautological but is not. Since there are four phases in the system, the statement suggests that two modes of movement are more functional than twenty-two possible other ones. The first pattern—adaptive to normative—is referred to as clockwise because the convention is to present the four phases in a fourfold table in which the adaptive is in the upper left-hand box, the allocative in the upper right-hand box, the social-integrative in the lower right-hand box, and the normative in the lower left-hand box.

[36] Note also that there is no one-to-one relationship between the pattern in which a system is built up (whether accumulated or differentiated) and the pattern in which it is maintained; e.g., the epigenesis of a system might be counterclockwise and the system will "click" clockwise once its epigenesis is completed.

[37] For a later development of this model see Talcott Parsons, "A Functional Theory of Change," in Amitai and Eva Etzioni (eds.), *op. cit.*

[38] *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

munity, in which his historical material is analyzed in great detail and potency, we conclude that Deutsch suggests—if we push the freedom of interpretation to its limit—that the allocative phase tends to come before the adaptive one (rewards before burdens); and that the normative phase (consent) tends to come before the social-integrative phase (compliance). In other words, interpreting liberally, we find Deutsch suggesting that a counterclockwise sequence from normative to adaptive is most common.

Haas compares the findings of his study of a modern unification with the findings of Deutsch *et al.* on historical cases from this viewpoint.[40] He distinguishes between identical expectations (or aims) and converging expectations that make actors co-operate in pursuing their non-identical aims. The distinction comes close to Durkheim's dichotomy of mechanic and organic solidarity and is similar to the dichotomy of expressive and instrumental elements.[41] Haas reports that the ECSC has followed a clockwise sequence in which convergent (or instrumental) expectations preceded the identical (or expressive) ones.[42] Interpreting Haas liberally, one could state that in the case of the ECSC adaptive integration (custom union) came first, followed by allocative integration of economic policies (regarding coal and steel and later the formation of a common market). The union is now on the verge of political integration (election of a European parliament; planning group for federal or confederal institutions) and at the beginning of normative integration. Actually by the time Haas completed his study in 1957, there was hardly any supranational merger of normative institutions, and even attitudes only started to change from convergent to identical.

Any effort to codify Deutsch's and Haas's findings for the benefit of further research on the question of the relative effectiveness of various sequences will have to take into account (1) the nature of the merging units, (2) the nature of the emerging unit (i.e., the kind of union established), and (3) the nature of functional statements.

B. MERGING UNITS

One might expect that supranational unification of societies that differ in their internal structure will proceed in a different sequence. If, for instance, the merging units are three newly independent states such as Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—states that in themselves are still in the process of building up their "expressive" foundations—the emphasis on normative and social integration on the supranational level might well be higher than when long-established and well-integrated states unify, as in the Scandinavian union, where the instrumental elements of the unification are stressed. These observations support the far from earth-shaking hypothesis that sector integration most responsive to the functional needs of the individual societies that are merging will come first in the unification sequence. After take-off, however, unification is expected to *proceed more and more in accord with the intrinsic needs of the emerging political union, less and less in accord with the internal needs of the merging units.*

The preceding statements should not be read to imply that "political communities develop differently in different historical context"; that, for instance, one can account for the difference between Deutsch's findings and those of Haas by pointing to the fact that Deutsch deals with historical cases while Haas is concerned with a contemporary one. Such statements are frequently made by historians who believe that each context is unique, hence what

[40] Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," in Stanley Hoffman (ed.), *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), pp. 230–31.

[41] *Ibid.,* p. 229. In Haas's own words: "Converging expectations make for regional unity instrumental in nature rather than based on principle."

[42] *Ibid.,* p. 230.

needs explanation is not diversity but uniformity—if ever found. For the sociologist the "historical context" is a shorthand phrase referring to the values of a myriad variable; unless these are specified, little is explained by the statement that "the context is different." In our case the question is: Which contextual variables account for the difference in sequences and for how much of the difference? (Often numerous factors have an effect but a small number accounts for most of the variance.)

"Historical cases," for instance, are often preindustrial societies; hence it comes to mind that the level of industrialization might account for part of the difference; industrialized societies might tend to merge in an adaptive-first, normative-last sequence; non-industrial ones, in a normative-first, adaptive-last sequence. This formulation seems suggestive because, if valid, it points to the direction in which these findings can be generalized. We would expect, for instance, contemporary non-industrialized societies to unify in the "historical," not in the "contemporary," fashion. The hypothesis also calls attention to the special importance of historical cases in which unification came after industrialization. If these unifications followed a "contemporary" sequence, the hypothesis on the relation of industrialization to the sequence of unification would be strengthened.

Another variable to be teased out of the undifferentiated phrase, "historical context," is the degree of nationalism. There seem to be three major kinds of unions: pre-nationalist (e.g., the Roman Empire); post-nationalist (e.g., the EEC); and unions that are themselves an expression of rising nationalism (e.g., the unification of Italy). All other things being equal, we would expect the initial phases of pre- and post-nationalist unions to stress the adaptive aspect and follow the clockwise pattern; and those unions that express nationalism to be initiated on the normative side, following the counterclockwise sequence.

C. KINDS OF UNION

The sequence of unification is determined not only by the *initial* needs of the merging units (e.g., industrialization) and the "period" (e.g., advent of nationalism) but also by the function the union fulfils for the various participant units as it is *completed.* Unions of nations differ greatly on this score. The most familiar type is that of custom unions, which keep up the level of international trade among member countries. The new Central American Union, formed in 1959, and the Latin America Free Trade Area, ratified in 1961,[43] are actually oriented at economic development, international division of labor, sharing of information, and even of capital rather than increased regional trade.[44] Wallerstein points to still a different function of unions: Some serve as instruments of subordination, while others serve to bolster independence.[45] Thus the whites, who are stronger in Southern Rhodesia than in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, use the federation of the three regions to hold the regions in which they are weak.

Functional analysis of social units that develop epigenetically is more complex than such an analysis of existing social units, for here we deal with functional analysis of change where the system itself is changing. Thus, as unification evolves, it comes to fulfil different (either additional or substitute) functions for the participant units and the emerging union. The West European unification might have been initiated in 1947 as a way to gain capital aid from the United States to reconstruct the postwar economies; soon it acquired the additional function of countering Soviet

[43] See "The Emerging Common Markets in Latin America," *Monthly Review* (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), September, 1960, pp. 154 ff.

[44] This point was made by Lincoln Gordon in "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered," *World Politics*, XIII (1961), 231–53.

[45] On these unions see Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa* (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. vii.

military expansion; then it came to serve economic welfare and, with the "rebellion" of France since De Gaulle has returned to office, it even serves, to a degree, to countervail United States influence in the Western bloc.[46] (It should be mentioned in passing that at a given stage of development the same union may have different functions for different participants. Thus, Germany supported the EEC partially to overcome its "second" citizen status in the community of nations; allied control of German steel industry, for instance, was abolished when Germany entered the ECSC.[47] France supported the formation of NATO in part to gain some control over a rebuilt and rearmed Germany.)

All functional needs—those of individual members, those common to all members, and those of the evolving community—vary with the various stages of the unification process; and they all seem to affect the sequence in which the "parts" are assembled. It remains for future studies to relate differences in sequence to these functional variations, to validate two hypotheses: (*a*) the higher the degree of unification the more its pattern of accumulation can be accounted for by common (identical or complementary) needs, rather than by the individual needs of member states, and by needs of the union rather than by common needs of the members, (*b*) accumulation sequences, whatever their take-off sector, are most likely to complete the process of unification if they follow the clockwise or counterclockwise sequence than any other.

D. FUNCTIONAL AND "REAL" SEQUENCES

An important difference between the statements about sequences made, on the one hand, by Deutsch and by Haas and the statements made, on the other, by Parsons, his associates, and in the preceding discussion is that the former refer to actual occurrences (the ECSC followed this and that pattern) and empirical frequencies (nine out of ten historical cases followed this sequence), while the latter refer to functional sequences. Functional statements suggest that if epigenesis proceeds in a certain sequence, it will be most effectively completed; if it follows another sequence, certain dysfunctions will occur. The nature of the dysfunctions can be derived from the nature of the stages which are skipped (e.g., high social strain is expected if the expressive elements are not introduced), or incorporated in a "wrong" order (e.g., high strain is expected when allocation of resources is attempted before adaptation has been built up). The fact that a particular unification follows a sequence other than the one suggested by the epigenesis model does not invalidate the latter so long as it is demonstrated that the "deviation" from the model caused dysfunctions. In short, the test of the model lies in its ability to predict which course of action is functional and which one is not, rather than to predict the course of action likely to be followed.[48]

In the construction of epigenesis models for the various kinds of nation unions, the use of two types of functional models must be distinguished: The crude *survival* model and the more sophisticated and demanding *effectiveness* model. The first specifies the conditions under which a structure exists or ceases to exist; the second also takes into account differences in the degree of success. In the case of nation unions, then, while many are likely to continue in existence, some will stagnate on a low level of integration while others will continue to grow in scope, function, and authority.

[46] Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," *International Organization*, XV (1961), 349–65.

[47] *Uniting of Europe, op. cit.*, pp. 247–48.

[48] Note that the system this statement refers to is not the existing one but a future state—that of a complete unification—of a community. The use of a future-system reference might prove useful for the general development of the functional analysis of change.

CONCLUSION

Sociological theories of change tend to be preformist; they provide differentiation models for the analysis of the structural development of existing social units. We presented some elements of an alternative, epigenesis model, which suggests that some social units acquire new subunits that fulfil new functions, do not just provide new subunits for functions served before in a less specialized manner. Since these new elements are incorporated from the environment, epigenesis (or accumulation) models are much more concerned with input from, and articulation with, external units than preformism (or differentiated) models. Hence the first question we asked was: Where does the power lie that controls the process—is it evenly distributed among the participant units or is it concentrated in the hands of elites? Are the power-holders members of the new emerging communities or outsiders? Does increase in self-control of the union precede, follow, or coincide with the growth in its performances?

Turning from the powers that control accumulation to the pattern of accumulation itself, we asked: Where does the process start, what subunit is built up first? Which follows? What effect does the construction of one part have on that of the others? The concepts of take-off and secondary priming proved to be useful in understanding the initiation and progress of accumulating processes. An application of Parsons' phase model served us in formulating a hypothesis concerning the functional sequence of accumulation.

The distinctness of accumulation models should be emphasized: While differentiation models focus our attention on internal processes, accumulation models are concerned with boundary processes; while differentiation models are interested in internal elites, accumulation models ask about the changing power distribution between external and internal ones and their respective impacts on accumulation. Analytically speaking, preformist models see their subject units—even when undifferentiated—as functionally complete, whereas epigenesis models view their units as either partial (to varying degrees) or complete.

We emphasized the need to treat social units and their change as multilayer phenomena, including at least a performance, a power (or control), and a communication layer.[49] If we deal with a phase, differentiation, or accumulation model, we need not assume that changes on one layer are automatically concomitant with changes on the others.

Although the epigenesis model can be applied to many social phenomena, we are interested here primarily in using it to study international unification. There is hardly a subject less frequently studied by sociologists and more given to sociological analysis than the development of political communities whose members are nations. Since the evolution of these communities is likely to be supportive of both the short-run armed truce and the development of the social conditions for lasting peace,[50] and since the processes of social change involved in forming supranational communities are comparatively highly planned, deliberately and frequently drawing on expert advice, the study of supranational unification carries the extra reward of not just better understanding of human society but also of understanding how to better it.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[49] See my *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), chaps. v and vii.

[50] These functions of nation unions are discussed in chap. viii of my *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

COMMUNITY POWER AND URBAN RENEWAL SUCCESS[1]

AMOS H. HAWLEY

ABSTRACT

Starting from the position that power is an attribute of a social system rather than of an individual, this study examines the relationship of the extent of power concentration to urban renewal success. The ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the employed labor force measures the concentration of power, and success in urban renewal is represented by arrival of cities at the execution stage in that program. The relationship is found to be statistically significant and remains so under a series of controlled observations. Thus it appears that the conception of power employed offers a promising procedure for comparative studies.

Power, in most sociological studies, is conceived as the ability to exercise influence in a decision-making process. It is viewed as a personal attribute that distinguishes leaders from followers. Working with that conception investigators normally proceed by inquiring into the reputations of members of a community, establishing juries to winnow the great from the small, constructing sociograms to determine who interacts with whom, and so on. No matter what the methodological apparatus, investigators are uniformly led to the discovery that managerial and proprietary personnel, with occasional exceptions, constitute the power figures.[2] Some of the more sophisticated start with the assumption that managers and proprietors are the principal power figures and use their sociometric tools to discover how members of an elite are grouped about various kinds of issues to form power centers. Both procedures, as Wolfinger has recently pointed out, often rest on certain unspoken and unwarranted assumptions.[3] They appear to assume, for example, that lines of influence are clearly perceptible to respondents. They also assume a static distribution of power among certain personalities. But the chief difficulty with the usual approach is that it is only applicable in a case study; it offers no facility for quantitative and comparative studies of the phenomenon. And that, it seems to me, is a disability inherent in a social-psychological approach to the study of community structure.

Before turning to an alternative way of treating the matter, a prefatory comment on the nature of that which is in question seems to be appropriate. It should be obvious that power in the social sphere, as with energy in the physical world, is ubiquitous. It is like energy, too, in that it appears in many forms. Every social act is an exercise of power, every social relationship is a power equation, and every social group or system is an organization of power. Accordingly, it is possible to transpose any system of social relationships into terms of potential or active power. Perhaps such a transposition is nothing more than the substitution of one terminology for another. At the very least, however, it focuses attention on the instruments of control and causes a social

[1] I am indebted to Professors Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Robert Somers for helpful advice in the preparation of this paper.

[2] Representative studies include Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); Robert O. Schultz and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The Determinants of Local Power Elites," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (1957), 290–96; Delbert C. Miller, "Decision-making Cliques in Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1958), 299–309; Paul Miller, "The Process of Decision-making within the Context of Community Organization," *Rural Sociology*, XVII (1952), 153–61.

[3] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Study of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (1960), 636–44.

system to be viewed as a control mechanism.

The community, for example, may be conceived as an energy system. That is, as a system of relationships among functionally differentiated units the community constitutes a mobilization of power—the capacity to produce results—for dealing with the environment, whether physical or social. Each unit or subsystem—family, church, store, industry—is also an organization of power for the conduct of a function. Both the system and its subsystems tend to approximate a single organization model. Moreover, since the performance of its function by any one part affects in greater or lesser degree the conditions under which other parts carry out their functions, the parent system and each subsystem is an arena in which a more or less continuous interplay of influence occurs. Power, then, is expressed in two ways: (1) as functional power—that required to execute a function; and (2) as derivative power—that which spills over into external relationships and regulates the interaction between parts. The two modes of manifestation are necessarily connected. The type of function performed determines the kind of derivative influence transmitted to other parts or subsystems. There might also be a quantitative association, though the magnitude of the derivative influence is a consequence not only of the scale to which a function has developed but also of its position in the system. Those subsystems that are most instrumental in relating the system to the environment doubtlessly exert a greater derivative effect than do subsystems one or more steps removed from the key position. Space does not permit a full exposition of a system conception of power. Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that power is a product of a system having developed, that it is lodged only in a system, and that it is most appropriately treated, therefore, as a system property.[4] Whatever power an individual might appear to possess is in effect attached to the office he occupies in a system. He acquires power by attaining to an office and he loses it when he is separated from the office. But the acquiring and losing of power is illusory; the property belongs rather with the office or, better still, to the system in which the office is a specialized function.[5]

In the conduct of its routine activities the system exercises its power through established and well-worn channels; the interplay of influence is institutionalized. But the structure of relationships through which power is communicated may leave various areas of interest or activity unattended, for example, private charity, religious digression and reform, the supervision of adolescents. When crises occur in such matters or when non-routine issues affecting the whole system arise, the existing structure is put to a test. It may or may not be effective in dealing with the exceptional circumstance. Whether it is effective would appear to be contingent on the way in which derivative power is distributed in the system. Where it is highly concentrated the community should be able to act as a unit in almost any emergency. On the other hand, where power is widely distributed a community may be able to act coherently only with great difficulty, if at all, when confronted with a novel problem.

This suggests a way of dealing with the variable quantitatively. A frustrating feature of studies of power has been the understandable failure to find a way to measure its amount. If, however, we can assume that an enduring system has sufficient force to regularly perform its normal functions,

[4] This position has been stated recently by Richard M. Emerson, though he objects to the assumption of generalized power that is adopted, at least for present purposes, in this study ("Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review,* XXVII (1962), 31-32.

[5] The conception of power developed here is interchangeable with the ecological concept of dominance. Ecologists, however, have been content to treat dominance as an attribute of location or type of place, though the concept has always carried overtones of organizational properties. They have neglected to exploit the concept as an entree into the general problem of organization.

we can conclude that all systems of the same kind generate equivalent amounts of power. There remains a variable, namely, the way in which power is distributed. Any given amount may be in some instances concentrated in a small sector of the system or in other instances distributed more or less uniformly over all sectors or subsystems. The measurement of distribution appears to present fewer difficulties than does the measurement of the amount of power.

Now let me propose that the greater the concentration of power in a community the greater the probability of success in any collective action affecting the welfare of the whole. This follows, if it be granted that (1) success in a collective action requires the ability to mobilize the personnel and resources of the community and (2) that ability is greatest where power is most highly concentrated. The proposition does not say that a concentration of power assures success in any community venture. Various factors might intervene to defeat a collective project. Moreover, a concentration of power might be used to block a course of action. Power concentration, however, is not needed to defeat an action on the part of a community. That might occur as a result of power being so diffusely held that mobilization of the community cannot be accomplished.

Proceeding from the notion that system power resides in the subsystems or functional units of a community, we can infer that it must be exercised through the managerial functions of the subsystems. For it is those functions that co-ordinate the several other functions in their respective subsystems and articulate the latter with the larger system. In the absence of data on the number of managerial functions, I shall use the number of managerial personnel, that is, the number of people who reported occupations as manager, proprietor, or official in the Population Census, to measure concentration of power. Personnel, it should be stressed, is used only as a substitute for, and as an index of, functions.[6] Since the significance of the number of functions varies with the number of all other functions (i.e., the size of the employed labor force), it should be expressed as a ratio to the latter. Hence the lower the ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials[7] to the employed labor force the greater is the concentration of power. (This measure will hereafter be called the MPO ratio.)

As the dependent variable, that is, an example of collective action, I shall use success in urban renewal. Urban renewal, programed and administered by the Housing and Home Finance Agency, has the advantage of involving a standard procedure to which all participating communities must submit in like manner. Participation in the program by a municipality involves passage through a series of stages, differentiated by the extent to which the planning and other local arrangements required for federal financial support have been fulfilled. The stages are *planning*, *execution*, and *completion*. Arrival at the completion stage is unquestionably the best measure of success. Unfortunately only eighteen cities in the continental United States had by the end of 1959 advanced so far—hardly enough for statistical purposes. The next best indication of success in urban renewal is arrival at the execution stage. At that stage a city has completed its planning and has satisfied all administrative requirements for the receipt of a capital grant from the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The

[6] A similar notion appears in the introductory remarks of C. Wright Mills in his book on *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). Nevertheless it soon becomes apparent that Mills is mainly concerned with the personal characteristics of the occupants of such positions.

[7] For present purposes only managers, proprietors, and officials "not elsewhere classified" are used, this eliminating technical positions that have no management or policy-determining functions. The category, it should be noted, is not limited to management positions in pecuniary establishments. It includes managers of art galleries, libraries, community funds, welfare agencies, and others.

city is then either at the point of, or has embarked upon, the acquisition of land, the relocation of current occupants, and clearing and improving the land. At the end of 1959, ninety-five cities with population of 50,000 or more (in 1950) had advanced to the execution stage.[8]

For control purposes data on two other classes of cities of 50,000 or more population are employed. One class includes cities that entered the urban renewal program but for one reason or another abandoned their efforts sometime between 1950 and 1960. The thirty-eight cities that had that experience are called "dropouts." The second control class is made up of all cities, in states where urban renewal is legally permissible, that have not attempted urban renewal at any time. There are sixty-one such cities. All the members of this class, it is to be noted, are eligible for urban renewal assistance from the federal agency. There remains a sizable group of cities that are still in the planning stage. Eventually they will either pass into the execution stage or terminate their efforts; but at present their status is indeterminate. For that reason they are not included in the present study.

Whether urban renewal is a form of collective action that would call into operation the organization of the entire community may be debatable. The general scale of urban renewal projects is clearly relevant to the question. The average acreage involved in urban renewal projects in the 253 cities that were in the program in mid-1959 was 78.6 per city, or about one-eighth of a square mile. But one-fourth of all urban renewal acreage was contained in five cities; half the total was in nineteen cities. In the remaining cities the average acreage per city was 42.5, or a little over one-sixteenth of a square mile. That urban renewal, in the light of these magnitudes, represents a significant challenge to a community must be left as an unanswered question for the present. If it is regarded as a major undertaking in a community, it should certainly involve the local power structure. If it is considered to be a rather insignificant form of collective action, then as a dependent variable it provides a fairly severe test of the hypothesis.[9]

It seems advisable to restate the hypothesis in the operational terms set forth. The hypothesis is: MPO ratios are lowest in urban renewal cities that have reached the execution stage and highest in cities that have never attempted urban renewal. Dropout cities are expected to occupy an intermediate position between the polar classes.

The hypothesis is to be examined with reference to cities of 50,000 population or more. The abundance of data available for cities in that size range offers considerable latitude for refining the measure of power concentration and for the development of controls. In the following, however, the analysis of power concentration as an independent variable is confined primarily to ratios for the entire class of MPO's. Differentials within that class will be investigated in a later report.

As a preliminary test of the representativeness of cities of 50,000 population or more, their MPO ratios, for each urban renewal status class, are compared with those for all cities of 15,000–50,000 population, in Table 1. Observe that the two series of ratios are very similar. Thus it seems possible that findings for large cities might apply to all cities regardless of size. Further, though somewhat tangential, support of that conclusion is found in the fact that the number of years spent in the planning stage before reaching the execution stage is unrelated to size of city. No further attempt to ascertain the representativeness of large cities has been made.

[8] Data on cities that have had urban renewal experience have been obtained from the *Annual Report of the Housing and Home Finance Agency*, 1951 through 1960 (Washington, D.C.).

[9] *Urban Renewal Project Characteristics* (Washington, D.C.: Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal Administration, June 30, 1959).

It is also to be noted in Table 1 that the ratios conform to the hypothesis. Power is most highly concentrated in the execution-stage cities and most diffusely distributed in the never-in-program cities. That the concentration of power, as represented by the ratio of all MPO's to the employed labor force, is significantly greater in cities that have reached the execution stage in urban renewal than in the other classes of cities is apparent in Table 2. The probability that the association shown there is due to chance is less than 1 in a 100.

TABLE 1

NUMBER AND MPO RATIOS, CITIES BY SIZE CLASS AND BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	ALL CITIES OF 15,000 POPULATION AND OVER		CITIES OF 50,000 POPULATION AND OVER		CITIES OF 15,000-50,000 POPULATION	
	No.	MPO Ratio	No.	MPO Ratio	No.	MPO Ratio
Execution stage	136	9 0	95	9 0	41	9 1
Dropout	79	10 0	38	10 1	41	9 8
Never in program .	402	11 0	61	10.8	341	11 1
Total.	617	10 4	194	9.5	423	10 7

TABLE 2

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF CITIES (MPO RATIOS), BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS*

Urban Renewal Status	1st (Under 7.7)	2d (7 8–8.9)	3d (9 0–9.9)	4th (10 0–11.7)	5th (11 8 and Over)
Execution stage . ..	27	22	21	17	9
Dropout	3	9	8	8	7
Never in program.. ...	9	9	8	13	22

* $\chi^2 = 23\ 516$, $C = .330$, $P < .01$.

The quintile distribution of cities shown in Table 2 displays a considerable spread over the ratio range in each urban renewal status class. That raises a question of how some cities manage to get to the execution stage without a concentration of power. The complementary question of how other cities with marked concentrations of power escape urban renewal may be given a tentative a priori answer: that is, th[e] are susceptible and may yet enter the pr[o]gram. In any event, it is doubtlessly tr[ue] that factors other than the distribution [of] power operate on urban renewal experien[ce] or the lack of it.

For example, the probability that urba[n] renewal might recommend itself to a com[]munity as a course of action should [be] somewhat contingent on the state of i[ts] physical equipment. If the equipment, i[n] this instance its buildings, is fairly new an[d] in good condition, urban renewal woul[d] make little sense. But where buildings ar[e] old or dilapidated a proposal to renew o[r] rehabilitate would appear to be appropriate. Two measures of the condition of building[s] are used here: (1) the percentage of al[l] residential units constructed before 1920 and (2) the percentage of all residentia[l] units reported as dilapidated. Cities ar[e] classified relative to the median for eac[h]

characteristic, providing two dichotomies. "Young" cities have less than 65 per cent of their houses built before 1920, and "old" cities 65 per cent or more of their houses built prior to that date. Cities with less than 4.7 per cent of their houses dilapidated are described as "low" on that variable while those with 4.7 per cent and over are classified as "high."

It is conceivable, too, that some cities might have anticipated the problems that invite urban renewal by having established a well-financed and strongly supported planning agency. Cities that have done so might not have to seek federal assistance for improvements. A contrary argument can also be advanced. Perhaps cities with substantial commitments to planning are more prepared to enter into a renewal project than are cities in which planning has not been developed to any appreciable extent. Notwithstanding my inability to resolve this question, the size of the planning budget might prove to be a factor of some consequence. For the purpose of control, planning expenditures are expressed as a ratio to total government operating costs in 1955. Ratios of less than .4 are below the median and thus identify their respective cities as "low" with respect to planning budgets, while ratios of .4 and over indicate cities with "high" planning budgets.

There is a strong likelihood, too, that central cities of metropolitan areas might be more favorably disposed toward urban renewal than suburban cities. That should follow from the fact that central cities are generally older than are suburbs. But it should also derive from the deconcentration trend through which central cities have been losing population and industry to outlying areas. Many large suburban cities have also begun to experience declining growth rates, though in only a few cases has the trend reached a critical stage. Where substantial losses, real or threatened, have been encountered urban renewal might appear to offer a means by which to reverse the trend. There is a second factor that calls attention to the central city–suburb distinction. That is the peculiar residential distribution of managers, proprietors, and officials. Since members of those groups tend to live in suburbs while working in central cities their numbers as reported in the Census fail to reflect accurately the number of such positions in each place. The only practicable solution to this difficulty is to control for metropolitan status, that is, central city and suburb.

My operationalization of the concentration of power represents but one facet of a complex phenomenon. Other dimensions of that phenomenon should at least be admitted as control variables. For example, power may lie mainly in either the manufacturing or in the local service sector of a community's economy, whichever is most important. Relative importance is here measured by the ratio of manufacturing payroll to the combined payrolls in retailing, wholesaling, and service enterprises. Service cities have ratios of 1.5 or less and manufacturing cities have ratios of over 1.5.

The average size of manufacturing plant is another possible dimension of the distribution of power, especially if it may be construed as an indicator of the general scale of functional activities in the community. Size of plant is measured by the average number of employees per plant. Small-plant cities have averages of less than 70 employees; large-plant cities have over 70 employees per plant.

Still another expression of power distribution is found in the type of city government. In cities having a commission form of government, administrative responsibility is spread over a large number of non-elective officials. Such cities probably are unable to mobilize for action unless there is a fairly high concentration of power of the kind under study here. Administrative authority is more centralized where a mayor-council government exists.

And in a city manager government administrative authority reaches its highest degree of centralization and articulation. Hence, contrary to the findings of another study that type of city government is not important in determining urban renewal success,[10] I shall employ it as a control.

Two other controls having to do with the socioeconomic level of the resident population are used. Both assume that where

[10] George S. Duggar, "The Relation of Local Government Structure to Urban Renewal," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, XXVI (1961), 49-69.

TABLE 3

MEAN MPO RATIOS IN CITIES, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED

Control Variable	Urban Renewal Status		
	Execution Stage	Dropout	Never in Program
Age of housing:			
Young	10 1	10.7	12.2
Old	8.2	9.5	9.5
Extent of dilapidation:			
Low	9 1	9 2	11.0
High	9.1	10.9	10.2
Planning budget:			
Small	8.8	9 3*	11 0
Large	9.6	11 3	11 6
Metropolitan status:			
Central city	9 0	10.8	10.1
Suburban city	8.9	8 5	11.9
Government:			
Manager	9.5	9.7	12.3
Mayor-council	8 8	9 4	9 7
Commission	8 7	12 1	10 2†
Industry:			
Service	10 0	10 9	12 6
Manufacturing	8 1	9 2	9 7
Size of manufacturing plant:			
Small	9.5	11.0	12 0
Large	8.1	8.8	9.5
Median income:			
Low	8 8	10 7	9 6
High	9 2	9.7	11.4
Education:			
Low	8.2	9.8	8.6
High	9.8	10.5	12 4
Region:			
Northeast	8.5	8.1	9.8
North central	8.5	10.6	10.4
South	9.4	11.0	12.2†
West	11.9†	12.8*	12 6

* *N* is 5 or less.
† *N* is less than 10.

the socioeconomic level is high the community may be prepared to act in a matter such as urban renewal independently of a concentration of power. The first, education, is represented by the proportion of the population with four or more years of college completed. The second, income, is measured by median income. Cities are dichotomized on the median for each variable. Cities with less than 6.0 per cent of their residents with four years or more of college education are "low," and those with over that proportion are "high." The median position for the median income array falls at $3,450; cities below and above that figure are "low" and "high," respectively.

Finally, region is included among the controls. To some extent regional differences combine differences in age of cities, dilapidation, income, education, and possibly other of the control variables discussed above. Thus it is reasonable to expect that the association of power distribution with urban renewal success might vary by region. Four regions are recognized for control purposes; northeast, north central, south, and west.[11]

MPO ratios for each urban renewal status class and with each of the ten controls applied successively are shown in Table 3. In no instance does the introduction of a control vitiate the association of power concentration with urban renewal success, though in a number of instances the dropout cities fail to hold an intermediate position between execution stage and never-in-program cities. Although the averages for dropout cities are affected by small numbers of cities in many cases, it is also possible that power concentration has been employed to defeat urban renewal in those cities. It is worth noting that even where the concentration of power is relatively great, as in old cities, mayor-council cities, manufacturing cities, large-plant cities, low-education cities, and cities in the northeast, the concentration varies with urban renewal success. There is no indication, in short, that the importance attached to the concentration of power is peculiar to any one type or class of city. Despite the fact that suburban cities are the preferred places of residence for a large proportion of the holders of administrative positions, urban renewal success seems to require as great a concentration of power in suburbs as it does in central cities. Also of interest is the evidence that manager cities appear to be able to achieve urban renewal with less power concentration than do cities of other government classes.

To better assess the closeness of the association of power concentration with urban renewal success I have employed rank correlation analysis, using Kendall's tau-*c*. For this purpose the three urban renewal status classes are assumed to constitute a scale. Evidence that such an assumption is reasonable is present in Tables 1 and 3. The independent variable is treated in a quintile distribution of cities by MPO ratios, as in Table 2. The results are shown in Table 4, for which data a one-tailed test of significance was used.

It is clear from the findings in Table 4 that the concentration of power is positively and significantly associated with urban renewal success under virtually all conditions of control. Several exceptions occur, however. The relationship is not dependable for cities with mayor-council governments, with a predominance of service industry, with small proportions of college graduates among their residents, and with locations in the northeast and the west. Some of these exceptions appear to be contrary to the positive findings involving variables known to be closely associated with them (education and income, northeastern location, and manufacturing industry). Had it been possible to refine the controls, some of the inconsistencies doubtlessly would have disappeared.

[11] Two other controls were used with similar results: population size and income as represented by the proportion of families with incomes of $10,000 or more per year.

The category of all managers, proprietors, and officials is quite heterogeneous; it embraces the full range of both size and type of unit in which such positions occur. Thus it is not unlikely that one or another subclass or industry group of managers, proprietors, and officials might be primarily responsible for the observed association. But the measures reported in Table 5 indicate that that is not the case. The correlation is statistically significant for eve industrial class of managers, proprieto and official but one. The one, public a ministration, not only falls short of si nificance, it is negative. Why the prospec for urban renewal success should tend increase with increases in the relative nur bers of managers and officials in public a ministration poses an interesting proble But that is not a question that can l

TABLE 4

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION OF MPO RATIOS WITH URBAN RENEWAL STATUS, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED

Control Variable	Tau	x/σ	P
All cities	.267	4.112	00003
Age of housing:			
Young	239	2 568	00510
Old	.236	2 689	00360
Extent of dilapidation:			
Low	258	2 801	00260
High	.267	2 951	.00160
Planning budget:			
Small	.243	2 159	01540
Large	.305	2.430	.00750
Metropolitan status:			
Central city	214	2 874	00200
Suburban city	402	3 337	00048
Government·			
Manager	.429	3 711	.00011
Mayor-council	134	1 387	08230
Commission	.302	3 337	00048
Industry:			
Service	169	998	15870
Manufacturing	220	3 175	00068
Size of manufacturing plant:			
Small	.301	3 292	.00048
Large	186	2 065	.01960
Median income.			
Low	.219	2 533	.00570
High	266	2.833	.00230
Education:			
Low	.122	1.382	.08380
High	.363	3.995	.00003
Region:			
Northeast	.108	1 096	13350
North central	.233	2 062	.01970
South	388	2.805	00260
West	.105	.649	.25780

TABLE 5

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION OF MPO RATIOS WITH URBAN RENEWAL STATUS, BY CLASS OF INDUSTRY, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED

Industry Class	Tau	x/σ	P
All industries..	.267	4.112	00003
Manufacturing:			
Salaried MPO's.... .. .	170	2 622	.00440
Self-employed MPO's.... .	.209	3.229	.00137
Retail and wholesale trade ..	214	3 300	00097
Banking and finance .	209	3 229	00137
Public administration .	−.105	−1 612	10740

pursued here. Nor is it possible to press the analysis of industry class of managers, proprietors, and officials further at present, though the fact that the relationship for each industry class taken separately responds differently to the application of controls clearly points to a need for a more intensive investigation.

While the findings reported in this paper should be regarded as exploratory, they clearly support the hypothesis that the lower the MPO ratio the greater the chance of success in an action program such as urban renewal. They also demonstrate the facility and the economy in research of a conception of power as a system property. Much remains to be done, however, to develop knowledge about that property. A factor of some importance is the composition of managerial positions in a city. The relative numbers in the key industry should prove decisive, if my initial argument is correct. What constitutes a key industry, of course, is contingent upon the function the city performs for the regional and national society. The pursuit of that question will doubtlessly suggest further lines of investigation.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

TOWN AND GOWN: THE POWER STRUCTURE OF A UNIVERSITY TOWN

DELBERT C. MILLER

ABSTRACT

The power structure of a university town studied by reputational and issue history techniques shows that business and governmental institutions and associations dominate education as the most influential agencies in resolving community issues. However, the university is the largest employer and contains a very highly educated leadership reserve. The university is well represented in community affairs by its university officials, but the faculty are underrepresented. Faculty are more commonly engaged in state, national, and international leadership roles than in local participation. An accomodation has been worked out in which the university provides educational service and athletic and cultural entertainment, while the town furnishes economic goods and political leadership.

THE PROBLEM

The possibility of studying communities with varying power structures is an intriguing challenge to the community researcher. In the United States there is great opportunity among our thousands of towns and cities to find a wide range of institutional power arrangements. One thinks of the possible dominance of the church in Salt Lake City, Utah, government in Washington, D.C., business in Wilmington, Delaware, or education in a small university town such as Ann Arbor, Michigan; Ames, Iowa; East Lansing, Michigan; State College, Pennsylvania; Pullman, Washington; and scores of others. Yet most studies have not exploited this variety of institutional base.[1] No one seems to have explored the power structure of a university town.[2]

The following report describes a study of a small city where the university is the largest employer.[3] In 1960 the city had a population of 32,000 of which 13,000 were university students. The university employs 3,600 faculty and staff personnel and provides the main economic support for the town. Moreover, the university houses a faculty of over 1,000, providing the largest single group of highly educated, high-income personnel in the community. It seems likely that this leadership and economic concentration would easily dominate the community life and decision-making of this town: this characteristic of potential university dominance is a major hypothesis for the study. The town, in turn, has been given the fictitious name of Cerebrille (in honor of its surplus of eggheads). However it must be acknowledged that industry and commerce are vigorous components of the

[1] For some exceptions see W. D'Antonio, W. H. Form, C. P. Loomis, and E. C. Erikson, "Institutional and Occupational Representations in Eleven Community Influence Systems," *American Sociological Review,* XXVI (June, 1961), 440–46. See also Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and English City," *American Sociological Review,* XXIII (February, 1958), 9–15; William H. Form and William V. D'Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage among Community Intellectuals," *American Sociological Review,* XXIV (December, 1959), 804–14.

[2] Robert A. Dahl and his associates have studied New Haven, Connecticut, the home of Yale University, but New Haven is a modern industrial city of approximately 170,000—see his *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961) Harry Scoble has studied Bennington, Vermont but neither Bennington College nor its faculty members are ever mentioned (see "Leadership Hierarchies and Political Issues in a New England Town," in M. Janowitz, *Community Political Systems* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961]).

[3] I am indebted to numerous graduate students at Indiana University for assistance in interviewing. These include James E. DeBurger, Robert R Rosenheim, Evangelos Vlachos, Thomas M Watts Gerald T. Slatin, Alan Booth, Chhaganbhai Patel Norbert Kudele, Benny S. Vineyard, Spiro Maroules, Alan Leader, Andre D'Elbecq, Donald H Granbois, John T. Inzana, Frank Castro, and Joseph Scott.

economic life: two industrial plants employ about 2,500 workers each; another plant employs about 700; an extractive industry employs 2,000. Altogether, there are about 15,000 non-agricultural jobs in the county area which is composed of approximately 60,000 people and in the center of which Cerebrille is located. Since only a few hundred full-time farmers remain in the county, the county and town must be considered as one interrelated industrial complex. Thus, while the university claims the highest number of jobs, it is only one of a number of employers. The composition of the city as a mixed industrial and university center makes it an especially appropriate research site for the test of university dominance.

There is another challenge upon which every researcher can capitalize in the study of community power. This is the opportunity to test rapidly emerging theory. A number of middle-range theories have been evolved that have not yet been fully tested.[4] Form and Miller have proposed that the power structure of a community is built upon an interrelated structure composed of five parts. These parts are:

1. *The institutional power structure of the society,* which refers to the relative distribution of power among societal institutions.
2. *The institutionalized power structure of the community,* which refers to the relative distribution of power among local institutions.
3. *The community power complex,* which is a power arrangement among temporary or permanent organizations, special-interest associations, and informal groups emerging in specific issues and projects.
4. *The top influentials* refer to those persons who are reputed to be of most influence and power in community decision-making.
5. *The key influentials* are acknowledged leaders among the top influentials.

Each part is believed to be interrelated and to influence the nature of each successive part. This structure has never been fully tested, especially the significance of the institutionalized power of the community. This study attempts to assess this component in its relation to the other four constituent parts.

A theory to predict issue outcome in community decision-making was proposed by Form and Miller, and a prediction study was reported based on a right to work issue in Seattle, Washington.[5] Robert C. Hanson has refined the methodology and has published a report on two predictions of issues debated in Denver, Colorado.[6] A further test of this theory and methodology is proposed.

Finally, a test of the clique hypothesis is proposed. Ever since Floyd Hunter reported that key influential leaders of southern's "Regional City" meet in clique groups under the acknowledged leadership of a clique leader, the process of community decision-making continues to demand careful study.[7] Few social hypotheses are more difficult to substantiate. Nonetheless, this hypothesis remains extremely significant, and, in this study of Cerebrille, further data were gathered by careful probing. In the search for clique structure, the respondent was asked to sift hearsay from direct observation so that the evidence might be appropriately labeled as to its real nature.

HYPOTHESES

I. The community power structure of Cerebrille is composed of five interrelated components which are:

[4] William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, *Industry, Labor, and Community* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), chaps. xiv and xviii.

[5] Miller, "The Prediction of Issue Outcome in Community Decision Making," *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society, Research Studies of the State College of Washington* (June, 1957), pp. 137–47.

[6] Robert C. Hanson, "Predicting a Community Decision, Test of the Miller-Form Theory," *American Sociological Review,* XXIII (October, 1959), 662–71.

[7] Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). Cf. R. J. Pellegrin and C. J. Coates, "Absentee Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXI (March, 1956), 413–19.

1. The institutional power structure of society
2. The institutionalized power structure of the community
3. The community power complex
4. The top influentials
5. The key influentials

II. University administrative officers, faculty, and their wives dominate the community decision-making of Cerebrille.

III. Three factors determine the outcome of a community decision in Cerebrille.

1. The critically activated parts of the institutionalized power structure of the community
2. Power arrangements of the community power complex
3. Solidarity of the top influentials

IV. Leaders in Cerebrille influence policy-making by acting in concert through cliques.

METHOD OF RESEARCH

The principal task facing the researcher is to identify the persons and groups which are actively participating in community decision-making. Three general techniques are available.[8] One may seek to identify the official positions and groups whose importance and resources are indicated by available information in directories, etc.[9] Another method is to seek out the salient issues which have been or are being debated, and then to identify the roles of persons and groups as they relate their behavior to these issues. A third method is to discover those persons who are reputed to be of influence because of their image as persons who have a record of past participation in community issues and projects. In this study, the second and third methods were selected as having the highest validity.[10] The first task became one of identifying the top "influentials," the most influential associations, and the salient issues. Top influential nominees were assembled for such sectors as religion, education, government and politics, business and finance, cultural and artistic, labor, social welfare, society and wealth, independent professions (such as medicine, dentistry, and law), mass communication, and recreation. Likewise a list of influential organizations and salient issues was assembled. The lists of persons, groups, and issues were prepared by selecting a knowledgeable person as the informant for each institutional sector. Then, a new expert panel of eight raters was selected because of their knowledge and experience in the community. The panel raters were persons with access to top influentials but who we felt would not be included among them. Raters included a political reporter, a chamber-of-commerce executive, a public school principal, a church official, a social welfare executive secretary, a university dean, a public relations man, and a labor official. The panel was drawn to represent as fully as possible the total range of institutions.

Our final total list carried over three hundred nominees for top influentials and some twenty-four organizations were listed. The consensus arrived at by the expert raters enabled us to cut this list to forty-nine of the most important influentials and eleven of the most influential organizations. Seven salient community issues were identified.

An interview schedule was constructed and the selected influential persons, groups, and issues were listed. Supporting questions were prepared to secure evidence for each of the hypotheses.

In this report each hypothesis will be examined, the nature of evidence being gathered will be reviewed, and results will be reported. A special interview study of five faculty and administrative officers most

[8] Peter H. Rossi, "Community Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I (March, 1957), 415–33.

[9] Robert O. Schulze and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The Determination of Local Power Elites," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (November, 1957), 290–96.

[10] See Lawrence J. R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December, 1961), 817–30.

active in community life has been completed. Extensive newspaper analysis has been employed to gather validating evidence of the community activity of top influentials. Many informants have provided additional information about the behavior of organizations and the history of community issues.

THE POPULATION

Out of the forty-nine top influentials, completed interviews were secured from 37 or 76 per cent. Twelve interviews were not secured because of illness, absence from the city, etc. There was only one direct refusal. Those top influentials who were interviewed represent a wide range of institutional life. Ten top influentials came from business and finance, nine from education, and three each from labor and political parties, two from religion, seven from law and medicine, two from the local newspapers, and one from welfare. Sectors such as society and wealth, and cultural and artistic have representatives in the population but their principal identification is in one of the above sectors. None of the institutional sectors except recreation is without representation. This is because no one of top influence could be identified with this sector. Otherwise, the representation across the institutional sectors is adequate to provide a truly representative view of the community as top influentials see it. All of the top ten key leaders who were identified by the top influentials were interviewed.

TEST OF HYPOTHESES

Test of Hypothesis I.—The community power structure of Cerebrille is composed of five interrelated parts.

1. The *institutional power structure of society* is not open to empirical analysis in this study. Studies by Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills and others provide provisional but not conclusive evidence of such a structure.[11] The assumption proposed in this paper is that the national power structure is strongly structured to give the largest strength to business, government, and labor. Education, mass communication, church, and military institutions are viewed as strong power interest blocs. Recreation, welfare, and cultural sectors emerge as weak institutional parts. This institutional power structure of society should be duplicated in Cerebrille unless the local structure has developed an idiosyncratic character based on its special composition. Since Cerebrille does have such a concentration of university personnel, the institutionalized power structure of the community might be expected to show a variation accentuating the education sector.

TABLE 1

RANK OF REPUTED COMMUNITY INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL SECTORS IN CEREBRILLE

Institution	Over-all Rank
Business and finance	1
Local government	2
Education	3
Mass communication	4
Religion	5
Labor	6
Republican party	7
Democratic party	8
Social welfare	9
Independent professions of medicine and law	10
Society and wealth	11
Cultural and artistic	12
Recreation	13

2. The *institutionalized power structure of the community* is ascertained in this research through the reputational method. The top influentials rank the institutional sectors *for their relative strength and influence in getting things done and in influencing the community when community-wide issues and projects are debated.* The sample respondents showed high consensus in naming business and finance as the most influential institutional sector with local government a close second. Education was ranked third. The full list of rankings is shown in Table 1.

[11] See esp. Hunter, *Top Leadership* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), and Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

If the rankings are converted into influence units, the institutionalized power profile appears in Figure 1.[12]

3. The *community power complex* is ascertained by asking respondents which of eleven selected organizations are the most important in getting things done in the Cerebrille community. The Chamber of Commerce, the Cerebrille Advancement Corporation, the United Fund, and the Junior Chamber of Commerce lead the rat-

[12] The conversion was made by giving a 1st rank rating a score of 13, a 2d rank rating a score of 12, and decreasing until a 13th rank rating received a score of 1. Each rating given by the 37 respondents was cumulated for each sector according to the formula: Total Institutional Sector Influence Score $= \Sigma f(13) + f(12) + f(11) + f(10) + f(9) \ldots f(1)$. These scores are as follows: business and finance, 409; local government, 398; education, 321; mass communication, 314; religion, 266; labor, 238; Republican party, 219; Democratic party, 211; social welfare, 209; independent professions of law and medicine, 200; society and wealth, 192; cultural and artistic, 151; recreation, 135.




FIG. 1.—Institutionalized power structure of Cerebrille

ings. Although the League of Women Voters and the Christian Center show strength, it must be concluded that business-dominated organizations are believed to be the most influential in Cerebrille.[18]

4. The *top influential* nominees in this study number forty-nine. It has been pointed out that they include persons from all institutional sectors except recreation. However, business dominates in the number raters chose. Thirty-seven top influentials who were interviewed were asked to describe their acquaintance pattern and their committee work with the entire group of forty-nine. They were then asked: "If you were responsible for a major project which was before the community that required decision by a group of leaders—leaders that nearly everyone would accept—which persons on the list would you choose, regardless of whether they are known personally to you or not? Add names if you wish."

Twelve nominees have been selected by a high consensus. They will be identified by number and their occupation. Table 2 shows their rank by percentage of votes received.

5. These persons may be regarded as the *key influentials* or acknowledged leaders. It can be noted that nine out of the twelve are business people. The remaining three include two university officials and one optometrist. No religious leader, no labor leader, and no public school representative is included.

The question is often asked if these nominations of influentials correspond to actual performance when issues are debated and projects are carried out. A number of validating tests are possible to gather additional evidence. These include the acquaintance pattern, the community committee participation, and histories of issues. Each of these forms of data has been gathered and each tends to validate the list of key influentials. Newspaper accounts were used to verify the activities of influentials as reported to the interviewer in connection with community issues. A new effort to identify chief spokesmen in a large variety of areas was attempted. The aim was to find out if there was consensus about a chief spokesman for the following groups: merchants, manufacturers, bankers, labor, university, society and wealth, social welfare, local government, religion, Republican party, Democratic party, best local contact with state officials, best local contact with federal officials in Washington, cultural and artistic, local newspapers, doctors, lawyers, and public school teachers. This question revealed that a high consensus was reached on eight spokesmen of

TABLE 2

KEY INFLUENTIALS IN COMMUNITY INFLUENCE LEADERSHIP CHOSEN BY VOTES OF THIRTY-SEVEN INFLUENTIALS

Key Influentials Chosen	Percentage of Votes
1. Manufacturer	68
2. University president	68
3. Banker	65
4. University business official	60
5. Quarry owner	54
6. Government official and party leader	50
7. Wholesale owner	41
8. Newspaper owner and editor	40
9. Merchant	40
10. Optometrist	33
11. Merchant	30
12. Building supply owner	30

[18] Choice-status rankings were computed for each organization listed according to the formula:

$$CS = \frac{\text{No. of persons choosing } i \text{ as most influential}}{N},$$

where *CS* is choice status. The choice status rankings for organizations are as follows: Chamber of Commerce, 0 70; Cerebrille Advancement Corporation, 0 43; United Fund, 0.33; Junior Chamber of Commerce, 0.33; League of Women Voters, 0.24; Lions Club, 0.16; Christian Center, 0.16; Salvation Army, 0.13; Exchange Club, 0.06; Council of Social Agencies, 0.03. For statistical treatment see Marie Jahoda *et al., Research Methods in Social Relations* (New York: Dryden Press, 1951), Part 2, "Selected Techniques," p. 571.

the eighteen groups.[14] Out of these eight, five chief spokesmen were also nominated previously as key influentials. This is believed to be confirmatory evidence. Moreover, the committee participations reported by the key and top influentials who have been interviewed are shown in Table 3.

Key influentials show almost twice as many committee participations with top influentials as do other top influentials. This study, as in previous studies of other communities, shows key influentials to have significantly higher scores than the top influentials only.[15] Additional evidence for the active participation of both key and top influentials is found in answers to the question of whether there are certain persons active "behind the scenes." Some thirty-eight persons were said to play such roles. Of the top seven nominations, five are shown to be key influentials. But public participation is also a dominant characteristic of the key and top influentials. Newspaper study of the committee appointments has been made over the past two years. Appointments to the Mayor's Redevelopment Commission, the Hospital Finance Committee, the School Tax Study, the United Fund, the School Reorganization Committee, and others have been examined. These show that the top influentials are drawn upon heavily as though they constituted a leadership reservoir.

TABLE 3

COMMITTEE PARTICIPATIONS WITH OTHER TOP INFLUENTIALS WITH WHOM TOP INFLUENTIALS WORKED DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS*

Rank of Key Influentials	No of Participations
1	22
2	31
3	17
4	10
5	30
6	8
7	22
8	9
9	27
10	11
Total	187

* Twenty-seven top influentials report an average of 9 7 committee participations with key and top influentials. Mean = 18 7 committee participations with other key and top influentials

The first hypothesis may now be examined against the data. Five component parts of the community power structure have been identified and their interrelationship is indicated by common patterns. Business, which shows the highest dominance in the institutional power structure of society, continues to reflect this dominance in the institutionalized power structure of Cerebrille, in its community power complex and in the composition of the top and key influentials. Thus, the components of the power structure are shown to have a direct association. Education is reputed to have strong influence but is not a dominant institution, lagging in third position behind business and government. But the question arises, "What evidence supports or rejects this reputed image of community power?" Hypothesis II is directed toward an answer

Test of Hypothesis II.—University administrative officers, faculty, and their wives dominate the community decision-making of Cerebrille.

To test this hypothesis the official listing of 222 elected and appointed city, county, and township officials was first examined. These are the positions that must be regularly filled by law. There are 1,278 faculty and administrative officers of

[14] Choice-status scores were computed by the formula:

$$CS = \frac{\text{No. of persons choosing } i \text{ as spokesman}}{N-1}.$$

See M. Jahoda, *op. cit.*, p. 571. The scores are as follows: bankers, 0 83; local government, 0.83; newspapers, 0 75; manufacturers, 0.67; university, 0 58; Republican party, 0.50; labor, 0.50; Democratic party, 0.50; doctors, 0.42; public school, 0.42; cultural and artistic, 0.33; lawyers, 0.33; religion, 0 25; local contact man with state officials, 0.25; local contact man with federal officials, 0.19; merchants, 0.17; society and wealth, 0 08.

[15] See Hunter, *op. cit.*

the university: 1,183 live in the city, 95 live outside the city. Of the 222 positions of policy and advisory responsibility for the city, only eight are filled with faculty or administrative officials. Two positions are occupied by faculty wives. Thus ten out of 222, or 4.5 per cent are occupied by university personnel.[16]

The mayor has had occasion to appoint some important advisory committees during the past year. Perhaps the most important is the Urban Redevelopment Committee. Urban redevelopment has been very controversial, and the mayor has needed community-wide backing. He appointed a full committee of forty-six citizens; of these eight, or 16 per cent, were university faculty or administrative officials. A more powerful ten-man Redevelopment Executive Committee was also appointed. One administrative official of the university was invited to sit on this important committee.

A School Reorganization Committee was appointed with a university professor as a member (later appointed chairman), but all other members were from other parts of the community.

When an important hospital finance group was formed, the chief spokesman for manufacturers was named chairman. His committee appointments included the chief spokesman for the doctors, the chief spokesman for the bankers, a wealthy wholesaler, a leading merchant, and an administrative spokesman for the university.

These statistical results pointed to some tentative conclusions:

1. University personnel are not proportionately represented in important policy and advisory positions. This conclusion seems most definite if the faculty are viewed as a large pool of highly educated persons available for leadership, and the further assumption is made that community participation is an important civic responsibility of a university faculty. However, even in the limited demographic terms of per capita representation, the conclusion seems to be tenable.

2. Some representation of the university is usually included on important committees, although it appears that this representation is generally limited to one person per committee.

To find out more about the representation of the university, the following list of all university people known to be active in community policy-making was assembled:

1. Dean, junior division	1. Mayor's Redevelopment Committee 2. City Council
2. Geology researcher (officially a state employee but working on the university campus)	1. Board of Planning Commissioners 2. Mayor's Redevelopment Committee 3. Board of Zoning Appeals
3 Radio and television professor	1. Board of Planning Commissioners 2. Park and Recreation Board
4. Faculty wife of government professor	1. Park and Recreation Board 2. Board of Education
5. Health and safety professor	Safety and Traffic Commission
6. Psychologist	Probation Advisory Council
7. Faculty wife of law professor	Probation Advisory Council
8. Geologist	1. Planning Commission 2. Mayor's Redevelopment Committee
9. University president	Informal contacts of policy-making importance
10. Sociologist	Welfare Council

[16] I am especially indebted to Robert R. Rosenheim for assistance in testing Hypothesis II.

11. Vice-president and treasurer of the university	Mayor's Redevelopment Committee
12. Education professor	School Reorganization
13. Law professor	Mayor's Redevelopment Committee
14. Government professor	Mayor's Redevelopment Committee
15. Physician, health center	Mayor's Redevelopment Committee
16. Administration official	Mayor's Redevelopment Committee

An interview schedule was drawn to evoke more information about the university and its representation. Five of the most important representatives were interviewed using the following open-end questions:

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SELECTED UNIVERSITY PERSONNEL ACTIVE IN COMMUNITY DECISION-MAKING

1. What are your current roles in local government and community life?
2. When did you begin your work as a member of (———) committee?
3. Do you feel that you represent the university or faculty?
4. Do you think generally the interests of the university and of faculty people are adequately represented? Why?
5. If not, would you suggest any ways of improving representation?
6. What issues do you consider important to the university in the local community?
7. Is the university or the faculty adequately represented on these issues?
8. How much power could the university and its faculty exercise if it were thoroughly activated? What would happen?

The interviews reveal that it is important to distinguish the university as a corporate body and the faculty as essentially professional employees. A relatively few administrative officials are almost always brought in on matters that affect the university as a corporate body. The president of the university says that members of his own family and of his key administrative officers' help keep communication open between him and the university. There is general agreement that representation of the university as a corporate body is satisfactory. In contrast, the role of faculty as community citizens may be considered to be unsatisfactory. This opens a problem area with many facets. In the first place, faculty members and wives are never considered solely as citizens. They are always identified with their university employment. This identity of a citizen with his role in employment is, perhaps, a sad but undeniable fact. Immediately, the problem of representation springs either from the behavior of faculty members or the behavior of the other members of the community toward the faculty.[17] Let us take the first set of factors.

The most common charges made by active faculty members in community decision-making is that faculty people are apathetic. There is no university policy about faculty participation, and since the occupation stresses research and professional growth on a national and international scale, energy tends to be channeled increasingly into the occupation. There is also a very active faculty social and campus life. The result is that faculty participation in community life is small and may be declining. Some observers also believe that this in-group character of the faculty breeds an arrogance of superiority, whether intended or not. The channels of communication between town and gown are very narrow. Kiwanis, Rotary, and the Lions Club are serving as important social channels for a number of university faculty and administrative officers with the businessmen of the community. The country club attracts mainly members of the business school, but these are few in number. A large part of the faculty is new to the university and its members have not yet de-

[17] Cf. Victor A. Rapport, "Conflict in a New England College Town," *Social Forces*, XVII (May, 1939), 527–33.

veloped the roots necessary to enable them to become widely acquainted and with deep enough roots to become interested in community affairs. Moreover, lack of tenure and competition moves many away each year. Finally, there is a prevalent administrative and faculty opinion that the university will realize its aims more effectively if faculty members refrain from local "controversies" which can endanger its budget and its policies.

The second set of factors arises from a historic resentment of the university because the town has had to rely so heavily upon it for support. There has always loomed the specter of the university dominating the community, buying up residential land, inflating land and rentals, and making demands on town officials who were afraid of opposing the hands which fed them. This has diminished with the postwar entry of four large manufacturing plants, but the heritage remains. There are clearly outlined boundaries for university representation. It is customarily understood that no more than one person from the university will be put on a committee or board. Membership quotas are quietly imposed on membership in various organizations. Town residents generally see faculty people as better educated than they and more liberal in outlook. They fear the transplantation of other cultural influences in the midst of their historically conservative, culturally indigenous community. The university does not pay taxes, nor do most of the 13,000 students. Thus, it can be seen as draining social services without adequate compensation. In such a view, the monetary outlays of the university and the taxes paid by the faculty can be forgotten. If faculty members seem arrogant or at least mysteriously distant, then the townspeople react by withdrawing into the town center while the faculty perch high and dry on their educational island four blocks from the city center. The old town-and-gown cleavage cannot be wished away even in the common demands of citizenship. But an accommodation has been worked out, and both parties live peaceably together in symbiotic tranquillity. It is as if a psychological contract had been made with the following terms: "Let us move together on economic matters in which we have common interests, but let us go our own way when we differ. Let our social life find its own level. We of the town look to the university to provide the cultural and athletic entertainment. Let our community decision-making rest firmly in the hands of business and government, with the understanding that the faculty and the university are to have a minority voice. We know the university faculty represent a huge leadership potential but it is well that they stick to their books and their students. Let's keep it that way."

Merton has distinguished two types of community influentials which he calls "locals" and "cosmopolitans." The faculty of Cerebrille appears to be an almost solid group of cosmopolitans. Of them, Merton has said: "Cosmopolitans are concerned with associations primarily because of the activities of these organizations. They are means for extending or exhibiting their skills and knowledge. Locals are primarily interested in associations not for their activities but because these provide a means for extending personal relationships. . . . Locals feel rooted to the community; Cosmopolitans feel that the town is only one of many. They are aware that they can advance their careers in other communities. Their wider range of experience has modified their orientation toward their present community."[18]

Test of Hypothesis III.—Three factors determine outcome of a community issue in Cerebrille: (1) the critically activated parts of the institutionalized power structure of the community; (2) power arrangement of

[18] Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press), pp. 296–99 (see also Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles I and II," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, II [December, 1957], 281–306, and *ibid.* [March, 1958], 444–80).

the community power structure; and (3) solidarity of the top influentials.[19]

In an attempt to test this hypothesis, influentials were asked in which issues and projects they had taken part. They were also asked to select one in which they had a high interest. The poll results are shown in Table 4. This poll indicates that the top influentials have taken greatest part in projects and have not been attracted by the controversial issues. We asked respondents to take an issue or project in which they have a high interest and analyze the power structure around it. Since thirteen chose the

TABLE 4

PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST OF INFLUENTIALS IN PROJECTS AND ISSUES

Issue or Project	No Who Took Part	No. Who Had High Interest
Urban renewal	16	5
County planning.....	9	3
Hospital drive.	26	13
School reorganization....	12	3
Improvement of central shopping center........	13	3
Attracting new industry...	23	5
United Fund Drive.......	27	5

hospital drive project, it would seem to offer a test of the issue-outcome theory. Unfortunately, this project is not controversial. The new hospital was once a controversial issue, but now it has consensus and the goal is to make the new fund drive a success. There is almost no opposition and for this reason it does not pose a good test example. The urban renewal issue is the issue of greatest controversy. Five top influentials report that they have taken high interest in it. One is on the redevelopment commission and one is on the city council which must approve it. The member of the council has marked the issue very important to business and important to labor, religion, welfare, independent professionals, education, recreation, and government. He sees seven important sectors for it, none against, and business split. He sees the oppositio as verbal but with little co-operation amon them. The proponents of urban renewal ai seen as united in their activities but with split among the top leaders. The strengt for it resides in the vigorous commitment c the city government and the Democrati party—the opposing strength is found i a part of the Republican party, the Re publican newspaper, and some independer professionals. Business is badly split. Th scores of the five respondents who hav shown high interest on this issue power ar rangement is 90:19 and the prediction i for success of the urban redevelopmer project.[20] On September 4, 1961, fou months after the last research data wer gathered, the city council approved the re development project after a stormy six-and a-half hour public hearing. The outcom confirms our hypothesis.

Test of Hypothesis IV.—Leaders in community influence policy-making by act ing in concert through cliques.

To test this hypothesis respondent influ entials were asked: "There are severa 'crowds' in Cerebrille that work togethe and pretty much make the big decision True—— False——. Please tell us mor about this." The interviewer was taught to probe and ask such questions as: "Do influ entials meet and eat together?" "Are ther any clique leaders?" "Are there any issue in which you have observed a 'crowd' a work?"

The top influentials have voted two to one in their affirmation of "crowds" work ing together to make the big decisions However, their interpretations vary. On respondent says you will always have a small active group which is seeking to bet ter the economic and social standing of any town. Another respondent says leaders mee informally at first with an idea, and afte lunching several times come up with a

[19] See Form and Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 657–66.

[20] For scoring the prediction schedule see Rober C. Hanson, "Predicting a Community Decision, A Test of the Miller-Form Theory," *American Soci ological Review*, XXIV (October, 1959), 662–71.

plan which they push through formal channels. Almost all respondents who believe crowds exist and work together report that there is no single dominating personality and that such crowds as exist are few in number and small in size; there is much overlapping in these crowds. Pressure is frequently used by these groups to better their own interests, but no particular crowd exerts a great deal of pressure.

One respondent said that "there is no standing coalition. Yet you need business, mass communication, education, and the women's clubs to get a problem pushed along. If you can get these groups united you can solve most community problems."

A key influential who denied the presence of "crowds" said: "The idea has to win support and various people come in on different projects. I don't think any groups get together to talk things over. There is only one group of men whom I see that get together regularly for lunch, and that is the lawyers." Yet another key influential said: "I find the same guys working in the same groups. It changes some as some get old and drop out. Hell, in the last couple of years I've been in twenty groups. I go there and it is the same bunch. In general, they don't get much done."

Other evidence could be presented. It would show a conflicting character. Respondent influentials sometimes exhibit ambivalence. They hesitate to identify "crowd" behavior lest they seem undemocratic, and yet they desire to proclaim an effective organization in order to stake out a claim to leadership. One respondent denied the existence of "crowds" and cliques but on later probing said he was the leader of a large fluid committee which can get projects initiated and which is powerful enough to block issues which it opposes. Many observers agree that it is easier for a coalition to oppose successfully some projects than to "put over" a project.

It may be concluded that Cerebrille has no fixed coalitions of power but that fluid power arrangements are frequently concentrated and influence generated. Historically, power arrangements have grown more fluid as growth and diversification of the city have taken place. Almost all would agree that today the Chamber of Commerce is the most important communication center for the men who count.

SUMMARY

Cerebrille does not justify its name. Although it houses a rich array of talented personnel reflecting all the specialities of natural science and mathematics, business, education, culture, law, and social science, these are almost untapped. University faculty are more likely to be giving of their knowledge and energy in Washington, D.C., New York City, or Thailand than in their home community. Cerebrille is two worlds: one is a local segment of the market society dominated by business and government men; the other is a cosmopolitan island of intellectuals and their scholarly activities. The two live in a symbiotic adjustment which is defined by a psychological contract in which roles are spelled out in accordance with mutual self-interest. Each lives in peace with, and contributes to, the other, but neither is able to harness the total potentialities for the good life which is inherent in the people. The cleavage between town and gown, which no one will willingly admit, nonetheless stands as a barrier between the great knowledge and the great promise of American life. The result is a weaker local community with power flowing to state and national levels.[21] If this can happen to Cerebrille, what can be the promise for less endowed communities?

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

[21] This theme is discussed extensively by Peter F. Drucker, Robert A. Dahl, and myself in *Power and Democracy in America*, ed. W. D'Antonio and H. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961).

STRUCTURAL BALANCE, MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY, AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

JAMES A. DAVIS

ABSTRACT

Balance theory, a theoretical system developed by Cartwright and Harary to formalize concepts set forth by Heider, is used with slight modifications to restate fifty-six sociological and social-psychological propositions from the writings of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee; Coleman; Davis; Durkheim; Festinger; Fiedler; Homans; Katz and Lazarsfeld; Lazarsfeld and Merton; Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, Merton and Kitt; and Stouffer *et al.* The propositions are grouped under (*a*) *Person, Other,* and *X*, (*b*) group structure, (*c*) changes in attitudes and opinions, and (*d*) values.

Almost seventy-five years ago Durkheim wrote: "Social life comes from a double source, the likenesses of consciences and the division of social labor" (5, p. 226). Less than a year ago, George Caspar Homans wrote:

> The first and most obvious thing to be said (about conformity) is that if members of a group are to resemble one another in their behavior, some of them must find this similarity valuable or rewarding. Similarity is not always rewarding. . . . The division of labor means differences in labor, and it often pays off. But we are now dealing with the case in which similarities rather than differences are valuable [11, pp. 114–15].

The powerful effects of similarity and difference between people as explanatory principles in analyzing human behavior have not, of course, gone unnoticed in the interim. Of the two, however, similarity has received more attention, and it is the burden of this paper that the point has been reached where it is possible to spell out a theory of similarity (what Durkheim would call mechanical solidarity) that organizes a number of principles and hypotheses in recent research.

In particular, the ideas presented here are culled from five clusters of authors and studies: (*a*) a group of social psychologists mostly influenced by Gestalt thinking in general and Kurt Lewin in particular (2, 6–9); (*b*) George Homans' two theoretical books (10, 11); (*c*) a series of studies by sociologists associated with Columbia University and the Bureau of Applied Social Research (1, 3, 12, 13, 15); (*d*) the theory of relative deprivation (4, 16, 17); and (*e*) Durkheim (5).

In order to avoid the appearance of acute megalomania it must be made clear what this essay is and what it is not. On one hand, the author makes no claim of originality or profundity, his belief being that almost all the conclusions either can be found in the works cited or are familiar principles of human behavior. On the other hand, there is no claim that the proposed theory subsumes, integrates, or codifies any or all of these works. Running through the writings mentioned above are a number of concepts and propositions that can be restated (with some inevitable distortion) in a common language and in terms of a small number of postulates. Some of these concepts and propositions are: structural balance (2, 9), magnitude of dissonance (6), abilities and opinions (7), liking and cognitive unit formation (2, 9), sentiments (10, 11), constraint versus warm friendly relations (10), pressures toward uniformity (6), social comparisons (7), distributive justice (11), subgroup formation (4), relative deprivation (4, 16, 17), choice of reference group (16), assumed similarity (8), cross-pressures (1), polarization of social opinions (3), attachments (10), the effects of shop size on social relations (15), friendship

10, 13), self-selected and involuntary social relations (15), mechanical solidarity 5), "homophily" and "heterophily" (13).

The remainder of this paper is an exposition of the theory organized as follows: a) discussion of the formal language and concepts, (*b*) major postulates, (*c*) derived propositions about interpersonal relations, (*d*) derived propositions about group structure, (*e*) derived propositions about attitudes and values.

This essay should be considered as an attempt at deductive theoretical analysis, not as a review of the literature.

THE THEORY

The theory submitted here consists of three parts: (*a*) a formal apparatus combining graph theory and elementary algebra, (*b*) an interpretation of the formal concepts in terms of social psychological concepts, and (*c*) a set of postulates that provide the basic propositions. With some slight modifications, the theory is that developed by Cartwright and Harary (*2*).

THE P-O-X EQUATION

The formal apparatus of the theory can be expressed in eight definitions:

Def. 1. A linear graph, or briefly, a *graph,* consists of a finite collection of *points,* $A, B, C \ldots$, together with all unordered pairs of distinct points. Each of these pairs (e.g., AB) is called a *line.*

Def. 2. Lines may vary in *type* (or "kind" of relationship) and *sign* (plus or minus) or *numerical value.*

Def. 3. The *net value* of a line of two or more types is the sum of the values for each type.

Def. 4. A *path* is a collection of lines of the form $AB, BC, \ldots DE$, where the points A, B, C, D, and E are distinct.

Def. 5. A *cycle* consists of the above path together with the line EA.

Def. 6. The *value of a cycle* is the product of the net values of its lines.

Def. 7. A cycle with a positive value is *balanced,* a cycle with a negative value is *unbalanced.*

Def. 8. The *net value of a graph* at point P is the sum of the values of the cycles in which P is a point.

Definitions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are taken almost literally from Cartwright and Harary.[1]

The only important difference in our theory is the addition of definitions 3 and 8, which concern multiple types of lines and/or multiple cycles. The assumption is that each is a sum (not a product) and that net values of lines are to be "calculated" prior to the calculation of the values of the cycle. Thus, different cycles must include different points.

So far, the apparatus presented is devoid of any content, and the definitions given could apply to people, switching circuits, messages, kinship relations, etc. Again following Cartwright and Harary, together with Heider (2, 9), let us provide interpretations for points.

Def. 9. *Person* (P) is the individual whose behavior is predicted by the theory, the point whose net value is being considered.

Def. 10. *Other* (O) is some additional individual.

Def. 11. X is some value or social object, sometimes a third individual.

Thus, in the analysis of voting, P might be a particular voter, O might be Person's best friend, and X might be a candidate or political party.

Our interpretations of lines are as follows:

Def 12. *Liking:*
This refers to a person's evaluation of something, as when Person likes or admires, approves, rejects, or condemns [adapted from 9, p. 200].

Def. 13. *Unit Formation:*
"In addition, there is a unit relation . . . the parts of such units are perceived as belonging together in a specially close way. But also two (or

[1] The reader who is unfamiliar with the theory will find a very clear exposition in their article, which is reprinted in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, *Group Dynamics* (2d ed.; Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1960).

more) separate entities can form a unit. The two entities may be related through similarity, causality, ownership, or other unit-forming characteristics" [9, pp. 200–201].[2]

In order to shift from a language to a theory it is necessary to state the fundamental propositions or postulates from which the specific inferences or hypotheses of the theory will be drawn.

POSTULATE I: People prefer positive net values.
- *a*) If possible, people will act to shift the net value of their cycles from negative to positive or from a positive to a greater positive value.
- *b*) Low values are associated with feelings of distress, tension, discomfort, etc. The lower the value, the greater the distress (or dissonance).

POSTULATE II: Liking has a positive value; its opposite, disliking, has a negative value; indifference has a value of zero.

POSTULATE III: Unit formation has a positive value; its opposite, the segregation relationship, has a negative value.

Although put in our words, these too are quite close to the basic assumptions in Heider and Cartwright and Harary. The idea also has a partial overlap with Festinger's concept of dissonance (6), although Festinger's concept is more general. We will use "unbalanced" and "dissonant" as synonyms in our exposition, although there is more to dissonance than sheer structural unbalance.

Although the postulates are designed to place some social psychological flesh on the formal bones of the theory, the principles are rather abstract. The following example may serve to illustrate the theory in concrete terms.

One of the better known case studies in the marriage and family literature involves the structural imbalance incurred by two Veronese adolescents, Juliet Capulet and Romeo Montague. Although their families are bitter enemies, the two fall in love, and in Act II, Scene 2, Juliet muses, "O Romeo, Romeo! wherefore art thou Romeo? . . . 'Tis but thy name that is my enemy" . . . etc.

Although the situation perhaps loses some literary value in translation into balance theory, it will serve to illustrate the definitions and postulates outlined above.

The *points* are: *Person* (Juliet), *Other* (Romeo), and *X* (the Montague name).

The *lines, types,* and *signs* are: *Person-Other* (liking, positive to say the least); *Other-X* (unit formation, positive . . . i.e., Romeo is strongly associated with his family name); and *Person-X* (liking, negative . . . Juliet hates Montagues).




FIG. 1.—The *P-O-X* cycle

The *cycle* consists of the three lines connected as shown in Figure 1 (following the convention that positive lines are solid, negative lines dotted).

The *value* of the cycle is *negative* and the cycle is *unbalanced* (a positive times a positive times a negative value gives a negative product).

Juliet is distressed because she would prefer a positive value (Postulate I) and she acts to increase the value of the cycle (Postulate I*a*) by shifting the *O-X* line toward the negative, that is, by dissociating Romeo from his name. If successful this would make the cycle positive (and ruin the play).

[2] Definitions 12 and 13 are taken directly from Heider (9).

LIKING AND SIMILARITY IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

While graph theory has not been used much by sociological theorists, a case can be made that the ideas of the theory have been widely acepted in sociology in other formulations.

Clearly the Cartwright-Harary-Heider concept of "liking" has an immediate transfer to sociological theories, a number of which say in other words that if P likes O he will tend to prefer or develop relationships with X similar to O's relationship to X.

Homans' concept of "sentiments" in *The Human Group* is practically identical with liking, and we shall see later that his analysis of the relationships among three persons (10, pp. 248–52) is straightforward balance theory, given that "warm friendly relations" are the equivalent of liking, and "constraint" is construed as "disliking."

A number of attitude and opinion theorists associated with Columbia University and the Bureau of Applied Social Research have come at the same idea from the opposite direction—the effect of identical attitudes toward X on P's liking for O.

Coleman writes: "As in an argument between friends, a discussion which begins with disagreement on a point in question often ends with each disliking the other. . . Conversely, a relationship which begins with two people agreeing in tastes and interests often ends with both liking one another" (3, pp. 10–11).

The authors of *Union Democracy* draw a similar inference: "the less likely he [a worker] is to find people who share his salient values and attitudes . . . the less likely are those relations to develop into close and intimate friendships" (15, p. 157).

One of the most explicit developments of this idea is in Lazarsfeld's and Merton's paper, "Friendship as a Social Process" (13), with its concepts of "homophily" and "heterophily."

While the implicit or explicit acceptance of liking as a factor in PO bonds is almost universal among sociologists, less attention has been given to sociological equivalents of the unit relationship. Heider himself treats it as a very broad category, including any psychological or reality factor that leads to the perception of grouping or segregating certain elements into a figure against the ground of all remaining elements.

When we come to ask what sorts of things should lead P to see himself and *Other* grouped together perceptually, at first glance the possibilities seem endless—membership in the same group, high rates of interaction, identification, etc. While all of these undoubtedly are important, our theory will consider only one factor similarity.

Def. 14. Considering P and one or more *Others*, and a set of social attributes including X, the *similarity* between P and O (symbolized by r_{PO}) is the correlation between P and O over all the attributes other than X.

That is, the similarity between P and O is defined as the correlation between P and O in terms of social attributes other than X.

In more eloquent, but less operational, language this is what Durkheim presumably meant by his concept of envelopment by the collective conscience, which amounts to a correlation between people in terms of social characteristics. The greater the correlation, Durkheim might say, the stronger the collective conscience and the greater the mechanical solidarity. "Solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides at all points with it. But at that moment, our individuality is nil" (5, p. 130).

A more recent, but similar, line of argument for the claim that similarity leads to positive PO bonds comes from writers who have analyzed social comparisons.

Let us begin with the "theory of relative deprivation" (4, 16, 17). The theory originally appeared in the empirical research of *The American Soldier* series, was codified by Merton and Kitt, and has recently been translated into a formal system using the calculus of probabilities (4). The general idea is that men evaluate their own lot by comparison with others. The knotty theoretical question, of course, is "what others?" The authors of *The American Soldier* do not treat the problem directly; in fact, as Merton and Kitt note, they do not even define relative deprivation. Merton and Kitt note three formal possibilities: persons "with whom they were in actual association," persons "of the same status or in the same social category," and persons "who are in some pertinent respect of different status or in a different social category," but they do not opt for one of these to the exclusion of the rest, saying:

> This suggests the general hypothesis that some similarity in status attributes between the individual and the reference group must be perceived or imagined, in order for the comparison to occur at all. Once this minimal similarity obtains, other similarities and differences pertinent to the situation will provide the context for shaping evaluations (16, p. 61).

The clearest stand for the similarity hypothesis is taken by Homans in his discussion of "distributive justice" (11). Although in his formal theory the idea is developed from the concept of "investments" and the claim that personal attributes are investments, Homans clearly favors the similarity hypothesis: "the heart of these situations is a comparison. . . . In effect Person asks himself: 'Am I getting as much as other men in some respect like me would get in circumstances in some respect like mine?' " (11, p. 76).

From this we believe it is only a short step to the more general proposition that to the degree that *Person* and *Other* are similar in their general social attributes, *Person* will prefer that their liking or unit relationships regarding a specific attribute be similar (i.e., balanced).

A slightly different position, however, is taken by the writer who has been most explicit on the subject. In Festinger's theory of social comparison processes, he states:

> Hypothesis III: The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one's own increases [7, p. 120].

At first glance, it appears that Festinger, too, seems to favor the "similarity hypothesis," but a close reading raises some problems. In our terms, his hypothesis read literally is that P only compares with O if they are relatively or absolutely identical in terms of X. If so, it would be circular to argue that the relationship between P and O affects P's relationship with X if it is also hypothesized that the relationship between P and O is determined by their relationship with X. Logically the outcome—the prediction of a tendency toward balance—could be derived from this hypothesis, but the formulation presents these technical difficulties.

From here on we shall limit our consideration of unit formation to the single factor of objective similarity, although definition 13 is broader than that.

Having reviewed the formal definitions and postulates and having seen that a number of sociological and social psychological writings can be interpreted as accepting these principles, we are now ready to proceed to draw a number of inferences about various forms of social behavior. It should be stressed, however, that we are not proposing a general theory of interpersonal relationships, but rather a number of "other things equal" propositions. In particular, the theory ignores three classes of variables that undoubtedly should be in any general theory.

First, the theory ignores differentiation and the effects of a division of labor—Durkheim's organic solidarity and Homans' exchange process. The benefits that accrue to *Person* from exchange and divi-

ion of labor are precisely the forces that erve to compensate for or offset tendenies toward balance. We do not believe hat the two ideas are contradictory, howver. Rather, we believe that it requires ome exchange profit to reward *Person* so hat he will enter unbalanced situations. Thus, while the essential postulate of balnce theory is "Birds of a feather flock toether," the essential postulate of exhange theory is "Politics makes strange edfellows," which are not contradictory if olitics is construed as meaning "some muual benefit."

Second, a general theory of interpersonal elations should include social interaction s a variable. Interaction can be conceived s a third kind of graph variable, and ineed some of Homans' propositions in *The Human Group* can be restated in terms of alance theory assuming that interaction as the status of liking or unit formation. On the other hand, a case can be made that interaction is not a variable at all but a actor intensifying the effects of other variables. This is, in effect, one of the major heoretical shifts in Homans' work between *The Human Group* and *Social Behavior.* Unfortunately, we have not been able to work out a formalization of the role of ineraction that does not lead to one or more bizarre theorems and, hence, will ignore variations in interaction.

Third, we shall assume that P is unlikely to grossly misperceive O's situation. While there is a large research literature indicating that people can and do maximize balance by distorting or misperceiving others' likes and dislikes, we shall consider only situations of such degree of contact that misperception is, except momentarily, excluded as a solution to the problem of achieving balance. Thus, while it is possible for people to kid themselves about the stands of distant political figures, or transient experimental groups, we shall assume that over the long haul people cannot kid themselves much about their wives, friends, and colleagues.

INFERENCES FROM THE THEORY

The inferences are divided into four groups: (a) propositions about *Person, Other,* and X; (b) propositions about group structure; (c) propositions about changes in attitudes and opinions; (d) propositions about values. Derivations will be numbered and indicated by a capital D (e.g., D1, D2 . . .).

PERSON, OTHER, AND X

D1. The more similar *Person* is to *Other*, the more *Person* will like *Other*.

This proposition, which has been treated perceptually by Fiedler (8) is based on the following reasoning. We have considered P and O in terms of a set of attributes, one of which is X. The selection of X being arbitrary, each of the attributes can be an element in a balance cycle involving P and O. Now the more similar P and O are in terms of characteristics, the greater the proportion of the cycles with a positive (PX) (OX) product. If, in turn, the (PX) (OX) product is positive, a positive value for (PO) will raise the value of the cycle and thus add to net value. Because liking adds to the positive value of (PO), it follows that similarity leads to liking.

For simplicity, we shall refer to people who are more similar than different, as peers.

Def. 15. *Person* and *Other* are peers if r_{PO} is positive.

D2. The value of P's liking for O tends to be the same as the value of O's liking for P (i.e., liking tends to be symmetrical).

Because the correlation r_{PO} is symmetrical, its value is the same for P and O. Hence, if D1 is true for P it is true for O, and their degrees of liking should be similar. It should be noted that the theory does not state that similarity is a necessary condition for liking, merely a sufficient one. Liking based on "exchange" is not, as noted above, within the purview of the theory.

While it may be elaborating the obvious, we shall have use of the following definition:

Def. 16. If *P* likes *O* and *O* likes *P, P* and *O* are friends.

D3. Friends tend to become similar in activities.

D4. Friends tend to become similar in attitudes.

Derivations 3 and 4 are, of course, the obverse of D1, with activities interpreted as unit formation regarding *X* and attitudes as liking regarding *X*. However, some attributes are changeable (habits, tastes, hobbies, etc.) while some (sex, intelligence, age, etc.) are unmodifiable even under pressures to maximize balance. Just as a positive (*OX*) (*PX*) value is congruent with liking, liking makes the (*PO*) bond more positive and is hence congruent with increased similarity in *X*, if *X* is subject to voluntary change.

D5. If *P* and *O* are friends but differ in their degree of liking, the one with the greater degree of liking will imitate the one with the lesser, rather than vice versa.

Although liking tends toward symmetry, it need not be completely so. If there is a discrepancy, the individual with the greater liking has the greater (*PO*) value, and the greater pressure to seek similarity vis-à-vis *X*, an idea somewhat like Willard Waller's "Principle of Least Interest."

Having stated the basic derivations regarding *P, O,* and *X,* we can begin to treat somewhat more complicated situations involving more than two people, first considering the situation where *X* is a person and then the situation where there are two *Others* and a single *X*.

In *The Human Group* Homans develops the proposition, "the relationship between two persons A and B is partly determined by the relationships between A and a third person C, and between B and C" (10, pp. 248–61). If his statements regarding interaction are deleted, the same conclusions can be drawn from balance theory. Thus, rephrasing the proposition on his page 251:

D6. If the relationships between *Person* and *Other* and between *Other* and *X* (where *X* is a third individual) are both marked by dislike, the relationship between *Person* and *X* may be friendly.

By ringing the changes on this formulation, we may add the following:

D7. If *Person* likes *Other* and *Other* dislikes *X, Person* will tend to dislike *X*.

D8. If *Person* likes *Other* and *Other* likes *X, Person* will tend to like *X*.

D9. If *Person* dislikes *Other* and *Other* likes *X, Person* will tend to dislike *X*.

Having considered liking among three people, let us elaborate the situation further by considering three people and *X*.

One of the most famous ideas in communications research is that of "cross-pressures." Like many important ideas in this area it is hard to spell out formally, but a reasonable definition appears in *Voting:*

> As we have seen, family and friendship formation and social discussion generally take place among people who are *alike* socially in the politically relevant respects (e.g., class and religion). But not always. When memberships in two strata overlap, small group formations and social discussions spread among people alike in some respects but not in other important ways [1, p. 128].

Berelson *et al.* draw the following conclusions about the consequences of such situations:

> An individual who is characterized by any type of cross-pressure is likely to change his mind in the course of the campaign, to make up his mind late, and occasionally, to leave the field and not to vote at all [1, p. 284].

The translation of this into our terms is given by Figure 2, where solid lines indicate positive values and dotted lines, negative values.

To the extent that *Person* has a positive bond to *Other*$_1$ and also to *Other*$_2$ (where the *Others* may be social groups) it becomes increasingly difficult for him to adopt a stable attitude toward *X*. If, for instance, he likes *X*, the value of the $(P)(O_1)(X)$

triangle becomes positive, but the value of the $(P)(O_2)(X)$ triangle becomes negative. The general proposition is as follows:

D10. To the extent that *Person* has equal positive ties to two *Others* who have equal and opposite degrees of liking for *X*, the net value of any attitude toward *X* approaches zero for *Person*.

In order to avoid reifying groups, a fuller analysis could be developed using individuals. Thus, the lines in Figure 2 may be thought of as the average of the values of the personal relationships between Person and group members, and group members and *X*.

Working out some of the possibilities in detail gives the following propositions:

D11. The greater the cross-pressuring for *Person* (i.e., the more equal the opposite values), the weaker his attitude (liking) toward *X*.

D12. If *Person* does adopt a positive or negative attitude toward *X* it will be the attitude of the *Other* with the strongest degree of liking or disliking toward *X*, provided that *Person*'s bonds to the two groups are equal.

D13 If *Person* does adopt a positive or negative attitude toward *X*, it will be that of the *Other* to whom he has the stronger positive tie (liking or similarity) providing that the strengths of the *Others'* attitudes toward *X* are equal.

D14. If *Person* does adopt an attitude toward *X*, he will tend to lower his liking for the *Other* with whom he is now in imbalance and increase his liking of the *Other* with whom he is now in balance.

GROUP STRUCTURE

Having stated the basic derivations from the theory in terms of *Person, Other,* and *X*, we can now proceed to a different level of analysis, . the statistical properties of groups. That is, instead of considering a particular (P) (O) (X) triangle, we shall treat the properties of the distributions of triangles in groups which vary in the distribution of particular variables.

In doing so, we shall make two assumptions of statistical and substantive importance. First, it is assumed that the group is large enough so that the distribution for the entire group approximates the distribution of *Others* for each particular *Person.* In a group of thirty, which is split fifty-fifty in political preference, if *Person* is a Democrat, 52 per cent of the *Others* are Republicans, which is pretty close to 50 per cent. In a group of two, however, split fifty-fifty in political preference, 100 per cent of the *Others* are of the opposite political persuasion.

Second, we shall assume that the communication in the group is such that each member receives an essentially similar and




FIG. 2.—The cross-pressure situation

accurate perception of the characteristics of the group as a whole.

It is probably true that these two assumptions are antithetical, the larger the group the less adequate the communication and the smaller the group the more distortion introduced by subtracting *Person* from the distribution of *Others*. Nevertheless, it would appear fair to say that the assumptions, while extremely useful in facilitating the deductions, affect only the degree of precision, not the essentials of the predictions.

It is a persistent observation in field studies of human behavior that in groups of moderate size there is a tendency for subgroups or cliques to form.

Def. 17. A subset of group members whose average liking for each other is greater than their average liking for the other members is a *clique.*

The development of cliques has been analyzed in some detail by Homans (10), Lazarsfeld and Merton (13) and Lipset *et al.* (15). Homans emphasizes the im-

portance of differential rates of interaction in clique formation, a major theme of *The Human Group* being that differentials in social interaction determined by work (the external system) lead to differentials in liking, other sentiments, and activities so that "the activities of a sub-group may become increasingly differentiated from those of other sub-groups up to some limit imposed by the controls of the larger group to which all the sub-groups belong" (10, p. 136). Our impression is that the research literature over a variety of studies tends to support the claim that in day-to-day social life, differences in rates of interaction are the major factor behind subgroup formation. Our theoretical analysis, however, is assuming that interaction rates are uniform within a group, and hence we may proceed to consider other variables. For groups with undifferentiated patterns of interaction, Lazarsfeld and Merton and the authors of *Union Democracy* have stressed the importance of "value homophily" and "similarity." Taking their lead, we may state the following proposition:

D15. For any given X or social characteristic the greater the number of categories into which it is (perceived to be) divided the greater the number of cliques which will form.

Given our proposition that positive bonds follow from similarity, it follows that where there is internal differentiation mutual bonds will tend to develop among subsets, and liking will be greater within cliques than between clique members and the rest of the group. Thus, a group composed of members of one religion cannot form cliques differentiated in religion; a group composed of members of two religions will tend to form two cliques based on religion; a group composed of members of N religions will tend to form N cliques based on religion.

D16. Unless the attitudes or characteristics are totally confounded, or there is no internal variation, the greater the number of characteristics or attitudes, the larger the number of cliques which will form.

Derivation 16 simply says that the addition of another characteristic will add to the possible logical cross-partitions of the group and hence to the number of cliques, unless the characteristic is totally undifferentiated or so confounded that there are no people falling in the logically possible additional classes.

D17. Cliques are more likely to form on the basis of strong attitudes than on the basis of weak ones.

As the absolute value of the liking of X increases, the mean value of bonds in homogeneous cliques increases and the mean value of bonds to non-clique members with opposite attitudes decreases, so that strong attitudes are predicted to produce greater clique differentiation than weak ones.

Considering N attributes, the greater their intercorrelation over individuals:

D18. The larger the size of the clique formed by those who share the attributes;

D19. The greater the differentiation between members of the clique formed by those who share the attributes and other members of the group;

D20. The greater the proportion of the group falling into two hostile cliques, one composed of those sharing all the attributes and one composed of those sharing none of the attributes.

While it may not be obvious, derivations 18, 19, and 20 attempt to restate some key propositions in Coleman's *Community Conflict* (3, pp. 21–23).

The argument can be put in terms of the statistics of association in contingency tables. Consider, for example, three attributes, A v a, B v b, and C v c. There are eight possible combinations, of which we are interested in ABC, abc, and the remaining six which we will call "intermediate." Persons in ABC possess all the attributes, persons in abc possess none of the attributes, and persons in the intermediate category possess some, but not all.

If A, B, and C are independent, the frequency of each type is given by multiplication of the marginal frequencies for the relevant attributes. If, however, there are

positive associations, then the groups *AB*, *AC*, and *BC* will contain more than the expected frequencies and (assuming no interactions) *ABC* will have a higher frequency than under independence. Thus, the greater the associations the greater the size of *ABC* and the clique formed by those in *ABC* (D18).

By the same argument, the size of *abc* must increase if association occurs or increases. Consequently, the size of "intermediate" must decline. Considering the members of *ABC*, as association increases, the number of "outsiders" who are in *abc* increases and the number of "outsiders" in intermediate decreases, meaning that a greater proportion of the outsiders have "nothing in common" with the clique members and a smaller proportion have "something in common" with clique members. According to the theory this should lead to increasing the difference between mean liking within the clique and mean liking outside, and hence the differentiation between *ABC* and the rest of the group (D19). Finally, as increasing association means an increase of the frequency of *ABC* and *abc* and a decrease of the frequency of intermediate, it follows that as the intercorrelations increase the percentage of the group falling in the antithetical (and thus, according to the theory, hostile) cliques *ABC* and *abc* increases (D20).

These propositions appear to restate Coleman's concept of "interlocking memberships" and the propositions on subgroup formation in "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation" (4).

We can now establish a typology of group structures by combining the inferences from D15, D16, D17, D18, D19, and D20.

The rows in Table 1 stand for differences in the absolute number of dimensions. The columns designate differences in the associations among the dimensions. In the right-hand column is the extreme case where there are strong associations which are consistent in the sense that a reflected matrix would have a high preponderance of positive signs. In the left-hand column is the opposite situation where the associations are low or associated in such a way that even a reflected matrix contains a large number of negative signs.

Def. 18. The *unity* of a group is the inverse of the variation (variance, standard deviation, etc.) in value of the member-member likings. The opposite of unity will be called *fragmentation.*

Definition 18 says that a unified group is one in which all members tend to like each other to the same degree and a fragmented group is one in which there tend to be extremes of liking and disliking within the group. Note that this aspect of group structure is not the same as mean liking considered in definition 17. A group in which everybody is faintly hostile to everybody else is considered to be more unified and less fragmented than one in which most everybody dislikes most everybody but a few people like each other very much. The combination of unity and high average liking should, perhaps, be termed "solidarity."

TABLE 1

TYPES OF GROUP STRUCTURE

No of Dimensions	Associations among Dimensions	
	Low or Inconsistent	High and Consistent
Many. . . .	"Interlocking"	"Polarized"
Few.	"Simple"	"Dichotomized"

D21. *Group Structure and Unity:*

a) *Simple:* In such groups there are few dimensions and they are not correlated.

For example, some primitive societies and most American primary schools are differentiated around the independent axes of sex and age, such as "old women" or "fifth-grade boys."

By the inferences from our theory a simple group should tend to form a small number of large cliques around the lines of differentiation.

b) *Dichotomized:* If, in what would otherwise be a simple group, the characteristics tend to be strongly associ-

ated, the number of subgroupings remains constant (unless the associations become "perfect") but more and more people are found in one or the other antithetical subgroup.

For example, one might think of the traditional Southern small town organized around the correlated characteristics of race and status, with two large groups of high status whites and low status Negroes, along with the smaller groups of low status whites and high status Negroes.

In comparison with the simple system a dichotomized group will have less unity because more of its people fall into situations where they have high similarity to a large number and low similarity to a large number of group members.

c) *Interlocking:* If, in what would otherwise be a simple group, the number of dimensions is larger, the number of subgroupings will increase, but the size of cliques will decrease.

For example, one might contrast the high school with the primary school. In addition to sex and grade, high-school students are differentiated on neighborhood, course of study, and extracurricular activities. The high school thus has more dimensions.

In comparison with a simple system, the interlocking system will be more unified, because for any given person there are fewer others who are socially identical or socially disparate. Along with high unity an interlocking group will tend to contain a large number of small cliques which are, however, not highly differentiated. Thus, the high school has both "more cliques" and "more school spirit" than the grade school.

d) *Polarized:* If, in what would otherwise be a simple group, the number of dimensions is large and the dimensions are strongly and consistently associated, the number of subgroupings increases and the size of polar social groups increases.

For example, one might think of the traditional New England mill towns which at one time were differentiated in wealth, religion, political preference, and nativity, but in such a way that being rich, Protestant, Republican, and native born tended to go together, as did being poor, Catholic, a Democrat, and foreign born.

Such a community should lie between the dichotomized and interlocking in terms of its unity. The degree of cleavage between the polar groups should be high because each additional characteristic reinforces internal similarity and external contrast. Thus the several generations of common history and Protestant religion shared by whites and Negroes in the traditional Southern town are lacking in the mill town, and religion and nationality differences undoubtedly exacerbated the conflicts. However social characteristics are seldom perfectly correlated, and even though the polar groups are more strongly differentiated than in a dichotomized group, fewer people fall into the extremes. The existence of some rich Catholics, Protestant Democrats, foreign-born Republicans, and poor native-born persons adds to the number of persons not included unambiguously in the polar groups, and thus adds to the unity of the group when compared with the dichotomized group.

From this point of view the existence of complicated group structures is seen as enhancing the unity of the group. At first glance, it may appear that the theory is much akin to Lévi-Strauss's theory of kinship structures (14). It should be noted, however, that the underlying idea is exactly the opposite, although it does not deny Lévi-Strauss's ideas. His theory is one of "organic solidarity" or exchange, rather than mechanical solidarity or similarity. Our theory says nothing about the exchange of women or other valuables between subgroups but rather says, in effect, that the existence of additional subgroups prevents group fragmentation by making less probable the development of large, cohesive cliques set totally apart from the rest of the group.

Let us now consider a final aspect of group structure—size.

In *Union Democracy* (15, pp. 163–75) there is an intensive analysis of the effects of group size, based on differences between small and large shops of printers. The main line of argument goes as follows:

In the small shops, a nonconformist voter to whom union politics is important cannot find that support in the shop itself; the small shops are usually too small to allow the creation within them of subgroups which stand against the

political sentiments of the majority in the shop. . . . In the larger shops there are enough men available of similar preferences for a man to find social support for his nonconformism [15, pp. 170–71].

Translating the argument into the language of the theory:

D22. If a group has cliques, the larger the group the greater the probability there is that a clique of size N or larger exists.

D23 The effect of group size on clique membership is stronger for persons whose attitudes and characteristics are in the minority.

In other words, for groups with the same degree of differentiation, the larger the group the greater the absolute number of persons who possess any particular combination of characteristics. Thus, if it is assumed that there is some absolute size necessary for the formation of a clique, the larger the group the greater the probability that a person with a particular combination of characteristics can find sufficient others to form a clique. Because of their smaller number to begin with, the proposition applies with special force to those whose characteristics are atypical. Thus, the probability of formation of cliques of deviants is affected by group size as well as the structure of the characteristics and attitudes in the group.

In the final section of this essay, we shall consider an additional structural factor, the frequency of occurrence of X.

CHANGES IN ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

A whole tradition of social psychological research (group dynamics) has placed stress on the role of group relationships in the adoption and change in attitudes. Recently Homans has attempted to restate the principles involved (11, pp. 83–129). In addition, Coleman's analysis of community conflict (3) may be thought of as a similar analysis at the level of a larger group. Although the following propositions do not attempt to synthesize such a vast literature, a number of the key propositions appear to be similar to those in balance theory. The similarity is no coincidence, Cartwright and Harary being members in eminent standing in the group dynamics fraternity.

We shall consider three situations:

Def. 19. *Innovation* is a situation where initially the members either do not possess or have no degree of liking for a given X, and an attempt is made to introduce X into a group.

Def. 20. *Attitude change* is a situation where initially most or all of the members possess X or hold a given attitude and an attempt is made to reverse the situation.

Def. 21. *Conflict* is a situation where initially the members differ in their liking of X, some liking it, some disliking it.

Innovation.—The proposition that social relationships are a factor in the acceptance of new ideas and attitudes has become a major theme in contemporary communications research following the publication of Katz's and Lazarsfeld's *Personal Influence* (12). The general idea of group effects and opinion leadership can be stated in the language of our theory in terms of a general proposition and a series of subsidiary propositions specifying variations in the process.

D24. *Person* is more likely to adopt an innovation if he has a positive tie of liking or similarity to the innovator.

If *Person* has a positive tie to *Other*, when *Other* "suddenly" likes X, *Person* can increase the net value of his relationship by only liking X (provided, of course, that he has no initial dislike of X, this being part of the definition of innovation).

Putting the same idea in terms of group level variables, we can say:

D25. Innovations tend to diffuse rapidly within cliques but slowly between them.

Because cliques are defined in terms of high rates of positive ties, adoption of a new attitude or activity by a member will be followed by acceptance within the clique. Because, however, members of other subgroups and isolates have less positive or

even negative bonds with members of the innovating group, they will tend to resist or be late adopters.

D26. Within a group the rate and degree of the acceptance of an innovation is proportional to the degree of liking of the members for each other.

D27. Within a group the rate and degree of acceptance of an innovation is proportional to the homogeneity of the members in social characteristics.

Because liking and homogeneity produce positive ties, and positive ties affect acceptance, derivations 26 and 27 restate in balance theory the common proposition that acceptance is related to group cohesiveness and homogeneity.

D28. Innovations initiated by highly liked people are more likely to be adopted than those initiated by less liked or disliked people.

D29. Members most typical of the group in terms of attitudes and attributes will be relatively more successful as innovators.

Derivation 28 is the "opinion-leader" hypothesis and is a restatement of D5 in terms of average liking rather than a two-person situation.

D30. Members of multiple cliques tend to be sources of innovation, providing that they are not disliked by or dissimilar to clique members.

Marginal men—those with a tie to more than one group—have long been noted as sources of innovations. In balance-theory terms, such a proposition is justified from the following: As an innovation diffuses through a certain clique, it will be eventually adopted by a "marginal member," although because he is less similar to the other clique members he is probably not an early adopter. Once he has adopted the innovation, however, he will tend to be an "early" adopter in his other clique (because he has more positive ties to the clique that began the process than other members of his alternate group). If he is liked in his "other" clique, he will then serve as an influential in the second clique and a source of innovation.

As the theory predicts that innovation is affected by clique membership, it follows that for larger groups the process of diffusion will vary with group structure as defined above.

D31. In contrast to simple groups, within dichotomized groups acceptance of an innovation tends to begin rapidly but then to slow down or stop before acceptance is universal.

D32. In contrast to simple groups, within interlocking groups acceptance of an innovation tends to begin slowly but to increase in rate and to become complete.

The arguments are as follows. In dichotomized groups, because of the large size of the two antithetical groups the original adoption is likely to be within one of them. Because of the high positive bonds, acceptance will be rapid within this polar subgroup. However, members of the opposite subgroup will tend to resist adoption because of their negative bonds to the adopting group. Therefore, after an original spurt, the innovation will slow down or cease its rate of acceptance. The opposite is predicted to occur in interlocking groups. Here the initial adopting clique is likely to be small and its mean positive bondness not as high as for the polar group. However, because there are fewer antithetical cliques in the interlocking system the process of diffusion should proceed steadily and by a snowball process eventually include most of the group.

Attitude change.—A classical problem in social psychology is that of the process by which a campaign reverses the attitudes (degree of liking of X) of members of a group. A number of common conclusions about this process may be drawn in terms of balance theory.

D33. It is more difficult to reverse the attitudes of individuals when they are members of a group with high consensus on the attitude.

This derivation may be thought of as the balance-theory hypothesis on "social sup-

port for attitudes." The reasoning, of course, is that if a larger number of persons in the group like (or dislike) X, and P has positive ties of liking or similarity to the group, for P to reverse his liking of X may lower the net value of his cycles considerably. One of the major lessons of research on propaganda and communication is that all too often a communicator must ask *Person* to pay the price of setting himself against his friends in return for the scant gains of changing an attitude.

As before, certain variations in the process may be set forth:

D34. The greater the degree of liking within a group the greater the resistance of its members to attitude change.

D35. The greater the degree of similarity in characteristics and attitudes other than X within a group the greater the resistance of its members to changes in attitude toward X.

Derivations 34 and 35, of course, merely restate D26 and D27 in terms of attitude change rather than innovation. The opinion-leader hypotheses come out in a different form, however.

D36. Members who dislike or are indifferent to the others are more likely to change their attitudes.

D37. Members who are atypical of the group in characteristics or attitudes other than X are more likely to change their attitudes.

While derivations 28 and 29 said that typical and well-liked members tended to be sources of innovations, derivations 36 and 37 say that atypical and uninvolved members tend to be the beachheads for attitude change. The reason is that their bonds to other members are zero, or negative, and hence adoption of an attitude opposite to their associates does not lower their cycle values. Whether members with mild liking or lesser similarity are easy targets is a moot point. One might argue that since their bonds are lesser they have less to lose by changing their attitudes, but one might also argue that they are in danger of losing what little they have. Probably it depends on the value of their bonds to members in other groups. If the group in question is their only source of social rewards, they probably resist change, but if they have a foothold elsewhere they are free to change (10, p. 118). In more formal terms:

D38. For a person with positive bonds in a clique or peer group, group pressure to resist attitude change is inverse to *Person*'s positive attachments to other groups with opposite degrees of liking for X.

For purposes of theoretical analysis we have been assuming that the initial situation was one of 100 per cent liking (or disliking). In reality, of course, deviants always exist, and the theory allows us to derive some consequences of continued deviance, in a proposition often presented in group dynamics literature and treated at length in *Social Behavior* (10, pp. 112–29).

D39. In a group in which most, but not all, members like (or dislike) one or more X's, the degree to which a given member is liked is proportional to his adoption of the majority attitudes.

The proposition says that conformity leads to being liked, deviance leads to being disliked. The argument is that the deviant creates unbalanced cycles for conformers who then lower the amount of their dissonance and sometimes change the cycle to positive by lowering their degree of liking for the deviant. Conversely, high liking of those who conform raises the net values of the cycles for other conformers.

Conflict.—What happens when the initial proportion liking (or disliking) X is neither zero nor 100, but some intermediate figure, has long been discussed at the microscopic level as "group pressures toward conformity" and has been analyzed recently at the macroscopic level in Coleman's *Community Conflict* (3). According to balance theory the process and outcome will vary according to the structure of the group. We will consider first what is predicted for a clique and then turn to propo-

sitions concerning differentiated groups. In each case we shall consider what happens when a "new X" appears and there is a division among the members into those liking and those disliking X.

D40. In a clique attitudes will tend to converge on unanimity.
D41. The greater the degree of liking of the members for each other the faster the convergence and the nearer unanimity the final outcome.
D42. The greater the degree of similarity of the members in terms of attributes other than X the faster the convergence and the nearer unanimity the outcome.
D43. The stronger the initial attitudes the faster the convergence and the nearer unanimity the outcome.
D44. Pressures toward change in attitudes or toward more vigorous proselytizing will be more common for (*a*) those on the minority side, (*b*) those with the strongest initial attitudes, (*c*) those who like the greatest proportion of the other members, (*d*) those who are most typical of the group in terms of personal characteristics.
D45. The "side" with the greater proportion of well-liked members will tend to win

The general form of the proposition is now familiar, but the line of reasoning in this case is as follows: The general proposition of convergence stems from these considerations. If initial bonds are positive (as they are by definition in a clique) the emergence of disagreements will lower the net values of the cycles to each member. By either changing their own opinions or by influencing others, the members will tend to raise the level of agreement, the condition giving the highest net gain being unanimity. Derivations 41–43 state the conditions that produce the greatest average dissonance in the group and hence the greatest pressure to achieve unanimity. Derivation 44 enumerates the particular subgroups in the group who will suffer relatively greater dissonance, and hence the greatest pressure to change or change Others. Finally, derivation 45 is another restatement of D5 on imitation.

In the differentiated group containing more than one clique, the process, as analyzed by Coleman, is somewhat different, essentially because positive bonds are not distributed evenly throughout the population. Rather such a population may be thought of as N cliques, whose degree of hostility to each other is a function of the degree to which the total group is interlocking or dichotomized. The development of an issue then simply serves as an additional dimension. The process predicted is as follows:

D46. When an issue arises cliques tend to move toward internal homogeneity, with consequent increased differentiation between cliques.
D47. If the issue is one where feelings are very strong, there will be a tendency toward polarization.
D48. Polarization will be less likely in groups where there was initially a low degree of association in characteristics and attitudes or a high number of dimensions.
D49. Individuals who belong to multiple groups will develop less strong attitudes
D50. Subgroups that are representative of the group as a whole will tend to take no stand on the issue.

The theory predicts that the process will go as follows: Once an issue arises the subgroups in the community will move toward homogeneity in opinion according to the derivations stated above for cliques. As they become internally consistent, their differentiation from those groups converging toward the opposite side increases (D46). If, however, the issue is very heated, all the subgroups on one side tend to develop a more positive bondedness, and there is a tendency toward the development of two camps (D47). As Coleman notes, the degree and rapidity of polarization will be less where existing characteristics were loosely associated and attachments were thus distributed widely throughout the group (48). In addition, cross-pressured individuals (D49) will tend to have no opinion at all, and groups that are representative of the community (e.g.,

civic organizations), being heavily cross-pressured, will tend to take no stand at all (D50), leaving initiative in the hands of "extremist" groups whose internal dissonance is less, a phenomenon characteristic of desegregation conflicts in the American South.

While the propositions have been developed in terms of Coleman's analysis of unstructured community issues such as fluoridation controversies, the derivations also restate some of the major theoretical generalizations from *Voting* (1) on social processes in electoral campaigns. Thus the authors of *Voting* conclude that, as an electoral campaign continues, groups tend to become homogeneous in political attitude ("The campaign increases homogeneity within and polarization between religious groups and occupational groups" [1, p. 149]), and that cross-pressured individuals and groups tend to have unstable and weak voting intentions.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

The final social-psychological concept to be considered is relative deprivation (4, 16, 17), the proposition that people tend to assess rewards and punishments not only in terms of their intrinsic hedonic value but also by comparison with standards based on the experience of others (reference persons and groups).

Because we have to treat unit formation and liking for *Person* and *Other* simultaneously, it will be helpful to shift to a more formal approach. The postulates of the theory can be translated into the following:

$$\text{Value to } P = (L_{PX} + U_{PX}) \times (L_{OX} + U_{OX}) \times (L_{PO} + r_{PO}), \quad (1)$$

where L stands for the degree of liking, U for the degree of unit formation, r_{PO} for the correlation between P and O over attributes other than X. Subscripts are asymmetrical except for r_{PO}.

While the previous section concerned liking, the issue here is possession, or, in the language of the theory, the unit relationship. In considering attitudes, we assumed in effect that the unit relationship was irrelevant, that is, in equation (1), the terms U_{PX} and U_{OX} were equal to zero.

In analyzing relative deprivation, however, liking and possession have to be considered simultaneously.

Def. 22. X is a value if everyone in the group likes X or if everyone dislikes X.

Valuing is not necessarily the same as possessing. One may like money or promotions or good grades but not possess them. One may dislike poverty, demotions, or bad grades but still possess them. With this in mind let us consider what happens when: (*a*) X is a value, (*b*) there is a positive bond between *Person* and *Other*, (*c*) there is a discrepancy between *Person* and *Other* in terms of the possession or degree of possession of X.

We note that if U_{PX} and U_{OX} are both zero, the net value of the cycle to *Person* will be positive under the stipulations, and also that the value will be positive in any situation in which $U_{PX} = U_{OX}$.

Because the stipulations require L_{PX} to be the same as L_{OX} the subscripts can be dropped and the equation rearranged:

$$\text{Value to } P = [L^2 + L\,(U_{PX} + U_{OX}) + U_{PX}U_{OX}] \times (L_{PO} + r_{PO}). \quad (2)$$

Put this way it can be seen that the contribution of the two U terms is a function of their sum plus their product. Exactly what will happen will depend on the sign and value of L and the specific values of the two U terms, but for present purposes, the following generalizations will serve: (*a*) if L is positive and U_{OX} is some positive number, the value of the cycle to *Person* is proportional to the value of U_{PX}; (*b*) if L is negative and U_{OX} is negative, the value of the cycle to *Person* is inversely proportional to the value of U_{OX}; (*c*)

if L is positive and U_{PX} is positive, the value of the cycle to *Person* is directly proportional to U_{OX}; and (*d*) if L is negative and U_{PX} is negative, the value of the cycle to *Person* is inversely proportional to U_{OX}. Translating from algebra into the language of the theory:

D51. Under the stipulations above, if *Other* possesses an X that both *Person* and *Other* like, the less X that *Person* possesses the lower the value of the cycle to *Person*.

D52. Under the stipulations above, if *Other* does not possess an X that both *Person* and *Other* dislike, the more X that *Person* possesses the lower the value of the cycle to *Person*.

D53. Under the stipulations above, if *Person* possesses an X that both *Person* and *Other* like, the more X that *Other* possesses the greater the value of the cycle to *Person*.

D54. Under the stipulations above, if *Person* does not possess an X that both *Person* and *Other* dislike, the less X that *Other* possesses the greater the value of the cycle to *Person*.

Let us compare these results with the analysis in "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation." In that paper three psychological states were postulated (4, p. 283):

> When a deprived person compares himself with a non-deprived person, the resulting state will be called "relative deprivation. . . ."
>
> When a non-deprived person compares himself with a deprived person, the resulting state will be called "relative gratification. . . ."
>
> A person experiencing *either* relative gratification or relative deprivation will also experience a feeling that his deprivation status is different from that of his peers. We will call this "fairness" in the sense that it indicates a belief that there is differential treatment in the in-group.

It thus appears that lack of "fairness" is the logical equivalent of imbalance and that all the propositions about fairness in "A Formal Interpretation" can be translated into balance theory. Specifically, we can restate the propositions on the distribution of rewards to complete our analysis of group structure, begun previously in the consideration of number of dimensions and associations among dimensions.

D55. Within a clique, as the proportion receiving a given value increases (or the proportion not receiving a given negative value decreases):
- *a*) Cycle values decrease among those whose situation is less favorable.
- *b*) Cycle values increase among those whose situation is more favorable.
- *c*) For the group as a whole, average cycle values decrease as reward levels move from zero to 50 per cent and increase as reward levels move from 50 per cent toward 100 per cent.

D56. Within a group with two cliques, the distribution of rewards (or punishments) will affect group differentiation as follows
- *a*) To the extent that reward distribution is correlated with clique membership, it will lead to greater clique differentiation.
- *b*) To the extent that reward distribution tends toward fifty-fifty within a clique, it will lead to lessened clique differentiation.

While balance theory turns out to be involved in the theory of relative deprivation, the theory of relative deprivation cannot be totally encompassed within it. In particular, the idea of relative gratification goes beyond balance theory in a way which indicates some important limits to the theory.

Although relative gratification is postulated to produce a lowering of (POX) cycle value, and people are postulated to prefer high cycle values, the theory of relative deprivation assumes that relative gratification is satisfying to *Person*. How can these two hypotheses be reconciled? We think the answer comes from the fact that the value of the POX cycle is only one of many sources of gratification for ego. Thus, while surpassing one's peers does indeed lower the rewards from peer relationships, the compensation in terms of intrinsic gratification from the reward or the feeling of competitive success may more than com-

pensate for the loss. Whether the value of a positive (*POX*) cycle outweighs the value of the reward (as it apparently does in the case of restriction of output among work groups) or whether the value of the reward is greater (as it is when student peers compete for grades) is not predictable from balance theory alone.

If these reflections are valid, they suggest that balance theory is of decreased utility in social situations where there is a short supply of a highly valuable *X*.

We can illustrate this limitation from the area of politics. According to the theory, if *Person* meets *Other* and it turns out that they both like a given political candidate, the theory predicts that they will tend to like each other precisely because they share a liking. Consider, however, the two candidates themselves. The fact that Kennedy liked the presidency and Nixon liked the presidency did not imply that Kennedy and Nixon liked each other. Although it must be admitted that sometimes competitors do develop a liking because they have something in common (e.g., trial lawyers or rival athletes), in the case of the presidency, although both candidates "liked it," only one could possess it, and this unavoidable asymmetry means that often candidates are willing to sacrifice their positive peer relations to gain the prize.

This important qualification allows us to set the theory in some perspective. We feel that within a broad and important area of social life, the theory presented manages to integrate a considerable number of ideas and findings. At the same time, it is not presented as a complete theory of human behavior. The theory claims that positive cycles of similarity are attractive to people, but it must admit other sources of motivation. The dissimilarity in exchange between differentiated people and the dissimilarity of triumph in competition also are sources of reward that may outweigh the values of the cycles discussed. What balance theory maintains, however, is that there must be some gain in exchange and high reward from competition to offset the imbalances that occur.

SUMMARY

Balance theory, a social-psychological theory developed by Cartwright and Harary (2) to formalize concepts set forth by Heider (9), has been used to restate in a common language fifty-six propositions from the writings of Berelson *et al.* (1), Coleman (3), Davis (4), Durkheim (5), Festinger (6, 7), Fiedler (8), Homans (10, 11), Katz and Lazarsfeld (12), Lazarsfeld and Merton (13), Lipset *et al.* (15), Merton and Kitt (16), and Stouffer *et al.* (17).

Despite the wide range of topics covered by the theory it is not advanced as a general theory of interpersonal relations but as a theory of one major component. It is suggested that a general theory of interpersonal relations must consider, in addition to balance, the exchange process and the effects of competition for scarce values.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REFERENCES

1. BERELSON, BERNARD R., LAZARSFELD, PAUL F., and McPHEE, WILLIAM N. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
2. CARTWRIGHT, DORWIN, and HARARY, FRANK. "Structural Balance: A Generalization of Heider's Theory," *Psychological Review,* LXIII (September, 1956), 277–93.
3. COLEMAN, JAMES S. *Community Conflict.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957.
4. DAVIS, JAMES A. "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation," *Sociometry,* XXII (December, 1959), 280–96.
5. DURKHEIM, ÉMILE. *The Division of Labor in Society.* Translated by GEORGE SIMPSON. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947.
6. FESTINGER, LEON. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.* Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957.
7. ———. "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," *Human Relations,* VII (1954), 117–40.
8. FIEDLER, FRED E. *Leader Attitudes and Group*

Effectiveness. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958.

9. HEIDER, FRITZ. *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.
10. HOMANS, GEORGE CASPAR. *The Human Group*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950.
11. ———. *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961.
12. KATZ, ELIHU, and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955.
13. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F., and MERTON, ROBERT K. "Friendship as a Social Process· A Substantive and Methodological Analysis," in MORROE BERGER, THEODORE ABEL, and CHARLES H. PAGE (eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, pp. 18–66. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand & Co., 1954.
14. LÉVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE. *Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949.
15. LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN, TROW, MARTIN A., and COLEMAN, JAMES S. *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1956.
16. MERTON, ROBERT E., and KITT, ALICE S. "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in ROBERT K. MERTON and PAUL F LAZARSFELD (eds.), *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier."* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950.
17. STOUFFER, SAMUEL E., SUCHMAN, EDWARD A., DE VINNEY, LELAND C., STAR, SHIRLEY A., and WILLIAMS, ROBIN M., JR. *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949.

SOME UNDERCURRENTS IN THE PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS

WILLIAM A. GAMSON AND HOWARD SCHUMAN[1]

ABSTRACT

Individuals ranking physicians highest in prestige are not more likely to be generally favorable to the occupation than those ranking them lower. There is some evidence that they are, in fact, more *hostile* to physicians than those ranking this occupation lower in prestige. In this paper an attempt is made to explain this apparent ambivalence in terms of (1) personal salience and dependence, (2) conflicting cultural standards, and (3) the relation between standards and performance.

Both the social scientist and the lay observer frequently find it relevant and interesting—for different reasons perhaps—to consider carefully the prestige of people they encounter. Although there are numerous indirect ways to obtain a quantitative measure of prestige, the existence of a shared concept—"prestige" or "social standing"—allows a direct approach: One may simply ask people to evaluate the prestige of a set of social objects. This, in fact, was done in the realm of occupations in the well-known 1947 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) sample survey of the "general standing" of some ninety occupations.[2]

For those who expected in a business-oriented American culture that occupations connected with commerce and industry would be most highly evaluated, the NORC survey contained some surprises. Physicians and college professors, tying for second and seventh places respectively, outranked such business-centered occupations as banker and member of the board of directors of a large corporation. The standings of physicians and professors were, if anything, underestimated by the study, since some of the closest competing positions were not occupations in the ordinary sense, but specific governmental positions such as United States Supreme Court Justice. It seems clear, then, that some professional and intellectual occupations in the United States stand at the very top of the prestige hierarchy.[3]

Yet can we conclude that an individual who rates a given occupation high in "general standing" also thinks relatively well of

[1] This paper has equal authorship. We wish to thank Alex Inkeles, Benjamin D. Paul, and Thomas F. Pettigrew for their suggestions on an earlier draft.

[2] National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, pp. 3–13 (reprinted in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset [eds.], *Class, Status, and Power* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953], pp. 411–26). Similar studies have also been made in a number of other countries, both Western and non-Western. For a comparative analysis up to 1956 see Alex Inkeles and Peter H. Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (January, 1958), 390–99. A recent study by R. Murray Thomas, "Reinspecting a Structural Position on Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (March, 1962), 561–65, adds a non-industrialized nation, Indonesia, to the list of countries for which data are available.

[3] There is one serious omission in the NORC study from the standpoint of evaluating the relative prestige of occupational sectors in the United States. The "entertainment world" is not represented at all among the ninety occupations, except by the ambiguous title of "singer in a night club." Numerous surveys have shown that many sports and entertainment celebrities are more widely known to the American public than even leading political figures, though to what extent this carries over into prestige is less certain. A recent comparison of prestige rankings by Japanese and American high-school students reports that the title "movie performer" ranked seventh among the Americans, but sixteenth among the Japanese (out of twenty-three occupations) (Charles E. Ramsey and Robert J. Smith, "Japanese and American Perception of Occupations," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV [March, 1960], 475–82).

that occupation generally?[4] Indeed, it would be reasonable to expect a positive correlation between rating an occupation high in social standing and having a favorable general image of it. Most characteristics mentioned by people in explaining their bestowal of prestige upon certain occupations—characteristics such as education, service to the community, and high moral standards—carry a quite favorable connotation.[5]

However, sociologists have been cautious in drawing such an inference, no doubt in part because of the awareness that outward signs of deference are sometimes granted on the basis of power rather than of liking. In general, "prestige" or "social standing" has not been given a more inclusive meaning, although there have been frequent attempts to understand the underlying bases of occupational standing.

When we come to certain occupations, however, like those of physician or professor, there is sometimes more of a tendency to blur the distinction between prestige and other types of positive evaluation. For example, Lipset, in a stimulating article on "American Intellectuals: Their Politics and Status," writes that while the intellectual "may feel himself neglected and scorned, his work poorly valued by the community, the community itself places him fairly high when polled on the relative status of occupations."[6] Lipset's evidence for the latter half of his proposition is taken largely from the high standing of college professors and other "intellectual occupations" in the NORC survey discussed above. Similarly for physicians, Feldman, drawing on a 1955 NORC survey, felt that "this ascription of high social standing to physicians is a sign of respect."[7] Both quotations seem to imply that those individuals who rank an occupation high in social standing are likely to regard it favorably in more general terms.

The data reported here suggest that attributing prestige and showing scorn for the same occupation are not incompatible psychologically; prestige and scorn may be quite independent or—more striking—may go hand in hand. Both the feelings of intellectuals and the findings of the polls may be correct. A social role may have comparatively high prestige in the eyes of many members of the general public, while at the same time its occupants and its output may be devalued in direct ways by the very same individuals.

Our discussion will deal with the status of physicians. While this limits the generality, the focus on physicians has certain advantages. On one hand, there is no doubt about the high prestige of this particular occupation, while on the other hand, the strong service component in the physician's role should contribute to a favorable image.

PRESTIGE AND HOSTILITY

The data presented here are from interviews conducted in early 1960 with a probability sample of 141 registered voters living in one precinct in Cambridge, Massachusetts.[8] Attitudes toward physicians con-

[4] Our focus here is on the correlation over respondents, not the correlation over occupations. The latter approach has been explored in several studies (cf. Rossi and Inkeles, "Multi-dimensional Ratings of Occupations," *Sociometry*, XX [1957], 234–51). A recent paper by Louis Kriesberg ("The Bases of Occupational Prestige: The Case of Dentists," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII [April, 1962], 238–44) uses an approach similar to that presented in this paper.

[5] National Opinion Research Center, *op cit.*

[6] In *Daedalus*, Summer, 1959. A slightly revised version appearing in Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960), omits the phrase "his work poorly valued by the community"; whether this change was made for stylistic or substantive reasons is not clear.

[7] Jacob J. Feldman, "What Americans Think about Their Medical Care" (American Statistical Association Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section Meeting, December 27–30, 1958)

[8] The population to be sampled consisted of all registered voters living in the precinct on election day. The 141 completed interviews represent 74 per cent of the original sample of 190. Since not every respondent answered every question in a codable manner, the sample size in most of our analysis is slightly less than 141. The precinct consisted pri-

stituted one theme of a larger study of attitudes toward fluoridation of the community water supply. Three measures were employed to assess the public image of the medical profession. The relation between two measures of primary concern will be presented and analyzed first; the third measure, of less central importance, will be discussed at a later point.

1. *Physician Prestige Scale.*—Early in the interview, respondents were presented a list of ten occupations. They were asked to choose the occupation that they felt had the highest "social standing," the second highest, and the third highest.[9] For purposes of analysis, respondents were divided into four main subgroups according to the rank given physicians. Of 130 respondents with codable responses, 26 ranked physicians first, 37 ranked them second, 31 ranked them third, and 36 did not include physicians among their three choices.

2. *The Medical Hostility Scale.*—In the course of the interview respondents were also asked to express their degree of agreement or disagreement (on a seven-point scale) with the statements given in Table 1, which were mixed among a larger number of Likert-type items. The average intercorrelation among these four items was .28, and on this basis, as well as that of content, they were combined to form a total Medical Hostility Score.

marily of a lower middle-class and working-class population; it was largely second- or third-generation Irish and Italian in ethnic origin, and heavily Catholic (71 per cent of the sample) in religion. About half the sample had not completed high school.

[9] If we weight a first choice as 3 points, a second as 2, and a third as 1, the average score for physicians is 1.42 compared with 1.56 for governor of a state, 1.22 for clergyman, and lesser scores for (in order) college professor, scientist, banker, dentist, airlines pilot, electrician, and carpenter. The rank-order correlation between this ordering and the 1947 NORC poll is .92; the only noticeable discrepancy is that the Cambridge sample, with its high proportion of Catholics, tends to rank clergymen somewhat higher than the NORC sample ranks ministers.

Interrelation of the two scales.—We are not interested here in the absolute levels of medical hostility and prestige. What concerns us is the relationship between the two scales. The correlation is low but ***positive*** and significant ($r = +.18$, $P < .05$). Quite clearly the attribution of prestige to doctors and the deprecation of doctors are ***not*** inversely correlated in this sample. Granting prestige does not seem to imply an attitude of general esteem on the part of the grantor.

A second, more tentative conclusion seems warranted as well. It is the very

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH FOUR ITEMS ON A MEDICAL HOSTILITY SCALE

Item	Per Cent
If you go to two doctors, you will probably get two opposite kinds of advice	63
When it comes to colds, headaches, and a great many other illnesses, the neighborhood druggist probably knows as much as the highest-priced doctor	41
Doctors know a lot less about sickness than they let on	38
Doctors have more money and prestige than they actually deserve	33

people who rank the occupation of physician at the top of the prestige hierarchy who tend to show relatively more hostility toward doctors when the questioning shifts to concrete matters of occupational performance (see Table 2). If such a relationship should continue to hold in another and larger sample, it would indicate that for physicians, at any rate, ambivalence may be the characteristic attitude of those who accord them the highest prestige.[10]

Control variables.—Before speculating

[10] Kriesberg (*op. cit.*) reports very low but positive correlations between prestige ranking of dentists and certain favorable attitudes toward the dental profession. This is slightly different from our result for physicians but may be accounted for by the different position on the prestige hierarchy of the occupations involved. In any event, it is important to note that in neither study is there any sizable positive relation between favorable attitudes and high ranking.

about the sources of this ambivalence, however, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the results in Table 2 are spurious. There is a particular problem with the Medical Hostility Scale—hostility is always indicated by agreement with an item. As various investigators have shown, such items may elicit agreement from some respondents for reasons having little to do with item content.[11] A measure of agreeing response set was obtained for each respondent using a balanced six-item F-scale.[12] When prestige and hostility are correlated for groups with differing amounts

TABLE 2

Hostility to Physicians	Prestige Rank of Physicians			
	1st or 2d		3d or Lower	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
High	21	33	12	18
Medium	32	51	34	51
Low	10	16	21	31
Total	63	100	67	100

of response set, the original relationship does not disappear, but it does become more precisely located. It continues to hold most strongly among those respondents showing evidence of a "yea-saying" tendency; among the other respondents, the relation is slight although even here it is not reversed in direction.

Examination of a variety of background control variables—education, sex, race, age, occupation, and self-identified social class—leaves the hostility-prestige relationship largely undisturbed. Although the sample is too small to allow any definitive control, the relationship persists for each of the population subgroups mentioned. For example, as might be expected from the response-set findings, it is strongest among the least educated (eighth grade or less), but it also holds among those with high-school education and, to a slight degree, among the small group of respondents with some college experience.

SOURCES OF AMBIVALENCE

Even if further evidence should show that the correlation between prestige ranking and hostility is actually zero, rather than positive, ambivalence in its most literal meaning would still be indicated. A consistent attitude toward doctors should logically lead to a negative relation between these two variables. It seems fruitful, therefore, to take the theme of ambivalence as a guide in interpreting the paradoxical association between prestige and hostility.

The suggestion is not novel that high-prestige occupations in general, and the medical profession in particular, are subject to a considerable amount of ambivalence. Some social scientists in discussing the physician's status have stressed the likelihood that hostility may accompany admiration. "Any group that has reached the intimate and trusted status achieved by the medical profession," writes Alfred McClung Lee, "is . . . subject to feelings both of gratitude and high expectation on the one hand and of distrust and rejection on the other."[13] In a similar vein, Werner Cohn hypothesizes that a good deal of ambivalence is an inevitable part of attitudes toward high-status occupations.[14]

Most physicians are undoubtedly aware that the deference they receive from pa-

[11] See, e.g., Gerhard E. Lenski and John C. Leggett, "Caste, Class, and Deference in the Research Interview," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (March, 1960), 463–67.

[12] A six-item F-scale was included, using three items from the original F-scale and three "reverse-F" items. By reversing the scoring on the latter three items, and subtracting the total from the respondent's score on the three regular F items, a rough measure of agreeing response set was obtained.

[13] "The Social Dynamics of the Physician's Status," *Psychiatry*, VII (November, 1944), 372–77.

[14] "Social Status and the Ambivalence Hypothesis: Some Critical Notes and a Suggestion," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (August, 1960), 508–13.

tients is frequently tinged with latent hostility. Some appear to believe that the occurrence of hostility is a new and somewhat inexplicable phenomenon, in contrast to an earlier era when the beloved family doctor made his daily rounds surrounded by warmth, trust, and gratitude. Several things suggest that this picture is a caricature.

As Feldman points out, the "medical profession's public relations were never as glorious as they are sometimes made out to have been. There is evidence that many people were aware in the past that doctors' healing abilities were at best severely limited and that their ethics were not beyond reproach." He points to an unsystematic survey conducted in 1922 in which "doctors were described as rapacious, pompous, arrogant, inconsiderate, and so on . . . at a time when . . . the medical profession was supposedly accorded nothing but deification by a grateful populace."[15]

Paramedical cults and patent medicines are not contemporary in their origin and were employed over the expressed opposition of the physicians of the day. Many public health measures have met with resistance and many physicians who supported them were personally abused.[16] In short, if the image of the physician today combines prestige and hostility, there is no reason to think that the addition of hostility is a radically new development or that a general loss of esteem is suddenly under way.

Despite the existence of hostility to doctors, one should not lose sight of the generally high esteem in which the profession is held. Feldman, in reporting the results of a national survey, which included a number of items with negative stereotypes of physicians, concluded that, "by and large, the medical profession seems to come off quite well."[17] Similarly, Gaffin, in a study conducted for the American Medical Association, found that most people held their own doctors in very high esteem and were only slightly less favorable toward the medical profession as a whole.[18] In short, both admiration and hostility exist—and quite possibly they manage to coexist in the same person.

This indeed is the main fact we have to explain: *not* the existence of high prestige and high hostility as *separate* phenomena, but their failure to be inversely related and, indeed, the possibility that they are positively related. Why is it that the same people who are attracted by the prestige of an occupation are also especially critical of that occupation? To answer this question we must look for explanations that treat prestige and hostility as separate variables, but tied together in a psychologically meaningful way.[19] In the following discussion, several lines of explanation are offered as hypotheses. In one case some relevant evidence is available, but in the main these are suggestions for future investigation.

1. *Personal salience.*—Perhaps the medical profession is simply more salient for some people; feeling more intensely about it, they are quick to see *both* its good and its bad qualities. One obvious contributing factor of this kind would be an unusual concern over illness. The respondent pre-

[15] Feldman, *op. cit.*

[16] There are few data in this study, however, to support an interpretation of opposition to fluoridation as an expression of hostility to the medical and dental professions. Specifically, there is no correlation between either the Medical Hostility Scale or the ranking of physicians and position on fluoridation.

[17] Feldman, *op. cit.*

[18] Ben Gaffin and Associates, Inc., *What Americans Think of the Medical Profession* (Chicago: Ben Gaffin & Associates, Inc., 1955).

[19] It might seem at first that simple envy is an adequate explanation. Those who perceive doctors high in status, the argument would run, feel envy and deprecate them in other ways. However, this fails to explain why these envious people would rank doctors higher than do other people. Why, for example, do they not focus their envy on some other occupation in the same high status range?

Similarly, the fact that physicians differ in skill or treat patients of varying social backgrounds somewhat differently would explain why some people might be more favorable to the profession than others, but it would not explain the ambivalence.

occupied with thoughts of sickness, whether for realistic reasons or not, is apt to be acutely aware of both the doctor's powers and his limitations.

This hypothesis was tested by making use of another part of the interview schedule dealing with medical images. Early in the interview, respondents were shown a photograph of a physician examining an elderly man in the latter's living room. They were asked to describe what was happening in the picture. Responses were coded to obtain each respondent's "definition of the seriousness of the situation."

In terms of the saliency hypothesis, we would expect respondents who define the illness as most serious to rank physicians high and to have high hostility toward them. The latter relationship does occur ($P < .05$), but the former does not. Nor does the hostility-prestige relationship vary among those with different definitions of the seriousness of the situation.

It is possible, of course, that the salience of the physician's role for many individuals comes not from concern over illness itself, but rather from the resulting doctor-patient relationship and its emotional overtones. Feldman produces evidence that could support such an argument—those who have the most contact with physicians are likely to be most critical.[20] The physician, it may be noted, is a prime object of dependence, both because of his specialized knowledge and because of the additional incapacities of the patient. In a society with strong values of independence, manifestations of dependence are accompanied by guilt or shame among many persons. Individuals with conflict in this area might well emphasize the high prestige of physicians. At the same time, they might react with resentment as a way of handling personal anxieties aroused by their dependence on the skills of this occupational group.

2. *Conflicting cultural standards.*—A second line of investigation might well focus not on the respondent's personal relation to physicians but on his perception of norms governing the medical role. Cohn suggests that, in granting prestige to an occupational role, individuals make use of two conflicting types of criteria.[21] Both are important sources of prestige, and an occupation that ranks high on both, as physicians do, should have exceptionally high prestige. However, because of the conflicting nature of the standards, this high prestige should be relatively unstable and accompanied by ambivalence.

The first of these sets of standards, Cohn suggests, are "the criteria of invidious ranking (the stratification criteria), which in American Society are primarily related to money, occupation, and formal education." These are the standards of self-interest, of performance and worldly success, of self-orientation. The second set of standards, Cohn calls the "charismatic judgments," but they might more accurately be called the service criteria. They are directed at personal quality and are anti-stratification These are the standards of self-sacrifice and collectivity orientation. A banker may rank high on the first set of standards, a priest high on the second, but the physician seems to combine both.

It is important to note that there is conflict between these two sets of standards. Judged relative to other occupations on each set of criteria, the effect seems to be additive. But when applied *simultaneously* to a single role, both cannot be maximized. Thus, the observer must reconcile the picture of the dedicated and selfless healer devoted to the public welfare at considerable personal sacrifice with that of the wealthy and status-conscious sportscar owner organized in a trade association which helps to enforce "fair trade" through opposition to federally sponsored health programs. Both images have elements of truth, and ambivalence may well be the result.

3. *Occupational standards and role performance.*—This hypothesis is similar to the previous one except that it stresses not

[20] Feldman, *op. cit.*

[21] Cohn, *op. cit.*

the conflict between two sets of standards but between ideal standards and actual performance.

Thus, the physician's role is presented to the public as a rare combination of scientific intelligence and public service. Respondents who rank doctors first may do so because they particularly value such occupational ideals and see them embodied in the *normative definition* of the physician's role. On the other hand, respondents whose first choice is state governor or banker may be evaluating occupational prestige against a different backdrop of ideal standards, for example, the ability to maximize power or wealth. But note that in all these cases, the ranking is performed largely at the abstract level of normatively defined occupational roles, and the frame of reference is the relative one of comparing one occupation with another.

The items that make up the Medical Hostility Scale confront the respondent with a different frame of reference. In this case, he judges the actual performance of the physician. If his expectations regarding science and service are exalted, then he may well be especially critical of actions by physicians that would be accepted more casually by those who put less value on service criteria.

In short, the very standards that lead to high prestige may cause physicians to be judged against criteria that are exceedingly difficult to meet. The stronger a respondent feels about the importance of such standards the more he is likely to accord prestige to physicians as against other occupations but to judge physicians severely by these same standards: hence ambivalence of the type found here.[22]

It is a necessary part of the present hypothesis that doctors do indeed fail to a significant extent to live up to the normative definition of their role. We need not, however, decide whether this failure is, as Lee suggests, an inevitable result of impossible idealization of a role in which the incumbents are subject to normal human limitations[23] or is due simply to the mediocrity of the average doctor. The former view would stress the overidealized image against a reasonably adequate performance; the latter an inadequate performance against a reasonably attainable ideal. Either way a discrepancy is produced, with ambivalence as the likely result.

CONCLUSION

The high prestige of physicians in modern society has been documented by a number of studies in this country and elsewhere. It is frequently assumed that this prestige arises from the unique combination of science and public service that characterizes the physician's role. Because of this, it is easy to conclude that in the case of the physician (and possibly in the case of other "disinterested" professionals), people who grant high social standing to the role do so as part of a larger favorable image of it.

This paper has offered evidence and interpretations pointing in the opposite direction. The results pointing to a positive correlation between hostility and prestige are hardly decisive, but they are strong enough to present an interesting challenge to common-sense assumptions. Certainly, they cast strong doubt on the existence of an inverse relation between these two variables.

The argument and evidence have been restricted largely to the case of physicians. Other professional and high-status groups may share such ambivalence. Berger describes contradictory Egyptian attitudes to-

[22] The Medical Hostility item that shows the strongest positive relation to prestige is the following: "Doctors know a lot less about illness than they let on." The content of this item clearly represents a direct challenge to one of the main ideals of the doctor's performance, namely, his wise and trustworthy guidance in personal matters of great importance. The person who most values such wisdom in the abstract, we are suggesting, is the person most sensitive to failures in wisdom in concrete performance and most apt to censor such failure.

[23] *Op. cit.*

ward the civil service in similar terms: "Like other symbols of power, the public bureaucracy evokes fear, respect, opposition and even ridicule in mixtures. Many Egyptians speak of the high status of the government official, but disparage the man who values the shabby security of public employment."[24] As people in positions of high prestige have often sensed, the deference they receive may well be accompanied by an undercurrent of resentment, and physicians may not be immune from this mixed evaluation.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

[24] Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 90. The relation between favorable attitudes and high ranking may well vary depending on the characteristics of the particular occupation in question.

SOCIAL CLASS AND PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS: AN INTERPRETATION

MELVIN L. KOHN

ABSTRACT

The argument of this analysis is that class differences in parent-child relationships are a product of differences in parental values (with middle-class parents' values centering on self-direction and working-class parents' values on conformity to external proscriptions); these differences in values, in turn, stem from differences in the conditions of life of the various social classes (particularly occupational conditions—middle-class occupations requiring a greater degree of self-direction, working-class occupations, in larger measure, requiring that one follow explicit rules set down by someone in authority). Values, thus, form a bridge between social structure and behavior.

This essay is an attempt to interpret, from a sociological perspective, the effects of social class upon parent-child relationships. Many past discussions of the problem seem somehow to lack this perspective, even though the problem is one of profound importance for sociology. Because most investigators have approached the problem from an interest in psychodynamics, rather than social structure, they have largely limited their attention to a few specific techniques used by mothers in the rearing of infants and very young children. They have discovered, *inter alia,* that social class has a decided bearing on which techniques parents use. But, since they have come at the problem from this perspective, their interest in social class has not gone beyond its effects for this very limited aspect of parent-child relationships.

The present analysis conceives the problem of social class and parent-child relationships as an instance of the more general problem of the effects of social structure upon behavior. It starts with the assumption that social class has proved to be so useful a concept because it refers to more than simply educational level, or occupation, or any of the large number of correlated variables. It is so useful because it captures the reality that the intricate interplay of all these variables creates different basic conditions of life at different levels of the social order. Members of different social classes, by virtue of enjoying (or suffering) different conditions of life, come to see the world differently—to develop different conceptions of social reality, different aspirations and hopes and fears, different conceptions of the desirable.

The last is particularly important for present purposes, for from people's conceptions of the desirable—and particularly from their conceptions of what characteristics are desirable in children—one can discern their objectives in child-rearing. Thus, conceptions of the desirable—that is, values[1]—become the key concept for this analysis, the bridge between position in the larger social structure and the behavior of the individual. The intent of the analysis is to trace the effects of social class position on parental values and the effects of values on behavior.

Since this approach differs from analyses focused on social class differences in the use of particular child-rearing techniques,

[1] "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations," in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), *Toward A General Theory of Action* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951], p. 395). See also the discussion of values in Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951), chap. xi, and his discussion of social class and culture on p. 101.

it will be necessary to re-examine earlier formulations from the present perspective. Then three questions will be discussed, bringing into consideration the limited available data that are relevant: What differences are there in the values held by parents of different social classes? What is there about the conditions of life distinctive of these classes that might explain the differences in their values? What consequences do these differences in values have for parents' relationships with their children?

SOCIAL CLASS

Social classes will be defined as aggregates of individuals who occupy broadly similar positions in the scale of prestige.[2] In dealing with the research literature, we shall treat occupational position (or occupational position as weighted somewhat by education) as a serviceable index of social class for urban American society. And we shall adopt the model of social stratification implicit in most research, that of four relatively discrete classes: a "lower class" of unskilled manual workers, a "working class" of manual workers in semiskilled and skilled occupations, a "middle class" of white-collar workers and professionals, and an "elite," differentiated from the middle class not so much in terms of occupation as of wealth and lineage.

Almost all the empirical evidence, including that from our own research, stems from broad comparisons of the middle and working class. Thus we shall have little to say about the extremes of the class distribution. Furthermore, we shall have to act as if the middle and working classes were each homogeneous. They are not, even in terms of status considerations alone. There is evidence, for example, that within each broad social class, variations in parents' values quite regularly parallel gradations of social status. Moreover, the classes are heterogeneous with respect to other factors that affect parents' values, such as religion and ethnicity. But even when all such considerations are taken into account, th empirical evidence clearly shows that bein on one side or the other of the line th divides manual from non-manual worke has profound consequences for how on rears one's children.[3]

STABILITY AND CHANGE

Any analysis of the effects of social clas upon parent-child relationships should sta with Urie Bronfenbrenner's analytic revie of the studies that had been conducted i this country during the twenty-five yea up to 1958.[4] From the seemingly contradi tory findings of a number of studies, Bro fenbrenner discerned not chaos but orderl change: there have been changes in th child-training techniques employed by mid dle-class parents in the past quarter-cen tury; similar changes have been takin place in the working class, but working class parents have consistently lagged be hind by a few years; thus, while middle class parents of twenty-five years ago wer more "restrictive" than were working-clas parents, today the middle-class parents ar more "permissive"; and the gap betwee the classes seems to be narrowing.

It must be noted that these conclusion are limited by the questions Bronfenbren ner's predecessors asked in their researcl The studies deal largely with a few par

[2] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[3] These, and other assertions of fact not referre to published sources, are based on research my co leagues and I have conducted. For the design c this research and the principal substantive finding see my "Social Class and Parental Values," *Ameri can Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (January, 1959) 337–51; my "Social Class and the Exercise c Parental Authority," *American Sociological Re view*, XXIV (June, 1959), 352–66; and wit Eleanor E. Carroll, "Social Class and the Allc cation of Parental Responsibilities," *Sociometr* XXIII (December, 1960), 372–92. I should lik to express my appreciation to my principal col laborators in this research, John A. Clausen an Eleanor E. Carroll.

[4] Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Soci Class through Time and Space," in Eleanor E. Mac coby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene I Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psycholog* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958).

icular techniques of child-rearing, especially those involved in caring for infants and very young children, and say very little about parents' over-all relationships with their children, particularly as the children grow older. There is clear evidence that the past quarter-century has seen change, even faddism, with respect to the use of breast-feeding or bottle-feeding, scheduling or not scheduling, spanking or isolating. But when we generalize from these specifics to talk of a change from "restrictive" to "permissive" practices—or, worse yet, of a change from "restrictive" to "permissive" parent-child relationships—we impute to them a far greater importance than they probably have, either to parents or to children.[5]

There is no evidence that recent faddism in child-training techniques is symptomatic of profound changes in the relations of parents to children in either social class. In fact, as Bronfenbrenner notes, what little evidence we do have points in the opposite direction: the over-all quality of parent-child relationships does not seem to have changed substantially in either class.[6] In all probability, parents have changed techniques in service of much the same values, and the changes have been quite specific. These changes must be explained, but the enduring characteristics are probably even more important.

Why the changes? Bronfenbrenner's interpretation is ingenuously simple. He notes that the changes in techniques employed by middle-class parents have closely paralleled those advocated by presumed experts, and he concludes that middle-class parents have changed their practices *because* they are responsive to changes in what the experts tell them is right and proper. Working-class parents, being less educated and thus less directly responsive to the media of communication, followed behind only later.[7]

Bronfenbrenner is almost undoubtedly right in asserting that middle-class parents have followed the drift of presumably expert opinion. But why have they done so? It is not sufficient to assume that the explanation lies in their greater degree of education. This might explain why middle-class parents are substantially more likely than are working-class parents to *read* books and articles on child-rearing, as we know they do.[8] But they need not *follow* the experts' advice. We know from various studies of the mass media that people generally search for confirmation of their existing beliefs and practices and tend to ignore what contradicts them.

From all the evidence at our disposal, it looks as if middle-class parents not only read what the experts have to say but also search out a wide variety of other sources of information and advice: they are far more likely than are working-class parents to discuss child-rearing with friends and neighbors, to consult physicians on these matters, to attend Parent-Teacher Association meetings, to discuss the child's behavior with his teacher. Middle-class parents seem to regard child-rearing as more problematic than do working-class parents. This can hardly be a matter of education alone. It must be rooted more deeply in the conditions of life of the two social classes.

[5] Furthermore, these concepts employ a priori judgments about which the various investigators have disagreed radically. See, e.g., Robert R. Sears, Eleanor E Maccoby, and Harry Levin, *Patterns of Child Rearing* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957), pp. 444–47, and Richard A. Littman, Robert C. A. Moore, and John Pierce-Jones, "Social Class Differences in Child Rearing: A Third Community for Comparison with Chicago and Newton," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (December, 1957), 694–704, esp. p. 703.

[6] Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*, pp. 420–22 and 425.

[7] Bronfenbrenner gives clearest expression to this interpretation, but it has been adopted by others, too. See, e.g., Martha Sturm White, "Social Class, Child-Rearing Practices, and Child Behavior," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (December, 1957), 704–12.

[8] This was noted by John E. Anderson in the first major study of social class and family relationships ever conducted, and has repeatedly been confirmed (*The Young Child in the Home: A Survey of Three Thousand American Families* [New York: Appleton-Century, 1936]).

Everything about working-class parents' lives—their comparative lack of education, the nature of their jobs, their greater attachment to the extended family—conduces to their retaining familiar methods.[9] Furthermore, even should they be receptive to change, they are less likely than are middle-class parents to find the experts' writings appropriate to their wants, for the experts predicate their advice on middle-class values. Everything about middle-class parents' lives, on the other hand, conduces to their looking for new methods to achieve their goals. They look to the experts, to other sources of relevant information, and to each other not for new values but for more serviceable techniques.[10] And within the limits of our present scanty knowledge about means-ends relationships in child-rearing, the experts have provided practical and useful advice. It is not that educated parents slavishly follow the experts but that the experts have provided what the parents have sought.

To look at the question this way is to put it in a quite different perspective: the focus becomes not specific techniques nor changes in the use of specific techniques but parental values.

[9] The differences between middle- and working-class conditions of life will be discussed more fully later in this paper.

[10] Certainly middle-class parents do not get their values from the experts. In our research, we compared the values of parents who say they read Spock, Gesell, or other books on child-rearing, to those who read only magazine and newspaper articles, and those who say they read nothing at all on the subject. In the middle class, these three groups have substantially the same values. In the working class, the story is different. Few working-class parents claim to read books or even articles on child-rearing. Those few who do have values much more akin to those of the middle class. But these are atypical working-class parents who are very anxious to attain middle-class status. One suspects that for them the experts provide a sort of handbook to the middle class; even for them, it is unlikely that the values come out of Spock and Gesell.

VALUES OF MIDDLE- AND WORKING-CLASS PARENTS

Of the entire range of values one might examine, it seems particularly strategic to focus on parents' conceptions of what characteristics would be most desirable for boys or girls the age of their own children. From this one can hope to discern the parents' goals in rearing their children. It must be assumed, however, that a parent will choose one characteristic as more desirable than another only if he considers it to be both important, in the sense that failure to develop this characteristic would affect the child adversely, and problematic, in the sense that it is neither to be taken for granted that the child will develop that characteristic nor impossible for him to do so. In interpreting parents' value choices, we must keep in mind that their choices reflect not simply their goals but the goals whose achievement they regard as problematic.

Few studies, even in recent years, have directly investigated the relationship of social class to parental values. Fortunately, however, the results of these few are in essential agreement. The earliest study was Evelyn Millis Duvall's pioneering inquiry of 1946.[11] Duvall characterized working-class (and lower middle-class) parental values as "traditional"—they want their children to be neat and clean, to obey and respect adults, to please adults. In contrast to this emphasis on how the child comports himself, middle-class parental values are more "developmental"—they want their children to be eager to learn, to love and confide in the parents, to be happy, to share and co-operate, to be healthy and well.

Duvall's traditional-developmental dichotomy does not describe the difference between middle- and working-class parental values quite exactly, but it does point to the essence of the difference: working-class parents want the child to conform to externally imposed standards, while middle-class

[11] "Conceptions of Parenthood," *American Journal of Sociology*, LII (November, 1946), 193–203.

parents are far more attentive to his internal dynamics.

The few relevant findings of subsequent studies are entirely consistent with this basic point, especially in the repeated indications that working-class parents put far greater stress on obedience to parental commands than do middle-class parents.[12] Our own research, conducted in 1956–57, provides the evidence most directly comparable to Duvall's.[13] We, too, found that working-class parents value obedience, neatness, and cleanliness more highly than do middle-class parents, and that middle-class parents in turn value curiosity, happiness, consideration, and—most importantly—self-control more highly than do working-class parents. We further found that there are characteristic clusters of value choice in the two social classes: working-class parental values center on conformity to external proscriptions, middle-class parental values on *self*-direction. To working-class parents, it is the overt act that matters: the child should not transgress externally imposed rules; to middle-class parents, it is the child's motives and feelings that matter: the child should govern himself.

In fairness, it should be noted that middle- and working-class parents share many core values. Both, for example, value honesty very highly—although, characteristically, "honesty" has rather different connotations in the two social classes, implying "trustworthiness" for the working-class and "truthfulness" for the middle-class. The common theme, of course, is that parents of both social classes value a decent respect for the rights of others; middle- and working-class values are but variations on this common theme. The reason for emphasizing the variations rather than the common theme is that they seem to have far-ranging consequences for parents' relationships with their children and thus ought to be taken seriously.

It would be good if there were more evidence about parental values—data from other studies, in other locales, and especially, data derived from more than one mode of inquiry. But, what evidence we do have is consistent, so that there is at least some basis for believing it is reliable. Furthermore, there is evidence that the value choices made by parents in these inquiries are not simply a reflection of their assessments of their own children's deficiencies or excellences. Thus, we may take the findings of these studies as providing a limited, but probably valid, picture of the parents' generalized conceptions of what behavior would be desirable in their preadolescent children.

EXPLAINING CLASS DIFFERENCES IN PARENTAL VALUES

That middle-class parents are more likely to espouse some values, and working-class parents other values, must be a function of differences in their conditions of life. In the present state of our knowledge, it is difficult to disentangle the interacting variables with a sufficient degree of exactness to ascertain which conditions of life are crucial to the differences in values. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the principal components of class differences in life conditions to see what each may contribute.

The logical place to begin is with occupational differences, for these are certainly pre-eminently important, not only in defining social classes in urban, industrialized society, but also in determining much else about people's life conditions.[14] There are at least three respects in which middle-class occupations typically differ from working-

[12] Alex Inkeles has shown that this is true not only for the United States but for a number of other industrialized societies as well ("Industrial Man. The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception, and Value," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (July, 1960), 20–21 and Table 9.)

[13] "Social Class and Parental Values," *op. cit.*

[14] For a thoughtful discussion of the influence of occupational role on parental values see David F. Aberle and Kaspar D. Naegele, "Middle Class Fathers' Occupational Role and Attitudes Toward Children," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XXII (April, 1952), 366–78.

class occupations, above and beyond their obvious status-linked differences in security, stability of income, and general social prestige. One is that middle-class occupations deal more with the manipulation of interpersonal relations, ideas, and symbols, while working-class occupations deal more with the manipulation of things. The second is that middle-class occupations are more subject to self-direction, while working-class occupations are more subject to standardization and direct supervision. The third is that getting ahead in middle-class occupations is more dependent upon one's own actions, while in working-class occupations it is more dependent upon collective action, particularly in unionized industries. From these differences, one can sketch differences in the characteristics that make for getting along, and getting ahead, in middle- and working-class occupations. Middle-class occupations require a greater degree of self-direction; working-class occupations, in larger measure, require that one follow explicit rules set down by someone in authority.

Obviously, these differences parallel the differences we have found between the two social classes in the characteristics valued by parents for children. At minimum, one can conclude that there is a congruence between occupational requirements and parental values. It is, moreover, a reasonable supposition, although not a necessary conclusion, that middle- and working-class parents value different characteristics in children *because* of these differences in their occupational circumstances. This supposition does not necessarily assume that parents consciously train their children to meet future occupational requirements; it may simply be that their own occupational experiences have significantly affected parents' conceptions of what is desirable behavior, on or off the job, for adults or for children.[15]

These differences in occupational circumstances are probably basic to the differences we have found between middle- and working-class parental values, but taken alone they do not sufficiently explain them. Parents need not accord pre-eminent importance to occupational requirements in their judgments of what is most desirable. For a sufficient explanation of class differences in values, it is necessary to recognize that other differences in middle- and working-class conditions of life reinforce the differences in occupational circumstances at every turn.

Educational differences, for example, above and beyond their importance as determinants of occupation, probably contribute independently to the differences in middle- and working-class parental values. At minimum, middle-class parents' greater attention to the child's internal dynamics is facilitated by their learned ability to deal with the subjective and the ideational. Furthermore, differences in levels and stability of income undoubtedly contribute to class differences in parental values. That middle-class parents still have somewhat higher levels of income, and much greater stability

[15] Two objections might be raised here. (1) Occupational experiences may not be important for a mother's values, however crucial they are for her husband's, if she has had little or no work experience. But even those mothers who have had little or no occupational experience know something of occupational life from their husbands and others, and live in a culture in which occupation and career permeate all of life. (2) Parental values may be built not so much out of their own experiences as out of their expectations of the child's future experiences. This might seem particularly plausible in explaining working-class values, for their high valuation of such stereotypically *middle-class* characteristics as obedience, neatness, and cleanliness might imply that they are training their children for a middle-class life they expect the children to achieve. Few working-class parents, however, do expect (or even want) their children to go on to college and the middle-class jobs for which a college education is required (This is shown in Herbert H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes: A Social Psychological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset [eds.], *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification* [Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1953], and confirmed in unpublished data from our own research.)

of income, makes them able to take for granted the respectability that is still problematic for working-class parents. They can afford to concentrate, instead, on motives and feelings—which, in the circumstances of their lives, are more important.

These considerations suggest that the differences between middle- and working-class parental values are probably a function of the entire complex of differences in life conditions characteristic of the two social classes. Consider, for example, the working-class situation. With the end of mass immigration, there has emerged a stable working class, largely derived from the manpower of rural areas, uninterested in mobility into the middle class, but very much interested in security, respectability, and the enjoyment of a decent standard of living.[16] This working class has come to enjoy a standard of living formerly reserved for the middle class, but has not chosen a middle-class style of life. In effect, the working class has striven for, and partially achieved, an American dream distinctly different from the dream of success and achievement. In an affluent society, it is possible for the worker to be the traditionalist—politically, economically, and, most relevant here, in his values for his children.[17] Working-class parents want their children to conform to external authority because the parents themselves are willing to accord respect to authority, in return for security and respectability. Their conservatism in child-rearing is part of a more general conservatism and traditionalism.

Middle-class parental values are a product of a quite different set of conditions. Much of what the working class values, they can take for granted. Instead, they can—and must—instil in their children a degree of self-direction that would be less appropriate to the conditions of life of the working class.[18] Certainly, there is substantial truth in the characterization of the middle-class way of life as one of great conformity. What must be noted here, however, is that *relative to* the working class, middle-class conditions of life require a more substantial degree of independence of action. Furthermore, the higher levels of education enjoyed by the middle class make possible a degree of internal scrutiny difficult to achieve without the skills in dealing with the abstract that college training sometimes provides. Finally, the economic security of most middle-class occupations, the level of income they provide, the status they confer, allow one to focus his attention on the subjective and the ideational. Middle-class conditions of life both allow and demand a greater degree of self-direction than do those of the working class.

CONSEQUENCES OF CLASS DIFFERENCES IN PARENTS' VALUES

What consequences do the differences between middle- and working-class parents'

[16] See, e.g., S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, "The Working Class Subculture: A New View," *Social Problems*, IX (Summer, 1961), 86–97.

[17] Relevant here is Seymour Martin Lipset's somewhat disillusioned "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (August, 1959), 482–501.

[18] It has been argued that as larger and larger proportions of the middle class have become imbedded in a bureaucratic way of life—in distinction to the entrepreneurial way of life of a bygone day—it has become more appropriate to raise children to be accommodative than to be self-reliant. But this point of view is a misreading of the conditions of life faced by the middle-class inhabitants of the bureaucratic world. Their jobs require at least as great a degree of self-reliance as do entrepreneurial enterprises. We tend to forget, nowadays, just how little the small- or medium-sized entrepreneur controlled the conditions of his own existence and just how much he was subjected to the petty authority of those on whose pleasure depended the survival of his enterprise. And we fail to recognize the degree to which monolithic-seeming bureaucracies allow free play for—in fact, require—individual enterprise of new sorts: in the creation of ideas, the building of empires, the competition for advancement.

At any rate, our data show no substantial differences between the values of parents from bureaucratic and enterpreneurial occupational worlds, in either social class. But see Daniel R. Miller and

values have for the ways they raise their children?

Much of the research on techniques of infant- and child-training is of little relevance here. For example, with regard to parents' preferred techniques for disciplining children, a question of major interest to many investigators, Bronfenbrenner summarizes past studies as follows: "In matters of discipline, working-class parents are consistently more likely to employ physical punishment, while middle-class families rely more on reasoning, isolation, appeals to guilt, and other methods involving the threat of loss of love."[19] This, if still true,[20] is consistent with middle-class parents' greater attentiveness to the child's internal dynamics, working-class parents' greater concern about the overt act. For present purposes, however, the crucial question is not *which* disciplinary method parents prefer, but when and why they use one or another method of discipline.

The most directly relevant available data are on the conditions under which middle- and working-class parents use physical punishment. Working-class parents are apt to resort to physical punishment when the direct and immediate consequences of their children's disobedient acts are most extreme, and to refrain from punishing when this might provoke an even greater disturbance.[21] Thus, they will punish a child for wild play when the furniture is damaged or the noise level becomes intolerable, but ignore the same actions when the direct and immediate consequences are not so extreme. Middle-class parents, on the other hand, seem to punish or refrain from punishing on the basis of their interpretation of the child's intent in acting as he does. Thus, they will punish a furious outburst when the context is such that they interpret it to be a loss of self-control, but will ignore an equally extreme outburst when the context is such that they interpret it to be merely an emotional release.

It is understandable that working-class parents react to the consequences rather than to the intent of their children's actions: the important thing is that the child not transgress externally imposed rules. Correspondingly, if middle-class parents are instead concerned about the child's motives and feelings, they can and must look beyond the overt act to why the child acts as he does. It would seem that middle- and working-class values direct parents to see their children's misbehavior in quite different ways, so that misbehavior which prompts middle-class parents to action does not seem as important to working-class parents, and vice versa.[22] Obviously, parents' values are not the only things that enter into their use of physical punishment. But unless one assumes a complete lack of goal-directedness in parental behavior, he would have to grant that parents' values direct their attention to some facets of their own and their children's behavior, and divert it from other facets.

The consequences of class differences in parental values extend far beyond differences in disciplinary practices. From a knowledge of their values for their children, one would expect middle-class parents to feel a greater obligation to be *supportive* of the children, if only because of their sensitivity to the children's internal dynamics. Working-class values, with their emphasis upon conformity to external rules, should lead to greater emphasis upon the parents' obligation to impose constraints.[23]

Guy E. Swanson, *The Changing American Parent: A Study in the Detroit Area* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

[19] Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

[20] Later studies, including our own, do not show this difference.

[21] "Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority," *op. cit.*

[22] This is not to say that the methods used by parents of either social class are necessarily the most efficacious for achievement of their goals.

[23] The justification for treating support and constraint as the two major dimensions of parent-child relationships lies in the theoretical argument of Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, *Family,*

And this, according to Bronfenbrenner, is precisely what has been shown in those few studies that have concerned themselves with the over-all relationship of parents to child: "Over the entire twenty-five-year period studied, parent-child relationships in the middle-class are consistently reported as more acceptant and equalitarian, while those in the working-class are oriented toward maintaining order and obedience."[24]

This conclusion is based primarily on studies of *mother*-child relationships in middle- and working-class families. Class differences in parental values have further ramifications for the father's role.[25] Mothers in each class would have their husbands play a role facilitative of the child's development of the characteristics valued in that class: Middle-class mothers want their husbands to be supportive of the children (especially of sons), with their responsibility for imposing constraints being of decidedly secondary importance; working-class mothers look to their husbands to be considerably more directive—support is accorded far less importance and constraint far more. Most middle-class fathers agree with their wives and play a role close to what their wives would have them play. Many working-class fathers, on the other hand, do not. It is not that they see the constraining role as less important than do their wives, but that many of them see no reason why they should have to shoulder the responsibility. From their point of view, the important thing is that the child be taught what limits he must not transgress. It does not much matter who does the teaching, and since mother has primary responsibility for child care, the job should be hers.

The net consequence is a quite different division of parental responsibilities in the two social classes. In middle-class families, mother's and father's roles usually are not sharply differentiated. What differentiation exists is largely a matter of each parent taking special responsibility for being supportive of children of the parent's own sex. In working-class families, mother's and father's roles are more sharply differentiated, with mother almost always being the more supportive parent. In some working-class families, mother specializes in support, father in constraint; in others, perhaps in most, mother raises the children, father provides the wherewithal.[26]

Thus, the differences in middle- and working-class parents' values have wide ramifications for their relationships with their children and with each other. Of course, many class differences in parent-child relationships are not directly attributable to differences in values; undoubtedly the very differences in their conditions of life that make for differences in parental values reinforce, at every juncture, parents' characteristic ways of relating to their children. But one could not account for these consistent differences in parent-child relationships in the two social classes without reference to the differences in parents' avowed values.

Socialization and Interaction Process (Glencoe, Ill Free Press, 1955), esp. p. 45, and the empirical argument of Earl S. Schaefer, "A Circumplex Model for Maternal Behavior," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* LIX (September, 1959), 226–34.

[24] Bronfenbrenner, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

[25] From the very limited evidence available at the time of his review, Bronfenbrenner tentatively concluded: "though the middle-class father typically has a warmer relationship with the child, he is also likely to have more authority and status in family affairs" (*ibid.*, p. 422). The discussion here is based largely on subsequent research, esp. "Social Class and the Allocation of Parental Responsibilities," *op. cit.*

[26] Fragmentary data suggest sharp class differences in the husband-wife relationship that complement the differences in the division of parental responsibilities discussed above. For example, virtually no working-class wife reports that she and her husband ever go out on an evening or weekend without the children. And few working-class fathers do much to relieve their wives of the burden of caring for the children all the time. By and large, working-class fathers seem to lead a largely separate social life from that of their wives; the wife has full-time responsibility for the children, while the husband is free to go his own way.

CONCLUSION

This paper serves to show how complex and demanding are the problems of interpreting the effects of social structure on behavior. Our inquiries habitually stop at the point of demonstrating that social position correlates with something, when we should want to pursue the question, "Why?" What are the processes by which position in social structure molds behavior? The present analysis has dealt with this question in one specific form: Why does social class matter for parents' relationships with their children? There is every reason to believe that the problems encountered in trying to deal with that question would recur in any analysis of the effects of social structure on behavior.

In this analysis, the concept of "values" has been used as the principal bridge from social position to behavior. The analysis has endeavored to show that middle-class parental values differ from those of working-class parents; that these differences are rooted in basic differences between middle- and working-class conditions of life; and that the differences between middle- and working-class parental values have important consequences for their relationships with their children. The interpretive model, in essence, is: social class—conditions of life—values—behavior.

The specifics of the present characterization of parental values may prove to be inexact; the discussion of the ways in which social class position affects values is undoubtedly partial; and the tracing of the consequences of differences in values for differences in parent-child relationships is certainly tentative and incomplete. I trust, however, that the perspective will prove to be valid and that this formulation will stimulate other investigators to deal more directly with the processes whereby social structure affects behavior.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH

RESEARCH NOTE

A FORMALIZED THEORY OF THE SELF-CONCEPT

In recent years many sociologists have ecome concerned with the relation between ie research process and existing theory. 'he use of formal mathematical models to nhance this relationship has not proved ompletely satisfactory. In this note we disuss the use of a type of formalization[1] 'hich has many of the advantages of the iathematical model, yet at the same time iaintains some of the values of the more ubjective theoretical approach with which re are familiar in sociology. The interacionist notions about the self-concept will e used to exemplify what is involved in his type of formalization. The strategy is ery simple: First, we scrutinize the theory o search out what seem to be its basic ropositions and make these postulates exlicit; second, the variables or concepts are lentified and carefully defined; third, all nterrelationships between the variables hat can be derived from the basic postuates are considered. We will use those rules f logic which are part of ordinary language ather than the rules of mathematics. Finaly, after the formalized theory has been exlicated, we can consider the conditions inder which each of the basic postulates vill be expected to hold. Let us now proeed by stating the formalized theory of the self-concept, considering an example of its application, and finally evaluating this approach as a method of handling theory.

THE SELF-CONCEPT

The interactionist notions about the self-concept, based on the writings of G. Mead, Cooley, and several others, are well known to social psychologists. The theory attempts to explain the conception that the individual has of himself in terms of his interaction with those about him.

Although there have been a variety of words used in describing what is meant by an individual's conception of himself, it appears that general agreement could be reached on the following definition: *The self-concept is that organization of qualities that the individual attributes to himself.* It should be understood that the word "qualities" is used in a broad sense to include both *attributes* that the individual might express in terms of adjectives (ambitious, intelligent) and also the *roles* he sees himself in (father, doctor, etc.).[2]

The general theory.—In very general terms the basic notions of the theory can be stated in one sentence: *The individual's conception of himself emerges from social interaction and, in turn, guides or influences the behavior of that individual.*

BASIC PROPOSITIONS OF FORMALIZED THEORY OF SELF-CONCEPT

The following statements are at least implicit in most treatments of the self-concept

[1] Terminology is always a problem in this area. ome have talked about axiomatic theories, some bout formal theories. We prefer the term "fornalized theory" because it connotes a process of lealing with existing theory which is our concern. lso, one finds several words used in the literature o refer to the statements of a theory; words like ostulates, propositions, axioms, theorems, and hyotheses. Here we will use the word "proposition" o refer to any statement which involves an emirical claim. Those propositions which the theory tarts with we have called basic "postulates." Statenents which are used to define a concept will be eferred to simply as "definitions."

[2] The language used in this definition comes mainly from Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), 223–58.

using this tradition and will be used as the basic postulates of our formalized theory.

1. The individual's self-concept is based on his perception of the way others are responding to him.
2. The individual's self-concept functions to direct his behavior.
3. The individual's perception of the responses of others toward him reflects the actual responses of others toward him.

(These postulates are not expected to hold under all conditions: The formalization procedure described below allows us to consider under what conditions they will hold.)

These three statements make up the postulates of the theory. The reason for this selection will become apparent later. Within these propositions there are four basic concepts or variables:

1. The individual's self-concept (S). (Defined above.)
2. His perception of the responses of others toward him (P). (The response of the individual to those behaviors of others that he perceives as directed toward him.)
3. The actual responses of others toward him (A). (The actual behavior of the others, that is, in response to the individual.)
4. His behavior (B). (The activity of the individual relevant to the social situation.)

At this point it is possible to see the first advantage from our formalized theory. By the use of simple logic we may take the three basic propositions and deduce from them three more. For example, from postulates 1 and 2 we can conclude that the way an individual perceives the response of others toward him will influence his behavior, for if his perception determines his self-concept and his self-concept guides his behavior, then his perception will determine his behavior. In symbolic form,

if $P \rightarrow S$	postulate 1
and $S \rightarrow B$	postulate 2
then $P \rightarrow B$	proposition 4

Therefore, the fourth proposition of the theory (call it a derived proposition) is:

4. The way the individual perceives the responses of others toward him will influence his behavior.

In like manner from postulates 1 and 3 we deduce a fifth proposition:

5. The actual responses of others to the individual will determine the way he sees himself (his self-concept).

And, finally, by combining either propositions 5 and 2, or 3 and 4 we get the sixth proposition:

6. The actual responses of others toward the individual will effect the behavior of the individual.

Our theory so far can be summarized in the following statement: The actual responses of others to the individual will be important in determining how the individual will perceive himself; this perception will influence his self-conception which, in turn, will guide his behavior. Symbolically,

$$A \rightarrow P \rightarrow S \rightarrow B \qquad \rightarrow = \text{"leads to"}$$

Before proceeding further into the analysis of the theory let us consider a short anecdote to clarify what we have said so far. The following story is alleged by some to be true; however, the present author has no confirmation of this and the story is presented only as a helpful device to make a point.


A group of graduate students in a seminar in social psychology became interested in the notions implied in the interactionist approach. One evening after the seminar five of the male members of the group were discussing some of the implications of the theory and came to the realization that it might be possible to invent a situation where the "others" systematically manipulated their responses to another person, thereby changing that person's self-concept and in turn his behavior. They thought of an experiment to test the notions they were dealing with. They chose as their subject (victim) the one girl in their seminar. The subject can be described as, at best, a very plain girl who seemed to fit the stereotype (usually erroneous) that many have of graduate student females. The boys' plan was to begin in concert to respond to the girl as if she were the best-looking girl on campus. They agreed to work

into it naturally so that she would not be aware of what they were up to. They drew lots to see who would be the first to date her. The loser, under the pressure of the others, asked her to go out. Although he found the situation quite unpleasant, he was a good actor and by continually saying to himself "she's beautiful, she's beautiful . . ." he got through the evening. According to the agreement it was now the second man's turn and so it went. The dates were reinforced by the similar responses in all contacts the men had with the girl. In a matter of a few short weeks the results began to show. At first it was simply a matter of more care in her appearance; her hair was combed more often and her dresses were more neatly pressed, but before long she had been to the beauty parlor to have her hair styled, and was spending her hard-earned money on the latest fashions in women's campus wear. By the time the fourth man was taking his turn dating the young lady, the job that had once been undesirable was now quite a pleasant task. And when the last man in the conspiracy asked her out, he was informed that she was pretty well booked up for some time in the future. It seems there were more desirable males around than those "plain" graduate students.

Our story suggests that the girl perceived the actual response of others (the men) in such a way as to require a change in her self-concept which in turn eventually changed her behavior. So their behavior influenced hers. However, the story brings to light another proposition that has so far been overlooked. At the end of the experiment we saw that the men's responses to the girl's behavior had changed, and they were now reacting to her as a desirable young lady. A new postulate then would be:

7 The behavior that the individual manifests influences the actual responses of others toward that individual.

We are not dealing with any new variables but rather with a new combination of the old ones. The theory at this point becomes circular:



It will be noted that with the addition of this new postulate a whole new set of derived propositions emerge. There are now sixteen interrelated propositions in our simple theory which has only four variables. Rather than laboriously listing these propositions, let us now consider some of the factors which modify one of the propositions.

It is apparent that as the theory now stands it has not gone far enough in explaining the phenomena under consideration, and it might prove misleading if left as is. The major problem lies in the fact that the propositions are presented as if there was a one-to-one relationship between the variables dealt with. It is obvious that in reality these propositions hold only in varying degrees under certain conditions. To illustrate the type of thing that might be done, we will briefly consider the conditions under which we would expect proposition 3 to hold.

This postulate states that the individual's perception of the responses of others toward him reflects the actual responses of others. We have a rather generous supply of evidence relating to the accuracy of this postulate: Studies of role-taking ability have, almost without exception, operationally defined role-taking ability in terms of the relationship between the individual's perception of the responses of others and the actual responses. *The evidence seems to suggest that the accuracy of postulate 3 varies with (1) the individual's familiarity with the others, (2) his familiarity with the situation, (3) the social visibility*[8] *of the situation, (4) the individual's past experience in interpersonal situations, and (5) other factors which relate to all types of perception (condition of body, immediate*

[8] Here we are using Merton's definition of "visibility": "the extent to which the structure of a social organization provides occasion to those variously located in that structure to perceive the norms obtaining in the organization and the character of role-performance by those manning the organization. In reference to an attribute of social structure, not to the perceptions which individuals happen to have" see Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), p. 350.

past, etc.). Briefly, what this proposition says is that the more familiar the individual is with the situation and the others in the situation, the more socially visible the situation is, the more experience the individual has had in interpersonal situations and the less interference there is from irrelevant conditions, the more likely it is that postulate 3 will hold.

EVALUATION

With the formalized statement of the basic postulates and derived propositions of the theory and an example of how the postulates must be conditioned, it is now possible to evaluate, at least to some extent, the usefulness of this method of dealing with theory in the social sciences. The following evaluation will be concerned primarily with the advantages and disadvantages of this approach over the informal, unsystematic approaches usually used in sociology. The advantages seen in this approach are listed below. No rank order is implied.

1. *The formalized theory offers the most parsimonious summary of anticipated or actual research findings.*[4] By designing our research so that we test four postulates of our theory and by the use of logical deductions we obtain support for sixteen propositions by testing only the four. Although this is an obvious virtue of the formalized theory, our modifying propositions make it clear that it must be taken with a certain degree of caution. Hypothesis-testing in sociology is such that the confirmation of propositions 1 and 2 at a certain level will not necessarily mean that proposition 4 can be stated at the same level of significance. Zetterberg cautions, "it is at present desirable that we in sociological research do not claim too much from the transfer of probability since our deductions are not too precise so long as our concepts are defined in normal prose and the deduction rules of ordinary language are used."[5] Even with some awareness of the factors which modify the postulates, words like "guides," "directs," and "influences" cannot be translated into rigorous mathematical operations.

   Zetterberg also points out another type of parsimony seen by comparing the results of sixteen isolated hypotheses (say, sixteen different investigators testing each of our propositions) with sixteen interrelated hypotheses (say, the same investigator does all the research using our theory.)[6] It is obvious that the same data will provide more confirmation with the systematic theory than with the isolated hypotheses.
2. *The formalized theory will make the present knowledge on the subject accumulative and point to gaps if they exist.* The theory provides a way of bringing together the evidence that has emerged on the subject of the self. For example, we find that there is a good bit of evidence accumulating on the relationship between perception and the self-concept, and there is some evidence on the actual responses of others as these responses relate to perception and self-concepts.[7] However, very little has been done in relating the self-concept of a person to his behavior.[8]
3. *The formalized theory requires a clear distinction between statements that define the concepts of the theory and statements that are empirical propositions.* Careless writers on the topic of the self have often used a definition such as: "The self is defined as

[4] Here we borrow extensively from Hans Zetterberg's discussions of axiomatic theory (*On Theory and Verification in Sociology* [New York: Tressler Press, 1954], pp. 16–28).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[7] There are a great number of articles on this topic. The following is only a sample: Leo G. Reeder, George Donohoe, and Arturo Biblarz, "Conception of Self and Others," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI, No. 2 (September, 1956), 153–59; S. Frank Miyamoto and Sanford Dornbusch, "A Test of the Symbolic Interactionist Hypothesis of Self-Conception," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI, No. 5 (March, 1956), 339–403; William R. Rosengren, "The Self in the Emotionally Disturbed," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI, No. 5 (March, 1961), 454–62; Carl J. Couch, "Self-Attitudes and Degree of Agreement with Immediate Others," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (1958), 491–96.

[8] For an example of the type of thing that might be done see Thomas S. McPartland, John H Cumming, and Wynona S. Garretson, "Self-Conception and Ward Behavior," *Sociometry*, XXIV, No. 2 (June, 1961), 111–24.

that organization of qualities *originating in social interaction. . . .*" Then the author goes on to attempt to convince his readers that that self is a social phenomena and not something innate or individualistic. Of course, he turns out to be right *by definition.* If he wishes to consider the social origin of the self as an empirical hypothesis (such as our postulate 1) then he is required to define his concept "self" independently of the concept of social interaction. The formalized theory should eliminate errors of this type by clearly differentiating those statements that are definitions and those statements that are empirical claims (postulates or propositions).[9]

4 *The formalized theory allows for careful consideration of the conditions under which the theory is expected to hold.* In our discussion of postulate 3 we atempted to show how a proposition could be scrutinized to find the conditions under which it would hold. This procedure requires empirical evidences outside the theory itself, since the limitations are in no way implicit in the propositions.

5. *The formalized theory provides a systematic procedure for scrutinizing the theory in terms of hidden implications and conceptual problems.* The requirement that all the propositions which are derived from the basic postulates be considered individually should reveal any hidden implications within the theory itself. The requirement for clear definitions of major concepts should go a long way in eliminating, or at least clarifying, conceptual problems.

6 *The formalized theory enables the investigator to bridge gaps in his data.* Often in empirical research there are situations in which it is impossible to gather data on one or more of the variables of the theory. In these situations a formalized theory may make it possible to bridge the gap between the data available by providing a conceptual link between these data. Suppose we have a situation where the only source of data is through direct observation (say participant-observation technique). If we wish to test our notions about the self, it is obvious that only two of our four variables can be measured. We can observe the variable we called "the actual responses of others," and we can observe the individual's behavior. However, we know of no way of directly observing the individual's perception or his self-concept. Our data then consist of observations of the actual responses of other persons toward the subject and the subject's actual behavior. Our theory allows us to "make sense" of these observations by suggesting that the relationship might be explained in terms of the two intervening variables of perception and self-concept. This was the case in the anecdotal example we used earlier. The girl's perceptions and self-concept were never observed, but we inferred something about them by applying the theory to the observations that were available. The theory stated in a formalized manner enabled us to bridge the gap in our data.

7. *The formalized theory facilitates communication.* A major problem that the sociologist faces today is understanding what his colleagues are talking about. We read passage after passage only to wonder what in the world the author is trying to say. If the theorist was required to formalize his notions as we have suggested in this paper, many of the misunderstandings would disappear. Many of us would find ourselves exclaiming, "Was that what he was saying?" The author cannot help but feel that some theorists, if required to handle their theories in this manner, might themselves end up saying, "Was that what I've been saying?"

The one disadvantage to this approach is that the formalized theory must not be treated as a set of logically and conceptually tight statements complete within themselves. Throughout this paper we tried to make it clear that the formal statements of the theory must be limited by statements of conditions. Our present state of development in sociology requires that we temper our statements even more with some "common-sense" notions we have about the subject with which we are concerned. We are suggesting here that, since the formalized theory may look like a mathematical model, some may assume that the conclusions can

[9] For an excellent statement of this point see Clarence C. Schrag, review of Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* in *American Sociological Review,* XVII (1952), 247–49.

be treated with the rigor of a mathematical derivation. This could prove disastrous. The careful investigator can reap the benefits of the advantages mentioned in this paper and avoid the disadvantages if he does not expect the theory to do more than it is capable of doing.

The purpose of this note has been to suggest the possibility of developing models that are not so restrictive as the conventional mathematical models, yet are formal and systematic enough to be a considerable improvement over the general run of theory in sociology. The hope is that this paper might stimulate other attempts at formalizing existing sociological and social psychological theories. The results of a trend in this direction may prove extremely valuable in unscrambling the present state of theory.

JOHN W. KINCH
San Francisco State College

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

PUTNEY AND MIDDLETON'S "ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND ANOMIA"

July 28, 1962

To the Editor:

The recent paper by Putney and Middleton on "Ethical Relativism and Anomia"[1] seeks to determine the accuracy of claims about the practical consequences of belief in ethical relativism. Unfortunately, it contains errors so serious as to constitute obstacles to a solution of the problem to which it addresses itself.

The authors conceive their aim to be an "empirical" examination of the question of "whether the acceptance of relativism is associated with anomia and the breakdown of normative standards."[2] They employ the following criterion: "Relativists and absolutists were dichotomized by means of a question asking whether ethical values were eternal and unchanging, or social products subject to modification."[3]

The Putney-Middleton conception of relativism is an idiosyncratic one; it is not that held by most students of the matter. In ancient Greece, the Sophists were called relativists because they believed that one man's opinion about what is right or wrong, good or bad, is no better than any other man's views. Contemporary books and articles that are seriously concerned with ethical relativism list several possible meanings of the term, but not the one used by Putney and Middleton. Consider this passage from a recent able work:

> By ethical relativism I understand the theory that moral ideas are all necessarily "relative to" a particular society, in the sense that they reflect the "standpoint" of some particular society and only "hold for" that society, so that in case of a conflict between these different standards there is no impartial or objective way of deciding between them; any reason that might be given would itself merely reflect the standpoint of the group to which one belongs.[4]

Ethical relativism has also been defined as the thesis that "There are conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid."[5]

Let us say, then, that ethical relativism consists of two elements: (*a*) there is no moral ideal, standard, or principle that is valid for, or binding upon, any society or culture that does not accept it; and (*b*) opposing moral claims are equally warranted since no possible evidence could support one more strongly than the other. In the light of this conception, we can see that whether one believes that values are eternal or only temporal does not determine whether one is a relativist or an "absolutist."

Having seen that Putney and Middleton distinguish ethical relativists from non-relativists by means of an idiosyncratic criterion, it is readily apparent that any conclusion which they might draw concerning the relationship, if any, between genuine ethical relativism and anomia will be highly questionable. Their questionnaire data does not support the conclusions that they tried to draw from it.

What would it be like to formulate questionnaire items that would determine whether or not a person is an ethical rela-

[1] Snell Putney and Russell Middleton, "Ethical Relativism and Anomia," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (1962), 430–38.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 431.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 433.

[4] Marcus George Singer, *Generalization in Ethics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 328–29.

[5] Richard B. Brandt, *Ethical Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 272.

tivist? Consider the following possible examples:

A. Would you accept or reject (agree or disagree with) the following claim: "Whatever is right (or wrong) for one person must be right (or wrong) for any similar person in similar circumstances?"

B. In your opinion, the assertion that "Hitler's actions in attempting to exterminate the Jews were morally wrong" has the following status:
   1. It is a judgment warranted because Hitler violated moral principles or human rights valid and binding upon all mankind.
   2. It is an opinion that is no more valid or warranted than the opinion that "Hitler was justified in killing as many Jewish people as he could."

These questions would be an improvement over the Putney-Middleton criterion for distinguishing ethical relativists from "absolutists." But even the approach just suggested would be highly inadequate. While an individual's verbal behavior in response to questionnaires may be relevant to this issue, it is quite insufficient when it is not joined with observations of his other behavior. We need careful reporting concerning one's (non-questionnaire) behavior as it concerns lynchings, brain-washings, and burning people alive (as well as less emotion-inciting practices) to determine whether he holds his views of such actions in the relativist or in the nonrelativist sense.

The Putney-Middleton paper is quite unempirical not only about ethical relativism but concerning anomia as well. A number of authors are cited as representing mistaken theories; the reader is led to anticipate that these views will be refuted by the presentation of evidence. Our authors write:

> Recent social scientists have . . . assumed that ethical relativism contributes to anomia, to a state wherein norms become ineffectual or disappear, and the individual liberated from guilt and goals alike. Hoult expresses this viewpoint, asserting that ordinary folkways are not "an adequate basis for the sustained coordinate endeavor that is indispensable for enduring social coherence." On the contrary, "thus far in history, man has given the type of loyalty that can be counted on even in crisis situations only to those values and techniques which he has been taught are related to the Eternal.[6]

Whether Hoult's assertions are correct or incorrect is not obvious, since it is doubtful that available data are sufficiently precise and comprehensive to be analyzed in terms of the crucial variables. But the authors of the paper have not come to grips with Hoult's claims.

What would be necessary in order to determine whether ethical relativists have "an adequate basis for . . . enduring social coherence," and would effectively support the "type of loyalty that can be counted on even in crisis situations?" One would have to study individual and group behavior that tends to endanger the survival of a society or undermines its cohesiveness. Despite the expectations aroused by the introductory paragraphs of their paper, Putney and Middleton do not present studies of societies in which norms disappeared and people were "unable to evaluate" their conduct, of societies that disintegrated and finally ceased to exist. Incidentally, how would individuals unable to evaluate their own conduct be able to give rational responses to a Putney-Middleton questionnaire? Relativists and non-relativists alike would reject the idea that adherents of their positions could be found who had *no* norms.

Whether a society can achieve its political, economic, and social goals more effectively if its members are (*a*) ethical relativists, or (*b*) non-relativists, is a matter that can be adequately ascertained only after historical and cross-cultural comparison studies have been made. The Putney-Middleton paper is culture-bound and profoundly ahistorical and therefore can make little contribution to the question at issue

JOHN W. COPELAND

University of Pittsburgh

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 430.

REJOINDER

September 19, 1962

To the Editor:

Many of Mr. Copeland's criticisms seem strained, if not irrelevant. Thus he charges that our research is "culture-bound"—which of course it is since our sample was restricted to American college students. The research was also "education-bound," and largely "social-class-bound" since the sample was essentially homogeneous on these characteristics as well. But all of this is not relevant to the research done on the sample specified. Our concluding paragraph clearly summarized these limitations and called for further research on divergent populations.

His concern over our conceptualization of relativism seems to come down to the fact that we say we asked our subjects whether values were "eternal and unchanging," whereas he prefers to think of relativism in terms of cross-cultural comparisons. Actually the concept of relativism usually involves both assertions: that societies have different norms, each valid in terms of their own value system, and that the same society will have different norms as its value system changes through time. Presumably, however, an individual who embraces one aspect of relativism is likely to embrace the other as well. In any case, the actual wording of our question involved both elements—it asked whether or not there were values that were valid in all places and all times.

We discussed in our article the fact that relativism does not necessarily involve the assertion that values are meaningless or unimportant—it merely asserts that they are relative. Copeland seems to miss this point. The first specific question that he proposes to distinguish relativists from absolutists might have merit—if pretesting demonstrated its utility—but the second question misses the issue. A relativist, as we pointed out in our article, may have values, and is likely, in contemporary American society, to condemn the actions of a Hitler. He would then find neither of Copeland's alternatives acceptable but would want a third choice—possibly "in terms of my own values I strongly condemn Hitler's attempt to exterminate the European Jews." The question Copeland suggests is obviously loaded and would be of little use in research.

Copeland's claim that our questionnaire responses do not necessarily reflect actual behavior is quite correct, and this problem was discussed at some length in the article. Within the limitations of a questionnaire, however, we attempted to come to grips with this problem by asking not only what the subjects believed they should do but also what they had done. To go beyond this would mean abandoning the questionnaire approach, which is presumably Mr. Copeland's preference. This is laudable, and it is to be hoped that he will himself undertake research involving the direct observation of behavior in macrocosmic cross-cultural situations.

In any case, the fact remains that among our sample of predominantly middle-class, American college students the belief that there are no values that are valid in all places and all times was not found to be associated with anomia in terms of the several criteria utilized. This was the major conclusion of the study, and apparently Copeland does not contest it.

SNELL PUTNEY

San Jose State College

SOUTHALL'S *SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AFRICA*

September 26, 1962

To the Editor:

In reference to the book review of Southall's *Social Change in Modern Africa* (reviewed by I. Wallerstein in the July, 1962, issue, pp. 133–34), I would like to point out that a criterion of urbanization similar to Southall's has previously been used by Stefan Nowakowski in his study of Warsaw Workers' Hotels (Stefan Nowakowski, "Hotel robotniczy na tle procesow urbanizacji i industrializacji," *Przeglad Socjologiczny,* XII [1958], 32–71). Nowakowski has shown that once a worker coming from a rural area ceases to visit his village frequently and, in general, shifts his reference group toward his urban environment, he has started the urbanization process. The period of the shift is most dangerous as far as personal disorganization is concerned.

By making this point here I am not interested in the priority issue (after all, Nowakowski would not have priority either; we can trace the concept back at least as far as Thomas-Znaniecki) but in the encouraging evidence which can be derived from cross-cultural studies. What we need are more systematic cross-cultural studies which, I propose, would show that human behavior is, say "90 per cent constant, and 10 per cent variable" due to cultural differences. From the viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge it is striking that over the last two decades American anthropologists as well as sociologists have been shifting their concentration upon cultural dissimilarities à la Benedict-Mead toward a search of "universals." In that sense, this change in the focus of interest could be related to the increasing efforts to bring about a political integration of our planet.

JIRI KOLAJA

University of Kentucky

BOOK REVIEWS

The Analysis of Social Systems. By HARRY C. BREDEMEIER and RICHARD M. STEPHENSON. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiii+411.

Has anybody noticed the change in introductory textbooks in recent years? I remember that when, as a graduate student, I encountered the writings of George Mead and Robert Park for the first time, I suddenly understood where the textbooks I had looked into earlier had taken their texts from. No more. Today the textbook emphasis is functionalist, the major references are Parsons and Merton, the key noun is not interaction but system, and the approbatory adjective is systematic or, better, *systemic*. This is simply a way of saying that the shift of the major garden of graduate training in sociology from Chicago to Harvard and Columbia is bearing its pedagogical fruit in the systematic theoretical orientation of recent textbooks; and in the frequency with which the influence of Robert Merton is acknowledged in prefaces.

Bredemeier and Stephenson's *The Analysis of Social Systems* is the most recent evidence of this trend in textbooks. Without pictures, glossy pages, double-columned text, or luxurious production by the publishers, it nevertheless manages to be a rather creditable text. Throughout the book, the authors consistently exhibit those distinctive marks of functional analysis: a systematic attention to the *problems* of achieving social order, and hence the habits of interpreting behavior in terms of its consequences, and of interpreting social structures as mechanisms that facilitate adaptation or integration, and that neutralize or forestall the incipient anomie of strains and conflicts. In addition, they do a remarkably good job of taking some of the more recent and difficult theoretical contributions of functionalists, and not only presenting them but utilizing them in an exemplary form that should not be beyond the grasp of the introductory student.

The Parsonian "orientations," for example, are included, and clearly treated as abstract categories that help to solve the problem of how shared expectations are structured. Bredemeier and Stephenson also utilize the Parsonian "functional problems of social systems" without forgetting that they were proposed as solutions to the difficult theoretical problem of functional requisites—as difficult today as it was in 1949 when Merton remarked on its "cloudy" and "empirically debatable" character. What catalogues of needs were to Malinowski, and what the imperative of filling the functionally most important statuses with the most highly qualified personnel was to Davis and Moore, the "functional problems" are to Parsons: an attempt to specify the needs without which the imputation of functions is meaningless. The scheme of pattern variables is also utilized throughout the book, both in highly abstract terms and in vividly concrete examples, as a way of conceptualizing the regularities behind variations in cultural definitions. Merton's influence is evident in the book's treatment of the concepts of reference group, status sequence, and status and role sets, which, as basic components of social structure, Bredemeier and Stephenson use in their exposition of the theory of manifest and latent functions and dysfunctions.

In its heavy indebtedness to Parsons and Merton, as well as in the topics it chooses to cover, the book invites comparison with a recent predecessor, Harry Johnson's *Sociology*. But to describe Bredemeier and Stephenson as a thinner or more elementary version of Johnson (which in one sense it is) is to do the present book an injustice. For Johnson's book, as Merton noted in his Foreword to it, is a *treatise;* as such it is more comparable to a book like Sorokin's *Society, Culture, and Personality* than to any introductory textbook I know of currently in use. Moreover, Johnson's book, thorough, deep, and rich as it is with analyses and examples, tends, like many treatises, to be pontifical and dogmatic, tends to treat controversial theoretical issues as if they had only one side, or to dismiss opposing views with a phrase or a footnote. Note, for example, Johnson's one-sentence dismissal of Linton

on status and role, or compare Johnson's treatment of the functionalist theory of social stratification (regarding which a reader would get hardly an inkling that there has been and continues to be considerable controversy in the literature) with Bredemeier and Stephenson's, which is thorough, fair, and eminently judicious in its conclusions. The prime value of *The Analysis of Social Systems* as an introductory textbook is that it is at once systematic and analytic without at the same time being consciously and heavily "theoretical." It casts functional analysis in what, in this reviewer's opinion, is its best light: as a certain *style* of analysis that time and again has proved its usefulness as a perspective (as what Merton has called a "general theoretical orientation"), but that as a formal, systematic theory is still either too primitive or too abstract or too full of unsolved logical problems to be confidently communicated to beginning students as identical with "sociological analysis."

Habitual users of encyclopedic texts, however, should be forewarned that, as textbooks go, *The Analysis of Social Systems* is a short book. The reader will find no chapters on race relations or crime and delinquency or collective behavior or "social processes," or demography and ecology. In my own view not very much is sacrificed by these omissions in an introductory text. More serious, however, is a rather perfunctory treatment of the concept of culture in a quite short chapter, a substantial segment of which is devoted to an exposition of the pattern variables. But there are two very good chapters on socialization, a fine introduction to the components of social structure, and more than adequate treatments of some of the major "sociologies of . . ." including science, magic, and religion. Finally, Bredemeier and Stephenson, like many former students of Merton, write clearly and well. Sentences that begin "Although the biogenic needs provide a means for initial transmission of cultural cognitions and the early canalization of cathexes . . ." (p. 64) are the rare exception rather than the rule.

BENNETT M. BERGER

University of Illinois

Human Behavior and Social Processes: An Interactionist Approach. Edited by ARNOLD M. ROSE. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. xv+680. $7.25.

Arnold Rose prefaces this book with the remark, "the lack of systematic formulations and of 'self-consciousness' renders the research contributions and extensions of the (symbolic interaction) theory somewhat disparate; there is not adequate cumulation of theory and confirmation. . . . We are . . . systematizing what . . . we have . . . accomplished, taking stock correcting and extending . . . and communicating" (pp. viii, xi).

Few would deny the importance to social psychology of the work of such contributors to this volume as Burgess, Hughes, Strauss Dubin, Goffman, Turner, and Rose. The question remains, however, whether these are the only scholars whose work lends confirmation to the line of thought of G. H. Mead. Very likely, as the earlier text by Lindesmith and Strauss showed, the answer is "No." The reviewer anticipated that this book would put in the context of symbolic interaction theory recent work in semantics, interaction, perception and cognition, child development, and social anthropology. By showing the greater significance such findings take on in that context, the book would demonstrate confirmation of the theory. The hopes were dashed.

An excellent, though brief, summary by Rose of interaction theory introduces the book. This reduction of the theory fails to indicate the many sensitizing concepts Mead's thinking provided for two generations of sociologists. Some such sensitivities are found in other papers of the collection, for example, Goffman's brilliant generalization from the "mark" and "cooler" of the confidence game to a multitude of similar denials of status.

Among the thirty-four papers in the collection are excellent articles by Turner, Stone, Hughes, Shibutani, Blumer, Dalton, Brotz, Powell, Glazer, and Cressey. Nine of the papers are well-chosen reprints; six are summaries of doctoral dissertations that barely hold their own in such fast company. The final three articles on urban ecology appear to be tacked on the end. As the editor notes, there is little more than a historical relation between symbolic interaction theory and the interest which Park, Burgess, and Wirth shared in urban ecology (p. viii).

The editorial construction of the book reinforces the impression that "symbolic interac-

tion" refers more to a *school* (Chicago) with a distinctive viewpoint than to a systematic theory. Generally speaking, the book is a collection of work done by people trained at Chicago, and by their students. To some extent, these scholars have in common a desire to analyze social processes, a focus on everyday life and recurrent problems, and a technique that combines lengthy interviewing with direct observation. Articles by Hughes, Strauss, and Goffman best illustrate the first of these marks of the school. Stone, Glazer, Dalton, and Powell illustrate the everyday life and problems focused in this book; and the distinctive method is demonstrated by Roth's study of tuberculosis treatment and by Becker's study of marijuana use.

In addition to theoretical essays, the collection has wide topical diversity: from the study of adolescent generational shifts in ideology to aging, from the social significance of wearing apparel to the role of the mortician. The articles have good bibliographies.

The book will be useful as a supplementary source for advanced undergraduate courses in social psychology offered to sociology students.

ROBERT J. POTTER

University of Michigan, Flint College

Collective Dynamics. By KURT LANG and GLADYS ENGEL LANG. New York: Thomas Y Crowell Co., 1961. Pp. xii+563. $7.25.

A few years ago a new book by Turner and Killian, on collective behavior, was reviewed in this and other sociological journals. The reactions of most reviewers was that the volume was a worthy contribution to a notably underdeveloped field; and that it marked the first new text in the field in many years. Some reviewers said that they hoped that the new text would stimulate interest in a field that was once the major concern of some of the most prominent American sociologists.

At least three years have passed since those reviews and the publication of the Langs's volume on *Collective Dynamics*. During this period, there have been few articles on collective behavior. If for no other reason than that it reminds us of the scarcity of resources, *Collective Dynamics* is a welcome addition.

The authors make a unique contribution by their ability to weave important ideas and concepts from other disciplines, notably experimental psychology, psychiatry, and literature into the traditional substance of collective behavior. This is most extensively done in their discussion of "Susceptibility and Polarization," under which they treat the following: "Mechanisms of Contagion," "Leaders: Initiators and Instigators," "The Susceptibility of Followers," and "Emergence of Social Objects: Victims and Rallying Points." Most previous studies have not done much more than label the mechanism of contagion. The Langs's willingness to borrow from related disciplines stands them in particularly good stead in their discussion of social objects.

The authors present a standard and competent discussion of the more typical subheadings in collective behavior. While they vary the procedure somewhat, and do not begin their volume with a discussion of different types of crowds and the distinction between the crowd, mob, audience, and mass, all of these topics are considered. They prepare the reader for his immersion into the field by a careful and most interesting introductory section on the differences between the phenomena studied under collective behavior or collective dynamics and the rest of sociology.

In titling their book *Collective Dynamics* they emphasize that their subject is concerned with "patterns of social action that are spontaneous and unstructured inasmuch as they are not organized and are not reducible to social structure." The authors' treatment of the differences between an analysis of social structure and an analysis of collective behavior is more systematic than previous work.

The weakest sections of the book are the last three chapters: "An Introduction to Social Movements," "The Dynamics of Social Movements," and "Research in Collective Dynamics." The organization of these materials suggests that the discussion of social movements is peripheral to the authors' primary concerns with collective behavior in less structured contexts. But their brief review does not offer a satisfactory compromise. Their discussion is not so summary as to indicate that social movements are phenomena in between collective behavior and social structure; nor is it as definitive as other sections. For example, the very sophisticated discussion of leaders, followers, and social objects that occurs in earlier sections is absent when they consider these same issues under social movements.

I found the last chapter, "Research in Collective Dynamics," most disappointing. This is unfortunate because some readers may have turned to it first. The authors allude briefly to the use of techniques that have been employed successfully in other areas of social research, namely, survey analysis and experimental design. But, these matters are hardly developed; nor are they adequately described by illustrations.

We began this review on a positive note; and we intend that it end so. For the strengths of the Langs's work far outweigh the shortcomings and weaknesses. *Collective Dynamics* provides not only a careful review and synthesis of the field (and therefore it is a good text), but it also has some original and highly insightful sections.

RITA JAMES SIMON

New York City

Main Currents in Modern Economics: Economic Thought since 1870. By BEN B. SELIGMAN. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xiv+887. $11.75.

Mr. Seligman's versatility is extraordinary. He is or has been the director of the Department of Education and Research of the Retail Clerks International Association, lecturer, and writer for such magazines as *Commentary* and *Dissent*. Now he has presented us with the first really comprehensive scholarly account of the main streams of economics during the past century. His mastery of an enormous literature is most admirable.

Taking classical economics through John Stuart Mill as his starting point, Seligman organizes his account around a simple scheme. In Part I he examines "the revolt against [the] formalism of classical economics." This revolt took three directions: historicism (especially German), which was a movement toward a kind of humanistic approach to economic life; Marxism, which was a movement toward a fusion of economics with political and ideological concerns; and institutionalism, which was an attack on analytic theory and a movement toward a general fusion of economics with social and moral concerns. In Part II—"The Reaffirmation of Tradition"—Seligman traces the growth of marginalism, equilibrium economics, and various streams of thought in England. Part III concerns the thrust of economics toward technical analysis in the recent twentieth century. Seligman summarizes the work of the Swedish school, Keynes, Schumpeter, Mrs. Joan Robinson, and many others The volume ends with a brief chapter on game theory and linear programming (for some reason he does not mention the organizational analysis of Simon, March, and others).

Occasionally, Seligman has to strain to haul an author into his scheme. How, for instance, can Hoselitz' contributions to economic growth fit into a chapter entitled "From Realism to Technique" and a part entitled "The Thrust toward Technique"? It strikes me that Hoselitz' significance for modern economics is precisely the opposite.

For each economist Seligman presents a brief personal sketch, an account of his philosophical and ideological outlook, and a technical but non-mathematical summary of his economic contribution. For some economists the three elements seem to have little reference to one another. These accounts are clearly written on the whole, however, and are valuable for the social scientist with limited training in economics. Sometimes Seligman accepts indiscriminately the judgments of secondary references. For instance, he advances the following odd sentence on Weber's sociology of religion: "It is even possible to prove that Catholicism was capitalism's driving force, as was attempted, in fact, by H. M. Robertson"

Seligman's institutionalist training shows clearly in this volume. Of the three directions of revolt against classicism, historicists receive 44 pages, Socialists 82, and institutionalists 125. Veblen receives as many pages as Keynes and twice as many as Mrs. Robinson and Chamberlain combined. More important Seligman views almost all economists in an institutionalist perspective. He is at most antianalytic and at least skeptical of technical theory (which takes us away from "realism"), he sees "applied economics" as the viable alternative to technique (by "applied" he appears to mean an imbedding of economics in the moral and political complexity of society)

This institutionalist perspective sometimes leads to questionable historical interpretations Seligman groups the historicists, Socialists and institutionalists as rebels against classical formalism. This classification fits the institutionalists best, some of the historicists very well, and Marx (with his wholesale acceptance of many parts of Ricardo) not very well In

addition, Seligman treats the marginalists, indifference-curve analysts, and others as "reaffirming" a tradition under attack. By most evidence, however, many of these economists were oblivious to the historicist, Marxist, and institutionalist attacks. Men like Pareto experienced discomfort with traditional economics, to be sure; but their discomfort stemmed more from logical and empirical difficulties *within* economics (e.g., difficulties with the principle of cardinality) than from attacks by outsiders.

For many of us interested in the *theoretical* relations between economics and the other social sciences, the institutionalist perspective is not very helpful. The institutionalist sees the analysis of non-economic factors as *opposed* to abstract economic theory—the more of the one, the less of the other. Or, in Seligman's words, "economics is not a science when it is economics and not economics when it is a science. As description, it is a branch of history, and as a system of analysis, a heavy borrower from mathematics." I feel that insofar as this view guides our thinking we shall see periodic onslaughts against technical economics, but we shall not gain in the integration of social theory. The limitations of economic theory are to be overcome not by retreating into the vast complexity of "institutional" variation, but rather by organizing non-economic variables themselves into a technical theoretical framework. Only in this way can the analytic relations between economic and non-economic thought be explored fruitfully.

NEIL J. SMELSER

University of California, Berkeley

The Decline of the Intellectual. By THOMAS MOLNAR. Cleveland: Meridian Books, World Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. 369. $1 75.

This book represents a significant contribution to the current debate concerning the vitality of inherited political ideologies of Marxism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism. The author, although receiving his advanced training in French literature in the United States, reveals a distinctly European mode of writing. Despite his acquaintance with some of the popular American social science literature, his approach is oracular rather than scientific, rationalist rather than empirical. For those wishing reinforcement of the "end of ideology" notion, as it emerges in the refracted mirror of a European conservative conscience, this book will prove of considerable interest. Those who envision an analysis of intellectual life in terms of the "social components" of intellectuals, rather than exclusively in terms of the ideas they produce, will perhaps be disappointed. This is a book with a "message," to which the resources and findings of social science are bent.

The "thesis" offered by Molnar is that the emergence of the intelligentsia as a social force has to do with its capacity to act as an agency for social change, to act on behalf of the bourgeois sectors of post-feudal society, while at the same time to promote its own "universal" interests in Peace, Truth, Humanity, Brotherhood, and the religion of equality. But with the success of the bourgeoisie, with its victory in Europe between 1789 and 1848, the intelligentsia was caught in a double bind between the conflicting necessities of servicing bourgeois social institutions and playing its role as an agency of change. Capitalism, which promised to establish the lost unity of man and society, only served to deepen the condition of alienation. It thus set in motion against itself the very forces of criticism that prior to the French Revolution found sustenance in the bourgeois critical spirit. But the "decline" of the intellectual has to do precisely with its casting about for some other anchor point promising the lost paradise of the whole man (in the present period, the proletariat). Instead of acting as a social force in its own right, it once more seeks moral redemption in the contest of other social classes. In this way, intellectualism becomes wedded to ideology—and this very wedding betokens the break now witnessed between intellectual production and philosophical speculation (which for Professor Molnar is the true end of the idea-workers).

But the decline of the intellectual is profoundly rooted to changed conditions and relations. Here Molnar stakes his claim to uniqueness. He maintains that, while the post-feudal relations needed intellectuals, the post-capitalist world does not. Intellectuals revolve in terms of political-ideological elites, while the life of technological-bureaucratic societies tends to bypass the scrutinization of ideas and ideologies. The "end of ideology" thus comes to signify not simply the displacement of "sec-

ularized" social science by an older "clerical" intelligentsia, but the termination of the intelligentsia as such. Molnar's conservative position is possibly more radical than the "liberalism" of the Lipset-Bell hypothesis—since the latter simply assumes that the end of ideology is a consequence of affluence, while Molnar sees in this same development a threat to the integrity of intellect as such. The search for wholeness ceases in the modern period. The break in function between intellect and practicality becomes complete. The Bureaucratic Pathos becomes complete, all the while celebrated by ex-intellectuals turned technicians. This material is forcibly presented in the author's section on the European intellectuals, where Molnar is clearly on solid ground. In America, this tendency for the intellectual to be displaced by the technocrat is seen in the rise of mass education, the mechanization of selection, and the routinization of mental work.

Molnar, however, girds himself for the task of redefining the function of intellect with scanty ammunition. After categorically dismissing communism, Marxism, liberalism (which he takes in pure form to be much like the first two), and a conservatism turned fascistic, the author is left with a critical conservatism that shows yearning and nostalgia for inherited forms of intellectual thought, but does not take seriously (*a*) that such philosophical styles of thought that existed in the medieval world are indeed behind us; (*b*) that the "decline" of intellectuals as a special group may be a permanent situation and not a temporary aberration; and (*c*) that intellectuals have flourished in a climate of ideologies and counter-ideologies, so that Molnar's call for an end of ideology and a return to philosophy is simply a misanthropic expression of that very decline of intellectual activity the author ostensibly bemoans the loss of.

For someone who sees Marx and his successors as villains in this drama—through science, secularism, and socialism—it is disquieting to note the occasions on which Molnar's *facts* are inaccurate; (*a*) Lenin did not write a book on *"Rationalism* and Empirio-Criticism" but rather on *"Materialism* and Empirio-Criticism" (p. 91); (*b*) the poet-author Mayakovsky is not "a prohibited author" in Soviet Russia and is remarkable to the degree that he has retained his audience in Party circles throughout the shifts of the last quarter century (p. 110); (*c*) Marx did *not* write "his doctoral dissertation on Heraclitus, the philosopher of dynamism and continuous change"—but rather on Greek atomism, that is, a comparative analysis of the philosophy of nature in Democritus and Epicurus (cf. p. 125). In any event, the relation of Marx's dissertation to the fact that "for the progressive, everything is in motion" is unfathomable. Finally, I should like to call Molnar's attention to his statement "that law and sociology officially do not exist in the Soviet Union. Law is taught at the Police Academy and sociology is smuggled in unofficially, in the anthropology departments of the universities" (p. 93). After long acquiescence in Stalinist orthodoxy, which viewed sociology as consciously antisocialist, the present attitude is more conciliatory. Sociology chairs exist at major universities, while an Institute of Sociological Research (whatever its level of research) now exists at the University of Leningrad. As for the legal profession, Molnar's statement makes no sense. Law as a discipline and profession has never ceased to exist and to maintain that law is taught at the Police Academy is absurd. As for sociology being smuggled through "anthropology departments," this is an impossibility since anthropology departments are nonexistent. The Soviet attitude toward anthropology continues to be that this subject, as taught and applied, is an academic extension of imperialism—an attempt to interfere in the sovereignty of underdeveloped peoples Though chairs and well-developed institutes of archeology and linguistics exist, to the best of my knowledge, the same cannot be said for anthropology.

It is important for Molnar to base his exhortations on evidence as well as on intuition However, despite these lapses, the book remains a stimulating contribution to the "great debate" on the nature of the beast called the intellectual.

Irving Louis Horowitz

Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. By Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. x+312. $5.25.

Students will find here elements of a textbook that is short on organizations in general, long on welfare agencies. Colleagues will find a research monograph, spread among pages of a textbook and concentrated in the Appendix. Both will be rewarded by a new contribution to the comparative analysis of complex organizations. This contribution is not developed because of the other two tasks that the same book serves. The pages devoted to the comparative analysis are of much interest.

The base of every comparative approach is a classification, and the base of every analytical classification is a variable. The authors classify organizations on the basis of *cui bono*, "who benefits." There are four major classes of benefiters: (1) members or participants; (2) owners or managers; (3) "public-in-contact," or client; and (4) "public at large." Although one organization may—and often does—serve all these publics, Blau and Scott establish that "the benefits to one party furnish the reason for the organization's existing, while the benfits to the others are essentially a cost" This is in contrast to the view expounded by James D. Thompson and others who view the organization as a pattern resulting from the bargains and coalitions of various groups of participants.

Mutual-benefit associations, business concerns, service organizations, and commonweal organizations are typical cases in kind of the four types of prime beneficiary groups. Each organization is associated with its special problems, the authors suggest. The crucial problem of mutual-benefit associations is that of maintaining the internal democratic processes; of business concerns, efficiency in a competitive situation; in service organizations, conflicts between professional service orientation and administrative procedures; and for commonweal organizations, the development of mechanisms for external democratic control, not by the membership but by the public at large.

Throughout the volume, Blau and Scott return from time to time to this classification to show that, if organizations differ with regard to the classifying variable, they differ also with regard to a particular variable under discussion. For instance, overbureaucratization has a different meaning in the different classes of organizations:

> In the case of mutual-benefit associations, such as unions, over-bureaucratization implies centralization of power in the hands of officials. Here it does not refer to inefficiency; indeed, bureaucratized unions are often ruthlessly efficient. But in the case of business concerns over-bureaucratization implies an elaboration of rules and procedures that impairs operating efficiency, and here the term is not used in reference to the power of management officials to decide on policies, since such managerial direction is expected and legitimate. Finally, service and commonweal organizations are considered over-bureaucratized if in consequence of preoccupation with procedures rigidities develop which impede professional service to clients or effective service of the public interest [p. 45].

Similarly, the four types are differently financed; mutual-benefit associations through contributions and dues; business through exchange in the market; service organizations through fees; and commonweal organizations through taxation.

This reviewer found this procedure for construction of a comparative analysis a sound one, and the insights so gained illuminating. The next step needed is to combine various approaches to a comparative analysis of organizations, in order to lay a foundation for continuity of research and theory construction.

AMITAI ETZIONI

Columbia University

Magic, Myth and Money: The Origin of Money in Religious Ritual By WILLIAM H. DESMONDE. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. xv+208. $5.00.

Magic, Myth and Money is an interesting speculative interpretation of the origin, psychological meaning, and social function of money. Reminiscent of the intent of many early works in social science, it is an argument in defense of a substantive thesis, which, in turn, is presented as support for a briefly stated philosophical position on universal natural law and the spiritual malaise of modern man. Fusing psychoanalysis, sociology, and anthropology into a tool of philosophical analysis, this work is clearly the product of a free-ranging intellect. The central thesis is that the origins of social organization and economic institutions may be traced back to the primitive hearth and home, and hence to the household gods. The economic relations of modern

man are no longer imbedded in familial morals. The ideal of "community" cannot be attained until a new synthesis of society, religion, and economics is achieved.

Most of the book purports to demonstrate the (historical) origin of money—or economic institutions—in religious ritual. It is an evolutionary argument of the naïve nineteenth-century unilinear variety, the universality of which is supported by armchair psychoanalytic interpretations of the mind of "primitive man" (be he Kwakiutl, Neanderthal, or Athenian), most often based on etymology. No detailed critique of this long argument is necessary, since it is not relevant as justification for the sociological, psychological, or philosophical import of the book. Just as the historicity of an actual contract is unnecessary in the contract doctrine of the state, and that of the primal cannibal feast is unnecessary in the explanation of the oedipal situation, the present-day function of money does not *depend* on the use of cattle in Uganda, and the mind of modern man is not made up of symbolic meanings attached to objects by ancient Greeks. Furthermore the data and generalizations of social scientists that are relevant to a moral problem are no substitute for a moral discussion of that problem. The philosophical message of *Magic, Myth and Money* is an important one, addressing the moral problem stated (e.g.) in Steinbeck's latest novel, but is greatly in need of clarification, explication, and *philosophical* justification.

Regardless of reservations one may have about the historical argument, this book deals with very important issues in sociology and psychology, although it is the opinion of this reviewer that the author carries us no farther than simply raising the issues once again. First, Desmonde shows that the financial structure of any society occurs not simply in the context, but also through the operation, of a value system and an associated normative system. A simple economic interpretation of even the structure of the market falls on the Hobbesian problem of order. In urban societies, moreover, the monetary reward system is isolated from (or in conflict with) shared norms and values recognized explicitly in other institutional areas of that society. Second, he maintains that money as a symbol and the institutions which surround the use of money have important psychological meanings for the individual personality. These arise out of the experience of socialization in the family of orientation, and refer in adult life to membership in family, community, and society. The symbolic meanings of money are many and varied, including mother's milk and many psychophysical processes and products, but not, surprisingly, feces.

This interpretation may be taken as a popular synthesis and extension of Freud, Durkheim, Frazier, and many others, and as such will doubtless prove as stimulating to students and interested laymen as it is irritating to professional specialists. Desmonde performs a real service in pointing up the relevance of social science classics to one of the central moral issues of our times.

RICHARD F. CURTIS

Yale University

Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors. By C. K. YANG. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. viii+473. $9.50.

What is the place of religion in Chinese society? Are the Chinese a religious people? These questions have long perplexed those who know China firsthand and those who have only studied it in books. The great Western Sinologues, such as Legge and Giles, and the cultured elite in China, such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Hu Shih, have further befogged the issue by saying that "China is a country without a religion," that "the Chinese are unreligious." Anyone who has spent long years in China has a definite feeling that these statements contain a fallacy but one that is not easily ferreted out. The present volume, by a professor of sociology at the University of Pittsburgh and the author of several creditable works on Chinese society, submits the irreligiosity of the Chinese to the test of facts and sociological analysis. The result is devastating.

One great merit, although not the greatest, of Professor Yang's work is its comprehensive coverage of the factual existence of religion in every phase of personal, familial, institutional, and state life in China. While the coverage may not be exhaustive, it is comprehensive enough to last for years to come. It may be on this score that Robert Redfield is quoted

as saying, "it is a large achievement." However, it would seem that what gives the present study a special note of value is the claim that one finds on the jacket—"The first comprehensive sociological analysis of Chinese religious behavior." This claim is well borne out as one follows Yang's treatment of religion in the integration of the family, its place in social and economic groups, the political role of Chinese religion, religious aspects of Confucianism, etc., down to the changing role of religion in pre-Communist China and to communism as a new faith.

However, the most important achievement of Yang's study is his use of the structural and functional viewpoints in answering the two questions that he poses in chapter i, namely, "What functions did religion perform for the maintenance and development of Chinese society? Through what structural forms were these functions carried out? The functions of the theistic and non-empirical elements of every institutional phase of Chinese society are demonstrated up to the hilt. The importance of religion is well proven by the preoccupation of the government—imperial, republican, and Communistic—with the control of the manifestations of religion and the suppression of heterodoxy.

Closely connected with the above methodology and perhaps of greater importance is Yang's use of a conceptual distinction of basic importance in solving this problem. In the Preface the author says that he found the key to the problem in T. Parsons' concepts of diffusiveness and specificity. It would seem to me, however, that he really opened the lock with the distinction of Joachim Wach in his *Sociology of Religion* of two types of religious groups: those that are identical with "natural groups" and those that are "specifically religious." In chapter xii, the author makes explicit Wach's distinction and ably demonstrates that the center of Chinese religious life was not in the priestly institutional religions of Buddhism and Taoism but within secular institutions of Chinese culture.

The book is well written with the occasional exception of a few rather long and involved sentences. It is especially well done in covering the political role of Chinese religion in historical perspective where the author with masterly strokes sketches out the interplay of classical religion, Buddhism, and Taoism. One feels that the chapter on the family could have been more fully developed. This book is highly recommended as a contribution to Sinology, cultural anthropology, and especially to the sociology of religion.

Albert R. O'Hara

National Taiwan University
Taipei, Taiwan

The People of Aritama: The Cultural Personality of a Colombian Mestizo Village. By Gerardo and Alicia Reichel-Dolmatoff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. xviii+483. $8.50.

The *mestizo* peasantry of "Aritama" (a pseudonym for a small town on the foothills of Colombia's Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta) is depicted by the authors as a passive, food-craving, disease-fearing, and mutually invidious group in the process of integration into the wider Colombian *Creole* culture. Aritama is located on a "cultural no-man's land" where the descendants of the ancient Tairona Indians and the champions of modern change have set up both a barrier and a battlefield. The battle is being won by the mixed bloods, but in the meantime it is subjecting the town to a series of strains. Notably change is occurring without much disintegration; the goal is clear and the people have openly decided to become "civilized."

The authors claim that Aritama represents an earlier stage in the current of development of Creole culture, defined on the basis of Gillin's *Moche.* Thus they do well in warning that Aritama is not typical of other Andean regions of Colombia where (as postulated by the present reviewer) a Hispanoid rather than a Creole culture prevails. This seems to be proof of a simultaneity of subcultures in Colombia (which in fact is not surprising), or perhaps a defect of observation by field workers—anthropologists would tend to identify Creole cultures, while sociologists would be prone to discover Hispanoid groups (with weak Indian cultural matrixes).

This methodological uncertainty arises from the fact that the authors, although extremely diligent, have consigned in the text some value judgments that cast doubts on the "cultural personality" portrait of Aritama. After reading the book, one is left with the sour impression that the authors "took revenge" on the

peasants for possible slights suffered during field work, or for the villagers' attempts to use magic to force the investigators to leave (p. 398). The authors' apparent hostility toward Aritamans seems evident in descriptions contained on pages 330, 334–35, and 370, especially the last one where a religious procession is described in mocking terms. Their excessive insistence on the food drive (which is in fact important) appears contradicted by their own descriptions of anxieties caused by disease, agriculture, and changes in occupations and even in clothes. One would recall Mead's description of the Manu, but without her sympathetic and often admiring attitude toward the natives. This sort of treatment may obscure local social realities.

There is one fact which unfortunately lowers the inherent value of the book: except for Gillin's monograph, no sources are cited, no documents produced which could give authority to the authors' statements (especially historical) and which would provide further lines of inquiry and research, so much needed in the present stage of development of social sciences in Colombia. This is an elementary methodological principle. A book can hardly be considered scientific if it merely purports personal views.

Such criticism is painful, in view of the many merits and virtues of the book. It throws light upon the social and economic structure of a little known region, it advances data carefully collected on culture and personality formation, and it presents an articulated theory of hallucinatory imagery. Besides, *The People of Aritama* is well written. Thus, in spite of the shortcomings just mentioned, the authors should be highly commended.

ORLANDO FALS BORDA

National University of Colombia
Bogotá

The Quest for Paradise; Europe and the American Moral Imagination. By CHARLES L. SANFORD. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. x+282. $5.00.

This book explores the thesis that the Edenic myth—the quest for paradise amidst the temptations of evil—has been the most powerful and comprehensive organizing force in American culture. To establish this contention the author, a professor of language and literature, presents an array of illustrations, mainly citations from the works of literary and political writers (not apparently chosen according to any particular scheme)

Sanford sees himself as starting where historians have left off. Though historians, he says, have used the myth of Eden as "a way of interpreting history" and studied it as "an effect of history and a contributing factor to history," they have not yet considered the paradise theme "as a possible basis for a more comprehensive view of history." Thus he seems to view the myth as *the dominant* myth in shaping the history of the American people. The failure of historians to pursue the Edenic myth further is attributed "in part" to their reluctance to venture into the "shadowy area of social psychology." This book may only demonstrate that students of literature rush in where historians and social psychologists have no wish to tread. To try to confirm or disconfirm the validity of Sanford's claim concerning the determinant consequences of the Edenic myth (so broadly defined) seems to this reviewer a sociological task beyond the call of duty—and without compensatory results. While it may be true that sociologists view myth primarily as justifying social practices, they have long agreed that ideas have consequences.

Each chapter is essentially a self-sustaining essay woven about the central theme. To illustrate the content: Writing on "The Hope of Reform and the Promise of American Life" the author quotes from literary reformers and critics such as Thoreau, Hawthorne, Bellamy, Mark Twain, Lincoln Steffens, Herbert Croly, and John Steinbeck to conclude that demands of American reformers have been shaped by the quest for perfection; theirs is a sense of moral outrage that perfection has not been realized. Material progress was long viewed by advocates of reform as evidence that America was being corrupted and fast going the way of Europe (the symbol of Evil). Their vision of a preindustrial heaven on earth inspired attacks on the spiritual poverty of America but also led to superficial thinking about the real problems of society. Though the reformers, living in their dream world, were perhaps a bit worried that they had been dispossessed from Eden, they were not willing to face up to reality. They failed to see "that the real enemy

of reform was what Herbert Croly called a canting Americanism of national irresponsibility and indiscriminate individualism." Such patterns of American thinking are traceable to the pursuit of paradise. Thus, the lack of enthusiasm for reform effort on the part of many Americans is also derived by Sanford from the pervasiveness of the same Edenic myth.

When the dust jacket dubs the book *"very readable,"* one hesitates but one can only agree that it is "erudite." Who can fail to admire a scholar who can weave together analyses of Kerouac, Roosevelt at Yalta, Christopher Columbus, Savonarola, Benjamin Franklin, and numerous others into the central theme of the Edenic myth as a cultural force? The book is suggested, though not required, reading for those with interests in intellectual history, the sociology of literature, and knowledge But when the dust jacket calls the book "provocative, albeit, controversial," I find it hard to be provoked or to understand what the controversy is all about.

GLADYS ENGEL LANG

Queens College

Heroes, Villains, and Fools: The Changing American Character. By ORRIN E. KLAPP. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+176. $3.95.

The linguistic categories people use to designate certain "social types" reflect meanings shared over some universe of discourse. How an analysis of the meanings of these categories can contribute to the study of group life has been demonstrated by such works in the old Chicago sociological tradition as Louis Wirth's *The Ghetto* and Samuel M. Strong's study of Negro "culture" in urban America. Klapp's little volume hews more closely to this tradition than to any other. His approach differs from that of his predecessors, partly in the scope of his subject matter (which embraces nothing less than the changing American character) and partly in the reliance of his diagnosis on three basic role models (the hero, the villain, and the fool). Much of the first part recapitulates—with some modification to be sure—themes which the author has dealt with in previously published articles on these types.

Those looking for a diagnosis of specific instances of hero worship or witch hunts or patterns of comedy will not find it here. Klapp focuses on linguistic usage; his study could be described as essentially lexicographical. Instead of a pantheon of supermen, the reader is introduced to such types as the "top dog," the trouble-maker, the fuddy duddy, etc. Generalizations about types are amply illustrated by reference to flesh-and-blood representatives, literary characters, and student responses to designations of role types. The presentation has a strongly impressionistic flavor.

The following key passage illustrates the character of most generalizations found in the book: "I have no statistics to present but may, perhaps, give an impression here—that three models (the good Joe, the smart operator, and the playboy) are most typical of the new American character that is forming. I see a composite of these images: the American who wants to be an easy going Joe with plenty of friends; who 'lives it up,' doesn't work too hard; and is smart enough to get machines or other people to do what he doesn't want to do. I do not see an emphasis on the Machiavellian lion, Neanderthal strong man, hard working puritan, Daniel Boone, or persevering seeker or climber. . . . These three types—the good Joe, smart operator, and playboy—seem to me to sum up, as far as three types could, the aspirations and character of one hundred and seventy million different people—what the new American character is coming to be. I think that such a type of man fits a society where pseudo-integration is the prevalent organization. For in pseudo-integration you do not put yourself out too far; you play it smart, act the good Joe, and use leisure as a relief from the tensions of excessive role playing perhaps even as a quest for self" (p. 121).

To this reviewer repeated use of one and the same public figure (e.g., Khrushchev, Hoffa, Senatory McCarthy, Will Rogers) to illustrate more than one of the three types (hero, villain, and fool) was somewhat disconcerting. While this could reflect usage and thus index the degree of integration found in American society, it is never made fully explicit to what extent such a lack of consensus reflects difficulties in defining the particular social category or, rather, the different evaluations of a personality by different people. Notwithstanding ambiguities of this sort, discussions of "anomic types," of the functions

of mockery of heroes, or of our "antiheroic" age contain suggestive insights.

It is the looseness with which linguistic social type categories are applied in the diagnosis, rather than their use, that constantly raises questions. For example, we are dealing with the changing American character but are offered no base line against which to gauge change. Clarification of the meanings contained in the social type categories is intended to support Klapp's diagnosis of American society. Yet since this linguistic analysis can, according to his own admission, sometimes be deceptive, correct interpretation of its sociological implications depends on how the analyst relates them to his own preconceptions. One's understandings about American society, it would seem, contribute as much to the linguistic analysis as the linguistic analysis does to the understanding of that society.

KURT LANG

Queens College

Living with Television. By IRA O. GLICK and SIDNEY J. LEVY. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 262. $4.95.

Living with Television is based on materials collected in sixty-nine separate studies by Social Research, Inc., over a period of four and a half years, involving altogether more than thirteen thousand interviews. The immediate objective of most of these studies was to ascertain viewer reactions to specific shows, personalities, and commercials. Also included was a survey on general attitudes toward television.

The authors treat television and television content as symbols and symbol systems. The responses to TV fare are seen to depend on how congruent these symbols are with dispositions already present. Accordingly, television can be either "embraced" or "protested" with an "accommodating" stance lying between these polarities. Life-cycle phases generate typical attitudes. Children up to twelve are generally embracers; the "teens" is typically a stage of protest, while the homebound old (over fifty-five) tend to revert to an embracing attitude. In the years between, when child-rearing and home-making are major concerns, social class exerts a determining influence on the attitude toward television. There is upper-middle-class protest, lower-middle-class accommodation and upper-lower-class embrace.

Documentation consists of profiles and vignettes of typical viewers. Popular attitudes are further amplified by sketches depicting the images different viewers have of programs and commercials. Description is supported by a welter of sociological and social psychological interpretations. But despite these and despite the inclusion of a methodological appendix, the volume remains a semipopular report. Aberrations from "type" are admitted, but their frequency and the factors that account for them are not analyzed in any detail. Also the report relies heavily on respondents' accounts, as, for example, in the conclusion that an attitude of accommodation gradually displaces the more extreme forms of embrace and protest once the novelty of television wears off and people learn to live with it

The descriptions themselves are sober, the picture of how people live with television appears to be authentic. The authors use a vivid essay style. The limitations of the volume may derive, in part, from an indecision concerning the readers to whom they wish to appeal. Still, the data initially collected to meet demands of clients, when put together, add up to little that is new.

KURT LANG

Queens College

Communications in Africa: A Search for Boundaries. By LEONARD W. DOOB. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi+406. $7.50.

In *Communications in Africa* Professor Doob has set a formidable task for himself and arrives at rather extraordinary results. The task is to open up Africa to research in communication. Doob is the most recent of a long line of intellectual conquistadors. What is extraordinary in his approach? He relies entirely on illustrative materials, often anecdotal in quality, to show the possibilities inherent in his methods. We are given a set of categories to shape our thoughts and some examples to illustrate them. Two are neatly and comfortably shuffled, efficiently, as by a master at cards; and since most of the examples illustrate most of the categories it all works—or does it? I confess to not knowing the answer

Nor does re-reading the book help to provide an answer.

If the book itself is mystifying, the importance of the subject particularly for Africa cannot be gainsaid. While we may know *who* communicates, we may not know *what* communicates.

To a layman like myself the study of communication in developing societies presents some puzzling problems. How does one compensate in research for differences between objective and subjective meanings which remain unreconciled when observer and subject belong to differing cultures? Is it possible to locate the communications aspect of multifunctional acts? How can actions which perform widely differing functions be usefully linked to a particular communications sequence? To one who is not a professional in his field, these and other difficulties of communication analysis in Africa seem great enough to warrant further discussion.

Precisely because I think this book is important I would like to query some of its conceptual aspects. I think there are several weaknesses here. Unfortunately I cannot give a professional criticism. I suggest that Doob's book is of significance because of (1) its theoretical scope, (2) the possibility of using it for comparative studies, and (3) the need for greater knowledge of effective communications by political and administrative practitioners. Doob's work, I have indicated, is an effort to evolve a theory of communications because the "search for boundaries" is also a search for theory.

If my interpretation of Doob's book is correct then several questions are in order.

1 How parsimonious is the analytical system? Are all these variables necessary?

The question is difficult to answer. Each concept is useful. The data employed in illustrations demonstrate that. However, no real attempt is made to indicate which of the categories are simply useful and which are clearly essential. Perhaps all are needed. If this is the case then the scheme is far too cumbersome. Composed as it is of four sets of three variables each, arranged in sequence, the system of categories becomes very clumsy. Moreover, discussion of each of the variables leads Doob to incorporate still other, more descriptive ones. For example, Variable II, "Goals," is further divided into primary, social, governing, and intergroup (a subform of governing) and emotive. The description of these requires still other variables. For example, primary goals are divided into three subtypes: body-sustaining, body-protecting, and tool-obtaining. The same holds true for the other typologies within the main variables. This results in a most elaborate taxonomy. We are not told how the taxonomy is derived except by reference to Hovlund and Janis whom Doob acknowledges as the inspiration of the scheme.

2. Is the taxonomy useful? A taxonomical theory of communications should pick up and render meaningful similarities and differences of communications and provide a basis formulating their means, range, and efficiency. On the first score, Doob shows how every act and every social object communicates something or is a means to communication. Since his illustrations are only that, he is unable to give us guidance on the evaluation of them, their range of significance, or their efficiency. Such evaluation would rest first on a mere experimentally derived set of data. As well, he would need to domesticate this taxonomic system and relate it to more general models of functioning societies, or descriptive models of the society in which a communication sequence under study actually occurs. No reference is made to known generalized models or a particularistic model. Such is the puritanism of the social psychologist that I suspect Doob will have to invent sociological and anthropological theory all by himself in order to evaluate the setting.

3. Are the concepts useful for operational techniques? Do these categories have a "cutting edge"? I think they probably do. For example, on Variable IV, Extending Media, we are told that "Certain *mechanical devices* display visual media and thus function as channels for disseminating them: bulletin boards, picture frames, chalkboards, billboards, and epidiascopes" (p. 106). Proverbs painted on West African lorries; such mottoes as "Help is God," "All in Vain," etc., pregnancy sticks among the Nama Hottentots, as well as scribes, postal services, and other more modern media are used as indicators of what is meant. In his discussion Doob goes beyond these to show the consequences in Africa of using new media for information and their possible implications. What begins as

painfully obvious shows less obvious consequences.

4. How good are the categories as a system? Here Doob is particularly unsatisfactory. System implies theory, but Doob's approach is a description of events which make up communications. It is not a theory of communications. A theory would presumably place greater stress upon causes of communications, relationships between communication and information, and the conditions under which the need to communicate is weakened or strengthened. There is sequence in the categories, and this raises the nice question whether sequence, by demonstrating relationship, therefore denotes system.

The question is more than an idle one because Doob is, after all, engaged in a search for boundaries. Boundaries can inhere in an analytical system or a concrete one. Since communication is itself an analytical device to identify certain aspects of daily life, "system" needs to be analytical, and imposed upon "the real world." By examining the real world in the light of the analytical system, we record our observations. Sequence is clearly a form of system since it demonstrates a patterning of variables. It is not a very elaborate one. Perhaps one can argue that a taxonomy which shows any system at all is doing pretty well. If this is true, then these categories do pretty well as an analytic system. The only trouble is that the "boundaries" remain vague.

Despite these criticisms, communicating, like governing, is an important series of events. Descriptive, taxonomical theories were crucial in elevating the study of my own field, government, to the level of a discipline even though these never succeeded in fixing its boundaries. Perhaps this book will do the same for communications. In the next few years communications could well become a discipline in its own right. Whether or not that occurs, however, the study of communications in Africa will clearly increase in importance. On that latter score, Doob is clearly the first to explore where many others will follow.

DAVID E. APTER

Institute of International Studies
University of California, Berkeley

Sozialer Wandel und Krankheit ("Social Change and Disease"). By MANFRED PFLANZ. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1962. Pp. 403. DM. 34.50.

This book puts medical sociology on the map in Germany and may well turn out to be considered a standard reference book for German sociologists. With unequaled thoroughness, the author delimits, defines, and expounds the field in all its dimensions, even historical, noting the antecedents of the present-day discipline and also relating problems of medicine to social change. He gives an excellent review of work done in this field in the United States and in Europe, showing competence and up-to-date knowledge.

In the second part of the book the author presents his own research about the social correlates of specified symptoms and diagnostic categories. The research was conducted at the Medical Clinic of the University of Giessen, where for three years, from 1956 through 1958, all patients filled out questionnaires—10,000 in all.

For more than two hundred pages, frequency of specific illnesses and reported ailments are presented in reference to social categories. Unfortunately, the presentation only rarely includes exact tables. The reader is told that there are certain correlations between specified social variables and specific illnesses or symptoms. Moreover, while the various social categories are discussed in turn, there is no attempt at synthesizing, integrating, or merely cross-tabulating the data. One example, singling out the symptom of headache, will suffice.

We learn on page 254 that male immigrants from the Balkan states report more headaches than would be expected by chance; on page 260 that women commuters suffer from headaches more frequently than expected, and on page 273 that in the upper class both women and men report headaches less frequently than in the lower class. On page 284 we find out that headaches are frequent among patients whose children are (or were) university students, and on page 298 we hear that this symptom is more prevalent among the unemployed than among the employed. This last finding is not integrated with the one reported on page 273 about the prevalence of this symptom in the lower class generally. All symptoms and diseases—dizziness, vegetative complaints, gas-

tritis, ulceritis, diabetes, etc.—are treated in the same fashion: under chapter headings referring to social categories, the reader is told that correlations between these categories and specified symptoms exist directly, or inversely, or do not exist. But there is no systematic integration of data and no attempt to subsume different findings under one concept. Even such obvious cross-tabulations as between family size and social class have not been made. On page 246 it is reported that male patients with five or more children report headaches more frequently, and although the author conjectures in this context that this may be due to class position given the higher birth rate in the lower class, he does not cross-tabulate these data with those on class position presented in a subsequent chapter where he tells us that males of the lowest class have an above-average number of headaches.

This is not to say that Pflanz is unaware of methodological and theoretical problems. After the presentation and discussion of his data, he discusses some pitfalls of statistical artifacts and sample selection; and in the last part of the book he deals with theoretical problems, such as "anomie" and "the role of the patient," quoting proper authorities (Merton, Parsons) and presenting their theoretical contributions. Yet, he presents these theories and insights in addition to the data and not for their evaluation.

In spite of these obvious shortcomings, this book, because of its all-encompassing thoroughness and wealth of information, as well as its exhaustive bibliography, will be useful to students in the field of health and illness.

ROSE LAUB COSER

McLean Hospital
Belmont, Massachusetts

Freiheit und soziale Sicherheit: Motive und Prinzipien sozialer Sicherung Dargestellt an England und Frankreich ("Freedom and Social Welfare: Motives and Principles of Social Security: The Case of England and France"). By GABRIELE BREMME. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1961. Pp. xv+263. DM. 29.

The current debate on health insurance makes this book particularly timely reading as it gives some of the ideological underpinnings and developments relevant to the issues of public welfare and social security in Western industrial societies. For many sociologists, this type of investigation will perhaps appear somewhat marginal since its main contribution is to the history of social and political ideas. But it is also a contribution to the study of the interaction between specific ideological trends and traditions and the social, economic, and political conditions in two national societies, namely, England and France. In its concern with questions of both social science and social policy, Bremme's study stands in the tradition of the problem-oriented *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik* which was one of the more influential sociological forums of its time.

The book traces first the development of British social policy, giving particular attention to the Beveridge Plan and its implementation between 1944 and 1948, and to the functioning of the new system during the first ten years of its existence. A similar line of presentation is followed for the French system, again with an emphasis on the legislative activity since 1945 and the modifications introduced by De Gaulle's administration. Of particular interest in the description of legislative activity surrounding social reform issues is the rather detailed documentation of the political perspectives and tactics of interest groups, trade unions, political parties, and parliamentary factions.

The third part of the book compares the British and the French systems of social security in terms of differential economic, social, and political structure, suggestive of a two-way sociology of knowledge type analysis. Apart from this rather latent virtue, however, those interested in social reform legislation as a process of inquiry and problem-solving will find this book quite useful.

WOLF V. HEYDEBRAND

University of Chicago

CURRENT BOOKS

ABRAHAM, HENRY J. *The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England and France.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xii+381. Descriptive analysis of administration of justice, with cross-national impressions.

ACKOFF, RUSSELL L., *et al. Scientific Method: Optimizing Applied Research Decisions.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xii+464. On "planning or designing the use of science in the pursuit of objectives"

ALLINSMITH, WESLEY, and GOETHALS, GEORGE W. *The Role of Schools in Mental Health.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962. Pp. xi+337. $7.50. Review of the literature in mental health and education, with reports on survey undertaken for this volume on innovations in two school systems as perceived by teachers and students, and other themes.

PETINO, ANTONIO. *Annali del Mezzogiorno* ("Annals of Southern Italy"). Sicily· Universita di Catania, 1961. Pp. 264. Seventeen papers on socioeconomic and political problems of the region.

ARTISS, KENNETH L. *Milieu Therapy in Schizophrenia.* New York: Grune & Stratton, 1962. Pp. xviii+169. $6.00. Report on psychotherapy in a military setting.

BECK, WARREN A. *New Mexico: A History of Four Centuries.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. Pp. xii+363. $5.95.

BOYLAN, MARGUERITE T. (ed.). *The Catholic Church and Social Welfare: A Symposium.* New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1962. Pp. 217. $5.00. Fifteen chapters by Catholic practitioners in the field of social welfare.

BRIM, ORVILLE G., JR., GLASS, DAVID C., LAVIN, DAVID E., and GOODMAN, NORMAN. *Personality and Decision Processes.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. 336. $8.00. Based on test of decision-making processes concerning child-rearing practices, and personality tests administered to two hundred adults.

BROWN, ZVIE, and LEVIN, DOV. *The Story of an Underground.* Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1962. Pp. xvii+422. Based on documents of underground organizations in the Kovno ghetto and on personal testimonials and written memoirs of survivors. In Hebrew, with seventeen-page synopsis in English.

CAMARGO, CANDIDO PROCOPIO DE. *Aspectos sociologicos del espiritismo en São Paulo.* Bogotá: Oficina Internacional de Investigaciones Sociales de FERES, 1961. Pp. 125.

CARLYLE, MARGARET. *The Awakening of Southern Italy.* London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi+147. 21*s*. Causes and consequences of poverty, based on personal observation and government reports.

CASSARA, BEVERLY BENNER. *American Women· The Changing Image.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. xv+141. $3.95. Eleven eminent contributors (female) comment on the problems of educated American women.

COX, OLIVER C. *Capitalism and American Leadership.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1962. Pp. xix+328. $6.00. Reviews the rise of capitalism in the United States and the relationship to "backward countries" in accounting for the nature of American leadership.

DALE, J. R. *The Clerk in Industry: A Survey of the Occupational Experience, Status, Education, and Vocational Training of a Group of Male Clerks Employed by Industrial Companies.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1962. Pp 118. 25*s*. Recruitment and training in five British manufacturing firms, with materials on the effects of technical change in clerical work

DREITZEL, HANS P. *Elitebegriff und Sozialstruktur Eine Soziologische Begriffsanalyse* ("Elite Concept and Social Structure: A Sociological Conceptual Analysis"). Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1962. Pp. viii+163. DM. 21 (paper). Assessment of the utility of the concept of elite

EULAU, HEINZ. *Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years: Class Roles and Perspectives in the 1952 and 1956 Elections.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xviii+162. $4.50.

FRIEDBERG, MAURICE. *Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets.* New York: Columbia University, 1962 Pp. xiv+228. $4.75. How Soviet publishers cope with shifts in official policy in selecting of authors and titles, the timing and size of printings, etc.

GIBB, HAMILTON A. R. *Studies on the Civilization of Islam.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+369. $7.50. Fifteen of the author's papers on medieval Islamic history, Islamic philosophy and religion, and other themes.

HAMMOND-TOOKE, W. D. *Bhaca Society: A People of the Transkeian Uplands, South Africa.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xx+325. $7.20. Based on a doctoral dissertation in social anthropology at the University of Cape Town.

HARE, PAUL A. *Handbook of Small Group Research.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962

Pp. x+512. $10.00. A review of the content of a half-century of small-group research, with a bibliography containing 1,385 items.

INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE. *Structures sociales et democratie économique.* Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1961. Pp. 280. Belg. Fr. 250.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology* 2 vols. Washington, D.C.· International Sociological Association, 1962. Pp. 254, 208 Volume I includes a collection of fifteen papers on sociologists, policy-makers, and the public and the nature and problems of sociological theory. Volume II deals with the sociology of development and includes ten papers on the early stages of growth and the maintenance of growth.

JEPHCOTT, PEARL, with NANCY SEEAR and JOHN H. SMITH. *Married Women Working.* New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. 208. $7.00. Based on a sample survey of a working-class London borough and a factory in the area employing married women.

KAUTSKY, JOHN H. *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries.* New York· John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xv+347. $3.95. Twelve papers by area specialists, with an essay by the editor.

KISER, CLYDE V. (ed). *Research in Family Planning* Princeton, N.J : Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xv+662. $12.50. Forty papers presenting studies on family planning around the world, fertility control, and problems of research design and measurement.

KITCHEN, HELEN (ed.). Compiled by Ruth Sloan Associates. *The Educated African: A Country-by-Country Survey of Educational Development in Africa.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962 Pp. xvii+542. $12.50.

KRECH, DAVID, CRUTCHFIELD, R. S., and BALLACHEY, E L. *Individual in Society: A Textbook of Social Psychology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp 564 $7.95.

KROEBER, A. L *A Roster of Civilizations and Culture.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 96 $3.50 An essay on the natural history of the world's cultures, living and extinct.

LEONARD, NEIL. *Jazz and the White Americans: The Acceptance of a New Art Form.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. 215. $4.50. A study of changing taste, based on the author's doctoral dissertation.

LIPSKY, G A., In collaboration with WENDELL BLANCHARD, ABRAHAM M. HIRSCH, and BELA C. MADAY. *Ethiopia.* New Haven· HRAF Press, 1962. Pp. 376. $8.75. Human Relations Area Files are used "to set forth the principal social values, patterns of thought, and chief patterns of behavior to the people."

LITTLE, LAWRENCE C. *A Bibliography of American Doctoral Dissertations, 1885 to 1959.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962. Pp. 215. $4.50.

MCLUHAN, MARSHALL. *The Gutenberg Galaxy.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Pp. 293. $5.95. The author explains, "with the application of the typographic lineal image to the organization of industry and markets and warfare the picture of industrial man is completed, and the *Gutenberg Galaxy* concludes with the 'Galaxy reconfigured' by the advent of electronic man."

MAIR, LUCY. *Primitive Government.* Baltimore: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962. Pp. 288. $1.25 (paper). A social anthropologist "examines the way in which government is carried on among people of simple technology." Based on field work in East Africa.

MAYS, JOHN BARRON. *Education and the Urban Child.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1962. Pp. ix+208. 25*s*. Social survey of the school and its local community in Liverpool.

MOL, J. J. *Churches and Immigrants: A Sociological Study of the Mutual Effect of Religion and Immigrant Adjustment.* The Hague: R. E. M. P. Bulletin, 1961. Pp. 86 $1 50.

NAIR, KUSUM. *Blossoms in the Dust.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. xxv+201. $4.00. Impressions of a Indian journalist who spent one year on a walking tour of India villages.

NATANSON, MAURICE. *Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. Pp. xii+220. Gld. 18. Concerning the philosophical foundation of phenomenology; aesthetics and literature; history and the social sciences.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. *The Principals Look at the Schools.* Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1962. Pp. 75. $1.50. Based on a survey of a national sample of elementary- and secondary-school principals.

NEVINS, ALLAN. *The State Universities and Democracy.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Pp. vii+171. $2.95. The Land Giant Act of 1862 and its aftermath: a historical review.

NIEUWENHUIJZE, C. A. O. VAN. *Society as Process.* The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp. 281. Gld. 28. Essays in social sciences method.

POLSKY, HOWARD W. *Cottage Six: The Social System of Delinquent Boys in Residential Treatment.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962. Pp. 193. $3.25. A participant-observer shows how a deviant subculture is maintained that undermines therapeutic goals of an organization.

PONSIOEN, J. A., *et al. Social Welfare Policy.* The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp. 287. Gld. 1. A text on the theory of social welfare policy and community development, with special reference to India and Yugoslavia.

RAINIO, KULLERVO. *A Stochastic Theory of Social Contacts*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1962. Pp. 103. A laboratory study and an application to sociometry.

RAJAGOPALAN, C. *The Greater Bombay*. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1962. Pp. xxii+211. Rs. 20.00. A study in suburban ecology, the origin and direction of suburbanization. The notion of integrated townships is proposed as a solution to Bombay's metropolitan problems.

RANNEY, AUSTIN (ed.). *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Pp. xi+251. $5.00. Ten political scientists in five countries review the history and present status of the field.

RIESSMAN, FRANK. *The Culturally Deprived Child*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962 Pp xv+140. $3.95. An assessment of the sociocultural circumstances of the "educationally deprived," with a chapter on "ideas for action."

RINTALA, MARVIN. *Three Generations: The Extreme Right Wing in Finnish Politics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. Pp. 281. $5.00. Development of "thought, action, and organization of the extreme right wing in Finnish politics during the years 1917 to 1939."

RITEY, HECTOR J. *The Human Kingdom: A Study of the Nature and Destiny of Man in the Light of Today's Knowledge*. New York. University Publishers, Inc , 1962. Pp. 498. $10.00

SAKSENA, R. N. *Social Economy of a Polyandrous People*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. xiv+143. $6 50. Based on field work in the Himalayas.

SHETH, HANSA. *Juvenile Delinquency in an Indian Setting*. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961. Pp. xv+295. Rs. 15.00. Describes the legal structure, types of offenses and offenders, and social factors in juvenile deliquency in Bombay State.

SHISTER, JOSEPH, AARON, BENJAMIN, and SUMMERS, CLYDE W. *Public Policy and Collective Bargaining*. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Pp. viii+248. $4.50. Eight specialists in law and industrial relations discuss legal regulation of internal union affairs, antitrust laws, picketing and boycotts, and other topics.

SKYUM-NIELSEN, SVEND. *Drinking Habits of Young Men* (in Danish). Copenhagen· Danish National Institute of Social Research, 1962. Pp. 136. Dan kr. 7. A random sample of 451 males, aged fourteen to nineteen, interviewed in Copenhagen to search information on drinking behavior.

SMITH, RAYMOND T. *British Guiana*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi+218. $4.00. Description of the country's social, political, and economic characteristics.

SODDY, KENNETH (ed.). *Identity, Mental Health and Value Systems*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1961. Pp. xii+271. $6.75. Two studies by an international and interprofessional committee

STEPHENS, WILLIAM N. *The Oedipus Complex*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. ix+273. $5.00. Based on ethnographic materials in the Human Relations Area Files and the Peabody Museum Library.

TIBBITTS, CLARK, and DONAHUE, WILMA (eds). *Social and Psychological Aspects of Aging: Aging Around the World*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. xviii+952. $20.00 Proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the International Association of Gerontology, including one hundred papers on social and psychological aspects of aging; social welfare of the aging; biological aspect of aging; medical and clinical aspects of aging.

TOURAINE, ALAIN, and RAGAZZI, ORIETTA. *Ouvriers d'origine agricole* ("Workers of Rural Origins"). Paris: L'École Pratique des Hautes Études, 1961. Pp. 127. (Paper.) A study in social mobility.

UMBARGER, CARTER C., DALSIMER, JAMES S., MORRISON, ANDREW P., and BREGGIN, PETER R *College Students in a Mental Hospital*. New York Grune & Stratton, 1962. Pp. xix+168. (Paper) An account of organized social contacts between college volunteers and mental patients in a hospital community.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. *Bibliography of Social Science Periodicals and Monograph Series: North Korea, 1945–1961*. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1962. Pp 12 $0.15.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE. *How the Government Works for Older People*. Washington, D C Government Printing Office, 1962. Pp. v+110 $0.40.

WAHLKE, JOHN C, EULAU, H., BUCHANAN, W, and FERGUSON, L. C. (eds.). *The Legislative System*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xii+517. $8.95. Eighteen papers on the legislative career, the legislative role, and the like.

WHALEN, WILLIAM J. *Armageddon around the Corner*. New York: John Day Co., 1962. Pp 249. $4.75. A report on Jehovah's Witnesses Describes growth and activities of one indigenous religious movement.

WIESE, LEOPOLD VON. *Das Ich-Wir-Verhältnis* ("The I-and-We Relationship"). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1962. Pp. 92. DM. 8 60 (paper) Essay on the individual in his community.

WINANS, EDGAR V. *Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. xxxvii+180. $5.00. Based on a year of field work in East Africa by an anthropologist; covers economic aspects of the political system, authority systems, kinship, and other topics.

WINER, B. J. *Statistical Principles in Experimental Design*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. x+672. $12.50. A textbook and reference source on experimental design.

WITKIN, H. A., DYK, R. B., FATERSON, H. F., GOODENOUGH, D. R., and KARP, S A. *Psychological Differentiation: Studies of Development*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xii +418. $7.95. A comprehensive report of the authors' research concerning cognition and personality in the course of the individual's development.

WOLF, ALEXANDER, and SCHWARTZ, EMANUEL K. *Psycho-analysis in Groups*. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1962. Pp. ix+326. $8.00. Two psychoanalysts describe concepts and methods of treating patients in a group setting.

WOOD, ARTHUR L. *Crime and Aggression in Changing Ceylon: A Sociological Analysis of Homicide, Suicide, and Economic Crime*. ("Transactions of the American Philosophical Society," Vol LI, Part 8.) Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1961. Pp. 132. $3.00 (paper).

WRIGHT, QUINCY, EVAN, WILLIAM M., and DEUTSCH, MORTON (eds.). *Preventing World War III: Some Proposals*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962. Pp. 460. $6.95. Twenty-six scholars in the sciences and humanities consider ways of stopping the arms race, reducing international tensions, and building a world society.

YASUBA, YASUKICHI. *Birth Rates of the White Population in the United States, 1800–1860*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. 198. $5.00. An economy study on fertility trends; birth ratios; mortality; demographic and socio-economic explanation of birth rates. Includes sixty-three tables.

ZETTERBERG, HANS L. *Social Theory and Social Practice*. New York: Bedminster Press, 1962 Pp. 190. $6.50. Moving from the client's problem to social theory and then back again.


ERRATUM

The *Journal* regrets an error in the article by H. M. Blalock, "Four-Variable Causal Models and Partial Correlations," which appeared in our September, 1962, issue. Chart I was set up incorrectly and should have appeared as follows:


CHART 1

PREDICTION EQUATIONS FOR FOUR-VARIABLE CAUSAL MODELS


FIVE-ARROW MODELS




$r_{12} = 0$




$r_{13.2} = 0$




$r_{23.1} = 0$



$r_{14.23} = 0$




$r_{24.13} = 0$




$r_{34.12} = 0$


FOUR-ARROW MODELS




$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{13} = 0$




$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$




$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{14.23} = 0$



$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{24.13} = 0$





$r_{12} = 0$
$r_{34.12} = 0$





$r_{13} = 0$
$r_{23} = 0$


CHART 1—*Continued*




























THREE-ARROW MODELS






















CHART 1—*Continued*



































THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

Volume LXVIII MARCH 1963 *Number 5*

STRUCTURAL ATTACHMENTS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN URBAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF FLUORIDATION REFERENDUMS[1]

MAURICE PINARD

ABSTRACT

The hypothesis is set forth that the adoption or rejection of fluoridation referendums, as well as the degree of unanimity, is a function of the structural integration of the community. More specifically, it is a function of the attachments of community members to their power elites and of the interconnectedness between members. Using 262 communities as units of analysis, several indicators of the independent variable are obtained from census data. The attachment proposition is generally substantiated, although some refinements that take into account varying types of community power structures have to be introduced

In recent years, many communities throughout the United States have had to face the problem of whether or not they would add fluorine to their water supplies. In accordance with varying legal systems, this decision has been made either by the executive bodies of these communities, town meetings, or referendums.

In a slight majority of the cases examined here, where the decisions were made either by referendums or by town meetings, the proposal to instal fluoridation equipment in the community was defeated (140 cases out of 262, i.e., 53.4 per cent). The identification of "structural" or "contextual" effects on community decisions is the focus of the analysis to be presented. It should be noted that the level of analysis adopted in this paper is not the individual behavior, but community behavior.[2]

It is first hypothesized that the various outcomes can be explained by the strength of the citizens' attachments to one another and to their community leaders. Communities can be seen as vast sociometric networks of individuals and subgroups more or less linked together and to their leaders. These networks may be such as to produce a closely knit, highly integrated community. On the other hand, the whole system may be only loosely interconnected, comprised of many independent subgroups, each one, though possibly integrated, being only loosely attached, if at all, to the others or to the community leadership. It is hypothesized that the community is more likely to support its leaders' policies in the former situation than in the latter.

[1] The author is particularly indebted to James S. Coleman of the Johns Hopkins University from whom he secured the referendum data and whose ideas and comments were most stimulating during the course of this research. Raymond Breton, Arthur L. Stinchcombe, and S. Stephen Kegeles are also thanked for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[2] Such an orientation avoids the pitfalls of ecological analysis (see W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, XV [1950], 351–57, and H. Menzel's "Comment," in the same issue, p. 674).

Second, it is hypothesized that closely knit communities will also tend to take stronger stands either for or against the issue, since their high degree of integration makes them move, so to speak, as a unit, in one direction or the other. Whenever they make a favorable decision, which according to the first hypothesis, they are more likely to make, one should find that this approval is made with a greater unanimity than in less-integrated communities. By the same token, if the close-knit community should take a negative stand on the project (for whatever reasons, whether it be because the leaders disapprove of the project, because the whole community has become alienated from the leaders, or because some influential dissenting group alone leads public opinion), one should expect a greater consensus of opinion against the issue than in a community less well integrated.

In short, the first hypothesis states that stronger attachments to, and identification with, the community create conditions favorable to a positive outcome, while the second hypothesis asserts that the degree of integration is determinant of unanimity.[3]

The basic ideas of this research are derived from Coleman's model of community conflicts,[4] which postulates that the basic structure of a community, its group attachments, informal associations, and community organizations, is the major determinant of the course of controversies. Thus, he states that after some people and groups have been involved in a conflict through disagreement on a particular issue, other "people respond to the conflict according to their previous associations, attachments, and antagonism to other people and groups in the community; that is, one's existing relations with and feelings toward other persons already in the dispute become a means of being drawn into it."[5]

Consequently, "if one could lay out the networks of social relations, likes, dislikes and organizational attachments prior to a dispute, and then locate the initial nuclei of opposition, he would know better what pre-existing attachments pull people to one side or another."[6]

METHOD OF COMMUNITY DECISION

In order to test the above hypotheses,[7] let us first consider whether the community reached its decision at a town meeting or by a referendum.[8] The town-meeting meth-

[3] Stated otherwise, the present hypothetical scheme implies an "asymmetrical" view of the political process instead of the two usual sides—one against the other—of the traditional "symmetrical" view. As will be seen later on, unexpected findings necessitate a reconsideration of the latter view.

[4] James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[6] *Ibid.* There are, of course, differences between a community controversy and a community referendum. While the latter is an institutionalized means of decision-making, the former is not. Furthermore, and related to this first difference, a controversy implies, by its very definition, group cleavages and antagonisms, while the outcome of a referendum can be the very manifestation of community integration or its simple absence. But it is contended that in both cases, the "social geography" of the communities can have very analogous effects.

[7] There is a growing body of research on referendums that often supports the above hypotheses. Some of these findings will be discussed below. Space limitations, however, prevent an extensive examination of this research here. See, among others, W. A. Gamson, "The Fluoridation Dialogue. Is It an Ideological Conflict?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXV, No. 4 (1961), 526–37; W. E Thompson and J. E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (1959–60), 190–95; E. L. McDill and J. C. Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (1962), 205–13; W A. Gamson and Peter H. Irons, "Community Characteristics and Fluoridation Outcome," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVII (1961), 66–74; A. L. Green, "The Ideology of Anti-Fluoridation Leaders," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVII (1961), 18; Arnold Simmel, "A Signpost for Research on Fluoridation Conflicts: The Concept of Relative Deprivation," *Journal of Social Issues*, XVII (1961), 26–36; T F A Plaut, "Analysis of Voting Behavior on a Fluoridation Referendum," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIII (1959), 213–22.

[8] Most indicators of the independent variable have been taken or adapted from census data (U.S Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population*: 1950. Vol. II. *Characteristics of the Population*.

od of decision should be more conducive to a positive outcome than the referendum procedure. In a town meeting the people gathered are more likely to be citizens who are interested in the community problems, who share the same values as the leaders, and who are more socially linked with them. Fewer unattached citizens would be likely to participate than in a referendum.[9] Consequently, fewer rejections of the project in such situations should be expected.[10]

Part 2 ff., [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952]). In addition, other indicators are employed, such as the strength of the turnout at the polls and the way in which the decision was reached, either by a town meeting or by a referendum (the town meetings and referendums considered in this paper were held between 1951 and 1955 in communities located throughout the United States).

[9] The concept of attachment is here taken in a broad sense: it covers all kinds of social ties, from the primary relations to the secondary associations in larger groups, whether voluntary or not; it also covers the values, the interests, etc., through which one identifies himself with particular persons and groups (see Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26).

[10] Since in the present data only a few cases are known to have been decided at a town meeting and since the cases in Massachusetts have been largely decided in that way, the two sets of data were pooled. The relationship holds, of course, in both sets of data:

	No of Communities		
	Measure Passed	Measure Defeated	Total
Massachusetts data:			
Town meeting. . .	30	15	35
Referendums.	2	6	8
Present data:			
Town meeting.	6	0	6
Referendums . . .	92	120	212

The Massachusetts data are from A. L. Green and J. L. Briggs, "Fluoridation in Massachusetts: A Statistical Comparison of Communities" (Cambridge, Mass.: Social Science Program, Harvard School of Public Health, 1957), pp. 11–12. (Mimeographed) One case which was in both sets of data has been eliminated from the present data. The method of decision is not known for some cases in the latter data.

The data reveal that 63 per cent of the communities that decided the issue at a town meeting approved the measure, while only 43 per cent of the communities deciding by referendum did the same.[11] This clearly supports the above expectation.

TURNOUT AT THE POLLS

As Coleman points out, the strength of the turnout in popular elections is generally related to involvement and interest in political matters: A lower turnout tends to represent the votes of "those most *attached* to community affairs."[12] On the other hand, if the turnout is large, it means that less attached people are more likely to participate in the referendum. Therefore, one would predict according to the first hypothesis that the lower the turnout, the more likely the measure is to be accepted. Furthermore, the second hypothesis leads one to predict that the lower the turnout, the more likely the referendum is to be approved or defeated by a strong majority (Table 1).

The reader can see that both expectations are corroborated by the data presented in Table 1.[13] Subsequent tables will show

[11] $N = 41$ and 220, respectively. a_1 (effect of form of decision) $= .20$; P $(a_1^* \leq 0) = .008$. For this result as for the following ones, a_i represents the percentage difference (in the $n \times 2$ tables) or what amounts to the mean of the percentage differences in each pair of controlled comparisons (in the higher-order tables). The probability that a_i could have occurred by chance, that is that a_i^*—the population effect parameter—is smaller than or equal to zero, is established as usual by finding the standardized normal deviate and by referring to tables of the standardized cumulative normal distribution. To this end, the variance of a_i is estimated as the sum of the variance of each proportion, divided by the square of the number of paired comparisons. The justification for these procedures will be presented in James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (N.Y.: Free Press of Glencoe, forthcoming).

[12] Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 19. To support his point, Coleman presents there a preliminary analysis of the same data.

[13] Since the number of eligible voters in each community was unknown, the turnout was estimated as the proportion of voters among the total population.

that the effect of turnout is maintained with the control of other factors.

SIZE OF POPULATION

It is well known that small communities are conducive to the formation of a closely knit social system. People in small towns are more likely to know each other and to have a greater amount of interaction among themselves through more diversified roles.

TABLE 1

VOTER TURNOUT FOR REFERENDUM AND APPROVAL OR DEFEAT OF MEASURE

	Turnout	
	Less than 25 Per Cent	25 Per Cent or More
Percentage of communities passing the measure*	46	36
No.	68	66
Of those passing the measure, percentage passing it with 60 per cent or more in favor†	68	42
No.	31	24
Of those defeating the measure, percentage defeating it with 60 per cent or more against†	84	67
No.	37	42

* a_1 (effect of turnout on outcome) = 10; $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = 12.

† a_2 (effect of turnout on extreme outcomes, with approval or disapproval considered as a control) = 21; $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = 004.

They are more linked to each other in the pursuit of their interests, either economic, political, or social. These structural characteristics should lead to a more easy identification with the political elite of the community and create pressures to favor any action, even if only mildly backed, by this elite. Therefore, one would expect the smaller communities to be more receptive to a fluoridation project.[14]

The data do reveal such a relationship: 51 per cent of the communities with a population of less than 10,000 passed the measure, while only 40 per cent of the larger ones did so.[15] The relationship is not very strong, but will be shown to be partly strengthened by holding turnover constant.[16] This result is all the more strikin since one could have predicted an opposit finding on two grounds: (1) small commu nities are usually depicted as much mor conservative than larger ones, and (2) i general as well as in these data, small com munities tend to have a larger turnout tha large ones, a factor conducive to defeat:

The above result could be explained, no by a stronger-attachment thesis, but, as i may be suggested, by a process of self-se lection: administrators in smaller commu nities know their citizenry better and there fore are in a position to present fluoridatio projects only when they think that ther is a high probability of approval.[17]

[14] Other researchers apparently found inconsister results in this regard. Gamson and Irons repor without details that in two other sets of data "n significant relationship between fluoridation actio and population size" was found, and that in on other set, "the data show no correlation" (Gamso and Irons, *op. cit.*, p. 68). However, a reanalysis o one of the former sets of data by this writer (th other sets were not available) revealed that, whil 60 per cent of the smaller communities of the sam ple have adopted fluoridation, only 18 per cent o the larger ones have done so, which strongly cor roborates our hypothesis ($N = 42$ and 11 respec tively; $P\ (a_1^* \leq 0) = .001$). This was recalculate from Green and Briggs, *op. cit.*, p. 3. The significan break on the independent variable in these dat appears at a population size about 2,500 (the on adopted here).

[15] $N = 158$ and 100, respectively. a_1 (effect o size) $= .11$; $P\ (a_1^* \leq 0) = .04$.

[16] With the regions held constant, the correspond ing percentage differences are for the Northeast, 3: per cent; the South, 24 per cent; the North Cen tral, − 4 per cent; the West, 0 per cent; a_1 (effect of size) $= .13$; $P\ (a_1^* \leq 0) = .10$.

[17] The installation of fluoridation equipment is more common in large cities than in small communities. According to *Public Health Reports*, by 1956, the proportion of large cities (500,000 or more) fluoridating their water supplies was 55 per cent, while for communities with a population ranging from 10,000 to 500,000, from 2,500 to 10,000, and for communities smaller than 2,500, the figures were 28 per cent, 15 per cent, and 5 per cent, respectively. (Reported in Benjamin D. Paul, "Fluoridation of Community Water Supplies" [Cambridge, Mass.: Social Science Program, Harvard School of Public Health, 1958], p. 5. Mimeographed.)

There is, however, another aspect of the result presented thus far that tends to confirm the prediction of this paper and that cannot be explained by a "self-selection" argument. If it is true that a positive outcome in small communities is a function of attachment to the administration, then one should observe not only a positive response but also a stronger positive response to fluoridation projects in these communities. Similarly, within these communities, if any group commanding community identification, be it elite or not, wages strong opposition to the project, this opposition faction is less likely to face a strong pro-fluoridation group because a closely knit community is more likely to move as a unit. Therefore, in this event, a stronger negative response would be expected.[18] Note that this would be contrary to the self-selection hypothesis, according to which the results would be skewed only in the positive direction.

Table 2 is partly consistent with the above argument. At least in the cases where the measure was defeated, the smaller the community, the stronger was the disapproval, clearly contradicting the self-selection hypothesis.[19]

Finally, since the turnout is generally lower in larger towns, thus favoring a positive outcome, the relationship observed above between size and outcome should be strengthened when the effects of turnout are controlled (Table 3).

This is partly true, although the relationship is not strengthened in the case of a high turnout, the percentage difference between small and large communities is increased when the turnout is low. Note also that both factors have an independent effect, with the size of the community having a somewhat larger influence.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION

The level of employment should also affect the degree and strength of attachments in a community. A high degree of unemployment is likely to produce at least two kinds of relaxation in the attachment network of the communities. First, it has been repeatedly found that the unemployed tend to isolate themselves socially as a re-

TABLE 2

SIZE OF COMMUNITY AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	Population		
	Less than 10,000	10,000–25,000	More than 25,000
Of those passing the measure, percentage passing it with 60 per cent or more in favor	56	73	42
No.	32	11	12
Of those defeating the measure, percentage defeating it with 60 per cent or more against*	82	74	61
No.	38	23	18

* a_1 (effect of size on disapproval, comparing extremes) = .21; $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = .06.

[18] Similar findings were reported in quite a different context. In the study of the International Typographical Union, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman found that the small union shops were much more likely to show unanimity in their approval or disapproval of a political party than larger shops. The stronger ties between the members in small shops were seen as preventing any strong political cleavage. See S. M. Lipset, M. A. Trow, and J. S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), esp. pp. 166 ff. The same study has also established the existence of a strong tendency on the part of small locals to support the incumbent administration of the I.T.U., due to stronger attachments to it in terms of communication and interests (See *ibid.*, chap. xvii, esp. pp. 364–82).

[19] Since the variation in the votes may be expected by chance alone to be greater in small than in large towns, the observed variation might be the result of that. However, even a turnout as low as 225 voters would still account for less than 7 per cent of the variation two-thirds of the times. Since this is a higher limit and since the variation observed in the data are greater than that, the results cannot be explained this way. A similar remark could have been made with regard to Table 1 above.

sult of their condition, even though they have more time for social participation.[20] It is easy to assume that this detachment from primary and secondary relations is also accompanied by attitudes of detachment and even alienation from the larger community.

Even more important is the finding that a high rate of unemployment in a community produces a widespread atmosphere of political apathy and detachment.[21] One can easily imagine how such feelings could be vented in an election. Latent economic and

This expectation is supported by the data. While 48 per cent of the communities with a low rate of unemployment (4 per cent or less) adopted the flouridation project, 36 per cent of those with a higher rate of unemployment did the same.[22] Again this relationship will be shown to be strengthened with population growth constant in the case of in- and out-migration (see Table 5 below).[23]

GROWTH OF COMMUNITIES

Another important indicator of the de-

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNITY SIZE AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION HOLDING TURNOUT CONSTANT

	LOW TURNOUT*		HIGH TURNOUT	
	Small Community†	Large Community	Small Community†	Large Community
Percentage of communities passing the measure‡ ..	55	37	41	31
No....	33	35	37	29

* Less than 25%.

† Population less than 10,000.

‡ a_1 (effect of size) = 14; $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = 05; a_2 (effect of turnout) = 10; $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = .12

political attachments are relaxed; people feel more free to oppose their leaders in any opportunity presented them. (In a way, a referendum on any particular project always becomes a plebiscite for the incumbents.)

gree of attachments in these communities, which can be obtained from census data, is their rate of growth between 1940 and 1950. Every increase in the population of a community by in-migration brings in new residents who can be assumed to have both weaker attachments within, and identification with, their new community. Such a

[20] See W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 163 ff., and references cited therein.

[21] In a largely unemployed community, Jahoda and Zeisel found that during the depression "subscriptions to a very low-priced workers' political publication dropped by almost 60 per cent; whereas subscriptions to another publication which had the same political direction [but was] more concerned with entertainment than with politics . . . declined only by about 27 per cent, in spite of its higher price" (Marie Lazarsfeld-Jahoda and H. Zeisel, *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal* [Leipzig: Hirzel, 1932], pp. 35–37; quoted from S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960], p. 187).

[22] $N = 75$ and 83, respectively. a_1 (effect of unemployment) $= .12$; $P\ (a_1^* \leq 0) = .06$.

[23] To be sure, the kind of attachments to which an indicator such as the level of unemployment refers is of somewhat different character than the kind represented by other indicators such as the method of decision or the size of the communities. The latter are pointing to attachments through *common* sets of values shared by a group, while the last indicator rather points to attachment of a group to another through a set of interests *particular* to that group. But, as stated previously, the concept of attachment is taken to cover these different aspects, since the consequences of attachments, not their bases, are of interest here.

community would then be, according to the present thesis, more prone to oppose a fluoridation project.[24] On the other hand, residents of communities that have undergone population decrease due to out-migration in the same period may feel disappointed with their leaders and be disaffected from them. They have probably lost the proximity of relatives, friends and acquaintances, and their community is no longer on the "road of progress."[25] One would thus expect such communities to reject fluoridation measures too.

Different from these two groups of communities are the ones subject to a natural

TABLE 4

TYPE OF COMMUNITY GROWTH AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	Out-Migration*	Natural Increase	In-Migration
Percentage of communities passing the measure†	44	53	41
No.	50	92	109

* Out-migration, less than 5 per cent increase (including decrease), natural increase, increase between 5 per cent and 20 per cent; in-migration, larger increase.

† a_1 (effect of out-migration compared to natural increase) = .09, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = .15; a_2 (effect of in-migration compared to natural increase) = .12, $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = .06.

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIP OF TYPE OF GROWTH AND OUTCOME, HOLDING PROPORTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE, TURNOUT, OR UNEMPLOYMENT CONSTANT

	OUT-MIGRATION		NATURAL INCREASE		IN-MIGRATION	
	No. of Communities	Per Cent Passing Measure	No. of Communities	Per Cent Passing Measure	No. of Communities	Per Cent Passing Measure
Proportion of young people:*						
Low†	19	26	29	38	36	31
High	17	47	37	60	53	42
Turnout:‡						
Low§	10	30	26	58	30	40
High	9	56	26	39	30	27
Unemployment:‖						
Low#	12	42	30	53	32	47
High	15	27	26	58	41	24

* a_1 (effect of out-migration compared to natural increase) = .125, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = 10; a_2 (effect of in-migration compared to natural increase) = .125, $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = .06; a_3 (effect of youth) = .18, $P(a_3^* \leq 0)$ = 0001.

† Of the total population 24 per cent or less is fourteen years old or younger.

‡ a_1 (effect of out-migration compared to natural increase) = .055, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = .34, a_2 (effect of in-migration compared to natural increase) = .15, $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = .05; a_3 (effect of turnout) = .06, $P(a_3^* \leq 0)$ = 26.

§ Less than 25 per cent turnout.

‖ a_1 (effect of out-migration compared to natural increase) = .21, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = 03; a_2 (effect of in-migration compared to natural increase) = .20, $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = .01, a_3 (effect of unemployment) = 11, $P(a_3^* \leq 0)$ = 10

\# Unemployed consist of 4 per cent or less.

[24] Migrants to cities have apparently always been found to be particularly prone to join mass movements when deprivations and a lack of social integration characterize their situation. For some indication of this process during the late Middle Ages see Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1957), pp. 22 ff.; see also Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff., and Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–71, 171.

[25] Areas of depopulation in France were shown to have been particularly sensitive to Poujade's appeals against the established order (see Stanley Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade* [Paris: Librairie Colin, 1956], pp. 12–13, 197 ff.). Similarly, Angell found that communities with a high degree of population movement (in- and out-migration) were less socially integrated than the others (Robert C. Angell, "The Social Integration of American Cities of More Than 100,000 Population," *American Sociological Review*, XII (1947), 335–42.

increase, whose residents have been there for many years and are therefore closely identified with their community. In this instance one would expect a more favorable reaction to fluoridation projects.[26]

The findings are consistent with these predictions (Table 4). The communities that lost members by out-migration and those that gained new unattached persons by in-migration were both less favorable to fluoridation than the communities that experienced a natural increase.

However, there is some evidence in the research previously mentioned which runs counter to this finding. For instance, Green and Briggs found a relationship partly running in the opposite direction between the adoption of fluoridation and population growth.[27] Gamson and Irons also report a similar finding in one other set of data and "no significant association" in a third set.[28] Though these samples are generally small,[29] it might lead one to think that the results remain inconclusive so far. In the present data the observed relationship is maintained or even strengthened[30] when the proportion of young people,[31] turnout, or unemployment are held constant (Table 5). In general, Table 5 reveals that when both the independent and the control variables have a positive effect, the outcome tends to be favorable six times out of ten; when both factors exert a negative influence, the outcome is favorable only approximately three times out of ten.[32]

It is also interesting to note that the picture obtained for the cases of in-migration cannot apparently be attributed only to the negative votes of newcomers. Observe, for instance, that when the turnout is low (i.e., when newcomers are less likely to vote), the outcome is nevertheless negatively affected by in-migration. The presence of new migrants seems to produce a relaxation in the previous structure of attachments of older ones. If communities are viewed as huge sociometric networks in which newcomers are not all isolates, their presence can easily be conceived as disruptive of these networks, thus diminishing the previous social cohesion of the whole system.[33]

[26] The population of continental United States increased from 1940 to 1950 by 14.5 per cent. This offers a rough indicator of what would be the natural increase by birth rate of a community (see U.S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*, Part 1, *U.S. Summary*, p. 18).

[27] *Op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff. They did not distinguish in- and out-migration from natural increase, but established only a rank order with regard to growth. An approximation to the present analysis can be obtained by dividing their rank data into three groups. This gives the following proportions of favorable communities (from the largest decrease to the largest increase): 35 per cent ($N = 17$), 50 per cent ($N = 18$), 67 per cent ($N = 18$). Thus only the last group does not meet our expectations. The writer is indebted to S. S. Kegeles, who offered this reanalysis in a written communication.

[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

[29] Samples with a total N of 53, 64, and 56 communities, respectively, and "not wholly independent" (*ibid.*, pp. 67–68). It should be noted, as suggested by Paul, that Green and Briggs's results might have been spurious: "Further analysis reveals that in our series rapid growth meant an influx of predominantly younger people, an influence favoring fluoridation" (Paul, *op. cit.*, p. 5).

[30] With the exception of the out-migration subgroup in the case of high turnout, based on nine cases only.

[31] Since it was established that the fluoridation of water supplies is an effective way to prevent tooth decay among children, it is not surprising to find that communities in which there is a high proportion of children are more likely to accept the project. It points at self-interest as another factor of fluoridation outcome. For similar findings see Gamson and Irons, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[32] A further test to see whether the association between rate of growth and outcome was not due to the direct association between size and growth (small communities experienced less growth) showed that this was not the case either. Both factors are independently related to the outcome.

[33] This last aspect of the findings indicates that there is some truth in Rossi's comment that fluoridation controversies in the cases of rapidly growing communities might be interpreted as an expression of "the malaise of the older residents in communities experiencing rapid growth" (see Peter H. Rossi, "Community Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, I [March, 1957], 441).

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITIES

Ethnic and racial diversity in a community is a rather important and well-documented source of weak interconnectedness. An ethnic minority, even one of the upper class, is, for example, often likely to be unrepresented in community administration and to be resentful of their exclusion.[34] Accordingly, such minorities should be more likely to vote against a fluoridation project.

Two indicators of the ethnic and racial composition of the communities were obtained from census data. Surprisingly, the findings with both indicators seem at first sight contrary to the hypothesis (Table 6). Communities with a higher degree of ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to approve the fluoridation projects, and the South, despite its high proportion of Negroes, is the most favorable region. How is this to be accounted for?

TABLE 6

ETHNIC AND RACIAL COMPOSITION AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	COMMUNITIES PASSING MEASURE	
	No.	Per Cent
Proportion of population that is native white.		
80 per cent or more	163	39
79 per cent or less	31	55
Census regions:		
Northeast	72	57
South	37	60
North Central	92	44
West	61	31

Let us first consider the regional phenomenon. One reasonable interpretation is that in the South heterogeneity is of a different character than that of other regions; it is almost exclusively due to the presence of Negroes who are largely outside the social system, and even more outside the political system. The hypothesis that uses ethnic heterogeneity as a factor in accounting for the lack of support of an administration can only make sense in so far as the ethnic minorities *do* participate in elections.

TABLE 7

REGION, TURNOUT, AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

CENSUS REGION	LOW TURNOUT*		HIGH TURNOUT	
	No.	Per Cent Passing Measure	No.	Per Cent Passing Measure
Northeast	10	60	12	42
South	18	50	7	43
North Central	9	33	43	40
West	8	38	27	33

* Turnout of 19 per cent or less.

Since in the South a large reservoir of potential opposition is not likely to manifest its dissent, the likelihood of rejection of fluoridation projects is reduced accordingly.

If this interpretation is correct, it should be apparent in the relationship between outcome and regions, with turnout held constant.[35] Table 7 shows that, at least when the turnout is relatively higher, communities in the South are not more favorable to fluoridation.

Moreover, a re-examination of the data in Table 6 pertaining to the association between outcome and ethnic composition reveals its spuriousness. As Table 8 shows, when region is held constant, the hypothesized relationship reappears clearly in two regions and the inverse relationship dis-

[34] See, e.g., Everett C. Hughes, *French Canada in Transition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), pp. 86–87.

[35] Strikingly, a pattern of very low turnout is found in the South: while only 25 per cent of the communities in the other three regions combined have a very low turnout (a turnout of less than 20 per cent), 72 per cent of the communities in the South are in this category ($N = 109$ and 25, respectively) ($P\ [a_1^* \leq 0 = .0001]$).

appears in a third one.[36] In the Northeast and the South, the larger the proportion of native white (i.e., the more homogeneous the community), the more likely the referendums are to be approved.[37]

STATUS STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITIES

Finally, it was hypothesized that middle-class communities would be more favorable to fluoridation project than lower-class ones,[38] since the former are likely to have a larger proportion of their residents closer to the assumed high status leaders than the latter; it was also hypothesized that communities with a relatively smaller variance in their occupational distribution might be more favorable to such a project, since such a small variance implies a greater integration of the community.

TABLE 8

ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND STAND ON FLOURIDATION, HOLDING REGIONS CONSTANT

Proportion of Native Whites	Communities Passing Measure*	
	No	Per Cent
Northeast		
High†	9	44
Low	11	36
South:		
High‡	10	70
Low	25	52
North Central:		
High†	64	39
Low	17	53
West		
High‡	37	32
Low	21	29

* a_1 (effect of ethnic composition, Northeast and South only [see n. 36]) = .13, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = .18

† Native whites make up 90 per cent or more of population

‡ Native whites make up 80 per cent or more of population. Because of large differences in ethnic composition in the South, it was impossible to break this variable in a consistent way. Thus care should be taken in comparing the regions in this table, with ethnic composition constant.

Again, the results of previous studies are not consistent with the foregoing proposition. Though they generally tend to indicate that middle-class *citizens* (where class is measured by occupation, income, or education) are more likely to be favorable to fluoridation than lower-class ones,[39] the relationship is often not linear.[40] A similar series of inconsistent results was found with respect to *communities*, where education and income were considered.[41]

What about the present results? The data in Table 9 show that, contrary to expec-

[36] Note that in the deviant case (North Central) and in the case with no relationship (West), the ethnic homogeneity is rather complete: only 7 per cent and 14 per cent of the communities in these two regions, respectively, are less than 85 per cent native white, compared to 35 per cent and 74 per cent for the Northeast and the South, respectively. One should therefore not expect the ethnic composition in the former two to have any effect.

[37] As in the case of the relationship between regions and outcome, a more accurate control variable here would probably be the turnout, since as we should expect, it is much lower in the less homogeneous communities. Such a control again revealed the expected direct association between degree of ethnic homogeneity and positive outcome. But since for many cases the turnout is not known, this expected relationship is already present in the remaining data, even without a control, so that the test remains inconclusive. For a similar pattern of zero-order relationships between ethnic heterogeneity and referendum outcome or turnout (on a metropolitan sewer district referendum), see W. C. Kaufman and S. Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (1960), 196–204. However no control by turnout is presented in this last study.

[38] By middle-class or lower-class communities, we mean here those which have a relatively high or low proportion of the gainfully employed men in the upper-middle class (the professional and managerial occupational groups).

[39] See, e.g., B. Mausner and J. Mausner, *Scientific American*, CXCII (1955), pp. 35–39.

[40] See Simmel, *op. cit.*, Tables 1 and 3; and other findings reported in W. A. Gamson and C. G. Lindberg, "An Analytic Summary of Fluoridation Research: With an Annotated Bibliography" (Cambridge, Mass.: Social Science Program, Harvard School of Public Health, 1960), pp. 1–3. (Mimeographed.)

[41] Gamson and Irons, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–72; a result consistent with the hypothesis is reported in W. C. Kaufman and S. Greer, *op. cit.*

tations, middle-class communities are *less* likely to favor fluoridation. Moreover, a series of controls revealed that this relationship is not a spurious one.[42] On the other hand, the zero-order relationship between variance in occupational distribution[43] and outcome is not clear. With a series of controls, however, this relationship ran, at least in part, contrary to expectations.[44]

How then can these findings be accounted for? The first one suggests that two closely related aspects of the social structure may be involved.

On the one hand, the above result may in part be due to a greater likelihood of factions or divisions *within the social and power elites* of a community whenever these elites are relatively large.[45] In the same way that small communities cannot afford to become divided on such a project, to oppose their administration, and to thereby introduce strains into a closely knit social system, a relatively small upper-middle class within a community cannot afford to be divided politically because it is too closely tied socially. It is only when there is a relatively large upper-middle class that the possibility of having factions or an institutionalized opposition would arise.[46] Hence middle-class communities would be more likely to oppose fluoridation than lower-class ones.

On the other hand, this result could also be due to a different system of attachments *between the elites and the rest of the community*, depending on whether these elites are large or small. In the former case, they could easily be closed on themselves socially and self-sufficient for the fulfilment of the power roles in the community. This would tend to create a large gap between them and the other classes, and a referendum could then be more easily defeated. Conversely, when the elites are small, their social contacts with the classes below them would tend to be more numerous and the latter would more easily occupy various

TABLE 9

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	COMMUNITIES PASSING MEASURE*	
	No.	Per Cent
Proportion of gainfully employed males in professional and managerial occupational groups †		
Low	52	48
Medium	47	40
High	59	37
Variance in occupational distribution ‡		
Low	58	41
Medium	64	45
High	36	36

* a_1 (effect of occupational structure, comparing extremes) = .11, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = 12

† Low, 21 per cent or less, medium, 22–25 per cent, high, 26 per cent or more

‡ Low, 0 99 or less; medium, 1 00 1 14, high, 1 15 or more

[42] For two such controls, see Tables 11 and 12 below

[43] Calculated on the basis of four occupational groups 1 professional and managerial; 2. clerical and sales; 3. skilled and semiskilled; 4. service and unskilled.

[44] See, e.g., Table 12 below.

[45] Studies of community power structures have increasingly been aware that these structures may be more or less monolithic, although this does not necessarily imply factions or divisions within the elites (see Delbert E. Miller, "Decision-Making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV [1958], 299–310, esp. pp. 307 ff.; Peter H. Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," in E. C. Banfield [ed], *Urban Government* [New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961], pp. 419 ff.). Neither of them, however, suggests that the size of the elites may lead to different power structures; Rossi on the contrary writes that "homogeneous middle class communities . . . will tend to have monolithic power structures, since the class basis for countervailing political power does not exist" (*ibid.*, p. 421).

[46] Again, a similar finding was made in the study of the I.T.U.: the smaller the size of the locals, the less likely they were to have an institutionalized opposition, or even any opposition at all (see Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 179, n. 2).

power roles in the community,[47] thus creating a greater likelihood of adoption of a fluoridation project. (An analogous reasoning could be made when we consider the variance in the occupational distribution, rather than the size of the elites.)

Since these interpretations may appear as too easy a reconciliation with the data (one can always contrive a good interpretation ex post facto!) they will be submitted to a series of tests by inference.

TABLE 10

SIZE OF SOCIAL ELITE AND EXTREME STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	Proportion in Upper-Middle Class*	
	Low	High
Of those passing the measure, percentage passing with 60 per cent or more in favor of it†	74	46
No.	19	22
Of those defeating the measure, percentage defeating with 60 per cent or more against it†	76	70
No.	29	33

* Low, 23 per cent or less; high, 24 per cent or more.

† a_1 (effect of occupational structure on extreme outcomes) = 17, $P(a_1^* \leq 0) = .03$.

First, if these interpretations are correct, that is, if the results of Table 9 reveal that it is difficult for a relatively small upper-middle class to stand internal divisions and to be isolated from other classes, communities with such a class distribution shou[l] take more extreme stands on the issu[e] whether for or against it. The data [i] Table 10 support this inference. Lowe[r] class communities do exhibit a pattern [o] more extreme approval or disapproval.[48]

A second test by inference pertains to th[e] simultaneous consideration of a third var[i]able—the size of the communities. If th[e] interpretations are correct, the first rel[a]tionship observed in Table 9 should be pa[r]ticularly strong in small communitie[s]. Indeed, a relatively small upper-midd[le] class in a large community may still consi[st] of a large absolute number of people an[d]

TABLE 11

SIZE OF SOCIAL ELITE, SIZE OF COMMUNITY AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	Communities Passing Measure*	
	No	Per Cen[t]
Communities of less than 10,000:		
23 per cent or less in upper-middle group	29	55
24 per cent or more in upper-middle group	40	38
Communities of 10,000 or more:		
23 per cent or less in upper-middle group	49	43
24 per cent or more in upper-middle group	40	35

* a_1 (difference of differences) = (55 − .38) − (43 − 3[5]) = 09, $P(a_1^* \leq 0) = .27$. The test applied here to see if the di[ff]erence is significantly greater in small than in large communit[ies] follows Leo A Goodman, "Modifications of the Dorn-Stouffe[r-]Tibbitts Method for 'Testing the Significance of Comparisons [in] Sociological Data,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, LX[V] (1961), 355–63.

consequently permit the existence of mor[e] than one political elite and a self-sufficien[t] social and political life, whereas such [a] small elite in a small town is bound to b[e] small both relatively and absolutely, pre[]cluding the maintenance of factions and th[e] formation of a self-sufficient subgroup.

Again the data presented in Table 1[1]

[47] Such an interpretation is suggested by analogous findings in the study of immigrant communities, where an association was found between a proportionately small professional elite and a lower degree of outgroup relations among other members of the communities. This finding was shown to be due to the fact that "when the professional elite is small, more people become concerned with the social life of the community [and] a more diversified group of people assumes leadership positions in the ethnic community . . . producing a high degree of cohesiveness in the group" (see Raymond Breton, "Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1961), pp. 147–55.

[48] This relationship is not due to the fact tha[t] lower-class communities would be more concen[]trated in the small-size category; the opposite i[s] actually true.

tend to support this inference. The difference between the two subgroups of small communities is 17 per cent, while for the two corresponding subgroups of large communities, the difference is only 8 per cent. As expected, within small communities, it seems to make more difference whether the elite is small or large than within large communities.

Thus far, the tests presented did not permit us to discriminate between the two suggested interpretations. A third test may be useful in this regard. The combination of the variance in occupational distribution with the proportion of upper-middle-class residents gives a typology of community power structures in terms of small or large and of isolated or non-isolated elites.[49]

According to the first interpretation, communities with a small and isolated elite (Type I) should, because of their difficulty in sustaining internal divisions, be most favorable to fluoridation; those communities with a large and non-isolated elite (Type IV) should be the least favorable.

On the other hand, the second interpretation leads us to expect that a small and non-isolated elite (Type III), one that creates greater community integration, is the most favorable, and that a large and isolated elite (Type II) is the least favorable situation for adoption of the fluoridation measure.

Although the first interpretation is more clearly supported, by the data in Table 12, both can, however, be seen to be partly substantiated. Pending further tests, both would have to be retained.

Note that the original hypothesis predicted a relationship in the opposite direction (communities of Type I were expected to be the least likely to approve fluoridation, since they are primarily working-class communities, and communities of Type IV were expected to be the most likely to approve, since they are relatively higher-class communities). Therefore, this section presents an unanticipated finding, revealing an interesting structural effect. While previous findings tend to show that middle-class *individuals* are more favorable to fluoridation than lower-class ones, middle-class *communities* seem to be less favorable than lower-class ones, the paradox being apparently explained by different structural arrangements within the elites and between the social classes. Further research would of course be needed to establish more firmly these findings, since the results of the last three tables are not all as conclusive as one might like them to be.[50]

TABLE 12

COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND STAND ON FLUORIDATION

	Communities Passing Measure*	
	No	Per Cent
Isolated elite †		
Small (Type I) ‡	16	56
Large (Type II)	64	36
Non-isolated elite:		
Small (Type III)	62	45
Large (Type IV)	16	38

* a_1 (effect of power structures, comparing I and IV) = .18, $P(a_1^* \leq 0)$ = .15, a_2 (effect of power structures, comparing III and II) = .09, $P(a_2^* \leq 0)$ = .15

† Isolated: variance of 1 05 or more; non-isolated: variance of less than 1 05.

‡ Small, proportion in upper-middle occupational group of 23 per cent or less, large, 24 per cent or more.

[49] If there is a low proportion of upper-middle-class citizens and a high variance, this indicates that the class structure is heavily skewed toward the lower-class end, thus resulting in a small *and* isolated social elite. Conversely, the combination of a high proportion of upper-middle-class people with a low variance gives a large non-isolated elite. The other combinations lead to two intermediate types; a small non-isolated elite and a large isolated one.

[50] The statistically minded reader may be bothered by the small attention paid to the significance tests presented. These allow him, however, to reach different conclusions if he so pleases. It is nevertheless contended that the strength of the demonstration presented in this paper does not rest on these tests, but rather on the diversity of the analysis carried, including the verifications by inference. On this see Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, *op. cit.*, Appendix I, B.

CONCLUSION

The general hypothesis of this paper has been for the most part substantiated. Different degrees and patterns of attachments of a community to its leaders do in fact influence the political support the former is ready to grant to the latter. In turn, these degrees and patterns of attachments are largely influenced by structural factors very different from the sociopsychological ones often used in voting behavior studies. The size of communities, their rates of growth, their ethnic and racial composition, their occupational and power structures, and the conditions of their labor market are all important features of the social system that influence community decisions.[51]

These results confirm the importance of political processes that have often been discussed, but rarely empirically analyzed. To the extent that elites in a political system, either democratic or totalitarian, tend to be separated from the lower segments of the system by a series of horizontal and disjointed layers, the system is bound to produce a more-or-less large collectivity of politically unattached citizens that oscillate between apathy or systematic opposition to the leadership; this is true whatever actions the elites take, or whatever party may be in power. The middle class, on the other hand, seems less likely to exhibit such a pattern of behavior. As is suggested by these data, they are either attached as a whole to their leaders or are formed into two or more groups of equally attached citizens, each to its own political elite, opposing, and eventually replacing, each other in the leadership of a community.

The above comments suggest that the thesis and the findings of this paper are closely related to the theories of mass versus pluralist societies.[52] In both cases, the degree of interconnectedness between the members of a collectivity and the power centers is conceived as a major factor for the democratic process. But while the latter theories put a particular stress on the role of free intermediate groups as links between the many groups of a society,[53] the present research stressed, partly because of the data available, other aspects of the social structure producing a more-or-less integrated community. The results presented indicate that these different orientations could fruitfully be incorporated into a larger theoretical framework.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

[51] One could raise an objection to some of the findings of this paper by maintaining that the variables used here are more indicative of differential degrees of education than of differential degrees of attachments, and that these findings simply show that a higher degree of education is more conducive to approval of a fluoridation project. Many facts, however, are inconsistent with this interpretation. It should be stressed that, while some of the findings might be possibly interpreted in this way, others clearly cannot, while all of them fit the attachment hypothesis. The above argument cannot account, e.g., for the findings that the projects are more likely to be approved in small communities. The same argument holds with regard to the consideration of growth as an indicator and, above all, for the analysis bearing on the pattern of extreme versus moderate outcomes. Finally, it should be stressed that education, although it may produce a greater rationality, is also likely to be conducive to greater attachments in the same way and with the same qualifications made above with regard to occupation.

[52] For a review of that literature see Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16 and pp. 73-82, and Kornhauser, *op. cit.*

[53] See, e.g., Kornhauser, *op. cit.*

POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF ADOLESCENT REBELLION

RUSSELL MIDDLETON AND SNELL PUTNEY

ABSTRACT

The relationship between deviation from parental political viewpoints and parent-child relationships is explored in a sample of 1,440 students in sixteen colleges and universities across the United States. Males are more likely to deviate from the political positions of their parents than females. A significant association is not found between a history of defiance of parents and political rebellion, suggesting that adolescent rebellion in America is expressed primarily in non-political ways. Rebellion is associated, at least for female students, with discipline in the home that is perceived as either strict or permissive, whereas those who report average discipline are less likely to rebel politically. Perceived extremes of parental discipline (strict or permissive) are associated for both males and females with lack of closeness between parent and child, which, in turn, is associated with political rebellion. This is particularly true when the student perceives his parent as being interested in politics. Political rebellion, then, appears most likely to occur when parent and child are emotionally estranged, when the child believes parental discipline is non-typical, and when the parent is interested in politics.

In his pioneer psychoanalytic study of political attitudes Lasswell pointed out that, although political beliefs may be expressed in a highly rational form, they are often developed in highly irrational ways. "When they are seen against the developmental history of the person, they take on meanings which are quite different than the phrases in which they are put."[1] Using a series of case studies, he attempted to demonstrate that family relationships were one of the non-rational determinants of whether or not an individual became an anarchist, a socialist, a highly conservative Republican, or a political assassin.

Political beliefs can be influenced by family relationships through rebellion; a youth may, for example, express rebellion against his parents by rejecting their political beliefs and adopting a divergent set. The probability of such political rebellion is enhanced by the fact that adolescence, which most authors regard as a period of generalized rebellion in American society,[2] is also the age at which most individuals seem to crystallize their political viewpoints.[3]

Clearly, adolescent rebellion cannot be attributed solely to the biological maturation process, for adolescence is not a period of storm and stress in every society.[4]

[1] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 153.

[2] Kingsley Davis, "The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," *American Sociological Review*, V (August, 1940), 523-35; Kingsley Davis, "Adolescence and Social Structure," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXVI (November, 1944), 8-15; Ernest A. Smith, *American Youth Culture* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962); Florence Kluckhohn and John P. Spiegel, *Integration and Conflict in Family Behavior* (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Report No. 27 [Topeka, August, 1954]); P. Blos, *The Adolescent Personality* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1941); Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," in Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (eds.), *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), pp. 522-31. For a variant view, however, see Frederick Elkin and W. A. Westley, "Myth of Adolescent Culture," *American Sociological Review*, XX (December, 1955), 680-84, and William A. Westley and Frederick Elkin, "The Protective Environment and Adolescent Socialization," *Social Forces*, XXXV (March, 1957), 243-49.

[3] See Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 51-68, and Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 217.

[4] Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1928); Margaret Mead, "Adolescence in Primitive and in Modern Society," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, (3d ed.; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958), pp. 341-49; and Yehudi A. Cohen, "'Adolescent Conflict' in a Jamaican Community," in *Social Structure and Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), pp. 167-82.

Rather, there appear to be structural features in American society conducive to youthful rebellion. Parsons, for example, argues that, since there is a sharp limitation of "objects of cathexis" in the isolated conjugal family typical of American society, children tend to be highly dependent emotionally on their parents, especially on the mother.[5] As the individual nears adulthood, however, he is expected to break this dependency and choose his occupation and sexual partner with little adult support. In adolescence, therefore, a reaction formation may be generated against the dependency needs and may find expression in a rebellious youth culture, compulsively independent and defiant of parental norms and authority, and, at the same time, compulsively conformist to the peer group that satisfies individual dependency needs. Parsons maintains that the rebellion is especially strong among adolescent boys because of an additional reaction formation of compulsive masculinity against an original identification with the mother.

The question remains, however, whether the adolescent is likely to use political beliefs as an instrument of rebellion. Hyman believes that he is not: "The almost complete absence of negative correlations [between the political attitudes of parents and children] provides considerable evidence *against* the theory that political attitudes are formed *generally* in terms of rebellion and opposition to parents."[6] The absence of negative correlations between the political beliefs of adolescents and their parents, however, does not demonstrate that rebellion tends to be non-political. It might simply indicate a relative lack of rebellion, even though such rebellion as occurred might often be political.

A recent study by Lane based on depth interviews with fifteen working-class and lower-middle-class men selected at random from an eastern housing development focused on how often rebellion against the parent was expressed politically.[7] Concentrating on rebellion against the father, he found that only four of his subjects had impaired relationships with their fathers. In none of these cases did the rebellion take a political form, and the subjects' general level of interest in politics was low. On the basis of these scant but suggestive data Lane argues that, compared with other Western cultures, American culture (because it is more permissive and the father is less dominant) tends to discourage youthful rebellion against the father. Moreover when such rebellion does occur, it tends to discourage its expression in political terms because politics is relatively unimportant to the father, making other forms of rebellion more appealing.[8]

Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton conducted a study of the circumstances under which political rebellion against the parent was most likely to occur in American society.[9] Seeking to test the hypothesis that the young tend to become radical in their political views because of adolescent rebellion against strict parental authority and discipline, they interviewed 339 first-time voters between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four in Cambridge, Massachusetts immediately after the 1952 presidential election. Each respondent was asked: "In your case, when you were in your teens, did your family want to have quite a lot to say about your friends and the places you went and so on, or were you pretty much on your own?" They found that there was maximum political conformity to parents among those subjects who said that their parents

[5] Talcott Parsons, "Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure," in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), pp. 336–47.

[6] Hyman, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[7] Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (August, 1959), 502–11.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 510.

[9] Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVIII (Spring 1954), 23–39.

had "about an average amount to say." Those who reported that their parents "had a lot to say" and those who said their parents left them "on their own" were both more likely to deviate politically from their parents. The researchers thus concluded that political rebellion was correlated with the type of discipline prevalent in the adolescent's family.

On the other hand, Nogee and Levin, in a study of 314 Boston University students eligible to vote for the first time in the 1956 presidential election, found no evidence of any relationship between strict parental control in early adolescence and political rebellion: "Although a small number do 'revolt' against their parents' political views, there is no evidence that the likelihood of such revolt is related to the strictness of parental control."[10] This study, like the previous study by Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton, did not investigate whether strictness of discipline was correlated with estrangement between the youth and his parents; rather they implicitly assumed such a relationship and concentrated on measuring the degree to which it might be expressed politically.

Previous research thus presents an incomplete and contradictory picture of adolescent political rebellion. It is generally agreed that adolescence is a period of general rebellion in American society. Hyman and Lane, however, are doubtful that this rebellion is likely to take a political form in the context of American culture. And when political rebellion occurs, Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton disagree with Nogee and Levin as to whether it is associated with the perceived degree of strictness of parental control.

In the present study we have attempted to investigate further some of the problems raised by the earlier studies. Are youths who are estranged from their parents no more likely to deviate from parental political views, as Lane suggests, than youths who are close to their parents? Does parental indifference to politics, as Lane further suggests, inhibit the political expression of rebellion by those who are estranged from their parents?

Our basic hypothesis is that estrangement from parents is associated with political rebellion if the parents are interested in politics, and perceived extremes of parental discipline (strict or permissive) are associated with lack of closeness between parent and child and thus with political rebellion.

METHODS

Anonymous questionnaires were administered late in 1961 to classes of students in sixteen colleges and universities in the United States. A state university, a state college, a private university, and a private liberal arts college were included in each of four regions—Far West, Middle West, Northeast, and South. Four of the institutions were church affiliated. Thus, although the individual subjects were not selected in a strictly random fashion, the sample does include a broad range of types of institutions and regions. Caution should be used in generalizing the findings on this sample to American college students in general, but analysis of the sample has not revealed any marked biases correlated with political rebellion or adolescent rebellion.

A total of 1,440 completed questionnaires was obtained from students attending the sixteen colleges and universities included in the survey. Almost all the subjects were between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two, a group in transition to young adulthood. At their age, the storms of adolescence are recent enough to be recalled, but distant enough to be viewed with a certain objectivity. Fully three-fourths of these students reported that they had fairly clear political views while still in high school, and it can be assumed that the effects of

[10] Philip Nogee and M. B. Levin, "Some Determinants of Political Attitudes among College Voters," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII (Winter, 1958-1959), 463.

adolescent rebellion on their political beliefs are now largely complete.

There were 824 males and 616 females in the sample. Since the relations of males and females to their mothers and fathers are somewhat different—especially in psychoanalytic theory, but also in terms of culturally defined relations between the sexes—we have considered the sexes separately throughout the analysis.

Each student was asked how close he was to each of his parents (response categories: "Very close," "Fairly close," "Not very close," and "Hostile"). If a parent died early in a child's life, lack of closeness is hardly indicative of rebellion, nor is the parent likely to have had a significant influence on the child's political views. When examining the personal nexus between parent and child in relation to political rebellion, therefore, we have excluded those cases in which the parent died before the child entered high school.

In order to measure political views, each respondent was presented with a set of five political categories and asked: "Which of these political positions is closest to your own views?"

1. Socialist
2. Highly liberal
3. Moderately liberal
4. Moderately conservative
5. Highly conservative
6. I have no political views

Extensive pretesting indicated that this set of categories was meaningful to American college students, involving as it does an extremely simple left-to-right continuum, and few students experienced any difficulty in characterizing their views in terms of the categories. At the same time, this approach avoided some of the knotty methodological problems involved in the use of political party affiliation or attitudes on substantive political issues as indexes of political position.[11]

To determine whether or not the student was deviating from his parents' political views, he was also asked to use the same categories to characterize the views of his mother and his father. In many cases the students' perceptions of their parents' views may have been incorrect. Yet it is precisely the perceived rather than the actual views of the parent that are of crucial importance in the present study. As the Thomas theorem states, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

For purposes of this study a student was defined as a political rebel if he placed himself to the left or right of his parent. If the student agreed with his parent, had no political views, or simply remained unaware of the views of his parent, he was considered a non-rebel.

Each student was asked, "How close are (were) you to your father?" and "How close are (were) you to your mother?" Further, in a question patterned after that used by Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton, we asked each student to report on the strictness of his parents' discipline: "When you were in high school, did your parents want to have quite a lot to say about your friends and the places you went and so on, or were you pretty much on your own?" (Response categories: "Parents had a lot to say," "Parents had an average amount to say," and "Parents left me pretty much on my own.")

As a rough index of generalized rebellion against the parent, each student was asked: "When you were in high school, how often did you defy your parents and do things contrary to their instructions or wishes?"

Finally, each student was asked how much interest he thought each of his parents took in political matters. Parents were classified as interested in politics if the

[11] For a detailed discussion of the problems of measuring variations in political views and the rationale for the particular categories we have selected, see Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Student Rebellion against Parental Political Beliefs" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Louisville, Kentucky, April 3, 1962, to be published in *Social Forces*).

student reported that they were very much interested or moderately interested most of the time. If the student believed that they were only slightly interested or not at all interested, they were classified as not interested in politics. Once again, it is the student's perception of his parent that might influence the pattern of his rebellion, not necessarily the actual views or interests of the parents.

The χ^2 test of significance was applied throughout the analysis, and the rejection level for the null hypothesis was set at .05.

FINDINGS

As shown in Table 1, approximately half the students hold political views different from those they attribute to their fathers, and nearly half hold political views different from those they attribute to their mothers. Male students are more likely than female students to deviate from the political views of their fathers and also from those of their mothers, and these tendencies are statistically significant beyond the .05 level ($P < .001$).

Thus our findings indicate that divergence from parental political views, as measured by our categories, is fairly common, especially among male students. The question remains as to how much of this difference between viewpoints can be attributed to the nature of parent-child relationships. If deviation from parental political viewpoints is motivated by rebellion against the parents, it might be expected that those students who have a history of conflict with the parents would deviate more often than those who do not. In Table 2, the students who report that they defied their parents often or very often while in high school are compared to those who report that they did so only occasionally or rarely. Except in the case of male students in relation to their mothers (where there is no difference), those who report frequent defiance deviate from the parental political viewpoints more often than those who do not. However, the differences observed in the sample are small, and none are significant at the .05 level. It might, nevertheless, be expected that when the parents of defiant students were interested in politics, there would be markedly more political rebellion than when the parents were indifferent to political issues. However, when the data are broken down according to the degree of perceived parental interest in politics, no consistent pattern emerges, and no statistically significant relationships are found. Our data thus lend little support to the contention that political rebellion is related to a generalized rebellion against the parents, and are consistent with Lane's contention that generalized rebellion in America is likely to be expressed primarily in non-political terms.

TABLE 1

PER CENT REBELLING FROM POLITICAL VIEWS OF PARENTS, BY SEX OF STUDENT AND PARENT

	From Position of Father		From Position of Mother	
	Per Cent	*N*	Per Cent	*N*
Male students	54	781	49	812
Female students	42	584	38	605
Total ..	49	1,365	45	1,417

Nevertheless, political rebellion might occur under particular circumstances. Following Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton, we therefore examined the relation of parental discipline to political deviation (Table 3). In every case, there is a maximum of political rebellion in students who perceive their parents as having imposed strict discipline. Moreover, we find (as did Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton) that those who perceive their parents' discipline as average are least likely to rebel politically (except in the case of males in relation to their mothers). However, the association between political rebellion and parental dis-

cipline is significant at the .05 level only for females ($P <.01$ for rebellion against the father's political views and $P < .02$ for rebellion against the mother's political views). Moreover, the percentages do not differ sufficiently to suggest that parental discipline is generally a decisive factor in determining whether or not the student deviates from the political views of the parents.

TABLE 2

RELATION OF DEFIANCE OF PARENTAL WISHES WHILE IN HIGH SCHOOL TO POLITICAL REBELLION, BY SEX

	Per Cent	N
	Rebelling from Political Views of Father	
Male students:		
Defied parents often or very often. .	56	130
Defied parents occasionally or rarely	53	650
Female students:		
Defied parents often or very often .	48	71
Defied parents occasionally or rarely	41	515
	Rebelling from Political Views of Mother	
Male students:		
Defied parents often or very often	49	135
Defied parents occasionally or rarely	49	678
Female students:		
Defied parents often or very often	44	73
Defied parents occasionally or rarely	37	533

Discipline, however, is likely to influence the degree of closeness between parent and child. Accordingly, we examined the relation between the student's perceptions of his parents' discipline and his degree of closeness with his parents (Table 4). The relationship revealed is non-linear, with those students who regard their parents' discipline as average having stronger emotional ties than those who regard it as either strict or permissive. All of the relationships are significant at the .05 level ($P < .001$ for male students in relation to their fathers, and $P < .01$ for the other three). This finding may explain why Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton found a maximum of political conformity among those young people who perceived their parents' discipline as average. These are the young people who are likely to be closest to their parents, and if nexus to parents is related to political conformity, there would thus be an indirect relationship between discipline and political rebellion. It must first be established, however, that closeness between parent and child is related to political conformity.

In general, there is a linear relationship between parent-child nexus and conformity to parental political views (Table 5). The associations are significant at the .05 level, except in the case of male students in relation to their mothers where it is nonlinear and not significant. The factor of parental interest in politics needs to be explored, however, inasmuch as politics is a relatively pointless instrument of rebellion unless it is of some importance to the parents.

Accordingly, the factor of perceived parental interest in politics is introduced into the examination of the relationship between parent-child closeness and political rebellion (Table 6). When the student perceives his parent as not interested in politics, no consistent relationship emerges between closeness to the parent and political rebellion, and none of the comparisons are statistically significant at the .05 level. When the student perceives his parent as interested in politics, however, a linear relationship is observed in all cases between political rebellion and estrangement of the student and his parent. Three of these four relationships are significant beyond the .05 level ($P < .01$ for male students and fathers, $P < .01$ for female students and fathers, and $P < .05$ for male students and mothers).

TABLE 3

RELATION OF PERCEIVED STRICTNESS OF PARENTAL DISCIPLINE TO POLITICAL REBELLION, BY SEX

	Strict Discipline		Average Discipline		Permissive Discipline	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Rebelling from political views of father:						
Male students.......	56	97	53	379	54	304
Female students.....	55	104	36	315	46	166
Rebelling from political views of mother:						
Male students.......	53	102	50	393	47	318
Female students.....	49	106	34	331	40	168

TABLE 4

RELATION OF PERCEIVED STRICTNESS OF PARENTAL DISCIPLINE TO CLOSENESS OF RELATION WITH PARENT, BY SEX

	Strict Discipline		Average Discipline		Permissive Discipline	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Feel close to father:						
Male students.......	73	97	86	379	70	304
Female students	73	104	83	315	70	166
Feel close to mother:						
Male students... ...	87	102	94	392	88	317
Female students .	85	106	94	331	86	167

TABLE 5

RELATION OF CLOSENESS TO PARENT TO POLITICAL REBELLION, BY SEX

	Per Cent of Students Rebelling from Political Position of Parents			
	Father		Mother	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Male student:				
Very close to parent.......	46	210	46	311
Fairly close to parent	56	399	53	424
Not very close or hostile to parent.	57	172	47	77
Female students:				
Very close to parent.............	37	205	34	333
Fairly close to parent....	43	249	41	211
Not very close or hostile to parent .	50	130	49	61

CONCLUSIONS

The data thus support our basic hypothesis that deviation from parental political viewpoints is associated with estrangement between parent and child—if the parent is interested in politics. This finding is consistent with Lane's contention that parental indifference to politics inhibits adolescent political rebellion. In general, the association between estrangement and rebellion is more marked in relation to fathers than in relation to mothers, perhaps because enough of the traditional male predominance in politics remains to render the father's political views a more obvious basis for rebellion than those of the mother.

Our data, moreover, generally support the conclusions of Maccoby, Matthews, and Morton (as against those of Nogee and Levin) that deviation from parental political views is related to the kind of discipline experienced in the home. However, the associations observed are not extremely high, a point consistent with Hyman's contention that political attitudes in America are not in general generated by adolescent rebellion.

Some caution should be observed in imputing a causal relationship to the associations observed between impairment of parent-child relationships and deviations from parental political views. Rebellion against the parent, arising from strained parent-child relationships, may provoke political deviation. But it may also be the case that political deviation arising from factors unrelated to the parent may be the source of alienation between parent and child. For example, one of our subjects reports that he and his father have drifted apart in large measure because he acquired different political views while attending college. When he visits home he and his father now become involved in bitter arguments over political questions, although once they were fairly close. Here the causal sequence seems clearly reversed.

One unexpected finding adds another dimension to the picture of political attitudes and parent-child relationships. Our data disclose a positive relationship between pa-

TABLE 6

RELATION OF CLOSENESS TO PARENT TO POLITICAL REBELLION BY INTEREST OF PARENT IN POLITICS, AND BY SEX

	Per Cent of Students Rebelling from Political Position of Parent							
	Father				Mother			
	Interested in Politics		Not Interested in Politics		Interested in Politics		Not Interested in Politics	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Male students:								
Very close to parent	44	165	53	45	50	165	40	146
Fairly close to parent	57	263	54	136	63	165	56	259
Not very close or hostile to parent	63	80	53	92	74	19	38	58
Female students:								
Very close to parent	35	188	53	17	36	214	32	119
Fairly close to parent	44	193	38	56	40	108	42	103
Not very close or hostile to parent	58	76	39	54	50	22	49	39

rental interest in politics and closeness of the student to the parent. In fact this tendency of students to feel closer to parents who are interested in politics is significant well beyond the .001 level in all four relationships: father and son, father and daughter, mother and son, and mother and daughter. Any interpretation of this finding is necessarily ex post facto, but a plausible explanation would be that there is a relation between frequent and rewarding parent-child communication and the student's perception of the parent as interested in politics. In many cases of alienation between parent and child there may be too little communication for the student to perceive clearly his parents' political interests, whereas when the parent and child are close, communication of political viewpoints may be facilitated.

In any case, our data suggest that, while some students express rebellion against their parents in political terms, many, if not most, do not. Family relationships are an influence on political attitudes, as Lasswell suggested, but many other factors, including education, reference groups outside the home, mass media, and perhaps even rational evaluation of issues, may influence political beliefs.

University of Wisconsin
and
San Jose State College

THE CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIC COMPETITION IN AMERICAN STATE POLITICS[1]

THOMAS W. CASSTEVENS AND CHARLES PRESS

ABSTRACT

Possible correlates of the degree of interparty electoral competition in the American states were investigated. Wealth, education, and welfare expenditure levels were found to be closely associated with the level of interparty competition within states. The degrees of industrialization, urbanization, and apportionment were not found to be closely associated with the degree of interparty competition.

The context and nature of democratic government have been intensively studied in recent years by Seymour M. Lipset[2] and Anthony Downs.[3] These authors variously classify political systems on the basis of cultural areas, governmental stability, or the number of major political parties, and hypothesize about the democratic political process. However, although they distinguish between democratic and non-democratic governments, neither Lipset nor Downs classifies political systems in terms of the degree of interparty competition in elections for office. Insofar as both writers accept Joseph Schumpeter's thesis that such competition is a fundamental characteristic of democracy,[4] one might expect that the values of the variables in their hypotheses, especially those that compare democratic and non-democratic governments, would vary systematically with the degree of interparty competition. The purpose of this article is to report the results of an investigation of this possibility.

Lipset's hypothesis that a relatively high level of economic development is a prerequisite of democracy, and Downs's hypothesis that democratic governments tend to redistribute the wealth from the rich to the poor oriented our research. The major hypotheses that were investigated are: (1) The comparative level of economic development is correlated with the comparative degree of interparty competition. (2) The comparative degree of interparty competition is correlated with the comparative degree of welfare orientation in the policies of governments.

The states of the United States offer several advantages for such comparative research: (1) The United States Census and other sources provide more detailed data about the states than is available for many nations of the world. (2) Several scholars have devised measures of party competitiveness within the states, and these measures are more systematic than those available for many nations of the world. (3) The states of the Union have, broadly speaking, a common culture and history, reducing the number of variables to be considered in comparative analysis. (4) The sample of political systems is large, including governments that are highly democratic by most commonly accepted standards as well as some that have exhibited strong non-democratic tendencies. An additional value of this study for students of state government is that it will hopefully lead to treatment of the states as more than a collection of similar governmental structures.[5]

[1] The authors' names are listed alphabetically to indicate their equal responsibility for this article.

[2] *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), chap. ii (see also his "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LIII [March, 1959], 69–105).

[3] *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

[4] *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3d ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), pp. 269, 283.

[5] See an early study by H. L. Mencken and Charles Anghoff, "The Worst State in the Union,"

The one drawback in making the comparison among states is that, because they are not sovereign, extrapolations from the present analysis to nations must be highly tentative.

MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS

Three students of state politics have devised empirical measures of interparty competition. Joseph A. Schlesinger classified competitiveness within states for individual offices by two variables: (1) extent of division of control of office between parties, and (2) rate of alternation of control of office between parties. He applied these measures to gubernatorial races for 1870–1950 and, in a later study, to gubernatorial, senatorial, congressional, and secretary of state elections for 1914–58.[6] We have, in addition, calculated presidential figures for this latter period using Schlesinger's method.

A second classification scheme devised by Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall is based on (1) extent of division of control of several offices between parties, and (2) relative closeness of the vote for several offices. The results of elections for the offices of president, senator, and governor were compiled for 1914–54, and states were then divided according to clusters that occurred when the above two measures were applied to these three offices.[7]

The third classification scheme, used by V. O. Key, Jr., is based primarily on average closeness of the vote for governor in twenty-one northern states.[8] Key calculated the mean Democratic party percentage of the general election vote for elections between 1908 and 1952 (with some state variations in time periods due to incompleteness of data); he also calculated the average Democratic primary vote as a percentage of the Republican primary vote and used these figures to aid in categorizing states.

In using Key's measure, we have omitted two states (Minnesota and Wisconsin) with strong third parties, since Key's method of calculation would automatically place this third-party vote in the Republican column. Insofar as some of Key's figures formed two distinct clusters on the basis of average percentage of gubernatorial vote, we devised an additional measure, hereafter called the Key Bloc measure. One bloc is of very competitive states (48.2–51.8 per cent), and one is of less competitive states (41.3–44.7 per cent).

The three classification systems of competitiveness stress different aspects of competition and, as might be expected, result in somewhat different classifications of states.[9] Schlesinger, in fact, in his most recent article on the subject, suggested that the whole conception of competitive states is erroneous, that there are widely varying patterns from office to office within individual states. His recent study thus permits an even more refined classification of competitiveness by individual office rather than by states.

MEASURES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In measuring economic development we chose the method used by Lipset, which focuses upon four variables: education,

American Mercury, 1931, pp. 1–16, 175–88, 355–71. This serious study attempted empirically based comparisons. Its poorly chosen title, harmonizing with the shocker style of the magazine, perhaps accounts for the neglect of this essay by social scientists.

[6] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Interparty Competition," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (December, 1955), 1120–28, and "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States," *Behavioral Science*, V (July, 1960), 197–210.

[7] Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1956), chap. vii (see also "The American Party Systems," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII [June, 1954], 477–85).

[8] V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), pp. 97–104.

[9] No classification yet devised takes account of intraparty as well as interparty competition. Some students argue that intraparty competition is generally less satisfactory as a means of democratic control (see V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950], pp. 302–6).

wealth, industrialization, and urbanization. Lipset demonstrated the relationship between democracy and the four variables by comparing subgroup averages. However, the numbers within cells are often extremely small and thus averages may overemphasize the deviant case; in addition, the averages may be made up of blendings of extreme tendencies. To offset these difficulties, where space permitted, Lipset indicated the range of values within subgroups. We will follow this pattern in our calculations.

The measures of competitiveness are, for the most part, based on data from the period of World War I to 1950. Our statistics for the four social variables are from the *1950 Census of Population*. In some additional tests, 1920 Census and other data were used. Thus, we were able to test the relationship of party competition to its possible correlates by the use of state data from the beginning as well as from the end of the time period in question.

Our indexes for the four variables differ significantly from Lipset's in two instances. The education variable is measured by the median years of schooling completed by people age twenty-five and over within a state;[10] this is more directly revealing of an electorate's education than are Lipset's figures for educational enrolments and allows for greater discrimination among the states than his figures on the percentage of literate persons. The wealth variable is measured by the median per capita income.[11] The industrialization variable is indicated by the percentage of the employed population that was employed in manufacturing.[12]

This index is more suitable than Lipset's use of the inverse of the percentage of males in agriculture insofar as it appropriately discounts persons employed in service trades. The urbanization variable is measured by the percentage of state population living in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.[13]

The departures from Lipset's usage reflect two judgments: (1) The consistency of Lipset's results from a multiplicity of indexes for each variable suggests that a single index is sufficient for each variable. (2) The more detailed data on the American states, by comparison with the data available on some nations, allow for the substitution of more adequate indexes in the two instances stressed above.

TESTS OF RELATIONSHIP

Table 1 presents the various classifications of competitiveness and relates them to data on the four variables of economic development. It includes means of subgroups, numbers in subgroups, and ranges. Omitted because of space are Schlesinger's figures on governor and president, 1870–1950, and on secretary of state and congressmen, 1914–58. Unless otherwise indicated, these measures do not contradict the findings reported.

With regard to most variables, the one-party states are somewhat isolated in the Ranney-Kendall and Schlesinger classifications (Key omitted these states from his system). Most one-party states are southern states that rank low on all four variables tested. This indicates that the Ranney-Kendall classification is a less severe test of interparty competitiveness than the Schlesinger and Key systems, inasmuch as the states outside the South can fall into only two classes. Key and Schlesinger both have three or more categories for nonsouthern states, making an exact patterning less probable by chance.

The data reveal that educational level and wealth are consistently related to competitiveness in almost all systems of classification with only a few minor reversals. When Key's classification is used, there is no linear relationship between state wealth and competitiveness; however, when the

[10] *1950 Census of Population*, II, Part 1, 1-118.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 1-137.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 1-135.

[13] *Ibid.*, I, *passim*.

TABLE 1

STATE PARTY COMPETITIVENESS RELATED TO LEVEL OF EDUCATION, WEALTH, URBANIZATION, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

	No.	Education (Years)		Wealth		Urbanization		Industrialization	
		Mean	Range	Mean	Range	Mean	Range	Mean	Range
Ranney-Kendall:									
Two-party state	26	10.0	8.5–12.0	$3,233	$2,617–$3,670	41.0	0–78.4	23.0	5.1–44.0
Modified one-party state	12	9.3	7.9–10.9	2,679	1,983– 3,376	20.4	0.1–54.1	20.3	2.9–35.5
One-party state	10	8.5	7.6–10.0	2,069	1,198– 2,680	21.9	0–38.6	18.4	10.7–27.9
Key:									
Competitive	5	10.1	8.5–11.5	2,986	2,584– 3,613	21.1	0–47.6	13.4	5.1–21.8
Leaning Democratic	5	10.1	9.3–11.1	3,497	3,344– 3,670	53.1	0–78.4	29.9	6.0–37.7
Less strong Republican	2	9.6	9.0–10.2	3,002	2,823– 3,182	39.2	24.3–54.1	24.0	12.6–35.5
Strong Republican	7	9.6	8.7–10.2	2,905	2,573– 3,519	15.2	0–56.3	23.3	2.9–40.9
Key, selected blocs:									
More competitive	6	10.2	9.3–11.1	3,426	3,069– 3,670	51.3	0–78.4	27.0	6.0–37.7
Less competitive	7	9.7	9.0–10.2	2,976	2,596– 3,519	26.4	0.1–56.3	26.2	4.9–40.9
Schlesinger, Governors, 1914–58.									
Competitive	18	10.1	8.5–12.0	3,215	2,584– 3,670	34.5	0–78.4	20.5	5.1–42.6
Cyclical	4	9.9	9.3–10.2	2,898	2,595– 3,117	33.0	12.4–69.7	25.7	9.2–44.0
One party predominant	14	9.7	8.4–11.6	3,058	2,032– 3,627	35.2	0–72.4	24.0	2.9–40.4
One party	12	8.3	7.6– 9.6	2,051	1,198– 2,680	23.6	4.6–38.6	18.1	9.8–27.9
Schlesinger, United States Senators, 1914–58:									
Competitive	13	9.9	8.5–12.0	3,256	2,584– 3,627	42.8	0–72.4	25.9	6.0–42.6
Cyclical	5	10.1	9.3–11.6	3,160	2,653– 3,495	40.6	0–76.7	22.0	5.9–44.0
One party predominant	18	9.8	8.4–11.5	3,008	2,573– 3,670	27.1	0–78.4	20.0	2.9–40.9
One party	12	8.3	7.6– 9.6	2,051	1,198– 2,680	23.6	4.6–38.6	18.1	9.8–27.9
Schlesinger, Presidents, 1916–56:									
Competitive	8	10.2	8.8–12.0	3,116	2,382– 3,495	34.0	0–53.4	18.6	6.0–36.6
Cyclical	23	9.7	8.5–11.6	3,130	2,384– 3,670	38.8	0–78.4	22.6	2.9–44.0
One party predominant	13	8.8	7.6–10.2	2,413	1,198– 3,519	19.0	0.1–56.3	20.0	4.9–40.9
One party	4	9.1	7.8–10.2	2,142	1,501– 2,573	12.5	0–26.7	23.9	13.8–34.2

Key Bloc measure is used such a relationship is evident.

The relationship between competitiveness and urbanization or industrialization is ambiguous, existing when some measures are applied but not when other classification schemes are used. A glance at competitive states isolated by various measures suggests one reason for this. Among the most competitive states in the nation, by all systems of classification, are the Rocky Mountain states, which are largely rural and lack extensive industry. Thus is appears that a type of competitiveness is possible without the presence of urbanization or industrialization. Indeed, the United States was able to support a two-party system and a degree of democracy before the Civil War, particularly in the Jacksonian period. It is possible, however, that the rural type of competition may differ from that in urbanized-industrialized areas. Perhaps, for example, the "class war" is more likely to spill over into politics in the latter areas.

(One such difference we found is that United States senators in the period since direct election are more likely to experience competitive races in states that are urbanized and industrialized.)

When tests were made between some measures of party competitiveness and data for 1920 on wealth, education, and urbanization, it was found that essentially the same relationships occurred. The Ranney-Kendall, Key Bloc, and Schlesinger (governors from 1914 to 1958) data showed a pattern between competitiveness and high education and high wealth values. The Ranney-Kendall and Key Bloc figures reveal a similar relationship for urbanization values.

Of the three major measures, Schlesinger's is the only one that omits any consideration of closeness of the vote. It also has the lowest correlation with the urbanization and industrialization variables. Judging from the Ranney-Kendall and Key Bloc results, we suggest that the factors of urbanization and industrialization are associated positively with closeness of the vote. However, it appears the effect of these factors is not sufficient to change the outcome of elections very often and thus does not cause alternations in power between the parties. The effect of urbanization and industrialization is probably a gradual altering of party strength. Thus, these two factors are more strongly related to competitiveness in the Ranney-Kendall and Key Bloc figures than in the Schlesinger measures.

OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING COMPETITIVENESS

We found that traditions resulting from the Civil War are among the most important factors associated with interparty competitiveness of states. Using 1865 as the cutoff date, we classified states into pre-Civil War and post–Civil War categories. The Schlesinger data on gubernatorial races in the period 1914–58 reveal that only five of the fifteen post–Civil War states were not competitive; Nebraska was classified as cyclically competitive, Kansas and North and South Dakota as one-party predominant, and Oklahoma as a one-party state Kansas, Nebraska, and North Dakota represent special problems of classification since the first two, although they entered the Union later, were deeply involved in the Civil War, and North Dakota maintained an active competitive factional system from 1916 to 1956 within the Republican party.

Of the pre–Civil War states, six were competitive, three cyclical, eleven one-party predominant, and eleven one-party states. To summarize, 29 per cent of the pre–Civil War states were in the competitive and cyclical competitive categories, and 67 per cent of the post–Civil War states fell in these categories. Attempts to determine whether pre–Civil War competitive states were more urban or industrial or had a larger percentage of foreign-born in 1920 than non-competitive pre–Civil War states, revealed no systematic differences.

When all states were classified by percentage of foreign-born in 1920, this factor

was found to be unevenly related to competitiveness when the Schlesinger measure for governor, 1914–58, was used. However, the percentage of foreign-born in 1920 was related to state competitiveness when the Ranney-Kendall classification of states was used.

APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE VARIABLES

Underrepresentation or fair representation in state legislatures is not associated with specific patterns of party competitiveness or economic development. Gordon Baker has classified state legislatures into five groups, according to the degree to which major urban areas are represented.[14] Using these categories to make comparisons on the basis of education, wealth, urbanization, and industrialization, no relationships were found. When Schlesinger (governor from 1914 to 1956) and Ranney-Kendall data were classified according to the Baker apportionment categories, no relationships were found. In addition, no relationship was found between apportionment and percentage of foreign-born in 1920 or date of entrance into the Union.

The Baker apportionment measure and a measure of legislative apportionment devised by Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay[15] were also applied to public welfare expenditures and old age assistance payments, but no relationship was found. As a further check on the apportionment variable, a ratio for each state was devised. We classified public welfare expenditures and old age assistance payments according to the wealth of the state, as a measure of effort relative to resources. No relationship was found between these ratios and apportionment.[16]

COMPETITION AND WELFARE

It is often argued that competitiveness between parties results in more benefits for citizens because the parties are forced to bid for votes. Two measures were used to determine whether competitive states were more associated with welfare-oriented policies than non-competitive states: per capita expenditures on public welfare in 1948 and average December payment of old age assistance in 1948.[17] The extensive involvement of the national government in welfare programs complicates the selection of indexes for this variable. However, since the state governments still retain a considerable degree of control over the two indexes selected, the two measures seem suitable for the purposes of this article.

Only selected measures of competitiveness are reported in Table 2. Unless otherwise specified, other measures do not contradict the reported findings. For Ranney-Kendall, Key Bloc, and Schlesinger's governor and president (1914–58) measures, a relationship was found between competitiveness and a higher expenditure on public welfare and higher per capita old age assistance paid. No relationship was found by using the Schlesinger measure for senators (1914–58); a weaker relationship or no relationship was found with Schlesinger measures for governor and president (1870–

[14] *Rural versus Urban Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956), pp. 15–17.

[15] "Unrepresentative States," *National Municipal Review*, XLIV (December, 1955), 571–76, with corrections from the April, 1956, issue, p. 198.

[16] Since this paper was prepared, Theodore Ervin, in a paper written for the State Government Seminar at Michigan State University, compared the two apportionment measures with a series of policy payoff measures No relationships were found. He next grouped states by competitive and non-competitive categories (collapsing Schlesinger's competitive and cyclical states into one category and his one-party predominant and one-party states into the other category). When apportionment measures were then applied, it was found that a regular step pattern prevailed, from highest policy payoffs to lowest policy payoffs as follows: high competition and good apportionment, high competition and poor apportionment, low competition and good apportionment, low competition and poor apportionment. Policy payoff measures included the two used in this article as well as others.

[17] See *The Book of the States 1950–51* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1950), pp. 258–59, 350.

1950). The Key measure on old age assistance shows that "leaning Democratic" states have a slightly higher average payment, although other payments pattern according to competitiveness. The anomaly of the "leaning Democratic" states is probably caused by the ideological predilections of the northern wing of the Democratic party. The ideology of the parties, as well as the degree of competition in the party system, therefore, seems to be an important determinant of the comparative level of old age assistance payments. The relationship between competitiveness and welfare expenditures is less marked when the Key classification is used.

It could be argued that wealth explains the relationship between party competition and higher policy payoffs. To test this hypothesis, wealth was controlled by dividing states into more wealthy and less wealthy categories. States were then grouped in each of these categories on the basis of party competition using Schlesinger's measure for governor (1914–58). Policy payoffs (average per capita welfare expenditures and average old age assistance payments) for each of these subgroups were then calculated. (Where subgroups had only one or two cases they were combined with the neighboring subgroup.) There was a linear relationship in each category. Among wealthy states those with the most competitive politics had the highest average

TABLE 2

PARTY COMPETITIVENESS RELATED TO STATE PUBLIC WELFARE EXPENDITURES AND OLD AGE ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS, 1948

	No. of States	Per Capita Welfare Expenditure	Average Old Age Assistance December Payment
Ranney-Kendall:			
Two-party state	26	$13 14	$46 70
Modified one-party state	12	11 51	38 49
One-party state	10	8 04	28 00
Key:			
Competitive	5	17 28	48 22
Leaning Democratic	5	10 27	50 16
Less strong Republican	2	11 04	41.21
Strong Republican	7	11.01	40 41
Key Bloc:			
Less competitive	6	14 72	54 83
More competitive	7	11.17	40 82
Schlesinger, Governor, 1914–58:			
Competitive	18	14 20	47 77
Cyclical	4	12 43	41 54
One party predominant	14	10 19	41 38
One party	12	9 02	28 64
Schlesinger, President, 1916–56:			
Competitive	8	19.72	53.50
Cyclical	23	11 07	43 04
One party predominant	13	8.60	32 51
One party	4	9 04	27 70
Baker Apportionment:*			
Equal representation	2	11 02	51 10
Moderate	7	8 21	33 85
Underrepresented	9	16.00	46 07
Distorted	22	11 90	39 47
Severe	8	9 38	40 85

* Degree of representation of urban areas in state legislatures (Barker, *op cit*)

policy payoffs; welfare expenditures decreased from competitive to cyclical to one-party predominant to one-party states. The same was true of the relationships among the less wealthy states. Thus party competition is associated with higher average policy payoffs, even when wealth is controlled.

Although the relationship between competition and policy payoffs must be treated with caution when it is extrapolated to nations, it suggests the hypothesis that the underdeveloped countries cannot afford a competitive party system. The major aim of the governments of these countries is to foster economic development, and their primary problem, from an economist's point of view, is to amass the necessary capital. Many economists argue that these countries cannot, unfortunately, afford both large welfare expenditures and large capital investments. A competitive party system, at least in the American states, is likely to siphon more funds into welfare than is a less competitive one. A competitive party system in the underdeveloped countries, therefore, seems likely to thwart economic growth. In such a situation, perhaps the best a devout democrat can reasonably hope for is a party system such as that of India or Mexico, which is dominated by one party but does not preclude other parties.

CONCLUSIONS

Four major findings emerge, but, given the non-sovereign status of the American states, they should be regarded as tentative hypotheses. (1) Wealth and educational level are related to democratic government as defined by the degree of interparty competition, but the effect of traditions is also important. (2) Democratic competition may flourish without urbanization and industrialization but may have a different character than that found in urban areas. (3) The level of competition that the underdeveloped countries can afford, if their attempts at economic development are to succeed, may be rather low. (4) Apportionment of legislatures is less important than party competition in explaining the level of policy payoffs. Competition appears to be able to override the drag on a democratic system resulting from legislative malapportionment.

It should be pointed out in conclusion that the relationships indicated, for example, between educational and competition levels, were established in a manner that does not allow for judgments of causal sequence. A future paper will investigate the temporal sequence of changes in the values of the variables considered.

Michigan State University

THE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST SEGREGATION

JAMES W. VANDER ZANDEN

ABSTRACT

Non-violent resistance to segregation is a tactic well suited to struggles in which a minority group lacks access to major sources of power within a society. Within the past decade, a number of forces have come to bear that have made southern Negroes susceptible to militant courses of action. The non-violent resistance movement that has developed among southern Negroes can be understood as an effort to mediate between the conflicting roles and traditions of the accommodating Negro and the new militant Negro; guilt feelings over the militant and aggressive patterns seek satisfaction and find expression in an emphasis upon suffering.

"Passive" or "non-violent resistance" has become a major weapon in the arsenal of the Negro movement against segregation.[1] A dramatic and spectacular tactic, it found its first large-scale employment in a movement launched in late 1955 against segregation on city busses by Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama. The success of the Montgomery movement established passive resistance as a key weapon in desegregation efforts, and projected upon the national horizon a new group of militant Negro leaders represented by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. The movement places great stress upon non-violent means such as boycotts and sit-ins, and non-violent reactions in the face of attack.

Non-violent resistance is a tactic well suited to struggles in which a minority lacks access to major sources of power within a society and to the instruments of violent coercion. The stratification structure and the functional division of labor of a society are so constituted that a minority group undertaking "non-co-operation," the withholding of its participation from certain essential areas of life, can exert considerable pressure upon the dominant group and extract concessions from them. By the same token, non-violent resistance is less likely to bring direct retaliation from the dominant group than are tactics employing more directly aggressive forms of expression. Moreover, within the South, the mass character of the movement has posed particular difficulties to whites who would undertake to punish the participants, for example, the relative infeasibility of mass imprisonments. During the past two decades vast social changes within the South have contributed to a redefinition of lynching as illegitimate. Simultaneously, within the larger American society, the Negroes' tactic of non-violent resistance has gained a considerable degree of legitimacy.

Prior to 1954, the predominant response of southern Negroes to their minority status was that of accommodation. Within the past decade, however, a number of forces have made southern Negroes susceptible to a protest or militant approach to racial segregation. A number of factors played an especially important role. First, a new definition of the Negro's position within the United States, especially within the South, has come sharply and forcefully to the foreground. The net effect of the 1954 Supreme Court decision against mandatory school segregation was that it advanced, in an authoritative, formal, and official fashion, a definition of the Negro as a first-class citizen. This decision overturned the "separate but equal" doctrine formulated in 1896 in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, which relegated the Negro to second-class citizenship and which, within the South, gave legal sanction

[1] From 1954 to 1956 the author taught at an accredited Negro college with an interracial faculty in a Deep South state. By virtue of this position he was able to move rather freely within the Negro community. The interpretation advanced within this paper in large measure rests upon the observations made from this vantage point

to the Negro's castelike position of stigmatized inferiority, subordination, and segregation.

The Supreme Court's action was closely associated with another factor, the emergence of the new nations of Africa. With the breakup of the old colonial empires, the world was no longer "a white man's world." On the international scene, the new Negro nations were defined, at least in theory, as the equals of the white nations (for example, within the United Nations). The Supreme Court's antisegregation decisions and the emergence of the African nations created a new self-image for many Negroes in which accommodation to Jim Crow no longer could be an acceptable response to the enduring and aggravated frustrations of the racial order.

Accompanying these developments is the growing awareness among southern Negroes that the Jim Crow structure is not a final and inevitable reality, and that antisegregation efforts offer the promise of success. Although the nation had for decades been more or less willing to allow the South a measure of sovereignty on the race issue, it has become increasingly unwilling to do so since World War II. There has been a growing insistence, reinforced by international pressures, that the racial norms of the South give way to the democratic norms of the American Creed. The Supreme Court's antisegregation rulings have been both a factor contributing to, and a product of, this sentiment. Even more important, the decisions of the Supreme Court reversed the racial situation within the United States: where segregation had previously enjoyed the highest legal sanction, mandatory segregation was now declared unconstitutional. Hence, the machinery and resources of the federal government became decisively committed for the first time since Reconstruction to an antisegregation program. Where previously there had been widespread despair and hopelessness among southern Negroes and resignation to the Jim Crow order, now the situation was progressively defined as one that could be altered. Where the "road to a better life" had appeared as an endless maze, with a mammoth white wall at every turn, now the Negro enjoyed potent white allies in any antisegregation movement. Sentiments and attitudes that had reinforced a pattern of accommodation have been increasingly undermined, contributing to the emergence of a protest pattern.

These changes have caused the great masses of southern Negroes to be caught up between two contradictory ways of life, the old one of second-class, the new one of first-class citizenship. Negro status is in a state of flux, lacking clarity and precise definition. The normative guideposts defining the Negro's position are in conflict between traditional patterns and the new patterns of racial equality. The white South itself is uncertain as to the "Negro's place." Where once there was a well-defined definition of the Negro's role, now that definition is in transition.

Although responses of overt, unaggressive accommodation to the racial structure generally prevailed among southern Negroes prior to 1954, various investigators noted that southern Negroes harbored considerable covert or latent aggressive impulses toward whites.[2] These feelings of latent hostility and aggression were not always manifest or conscious. From her psychiatric treatment of Negroes, McLean observed: "The intense fear of the white man with its consequent hostility and guilt may

[2] John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (3d ed.; New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1957), p. 252; Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1951), p. 342; Guy B Johnson, "Patterns of Race Conflict," in Edgar T. Thompson (ed), *Race Relations and the Race Problem* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1939), p. 126; Bertram P. Karon, *The Negro Personality* (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 165–67; Helen V. McLean, "The Emotional Health of Negroes," *Journal of Negro Education,* XVIII (1949), 286; and Hortense Powdermaker, "The Channeling of Negro Aggression by the Cultural Process," in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray (eds.), *Personality* (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956), pp. 602–3.

not be conscious in the Negro, but from my own psycho-analytic experience in treating Negro men and women, *I have yet to see a Negro who did not unconsciously have a deep fear of and hostility toward white people.*"[3] Karon, in a study of Negro personality characteristics in a northern and a southern city, concluded that Negroes in the South develop strong mechanisms of denial with respect to aggression, not only with respect to the race situation but to the whole of life. Compared with the Negroes in the northern city, the southern Negroes were characterized by a higher incidence in the number of people whose whole emotional life was colored by the struggle not to be angry.[4]

Within this setting, a program of nonviolent resistance to segregation offered a strong psychological appeal (in addition to its already-noted suitability as a tactic). On the one hand, there exist among Negroes considerable undercurrents of resentment toward whites and the southern racial structure. On the other hand, Negroes have been socialized generally in a tradition calling for the suppression of hostility and aggression toward whites, and also in a religious tradition stressing Christian love and tabooing hatred. Many Negroes have taken very literally the Christian doctrine that it is sinful to hate. Yet, they are placed in race situations in which hostility is an inevitable product; life confronts Negroes with circumstances that constantly stimulate aggressive thoughts and fantasies that are defined as sinful.[5]

The matter is compounded by widespread Negro feelings of self-hatred.[6] Within many minority groups there exist strong tendencies to accept the dominant group's evaluations and conceptions of the minority.[7] By virtue of his membership in the Negro group, the Negro suffers considerably in terms of self-esteem and has every incentive for self-hatred. In many respects, even good performance is irrelevant insofar as the Negro frequently gets a poor reflection of himself in the behavior of whites, regardless of what he does or what his merits are. Identified by society as a Negro, he, of necessity, so identifies himself. To compensate for this low self-esteem, the Negro identifies in part with whites and white values; for example, the success of the Negro cosmetic industry rests, in large measure, upon the considerable demand for skin bleaches and hair straighteners.[8] Hostility toward whites and simultaneous self-hatred and identification with whites are likely to intensify the internal turbulence which seeks for resolution.

Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., has given articulate and forceful expression to these crosscurrents (the feelings of hostility toward whites on the one hand, and the dictates requiring suppression of these impulses on the other), and has posed a solution to the dilemma. He has told Negroes that they have long been abused, insulted, and mistreated, that they have been "kicked about by the brutal feet of oppression." In essence, he has repeatedly told his Negro audiences, using such veiled euphemisms as "protest," that it is permissible and legitimate for them to feel hostility and to engage in aggressive activities against the ex-

[3] McLean, *op. cit.*, p. 286. My italics

[4] Karon, *op. cit.*, pp. 165–67.

[5] Powdermaker, *op. cit.*, pp 602–3.

[6] See Kardiner and Ovesey, *op. cit.*, p 297; Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark, "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children," in Theodore M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1947), pp. 169–78; Robert Johnson, "Negro Reactions to Minority Group Status," in Milton L. Barron (ed.), *American Minorities* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1957), p 205; Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), p. 259; and E. Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940), p. 180.

[7] Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 186–200.

[8] For a discussion of Negro incorporation and distortion of white middle-class values see E Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

isting racial order.[9] In fact, an important theme in his speeches has been that Negroes have "a moral obligation" to fight segregation: "To accept passively an unjust system is to cooperate with that system; thereby the oppressed become as evil as the oppressor. Noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good."[10] He has thus defined the traditional pattern of acceptance and resignation as immoral.

Simultaneously, King and his followers have paid extensive homage to non-hatred, to Christian love: "Love must be our regulating ideal. Once again we must hear the words of Jesus echoing across the centuries: 'Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, and pray for them that despitefully use you.' "[11] In essence, King's message to Negroes has been that they can have their cake and eat it too; that they can "hate," but that really it is not animosity but "love." He has aided Negroes to redefine as moral and acceptable what otherwise would be defined as immoral and unacceptable. This is not to suggest hypocrisy; rather, it is an example of the facility with which humans can rationalize and legitimatize feelings, attitudes, and behavior that might otherwise be a source of emotional distress to them.

An incident at a Knoxville rally in support of the "Stay Away from Downtown" movement (part of the campaign to win the desegregation of that city's lunch counters) is illustrative. After a number of bitter, biting, and militant speeches, the chairman of the meeting came back to the microphone and reassuringly indicated, "We're making a lot of noise, but that doesn't mean we're angry at anybody. If you have no love in your heart, stay at home. Why, even Jack Leflore's got it now, a little bit!"[12] The assembled Negroes were permitted to vent their hostility but then, fittingly enough, were comforted, "We're really not angry." Further relief from the tension was provided by the good-natured ribbing of one of the community's Negroes.

The King appeal attempts to mediate between the conflicting traditions, of the accommodating Negro and the militant Negro. Ambiguously immersed within conflicting roles, the appeal looks in both directions, toward the suppression of hostility (the traditional approach), and toward its expression in a militantly aggressive social movement. Although such activities may be labeled "passive resistance," in reality they constitute what psychologists refer to as "passive aggression." Their net result is to challenge, to aggress against, existing patterns (and by implication the people who adhere to such patterns, e.g., the boycotted white merchants).

Yet as is so frequently the case rationalizations are not always completely successful in handling impulses defined as unacceptable. Bitterness, resentment, and hostility cannot be dispensed with so simply; protestations of love cannot totally veil aggressive impulses. The consequence is a wide prevalence of deep and disturbing guilt feelings. King has noted this in his own experience. Referring to his encounters with bus and city officials, he writes: "I was weighted down by a terrible sense of guilt, remembering that on two or three occasions I had allowed myself to become angry and indignant. I had spoken hastily and resentfully, yet I knew that this was no way to solve a problem. 'You must not harbor anger,' I admonished myself. 'You must be willing to suffer the anger of the opponent, and yet not return anger. You must not become bitter. . . .' "[13]

Prevailing guilt feelings caused by ag-

[9] There is reason to believe that Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., himself, harbors considerable animosity toward whites; see Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride toward Freedom* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), pp. 71, 97, and 112.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[12] Merrill Proudfoot, *Diary of a Sit-In* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 118.

[13] King, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

gressive and hostile impulses seek satisfaction in the need for punishment. This probably accounts, in part, for the considerable premium assigned by the non-violent resistance movement to suffering. In fact, the endurance of suffering and the "turn the other cheek" orientation have become exalted in their own right. King declares: "We will match your capacity [referring to whites] to inflict suffering with our capacity to endure suffering. We will meet your physical force with soul force. . . . Do to us what you will and we will still love you. . . . But we will soon wear you down by our capacity to suffer."[14] And "The non-violent say that suffering becomes a powerful social force when you willingly accept that violence on yourself, so that *self-suffering stands at the center* of the non-violent movement and the individuals involved are able to suffer in a creative manner, feeling that unearned suffering is redemptive, and that suffering may serve to transform the social situation."[15]

Similarly, it is not unusual to hear the movement's activists express their willingness to die for their cause, to suffer the severest form of punishment, a martyr's death. King, indicating his "personal sense of guilt for everything that was happening" as a result of the bus boycott (e.g., the violence that had ensued), explains that he "broke down" in a public meeting and then "in the grip of an emotion I could not control," exclaimed, "Lord, I hope no one will have to die as a result of our struggle for freedom in Montgomery. Certainly I don't want to die. But if anyone has to die, let it be me."[16] At times it appears that some members of the movement engage in subtle provocations, in a masochistic-like fashion, whereby they expect to bring about pain and degradation; they offer their "cheek" with the prospect of receiving a slap.

The emphasis upon suffering has still another source. Christianity teaches that voluntary submission to sacrifice, privation, and the renunciation of gratification are preconditions for the attainment of the prospective goal, eternal happiness. Life is viewed as a brief period of affliction, to be replaced by eternal bliss for the righteous. The death of Christ upon the cross, the Savior's suffering, was the means by which the gates of paradise were opened.[17] Within this religious heritage, it is not difficult to make the attainment of an improved earthly future also contingent upon suffering. Suffering, and often merely its anticipation, clears the path to the fulfilment of otherwise forbidden values, the good life in which Negroes will enjoy a better future on earth. It is the Gandhian mandate that "Things of fundamental importance to people are not secured by reason alone, but have to be *purchased* with their *suffering*." The principle is seen in this illustration:

> Once a pool driver [Montgomery Negroes established a car pool during the period of the bus boycott] stopped beside an elderly woman who was trudging along with obvious difficulty
>
> "Jump in, grandmother," he said. "You don't need to walk."
>
> She waved him on. "I'm not walking for myself," she explained. "I'm walking for my children and my grandchildren." And she continued toward home on foot.[18]

Developments on the national and international scene have sharply posed the issue of the Negro's status within America. Within the context of these many crosscurrents, suffering provides a source by which Negroes may increase their self-esteem: First, one can appear uncommonly noble, gentle, and heroic through suffering and sacrificing one's own comfort and well-being for a cause. Second, suffering enables the Negro to feel that "we are after all the better men," "better" in the moral and spiritual sense. Christianity teaches that "He that

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[15] King, "Love, Law and Civil Disobedience," *New South*, XVI (December, 1961), 6. My italics.

[16] King, *Stride toward Freedom*, p. 143.

[17] In this connection see Theodor Reik, *Masochism in Modern Man* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1941), pp. 319, 341–42, 428, 430–33.

[18] King, *Stride toward Freedom*, p. 61.

humbleth himself shall be exalted" and "Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth." Negroes can find a considerable sense of self-worth in these teachings, for "after all, we are the better Christians; in God's eyes we are honored." King indicates: "Since the white man's personality is greatly distorted by segregation, and his soul is greatly scarred, he needs the love of the Negro. The Negro must love the white man, because the white man needs his love to remove his tensions, insecurities, and fears."[19] Third, Negroes can enjoy the idea that they will finally triumph, that they will conquer their enemies. They can gain considerable satisfaction in the fantasy that the very society that neglects and rejects them now will see its sinful ways and repent. There is an inner expectancy and foreknowledge of coming victory.[20] Then "the last shall be first." Here again this sentiment finds frequent expression in King's speeches: "Before the victory is won some may have to get scarred up, but we shall overcome. Before the victory of brotherhood is achieved, some will maybe face physical death, but we shall overcome . . . behind the dim unknown standeth God within the shadows, keeping watch above His own. With this faith in the future, with this determined struggle, we will be able to emerge from the bleak and desolate midnight of man's inhumanity to man, into the bright and glittering daybreak of freedom and justice."[21]

A social movement as such offers certain rewards to a people weighed down by a sense of inferiority, powerlessness, and insignificance. In fusing oneself with a social movement external to the self, one can acquire the strength which the individual self lacks by becoming part of a bigger and more powerful whole. In so doing the individual may lose some of his personal integrity as well as some of his freedom, but he can also gain a new sense of strength and significance.[22] In this connection, one is struck by the intense exaltation and glorification of the leadership of the non-violent movement by the rank and file, by its messianic character. Although mass meetings are frequently held during which the audience votes on various matters, their action is little more than a rubber stamp for the decisions made by the leadership and presented for perfunctory approval.[23] By the same token, a social movement helps to answer the question, "Who am I?" for a people whose social role is ambiguous and undergoing change.

The non-violent resistance to segregation has an assimilationist orientation in which Negroes aim to gain total acceptance and equality within American society. Should the movement fail to make what its members perceive and define to be satisfactory progress toward this goal, it is conceivable that movements of black nationalism, such as the "Black Muslims" (the Nation of Islam led by Elijah Muhammad), may gain ascendency among southern Negroes. At present these separatist movements operate primarily among the Negro lower classes of nothern cities. E. U. Essien-Udom suggests that these Negroes are estranged from the larger society that they seek to enter, a society that rejects them, while simultaneously they are estranged from their own group which they despise. Black nationalism provides a response to this dual alienation, rootlessness, and restlessness.[24]

Whereas the South, until recently, rather formally and rigorously defined the position of the Negro within the region, the North did not do likewise. Within northern

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[20] See Reik, *op. cit.*, pp. 319–22, 430–33.

[21] King, "Love, Law and Civil Disobedience," *op. cit.*, pp. 10–11.

[22] See Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1941), pp. 141, 151–56.

[23] See Jacquelyne Mary Johnson Clarke, "Goals and Techniques in Three Negro Civil-Rights Organizations in Alabama" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1960).

[24] E. U. Essien-Udom, *Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

cities, Negroes, at least in theory, were the equals of whites, although in practice this was frequently not the case. Accordingly, it is understandable that many northern Negroes, especially among the lower socio-economic groups, should become disillusioned and that they should turn their backs on integration for separatism. However, southern Negroes generally have not lost faith in the feasibility of the assimilationist approach; it has still to be tried. Furthermore, there is evidence that within the North the Negro church has lost its significance for many urban Negroes who seek to define their situation within religious terms.[25] This has not been the case within the South. A new group of Negro religious leaders, as represented by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., have undertaken to help the southern Negro define his situation within the terms of the church.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 331-32.

SOME ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SUBURBANIZATION IN THE COPENHAGEN METROPOLITAN AREA[1]

SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN

ABSTRACT

Data from the Danish population registers are analyzed to ascertain the role of migration in changing the distribution of population and income within the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area. The net effects of migration clearly account for the large growth of the suburbs and the actual population decline of the central city. Yet the existence of large, but selective, countermovements means that the over-all impact of migration is much greater than some of the small net changes in number suggest. The heavy flow of persons with high income to the suburbs countered by an almost equally large flow of persons with low income to the city means that the redistribution of population within the metropolitan area is producing an increasingly homogeneous population within the city proper, one composed largely of persons of low economic status

The rapid urbanization and metropolitanization of the world's population and the social and economic implications of this development have increasingly become the focus of social and demographic research.[2] Yet, in many countries of the world, including some of the more advanced, the absence of adequate data has precluded a comprehensive evaluation of the dynamics of these processes. The size and selective character of opposing streams of movement and the relative importance of these opposing streams in producing greater or lesser homogeneity in the urban and suburban areas has, to a large extent, defied analysis because of inadequate basic data. In the United States, for example, increasing metropolitanization has been clearly documented. So too have the differential rates of growth of the central city and the suburbs and the fact that in recent decades an increasing number of cities have actually begun to experience sharp population declines due to net migration losses.[3] These changes seem, in turn, to be producing a more homogeneous urban population, composed increasingly of persons of lower socioeconomic status.[4] However, our heavy dependence on decennial census data for migration information means that many of our conclusions about the qualitative and quantitative impact of urban and suburban migration have, because they are based on indirect measures, yielded net results only.

An opportunity to undertake a more intensive analysis arose as part of an ongoing

[1] This research was undertaken while the author was a visiting Fulbright research professor at the Danish National Institute of Social Research. Fellowship support by the Social Science Research Council and the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] See, e.g., International Urban Research, *The World's Metropolitan Areas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); UNESCO, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Calcutta: UNESCO, 1957), Philip M. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Latin America* (New York: International Documents Service, 1961); Jack P. Gibbs and Leo F. Schnore, "Metropolitan Growth: An International Study," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (September, 1960), 160-70; Donald J. Bogue, *Population Growth in Standard Metropolitan Areas, 1900-1950* (Washington: Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1953).

[3] United States Bureau of the Census, "Population of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 1960 and 1950," *1960 Census of Population, Supplementary Reports*, PC(S1)-1 (April 10, 1961), pp 1-4.

[4] See, e g , Harry Sharp and Leo F. Schnore, "The Changing Color Composition of Metropolitan Areas," *Land Economics*, XXXVIII (May, 1962), 169-83; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Metropolitan Community Residential Belts, 1950 and 1956," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (April, 1960), 245-52; Kurt Mayer and Sidney Goldstein, "Interrelationships between Social and Demographic Processes in an American City," *Proceedings of the International Population Conference, Vienna, 1959* (Vienna: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1959), pp 92-105.

investigation of internal migration in Denmark. In this research, special attention is focused on the components of population change in metropolitan Copenhagen, an area encompassing a population of 1,348,454 in 1960. The similarity in growth patterns between this area and a number of American metropolitan areas should make the Danish findings particularly relevant for evaluating the universality of certain features of the metropolitanization process. Most important is the existence in Denmark of a system of continuous population registers—in which a continuous record of each individual in the population is maintained by the Population Registry in his municipality of residence.[5] For each person born or newly moved into the community, a record is prepared. Correspondingly, the cards of deceased persons and of out-migrants are removed from the active files. These cards contain information on the person's name, sex, place and date of birth, place of residence, marital status, occupation, and, for in-migrants, date of arrival in the municipality and place of previous residence. By law, a person is required to report all changes in residence, both within and between municipalities. These reports provide the basis for the measurement of intramunicipality, intermunicipality, and international movement of Denmark's population.

Moreover, the ability to collate the socioeconomic data on individuals contained in the registry files with income information available in the annual tax returns filed by the population adds current data on income to the previous list of variables that are available for analytic purposes.

Utilizing both the migration data available from the tabulations prepared by the Copenhagen Statistical Office and the special tabulations prepared since 1954 on the income of migrant persons, the following analysis will examine the population development of the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area between 1900 and 1960, the changing importance of fertility, mortality, and migration in accounting for population growth or decline in the central city and the suburbs. Finally some of the economic correlates of the changing pattern of population distribution within the metropolitan area will be considered.

POPULATION DEVELOPMENT, 1900–1960

Even before the turn of the century, it was recognized that realistic evaluation of the economic and social structure of the city of Copenhagen must encompass consideration of some of the adjoining areas. In fact, as early as 1860 the adjoining municipality of Frederiksberg was treated statistically as a part of the capital city. By 1921, the same view was adopted toward Gentofte, a smaller municipality immediately north of Copenhagen. For statistical purposes, therefore, the "Capital" has, since 1921, consisted of the three contiguous but independent municipalities of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, and Gentofte.

Increasingly, the area's demographic and economic development extended even beyond the limits encompassed by the Capital. In recognition of this development, and on the basis of surveys[6] undertaken by the Copenhagen Statistical Office, first in 1930 and again in 1949–50, to ascertain the social and economic interrelationships existing between the central city and the outlying areas, the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area now consists of nineteen suburban municipalities[7] in addition to the three cen-

[5] The register is considered to be highly accurate in coverage of the population, particularly because Denmark has a well-established system of birth and death registration and a high level of literacy. Furthermore, the use of information in the registry in conjunction with exercise of various social and political privileges (e.g., voting rights and insurance benefits) and periodic checks and revisions of the registry based on a name-by-name comparison with census returns serve to enhance the completeness and accuracy of the system.

[6] For the specific criteria used in delineating the metropolitan area see "Hovedstadens Forstads—og Omegnskommuner 1950," *Statistisk Maanedsskrift* (Copenhagen Statistical Office), XXVII, Nos 5 6 (1951), 103–249.

[7] For the names of these nineteen suburban municipalities, see n. † of Table 1.

tral cities. The results conform closely to the American concept of a metropolitan area.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the "Capital," with its population of almost half a million, ranked as one of the large urban centers of Europe. Yet, indicative of the generally low level of suburban development, the concentration of 491,276 persons in the central city constituted 92 per cent of the total population of the twenty-two municipalities that were by 1950 to comprise the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area (Table 1). Despite this, as early as the first decade of the twentieth century, the nineteen suburban municipalities, though small in absolute number, were already growing at a faster rate than the Capital; between the censuses of 1901 and 1911, the Capital gained 19 per cent whereas the suburban municipalities increased by one-quarter. Over succeeding decades, the Capital exhibited a declining growth rate. By 1940–50, the increase in population from 890,130 to 974,901 was less than 10 per cent, and in the succeeding decade the Capital, like many American cities, experienced an actual decline of 5.2 per cent. Its 1960 population of 923,974 was not quite double that of 1901.

In contrast, each succeeding decade of the twentieth century has witnessed an increasing rate of growth in the suburban segment of the metropolitan area. The improved means of transportation to the suburbs, the location there of new employment opportunities, the restricted housing opportunities in the central city, and the corresponding attraction to the suburbs of both migrants from the city proper and those moving to the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area from elsewhere in Denmark all combined to account for these differentials. By 1950–60, while the Capital lost 5.2 per cent of its population, the nineteen surrounding suburban municipalities increased their numbers by 75.6 per cent, to a high of 424,480 persons. In the course of sixty years, the suburbs had grown tenfold, and showed every indication of continued growth.

Reflecting these differential rates of growth, each successive decade of the century was characterized by a decreasing concentration of the population in the Capital. Between 1901 and 1950 the proportion of total area residents living in the Capital declined from 92.3 to 80.1; by 1960, the central city contained only 68.5 per cent of the total metropolitan population. On the other hand, the over-all population dominance of the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area continued to grow, increasing from 21.7 per cent of all of Denmark's population in 1901 to 29.4 per cent by 1960.

COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE

The changing importance of natural increase and migration in the relative growth rates of the Capital and the suburban segment of the Copenhagen area is shown by the data in Table 2. For the Capital, each five-year period between 1941 and 1960 was characterized by a gain resulting from an excess of births over deaths. However, both the absolute and the relative size of this gain decreased with each successive quinquennial period. The average annual increase of 7,566 during 1941–45, equal to a gain of 8.3 per 1,000 population, had declined to only 1,534 per year by 1955–60, a rate of increase of only 1.6 per 1,000. Almost all of this change was due to a decrease in the number of births, resulting from the joint effects of the over-all decline in birth rates that followed the fertility upsurge in the late war and early postwar years and the decrease in urban fertility due to the exodus from the city and the failure to attract in-migrants in the reproductive age groups. At the same time, the increasing average age of the Capital's population produced a small increase in the absolute and relative number of deaths in the last of the four five-year periods cited.

While the size and rate of natural in-

TABLE 1

Changes in Population of Copenhagen Metropolitan Area, 1901–60

Year	Absolute No: Capital*	Absolute No: Suburbs†	Absolute No: Total Metropolitan Area	Absolute No: Total Denmark	Decennial Percentage Increase: Capital*	Decennial Percentage Increase: Suburbs†	Decennial Percentage Increase: Total Metropolitan Area	Decennial Percentage Increase: Total Denmark	Percentage Distribution of Metropolitan Population: Within Capital	Percentage Distribution of Metropolitan Population: Within Suburbs
1901 . .	491,276	40,781	532,057	2,449,540			.	.	92.3	7.7
1911	584,089	51,164	635,253	2,757,076	18.9	25.5	19.4	12.6	91.9	8.1
1921	700,610	68,234	768,844	3,267,831	19.9	33.4	21.0	18.5‡	91.1	8.9
1930.	771,168	103,912	875,080	3,550,656	10.1	52.3	13.8	8.7	88.1	11.9
1940	890,130	154,334	1,044,464	3,844,368	15.4	48.5	19.4	8.3	85.2	14.8
1950	974,901	241,753	1,216,654	4,281,275	9.5	56.6	16.5	11.4	80.1	19.9
1960	923,974	424,480	1,348,454	4,585,256	– 5.2	75.6	10.8	7.1	68.5	31.5

* Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, and Gentofte Although Gentofte was not officially included in the Capital until 1921, it is included here in the 1901 and 1911 statistics to insure comparability

† Includes 19 municipalities Ballerup Maaløv, Birkerød, Brøndbyerne, Dragør, Farum, Gladsaxe, Glostrup, Herlev, Herstederne, Hvidovre, Høje Taastrup, Hørsholm, Lyngby-Taarbæk, Rødovre, Store Magleby, Søllerød, Taarnby, Vallensbæk, and Værløse

‡ Of this total gain, 5.9 per cent represents the increase in Denmark's population resulting from the addition of territory in South Jylland under provisions of the Versailles Treaty

Source *Statistisk Aarbog for København, Frederiksberg, og Gentofte Samt Omegnskommunerne, 1961* (Copenhagen Copenhagen Statistical Office, 1962), p 1.

TABLE 2

Components of Population Change, Capital and Suburbs, 1941–60

Years	Average Annual No: Births	Average Annual No: Deaths	Average Annual No: Natural Increase	Average Annual No: Migration Balance	Average Annual No: Net Increase or Decrease	Rates (No per 1,000 Mid-Period Population): Births	Rates: Deaths	Rates: Natural Increase	Rates: Migration Balance	Rates: Net Increase or Decrease
					Capital					
1941–45	17,506	9,940	7,566	1,795	9,361	19.2	10.9	8.3	2.0	10.3
1946–50	16,948	9,900	7,048	136	7,184	17.6	10.3	7.3	0.1	7.4
1951–55	12,823	9,858	2,965	– 6,326	– 3,361	13.3	10.2	3.1	– 6.6	– 3.5
1956–60	11,991	10,457	1,534	– 8,371	– 6,837	12.7	11.1	1.6	– 8.9	– 7.3
					Suburbs					
1941–45	3,805	1,391	2,414	2,948	5,362	23.2	8.5	14.7	18.0	32.7
1946–50	4,902	1,518	3,384	9,081	12,465	23.7	7.3	16.4	43.8	60.2
1951–55	6,626	1,761	4,865	13,119	17,984	23.2	6.2	17.0	45.9	62.9
1956–60 . .	8,206	2,157	6,049	12,851	18,900	21.7	5.7	16.0	33.9	49.9

Source: *Statistisk Maanedsskrift* (Copenhagen Statistical Office), XXXVII, No 8 (1961), 148–49.

rease was declining, the effect of migration n the population was also undergoing narked change. The war period witnessed a mall annual population gain that could be ttributed to net in-migration—a yearly iverage of 1,795. During the next five ears, however, the average number of perons entering the city just barely exceeded he number leaving. Were it not for the arge number of persons who returned to he Capital immediately following the war (or who possibly first registered as in-mirants in the postwar years even though hey had actually entered the city during he German occupation), the last half of the orties would probably have been characterzed by net out-migration. In fact, data on single year basis show that the last sevral years of this decade did have such net osses. By the 1950's, the Capital experinced annual migration losses. In both peiods the losses resulting from migration were sufficiently large to more than cancel out the small gains resulting from the excess of births over deaths.

Meanwhile, the demographic experience of the surrounding suburbs was quite different. The number of births increased from a yearly average of 3,805 during 1941–45 to 8,206 during 1955–60, reflecting both the increased number of persons living in the suburbs and their concentration in the reproductive age groups. Further reflecting the changing age structure of the suburbs, the death rate declined by one-third to just about half that of the Capital's. As a result, natural increase played a much more important role in the population growth of the suburban areas.

The contrast between Capital and suburbs is even more striking when the role of migration in population growth is considered. During 1941–45, the net balance of migrants to the suburbs was already slightly greater than the excess of births over deaths. In the three succeeding five-year periods, migration exceeded natural increase by two to three times. Thus, at the very same time that the city was losing population, the suburbs were augmenting their large natural increases by still greater increases through net in-movement. In 1960, for example, the last year of the period under consideration, the suburbs grew by over 4 per cent through a gain of 18,481 persons, of whom 11,873 were migrants. By contrast, the Capital's net loss of 8,005 persons, all through out-migration, meant a population decline in just this one year of almost 1 per cent.

The foregoing evaluation of the relative importance of natural increase and net migration in the respective growth rates of the Capital and suburbs masks the more specific relation that exists between these two areas. Actually, much of the gain experienced by the suburbs is accounted for by the losses attributed to the Capital, since a significant proportion of the total movement into and out of these places represents exchanges between them.

The volume of movement within and between the twenty-two *kommuner* ("municipalities") comprising the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area is shown for 1952–59 in Table 3. In this period, between 203,000 and 217,000 persons, approximately 15 per cent of the total population of the area, changed residence annually within the area. Throughout the period, the number of intra-*kommuner* movers has been at least twice as large as the number of inter-*kommuner* movers. However, these statistics indicate that, while the over-all movement *within* the total metropolitan area did not increase between 1952 and 1959, there was a marked tendency for the movement to be directed toward the suburbs and between the suburban areas.

Mobility is not, however, restricted to movement within the metropolitan area; a significant part of the suburban growth results from the direct movement to the suburbs of persons living outside the metropolitan area. For example, of the 55,452 persons moving into each of the nineteen suburban *kommuner* in 1959, two-thirds came from other parts of the metropolitan

area—25,827 from the Capital and 11,120 from other suburban *kommuner.* The remaining 18,505 in-migrants originated outside the metropolitan area (Table 4).

Moreover, the population register data reveal that movement between the central city and the suburbs is not unidirectional. In 1959, 14,951 suburban residents moved out of the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area, and 13,835 persons moved from the suburban towns into the Capital. Thus, the net result of the gross two-way movement of 39,662 persons between the Capital and the suburbs was a gain for the suburbs of 11,992 persons, and the 33,456 person exchange with the outside area yielded a net gain of 3,554.[8]

The over-all importance of the exodus from the city to the suburbs is indicated by the fact that almost 80 per cent of the total migration gain of 15,546 persons experienced by the suburbs in 1959 came from the Capital. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the net gains were the result of considerably larger gross movements in *both* directions. Of particular interest is the not-insignificant movement from the suburbs to the city. So much emphasis has been given to suburbanization that the presence, and significance, of a considerable reverse movement has generally been overlooked.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILE PERSONS, BY TYPE OF MOBILITY, WITHIN AND BETWEEN VARIOUS SECTORS OF COPENHAGEN METROPOLITAN AREA, 1952–59

Type of Mobility	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Within individual Capital city	58.6	57.6	56.8	55.5	56.2	55.2	55.3	53.2
Within individual suburban municipality	11.6	11.4	12.5	13.3	12.4	12.9	12.2	13.3
Total within municipality mobility	70.2	69.0	69.3	68.8	68.6	68.1	67.5	66.5
Between two Capital cities	11.3	11.0	10.9	10.7	10.7	10.4	10.1	9.9
Between two suburban municipalities	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.9	3.7	4.3	4.5	5.2
Between Capital city and suburb	15.4	16.6	16.3	16.6	17.0	17.2	17.9	18.4
Total between municipality mobility	29.8	31.0	30.7	31.2	31.4	31.9	32.5	33.5
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total no. of movers within Copenhagen Metropolitan Area	211,568	203,426	211,529	214,618	210,344	217,282	210,066	215,319

Source: Annual reports on population movement in the Capital and its suburbs in *Statistisk Maanedsskrift.*

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

The suburban exodus from the Capital and the resulting loss of population has led to increased concern with the economic im-

[8] Although the specific data cited above refer to a single year, the basic pattern and, within relatively narrow limits, the actual volume of exchange has been the same for each year from 1952 to 1959 (see Table 4).

The migration stream that has changed most is movement from one suburban town to another; this increase (from 6,446 in 1952 to 11,120 in 1959) stems largely from the growing number of persons who reside in the suburbs. Because much of this movement is between similar places, it is similar in character to intra-urban mobility.

plications of such demographic change, especially the relative positions of the central city and the suburbs as places of employment and sources of income. Because this concern has been particularly true of the city of Copenhagen (as distinct from Gentofte and Frederiksberg), the available data refer largely to the impact of suburban movement on this one city, rather than on the Capital as a whole. However, since 78 per cent of the population of the three cities lives in Copenhagen proper, and since all three cities have been losing population through out-migration, the results of these findings probably characterize the experience of the Capital as a whole.

Valuable insights into the impact of suburban migration on the income structure of the suburbs and the central city are provided by comparing the data obtained in 1948, and again in 1957, on the suburban municipalities as residences and as sources of income in relation to Copenhagen (Table 5). In 1948, 117,315 taxpayers, including self-employed women, were registered residents in the nineteen suburban communities. Of this number, 54,335, or 46.3 per cent, reported having earned income in Co-

TABLE 4

MIGRATION TO AND FROM SUBURBS OF COPENHAGEN METROPOLITAN AREA, BY PLACE OF ORIGIN AND PLACE OF DESTINATION, 1952–59*

	PLACE OF ORIGIN OR DESTINATION			TOTAL
	Capital	Other Suburbs	Provinces and Foreign Countries	
1952:				
In-migrants	20,937	6,446	13,769	41,152
Out-migrants	11,669	6,446	11,001	29,116
Net	9,268	. . . . . .	2,768	12,036
1953:				
In-migrants	21,482	6,974	14,941	43,397
Out-migrants	12,210	6,974	10,795	29,979
Net	9,272	. . .	4,146	13,418
1954:				
In-migrants	22,652	7,350	15,105	45,107
Out-migrants	11,882	7,350	11,984	31,216
Net	10,770	. .	3,121	13,891
1955:				
In-migrants	23,668	8,320	16,018	48,006
Out-migrants	12,020	8,320	13,910	34,250
Net	11,648		2,108	13,756
1957:				
In-migrants	23,928	9,238	16,826	49,992
Out-migrants	13,436	9,238	14,645	37,319
Net	10,492		2,181	12,673
1958:				
In-migrants	23,638	9,572	17,570	50,780
Out-migrants	13,914	9,572	13,593	37,079
Net	9,724	. .	3,977	13,701
1959:				
In-migrants	25,827	11,120	18,505	55,452
Out-migrants	13,835	11,120	14,951	39,906
Net	11,992	. . .	3,554	15,546

* Statistics not available in comparable form for 1956

Source Annual reports on population movement in the Capital and its suburbs in *Statistisk Maanedsskrift*

penhagen. The 306 million kroner (equal to about $44 million) earned by these persons in Copenhagen constituted 40 per cent of the total income reported by all residents of the suburban towns. By 1957, the number of taxpaying residents in these suburban towns had increased by three quarters to 203,729; of this number, 48.1 per cent reported income earned in Copenhagen. The value of this income, 1,027 million kroner (equal to about $147 million), constituted 48 per cent of the total income reported in the suburban towns of residence.

TABLE 5

COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME AND BY OCCUPATION OF RESIDENTS OF COPENHAGEN WITH INCOME FROM SUBURBS AND OF RESIDENTS OF SUBURBS WITH INCOME FROM COPENHAGEN, 1957

(Per Cent)

	SOURCE OF INCOME	
	Suburbs (N=34,955)	Copenhagen (N=98,002)
Income level (in kroner):		
Under 1,000	30.4	14.0
1,000– 1,999	12.0	7.9
2,000– 4,999	18.9	15.2
5,000– 9,999	14.8	17.6
10,000–14,999	15.8	22.6
15,000–19,999	5.9	12.2
20,000 and over	2.2	10.5
Total per cent	100.0	100.0
Occupation:		
Professional and self-employed	5.9	11.7
Civil servants	4.6	12.8
Office personnel in private work	4.5	16.2
Sales personnel	8.6	8.5
Other white-collar workers	4.2	7.2
Total white-collar workers	27.8	56.4
Laborers	59.4	32.7
Others*	12.8	10.9
Total per cent	100.0	100.0

* Includes apprentices, students, and pensioners.
Source: *Statistisk Maanedsskrift*, XXXIV, No. 7 (1958), 189–96.

The process is not, however, entirely one-sided. Between 1948 and 1957 there was also an increase from 23,320 to 34,955 in the number of persons living in Copenhagen who reported having income from the suburban towns. Relative to the number of taxpayers resident in the Capital (approximately 480,000 in both years) these numbers are quite small. Nonetheless, the increase between 1948 and 1957 reflects the increasing opportunities for employment of city residents in the new suburban industry and commerce as well as in construction and domestic work.

The two opposing streams of commuters between Copenhagen and its suburbs also differed with respect to their average incomes. The 1948 income which the suburban residents received from Copenhagen averaged 5,627 kroner ($804) compared to the average income of 3,534 kroner ($507) which the Copenhagen residents received from the suburbs. While the direction of difference remained the same, the level had changed quite markedly by 1957. The average income received from the city by the suburban residents increased by 86 per cent to 10,481 kroner, compared to an increase of only 60 per cent in the average amount received by the Copenhagen residents from the suburbs. Thus, by 1957, the differential was almost two to one.

These differences in income level are accounted for by the greater concentration of Copenhagen residents in lower income groups (see Table 5), largely reflecting variations in occupational composition. Of the suburban residents with income from Copenhagen, 56.4 per cent are employed in managerial, professional, and other white-collar positions, compared to only 27.8 per cent of the Copenhagen residents receiving income from the suburbs. By contrast, 59.4 per cent of the latter group compared to only 32.7 per cent of the former are classified as laborers.

One by-product of the suburbanization process has, therefore, been a significant shift in the distribution of income: a considerable portion of income earned in the

central city accrues to persons who no longer reside there. In turn, an even greater portion of the income received by persons resident in the suburbs is derived from the central city of the area. Where the public services rendered and received differ, and where their costs have not been distributed among the different political units in fair relation to their taxable resources, the suburbanization process has created many problems of governmental administration and finance.

The data discussed above do not reveal fully the important role that migration has played in the redistribution of income between central city and suburbs. Since 1955, annual data are available on the income distribution of persons migrating to and from the City of Copenhagen, documenting quite clearly that the net result of the movement into and out of the city has been a net loss of persons with income (Table 6). In 1960, for example, the 156 million kroner of income (approximately $22 million) attributed to the in-migrants was more than canceled out by the 222 million kroner assessed income of the out-migrants, with a resulting loss to the city of persons having an aggregate income of 66 million kroner. While the specific values have differed from year to year, the basic pattern has been the same throughout the six years for which data are available.

However, these net results do not indicate the selective character of the in- and out-movement by income groups. In each year, persons with incomes under 5,000 kroner were more numerous among the in-migrants to the city than among the out-migrants; similarly, all higher income groups contained proportionally more out-migrants than in-migrants, with the differences tending to increase with rising income level. The net movement out of the city was, therefore, particularly selective of persons with higher incomes.

In part, this income differential was a function of the age selectivity of the migration streams. The city was gaining persons in the [illegible]

sons in the older ones. These age differentials were not, however, uniform for all income levels (Table 7). For example, in 1955 among those with incomes under 5,000 kroner, all age groups experienced net migration gains. By contrast, all age groups of all the income levels above 5,000 kroner were characterized by migration losses. The over-all gains of the low age groups under thirty were, therefore, due to the high concentration of young migrants in the lowest income group. Correspondingly, the losses experienced by the group aged thirty and over reflect the heavy net losses occurring in the higher income levels. In general, the same pattern of age and income differentials existed in 1960, except that the group aged twenty to twenty-nine also had over-all losses due to the increased net out-migration occurring in the higher income groups. By 1960, even the lowest income level of those fifty years and over experienced net losses. Thus, although the over-all income losses resulting from the migration process are produced by both age selectivity and income selectivity, the income variable seems to be the more important.

Related to both these factors was the occupational composition of the migrants. As shown in Table 7, the over-all net loss of 109 persons by Copenhagen in 1955 resulted from quite different patterns among the various occupational groups. Whereas the laborer, domestic servant, and student groups—all low-income categories—had net gains through migration, the self-employed, and the office and business personnel experienced net losses. Again, however, the patterns also differed among the various income levels of the same occupational groups; even among the white-collar categories the under-5,000-kroner income group had a net migration gain while among the higher income levels of laborers and domestic workers there was a very small net migration loss.

With minor exceptions, the same pattern described for 1955 persisted through 1958.[9]

[9] The data for 1956, 1957, 1958, and 1959 appear in *Statistisk Maanedsskrift*, XXXIII (1957), 5, [illegible]

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF IN-MIGRANTS AND OUT-MIGRANTS, COPENHAGEN, BY INCOME GROUP, 1955–60

PERSONS WITH ASSESSED INCOME (IN KRONER)	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960	
	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out
Under 5,000	60.8	45.7	57.6	43.9	56.8	40.4	54.9	40.1	52.9	37.5	50.7	35.7
5,000– 9,999	29.4	35.9	30.4	35.2	30.0	34.9	29.9	34.4	29.9	33.1	29.8	32.4
10,000–14,999	7.5	13.5	9.3	15.2	9.9	17.0	11.0	17.1	12.2	19.0	13.5	19.9
15,000–19,999	1.6	3.5	1.9	4.0	2.3	5.4	3.0	5.9	3.5	7.3	3.9	7.7
20,000 and over	0.7	1.4	0.8	1.7	1.0	2.3	1.2	2.5	1.5	3.1	2.1	4.3
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total no.	26,093	26,202	25,037	25,966	24,281	25,833	25,129	25,429	24,170	26,679	25,052	27,213
Aggregate income (in thousands of kroner)	127,053	167,261	128,801	172,651	129,254	184,735	139,504	184,568	142,459	207,388	155,968	222,252

Source Annual reports on income and property of migrated persons, in *Statistisk Maanedsskrift*

In both 1959 and 1960, however, the overall experience of the laborer group changed from one of substantial net gain to one of substantial net loss through migration. Within this group, the pattern of income differentials persisted. The greater similarity in the migration patterns of the laborers and white-collar groups at the end of the six-year period, compared to the beginning, may be indicative of a general narrowing of occupational-class differentials in migration, just as other studies have indicated such narrowings in other areas of demographic and sociological interest.[10] If this trend should continue, it would lead to still greater losses of migrants and of income for the Capital.

It is sometimes argued that although the net population gains to the city occur among persons who are currently young and of low income, in the long run the city will benefit from these persons as they develop careers and move up the income ladder. By attracting such persons, the city is thought to be assuring a future source of income. This argument assumes that these persons will continue to reside in the central city. Yet, as the larger study, of which this report is only one part, will show, one feature of migration in Copenhagen is the strong tendency for the same persons who move into a city one year to be among those who move out at a later date. Very likely, one feature of this pattern is the movement out of the city of persons who, having entered it while young and of low income, leave it later when married and of higher income. If this is so, and if the tendencies described earlier continue, then the central city may become increasingly the domicile of those whose income, type of work, and marital status makes residence in the more expensive and more family-centered suburban areas economically impossible or socially undesirable.

For 1955–60, the population and the financial drain that the suburban movement exerted on the central city can be further documented through information available on the net number of migrants, classified by assessed income level, who moved between the city of Copenhagen and (1) the two other cities of the Capital; (2) the nineteen suburban communities, and (3) the balance of Denmark (Table 8). In 1955, the net loss to the city of Copenhagen of 109 persons with assessed income resulted from a net out-migration of 95 to the other two cities of the Capital and 3,965 to the suburban towns. This single year's loss was compensated by the net in-movement of 3,951 persons from other parts of Denmark. However, sharp income differentials characterized these different streams. The small net exodus of 95 persons to the other two cities of the Capital involved the "movement" of over 5 million kroner in assessed income. However, the largest loss to Copenhagen by far, resulted from the net exodus to the suburbs which involved a loss of migrants with assessed income aggregating almost 39 million kroner. Although the net number of persons moving into Copenhagen from the rest of Denmark was sufficiently large to cancel almost all of the other out-movements, the very heavy concentration of these persons in the lowest income category meant that the aggregate assessed income of these net migrants totaled only 4 million kroner, an amount less than that lost through the other streams of out-migration. Therefore, the migration process in 1955 resulted in the loss of persons with assessed incomes amounting to 40 million kroner, with the vast bulk of this going to the suburbs.

The annual figures show some fluctuation, but the basic pattern approximates that described above. Although the net loss of persons to the suburbs does not increase with consistent regularity, the loss in aggregate assessed income tends to do so, rising to over 50 million kroner by 1959 and 1960. In addition, although the city continued to gain persons through its mi-

[10] See, e.g., Kurt B. Mayer, "Diminishing Class Differentials in the United States," *Kyklos*, XII (1959), 605–28.

TABLE

NET MIGRATION WITHIN AGE AND OCCUPATION GROUPS BY INCOME, COPENHAGEN, 1955 AND 1960

	Income Level (in Kroner)					Total
	Under 5,000	5,000–9,999	10,000–14,999	15,000–19,999	20,000 and Over	
			1955			
Age:						
15-19	799	− 67	− 5	1	..	728
20-29	2,693	−1,043	− 422	− 100	− 13	1,115
30-49	294	− 577	−1,018	− 365	−133	−1,799
50 and over	113	− 52	− 127	− 38	− 49	− 153
Total	3,899	−1,739	−1,572	− 502	−195	− 109
			1960			
15-19	965	− 98	− 1	− 3	..	863
20-29	1,841	− 913	− 809	− 327	−105	− 313
30-40	280	− 283	− 982	− 638	−392	−2,015
50 and over	− 99	− 104	− 236	− 129	−128	− 696
Total	2,987	−1,398	−2,028	−1,097	−625	−2,161
			1955			
Occupation group.						
Self-employed and professional	67	1	− 93	− 58	− 73	− 156
Office and business personnel	916	− 875	− 754	− 343	− 92	−1,148
Laborers	1,613	− 304	− 667	− 108	− 20	514
Domestic workers	944	− 136	− 22	− 4	− 1	781
Pensioners	− 10	7	− 4		− 4	− 11
Students and apprentices	1,028	− 10	− 9	5	− 2	1,012
Others	− 659	− 422	− 23	6	− 3	−1,101
Total	3,899	−1,739	−1,572	− 502	−195	− 109
			1960			
Self-employed and professional	54	− 47	− 63	− 67	− 97	− 220
Office and business personnel	327	− 847	− 915	− 551	−390	−2,376
Laborers	1,153	− 145	− 938	− 463	−134	− 527
Domestic workers	683	− 91	− 3	1	1	591
Pensioners	123	31	4	.	1	159
Students and apprentices	951	4	6		1	962
Others	− 304	− 303	− 119	− 17	− 7	− 750
Total	2,987	−1,398	−2,028	−1,097	−625	−2,161

Source: *Statistisk Maanedsskrift*, XXXII, No. 1 (1956), 12; and *ibid.*, XXXVII, Nos. 1-2 (1961), 15.

TABLE 8

No. of Net Migrants with Assessed Income, by Income Level and Aggregate Assessed Income, Migrants between Copenhagen and Other Parts of Denmark, 1955–60

(In Thousands of Kroner)

Income Level (in Kroner)	Origin and Destination of Moves to and from Copenhagen							
	Balance of Capital	Suburbs	Rest of Denmark	Total	Balance of Capital	Suburbs	Rest of Denmark	Total
	1955				1958			
Under 5,000	376	- 559	4,082	3,899	364	- 50	3,277	3,591
5,000- 9,999	- 168	- 1,721	150	- 1,739	- 162	- 1,407	321	- 1,248
10,000-14,999	- 176	- 1,200	- 196	- 1,572	- 89	- 1,231	- 256	- 1,576
15,000-19,999	- 62	- 374	- 66	- 502	- 106	- 524	- 96	- 726
20,000 and over	- 65	- 111	- 19	- 195	- 120	- 182	- 39	- 341
Total net migrants	- 95	- 3,965	3,951	- 109	- 113	- 3,394	3,207	- 300
Aggregate net income (in thousands)	- 5,093	-38,619	3,504	-40,208	-7,047	-40,515	2,498	-45,064
	1956				1959			
Under 5,000	1	- 459	3,499	3,041	191	- 529	3,107	2,769
5,000- 9,999	- 347	- 1,254	62	- 1,539	- 120	- 1,531	59	- 1,592
10,000-14,999	- 203	- 1,169	- 242	- 1,614	- 43	- 1,594	- 474	- 2,111
15,000-19,999	- 114	- 353	- 109	- 576	- 81	- 768	- 237	- 1,086
20,000 and over	- 95	- 105	- 41	- 241	- 92	- 289	- 108	- 489
Total net migrants	- 758	- 3,340	3,169	- 929	- 145	- 4,711	2,347	- 2,509
Aggregate net income (in thousands)	-10,934	-33,652	736	-43,850	-4,533	-53,841	-6,555	-64,929
	1957				1960			
Under 5,000	162	- 454	3,654	3,362	113	- 504	3,378	2,987
5,000- 9,999	- 284	- 1,605	126	- 1,763	- 295	- 1,368	265	- 1,398
10,000-14,999	- 200	- 1,445	- 337	- 1,982	- 95	- 1,431	- 502	- 2,028
15,000-19,999	- 146	- 536	- 135	- 817	- 117	- 679	- 301	- 1,097
20,000 and over	- 147	- 143	- 62	- 352	- 115	- 390	- 120	- 625
Total net migrants	- 615	- 4,183	3,246	- 1,552	- 509	- 4,372	2,720	- 2,161
Aggregate net income (in thousands)	-11,673	-43,600	- 208	-55,481	-8,124	-51,741	-6,419	-66,284

Source: Annual reports on income and property of migrated persons in *Statistisk Maanedsskrift*

gration exchange with that part of Denmark outside of the Capital Metropolitan Area, in both 1959 and 1960, it was actually losing assessed income to these places. At first glance, these two diverse patterns may seem impossible. Inspection of the data on income distribution of the in- and out-migrants for the rest of Denmark to the capital city provides an explanation. While the city continued to attract a large net number (3,200–3,600) of persons with incomes under 10,000 kroner, it began to lose an increasing number with incomes of 10,000 kroner and over. The larger aggregate income of these out-migrants far outweighed the low aggregate incomes of the larger number of in-migrants. Even this change may be due to the suburbanization process; as the nineteen municipalities now included in the suburban segment of the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area become increasingly built up, the suburban area is gradually extending beyond even these limits to encompass sections of the area now classified as "the rest of Denmark."

These data on the volume, direction, and economic character of population movement within and into the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area emphasize the important role of migration in effecting change in the sociodemographic structure of the area. The net effects of migration clearly account for the large growth of the suburbs and the actual decline of the central city. Yet, the existence of large, but selective, countermovements in all directions means that the economic and social impact of migration may be of much greater significance than some of the relatively small net changes in numbers might suggest. The heavy flow of persons with high income from the city to the suburbs, countered by an almost equally large flow of young persons with low income into the city, is a case in point. The city continues to provide the major source of employment and income upon which the surrounding suburbs depend. At the same time, however, it attracts and retains as residents persons whose income needs and whose demographic characteristics are sufficiently similar to make the city a much more homogeneous locality than was true in the past.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF SUBURBANIZATION[1]

HAL H. WINSBOROUGH

ABSTRACT

Suburbanization is a result of variation in two theoretically elemental aspects of urban population distribution, congestion and concentration, which can be derived from ecological theory about the structure of the city. Measures of these aspects need not vary together; variation in either may lead to increase in the areal size of the population agglomeration. Both are related to the population size of the agglomeration. Variables suggested by the ecological theory of the structure of the city are associated with variation in the aspects of suburbanization.

Few social trends have received as much attention as the suburbanization of American cities. This process is thought to have vast implications for our national life, affecting such diverse phenomena as the mental and moral health of the population, the efficiency of political control, and the vulnerability of cities to atomic attack. Despite the presumed importance of the suburbanization trend, so little is known of the process that Bogue and Harris, at the conclusion of their extensive study, were led to remark, "A fairly complete, theoretically sound and stable explanation of relative suburbanization remains to be developed."[2]

Although suburbanization means many different things,[3] basic to all notions is the phenomenon of the sprawl of urban population agglomerations over the landscape. It is in this narrow sense that the term "suburbanization" is used in this paper. By so doing, it is not our intention to suggest that distinctions between the word "suburb" and such words as "satellite" or "fringe" are not useful. Rather, we hold, with Schnore, that such entities "are themselves merely constituent parts of a larger urban complex—the metropolitan structure as a whole."[4] By using "suburbanization" as noted above, we have defined it as a phenomenon pertaining to the metropolitan structure that is basic to the development of the various types of peripheral communities, regardless of their functional or organizational characteristics.

The thesis of this paper is that a theory of suburbanization in this limited sense remains to be developed for two reasons:

1. The phenomenon of suburbanization has been thought of as a single process when, in fact, it is a result of changes in two aspects of urban population distribution that are theoretically and empirically distinct.

2. Explanations of the variation in suburbanization have not been based on the considerable body of ecological theory about the structure of the city as a whole.

We will argue that variation in suburbanization is a result of variation in two theoretically elemental parameters of urban population distribution which we will label "congestion" and "concentration." It will be noted that these aspects of suburbanization can be derived from a theory of the structure of the city. We will show empirically that these parameters need not

[1] This is Paper No. 16 in the series, "Comparative Urban Research," issued by the Population Research and Training Center, University of Chicago, under a grant from the Ford Foundation.

[2] Donald J. Bogue and Dorothy L. Harris, *Comparative Population and Urban Research via Multiple Regression and Covariance Analysis* ("Scripps Foundation Studies in Population Distribution," No. 8 [Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation, Miami University, 1954]), p. 72.

[3] Bogue and Harris use no less than fifteen dependent variables in their analysis of the state and the process of suburbanization (*ibid.*, p. 52).

[4] Leo F. Schnore, "Satellites and Suburbs," *Social Forces*, XXXVI (December, 1957), 121-27.

vary in the same direction at the same time, and argue theoretically that variation in either of these parameters may lead to increase in the areal size of the population agglomeration. Further, we will demonstrate that these two aspects of suburbanization are theoretically and empirically related to variation in the population size of urban agglomerations and can, in part, be seen as ways of accomodating variation in population size.

THEORIES OF URBAN STRUCTURE

One body of current theory about the structure of the city focuses on the competition among land-users for accessible land.[5] Because land near the center of the city is thought to be, on the average, the most accessible to all parts of the city, many businesses and services find central location desirable and are willing and able to pay large sums for parcels of the small quantity of land near the center. Households are not, by and large, able to compete for this extremely accessible land, but they too find advantage in locating near the center of the city because of reduced costs of travel to work, to shopping, and to the services offered in the center.

Considering only residential land, location near the center means higher land costs but lower transit cost. Location farther from the center, on the other hand, means increased transportation costs but diminished land costs because of less competition and because the supply of land increases in proportion to the square of distance from the center. Given these conditions, if persons locate their residences to minimize their total "cost," an equilibrium is reached when location at any distance from the center of the city is equally "costly." When such an equilibrium is reached, there is a particular distribution of population by distance from the center of the city. Hence, there is a particular distribution of population density by distance from the center.

Using this line of reasoning, Muth constructed a model that predicts an exponential decline in population density with distance from the center.[6] In this model, Muth assumes the usual economist's conditions of firm equilibrium, the usual function of transportation cost with distance and an exponential decline in cost of housing with distance from the center which he justifies empirically. This exponential decline in density has been reported previously as an empirical finding by Clark[7] and by Stewart and Warntz.[8] The exponential function may be given by

$$d(r) = d(0)\,e^{-r/g}\,, \qquad (1)$$

where $d(r)$ is the density at r distance from the center of the city, $d(0)$ is the density extrapolated to the center itself, and g indicates how density declines with distance. A more satisfying interpretation of the parameter g can be gained by noting that, if the foregoing actually describes the decline in density with distance and if the city were circular, then the population $p(r)$ of a zone of width dr at r distance from the city center would be given by

$$p(r) = 2\pi d(0)\,r\,e^{-r/g}dr\,. \qquad (2)$$

The latter is a unimodal function with maximum at $r = g$ as can be shown from its first and second derivatives. Thus, g

[5] See, e.g., Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950), esp. chaps. xiii and xiv.

[6] Richard F. Muth, "The Spatial Structure of the Housing Market" (paper presented at a joint session of the Econometric Society and the Regional Science Association in St. Louis, December 2, 1960).

[7] Colin Clark, "Urban Population Densities," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Ser. A, CXIV (1957), 490–96 (see also his "Urban Population Densities," *Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute*, XXXVI, No. 4 (1957), 60–90.

[8] John Q. Stewart and William Warntz, "Physics of Population Distribution," *Journal of Regional Science*, I, No. 1 (1958), 99–123.

may be interpreted as a kind of average distance of persons from the city center.[9]

ASPECTS OF SUBURBANIZATION

In the model situation, equation (1) distinguishes between, and provides a measure for, the two elemental aspects of suburbanization. The parameter g indicates concentration because it measures average distance from the city center; similarly, the parameter $d(0)$ is an indicator of congestion because it measures crowding in or near the city center.

If one is interested in the state of suburbanization at a given time, the values of these parameters describe the elemental aspect of population distribution in the urban aggregate. If one is interested in the process of suburbanization over time, changes in these parameters describe basic changes that may occur in population distribution.

Changes in the areal size of the model population agglomeration can result from a change in either of these two parameters. This assertion can be justified as follows: Suppose the "edge of town" is defined, as is approximated in the urbanized area concept used by the Bureau of the Census, at the distance from the center of the city, a, where the population density falls to a given figure, L. Then, rewriting equation (1),

$$L = d(0)\, e^{-a/g} \qquad (3)$$

and

$$a = g\,[\log_e d(0) - \log_e L]\,. \qquad (4)$$

Thus, with g constant, a is a function of $d(0)$. With $d(0)$ constant, a is a function of g.

It is not empirically necessary that these two aspects of urban population distribution vary together. This can be shown by estimating the parameters g and $d(0)$ for one city over a fairly long period of time. Data can be compiled on the population density of mile zones in Chicago for every decade from 1860 to 1950. The parameters of equation (1) are estimated by fitting to these data the linear equation

$$\log_{10} d(r) = \log_{10} d(0) - \frac{\log_{10} e}{g}(r)\,. \qquad (5)$$

Table 1 presents these parameters.

TABLE 1

PARAMETERS FOR EQUATION $d(r) = d(0)e^{-r/g}$ WHERE $d(r)$ IS POPULATION DENSITY AT r DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF CITY, FOR CHICAGO, 1860–1950*

Year	g	$d(0)$ (Thousands)	Correlation Coefficient	No.
1860	1 09	30 0	− 98	4
1870	1 14	70 8	− 99	6
1880	1 26	96 6	− 98	7
1890	1 97	86 3	−.98	13
1900	2 41	100 0	−.97	14
1910†	2 71	100 0	−.97	15
1920†	4 36	51.2	− 97	8
1930	5.60	49 1	− 94	8
1940	5 85	46 2	− 93	8
1950	6.51	46 5	−.95	8

* Data for 1910 and before are taken from *Report of the Chicago Traction and Subway Commission, 1916, on a Unified System of Surface, Elevated and Subway Lines* (Chicago, 1916), p 73 Data for 1920 and later are compiled by grouping community areas.

† Since data for 1910 and before are taken from one source and data for 1920 and after compiled from other sources, comparison of parameters between 1910 and 1920 is unreliable.

If by suburbanization one has in mind the concept measured by the parameter g, then Chicago has been deconcentrating since 1860. On the other hand, if one has in mind the concept measured by $d(0)$, then Chicago was growing more congested from 1860 to 1900 or 1910. Since that time congestion has decreased. From these data, then, we may conclude that it is not necessary that these two aspects of suburbanization vary together.

[9] Further, Taitel has shown that $2g$ is the mean distance of all persons from the center of the city when the city is circular and the decline in density continues to infinity (Martin Taitel, "On Problems of Measuring the Distribution of Population in an Urban Area," *Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association*, 1960, pp. 160–65).

From one point of view, it is not very surprising that g increases through the one hundred year period in Chicago. After all, the population size would seem to imply increase in area and, hence, an increase in average distance from the city center. This view, however, ignores the fact that population increase in the model city can be accommodated by increase in g or by increase in $d(0)$. This last assertion can be justified as follows: if the relationship expressed in equation (2) holds, then the population P of a circular city out to the limits of the city at distance a from the center is given by

TABLE 2

ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED POPULATION FOR CHICAGO AREA, 1910–50

Date	Actual Population (000)	Estimated Population (000)	Error (000)	Per Cent Error
1910	2,446 9	2,279 6	−167 3	−6.8
1920	3,178 9	2,993 5	−185 4	−5 8
1930	4,364 8	4,733 4	+368 6	+8 4
1940	4,499 1	4,855 0	+355 9	+7 9
1950.	4,920 8	5,074.0	+153 3	+3 1

$$P(a) = 2\pi \int_0^a d(0)\, a\, e^{-a/g} da \quad (6)$$

or evaluating the integral,

$$P(a) = 2\pi g^2 d(0) \times \left[1 - \frac{(a/g)+1}{e^{a/g}}\right]. \quad (7)$$

The expression $2\pi g^2\, d(0)$ is the population that would exist within the model city if its limits (and the fit of eq. [1]) extended extremely far from the center of the city.[10] The expression within brackets is a correction factor to adjust the population to compensate for setting the limits of the city at a finite distance from the city.

Once again, if the edge of the city is defined where the density falls to some value L, then equation (7) can be rewritten

$$P = 2\pi g^2 d(0) \times \left\{1 - \frac{\log_e[d(0)/L]+1}{d(0)/L}\right\}. \quad (8)$$

From equation (8) it is clear that population size is theoretically a function of the parameters g and $d(0)$.

However, it is worthwhile to question whether equation (8) is empirically justified. For Chicago from 1910 to 1940 the population of the metropolitan district is roughly the population within a density of 150 persons per square mile. For 1950 the population of the urbanized area is roughly the population within a density of 2,000 per square mile. If estimates of g and $d(0)$ are taken from Table 1 and if we consider Chicago a half-circle city, then Table 2 presents population estimates of the urban agglomeration from 1910 to 1950. Considering the crude assumptions involved in these calculations, the findings in Table 2 justify empirically an investigation of the implications of equation (8).

Equation (8) suggests that an increase in population size will require a modification of one or both of the parameters g and $d(0)$. In Chicago, up to 1900, it appears that population increase was accommodated by both a decrease in concentration and an increase in congestion. After 1900, apparently, it was no longer necessary to increase congestion to increase population. Deconcentration was satisfactory to accommodate the increase in population and even to permit decongestion to occur.

It is worth noting that population size in equation (8) is proportional to the square of g when $d(0)$ is constant. Thus, cities which already have a large value of g can accommodate more people by a unit increase in that parameter than can cities having a smaller initial value.

EXPLANATIONS OF ASPECTS OF SUBURBANIZATION

Muth has demonstrated that synchronic variations in the parameter g in United

[10] This equation, in a slightly different form, can be found in Clark, *op. cit.*

States cities in 1950 are associated with variations in variables having to do with transportation costs within the city.[11] The variable of transportation costs is, of course, derived from the theory of urban structure that was used in isolating a as an aspect of suburbanization. The following data illustrate the fact that pursuit of this line of reasoning may lead to explanation of changes in suburbanization.

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARAMETER g AND RIDES PER PERSON ON MASS TRANSIT IN EIGHT CITIES, 1890 AND 1950

City	1890*			1950†		
	Value of g	Value of r‡	Transit Ratio	Value of g	Value of r‡	Transit Ratio
Boston	3 31	– 74	252	3 33	– 59	164
Cincinnati	85	– 90	128	1 45	– 82	114
Detroit	1 87	– 80	111	10 00	–.55	102
Kansas City	1 37	–.90	286	3 85	– 57	105
Philadelphia	1 95	– 62	158	2 50	– 71	148
Pittsburgh	1 10	– 76	134	11 11	– 14	85
St Louis	1 08	– 73	150	3 57	– 53	136
Washington, D.C.	2 02	– 94	153	3 70	–.52	135

* Data for 1890 were compiled from U S Census Office, *Report on Vital and Social Statistics in the United States at the Eleventh Census 1890*, Part II, "Vital Statistics, Cities of 100,000 Population and Upwards," pp 143 334. Data for Boston and Philadelphia were taken from U S Census Office, *Vital Statistics of Boston and Philadelphia Covering a Period of Six Years Ending May 31, 1890*. Data for Washington, D C., were taken from U S Census Office, *Vital Statistics of the District of Columbia and Baltimore Covering a Period of Six Years Ending May 31, 1890* In all cases distance from the center of the city was estimated from ward maps included in the various volumes

† For 1950 values of g and r are taken from Richard F Muth, *op cit* The transit ratio is computed from data in *Transit Facts*, a mimeographed publication of the Public Administration Clearing House in co-operation with the American Transit Association.

‡ The value of r is the value of the correlation between distance from the center of the city and the logarithm of population density

For eight cities it is possible to compute g for 1890 and for 1950 and also to obtain data on the ratio of mass transit passenger rides to population. These data are given in Table 3, along with the correlation between distance and density for each city in each time period. In 1890 the correlation between g and rides per person was .42. In 1950 the correlation was — .68. Because the degrees of freedom here are certainly small and the sample of cities is not at all random, these results must be taken as only suggestive. These data do suggest, however, that intensive use of mass transit in 1890 implies a city that was relatively deconcentrated while in 1950 it suggests a city that was relatively concentrated. The difference in these two correlations is probably to be explained by the introduction of the automobile. In 1890 mass transit was probably the most efficient way to get to work. In 1950 mass transit is in competition with the auto.

Just as theory may be useful in explaining variation in suburbanization, so may the investigation of suburbanization be useful to theory. The equilibrium type of theory used in the foregoing pages necessarily neglects many aspects of reality. One of the theoretically interesting aspects of reality ignored by this model is the effect of previous growth on present city structure. This aspect is of theoretical concern because of its importance in one of the early descriptions of city structure—the Burgess zonal hypothesis. In that hypothesis, zonal variation in city structure was thought to be the result of the very growth of the city.

In order to investigate the influence of the timing of growth on density, we have computed, using small area data within the

[11] Muth, *op. cit.*

city, correlations among the logarithm of density, distance from the center of the city, and as a measure of the age of the area, the percentage of dwellings built before 1920. These correlations were computed for Chicago and Cleveland in 1940. They are presented in Table 4. Distance and age are negatively correlated and density and age positively correlated in both Chicago and Cleveland. The latter correlation is stronger in Chicago and the former

TABLE 4

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISTANCE FROM CENTER, LOGARITHM OF POPULATION DENSITY, AND AGE OF DWELLINGS, CHICAGO AND CLEVELAND, 1940*

City	Distance	Density	Age
Chicago †			
Distance		− 69	− 45
Density	−.60	.	52
Age .	− 15	.30	.
Cleveland:‡			
Distance .		− 65	− 62
Density .	− 60		.35
Age . . .	−.53	− 08	.

* Zero-order correlations are given above the diagonal, first-order partial correlations below.

† Data on density and distance from the center of Chicago for square mile areas within the city and towns outside the city are taken from Richard V Rockwell, "Metropolitan Lane Values as a Function of Population Growth and Decentralization" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Chicago, August, 1956) Data on age of dwellings are estimated for mile zones and towns from 1940 census data for census tracts

‡ Data for Cleveland are drawn from the *Real Property Inventory of the Cleveland and Metropolitan District and Cuyahoga County*, 1941.

stronger in Cleveland. The first-order partial correlation between the logarithm of density and distance, holding constant age of dwellings, is about — .60 for both Chicago and Cleveland. Thus, the relationship between density and distance, although somewhat augmented by the influence of age of dwellings, cannot be explained by that variable.

The relationship between age and density, on the other hand, is diminished considerably when distance from the center of the city is held constant. In Chicago it drops to .30 while in Cleveland it drops to — .08. Thus the partial correlation of age and density remains significant in one of the cities.

Looking at this finding in a different way we note that for Chicago the value of g computed from the zero-order regression of density on distance is 5.3, while the value of g computed from the first-order partial regression is 6.0. In Cleveland, on the other hand, g computed from the zero-order regression is 3.0, while g computed from the first-order partial regression coefficient is 2.9. In Chicago the influence of the timing of growth seems to have restrained deconcentration, while in Cleveland it has had little influence.

Thus we find that the pattern of settlement over time may make a difference in the degree of concentration found in the city. We also find that the importance, or even the existence, of these effects may vary from city to city. These results, then, point up the complex theoretical problem of the influence of previous growth on present structure. It suggests that the present theory of urban population distribution should be modified to account for influences of previous growth patterns on current population distribution.[12]

SUMMARY

This paper has argued that the state or process of suburbanization in a city is not a single thing but the result of changes in two elemental aspects of urban population distribution, concentration, and congestion. The parameters of the distribution of population over the urban aggregate provide well-defined and empirically productive measures of the state of concentration and congestion of the city. Changes in the population distribution resulting in the phenomenon of urban sprawl can, this paper asserts, be best understood in terms of changes in these two parameters.

DUKE UNIVERSITY

[12] A sound beginning on this kind of theoretical modification is provided by Beverly Duncan, Georges Sabagh, and Maurice D. Van Arsdol Jr., "Patterns of City Growth," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (January, 1962), 418–29

THE RESPONSE OF GANG LEADERS TO STATUS THREATS: AN OBSERVATION ON GROUP PROCESS AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR[1]

JAMES F. SHORT, JR., AND FRED L. STRODTBECK

ABSTRACT

For the explanation of aggressive episodes, group process is seen as an important adjunct both to su cultural and individualistic theories of gang delinquency. Gang leaders are observed to precipitate acts aggression that are directed outside their group when their status is threatened. This is believed to ar because the leaders' control of internal resources is limited. It also requires the support of aggressive nor within the group for such behavior is not appropriate in a group with "retreatist" norms. The interpret tion is based upon instances drawn from observations of a dozen Chicago gangs over a three-year peric

This paper describes a particular type of delinquent episode which arises when a gang leader acts to reduce threats to his status by instigating out-group aggression. Our view is that leaders resort to this action because of the limited resources they have for internal control of their group particularly when their status is attacked. Unlike other syndrome explanations, such as that of Bloch and Flynn[2] who related delinquency to particular types of parent-child relations, or the various theories that are concerned with the emergence of delinquent subcultures,[3] this paper attempts to provide a clearer understanding of the precipitation of episodes within "delinquent gangs." The focus is on the on-going relations of group members rather than on the boys' family backgrounds or the position of lower-class adolescen within the social structure. The argume is not that family background and soci class position are unimportant but, rathe that these factors cannot explain the eme gence of particular instances of aggressi delinquency from the on-going, largely no delinquent, behavior of gang boys.

We decided to develop this paper wi liberal use of illustrative instances in ord to correct the impression that would exi if William Foote Whyte's superb descri tion of Doc and the Nortons in *Stre Corner Society*[4] were permitted to car the full burden of our need for knowled about subinstitutionalized elementary soci behavior of corner groups.[5] It is almo necessary to protest that Whyte's corn boys were not delinquents, they were olde and they were much more stable as a grou than are adolescent delinquent gangs. Wh one turns to the narrative materials of t delinquency literature, it comes as a su prise to find how little illumination of grou process they provide. For any but the mo broadly formulated hypotheses concerni the nature of group life among the bo studied, we find these materials inadequat By contrast, the strength of *Street Corn Society* lies exactly in the fact that t

[1] This is a revision of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 1961. This investigation was a part of the Youth Studies Research Program supported by Research Grant M-3301 from the Behavioral Science Study Section, National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service, and directed by James F. Short, Jr, at the University of Chicago.

[2] Herbert A. Bloch and Frank T. Flynn, *Delinquency The Juvenile Offender in America Today* (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 151–75.

[3] See Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955); Albert K. Cohen and James F. Short, Jr., "Research in Delinquent Subcultures," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (1958), 20–37; and Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

[4] *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1943); 2d ed., 1955).

[5] See George Homans, *The Human Group* (N York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950); and Geo Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary For* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1961).

descriptions are given in such a way that the group process is explicit.

One notable instance of experimental research specifically related to delinquency is the investigation of Lippitt, Polansky, Redl, and Rosen in which deliberately frustrated camp boys followed in delinquent activity an impulsive boy who was ordinarily given low rank in the group.[6] These authors did not intend to suggest, however, that the mechanism revealed by this ingenious experiment is the typical process for delinquent groups in their natural setting. Similarly, Polsky and Kohn's description of the process by which "delinquency in its collective form" emerges "out of the interaction of a group of youngsters" within a juvenile correctional institution[7] is not meant to serve as the model for collective delinquency outside of a "total institutional" context.[8]

The closest parallel to our concern with group factors in delinquency outside the context of a camp or treatment institution is Jansyn's study of the social system of a gang with whom he worked as a "detached worker."[9] He found that, for this group of boys, delinquent behavior, on both an individual and a group basis, served to increase the solidarity of the group, and that group leadership and membership varied according to specific group goals being implemented. Further, the boys' perceptions of who was and who was not a member of the group, how large the group was, the importance and even the existence of a conception of "turf" or "territory" were responsive to the situation in which the group found itself.

The shifting character of the group structure that Jansyn describes for the white gang he worked with is present in the white gangs contacted in the present project, and in the Negro gangs as well. Central to our present argument is the proposition that flux in membership and amorphous group boundaries reduces the latitude the leader has in dealing with status threats. But, as the case material illustrates, the disposition of the threatened leader to use out-group aggression to deal with the threat involves further premises about group norms and the required fluctuation in role behavior by the leader. Eight cases, followed by brief interpretative sections, will be presented.

DETACHED WORKER CASE REPORTS

For a three-year period of the research some eight to ten detached workers[10] assigned by the YMCA to highly delinquent gangs were interviewed on a weekly basis. These interviews were reviewed by the re-

[6] Ronald Lippitt, Norman Polansky, Fritz Redl, and Sidney Rosen, "The Dynamics of Power: A Field Study of Social Influence in Groups of Children," in *Readings in Social Psychology*, ed. Eleanor Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene S. Hartley (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958).

[7] See Howard Polsky, "Changing Delinquent Subcultures: A Social Psychological Approach," reprinted from *Social Work* (October, 1959), pp. 1–15; and Howard Polsky and Martin Kohn, "Participant Observation in a Delinquent Subculture," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XXIX (October, 1959), 737–51.

[8] Erving Goffman, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions: The Inmate World," and "Staff-Inmate Relations," in *The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organization and Change*, ed. Donald R. Cressey (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), chaps. i and ii, pp. 15–106.

[9] Leon Jansyn, "Solidarity and Delinquency in a Street Corner Group: A Study of the Relationship Between Changes in Specified Aspects of Group Structure and Variations in the Frequency of Delinquent Activity" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Chicago, 1960).

[10] "Detached work" is a form of service currently being practiced by a number of agencies to reach groups of youth who are ordinarily inaccessible through more conventional channels, such as schools and churches, whose families do not send them to the agencies, and who do not themselves voluntarily come to the agencies. Such workers may be either male or female, depending usually on the sex of the client group, and typically they are young adults. In the YMCA project from which the following cases are drawn, workers are males, aged 25–30. Negro gangs have Negro workers, and white gangs have white workers. Our special thanks go to the staff of the Program for Detached Workers of the YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago for their excellent co-operation and stimulating ideas that have contributed much to the research.

search staff and representative selections have been made. In proceeding with the selection, we reasoned somewhat as one would in the review of cases in law. The principle is illustrated as it emerges in different form over the range of specific fact situations that might be encountered with street-corner groups.

Case 1.—Duke is the leader of the King Rattlers, a conflict-oriented group of approximately fifty Negro boys, aged fifteen to nineteen, who live on the periphery of a commercial area in the inner city. Duke is a good fighter, having risen to his leadership status in the group by being quick and effective with his fists while, at the same time, playing it very cool. Duke does not get caught. The detached worker reaffirmed Duke's status by working through him and was quickly successful in suppressing intergang fighting. Duke's leadership style capitalizes on his coolness and on his ability to both negotiate in intergang councils and to control his boys.

Despite his coolness, Duke did become implicated in a shooting incident that involved other members of the Rattlers and was sent to jail. The boys eventually "beat the rap," but they were held in detention for two and one-half months. While Duke and the others were absent from "the scene," new officers were "elected" by the worker and the group. It was understood that when Duke returned he would be president again. Upon Duke's return, despite the celebrations attending it, no formal recognition was made of his leadership. It was shortly after this that the detached worker with the Rattlers made the following observations in a weekly interview:

A . . Duke is acting very unusual. It's not the same Duke.

Q. What's happened?

A. I don't know. I feel maybe it's because he's been in jail and he's trying to release a lot of energy. Maybe after a while, he'll settle down. As of yet he hasn't settled down. He is one of the real instigators in fightin'. They say, "You know, Duke is acting like us now." The boys even notice the difference in him. It isn't just me.

Q: Do they appreciate this or don't they like this?

A: They appreciate it because now they have no more problems. All of them like to fight. If Duke chips in, that's better yet. But they notice the change in him. I keep tellin' Duke, "Be careful, boy, you'll be right back in jail."

The worker then described Duke's behavior at a basketball game which had been scheduled with the Jr. Lords.

A: Duke was calling them "mother fucker," and "The Lords ain't shit." Duke walked up to them—Duke doin' all the talkin'—instigator. Bill next to him and Harry listening. Everybody was listening but Duke, and I was having a problem trying to get Duke down there so he could get himself dressed and leave. Duke walked up and said, "you ain't shit. The Jr. Lords ain't shit. Are you a Jr.?" The boys said, "No." And he said, "A fuckin' old Lord, I'm King Rattler." Duke walked all through all of them, "You ain't shit," trying to get a fight. "Come on, Duke," I said, trying to push him down the stairs. But each time he'd get away and go over there, "You Lords ain't shit . . . we're Rattlers. We're Eastside Rattlers."

Q: Was he drunk?

A: No, he's sober but he's changed. Big change. Bill was watchin' him and goin' along I told Harry to grab him and told Henry to get Duke and take him. I had to grab him—he wouldn't listen. The rest of the Rattlers wanted to fight too. So I had to take Duke downstairs, and while they were getting their clothes on we had a problem with hats. They wanted the new hats of the other team which they could see on the rack. Duke owns a brown hat, but he had worn a gray one over there. By mistake, I gave him a brown hat which belonged to the Lords. When I saw what had happened, I tried to get it back but no one knew where it was.

The prognosis one would make from the hat and fighting incidents would be one of a growing gap between the detached

worker and Duke. Such a gap did not, in fact, materialize. Just a week later, the worker took Duke to a large department store where he secured a job as messenger-boy. Duke's behavior was exemplary. His "strange behavior" did not recur, and he resumed a steadying, essentially non-aggressive and non-delinquent influence on the group.

It is to be noted in the detached worker's report quoted above that the boys approved of Duke's aggressiveness, were willing to fight, and, against the express desires of the detached worker, were willing to help Duke conceal the stolen hat. After this brief period of catering to the most broadly held norms of aggressive behavior, Duke resumed the "cool" image that had distinguished him from the group he led. The Duke incident occurred despite the conscious intention of the detached worker to support Duke's leadership.

It is our interpretation that the tough, highly aggressive, behavior was adopted by Duke to clarify the uncertain leadership situation that had arisen as a result of his detention. In the next case, the status threat arises from a detached worker's failure to understand the previously existing leadership structure.

Case 2.—A worker who had been successful in reaching, and in reducing the delinquency of a leadership clique known as the "Big Five," suddenly found that a group of his boys were following another boy in predatory and assaultive delinquency. It developed that this new leader had been in jail during the several months that the worker had been with the group. The worker was only dimly aware of the boy's existence and not at all aware of his former leadership position. Upon release from jail, this boy gathered "lower-echelon" boys about himself and led them in a variety of aggressive delinquencies. This situation was well under way before it was understood by the worker but, when he did turn his attention to the errant group, he brought the aggressive behavior of the subgroup under relative control by "capturing" their leader.

Case 3.—A contrasting case involves the return from Army duty of a leader of the Midget Lords, a segment of a large conflict-oriented gang complex known as the "Nation of Lords." It resulted in what we call "The Great Train Robbery."

Johnnie was by far the strongest leader of the Lords. When a new worker was assigned to the group, Johnnie was in the service. The worker was told about Johnnie, however, and upon the latter's return to the group late in the summer of 1960, he was introduced to the worker. The worker was not able to "capture" Johnnie immediately and, in fact, found that he was somewhat uncomfortable with Johnnie and the clique of boys who were most directly involved with him. The worker continued, therefore, to spend the majority of his time with the less delinquent boys who were not Johnnie's immediate followers.

One evening Johnnie and his clique asked the worker to take them "out South" to a party. Figuring that this would at least remove a troublesome element from the area, the worker agreed to the request. Rather than staying with the boys, however, the worker returned to the area where he contacted other members of the Midgets.

On their own return trip, Johnnie and his boys made a spur-of-the-moment decision to hold up the car on the elevated train on which they were traveling. They beat one man and took cash from passengers.

If this dramatic demonstration of the toughness and daring had been successful, it would have reaffirmed Johnnie's leadership role in his clique, solidified the subgroup, and, in all probability, have drawn the worker into closer work with Johnnie's clique. The interpretation of this incident in terms of status implications is by no means unequivocal but, since the robbery cannot be understood as the actions of boys rationally oriented toward crime as a way of life, the need for an alternative interpretation is clear.

Case 4.—The protagonist, Lawrence, was an influential member of a group for which there was no single and most powerful leader. To maintain his position of influence, Lawrence was required to play a central role in many of the varied activities of the group. The incident in question turned around a "quarter party," which Lawrence was "putting down," primarily out of his embarrassment over having no money. Several of the other chiefs were employed at this time, but Lawrence was not. He deprecated the party and urged the Chiefs to join him in "turning it out," that is, in breaking it up.[11] When the other Chiefs refused to go along with the suggestion despite his urging, Lawrence did not pursue the issue further. Instead, he borrowed money from the worker because, we believe, his position in the group made asking for money from another group member untenable.

During the course of the evening, Big Daddy, another member of the Chiefs, started after a member of the Cobras with a hammer. The detached worker grabbed Lawrence and, in recognition of his status and ability to control the other boys, said, "Look, I don't want no crap. What about you?" Lawrence replied, "Don't worry, ain't gonna be no crap," and proceeded to help the worker bring about order.

If we view Lawrence's threat to turn the party out as a way of "saving face" when his financial dilemma further complicated the status ambiguity attendant upon the entry of a new worker into the group, then the resolution of status ambiguity by the loan and the request from the worker for help may be regarded as having prevented the delinquency.

The next two cases are parallel. They both involve a detached worker's problem in dealing with a highly aggressive boy who had an established role of instigating delinquent episodes.

[11] Whyte reports Doc's similar plight, though Doc did not suggest a delinquent way out of his dilemma (see Whyte, *op. cit.*).

Case 5.—In the first case, the boy, Commando, was known for his daring and for being in the middle of whatever was happening. When the Lords came together as a fighting group, under pressure from a rival gang who were "wolf-packing" in the area, Commando became one of the boys who was most difficult to control. He instigated trouble in a way that captured attention, and he set a style of violence by sometimes carrying a shotgun.

The worker decided to "put down" Commando in front of the rest of the group by telling him that he really was not tough or brave. He concluded by saying, "You ain't nothin'." Commando reacted by being even more reckless in his actions, particularly when members of the rival group were on the scene. He continued to demonstrate to the group that he was not chicken and that he *was* somebody until the worker ceased his public ridicule.

When the worker shifted to a nurturant relation and impressed Commando privately with his responsibility, as a leader, for curbing conflict, the boy became less aggressive and aided the worker. The worker still feels, however, that in a conflict situation, without a worker present, Commando would find it difficult not to "sell wolf tickets" (i.e., challenge) to rival gang members and instigate conflict. Commando appears not to be motivated to convert status won by aggression to a more stabilized rank in the group.

Case 6.—A comparable case involved Bill, a tough and influential member of the Pizza Grill Boys. These boys lived in an area where organized crime was firmly intrenched. The boys stole automobiles, auto parts, and many other articles, hot-rodded their cars, and drank excessively. They were not a fighting gang. The worker with these boys had been an intercollegiate boxing champion and had engaged in a brief professional career as a boxer. He taught Bill and others in the group a great deal about boxing. Bill proceeded to employ these skills in beating up on boys in the area. The worker strongly and publicly

reprimanded Bill for doing this, indicating that this behavior was stupid and cowardly rather than brave, tough, and skilled. Bill's subsequent action was to drink excessively and then proceed to get into fights that demonstrated how tough he was.

After winning a fight, Bill did not have the skills to convert the advantage to generalized rank. Cases 5 and 6 both involve inflexibility in role shift after aggression, thus suggesting that flexibility is required if a boy is to cope successfully with leadership demands of groups such as these.

The next case is interesting from two perspectives. First, it indicates that the outcome of competitive sports activities, even when supervised, may release a need for status equilibration that results in overt aggression. Second, it provides a commentary on what the participants understand concerning their own motivation.

Case 7.—Gary, one of the three top "influentials" among the King Rattlers, was captain of one of the two pool teams from this gang. The other Rattler team won their division play while Gary's team placed second in their division. In the championship playoffs, Gary's team was eliminated in the first round of play, while the other group, which had advanced to the semifinals, wound up in fourth place. Feelings ran high at the playoffs; and individual and team winners received a great deal of praise.

Gary and his team watched first the finals, then the presentation of the individual trophies to the other team from their gang. The trophies, which were proudly displayed upon the return to the Rattler area, re-emphasized Gary's failure in this formal leadership role. The timing was particularly bad because Gary had emerged as one of two major influentials among the Rattlers since the employment and marriage of Duke, the former leader, who was at this time spending less time with the group. But Gary himself had recently obtained a job and had not spent much time on the streets. Gary had been paid on the day of the tournament and, at the tournament, he had the substantial sum of between $50 and $80 in his pocket. I this reason, the gang, which placed a h value on strong-arming, was not cl whether Gary would continue to lead th in this activity.

Although we should like to have m detailed information we know only th after the tournament sessions were ov Gary and two members of his team stro armed a man. The team members held t man and Gary hit him; the take was $ Gary's subsequent comment to the worl was, "Shit, I wasted my time." This v as far as he could go to explain why he h strong-armed with money in his pock He told the worker simply, ". . . saw h walking down the street and just got h —for no reason, just got him."

The salient elements in Gary's case a these: (*a*) he was adept at strong-armi (*b*) strong-arming was status-conferring the group, and (*c*) Gary played a cruc role in the incident in question. While th facts are not sufficient to establish the r lationship, they are all consistent with t interpretation that Gary's action was sp cifically related to his need for status r affirmation following the perceived loss connection with the pool tournament.

Case 8.—On a note of caution, we sh close with an observation concerning drug-using group of white boys who resist taking up an invitation to aggressive b havior under highly provocative circu stances. The group was oriented primari around the use of drugs in pill form, thou the boys smoked marijuana heavily, dra excessively, and, when they could afford (and it was available), used heroin. A cording to the worker, these boys "look upon fighting as being 'square.'"

The incident to be reported concerns tl summer, 1961, "wade-ins" by Negroes ar whites at "white" beaches on Chicago South Side in protest against the segregatic of beach facilities. When the possibility the "wade-ins" became known to a larg white gang from the same area as the dru users, they immediately took up a batt cry and proceeded to plan the co-ordinatio

of groups in opposition to the "wade-ins." Excitement ran high and they admonished the drug-using group to lend support to the cause. The worker reported that the drug-using group "expressed considerable racial hostility" and "talked about getting into the coming battle," but when the "wade-ins" occurred they chose to separate themselves from the milling hostile crowd that gathered on the beach. Instead, they proceeded to get "high" on pills. While six of them did go to the beach, they chose to sit beneath a tree—at the far end of the beach, away from the "wade-in"—and play cards. In the words of the worker, "they could hardly have been less concerned with who was going to occupy the beach."

These boys, in contrast to previous cases cited, had been urged to fight, with clear insinuations that anyone who did not was "chicken," yet they chose to turn away. Their reaction to this threat was withdrawal from the larger group and participation in activity expressive of the norms which distinguished them from the conflict-oriented boys, namely, drug use. This instance does not involve any separate threat to the leader of this group, for all members seemed to agree easily on the course of action. However, this response, in this situation, suggests that, in groups in which the leader's prestige is bound up in competence at enjoying esoteric "kicks," it may well be doubted that status threat would result in aggressive behavior.

From the practical standpoint of understanding of gang functioning, this reservation may not be important, for it is the observation of our group and other workers that individual boys who adopt strong retreatist adaptations (such as drug use) do not continue as prominent members of large gangs. They drift off into small cliques, and in many cases appear to behave as an isolated individual who moves (without developing strong interpersonal ties) into loci of heightened collective emphasis on retreatist norms. From the theoretical standpoint, this instance suggests a possible dependence between group norms and modes of status reaffirmation and, at the same time, reminds us that there was a high evaluation of aggression in the functioning of the groups from which the other examples were collected. By an extension of this thinking, if one doubts that aggression would confer higher status in retreatist groups, it is also plausible to doubt that aggression would confer higher status in middle-class adolescent groups—though for different reasons.

TARGETS AND FUNCTIONS OF AGGRESSION

Miller and his associates suggest in "Aggression in a Boys' Street-Corner Group" that verbal aggression "was an essential element of behavioral mechanisms which operated to delineate standards of personal worth, to facilitate effective collective functioning, to maintain relations of reciprocity and equality, to define attitudes toward those outside the group and their values, to indicate the *limits* of acceptable behavior and to provide effective sanctions against deviation from group-supported standards."[12] For our groups, also, the level of intragroup aggression in such forms as "body-punching" and "signifying" is high but intragroup dominance-seeking aggressive behavior by gang members, including acknowledged leaders, is not supported by group norms and is rarely resorted to by gang leaders.

Leaders we have observed are cautious not to exercise their leadership arbitrarily, and often overtly disavow that they lead the gangs. The percentage of total activities that are formally organized is low, and leaders are, in general, very careful to obtain clearance from other high-status group members before staking their prestige on a given course of action. We do not, in many cases, know how the original hierarchy of status was established, but clearly it is not maintained by aggressive dominance-seek-

[12] Walter B. Miller, Hildred S. Geertz, and Henry S. G. Cutter, "Aggression in a Boys' Street-Corner Group," *Psychiatry*, XXIV (November, 1961), 283–98.

ing by leaders.[13] Except when other boys in the gang directly challenge their status, leaders of even the toughest fighting gangs do not engage in dominating, aggressive interpersonal relationships within the gang. Among conflict gangs the leaders are known to have the capacity to function aggressively against other members when necessary to maintain their dominance, but the overwhelming preponderance of their actions are co-ordinating and nurturant.

DISCUSSION

In Cases 5 and 6, the principals, Commando and Bill, made their bids for attention through aggressive behavior but, when the tension was past, they were not able to shift roles. Neither maintained a following. The observation that a good suitor may not make a good husband, or a good campaigner a good president, is applicable in other contexts. It is our thought that similar shifts in system requirements occur with great frequency on the corner. The leaders who persist over long periods, like Duke (Case 1), do have aggressive skills as well as the ability to use them selectively.

The quickened tempo of the testing of relationships on corners, in contrast with, for example, work groups, arises in part because leaders do not control important amounts of property, because there are few privileges or immunities they can bestow, and because there are no external institutional pressures that constrain members to accept the discipline of the gang. Gang membership is very fluid,[14] particularly among fringe members. The leader cannot crassly dominate a person who is dissatisfied with the allocation of rewards within the group because of the effectiveness of the threat of splintering away. The result is that the successful gang leader is surprisingly conciliatory in his corner relations.

The recourse to aggressive behavior toward an out-group object is viewed as being a part of the sensitivity to role requirements. Out-group aggression does not undercut the gratification that membership confers and does not expose the relationship to the threat of splintering. The foray provides excitement, a heightened need for leadership, and a non-disruptive way for the leader to exercise his aggressive skills.

We do not mean to imply that all attempts at status re-equilibration through out-group aggression are successful. Sometimes they are not, and when they are not, the consequences can be grave. Kobrin and Finestone describe a case in which a boy withdrew from the gang and began to smoke marijuana,[15] and another case, known to us by correspondence, resulted in suicide. Most failures are unquestionably less dramatic than these, but a social cost is surely involved.

This formulation has specific explanatory implications that may be illustrated by comparisons with Cloward and Ohlin's comment on the reduction of intergang fighting that comes about when detached workers become associated with gangs:

> The reduction in conflict may reflect the skill of the social workers, but another explanation may be that *the advent of the street-gang worker symbolized the end of social rejection and the beginning of social accommodation.* To the extent that violence represents an effort to win deference, one would logically expect it to diminish once that end has been achieved.[16]

[13] Mandel recently discussed the severe sociometric costs of interpersonally aggressive dominance-seeking among the boarding-school boys he studied. See Rudolf Mandel, *Die Aggressivität bei Schulern: Beobachtung und Analyse des Aggressiven Verhaltens einer Knapengruppe im Pubertätsalter* (Bern and Stuttgart: Verlag Hans Huber, 1959); also Miller *et al., ibid.*

[14] Our gangs are definitely not the very fluid near-group phenomena which Yablonsky describes, although we can imagine our boys answering as his respondents did after they were picked up (see Lewis Yablonsky, "The Delinquent Gang as a Near-Group," *Social Problems,* VII [Fall, 1959], 108-17, and Harold W. Pfautz, "Near-Group Theory and Collective Behavior," *Social Problems,* IX [Fall 1961], 167-74).

[15] Solomon Kobrin and Harold Finestone, "Towards a Framework for the Analysis of Juvenile Delinquency" (paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1958). (Dittoed.)

[16] Cloward and Ohlin, *op. cit.*, p. 176. Their italics.

Instead of viewing the presence of the worker solely as symbolic of the interest of the larger society, we would also stress that his presence stabilizes what we have come to call "the leadership structure." And, in so doing, we believe it makes less frequent the need for status-maintaining aggressiveness by leaders. We believe that the gang also recognizes its obligation to the worker as a *quid pro quo* for services performed by the worker and for the additional status within the gang world that accrues to a gang by virtue of their having a worker.[17] Both of these points relate to status-maintaining mechanisms within more immediate systems—the gang itself and the gangs of the area—rather than to the "end of rejection" at the hands of a somewhat amorphous middle-class society.

In conclusion, it is to be emphasized that we do not suppose the usual elementary approval and disapproval mechanisms are absent in the gang situation; it is more that we believe gang leaders to be particularly vulnerable when they try to use negative sanctions to maintain their rank. While we view the hypothesis as plausible, we believe it highly desirable to test it by purposive, experimental intervention in the functioning of on-going groups (e.g., by having a detached worker deliberately frustrate a leader). Because of the serious consequences that might follow from the resulting aggressions, we have not made such attempts with the groups presently under observation.

[17] James F. Short, Jr., "Street Corner Groups and Patterns of Delinquency: A Progress Report from National Institute of Mental Health Research Grant M-3301" (March 1, 1961). (Mimeographed.)

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
AND
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF A FIELD VIEW OF PERSONALITY

J. MILTON YINGER

ABSTRACT

Developing an adequate theory of personality, and research procedures competent to test and exte it, is one of the most challenging tasks faced by social science today. Progress has been blocked by t tendency to extend the concepts and research designs of psychology or of sociology—which are abstract d ciplines—to explain behavior in its full empirical manifestations. We can avoid the "fallacy of misplac concreteness" by specifying clearly the abstract quality of purely psychological or sociological reseai and, when our concern is with behavior, by developing a model that takes account simultaneously of in vidual tendencies and structural influences. This proposition is illustrated by reference to the study abnormal behavior and the question of personality continuity.

Perhaps in no other area of research is the student of human behavior so likely to be caught in the grip of his own concepts as in personality theory. That "personality" is simply a word, a construct in our heads, not a reality "out there," is a difficult position to maintain. Because it is a term that can readily be attached to the observable individuals whose behavior we seek to understand, we tend to reify personality. This is the more serious because of the limiting influence of theoretical perspectives. Inevitably our concepts and our research procedures reflect the psychological, psychiatric, sociological, and social-psychological theories of personality to which they are related.

It is the purpose of this paper to show how research is influenced by the selective attention to variables that results from different perspectives. Thereafter, the aim is to describe a multidisciplinary approach to personality and to indicate its peculiar value as a construct in certain situations, particularly those that prevail in changing and heterogeneous societies. There is no need to deny either the possibility or the value of purely psychological or purely sociological theories of personality, so long as the nature of their abstractions is kept fully in mind. But I believe it can be shown that a social-psychological construct is a more powerful analytic tool.

For certain kinds of problems we can afford to accept the Newtonian view of the physical world. Modifications of our notions of time and space and changes in tl mechanical conception of the stable stru ture of matter become necessary, howeve when our curiosity leads us to explore ou ward to the reaches of the universe or i ward to variations in processes inside tl atom.

By analogy, a purely sociological view personality, designed largely to study "s cial structure," "culture and personality and "role," and a purely psychologic view of personality, concerned primari with the isolation and measurement of i ner "traits" and their configuration, c contribute to the solution of some kinds problems. Under conditions in which soci cultural structure and individual expe ence are relatively stable and repetitiv *either* a purely sociological *or* psycholog cal approach to personality is useful. Tl constructs of each are likely to be ad quate *indexes* of the variables studied b the other. Thus definition of personalit and prediction of behavior in terms of cu tural norms and role requirements approx mate the results obtained by analysis the internal structure of the person, und conditions of stability. Oppositely, an somewhat paradoxically, under such co ditions definition of personality and pr diction of behavior in terms of inner trai and their configurations approximate th results obtained by a purely sociologica approach to the same questions. Each di cipline can partly afford to disregard th variables of interest to the other because

their relative stability. (One can afford to disregard the influence of altitude—or more generally, air pressure—on the boiling point of water if he seeks prediction at one altitude only.) The variables being neglected are no less operative because of their stability, but since their influence is constant it can be disregarded for purposes of prediction.

Under conditions of social change and mobility, however, the situation is quite different. If the psychologist seeks prediction simply by exploration of variation of inner "traits" (honesty, gregariousness, authoritarianism, aggressiveness, anxiety, persuasibility), he has to contend with the wide variation in situations within which these inner forces express themselves. And the sociologist or anthropologist who thinks of personality primarily in terms of cultural norms and roles is confronted, in changing societies, with wide variation in the extent and manner of their internalization. Under such conditions, a unit of analysis that is simultaneously psychological and sociological becomes essential. The terms "psychology" and "sociology" are used here in their widest meaning to refer to the study of biopsychological tendencies and sociocultural structures. For some purposes, elaboration of a four-level model may be preferable. In fact, each of the levels is a *system* of multiple variables. Personality tendencies related to aspiration and motivation, for example, may converge or diverge, with very different results for behavior.[1]

There is nothing startling or new about this point of view. It is close to the perspective of those sociologists who emphasize social interaction and those social psychologists who speak in terms of a field view.[2] But only rarely do we find social psychological research designed to handle simultaneously the variables that derive from inner tendencies and those that stem from the influences of the social situation. A great deal has been learned, of course, by the efforts to develop purely sociological or purely psychological models. Difficulty arises when these models are used directly as guides to research on social-psychological problems, that is, are used to predict *behavior* of the individual in the social setting, which is the social-psychological task. Strictly speaking, the interest of psychology is not in behavior, but in the inner tendency system of the individual and how it is produced.[3] More obviously,

[1] For some studies of the interaction of two or more variables on the personality level see Bernard Rosen, "The Achievement Syndrome: A Psychocultural Dimension of Social Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, XXI (April, 1956), 203–11 and his "Race, Ethnicity, and the Achievement Syndrome," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (February, 1959), 47–60; and Loren Chapman and Donald Campbell, "The Effect of Acquiescence Response-Set upon Relationships among the F Scale, Ethnocentrism, and Intelligence," *Sociometry*, XXII (June, 1959), 153–61.

[2] See, e.g., Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935); Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, *Social Psychology* (rev. ed.; New York: Dryden Press, 1956); Gardner Murphy, *Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), chaps. xxxviii and xxxix; Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951); Alex Inkeles, "Personality and Social Structure," in *Sociology Today*, ed. Robert Merton, Leonard Broom and Leonard Cottrell, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1959), chap. xi; Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York: Dryden Press, 1950); and a valuable but somewhat neglected book by Walter Coutu, *Emergent Human Nature* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949).

[3] This statement conflicts with the view of earlier "behaviorists" of the Watson school and with some contemporary experimental psychologists, Skinner, for example, who have no interest in the internal tendency system—Watson's "mystery box." In their research, attention is paid only to a $S \rightarrow R$ formula, not to the usual $S \rightarrow O \rightarrow R$ formula of much psychological study. The behaviorist in this sense undertakes a different type of abstraction from psychology as I have defined it. He seeks to isolate the results of a stimulus on behavior, all other things being equal. The emphasis on response and behavior may obscure the abstract quality of his research. This leads the experimentalist to disregard, and sometimes to disdain, the influence of variables studied by his fellow psychologists who are interested in the organism and those studied by sociologists, who insist that both stimuli and the

sociology is not concerned with the behavior of individuals, but with sociocultural systems and how they are produced.[4] Few of us are content to work on these levels of abstraction, however. The ultimately intriguing problem for most of us is: Why do human beings behave as they do? When we approach this question, the vital point is that behavior is always simultaneously situational and personal. We cannot answer the question by use of the constructs derived from either psychology or sociology, nor by adding attention to a few variables derived from the discipline that is not our main starting point. Social psychology has an essentially different unit of analysis: individual behavior in the social context.

There are doubtless several reasons why sociologists and psychologists frequently move into social psychological problems without reformulating the unit of study. Two factors seem most important: Even when we are concerned with purely psychological or sociological questions, we must study behavior, from which alone we can *infer* the inner structure of the person or the patterns of the sociocultural system. It is scarcely surprising that we should sometimes confuse our inferences with the behavior from which they are derived. But the results, as I shall try to show below, are poor understanding and prediction. A second source of the tendency to use sociological or psychological models to structure social-psychological questions is the pattern of academic training. Most of us have had our training in either psychology or sociology. Few are willing to depart far from "home" territory, because there we find the colleague group, the sources of prestige or promotion, the main reference group, and perhaps most important, there we find the continuing work being guided by the same models by means of which we have learned to look at our data. Under such conditions, we are proud of, and are rewarded in proportion to, the "purity" of our research model.

Whatever the causes, there is a widespread tendency to absorb social psychology into one of the "parent" disciplines, with, I am convinced, unfortunate results. Whether we declare with Krech and Crutchfield that "social psychology does not differ in any fundamental way from psychology in general,"[5] or with Strauss that "Social psychology . . . should have much to offer its sister fields, but only insofar as its practitioners can self-consciously tie their work back to the social organizational heart of sociology and anthropology,"[6] we are led to an inadequate formulation of the analysis of the individual behaving in the group.[7]

The difficulty in achieving a social-psychological view of personality is shown

---

response-setting are often social. There is no reason to object to Skinner's approach, provided the nature of the abstraction is kept in mind. It is only necessary to state that it is no substitute for personality psychology and that it certainly does not deal with the variables of interest to sociology. But perhaps most importantly for this paper—because of the identification of experimental psychology with behavior, and therefore the possibility of confusion—experimental psychology is no substitute for social psychology, with its more complicated unit of analysis.

[4] This is in disagreement with Franz Adler, "A Unit Concept for Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (January, 1960), 356–64, where it is suggested that behavior is the basic unit for both psychological and sociological analysis. In other respects, Adler's interpretation, despite this disagreement, seems to be in harmony with that developed here.

[5] David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), p. 7

[6] Anselm Strauss, *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 11

[7] It is perhaps significant that some of the basic theoretical work in social psychology has come from persons who were neither sociologists nor psychologists. It has come from philosophers, who easily disregard boundaries, from anthropologists, whose work is usually near the descriptive level and thus more readily focused on behavior, and from psychiatrists, many of whom are primarily concerned with the total behaving individual, not with abstracted segments.

even in the pioneering work of Lewin, whose interpretation of the field view did not entirely successfully incorporate personal and situational forces into the unit of analysis. In describing Lewin's work, Deutsch writes:

> Psychology must take into account physical and social facts which obey nonpsychological laws and which determine the external events that will impinge upon the perceptual motor regions of the person. . . .
>
> The nonpsychological milieu cannot have direct effects upon behavior because its parts are alien to psychological environments, except as its parts get transformed into goals, barriers, and other psychological facts through perception. However, as Wright and Barker point out:
>
> "It is nonetheless true that the nonpsychological milieu affects behavior indirectly. It provides the physical and social raw materials for psychological habitats; and by supplying these resources it goes far to determine just what behavior shall and shall not be possible for all who live within it."[8]

This statement well represents Lewin's dominant, if not his only, interpretation of the field approach. What is not said, however, and what prevents the Lewinian view from being fully field theoretical is that *the psychological environment cannot have direct effects on behavior either;* it must be conjoined with a facilitating non-psychological milieu, as Deutsch calls it. And in the same sense, the system of psychological tendencies provides the raw materials capable of being influenced by the environment and thus "goes far to determine just what behavior shall and shall not be possible," to use the phrase from Wright and Barker. It is one thing to take account of environmental forces as limiting conditions, as most psychologically trained field theorists do. It is another thing to incorporate personality variables and environmental variables into the very unit of analysis, with full attention to the fact that neither by itself has "direct effects upon behavior"—that is, has effects that are not mediated through the other system of influences.

In Lewin's work, field means "psychological field"—that part of the total series of forces that is perceived by an individual. It seems reasonable to a psychologically trained person to say that an individual cannot be influenced by a force of which he is unaware. (We will not here explore the several possible levels of perception.) "For all practical purposes," the author of a recent book writes, "this perceptual field is reality to the person doing the perceiving . . . ; it may not be in accord with the external observer's perceptions, but it and it alone determines behavior."[9] What is missed by this kind of observation is recognition that a person's perceptions are a function not only of his sensitivities but also of the available stimuli, many of them derived from culture and social structure. Priority in determining behavior can be assigned neither to the sensitivities of the person nor to the facilitating forces in the environment, because both are always involved in the equation.

It is perhaps not surprising that psychologists should sometimes fail to recognize the influence of social structure independent of the individuals' perceptions of it. That sociologists should fall into the same error is more puzzling. Thus Gross, Mason, and McEachern, in an otherwise first-rate study, deal with role conflict only in terms of the perceptions of position incumbents.[10] But lack of consensus on the part of the members of the role set, whether or not that lack is perceived, affects the

[8] Morton Deutsch in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), I, 193.

[9] Otto Strunk, Jr., *Religion: A Psychological Interpretation* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1962).

[10] Neal Gross, Ward Mason, and Alexander McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), p. 248. More commonly, of course, sociologists emphasize precisely the distinct effects of social structure, individual differences held constant. See Peter M. Blau, "Structural Effects," *American Sociological Review,* XXV (April, 1960), 178–93.

structure within which interaction takes place and the alternatives available to an actor, and thus influences his behavior. Perception of these facts by an actor is an additional variable; but the personality fact must be distinguished from the social fact.

THE FIELD VIEW OF PERSONALITY ABNORMALITY

The tendency to shift, without due notice, from an abstract sociological or psychological model to an interpretation of behavior can be found in almost every research area. Studies of delinquency, of discrimination, of creativity, of leadership have often treated either personal tendencies or situations as limiting conditions, not as causal forces. Insofar as the aim of research is to isolate, by analysis, the influence of one set of variables, this procedure is valid; but the persistent error is the practice of shifting from analysis on the inner-tendency system level or the sociocultural system level to the interpretation of behavior, which always involves influences from both levels. Consider this illustration of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness": "whatever be the element of social disintegration we are concerned with, its influence makes itself felt only on a *selected group of individuals*. It must therefore be the physical and mental make-up of offenders, as compared with non-offenders, that presents the crucial and practical issue in the study of crime causation."[11] On the other side, some sociologists emphasize subcultural norms, the influence of the group and community patterns as the "crucial and practical issues." They tend to overlook the problem associated with the fact that only some of those exposed to the crime-supporting situation engage in crime.[12]

It is a commonplace for students of human behavior to point out that "econom man" does not exist, that it is simply idea, useful to varying degrees in the effo to understand economic behavior. No mo does "sociological man" or "psychologic man" exist. This can best be illustrat perhaps by examining some aspects of a normal behavior, because the tendency take certain causal forces for granted m be weakened by observing departures fro the norm. When Durkheim sought an e planation of suicide, for example, he exa ined various theories, one by one, findi each inadequate until he came to the infl ences of the social structure. No psych pathic state, he found, "bears a regul and indisputable relation to suicide." N did the analysis of "normal psychologic states" prove of value, although he reco nized differences in aptitude for suici "permitting but not necessarily implyi suicide and therefore giving no explan tion for it."[13]

For decades this study has been use with good reason, as a prime example sociological research. There is often th

[11] "Crime Causation," in *National Probation and Parole Association Yearbook* (1941), p. 90. Note how precisely this reverses Durkheim's perspective, discussed below.

[12] Walter B. Miller, "Lower Class Culture as Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency," *Journ of Social Issues,* XIV, No. 3 (1958), 5–19 Ma recent studies, of course, qualify excessively ps chological or sociological views of crime and wo toward an integrated theory. See Lewis Yablonsk "The Delinquent Gang as a Near-Group," *Soci Problems,* VII (Fall, 1959), 108–17; Gresha Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutral zation: A Theory of Delinquency," *American So ciological Review,* XXII (December, 1957), 66 70; Albert Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (Glencoe: Fr Press, 1955); Solomon Kobrin, "The Conflict Values in Delinquency Areas," *American Sociolog cal Review,* XVI (October, 1951), 653–661; Joh Kitsuse and David Dietrick, "Delinquent Boys Critique," *American Sociological Review,* XXI (April, 1959), 208–15; William McCord and Joa McCord, *Origins of Crime: A New Evaluation the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study* (Ne York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Marsha Clinard in Merton, Broom, and Cottrell (eds.), *op cit.,* pp. 509–36; J. Milton Yinger, "Contracultur and Subculture," *American Sociological Revie* XXV (October, 1960), 625–35.

[13] Émile Durkheim, *Suicide* (Glencoe, Ill. Fre Press, 1951), p. 103.

lency, however, to think of it not as an mpt to isolate the social structural as- t of suicide causation but as a complete)ry of suicide. Durkheim does get near ι blending of individual and social fac- .[14] He notes that individual tendency necessary if not a sufficient cause (al- ugh he does not use these terms). What fails to make clear is that the sociocul- ıl forces are also necessary but insuffi- ıt. His development of the idea of "pro- tive cause" (*la cause productrice*) gives nacy to the social structural factor; this is meaningful only in the explana- ι of a social *rate* of suicide, not in the ıal psychological task of explaining the avior of the individual in the group set- ;. To restate the brief quotation from rkheim, one can with as much justice that an anomic setting "permits but s not necessarily imply suicide." Not ryone in such settings commits suicide. rkheim helped to eliminate an exces- ːly individualistic theory by demon- ıting the influence of sociological fac- ; in a dramatic way. As an illustration the new light that can be thrown on old ts by the use of a sociological perspec- ;, *Le Suicide* is a masterpiece. It is when try to use the study as a social-psycho- ical theory that we get into difficulty, it is no more adequate as an explana- n of behavior than the individualistic in- pretations it so successfully attacked.[15] The social-psychological point of view ı be described in simple mathematical ms by putting the familiar concepts of redisposing" factors (located in the in- ·idual) and "precipitating" factors (lo- ed in the situation)[16] into scales. As- ne that values can range from zero to ten, which would represent the theoretical- ly limiting cases. The likelihood of suicide (or of any other act being interpreted by the use of this scheme) is measured by the product of the values on these two pre- sumed scales; if either is zero, the act will not occur no matter how high the score on the other measure. Thus a person caught in a thoroughly anomic situation and sur- rounded by other social forces strongly precipitating him toward suicide will have no likelihood of performing the act if his "predisposal" score is zero. Similarly, if he is as thoroughly predisposed as is theoreti- cally imaginable, but is surrounded by a situation that contains no precipitating in- fluences whatsoever, suicide will not occur.

To think in terms of empirically more likely cases, we can hypothesize a "score" of 50 as the point at which suicide is likely to occur. A person with a "predisposal" score of 1 to 4 will be immune even in the most powerfully precipitating context, as anomic and stressful as one can imagine. If his score rises to 5, however, he becomes vulnerable in situations with the highest possible score. One can successfully predict a high *rate* (that is, a group measure) when such precipitating influences as anomie are strong (let us say, arbitrarily, above 7), because the product scores of a large number are brought above the as- sumed critical point of 50. A precipitating score of 5 will affect only those with a pre- disposal score of 10; but if the former scores rises to 7, all those above 7 in the latter measure are affected.[17] Knowledge of anomie, therefore, may allow us better

[14] See *ibid*, pp. 102-3 and 323-24, for example.

[15] On this question see Inkeles, *op. cit.*; George npson's Preface to his translation of Durkheim's *icide*; Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social tion* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), 326; Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Causes du suicide* aris. F. Alcan, 1930); and A. F. Henry and J. F. ort, *Suicide and Homicide* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free ess, 1954).

[16] See, e g., E. Gartly Jaco, "The Social Isolation Hypothesis and Schizophrenia," *American Socio- logical Review*, XIX (October, 1954), 567-77; and T. A. C. Rennie, "The Yorkville Community Men- tal Health Research Study," in *Interrelations be- tween the Social Environment and Psychiatric Dis- orders* (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1953), pp. 213 ff.

[17] In this greatly oversimplified scheme, I have assumed two arithmetic scales and precision in measurement. I have also disregarded the question of functionally equivalent types of behavior

to predict rates but is of no value in the social psychological task of understanding how particular individuals will behave in the social context. This statement can be reversed, of course: knowledge of individual tendencies tells us who is vulnerable but does not indicate the likelihood of a given act, which is always situationally influenced. The situation may be so constant that we have learned to take it for granted; but that is no indication of its irrelevance. And as we seek to extend our propositions in time and space we are inevitably confronted with variation in situational influence.

This same approach can guide our study of the more general problems of the social psychology of abnormality. The field view states that mental illness as behavior is not something *in* the person; it is a process that results from the interaction of the person with the situation. Two persons, equally burdened by doubt and guilt, equally torn by mutually contradictory inclinations, equally confused by ego-alienating desires (or however one may want to describe the abnormality-prone individual) are not necessarily equally likely to express these tendencies by abnormal behavior. One person may live in a supportive environment that blunts the edge of his anxieties or furnishes socially approved and ego-approved outlets for their expression. Another may be caught in a situation that compounds his anxieties. The task of sociology is to isolate the sociocultural conditions that minimize and those that maximize the likelihood of abnormal behavior (normlessness, or contradictory norms, or stressful socialization). The task of psychology is to isolate those conditions that establish tendency systems immune to or vulnerable to "abnormality-prone" environments. Social psychology, then, is concerned with the behavior of the individual in the situation. These are, of course, highly abstract distinctions. Many research studies and many scientists operate on two or more of these levels. It is essential, however, that the levels be kept analytically distinct in our minds, as they often are not, lest we assume that measures of normlessness or measures of inner stress can lead directly to prediction of behavior.

A psychogenic theory alone cannot explain abnormality both because there are alternative ways of expressing the inner tendencies and also because there is variation in the strength of precipitating forces. The positions one occupies, his class environment, the total situation of which he is a part all help to account for the path that he will follow. A sociogenic theory alone cannot explain abnormality because different inner-tendency systems respond differently to the same sociocultural circumstances. It is true that among persons equally anxious, one may become delinquent, another neurotic or a drug addict, another deeply religious, depending upon situational variation. Oppositely, however, the same situation may precipitate neurosis in one, delinquency in another, and unusual effort in a third, because of different "selector systems" within the individual.

When we conceive of personality as process, not as a system of inner traits, the study of abnormality takes on new dimensions. It is one thing to say that a given individual *is paranoiac;* it is another to say that he behaves paranoiacally under certain conditions. The latter statement leads us, with Cameron, for example, to seek out the precipitating conditions. If the suspicions, threats, and aggressive actions of the paranoia-prone individual heighten the anxiety of those around him, "he inevitably arouses defensive and retaliatory hostility in others."[18] This response seems to confirm his interpretation of the situation and promotes his aggressive tendencies. If, however, hostility-promoting responses are lacking, if a neutral therapist serves as a bridge to reality, the paranoia-prone individual "can begin to entertain doubts and consider alternative interpretations."[19]

[18] Norman Cameron, "The Paranoid Pseudo-Community Revisited," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXV (July, 1959), 58.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 58

Certainly an excessively situational approach to personality would lead to error: not all persons are equally liable to delusional responses. For some, only the most favorable conditions imaginable can prevent hostile behavior. It is less obvious that research which disregards the conditions under which behavior occurs, which studies only inner "traits," also leads to error. Such research yields good prediction for extreme cases under the usual range of conditions. If the predisposal score is high, most situations will precipitate abnormal behavior. The difficulty in this approach, however, is that it tends to support a conception of personality that yields poor prediction in dealing with persons with lower predisposal scores or in unusual conditions (in a different culture, for example, or in the neutral and supportive context of therapy). If I may speak in analogical terms again, if one lives in an environment that never falls below 0° C. or goes above 100° C. he can afford to predict solely on the basis of the "traits" of H_2O that it is a liquid. This is an adequate way of saying that H_2O, a compound with certain potentialities, is liquid under certain conditions which, being constant, can be disregarded. That does not mean, however, that the conditions are not always involved in producing the results.

The point of view being developed here requires a more drastic departure from disciplinary perspectives than is sometimes realized. To say that social interactional and cultural factors are involved in the origins of mental illness is not the same as saying that the situation in which a person with abnormal tendencies behaves *now* affects the likelihood and the forms of abnormal responses. Quite traditional psychiatry can accept the former statement, particularly if reference is to the social experiences in early life. Field view takes a more "radical" position when it argues that abnormality is a function of the current situation as well as of current tendencies.

This distinction can be illustrated by reference to the complicated problem of class variation in rates of schizophrenia. It is probably true that the rate is higher among the lower classes. (One can say only probably true, both because the total incidence is not the same as the detected or the hospitalized incidence, and also because later detection or treatment of cases in the lower classes may lead to greater severity, longer hospitalization or persistence, and hence to greater incidence at any given time.) There is good evidence that class subcultures and variation in patterns of interaction are among the causes of this differential. Persons vulnerable to schizophrenia are more likely to develop in lower-class contexts, according to this view, because of the frustrations, the subculturally allowable responses to frustrations, the family patterns, and other social facts more characteristic of lower-class than of middle- or upper-class experience. But field theory goes further: rates among the lower classes are higher, not only because of tendency differences laid down in the individuals but also because the contemporary situations facilitate different types of response. If two groups, one lower and one middle class, with equal predispositions, were compared, the lower-class group may have a higher rate, not because of what is in them (tendencies having been matched), but because of differences in precipitating forces: The responses of families and communities to illness and treatment vary by class; therapeutic demands are to some degree class-oriented; functionally alternative forms of response are not equally available. These may be among the situational ingredients that facilitate a schizophrenic response more frequently in one group than in another.

A field view requires redefinition of abnormality, not only in the sense that cultural and subcultural norms as well as contradictions within the person are taken into account, but more drastically in the sense that abnormality can be defined only in the process of interaction. Fried and Lindemann, for example, suggest this operational definition for extreme mental ill health:

impulses break through the regulations of the ego and superego; behavior cannot be controlled by the usual regulatory agencies —family, peers, work colleagues—and thus a crisis is precipitated; efforts to support the ego-superego system by the usual agencies of control fail, endangering the normal institutional structure and patterns of interaction; extraordinary institutional resources are drawn in.[20] This is no mere adding together of individual and group factors; it is a *process* definition that requires simultaneous attention to the various levels of influence.

If both tendencies and situations are involved in the causation of abnormal behavior, they must both be considered in programs of therapy. During World War II, persons removed from the front lines because of neurotic or psychotic symptoms had a much higher rate of recovery if they were treated in the combat zone than if they were taken to a hospital far from battle.[21] A conception of personality that leads one to think in terms of neurotic or psychotic persons as separate entities cannot easily interpret such observations. When we conceive of personality as behavior, however, and speak of tendencies toward neurosis under certain conditions, the full range of facts can be accounted for.

The only modification of the field view required here is recognition of the fact that *from the point of view of strategy* one or another of the causal forces may be more accessible to change. It may be most efficient to disregard the tendencies of mildly disturbed children and to concentrate on changing their situations. On the other hand, it may be necessary to take the social structures and cultural values as fairly fixed, as far as a deeply disturbed person is concerned, so that therapy must concentrate on the modification of his tendencies. Such strategic decisions, however, should not be permitted to obscure the continuing presence of both sets of forces in the causal equation. Continuous awareness of their interaction is necessary not only for theory but also for therapy. This is shown in an interesting way by group therapy, in which the effort is made to modify abnormal tendencies by experience in an artificially created and temporary social system with a somewhat unique subculture. Assuming success in this effort, one may be faced with the possibility that the individual, on returning to the dominant social world, will find himself too uninhibited or outspoken.[22] His former symptoms, however painful and awkward, were not wholly out of joint with the social system of which they were a part; they were indeed efforts to struggle with it. This is not to argue against therapy, of course, but only to stress the need for attention to the entire field of forces. Beck, who notes the possible dysfunctional consequences of group therapy, indicates that this is not typically a serious problem. Therapy ends short of full transformation of the person; the outside world continues to restrain him, and the restraints may be more acceptable if therapy has lowered self-deprecation and rigidities; and if the group processes in the therapeutic situation have taught patients to see social clues better they may interact more adequately with the group.[23]

CONTINUITY OF PERSONAL TENDENCY

It is sometimes supposed that field theory eliminates or minimizes the idea that there is continuity to personality. Attention to the importance of situational influences can be interpreted, by both opponents and proponents, to mean that the individual is a creature of all the outside

[20] Marc Fried and Erich Lindemann, "Sociocultural Factors in Mental Health and Illness," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XXXI (January, 1961), 87–101.

[21] See John Clausen in Merton, Broom, and Cottrell (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 503.

[22] See Dorothy Beck, "The Dynamics of Group Psychotherapy as Seen by a Sociologist," *Sociometry*, XXI (June, 1958 and September, 1958), 98–129, 180–97.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 191–95.

forces playing upon him at a given moment. His tendencies are so numerous and so lacking in structure that the facilitating and inhibiting forces of the environment become the crucial variables. In emphasizing the ahistorical nature of science, for example (only those influences at work in the contemporary field can affect behavior; their histories are not directly relevant), Lewin challenged the importance of continuity of personality.

A careful statement of field theory, however, does not in fact deny personality continuity. It does require a reinterpretation of the concept. Certainly an emphasis on the supreme importance of experiences in infancy and childhood as determining forces in behavior is challenged. Whether it be William James's idea of individual habit as "the enormous fly-wheel of society," or Freud's conception of character structure, or the emphasis of much contemporary learning theory on the canalization of response through reward and punishment—presumably to the end of stable response patterns—any theory that focuses on internal forces operating independently of any context seems inadequate. Yet each of these points of view can be made consonant with a field approach. When habits, character structure, or canalized responses are interpreted as a readiness to act, not as behavior, they need not clash with a field view. If it is true that an individual never behaves in a vacuum, it is equally true that the sociocultural and physical environments never call out behavior in a tendencyless individual.

When he described the ahistorical quality of science, Lewin did not deny the significance of past events. He simply noted that they could be significant for behavior only insofar as there were precipitates of these events in present tendencies. Stated in this way, the extent of tendency continuity becomes an empirical problem for investigation. There are good grounds for hypothesizing substantial continuity of personality. The bringing of the past into the present through memory, the continuity of the body, the very meaning of "self" and the insightful if not definitive construct of self-consistency all suggest the usefulness of the idea. Clinical insight into the way a neurotic person clings to his symptoms, evidence that prejudices often persist even in the face of powerful challenging facts, knowledge that propaganda messages can be twisted around by a perceiver to support his established views, and the vivid impression that most persons have of a strong lifeline connecting them with their own past all support the idea of continuity. For each such support, however, there are also contrary evidences: neurotic symptoms sometimes change or disappear, prejudices shift or are eliminated, communications may change attitudes, and individuals sometimes have the pleasant or unpleasant sense of drastic changes in themselves.

It is necessary to speak tentatively on this question because a definitive test of personality continuity is difficult to design. There may be substantial agreement among persons of widely differing theoretical perspectives on these propositions: Individuals vary in the extent to which they experience personality change as adults; some are "chameleons" and some are "beavers," to use Eugene Lerner's terms, and most are in between. Societies vary in the proportions of chameleons and beavers they produce, or in the extent to which they promote inner- and other-directedness. Some aspects of personality are more malleable than others; judgments may change more readily than opinions, opinions more readily than attitudes, attitudes than values, and values than self-image—to put the issue in overly simple terms. Personality changes are least likely to occur when the group structures with which the individual is involved remain stable.

This last statement, based on a field perspective, has received unusually stringent tests in recent years in the efforts to manipulate human beings. These efforts have ranged from verbal communications designed to change opinions and closely linked actions to major campaigns to

"brainwash" military captives and transform their basic values and allegiances. By stating the issue from a field point of view, we can see the problem of the consistency of personality from the opposite perspective, that is, the "inconsistency of personality."[24]

Systematic efforts to crush resistance and to remake the value hierarchies of individuals in concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps provide a severe test of the degree to which persons can be manipulated. There are difficult problems involved in the interpretation of the evidence, for it can be read in several different ways. An observer who is convinced that personality is a fairly stable organization of traits, the result of early experience acting upon a unique inheritance, will view evidence of drastic changes as temporary products of unusual situations. The "real" personality will reappear when conditions return to "normal." From the perspective of this paper, this is an inadequate formulation. If earlier personality tendencies manifest themselves again when an agency of manipulation is removed, after having been inhibited by that agency, it is not only because they have remained in the personality, but also because the situation that encourages them has returned. By this statement I do not want to contradict the principles stated above: some persons change less readily than others (their tendencies persist over a wider range of situations); and some personality tendencies are less malleable than others. I simply want to emphasize also that some social structures change less readily than others (allow a narrower range of alternatives among which personality tendencies may "select"), and that some aspects of the structure are less malleable than others. A situationalist view that treats individual variations as bothersome exceptions is just as inadequate as a personalist or traitist view that treats situational variations as bothersome exceptions.

From the point of view of field theory the degree to which human beings can be manipulated involves the interaction of variables on several levels. Analysis of the influence of drugs, lack of sleep, injury, and illness requires physiochemical research. The task is to discover how much the variance in behavior can be accounted for by the effects of drugs, for example, when personality, cultural, and group variables have been controlled. On the personality level, fear, anxiety, ability to withstand pain, and knowledge of issues are illustrative variables. Knowledge of cultural values and roles is also valuable for prediction: Turkish soldiers captured by the Chinese during the Korean War may have been less easily manipulated than some American soldiers, perhaps because there is much greater consensus on the role "soldier" and on the values of toughness in Turkish culture. On the level of social structure, the need is to study the ways in which efforts to manipulate behavior are affected by group processes. The Chinese Communists systematically destroyed the group structure among prisoners: leaders were removed, informing on one's fellows was rewarded, a sense of alienation from home support was promoted by allowing only unhappy letters to come through. Thus they sought a radical alienation from the sustaining influence of the group.

CONCLUSION

A field approach demands that we make our research designs even more complicated

[24] For evidence on this question see, e.g., Bruno Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXVIII (October, 1943), 417–52; Albert Biderman and Herbert Zimmer, *The Manipulation of Human Behavior* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961); E. A. Cohen, *Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953); I. E. Farber, Harry F. Harlow, and Louis J. West, "Brainwashing, Conditioning and DDD (Debility, Dependency, Dread)," *Sociometry*, X (December, 1957), 271–85; Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953); Edgar H. Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War: A Study of Attempted 'Brainwashing,'" *Psychiatry*, LXI (May, 1956), 149–72.

than they are; but it will yield correspondingly more satisfying results in any attempt to understand or predict behavior. Physicists and biologists are well aware of the need for this perspective. In the words of Jennings: "What any particular cell of the individual produces is largely determined by the surroundings of that cell—by the cells in contact with it, and by the hormones that bathe it; in short, by the 'internal environment'—so that the same set of genes produces different results in different cases."[25] One can, of course, add that the same environment produces different results when it influences cells with different potentialities.

Such a view would drastically alter the theoretical perspective of such research as that reported by Hovland and Janis in *Personality and Persuasibility*.[26] They are looking for elements in the person that will explain persuasibility, presumably regardless of the content of the message, the medium of communication, the communicator, or any other situational factor. They are looking, in short, for what they call the "unbound" trait of persuasibility. This is a possible construct, yielding prediction under some conditions. But as a general theory it seems to me to be quite inadequate; to try to predict from "trait" alone is to run into difficulty when a repetitive and consistent situation changes. Some of their hypotheses are borne out only because conditions vary over a narrow part of the imaginable range of messages, media, and communicators, and because they have isolated those persons for study who tend to be persuaded by a wide variety of communicators or messages. Again let me put the argument in simple mathematical terms. Assume that a score of 24 or more will produce persuasion of a given individual by a given message in a particular situation. Assume further that individuals vary from 0 to 10 in persuasibility tendency (not an "unbound" trait) and that situations (the message-communicator complex) have the same possible range in influence. Persons with a persuasibility score of 8 will be persuaded by all situations with a score of 3 or higher, but those with a score of 3, only by communications with an influence score of 8 or higher.[27] Hovland and Janis, by discovering those persons with a high tendency score, could afford to disregard message content, medium of communication, and other situational aspects and still get good prediction, because a large proportion of situations would have the requisite influence. It is often true that a fairly simple concept seems quite good when applied to extreme cases. (Paradoxically, an opposite theory may seem equally good. I suspect a Durkheim could develop a usable theory of "situation and persuasion," disregarding individual differences entirely.) A sterner test of a theory's adequacy, however, is its ability to interpret the behavior of persons along the whole range of tendencies toward persuasibility. For such a task, what is needed is not the isolation of presumed traits, but the specification of the conditions under which various tendencies are expressed.

If a "trait" approach is inadequate, it is equally true that our understanding is limited if we are excessively situationist, overlooking variations in individual tendency system. When Lewin, Lippitt, and White vary "group atmosphere" and process, in their studies of boys' clubs,[28] they

[25] H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1930), p. 122.

[26] Carl Hovland, and Irving Janis (eds.), *Personality and Persuasibility* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959).

[27] The simple product model here is doubtless inadequate. It is quite possible that a 24 produced by a 3 × 8 combination has a different meaning from one produced by a 6 × 4 combination.

[28] See Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" *Journal of Social Psychology*, X (1939), 271-99; and Lippitt and White, "An Experimental Study of Leadership and Group Life," in *Readings in Social Psychology*, ed. Theodore Newcomb and Eugene Hartley (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1947), pp. 314-30.

add significantly to our knowledge by isolating the influence of strictly social forces. They could predict certain *rates* of behavior without paying any attention to differences in individual propensity. But again, their success is partly a result of the fact that the tendencies of the boys involved varied over a narrow part of the imaginable range. Systematic variation in age, cultural and subcultural values, tendencies toward hostility, and the like, is necessary for knowledge of who will respond in various ways to "democratic" and "autocratic" group situations. Do six-year-olds respond in the same way as sixteen-year-olds? Do insecure and self-confident boys react differently? Would results be the same in Japan, Russia, and the United States?

It is not my intent to argue against the possibility or the desirability of a purely sociological or purely psychological approach to the study of personality, in each instance with the variables crucial to the other approach being controlled. It is vitally necessary, however, that those variables truly be controlled, not simply disregarded. And we must realize that our "victories" will be in the world of abstraction of our own creation. On the behavioral level, these variables are not controlled, but fully operative, and their influence must be taken into account. The function of psychological and sociological research on personality is to isolate one set of variables for more precise measurement. When we forget this function and attempt to make one or the other approach serve as a total theory of behavior, we weaken our understanding, despite good prediction under some circumstances. A social-psychological theory, building on the discoveries of the more abstract disciplines, is a more adequate guide to research that seeks to understand behavior.

Oberlin College

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

IKEDA, BALL, AND YAMAMURA, "ETHNOCULTURAL FACTORS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA"

October 18, 1962

To the Editor:

The recent article by Kiyoshi Ikeda, Harry V. Ball, and Douglas S. Yamamura, "Ethnocultural Factors in Schizophrenia: The Japanese in Hawaii" (*American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1962, pp. 242–48) deserves some comment, mainly because its publication is twenty-five years too late.

These investigators have reported the results of a survey that attempts to probe cautiously the role of ethnocultural differences in mental illness, basing their speculations upon certain differences in the rates of mental hospital first admissions of the Okinawan and Naichi Japanese in Hawaii. However, in their study they show no awareness of twenty years of controversy concerning the establishment of true incidence rates for different types of psychoses and the often specified objections to utilizing rate differentials based upon first admission to mental hospitals as a basis for making an interpretation. In their discussion these investigators have raised two questions: (1) Why have the Japanese as a whole manifested a proneness toward schizophrenia? (2) Why has the incidence of mental illness been significantly higher among the Okinawans than among the Naichi?

For the point of my comment I will discuss these questions together. The point is: do the data as organized by the authors provide any basis for assuming that reliable and valid differential rates were established in either case? Now, I have no first-hand familiarity with the situation in Hawaii, but I see no reason to assume at this point in time that many of the factors that are operating in other states of the United States as well as in Europe to account for differential rates in social structures and subcultures are not similar to those that operate in Hawaii. Here, I am referring to such factors as the strength and organization of the family, the differential accessibility to mental hospitals, the differential admission policy of hospitals, the changing fashions in diagnosis, the differing orientations of examining psychiatrists, the differential tolerance in communities for the mentally ill, general state policy with respect to treatment and care of the mentally ill, the presence in the community of certain mentally ill that never get to the hospital, the extent and degree of organization of outpatient clinics and private psychiatrists, and the difficulty of the correct ethnocultural designation (this particularly in the current study considering the fact that the Okinawan and Naichi immigrants came to Hawaii between 1885 and 1910) in the hospital records. All of these factors, or any one of them, should be sufficient to account for rate differences among Japanese and non-Japanese as well as among the Okinawans and the Naichis.

For example, in Table 1 (showing the first admission rates for schizophrenia and comparing Japanese with non-Japanese) the ratio of Japanese to non-Japanese is in the order of 1:1.4. This is certainly not a large difference and certainly contrasts rather markedly with the ratios of 1:3 often reported for community areas and social classes in some of the studies on the mainland. It is noted, of course, that the ratio of non-Japanese to Okinawan (Japanese) presents a 1:3 ratio. While the investigators have tried to make a case for the differences of the rates between the Okinawans and the Naichis by saying that the differ-

ences stand up when the data are broken down by sex, age, rural-urban and occupational backgrounds, and time periods, they are still open to the same type of criticism. In their discussion of their findings, while the investigators are quite correctly tentative and hypothetical, they appear very ready to want to believe that ethnocultural differences must have some role to play in mental illness and particularly schizophrenia. However, they make the ever recurring error—of which I, also, have been guilty—of jumping too quickly, without adequate exploration, from the finding of rate differences in certain groups and societal structures to rather vague and broad interpretations derived from the social situations of the groups in question. Thus, they point out that a certain variation with respect to the schizophrenic diagnosis between the Japanese and Filipinos "cannot be explained merely as a reaction to immigrant-minority status experiences." In a more positive vein, they suggest another possible interpretation "that the Okinawans, as a minority, were more exposed than the Naichi to extreme role strain" or that the Naichi maintained their major traditional institutions, thus gaining a high degree of insulation from the larger community, while the Okinawans were unable to do so. Now, I am not saying that these elements may not exist among these ethnic groups in Hawaii but only that they provide a very questionable basis for explaining rate differences, especially when we are on extremely uncertain grounds as to whether reliable and valid rate differences have been established.

The fact that Hawaii offers an ideal situation for the investigation of ethnocultural differences in minorities is true and has been recognized for several decades by various investigators in the behavioral sciences. Investigations in this area can certainly be carried on without compromising research possibilities by trying to extend our comprehension of the consequences that cultural differences may make with respect to personality on the basis of data of questionable reliability. The first task the investigators face is to establish that they do have valid and reliable differences in the incidence of schizophrenia diagnosed in some uniform fashion among the various ethnic groups on the island. When this is done one can then proceed to determine what is the best explanation to account for the differences.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne State University and Lafayette Clinic

REJOINDER

November 15, 1962

To the Editor:

We are most pleased that Professor Dunham concurs that Hawaii presents "an ideal situation for the investigation of ethnocultural differences in minorities." We also agree that such has been "recognized for several decades"; but we would stress *also* that this recognition has not resulted in any outpouring of major, published, *systematic* basic studies in that locale. The last such in sociology is A. W. Lind's *Island Community*, published in 1938. That happens to be twenty-four years ago. Thus *if* our paper is "twenty-five years too late," that would put it just about on schedule.

Nevertheless, we must reject most of what Professor Dunham has to say. This is especially so of his conclusion that we "are very ready to want to believe that ethnocultural differences must have some role to play in mental illness and particularly schizophrenia." We have tried to show only that the differences of rates *thus far* indicated appear to be consistent with other highly probable differences regarding community integration and interpersonal stress. Dunham may be correct that such a factor is "a very questionable basis for explain-

ing rate differences," but he is clearly in error to add, "especially when we are on extremely uncertain grounds as to whether reliable and valid rate differences have been established." If, as Dunham holds, our suggestions of other differences that we believe do exist (and that he concedes very well may exist) are "a very questionable basis for explaining rate differences" even if they do exist, then clearly he should hold them to be so regardless of how well the rate differences are demonstrated. This is the kind of criticism that is most stimulating.

Now let us consider Dunham's general and specific bases for questioning to what extent our preliminary findings established a reasonable likelihood that rate differentials do exist. His general allegation is that we show "no awareness of twenty years of controversy concerning the establishment of true incidence rates for different types of psychoses." Now all sociologists today are aware of the necessity to establish valid rates in any sociological inquiry that uses comparisons between rates, whether one is speaking of mental illness or anything else. As a general defense here we refer Dunham to our previous works, including, "Social Structure and Rent-Control Violations" (*American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1960) and "Ethnic Discrimination and the Marketplace" (*American Sociological Review*, October, 1960). As a specific defense in the case of types of psychoses, we merely ask why does he believe we carefully introduced the controls of time period, nativity, urban-rural residence, age, sex, and occupational category.

His more specific allegation in this regard is that we show "no awareness" of the "often specified objections to using rate differentials based upon first admission to mental hospitals." He presents a number of factors that we presumably ignored and asserts that "all or any one" could account for the differences. We are not sure whether his language here means that he believes that any of them that were operative would have operated in the same direction, so we shall pass that point. But we will examine each of his specific factors.

A number of his factors—including "the differential admission policy of hospitals," "the changing fashions of diagnosis," "the differential orientations of examining psychiatrists," "general state policy with respect to treatments and care of the mentally ill"—have been presumed by us to have roughly equivalent impacts on each ethnic grouping at any one point in time. Each might, of course, represent a change through time, but this is precisely why the "time control" over a twenty-year period was employed. We concede, of course, that "changing fashions" and "differing orientations" will be a greater problem in comparing a series of "one-shot" studies done at different points in time, even when each is as rigorously behavioristic as the recent Midtown Manhattan study.

Concerning another cluster of his factors—"the differential accessibility to mental hospitals" and "the extent and degree of organization of outpatient clinics and private psychiatrists"—we assert the following. During the period covered in this study, the mental hospital included was the *only* major mental hospital in the Territory of Hawaii; the differences with which we primarily concerned ourselves were first reported by Wedge (1952) upon the basis of his study of the *only* major screening center for mental patients (public or private) in the Territory; no substantial changes in regard to outpatient clinics and private psychiatry in Hawaii occurred during 1931–51, although many have occurred since 1955; our controls included urban-rural residence and occupation.

A third cluster of his factors includes "differential tolerance in the community" and "mentally ill who never get to the hospital," even though the latter may be based upon "low tolerance" and a pattern of "hiding the mentally ill." This, of course, is a clear possibility. It is where research in Hawaii should *now* head.

But it also leads us to what appears to be Dunham's proposed candidate as the explanatory factor of any valid rate differentials that might exist: "the strength and organization of the family." We trust that

Dunham does not really think that such is not subsumed under our variables of "integrative institutions." But, in addition, there is evidence that his particular variable is in turn affected very considerably by the differences between the positions in the social structure that we mentioned *and* between the Okinawan and Naichi cultures as brought to Hawaii. This possibility should also be included in future research.

We are aware that "ethnocultural differences" are, at best, only very rarely a factor worthy of research today, presumably because in the United States such a variable is viewed as inconsequential as an influence in individual adaptations (whether in mental illness or juvenile delinquency). As we read Dunham, he may concur in this position, but he still holds with us that Hawaii is an excellent place to pursue this matter further.

A final word on the "difficulty of the correct ethnocultural designations." Here we had several "advantages" from a technical standpoint. First, Japanese-American males generally in Hawaii have "married out" at a very low rate, as have Naichi-American females. Second, a disproportion of the Okinawan-American females who have married out have done so to Caucasian-American servicemen and subsequently moved to the Mainland. These statements are not based only upon marriage license data. They are also based upon very detailed studies of family composition by ethnicity that we have made in 1952 and 1962. Third, we have the impression that Dunham does not appreciate the degree of hostility toward Naichi-Okinawan intermarriage that characterized the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii through the 1940's. Fourth, the ethnic classifications used were based not only on the classification of the names of the patients and his relatives (we will be happy to provide anyone interested with the detailed name lists), but also upon an examination of the hospital records on place of birth of the patient, his parents, and other near relatives. Surely Dunham is not suggesting that anything that is difficult and time-consuming cannot be done with reasonable accuracy.

Dunham is welcome to plead "guilty" to any sins he believes he has committed in the past. We, however, plead guilty only to the desire that this preliminary research may have documented that this matter should be pursued more systematically in Hawaii and that such a pursuit merits financial support. We plead "not guilty" to any of his sins of twenty-five years ago. Even more, regardless of his plea, on the basis of the very nature of scientific inquiry we find him "not guilty."

KIYOSHI IKEDA
Oberlin College

HARRY V. BALL
University of Wisconsin

DOUGLAS S. YAMAMURA
University of Hawaii

HOROWITZ, "THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION OF C. WRIGHT MILLS: IN MEMORIAM"

September 18, 1962

To the Editor:

In his note in memoriam of C. Wright Mills (*American Journal of Sociology,* July, 1962), Professor Horowitz refers to "Mills's already masterful introduction to *From Max Weber*" and cites this work as follows (n. 8): *"From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (edited with Hans Gerth)."

This, I believe, is unfair to Professor Gerth. The correct quotation would be: *"From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* translated, edited, and with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills." It would have in no way distracted from Mills's merits if Horowitz had given Gerth full credit for his part in the Weber edition; after all, he was the senior author, and the Introduction is his work at least as much as Mills's.

RUDOLF HEBERLE
Louisiana State University

REJOINDER

November 2, 1962

To the Editor:

I am pleased to accept Professor Heberle's reformulation of footnote 8 from "edited with H. H. Gerth" to "translated, edited, and with an Introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills." Given the fact that this was an obituary notice on C. Wright Mills, I felt certain that the initial formulation would be understood as appropriate to the task. In no way should it have been construed as an attempt to give priority to Mills's contribution over that of Gerth. Gerth's writings have always elicited my respect and admiration; and his co-authorship of the introduction to *From Max Weber* could hardly be placed in dispute.

Heberle's comment to the effect that "after all, he was the senior author" does not prepare us for his concluding phrase—"and the Introduction is his work at least as much as Mills." There is no evidence that *From Max Weber* had either a "senior" editor or a "junior" editor. Only co-authorship and coeditorship is expressed in the Preface; all comments are in terms of "our" and "we." True enough, in terms of the translation of the Weber essays Gerth and Mills performed different functions. As the Preface says: "Responsibility for the selections and reliability of the German meanings rendered is primarily assumed by H. H. Gerth; responsibility for the formulation and editorial arrangement of the English text is primarily assumed by C. Wright Mills."

As for the Introduction, the Preface says nothing special. Presuming the last sentence of their Preface to cover the matter of authorship as well as translation responsibility, we must accept joint and equal authorship as complete and final. "But the book as a whole represents our mutual work and we are jointly responsible for such deficiencies as it may contain." Needless to conclude, the reception of *From Max Weber* by the profession and the public added considerable luster to both Gerth and Mills. This is a volume of shared glory—not reflected glory—for both scholars.

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ

Hobart and William Smith Colleges

COSER, "SOME FUNCTIONS OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND NORMATIVE FLEXIBILITY"

November 29, 1962

To the Editor:

In the September, 1962, issue of the *American Journal of Sociology,* Lewis A. Coser speaks of deviant behavior and normative flexibility. In his article Dr. Coser states that "in the process of uniting itself against deviance, the community not only revives and maintains common sentiments, but creatively establishes moral rules and redefines 'normal' behavior." Later, he speaks of the group's reaction in similar terms.

I think there is a point worth mentioning that Dr. Coser overlooks—the size of the group or community. Durkheim in *Division of Labor in Society* (p. 102), speaks of "public temper" in small-town terms. People stop each other on the streets and visit and "talk of the event." It would be my contention that the generalization made by Dr. Coser would more likely be found in the habitat that Durkheim speaks of where communication is on a face-to-face level. Furthermore, I would like to point out that Durkheim in the same book (p. 101), speaks of a different reaction in the strong state and the weak state. This point might be pursued fruitfully in clarifying the original statement.

In connection with this, would not the modern society of ours demonstrate an ex-

ception to Dr. Coser's statement? Deviant behavior for the most part is dealt with in the relative privacy of the courtroom. Only in the rare execution cases or the bizarre sexual deviant cases is the general public aware of this reaffirmation of societal norms.

JAMES R. MCINTOSH

Syracuse University

REJOINDER

December 14, 1962

To the Editor:

I agree that what I had to say cannot be directly applied to large-scale or mass societies. That is why I did not do so.

But, further, it should be kept in mind that larger units, such as urban areas, tend to be mosaics made up of smaller communities (see Morris Janowitz' *The Community Press in an Urban Setting*). Deviant behavior that may not have any major impact on the larger unit may well be of considerable significance in the smaller local community. To the extent that mass society undermines community, to that extent the processes I discussed are no longer applicable to it—but that is plainly another story.

LEWIS A. COSER

Brandeis University

BOOK REVIEWS

On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins. By EVERETT E. HAGEN. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962. Pp. xviii+557. $7.50.

This book is an attempt to present a general theory of the origins of economic growth. Like another recent work, *The Achieving Society*, by David McClelland, Hagen places principal emphasis on the psychological factors in development. But, unlike McClelland, he is not concerned with identifying the psychological concomitants of all episodes of economic growth (e.g., the passing phases of economic advancement in antiquity or some medieval cities) but only of those that occurred in more recent periods and led to a more or less sustained experience of economic advancement. The major distinguishing characteristics of these recent periods of growth are that they exhibit continuing advances in science, continuous technological progress associated with new conceptions and their translation into productive techniques, the development of various new types of skilled labor, innovational entrepreneurship, and new forms of governmental, political, and social administration. One or another of these new developments occurred also in ancient or medieval periods of economic growth, but their combined impact is a modern phenomenon. Hagen concentrates on this latter phase of economic growth.

He begins by evaluating critically a number of theories that tried to explain why certain social groups in some societies entered upon technological and economic progress sooner and with greater success than others. He comes to reject all theories based on race, climate, the spread of knowledge, and specific religious or economic conditions, partly as irrelevant and partly as insufficient. He then turns to a discussion of his own theory of change.

Hagen's basic theory stresses the difference between traditional and economically progressive societies in terms of their prevalent divergent personality structures. In traditional societies, the description of which is based principally on Redfield's analysis of the folk society, the predominant personality type is the authoritarian; for economic development, the prevalance of creative and reforming personality types are necessary. The ultimately determinant variables are derived, therefore, from a psychological theory largely founded upon the work of Murray, Erikson, Barron, and other psychologists whose writings are extremely exploited (see the Bibliography on pp. 528–31). Stated in these terms, the crucial factor that needs explanation is the dynamic one: How is a traditional society, firmly subjected to the dominance of authoritarian personalities, converted into one in which creative reformers are produced and gradually gain ascendance so as to perform the required tasks of economic progress?

In describing this process of social transformation, Hagen singles out certain social groups, since he finds that the major role of carriers of technological and economic innovation is exercised, in most cases, by a particular subgroup of the population. In Japan, this group consisted of the samurai and the wealthier merchants and peasants; in Colombia, of the Antioquenos; and in Britain, primarily of religious dissenters. All these groups underwent first a "withdrawal of status repect," a pattern of social change that may be the result of conquest, the rejection or isolation of certain immigrants, or the refusal to accept often highly valued symbols of a social group. The result of this withdrawal of status respect in a traditional society with a high predominance of authoritarian personality patterns is, at first, apathy, social retreat, shiftlessness, and various other forms of disorganization or downward mobility. But, in some cases, these developments, observable during a few generations, may give way to creativity, particularly among persons who are members of the social group originally subject to withdrawal of status respect. The primary mechanism by which these stages of change follow upon one another is largely determined by differing patterns of child treatment and the ways that children react to this treatment by their parents through successive generations experiencing this change. Here

the theory returns to its psychological root; the central importance assigned to these reactions, often subtle and little noticeable on the surface, is the consequence of the application of the psychological findings of the writers mentioned earlier to the historical episodes with which Hagen is concerned.

The final confirmation of this theory lies in the historical evidence and its interpretation. But this is a field in which Hagen is not very strong. He often summarizes historical events of great significance for his model in insufficient detail, leaving out of consideration some often very obvious factors that would permit the facts to be interpreted in a very different manner. For example, in one place he stresses the slowness with which new technological innovations were introduced and explains that "the anxiety at facing new situations that is characteristic of authoritarian personality kept individuals from seeing the opportunities for profitable change that lay waiting around them" (p. 293). Yet, even a rapid reading of the pertinent literature in economic history will show that the sluggishness of introduction of the specific innovations he cites was due not to an absence of the desire to make profit on behalf of many, but the overwhelming restrictions imposed by guilds and other quasi-monopolistic organizations. It may, of course, be argued that this was a consequence of the prevalence of authoritarian personality patterns, but then the entire threat of social and economic history can be interpreted in these terms by simply assigning to the group that at any given time was dominant a strong admixture of authoritarian personality, and by assigning in all cases of change, a sense of creativity to those who engineered the change. In brief, this would mean that all historical dynamisms can be reduced ultimately to the interplay between authoritarian and creative reform personalities.

It appears that the valid applicability of Hagen's interpretation is subject to similar restrictions as some alternative explanations he rejects in the first few chapters of his book. It is not denied that in some instances the gradual or sudden emergence of newly creative personality types may have been an important factor in the development of economic innovation. On this point, the theory of Hagen is in conformity with that of McClelland, except that Hagen stresses creativity and McClelland achievement motivation. But the much better quality and greater quantity of evidence and the logically much more compelling reasoning of McClelland makes his interpretation of the significant psychological factors in the development process preferable. Neither he nor Hagen can explain convincingly all instances of economic development by placing principal stress on psychological factors.

Hagen's treatment of social structural factors is inadequate. It is agreed that he is aware of the importance of social structure and stratification, but he regards them merely as derivatives of psychological factors. According to his interpretation, the functional needs of a given social structure are due not to the internal constellation of, or tensions within, a system, but to the psychologically determined objectives of social action by the predominant personality types within the structure. This defect and the often superficial and inadequate treatment of historical cases seriously reduce the value of a book that offers, in some places, interesting new approaches and ingenious explanations of the economic development process.

BERT F. HOSELITZ

University of Chicago

Elitebegriff und Sozialstruktur: Eine soziologische Begriffsanalyse ("Elite Concept and Social Structure: A Sociological Conceptual Analysis"). By HANS P. DREITZEL. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1962. Pp. viii+163. DM. 21 (paper).

This interesting essay attempts to clarify the meaning of the term "elite" as a sociological concept. This is no easy undertaking considering the heavy ideological overtones that color its use in both popular discourse and scholarly discussion. The term "elite," frequently employed with different meanings and often without benefit of any definition, is inextricably bound up with certain well-known but highly controversial political theories.

Cutting away the ideological underbrush, the author defines as elites those incumbents of top social positions who have reached eminence through personal achievements by means of an institutionalized selection process. Elites consist of technological, scientific, managerial, and administrative experts in industry and govern-

ment, in military and educational institutions, and also in the world of entertainment and sports, who are in a position to exercise influence or power beyond their own organizations, or who serve as models for imitation as culture heroes. This definition explicitly excludes those whose status claims rest purely on inherited qualities or on property ownership not validated by personal achievement. So defined, the elite concept becomes a historical category, applicable only to modern industrial society. It cannot be employed for the analysis of earlier historical epochs. According to the author elites came into their own only toward the end of the nineteenth century when fully developed industrialism replaced a prior bourgeois capitalism The social structure of Western society has experienced a historical progression from estates to classes to elites.

The transition has been gradual. An early type of elite can be discerned in the military accomplishments of medieval knights and an intellectual elite can be traced back as far as the Enlightenment. In time, the intellectual elite came to occupy a marginal position on the periphery of nineteenth-century bourgeois class society. Its hallmarks were and are the possession of knowledge acquired through a formal academic education. The beginnings of industrialization then brought forth a new elite of business enterprisers and captains of industry. But it is only in the late stages of industrialization that elites have proliferated everywhere and have come to dominate contemporary society. As mass production and mass consumption have attenuated class differences, class conflicts have died down and all aspects of life have become democratized. Consequently, the hierarchical class structure of the nineteenth century has given way to an equalitarian mass society characterized by a plurality of elites.

At this juncture the reader's appetite is whetted for a discussion of some crucial problems posed by this thesis. For instance, are there any interrelationships between different elites? And how are they related to non-elite survivals of earlier epochs who occupy high positions by virtue of ascription rather than achievement? Most important of all, what is the nature of elite social structures; are they dichotomized into elites and undifferentiated masses or do they consist of multiple pyramids each with its own gradations? However, Dreitzel largely sidesteps such questions, pleading the lack of any general theory of industrial society that could provide some answers. Instead, he analyzes in some detail the qualifications required for elite positions, and such institutionalized selection channels as formal schooling and career patterns by which these positions are filled. This is followed by an explication of leadership functions and role-model aspects inherent in elite positions. And, as he inevitably must, the author also considers the relationship between elites and power structure. This takes the form of a critical evaluation of the "Machiavellian" theories of Mosca, Michels, and Pareto, to whom he adds C. Wright Mills. All of these theories present oversimplified and exaggerated pictures of a society in which powerful elites perennially confront powerless masses. If one accepts Dreitzel's definition of elites as recognized experts in any field of endeavor, one must also accept his conclusion that they vary widely in power.

It does not detract from the merits of this stimulating essay that it raises as many questions as it answers. This reviewer has felt for some time that the traditional categories of stratification theory are becoming increasingly obsolete and that new conceptual tools are required for an adequate understanding of the social structure of contemporary industrial societies. Dreitzel's book does not provide the solution, but it certainly helps to point up the problem.

Kurt B. Mayer

Brown University

Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths By Michael Cherniavsky. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. xix +258. $6.00.

This is a striking book that should be read by more sociologists than those interested either in Russia or in social history. Basing his writing on extensive literary research, which this reviewer cannot pretend to assess, Cherniavsky deals with "the myth of the Tsar and the myth of the People" as these myths have been transformed in the course of Russian history since the thirteenth century. Following the inspiration of Ernst Kantorowicz' *The King's Two Bodies* (1957), the author examines, in the first

part of the book, the symbolic identification through which divine nature was attributed to the Tsar's princely power while (in contrast to western Europe) a saintly nature was attributed to him as a man.

Having documented this point, Cherniavsky then shows how this identification was gradually impaired under the impact of two great crises, the end of a seven-hundred-year-old dynasty and the rise of a centralized state, leading to a shift of emphasis from the image of the saintly prince to that of an imperial ruler. Though the imperial rulers continued to draw upon the earlier imagery, they were also responsible for innovations such as the Petrine Reforms, and, in 1762, the release of the gentry from obligatory state service.

The author suggests that these and other changes in Russian society initiated a quest for national identity that drew upon an earlier idea of "Holy Russia" and developed it into a powerful image of the Russian people as a symbol of orthodoxy and legitimation that, unconsciously or not, was employed in opposition to the official panegyrics of autocracy. In the second half of the book, this "new orthodoxy" is traced in terms of its own permutations from the writings of Pushkin to those of Dostoevski and some few revolutionary writers like Blok and Maiakovski.

These remarks merely suggest the range of the book; readers will see for themselves that this range is examined in detail and with a highly sophisticated awareness of the elusive way in which such myths are transformed without ever quite losing earlier patterns of symbolization that, nevertheless, have been superseded. Still, Cherniavsky shows clearly enough that, at the level of the myths of legitimation, the earlier symbol of the saintly prince is superseded in early modern times by the symbol of the saintly people, with a consequent shift in emphasis from the legitimation of power to a symbolization of national identity. As an analysis of the core values of a civilization the study cannot be too highly recommended.

REINHARD BENDIX

University of California Berkeley

The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. By ŞEREF MARDIN. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. viii+456. $10.00.

Dr. Mardin centers his study on the "Youn Ottomans," active chiefly from 1867–78, wh publicized the ideas of patriotism and politica liberty and whose agitation for representativ government prepared the public for the con stitution won in 1876. He also presents muc of importance on the whole period of West ernizing reform that preceded them. Th Young Ottomans are doubly important. Th modernization of Turkey under Atatürk pre supposed and was deeply colored by the nine teenth-century reforms and by the Youn Ottomans' response to them. More generally the Young Ottomans were among the firs Muslims to wrestle on a serious theoretica level with the dilemmas presented by mo dernity, which have troubled all Islamic socie ties since.

A central point of interest (among many is Mardin's well-documented interpretation of how these men combined conservatism and radicalism, opposing the un-Islamic Western ism of the reforming Ottoman governments yet pursuing a policy inspired by Westerr revolutionary liberal nationalism. Mardi stresses the continuity of the Ottoman move ment for bureaucratic supremacy based on Westernizing reforms, which dated from the early eighteenth century and triumphed with the Hatt-i Serif of 1839. Three groups had special grievances against this bureaucratic absolutism: the clerical class, which had lost its pre-eminence; the military, likewise reduced in status; and, once the reforms were established, the lower bureaucracy itself, restricted in opportunities by an internal bureaucratic evolution. These grievances were given relevance by the dislocation of Ottoman moral norms under Westernization and by the dubious intentions of Western powers toward the Ottoman state. The Young Ottomans largely lower bureaucrats aware of Western ideas, but gaining the ear of the other groups also, wanted to impose controls on the top bureaucrats in the interests of Turkish society. Such controls must be moral and national in nature, and hence Islamic. To be effective they must nevertheless use modern Western forms; but the Islamizing tendency among the Young Ottomans forced them to reject essential elements in the contemporary Occidental political outlook that they otherwise adopted;

their ideological inconsistencies contributed to their inability to resist 'Abd-al-Ḥamîd's subsequent despotism.

Despite his interest in the play of social forces, Mardin does not slight the individuality of the men he discusses; and his frankly Turkish point of view on nineteenth-century events is not allowed to distort his analysis.

MARSHALL G. S. HODGSON

University of Chicago

Man and Society in Japan. By TADASHI FUKUTAKE. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1962. Pp. 241.

Sociology in Japan is in transition from concern with "who influenced whom" in the building of theoretical systems combined with lack of concern with the realities of Japanese society to the opposite combination. Fukutake joins the better part of the two styles.

The essay that gives its name to the book is a penetrating comparison of prewar Japanese industrial and rural society with the individualistic societies of the West, an analysis of postwar changes, and some speculation about the prospects of democracy. Japan never had, he tells us, that independence of the individual consciousness and conscience that was characteristic of the countries in which modern capitalism and democracy developed. Familism, and its counterpart in the great industrial groups, set boundaries both to ambition and conscience. Fukutake thinks that system still prevails, with some modifications; he at least suggests that it has been helped by the reversal of policy that shows itself in United States support of the great corporations—bastions of the right in politics—as a means to make of Japan a strong ally against Russia and China The group in power is not, he says, likely to pursue a course of fostering a strong feeling of independence on the part of the masses of white-collar and working people. This essay also gives a good, if brief, analysis of recent changes in the class structure of Japan: the rise of a new salaried middle class, of a great industrial working force, with continued strong control by the same groups who built up Japanese industry and power before the war.

The essay is followed by several monographs—all previously published in Japanese—that report studies of rural life and of the effect of industry upon a rural region. The theme is related to that of the leading essay. One monograph shows that the change from a law of male primogeniture to one of equal division of land among all children has had little effect on either attitudes or practice. Land is still considered family, not individual, property, and primogeniture is still considered the sure safeguard against dividing land into still smaller parcels. He relates attitudes on this matter to the position of respondents in the sibling order, to the state of farming in the various communities studied, and to ownership of land. Also, in another monograph, he shows the changes wrought by the land reform that reduced absentee ownership and made most Japanese farmers owners of most of the land they cultivate. This reform seems to have stimulated farmers to use fertilizers, machinery, and other devices for increasing productivity and income. It is interesting that the United States should have insisted on such a reform in Japan while inefficient share-cropping still prevailed in some regions at home.

In all of the monographs included in the book, Fukutake works on the effect of social changes on the family system, and on the relation of those changes to democratization of the Japanese economy and society. One should at least mention his study of Amerika-mura, a poor fishing village whose life and economy have been transformed by the income and influence of emigrants returned from Canada. It would be interesting to carry out equivalent studies in Ireland, Italy, and Greece. All of them have "Americans" of this kind.

So far as I know, this is the only volume in English of monographs based on current empirical work of Japanese sociologists. A good many studies done by Americans have been published. We should complement them with study of the work done by the Japanese on their own society—and on ours, for that matter, when they do them. Translation into English is, I fear, the only means of getting such work before Western readers. Fukutake's work is a welcome beginning; it is well done and it reports trends on important matters

EVERETT C. HUGHES

Brandeis University

Public Opinion and Congressional Elections. Edited by WILLIAM N. MCPHEE and WILLIAM A. GLASER. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. ix+326. $5.95.

While the Elmira study of voting was in its analysis phase, Lazarsfeld and others of the Columbia group worked through the American Association of Public Opinion Research to stimulate sample interview studies of the 1950 Congressional elections in Colorado, Washington, and parts of Iowa and Minnesota. The guiding motive was to see how well Erie County and Elmira findings on Presidential elections stood up in the somewhat different context of low-pressure, off-year Congressional elections. The interviews were deposited at Columbia without proper funds for analysis and, as a consequence, have been exploited slowly and sporadically. This book is the long-awaited outcome.

The volume includes thirteen essays written over the past decade by various combinations of twelve authors. Only two or three of the contributions have been generally available prior to this appearance. Attempt at integration is slight and rests largely on an introductory overview and the mechanical fact that all of the essays are based on the same body of data. The original goal of the data collection, the question of generalization, makes itself felt from time to time in the volume. By and large, however, the main thrusts of inquiry have passed beyond this point and diverged in a number of directions. Some of the more ambitious essays include an analysis by Glaser of significant aggregate outcomes of fluctuations in voting turnout between Presidential and Congressional elections; a long chapter of the "noble failure" variety by McPhee, Anderson, and Milholland on attitude consistency, which recounts efforts to cope with some of the mercurial properties of political attitudes as measured; and two chapters describing the conception and heuristic value of McPhee's simulation of a voting system

The introductory essay has the flavor of an apologia, and seems calculated to disarm those critics who have suspected all along that voting studies would come to no good end. I frankly doubt that either this essay or the book as a whole will win converts among casual readers, and may indeed lose some old followers, for the volume lacks the ingenuous splendor of the earlier Columbia studies. And yet this loss of audience is, I fear, an inevitable price of progress, and has accompanied empirical maturity in other areas as well, with demography serving as a case in point.

For the reader who has close contact with materials in this area, however, the book makes a number of signal contributions. This is true not only in what the book says but in how it says it. The most important groundbreaking lies in the reduction of familiar inductive regularities to formal models of microprocesses, with inferences drawn as to the way in which such processes combine in the longer run to produce significant aggregate phenomena. Since such models are capturing the fancy of the younger generation in a number of areas of social science, the book recommends itself on this score to a broader class of readers.

Where substance is concerned, the degree to which the work of the Columbia and Michigan groups have converged upon one another in a period not marked by close contact seems remarkable, despite some noteworthy initial differences in data sources and guiding traditions The most impressive case is the explanation of the old riddle of off-year Congressional losses for the party in power, sketched by Glaser in 1956 and independently by Campbell in 1958, and published by Campbell in 1960 and by Glaser as the first essay in this volume But the convergence is visible well beyond this single example, and extends to the total configuration of variables that are now seen as lending primary shape to the aggregate voting process. As a first approximation, for example, McPhee's voting system model finds eloquent indorsement in all of the Michigan data, and deserves to be put to work as the core for increasingly refined study of variation in important parameters. Throughout, one gets the sense, unfamiliar though it is in much of social science, that there is after all an external reality that requires this convergence, and hence that we shall not be plagued to eternity by a babel of vague theories talking past one another.

PHILIP E. CONVERSE

University of Michigan

Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis. By SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL. ("London School of Economics

Monographs on Social Anthropology," No. 24.) New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. vi+178. $6.00.

This book, a revision of a Master's thesis in sociology at the University of London, can be divided into three parts. (1) Since there was no legal profession in China, the application of the law was in the hands of the government. Therefore, five chapters are devoted to the theory and functions of government, government administration and personnel, codified law, and judicial procedure in China. (2) Two chapters concern the jurisdictional functions of the lineage (*tsu*), the guild (*hong*), the local community and custom. (3) Finally, the complex of legal and norm-enforcing institutions (as a whole), governmental and non-governmental, is considered, along with the effectiveness of law as a support for the social order.

The best parts of the study are chapters v and vi where several empirical generalizations emerge. Supplementary statutes (*li*), added from time to time to the fundamental laws (*lu*), represented only "partial adaptation to particular circumstances, in order to make the law fit all eventualities, rather than fundamental developments in legal thinking" (p. 60). Equality before the law was not even a *principle*, let alone institutionalized in the application of the law. The distinction between penal law and administrative law was less sharp than in modern systems. Once initiated, all legal cases necessarily resulted in punishment for at least one person: the accused if judged guilty, if not, then the unjustified accuser; even a witness might incur punishment. The Chinese lacked a conception of proof "beyond reasonable doubt." Some of the injustices of the system, of which the Chinese were quite aware at the time, were fostered deliberately because they were functional to the government: the people's dread of the courts kept the volume of litigation per capita brought to court low, freeing officials for other administration tasks.

Although the book represents a competent synthesis of what is already known descriptively about Chinese law, it neither advances significantly our substantive knowledge nor explicitly comes to terms with theoretical problems. The author hopes eventually to compare Chinese and other systems of law (p. 1), yet we are never told what analytic categories are relevant in such comparisons. Hence, there is no way to assess the pertinence of the data presented. A few general propositions are alluded to but not developed: for example, "Legal systems in which the major role in trial procedure is played by the Judge have not had the spur to developing clear rules of evidence which jury trial provided in England, viz., the need to guide lay jurors" (p. 74). Weber's view that codification of law is not always synonymous with rationalization (systematic revision of the substance of law) is cited, but the Chinese case is not used as a vehicle to advance Weberian theory. The author seems unaware of Weber's discussion of "Kadi-justice" (*From Max Weber* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1946], pp. 216–21), although some of her data are relevant.

Van der Sprenkel's clear mandate is to move ahead from her substantial beginnings, both empirically and theoretically.

ROBERT M. MARSH

Cornell University

Society and the Law: New Meanings for an Old Profession. By F. JAMES DAVIS, HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., C. RAY JEFFERY, and E. EUGENE DAVIS. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. vi+488. $6.95.

The sociology of law, after long neglect in this country (or perhaps avoidance), has in recent years been the focus of accelerated attention. *Society and the Law,* written by two sociologists and two lawyers, is among the first book-length treatments to appear. This interdisciplinary undertaking, the authors point out, is also the first American attempt to assay the field generally.

The book is organized into three parts: Part I, "Law and Social Organization," which presents the standard literature in the sociology of law, and introduces the guiding principle of law as a major form of social control; Part II, "Law and Social Change," which describes judicial processes in America, especially in four legal arenas (public law, the courts, family law, and criminal law); and Part III, "Lawyers as a Professional Group," which is devoted to the legal profession and law schools.

In the first chapter the works of major sociologists and lawyers are briefly presented, one after another. This shotgun technique of covering legal sociology, sociological jurisprudence, and a few investigators of social control

will surely confuse the uninitiated. Teachers using this book as a text would be best advised to ignore the chapter.

The chapters on judicial processes in America, which comprise Part II, are often valuable descriptions of court procedures and the role of lawyers. Jeffery's chapter on criminal justice is a refreshing treatment of criminal procedures. All sociologists would do well to read it. The other chapters, however, are consistently marred by far too much historical development and far too little sociological substance.

The final chapters on lawyers (of which Jeffery is primary author), and education (Foster and Jeffery), are perhaps the best contributions to the book. Much of the available statistics on types of practices, income and ethnic distributions, and kinds of law schools are cogently related to law problems in the context of a changing profession.

The authors generally display an excellent command of the legal literature, particularly of significant court decisions, sociological jurisprudence (and legal realism), and the history of law. Unfortunately, as suggested above, the book is not nearly as strong on the sociology side. Although law is sociologically conceived, the materials seldom rise beyond descriptions of sociolegal problems and the evolution of legal agencies. The authors are certainly aware of sociological issues (they list many in the form of "hypotheses" in chap. iii), but they do not come to grips with them. The insights of Holmes, Pound, and other major "sociological jurisprudes" are applied, but few chapters venture far beyond these writers. Thus what is a firm foundation for an empirical sociology of law is not advantageously developed in terms of significant contemporary research and theory from general sociology. Legal agencies and legal processes on all levels—legislative, judicial, executive, *and* commercial—are not made the occasion, as they can be, for illuminating a wide range of relevant sociological questions.

JACK LADINSKY

University of Wisconsin

Police Power and Individual Freedom: The Quest for Balance. Edited by CLAUDE R. SOWLE. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 287. $7.50.

The papers in this volume were originally presented at an International Conference on Criminal Law Administration held at the Northwestern University School of Law in 1960. They were later published in *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science* and were brought together in this book for convenience and wider dissemination. The discussion is organized around four main topics: "Police Detention and Arrest Privileges," "The Exclusionary Rule Regarding Illegally Seized Evidence," "Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations," and "The Privilege against Self-incrimination." Each part begins with three comparatively lengthy and detailed papers devoted to the American scene, followed by briefer comparative statements that describe the corresponding practices of seven foreign nations: Canada, represented by G. Arthur Martin; England, by Glanville L. Williams; France, by Robert Vouin; Germany, by Walter R. Clemens; Israel, by Haim H. Cohn; Japan, by Haruo Aba; and Norway, by Anders Bartholm. The papers dealing with the American scene are by Frank J. Remington, O. W. Wilson, Caleb Foote, Francis A. Allen, Monrad G. Paulsen, Frank J. McGarr, Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Fred E. Inbau, Bernard Weisberg, Claude R. Sowle, John T. McNaughton, and Louis C. Wyman.

This collection of articles on hotly debated issues by distinguished scholars and practitioners is valuable because it presents both sides of the controversy persuasively and sympathetically and also because it puts the general problem in a broader framework than usual by making international comparisons. The uncommitted reader is likely to find himself swinging from one side to the other as he reads successive articles. In the process of trying to make up his mind he is sure to pick up a great deal of information and probably to acquire new points of view from the thoughtful and informative discussions by the distinguished participants.

Since the discussions are almost entirely legal in nature, it is inevitable that little information is presented concerning what the actual practices of the police are, how they differ from nation to nation, and what the effects of these practices are. Another reason for this lack of data is, of course, that insufficient research attention has been given to them. Data of this sort needs to be available before one

can pass judgment on the significance of many of the issues. Williams, for example, notes that while the English police are forbidden by the Judge's Rules to question suspects after arrest or to forcibly detain suspects for questioning, both of these rules are commonly violated with the connivance of judges who overlook the violations. The significance of this for the American scene requires that more be known about the differences between American and British police policies than is included in this book.

Of interest to the sociologist concerned with the administration of the criminal law are the many suggestions of needed research in this field. A number of the authors indicate that police practices probably have important effects upon public attitudes that influence the efficiency of law enforcement and possibly even crime rates. The research that is needed to explore matters of this kind is sociological in nature. From this point of view alone, this work is one that should receive careful attention from criminologists. Supreme Court decisions published after this book had gone to press have, of course, heightened the interest in the broad issue with which it is concerned. The balance between individual freedom and police power is an uneasy and shifting one, but the issues involved are of vital and central importance in a free society.

ALFRED R. LINDESMITH

Indiana University

Criminal Law: Problems for Decision in the Promulgation, Invocation, and Administration of a Law of Crime. Edited by RICHARD C. DONNELLY, JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, and RICHARD D. SCHWARTZ. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xxvi+1169. $15.00

This is a "casebook" on criminal law, though one of a rather unusual kind. From the sociological point of view, it is a fascinating book of readings on the practices and rationales of one type of social control.

Unlike the traditional casebook, it does not provide the latest established answers to equally well or even more established questions; it emphasizes rather the *problems* of criminal law by concentrating on borderline cases and contrasting materials. The subject matter covered is broader than in the usual criminal law casebook and includes problems of legislating as well as after-verdict administrative decisions. Thus, besides statutes and appellate court decisions, legislative committee materials are presented as well as trial transcripts, parole board deliberations, prison and parole reports etc. In addition, the volume relates materials from medicine and the behavioral sciences to the informed common-sense reasoning found in the judicial and administrative documents. Since the focus is clearly "to help law students become lawyers, not to become professionals in other disciplines" (p. 4), these materials are introduced as expert opinions to be taken into account in legal decision-making, not as starting points for the study of sociology or psychology nor as substitutes for legal reasoning.

The book is organized into three chapters, presenting the whole subject matter of criminal law from three points of view, none of which is based on the customary classification of types of offenses or on the similar one of types of offenders. The first chapter is structured around a specific case and raises from this starting point the basic problems of criminal law. The second chapter, the largest part of the book, develops the subject matter as a problem for legislation. It explores, "primarily in terms of individuals, such issues as the distinction between civil and criminal law, the purposes of a law of crimes and its sanctions, the requisite elements of a crime including aggravating and mitigating events, and the reasons for defining crimes" (p. 920). Finally, the third chapter re-examines these same questions in terms of groups and collectivities, considering the legal relevance of such different types of "groups" as corporations, mobs, families, or racial minorities, and of different types of relationships between individuals and groups.

To what degree does the volume succeed in adducing relevant knowledge in the social sciences to considerations of criminal law? Any reviewer of a collection of readings is tempted to point out missing contributions. To give in to this temptation seems particularly unfair in this case, considering the size the volume already has attained. Nevertheless, the first reaction of a sociologically oriented reader is likely to be one of disappointment. Research on differential crime rates in different strata and ethnic groups or on juvenile delinquency,

theoretical analyses concerning the conditions of anomie and the genesis of deviant behavior in general as well as theoretical discussions of other than legal forms of social control are less represented than seems to be warranted.

However, apart from several specific pieces of theory and research, the exclusion or inclusion of which may be debated, second thoughts about what sociology has to offer to the lawyer concerned with criminal law suggest that this is mainly a certain perspective of looking at things and "general orientations" indicating "*types* of variables that are somehow to be taken into account rather than specifying determinate relationships between particular variables" (R. K. Merton).

Taken as a whole, the book does succeed in conveying some such general orientations and a pervasive "sociological perspective" that may be characterized here as a way of looking at social phenomena with a mind "alienated" from the tacit assumptions of a culture and its institutionalized definitions of situations, and alerted to latent relationships and functions. This is achieved, not so much by quoting explicit statements of sociologists, but rather, probably more efficiently, by a "sociological arrangement" of the materials and by using often non-technical language that puts legal actions implicitly into a larger framework of social control (thus, the title of the first section describing, among other things, a trial reads: "The Disturbing Event—Official and Unofficial Community Responses." The same purpose is served by a recurrent insistence on questions like "What aims should the criminal law try to achieve?" "What is the rationale for specific regulations and institutions?" 'What ought to be?" and "How can it be achieved?"

The study of social control is without doubt one of the central areas of sociological inquiry; and yet, the study of the most conspicuous, though not the most important, form of social control, the study of law, is seriously lagging behind other areas of social research. This volume goes far in preparing legal materials for an easier digestion by sociologists. It would not be the least achievement of this common effort of social scientists and legal scholars if it would stimulate sociologists to analyze criminal law as a form of social control on a level of differentiation and inclusiveness that is more adequate than the usual bird's-eye views or the equally insufficient detailed accounts of fragmental phases of the law incidental t other research concerns.

In this double sense, *Criminal Law* is a valu able and original contribution toward bridgin the gap between the social sciences and leg scholarship and institutions.

DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYE

Dartmouth College

Man, Crime, and Society. By HERBERT A BLOCH and GILBERT GEIS. New York: Ran dom House, 1962. Pp. 642.

A good textbook, I suppose, provides thor ough coverage of its subject matter, a logica and systematic organization of the material and an extensive bibliography to guide furthe reading. *Man, Crime, and Society* does all o these things and yet something is lacking. a point of view that can unite the divers strands of a field and give it coherence.

The book is divided into eight parts. Part I which serves as an introduction, has a his torical depth usually missing in sociologica textbooks. Part II covers law and the science of criminology, and Part III traces the patterr of crime rates in the United States. The next three portions of the book explore "behavior systems in crime," including "professional criminals," "organized crime," "homicide and assaults," "the sexual offender," "property offenders," "petty and miscellaneous offenses," "white-collar crime," and "the juvenile delinquent" The plan of these three sections and their internal organization is rather confusing and, in fact, gives the impression of being little more than an *ad hoc* listing of the most common types of criminals.

Part VII deals with the police, the courts, the prisons, and the nature of criminal responsibility. In the concluding section—Part VIII, entitled "The Challenge"—the authors examine the future prospects of criminology.

The book is competent but lacks the unifying force of an explicit, over-all, theoretical viewpoint; and, in my opinion, this lack is not met by an appendix labeled "Components of Behavior Systems of Crime: A Framework for Study and Research." I think this raises a fundamental question about textbooks in sociology and its subdivisions such as criminology. We may be moving toward a point where

the field of sociology has grown so complex and varied, so jammed with facts and hypotheses, that textbooks can do little more than present the accepted findings and the major conflicting theoretical arguments. There will be no room left for any one or two authors to impress their individual stamp on the material; and textbooks will become cut-and-paste affairs —in effect, books of readings with a bit of commentary. But I do not believe we are at this point yet, and I believe this book by Bloch and Geis fails to make a *serious* attempt to reconcile opposing positions or show why one position is preferable to another. Despite its many virtues, the book remains a *digest,* that is, a body of information gathered from many sources and arranged for ready reference, rather than a synthesis.

GRESHAM M. SYKES

Dartmouth College

Family Environment and Delinquency. By SHELDON and ELEANOR GLUECK. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Pp. xi+328. $6.50.

This book, the third in a series analyzing data on five hundred delinquent boys and five hundred matched controls, presents four kinds of data: (1) "social factors," concerning home and family background; (2) and (3) psychological "traits," obtained from the Rorschach Test and a psychiatrist's interview; (4) somatotype data.

In quality, the social factors data are probably the best of their type on delinquents. But the psychiatrist's preconceptions concerning the causes of delinquency may have influenced the trait data since he knew which boys were the delinquents. Use of a second perhaps overlapping, interviewer might have made it possible to partially check this. Nevertheless, these data merit close attention. As for the Rorschach, it seems doubtful that forty-three distinct personality variables and eleven intellectual variables can be measured by this single test That the Rorschach protocols could be sorted into delinquent and non-delinquent piles with high accuracy is not reassuring; clinical intuition can succeed in such judgments from projective protocols even when they cannot be reduced to objective criteria. The somatotype data appear acceptable.

A previous work was concerned with assessing which of sixty-six psychological traits could be located closer to the constitutional than to the sociocultural end of a biosocial continuum of determination. Traits varying among the four body types were presumably closer to the constitutional in origin. In addition, all traits and social factors were examined for differential effects over the four body types upon the presence of delinquency.

The present work continues this inquiry by testing traits for a significant relation with each of the environmental factors. Traits are then categorized along the hypothetical biosocial continuum according to whether they were related only to the body types, only to environmental factors, to some of both, or to none of these. It would be interesting to hear from a biological scientist concerning the promise of such an investigation. It can be noted, however, that assignment of traits to points on the biosocial continuum according to their number of significant relations with environmental factors, and whether or not they were related to body type, rather than according to the strength of these associations, assumes equal association between the trait and every one of the independent variables. Although aware of this, the Gluecks contend there is no way to measure this association exactly—which does not argue for not measuring it at all. Measures of association would have been especially useful in ordering traits within the constitutional and environmental categories, and perhaps in assessing the relative total contributions of both to a trait. Furthermore, since many of their factors may be measuring the same thing, the number of factors associated with a trait may be inflated over the number that are independent. At this point and many others, the book is badly in need of partialing techniques of examining data, although the zero-order relations are frequently interesting. A few of the resulting assignments to the biosocial continuum are insensitive to other possibilities. For example, "high performance intelligence" is assigned to the social extreme because it is associated with three social factors. Yet, these three factors could easily reflect high intelligence in the parents, indicating a presumption of hereditary determination. This suggests the possibility of spurious correlations between traits and social

factors, when both are actually genetically determined.

Interactions are examined between factors and delinquency for effects on traits but are discussed as though they were interactions between factors and traits affecting delinquency. These are not equivalent procedures, and it is possible for the two interactions to operate in opposite directions (the same confusion applies to the somatotype data). Consistently, delinquency is treated as the dependent variable, although the tables are not "percentaged" in the direction that would then be appropriate. Interactions are not necessarily causal, with one variable exacerbating the effect of the other; such effects could also be due to a third variable differentially associated with variables in the analysis. Causal direction seems too often assumed to be toward delinquency. Table captions are vague. Multivariate techniques might have been more appropriate.

Despite these criticisms, the book deserves attention.

ROBERT A. GORDON

University of Chicago

Kids, Crime and Chaos: A World Report on Juvenile Delinquency. By ROUL TUNLEY. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xiii+206. $3.95.

Roul Tunley is a reporter who was commissioned by the Greater Philadelphia Movement (GPM) to make a study of what is known about delinquency and what is being done about it, in the interest of delinquency control. This happened, we are informed, after the death of James Bossard, who had originally undertaken the project for GPM. This book is Tunley's report of his study—a reporter's impressions after a world tour during which he elicited opinions from "experts" of many persuasions.

Tunley is curiously adamant throughout the book as he inveighs against "our *preoccupation with research*" (italics his), yet for the thoughtful reader his book leads inevitably to the conclusion that more, and certainly better, research is needed: His perplexity at the reluctance of those whom he defines as "experts" to provide answers to his "three key questions" betrays his lack of understanding both of the complexity of the problems to which he sought answers and the meaning of scientific inqu and integrity. His questions were these:

1. In your opinion, is delinquency on the rise?
2. Do you think it can be controlled?
3. If you had unlimited power to deal with problem, what would you do first?

Referring to his "experts'" responses these questions, Tunley remarks, "Surprisi ly, these brief questions often stopped th cold." Small wonder! What charlatan wo have the gall to attempt an answer to su sweeping questions in the course of an terview?

Tunley's sharper barbs are reserved for "e pert" practitioners, such as psychiatrists a social workers, but sociologists and "researc ers" come in for their share as well. We a accused of being "avid of degrees" and speaking in language "known only to the i tiate" (p. 10), and of making of research " end in itself" (p. 16). "Research" is co demned on the one hand as obscurantist a on the other as preoccupied with trivia a with belaboring the obvious. A "research pr fessor" is quoted approvingly from the *N York Times* to the effect that "Imagination the long run rules the world—not scientific r search, and still less, scientistic sham. Mode society, in many ways sick, needs not t short-sighted manipulations of the resear technician, but rather the artist's touch" (191). Despite the righteous indignation th welled up within my breast as I read su charges and at such a point of view, the ha truth that has impressed Tunley so great argues for critical self-examination by the d cipline. To the extent that such ill-begott (cobbled?) shoes as these may fit, sad to r late, we must wear them. It is all the mo important that such views be seriously co sidered, because an intelligent, and at tim very perceptive, layman to our discipline a to related professions, is their purveyor

In between these views Tunley interspers much information concerning the nature juvenile delinquency here and abroad, and recent imaginative approaches to its preve tion and treatment. From personal knowled of some of these programs and the inciden reported I would offer the opinion that Tunle is overly optimistic about these, but his poi is well taken. There is much experimentatio in the field that breaks the bonds of traditio

and that stands in danger of being ignored, at least partially because of this.

Tunley's conclusions also are well taken, by and large. In the end, however, his lack of sympathy with research, and concern with theory leads to a "shotgun" approach to potential solutions to delinquency control that is not likely to be very useful to those who are struggling with these problems and are plagued by gaps in their knowledge.

JAMES F. SHORT, JR.

Washington State University

The Academic Community: An Essay on Organization. By JOHN D. MILLETT. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. x+265. $5.95.

In his Preface to this volume, President Millett of Miami University (Ohio) calls it "a little essay on university organization and administration." He discusses colleges and universities in the perspective of organization theory and emphasizes the unique institutional pattern of higher education. The fundamental thesis is explicitly stated in negative form—that ideas drawn from business and public administration have only limited applicability to colleges and university administration. There are separate chapters on faculty, students, alumni, and administration. The style has some of the flavor of a presidential talk at an alumni dinner.

This volume would be an admirable introduction for a foreigner wanting to learn about the structure and problems of American higher education. It might also be useful to newly appointed trustees or newly enrolled graduate students It has very little to say to the educational sociologist.

Few sociologists would quarrel with Millett's frame of reference, or even with his outline of topics, but the coverage of these topics is necessarily cursory in a work of this length, and the treatment of many points is a little careless, a bit uninformed, or opinionated. There is not a single table of data. Despite the author's long experience in the statistical analysis of higher education, he hardly draws on empirical studies except to discuss changes in student attitudes and trends in university growth. In other areas, the factual evidence is sketched freehand. Thus, we learn that nothing is known about the social origins of scholars, and that "The faculty member does not think of himself as an employee of the college or university" (p. 101).

There are a number of curious arguments; for example, that when faculty members demand direct access to the board of trustees, an honorable administrator should resign, and some presidential sermonizing: "a Board [of Trustees] needs to bear always in mind that its role is not to handle detail, but to see in detail issues of importance which require careful consideration. To these a Board brings its particular talent: the talent of conscience, the talent of the lighthouse above the waves of momentary storm, the talent of a peak above the ordinary heights of man" (p. 186).

If we are ever to develop an applicable body of sociological knowledge about college and university administration, its authors will have to be more sensitive than this to problems of bias and subjectivity.

THEODORE CAPLOW

Columbia University

Educating in the Expert Society. By BURTON R. CLARK. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 301. $2.75.

This soft-cover book is presented as a "study in the sociology of education." Actually it is not a text in the sociology of education but rather a survey of surveys pertaining to the very broad topic of education and society. Combining the works of others with his own interpretation and commentary Clark moves rapidly, and at times I would maintain inadequately, through the function of education; education and its implications for educational and social status; education and minorities; education and the control of educational institutions; student cultures in high school and college; and, finally, educational processes in an expert society. The authors whose works he cites (i.e., Kahl and the "common man boys," Becker's Chicago schoolteachers, Rossi's parochial school material, etc.) have already had more than adequate coverage in other places and little is gained by yet another go around.

A precise and fair evaluation of this book is made difficult by the fact that one would be

hard pressed to find a specific point made by the author with which issue might be taken. The shortcomings rather are found in Clark's treatment of the material. He makes a series of broad sweeping generalizations that are not supported by empirical evidence. At one point, for example, he suggests (with a helping hand from Riesman) that our elementary schools have moved from a concern with "knowledge" to a concern with "group relations." In reality, and Clark himself makes this point later in his book, there has been a growing emphasis on "hard knowledge" in elementary schools and a steady stream of educational innovations directed at giving the child a clearer understanding of the world in which he must live. A concern with the development of interpersonal competence does not necessarily mean the abandonment of curriculum dealing with history, literature, science, civics, or art.

In his discussion of the impact of education on values, attitudes, and behavior, the author once again takes a position that leaves much to be desired. Using, for the most part, survey data he notes that there are positive correlations between levels of educational attainment and certain values and attitudes. The problem of selectivity and the impact of certain near-demographic factors on behavior are not considered as potential variables that account for some of the variation in the attitudes expressed by college and non-college populations. Given his concern with student subcultures, it is surprising that Clark is not more critical in differentiating between the socialization powers of college faculty and college peers.

In respect to college student subcultures Clark once again goes beyond available empirical evidence. Borrowing heavily from the work of Martin Trow (and indirectly from Riesman and Wedge) he establishes a subcultural model that identifies four student types: academic, noncomformist, vocational, and collegiate. The proposed model, however, contains numerous methodological loopholes that are not discussed by the author. For one thing it is a static model that does not allow for the identification of students who move from one subcultural unit to another as they move through academic training. Second, the model and Clark fail to take into consideration the impact of field of study, year of study, and school type on the emergence and operation of the various student subcultures. Similar questions might be raised in respect to the three high-school subcultures proposed by Clark: "fun subculture," "academic subculture," and the "delinquent subculture." In this case Clark takes the position that "American high school students throughout much of the twentieth century have been strongly influenced if not dominated by values and practices that range from nonintellectual to anti-intellectual and subvert the formal purposes of the school." While this reviewer would agree that many high-school students and high-school communities do place the emphasis on non-academic activities, he cannot accept the proposition of domination by non-intellectual and anti-intellectual influences. The fact that Clark can cite several studies that indicate that high-school students believe a good personality, good looks, and good money help improve a student's status with his peers is not sufficient evidence to support a notion of anti-intellectualism in American high schools. We would certainly not accept the idea that an anti-intellectual climate exists in our institutions of higher education, yet a recent survey of American graduate students conducted by the National Opinion Research Center found that over 40 per cent of the respondents felt that a "pleasing personality" does help give you prestige with the faculty and over 60 per cent report that a pleasing personality enhances prestige with one's fellow students.

Not unlike others who have looked at student-faculty relationships, Clark operates under two questionable premises. The first is that faculty members involved in research will not and care not to penetrate student life I would propose that with the increased research support given to students (undergraduate and graduate alike), opportunity for faculty to play the role of socializer is perhaps greater than ever before. A second assumption seems to be that students desire contact with the faculty in non-academic settings. Research conducted by this reviewer would indicate that many students prefer faculty who stick to the business of teaching and do not attempt to become involved in the students' internal dynamics.

In conclusion, then, a major weakness of this book lies in the fact that while many areas of interest are covered there is a lack of critical analysis.

DAVID GOTTLIEB

Michigan State University

Scientists in Industry. By WILLIAM KORNHAUSER. With the assistance of WARREN O. HAGSTROM. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. xii+230. $6.00.

Scientists as employees in industry are of interest to sociologists as a growing new group among salaried professional workers. Beginning in the 1950's the professional and technical group is the only occupational category that has shown any appreciable increase in size. There is every likelihood that the most significant increases in size of employee group will continue to occur among professional employees.

William Kornhauser with the assistance of Warren O. Hagstrom has undertaken in *Scientists in Industry* a study of conflict and accommodation in four major areas of strain between scientists and organizations in industrial research: goals, controls, incentives, and responsibilities for research. In this respect this study overlaps and confirms an earlier study by Marcson, *The Scientist in American Industry*, which too dealt with the strains of the professional employee in the areas of goals, controls, incentives, work situations, and authority systems. The convergence of these two independent studies indicates that sociology does have a body of mature tools that when used expertly will result in similar findings, not in highly individuated opinion.

The Kornhauser study ably analyzes the relations between professional employees, deals with the professions to which they belong, and studies nine organizations for which they work The nine organizations consist of six industrial laboratories, a trade association laboratory, a government laboratory, and an independent research institute. In each of these organizations the authors interviewed individuals on a variety of levels and in different areas of research, as well as of top management and of production departments. The authors do not report, however, the number of interviews undertaken either by organization or as a total.

The basic interest of studies in this field is in the organizational pressures on professional values and in the types of accommodation made to these pressures. When applied to scientists and engineers in industry, the authors, as well as the other students in this field, are interested in three types of problems: (1) What types of problems emerge in the interrelationships between professions and organizations? (2) What are the different ways in which these problems are defined and reacted to in different organizations? (3) What are the different ways in which these problems are defined and reacted to in different types of professions? The authors concentrate on the first two problems, and do not attempt to develop any research data on the third.

Kornhauser points out that the scientist as a professional employee is involved in two conflicting sets of expectations and needs. The fact that he is a member of a profession impels him to act according to the norms of the profession rather than those of the industrial organization. Professions, therefore, in a sense "limit organizations."

At the same time, however, "organizations limit professions." The industrial organization attempts to acculturate its professional to its own norms. This is the setting of the conflict situation analyzed by the author, and earlier spelled out in Marcson's analysis of "Authority" in *The Scientist in American Industry*.

The result is that certain fundamental problems arise out of this system of interaction of professions and organizations. "There are built-in strains between work establishments and professional institutions with respect to (*a*) goals for professional work, (*b*) controls for professional work, (*c*) incentives for professional work, and (*d*) influence of professional work."

The authors imaginatively marshal evidence from their interview materials and other studies to point out that industry presses for short-run results from its scientists and engineers for new or improved industrial products and processes and that this conflicts with scientific values. The industrial organization's concern with extending its usual patterns of managerial control to research laboratories provokes conflict with the scientists' conception of autonomy. The authors proceed to the analysis of conflict as they turn to such other problems as recruitment, organization, supervision, and communication. They discuss the efforts of professional groups to exercise some control in these problem areas, and the conflict between professional societies and unions of professional employees as reflecting strain between professions and industrial organizations with respect to the problem of incentives in industry. The authors point out that, "un-

less scientists are primarily concerned with their professional allegiance, they will be less likely to uphold scientific standards or to aspire to scientific excellence. . . . Hence, where industry dampens the motivation of scientists to participate in outside professional activities, industrial research suffers."

The study wisely takes as its theme autonomy versus integration of professional activity in organizations. The role of the professional scientist in industry is expressed in the strain between autonomy and integration, and leads the authors to advance the proposition that; "professionalism has as its primary function the protection of standards for creative activities; organization has as its primary function the efficient coordination of diverse activities." The continual strain in industry on professional autonomy requires outside support of professional or other associations. The professional association is limited in its activities. It may be dominated by industrial executives who too are scientists. Professional unionism has largely failed, the authors point out, since it is primarily a "method of countering one set of organizational controls (management) with another set of organizational controls." The authors see the need and correctly predict that new associational attempts will be made by professional scientists to meet the problem of professional autonomy.

This book has much in it that merits the interest of the members of any profession, including members of the American Sociological Association. I wish we had more studies like this in related professional fields.

Simon Marcson

Rutgers University

Life in the Ward. By Rose Laub Coser. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1962. Pp. xxxi+182. $7.50.

This is a study of the staff and fifty-one patients on the surgical and medical wards of a metropolitan Jewish hospital. Much of the material has already appeared in three journal articles, including the discussion of authority and decision-making (*American Sociological Review*, February, 1958), which ranks as one of the best in the literature. That chapter is also far and away the best in this book, though this reviewer found much of interest in the discussion of the two types of patient adaptation, the role of humor, and the documentation of staff self-interest masked by the blanket phrase "for the good of the patient." The reader should be prepared for many minor annoyances. For example, that these are ward rather than private patients, and primarily first- and second-generation Jewish patients, is not seriously considered to be a limitation on generalization. Statistical analysis is carried to some sort of extreme when the assertion "only one-half" refers to one of two people in a category. There is one page of footnotes in small print for every four pages of text, and for such a slim volume the price of $7.50 seems excessive.

My major criticism is of the heavy reliance upon the Parsonian notion of a "sick role." Role analyses depend upon exaggerated notions of the clarity of boundaries and discontinuities of life. This helps account for the sense of outrage implicit in her view of the hospital. She compares it to "a defense plant a military outpost, an armed-guard ship" and to a "command society, rigidly stratified, self contained." There is a "separating wall" between doctor and patient; "social mobility" between *doctor and patient* is "grossly restricted"! The relationships are compared to those of master and servant, or at best, parent and child. The views that nurses hold of interns are systematically (and with little justification) compared to stereotypes of racial and ethnic minorities. Doctors are the main objects of hostility, for in their "role-sets" they are concerned primarily with cases and teaching. For example, because a particular patient "was not ill in an interesting way, she was given a minimum of attention." But how much attention is feasible in a busy ward for this patient who suffered from "generalized itching" which could neither be diagnosed nor treated? Because the physician could not help her and felt she was not seriously ill, the author additionally holds him responsible for encouraging "latent" attitudes in the relatives such that the patient is sent to a nursing home in a "taxi hired by the hospital," unaccompanied by a relative, and "in a shabby cotton dress."

In this hostile, segregated world, the patient appears as helpless as the staff appears indifferent. The emphasis upon the "sick role" assumes that patients have few or no resources

of their own, and the break with the outside world is catastrophic, as if all patients had been well throughout their life and had no contact with ill people. The roles of the medical staff dictate that they will make no effort to handle the transitions to and from the hospital and have no comprehension of the problem. Roles are not likely to be that compartmentalized, nor human experience so discontinuous. Having made no "rational choices" during his stay, the patient "may have 'unlearned' the making of choices" and be unable to "reorganize himself anew." The length of stay is never mentioned, though it would seem to be a crucial factor in such a dramatic and unlikely change brought about only by a hospital stay.

Her own evidence challenges this perspective on patient careers. On the basis of interviews patients are divided almost evenly into two groups: the hospital-oriented type dependent upon primary gratifications, and the outside-oriented type emphasizing some autonomy and holding an instrumental orientation toward the hospital. It is not clear which group is properly socialized and "adapted to the sick role." What is clear, however, is that those in the hospital-oriented group are far more ill. To a disproportionate extent they are (1) over sixty-five (44 per cent of all patients were); (2) are probably first-generation immigrants; (3) have had three or more admissions; and (4) are in the medical ward with its concentration of degenerative diseases where therapy is prolonged, uncertain, and undramatic. Surprisingly, she neglects to compare the two groups by diagnosis or seriousness of illness, though she recognizes that "this might be a fruitful subject for further investigations." It seems likely that it would be a more basic and economical explanation of the behavior of patients than the degree of socialization to "the" sick role. The role concept plays no part in the excellent discussion of structural differences between the medical and surgical wards because that analysis is based on differences in staff tasks and technologies, which are grounded in medical differences between patients. Like most concepts, that of "role" can distort as well as clarify.

CHARLES PERROW

University of Michigan

Seven Questions about the Profession of Librarianship. Edited by PHILIP H. ENNIS and HOWARD W. WINGER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. v+104. $3.75.

Designed for librarians, this slim volume is composed of seven articles, discussions of four of them, and an introduction by Philip H. Ennis. The papers were first presented at the Twenty-sixth Annual Conference of the Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago in 1961. Seven interrelated questions were framed to give direction to the conference, but, as Ennis observes, these questions "were not always accepted or understood" by the speakers (p. 3). The reader will find it difficult to determine exactly what these central questions were, although the titles of papers provide a clue: "The Librarian: From Occupation to Profession," "Aspects of Librarianship: A Trace Work of History," "Education for a Profession," "Ports of Entry to Librarianship," "The Accommodation of Specialization," "The Librarian's Search for Status," and "Critique of Library Associations in America."

The first and third papers were presented by sociologists William J. Goode and Everett C. Hughes. In their usual competent manner they offer insights and ideas about professions and the need for the new professions to change their models. The fifth paper is written by a university vice-president who adds a light touch to his discussion of specialization in general and the need for co-ordination.

The articles (and discussions) by the librarians, except for the excellent one on the history of librarianship, by coeditor Winger, are almost embarrassing to read, not because the authors have nothing to say, or write poorly, but because what they are saying is directed to a sensitive and self-conscious audience—the librarian. The sociologist will feel as if he were eavesdropping; as if he were watching a combination of psychodrama and group therapy—a kind of public catharsis. The librarian speakers function as cheer leaders and in stream-of-consciousness fashion, which in some way rivals James Joyce, keep repeating: WE ARE A PROFESSION, WE ARE A PROFESSION. Sociologists Ennis and Goode reply, "No, not yet," and Goode adds, "Maybe never."

Despite Ennis' statement that the debate whether the work of a librarian is or is not a

profession is sterile, this question was of central interest to the conference. The librarian insists he is a member of a profession but that he is not properly recognized, and one conclusion reached is that others must be convinced of his status. Various ways of doing this are offered: These include strengthening the library association, conducting nationwide campaigns for state certification and improving the quality of recruits, proper training of student librarians, including strengthening education requirements—and seeing that all have the appropriate degree.

A second theme running through some of these articles concerns the effect that bureaucracy has on professional people. (Professional or not, trained librarians have problems in common with members of the acknowledged professions. However, creativity, a major theme in the literature about professionals working in complex organizations, is not an issue here—the client does not demand it.)

If you are interested in librarians and/or wish to use their remarks as raw data, or if you are studying the professions and the problems that arise from their employment in bureaucratic situations, or if you simply enjoy or cannot help eavesdropping because of your sociological training, then read this book—otherwise, except for the articles praised above, you can save your time.

ERWIN O. SMIGEL

New York University

Socialized Medicine in England and Wales: The National Health Service. By ALMONT LINDSEY. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. xii+561. $8.50.

This book is the first detailed review of the National Health Service in England and Wales, and of the conditions and events leading up to it. Lindsey, a professor of history in Mary Washington College, University of Virginia, has made a thorough compilation of committee reports, newspaper editorials, official studies, opinions of prominent people, and other pertinent literature. The documentation is exhaustive and well organized and will save another researcher literally years of time if he wishes to approach the Service in another framework. Because of its exhaustiveness, however, the book is difficult reading. Lindsey succeeded in giving what he hoped would be "a reasonably unbiased understanding of the British approach," although he is transparently neutral on the side of the Service, so to speak.

Lindsey spent six months in Great Britain talking with a wide range of people, but he did not conduct any systematic field studies. From the standpoint of the historian, Lindsey says that "there is no substitute for a methodical analysis of the literature." From the standpoint of the sociologist, of course, there is no substitute for field studies of various kinds after the existing literature has been reviewed

I cannot accept fully Lindsey's conclusion that "No longer does England have any doubts as to whether the economy can afford such a comprehensive scheme. Prudent spending and careful management have produced a service of incalculable value." My own observations during several visits to England and a review of the major reports on the Service leaves me less sanguine than Lindsey. In fact, worry over the cost of the Service has almost become an obsession. But I would agree with Lindsey that the Service is here to stay and in substantially the same form in which it was established.

I conclude that the book is an extremely good source for those who wish to examine the literature and get a good overview of the Service. It is not, however, a good critique of the Service, because Lindsey would find it difficult to separate a very humane social concept from a deep analysis in the crucible of experience

ODIN W. ANDERSON

University of Chicago

Courses toward Urban Life. Edited by ROBERT J. BRAIDWOOD and GORDON R. WILLEY. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. ix+371. $7.50.

Probably few sociologists will read this volume; yet it contains material of value to many. The sociologist concerned with evolutionary theory or with the more specific issues of man's relationship to his physical environment and the prerequisites for urban life would be well advised to consult this detailed and highly informative work.

This book, the result of a symposium held at the European headquarters of the Wenner-Gren Foundation in 1960, surveys those regions of the world that had, before the time of Columbus, reached the stage of more or less effective food production. For each area the main patterns of cultural development—from the earliest evidences of human society up to the threshold of "urban civilization"—are summarized.

There are chapters on such diverse areas as Mesoamerica, Eastern North America, Amazonia and the Caribbean, Africa south of the Sahara, China, the lower Rhine Basin, the temperate zone in continental Asia, etc. Notably lacking are discussions of Egypt or Southeast Asia. In all there are sixteen such papers: eleven treat the Old World, five the New—a more balanced collection than the recent work edited by Stuart Piggott, *The Dawn of Civilization* (1961), which deals with societies over the world during much the same time period (though it embodies a quite different approach).

The various chapters in the book under review give special attention to the geographical environment of each region, settlement patterns, and the course of cultural development —particularly in technology, but with some reference to social organization. The final chapter, by the editors, is a summary and interpretative essay and the most useful section for the non-specialist. Braidwood and Willey's observations on the relationship between food production and social change particularly merit serious consideration. Their discussion of the prerequisites for urban life is valuable as well.

As to the limitations of this work, it is difficult to evaluate a volume of this sort, containing as it does essays on widely differing regions and embodying somewhat individual approaches. One can take exception to some specific items. Pittioni, discussing southern Europe, indulges in some murky reasoning on pages 224–25 (particularly in sections of n. 20), as does Sankalia, writing on India (esp. on p. 71). And although Willey, in his chapter on Mesoamerica, is more hospitable to the assumption of urban settlements in the Maya region (even in the Classic period) than he was in some of his earlier writings, he still clings to the notion of "civilization without cities" for the lowland Maya area (p. 101). Yet, the spectacular findings at Tikal and Dzibilchaltun, though recent, nevertheless offered considerable evidence by the time of the symposium of the impressive size of these two lowland Maya settlements, as well as the high density of house sites of Dzibilchaltun and small structures of non-ceremonial, non-palatial character in Tikal that Coe (*American Antiquity*, April, 1962) concedes can only be the remains of houses.

As for more general observations, it is unfortunate that the editors, or for that matter the individual authors, did not see fit to discuss explicitly their materials in relation to evolutionary theory, for this framework is implicit in most of the chapters. Contrary to the assertions of some anthropologists and sociologists, the theory of cultural or social evolution is by no means dead. It has recently crept back into American sociology through the study of developing or modernizing countries—often without the authors' awareness. Not that the theory formulated by Spencer, Ward, *et al.* will re-emerge, but some radically changed version will take shape—as it has, for example, in the work of Julian Steward. The main point is that whoever seeks to formalize neo-evolutionary theory must take account of the data presented in this important volume.

GIDEON SJOBERG

University of Texas

Governing the Metropolis. By SCOTT GREER. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xi+153. (Paper.)

This long essay is a marvel in its scope, its incisiveness, and its clarity. Without the folderol of general-systems theory or pattern variables, Greer has sketched in the historical, technological, political, economic, and social-psychological factors that have shaped such phenomena as the rise of suburbia, patterns of land use, fractionation of political power, and the pattern of the future metropolis. For the sociologist studying some one aspect of contemporary communities, for the city planner, and for the beginning student of sociology this book provides a sweep and perspective on American cities unequaled in the literature.

The three main parts of the essay are enti-

tled, "The Creation of a Metropolitan World," "The Governmental Response to Metropolitanization," and "The Future of Metropolity." Since their origin cities have performed the function of establishing order—peaceable communication and co-ordination of activities—within their spatial boundaries. The basic question the author raises is, given increases in scale, changes in speed and flexibility of transportation, and increases in social differentiation, how adequately do contemporary structures of government perform their basic task of ordering and co-ordinating human activities? He argues that American cities, at least, have been prevented from establishing effective metropolitan-wide governing bodies by the heritage of Jacksonianism embodied in the legal system, the localized value commitments and choices of citizenry and officeholders, and the bifurcation of economic and political power. Metropolitan governance does not adequately plan metropolitan-wide services nor establish fiscal and political equity. Yet for all of this, the author points out that metropolitan communities do provide services that are adaptive to the needs of the metropolis; for instance, expressways get built and school districts are consolidated.

To document major themes, the essay makes extensive use of Greer's own research on St. Louis and the works of many others. He is especially effective in showing how familistic values and localistic attachments lead to the defense of the identity and autonomy of suburbs and neighborhoods. I have only one minor quarrel with the author: Greer believes he is developing a theory. But theories in sociology must lead to testable and explicit propositions; in this case most of the propositions are implicit and only occasionally lead to differential predictions. But, compared to metropolitan government, the essay performs *its* functions well.

MAYER ZALD

University of Chicago

The City Church: Death or Renewal. By WALTER KLOETZLI Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1961. Pp. xi+224. $3.75.

In the sociology of religion there is an increasing body of literature devoted to the study of individual congregations or parishes. However, comparative studies are virtually non-existent. Rev. Walter Kloetzli, of the National Lutheran Council, has produced a pioneering study of comparative church structure. He has chosen eight city parishes faced with the problem of urban change and described the various attempts, some successful and some unsuccessful, which have been made to adjust to change.

The first ninety-three pages of the volume are devoted to field work descriptions of the various churches and the different methods the pastors and their people have evolved to meet the problems of change. This part of the study is based on field work which seems to have consisted in great part of a congregation self-study conducted by a "representative committee" of the congregation and six to eight depth interviews "with representative members." Special emphasis is placed on the pastor, the lay leadership, and the church program.

The second part of the volume is based on a mail survey questionnaire sent to a random sample of the larger congregations and the total membership of the small congregations Percentage data are given on characteristics of membership, church life of membership, perception and evaluation of the church and its leadership, and perception and evaluation of the neighborhood and the church's involvement.

Kloetzli's conclusion—that there are no simple answers to the problems a church must face in a changing urban environment and that adaptation must be tailored to the needs of a given community—is not especially revolutionary; nevertheless this dictum is so often ignored in practice that it is well to have it dramatically documented.

Undoubtedly, Kloetzli's work will be of great use to any church trying to find its appropriate mission in an urban metropolis. Furthermore, his courage in venturing into comparative study is to be warmly applauded. Unfortunately he has not entirely avoided the dilemma which faces any writer delving into "ecclesiastical sociology": it is difficult to write a volume which at the same time is useful to the ecclesiastical administrator and interesting to the professional sociologist. The first section of the present study is rather too impressionistic for the professional even though it will make interesting reading for the

ecclesiastic. On the other hand, the data in the second or "objective" part of the study are likely to bore the ecclesiastic and intrigue the professional. The latter will wonder what kind of sampling method was used, what percentage of those to whom questionnaires were mailed actually replied, what kind of cross-tabulations might be possible. Unfortunately there is only one paragraph on methodology and it answers none of the questions a sociologist would have to ask before he could make a final evaluation of the book's contribution to the sociology of religion.

Charles Y. Glock has contributed a thoughtful essay as an Afterword.

ANDREW M. GREELEY

University of Chicago

Sociology of Religion. By GLENN M. VERNON. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. ix+413. $7.95.

In the past half-dozen years enough texts in the sociology of religion have appeared that the instructor may now select on several bases: historical coverage, ethnographic breadth, theoretical consistency, length, or attention to religious organizations. This variety no doubt reflects the increasing number of students involved in courses in sociology of religion Vernon has written a valuable addition to this collection. Summarizing a large portion of the social science work in religion, he organizes it into manageable and very readable chapters. This is *his* characteristic set of qualities—traditional format, minimal technical language, lucidity.

Vernon's "informing" theoretical orientation is that of symbolic interaction, with the corollary that symbols in the religious institutional realm tend toward compatibility with those in other realms. The book's organization, therefore, following an introductory section, consists of eleven chapters on the functions and organization of religious symbols, followed by six chapters on religion and other social institutions. An instructor of the one-semester course needing a single text would do well to adopt this one, especially if his students have had little background in sociology. The frequent quotes from *Time* magazine and *Christian Century*, for example, which could be irksome in some contexts, should illustrate nicely to the "lay" reader the relevance of the general sociological discussion.

The several chapters on religious organizations, leadership, and specialization, it seems to this reviewer, are especially well handled. The radically different consequences of religion in preliterate tribes and in urban America are impossible to compare and understand without careful attention to the difference between uniform "institutionalized" religion and multiform "organized" religion. Vernon's discussion of these materials is very clear.

Along with general approval always goes some reservation, however. Most serious is the failure to keep straight the "postulate of indispensability," a sin more often perpetrated by sociologists of religion than by others (e.g., "Since . . . a major function of religion is to provide moral definitions for the group . . ."; "Since religion provides moral definitions of various sexual activities . . ."). Other minor matters include the dozens of times the author tells us that social science cannot assess values. It is unfortunate, if true, that students need be told so frequently. Then, too, this reviewer would have preferred one, not two, chapters on religion and marriage, the space taken up instead by a discussion of religion and the arts, say, or religion and recreation.

Altogether, though not *the* best text, Vernon's *Sociology of Religion* does beat many of them hands down, and it probably *is* the best for use with undergraduates of limited background in behavioral science.

PHILLIP E. HAMMOND

Yale University

Ethics and Bigness. Edited by HARLAN CLEVELAND and HAROLD D. LASSWELL. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. lxv+542. $7.50.

This is a selection of papers prepared for the sixteenth meeting (1960) of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, held on the theme of "challenges to traditional ethics in government, politics, and administration." The editors of this volume were, respectively, chairman and co-chairman of the meeting. The participating notables included Jesuits and rabbis, logicians and lobbyists,

Hindus and Swedes, generals and psychoanalysts.

The twenty-seven papers are supplemented by numerous commentaries, three introductory articles, and a half-dozen appendixes. They are concerned with responsibility in political, scientific, academic, religious, and government organizations. There is a special section on civil-military relations and another on organizational ethics. A companion volume on *The Ethic of Power* came out of the same meeting.

Most of these papers are unusually well prepared. A few are major contributions—for example, Stokes's findings on popular evaluations of government, Parsons' description of the cultural background of American religious organization, Lee's summary of organizational trends in Protestant denominations, Egger's essay on the unsettled limits of the American presidency, and Katzenbach's remarkable discussion of the separation of powers and national security. The papers concerned with particular issues are more informative than those dealing with general ethical dilemmas. Grundstein's "Prolegomena to Ethics" is an exception, although it has more to say about alternative modes of describing organizations than about ethics.

The most remarkable thing about the discussants, viewed collectively, is how ethical they really are. We read very little here about white-collar criminality, or genocide. Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, these experts are not much concerned with ethical dilemmas of the kind raised by the Oppenheimer hearings, the Eichmann trial, or even the General Electric case. They are much more interested in problems like the conflicting responsibilities of high military officers to their civilian superiors and to congressional committees, the pressures on a small-town mayor to decide zoning questions against the public interest, the discrepancy between manifest and latent goals in public housing programs, the inconsistent demands of organizational loyalty and intellectual autonomy in the career of the employed professional. None of these questions is trivial, of course, and most of the authors have wrestled with them valiantly, at first or second hand. Nonetheless, there is a faint note of complacency. Good men, we learn, often have difficulty in translating their goodness into organizational terms. Never—in this volume—are we forced to contemplate the spectacle of a good man doing evil at the behest of an organization. People whose ethical dilemmas are insurmountable presumably do not attend such conferences.

THEODORE CAPLOW

Columbia University

Changing Patterns of Prejudice. By ALFRED J. MARROW. Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1962. Pp. xiv+271. $6.95.

A semipopular book on prejudice and intergroup relations, as this one, is likely to reach an audience outside the ranks of social scientists. The author is well equipped to write such a book, since he holds a Ph.D. degree in psychology, and yet his orientation is primarily that of a layman: He was chairman of the Commission on Intergroup Relations of New York City, and chairman of the board of a textile firm "employing more than 2,000 people and operating six plants." His scope is the usual broad one, covering intergroup relation problems in industry, housing, schools, social and athletic organizations, as well as the psychology of prejudice, minority criminality, swastika "epidemics," and the language difficulties of the Puerto Ricans. While the main focus is on New York City, for which the information is quite comprehensive and up to date, there are excursions to other parts of the country.

The author was a student of the late Kurt Lewin, and he integrates into the specific descriptions of social condition references to a number of studies done by psychologists of the group-dynamics school. An effort is made to indicate the relevancy of these studies, but there is nonetheless a schizoid quality resulting from this effort. The descriptive material—drawn from the author's considerable experience in intergroup relations work in New York—is the raw stuff of sociology, but the studies elicited to aid in the analysis are mostly psychological experiments on individuals. Thus the analytic argument is mostly through analogy, rather than through the use of the data itself to test the analytic interpretation.

Because of the author's firsthand knowledge, he makes a number of novel observations, such as that the government of New York

City—which has thoroughgoing laws against discrimination—lets construction work to contractors who, in turn, deal with craft unions that discriminate against Negro workers. He is realistic enough to point out how the open-occupancy law works to the political disadvantage of the hitherto residentially segregated minorities, and yet idealistic enough to say that the open-occupancy law is a moral gesture.

While the author seeks to be objective and comprehensive, the book cannot be considered scholarly. Its reference to studies and reports is highly selective, and occasionally there is a misuse of statistics—for example, "Although Negroes make up 10.5 per cent of the total population, only 4 per cent of them live in suburbs" (p. 101).

Yet there is a freshness and readability about the book, as well as a good choice of photographs and a handsome format, that makes it recommended reading.

ARNOLD M. ROSE

University of Minnesota

Negro and White in Connecticut Town. By FRANK F. LEE. New York: Bookman Associates, 1961. Pp. 207. $5.00.

This small volume describes patterns of race relations as they existed in a New England industrial town of 10,000 population up to 1952. The author lived in the community for two years, and conducted unstructured interviews with members of all but one of its seventy-eight Negro households and with whites thought to be knowledgeable about racial patterns.

The findings contain few surprises: Except in school and some work places, whites and Negroes were largely segregated, and Negroes had poorer housing, jobs, access to public facilities, and political influence. Lee seeks to explain these patterns not only in terms of the discriminatory practices of the whites, but also on the basis of the small size, migrant background, low educational and skill levels, and reactions of apathetic avoidance of the Negro group. He concludes that mechanisms of social control operate within both white and Negro groups to perpetuate inequalities, and also proposes a rank-ordered list of white techniques of control, for example, violence, insult, and paternalism, that may be helpful to other students of race relations.

Readers interested in community structure may be disappointed with this work, for the author provides almost no description of the sociometric patterns or power structures within which decisions on racial issues were made. Further, the study suffers from the fact that Lee limits his analysis almost wholly to Connecticut Town itself, even though this community was only ten miles from a city of 125,000, although the great majority of Negro employees in this suburb commuted from the larger city, and although many local Negroes found their social lives only within the metropolis. Thus, there is no systematic assessment of Negro employment opportunities or other dimensions of the "real" metropolitan community within which the residents acted. Finally, it is unfortunate that the report is dated, since the patterns observed in the early fifties, before the Supreme Court school decision, may have been altered by the rise of Negro militancy in American society over the past decade.

The book is clearly written. Its last sixty pages are devoted to a listing and data on informants, detailed references, and an annotated bibliography.

DAVID STREET

University of Chicago

---

a.c.

Jewish-Gentile Courtships: An Exploratory Study of a Social Process. By JOHN E. MAYER. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Pp. x+240. $5.00.

The author's interest is in the process whereby people select marriage partners who are not in their fields of eligibles. It is a sociological truism, he asserts, that "what happens between two persons after they meet cannot be predicted from their predispositions." Accordingly the author looks for explanation to the interaction between the partners, between each partner and his parents, and to that between each partner and his friends. Since the author looks to interaction within these three relationships to explain intermarriages, he remarks that it was unfortunate that he was unable to gather data from the parents and the

friends' of the partners. Thus he says that whereas friends probably try to appear less disapproving of cross-ethnic marriages than they actually are, "nevertheless, for the purposes of our study, we shall view the [partner's] image of his friends' feelings as coinciding with the way these friends actually felt." Quite as dismaying to this reviewer was the apparent slightness of the author's effort to integrate the testimony of husbands and wives in order to provide the best possible picture of their interaction.

The author and his wife interviewed almost all (eighty-six of the ninety persons) in forty-two married and three engaged couples wherein one spouse was Jewish, at least nominally, and the other was at least nominally Christian. In over two-thirds of the cases it was the husband who was Jewish. The author wanted subjects who, prior to meeting their future spouses, had been negatively predisposed to such intermarriages. On the basis of interview responses the author concluded that twenty-nine (presumably of the eighty-six interviewed subjects) had been negatively predisposed to the kind of intermarriage in which the author was interested and which subsequently they had made—Jewish-Gentile. These subjects he called "Reluctants"; the rest he called "Amenables." Most of the book is based on the interviews with these twenty-nine Reluctants: ten men and nineteen women; seventeen Jews and twelve Christians.

The author laments his inability to get a control group of Reluctants who had been attracted to, but gave up, such ineligible prospective spouses. Another kind of control would have been desirable. For example, the author hypothesizes that those who did not immediately attract their cross-ethnic future spouses had virtues that were latent. A control group of ethnically homogeneous couples might have enabled the author to determine whether or not latent attractiveness is unique to cross-ethnic matings. And at another point, Mayer interprets his data as suggesting that the Reluctants, whose parents generally had strong objections to cross-ethnic marriages, did not keep their parents informed of the developing intensity of their relationships. May it not be true that parents' information lags considerably behind the pace of involvement even when the parents do not object at all?

One of the author's most interesting interpretations is that much of parents' opposition to cross-ethnic marriages arises from their feeling that such marriages stamp them as failures, especially in the estimation of the kin group—if they had reared their children properly, they would not have married across ethnic lines. The rubric of "Gresham's law applied to filioethnicity" might be applied to one of his conclusions: that in cross-ethnic marriages where the ethnic backgrounds of both spouses are known, the children are likely to be identified with the ethnicity of less prestige. Thus in the case of Jewish-Gentile marriages, "there is greater probability that the child will be regarded as Jewish."

Occasionally one encounters an article so rich and compact that one wishes the author might have expanded it into a book. Alas, it is more frequent, as with the present case, that one feels justice could be done to a book in one article at most. Treatment extending to book length seems justified when one or more of the following purposes is being carried out: the systematic testing of hypotheses, the presentation of a theory and the tracing of its implications, a critical review of related literature, and/or an insightful hypothesis-provoking analysis of a few cases presented in depth. Mayer manages to accomplish none of these. The subtitle and the exposition of the design of research warn the reader not to expect the first. A generalized thinness precludes the other three—that is, with respect to theorizing, to review of literature, and the data gathered.

ROBERT F. WINCH

Northwestern University

Communication and Social Order By HUGH DALZIEL DUNCAN. New York: Bedminster Press, 1962. Pp. xxx+475.

The basic thesis of Duncan's ambitious book is that, without an understanding of the role of symbols in society, sociologists cannot hope to develop adequate models for social analysis. "We must return the study of man in society to a study of communication, for how we communicate determines how we relate as human beings" (p. 438). The mechanical and biological models that have enabled behaviorists and

thers to achieve quantified information about his or that aspect of social life are inadequate or an over-all social theory. Methodologically, he study of communication requires that the wide gap between humanistic and scientific nderstanding" (p. 438) be closed.

Duncan first reviews critically the major con-ibutions to communication theory during this entury. Freud's analysis of dream symbolism, immel's concept of sociability, James's in-ghts into religious experience, and Dewey's lating of art and experience, among others, e examined for the light they may throw the theory of symbolic action, here a syno-m for communication. But his real heroes e G. H. Mead and especially Kenneth Burke, 10 deal directly with the problem of symbols social communication.

Burke sees art as a symbolic reflection of the st representative patterns of the real dra-tic confrontations (conflicts, purposes, and isfactions) that constitute society. Through nbolic resolution of conflict, art provides strategy for living, a hortatory hypothesis reconciling the requirements of social order l individual acceptance of that order. "Lit-ry acts," ranging from the proverb to the hest forms of comedy and tragedy, are his a. In all, he finds hierarchy as the basic dition of social life, the determining factor communication. Men meet as inferiors, su-iors, or equals and in conflict work out les of acceptance, rejection, or doubt vis-à-vis the social structure. But symbolism does not merely reflect human motives; the symbols themselves become objects of love or hate. Their analysis can tell us what men want.

Duncan develops these elements of Burke's thought by examining a variety of hierarchical relationships in modern society in terms of their symbolic expression; for example, cloth-ing, the earning and spending of money, various types of political rhetoric (his analysis of Hit-ler's oratory is particularly good). His most original contribution to communication theory is a suggestion that comedy should be studied as a model of social symbolization that unmasks the various forms of mystification involved in hierarchically ordered relations.

Unfortunately, the book is repetitious and abstract to a fault. It is too rich in suggestions for future studies and not rich enough in carry-ing out its major aim: the analysis of art forms, especially comedy, as useful models for the theory of communication. Nevertheless, soci-ologists who do not "confuse quantification and science" will appreciate this effort on a grand scale to revive the classical tradition of human-istic sociology of Weber, Veblen, and Mead. Humanists will be glad to read a sociologist who takes art more seriously than most literary scholars. And the general educated reader will find much wisdom about the operation of so-ciety and about the American condition.

NORMAN RUDICH

Wesleyan University

CURRENT BOOKS

ALBRECHT, RUTH E. (ed). *Aging in a Changing Society*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962. Pp. xii+187. $3.75 (paper). Twelve papers on current concepts of aging, special problems related to aging, population changes in the past decade, and rehabilitation factors for the aging.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON. *Anthropology and Human Behavior*. Washington, D.C.: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1962. Pp. viii+214. $2.50 (paper). Eight papers on "the variety of strategies available for the study of human behavior in a cultural context."

BAILEY, SYDNEY D. *The Secretariat of the United Nations*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962. Pp. 113. $3.50.

BARBER, BERNARD, and HIRSCH, WALTER. *The Sociology of Science*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. viii+662. $8 50. A reader with thirty-eight papers on the social character of science; historical development; images of the scientist and self-conceptions; organization of work; the social process of scientific discovery; and the social responsibilities of science.

BAUM, SAMUEL. *The Labor Force of Hungary*. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Pp. 34. $0 25. Size, composition, and growth of the Hungarian labor force since 1900.

BECKER, ERNEST. *The Birth and Death of Meaning: A Perspective in Psychiatry and Anthropology*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xiv +210. $5.00.

BENNIS, WARREN G., *et al*. *The Role of the Nurse in the Outpatient Department: A Preliminary Report*. New York: American Nurses' Foundation, Inc., 1961. Pp. 88. $3.00 (paper). Based on interviews and questionnaires collected in one Boston hospital.

BERNARD, JESSIE. *American Community Behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv+465. $6.50. Textbook on community organization, competition and conflict, and institutionalization of enacted norms.

BERNDT, RONALD M. *Excess and Restraint: Social Control among a New Guinea Mountain People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xxii+474. $8.95. Anthropological field study of four language groups.

BERTRAND, ALVIN L., FLOYD, CORTY L., AND ASSOCIATES (eds.). *Rural Land Tenure in the United States: A Socio-economic Approach to Problems, Programs, and Trends*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. Pp. xii+313. $7.50.

BOUMA, DONALD H. *Why Kalamazoo Voted N The Defeat of a Housing Proposal*. Kalamazo Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Emplo ment Research, 1962. Pp. vii+32. An intervie study of 250 Kalamazoo households.

BROSS, L. D. J. *Prévision et décisions relationell* Paris: Dunod, 1961. Pp. ix+216. New Fr 3 Translation into French of "Designs for D cisions."

BROWN, DEMING. *Soviet Attitudes toward Ame can Writing*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Unive sity Press, 1962. Pp. ix+338. $6.00.

BUNZEL, JOHN H. *The American Small Busines man*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 196 Pp. x+307+xii. $4.95. The ideology and behavi of small businessmen as analyzed by a politic scientist.

BURKE, KENNETH. *"A Grammar of Motives"* an *"A Rhetoric of Motives."* Cleveland, Ohio Wo Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. xxv+868. $2.95 A r print of two books in one volume

CALLAHAN, RAYMOND E. *Education and the Cult Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces Th Have Shaped the Administration of the Publ Schools*. Chicago: University of Chicago Pres 1962. Pp. 273. $5.50.

CARLSTON, KENNETH S. *Law and Organization World Society*. Urbana: University of Illino Press, 1962. Pp. xii+356. $6.50. A theoretic exposition.

CARNER, DONALD C. *A Program for Hospital In centives*. Madison: University of Wisconsi 1962. Pp. 75. $1.00.

CATTELL, STUART H. *Health, Welfare and Soci Organization in Chinatown, New York Cit* New York: Department of Public Affairs, Com munity Service Society of New York, 1962 P vi+142. $1.50 (paper).

CLARKSON, GEOFFREY P. *Portfolio Selection: A Sim ulation of Trust Investment*. Englewood Clif N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+143 $4 5 Decision-making theory applied to investmen behavior.

CROMIE, ROBERT, and PINKSTON, JOSEPH. *Dillinge A Short and Violent Life*. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. 266. $4.95.

CROWDER, MICHAEL. *Senegal: A Study in Frenc Assimilation Policy*. New York: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1962. Pp. 104. $1.75 (paper).

CULLEY, JACK F. (ed.). *Contemporary Values an the Responsibility of the College*. Iowa City State University of Iowa, 1962. Pp. 61 Nin papers presented by the Iowa faculty at a semi nar for college and university teachers.

DANIELS, ROGER. *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. ix+165. $3.50.

DEBUYST, FEDERICO. *La Población en America Latina* ("The Population in Latin America"). Brussels: Centro de Investigaciones Socio-Religiosas, 1961. Pp. 188.

DEFORD, MIRIAM ALLEN. *Stone Walls: Prisons from Fetters to Furloughs.* Philadelphia: Chilton Co., 1962. Pp. xv+236. $5.00.

DELANEY, JACK J. *The School Librarian.* Hamden, Connecticut: Shoe String Press, 1961. Pp. x+183. Human relation problems in libraries.

DRUCKER, PETER F. *The New Society: The Anatomy of Industrial Order.* New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Pp. xiii+362+5. $1.95 (paper). The 1958 edition reprinted.

EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, HIGH AUTHORITY. *Tenth General Report on the Activities of the Community: February 1, 1961–January 31, 1962.* Luxembourg: European Coal and Steel Community, 1962. Pp. 586. Reviews the state of the Common Market for coal and steel; long-term development of community industries; and social policy. Includes twenty-two graphs and an appendix with fifty-five tables.

EVAN, WILLIAM E. (ed.). *Law and Sociology.* New York Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xii+235. $5.00 A collection of nine essays.

EVANS, K. M. *Sociometry and Education.* New York. Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. vii+149+16. $3.75 On the uses of sociometric techniques in the classroom.

FENTON, NORMAN (ed.). *Explorations in the Use of Group Counseling in the County Correctional Program.* Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1962. Pp. vii+174. $4.00.

FERARD, MARGARET L., and HUNNYBUN, NOEL K. *The Caseworker's Use of Relationships.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1962. Pp. xi+133. $4.75 By two British caseworkers.

FESHBACH, MURRAY. *The Soviet Statistical System: Labor Force Recordkeeping and Reporting since 1957.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962. Pp. vi+99. $0.70. The "impact of the Soviet administrative reorganization of mid-1957 on the structure and operation of Soviet statistical agencies concerned with collecting and reporting labor force data."

FORRESTER, MARION WALLACE. *Kenya To-Day: Social Prerequisites For Economic Development.* The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp. 179. Gld. 1. Includes data on household budgets in Nairobi; by an economist.

FORTES, MEYER (ed.). *Marriage in Tribal Societies.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp. vii+157. $4.75. Three papers provide ethnographic observation on African tribal societies; a fourth reanalyzes Malinowski's Trobriand materials.

FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR. *Conflict Management in Organization.* Ann Arbor, Mich.: Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, 1961. Pp. ii+72. $3.00. A report of a seminar conducted by the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior in co-operation with the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, the University of Michigan.

FRASER, DOROTHY M. *Current Curriculum Studies in Academic Subjects: A Report Prepared for the Project on Instruction.* Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1962. Pp. 102.

GADALLA, SAAD M. *Land Reform in Relation to Social Development, Egypt.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+139. $3.75. A rural sociologist describes the effect of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 on rural communities and families.

GOROW, FRANK F. *Statistical Measures: A Programmed Text.* San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. viii+178. $2.25 (paper). Central-tendency dispersion correlation.

GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY. *The College Experience: A Focus for Psychiatric Research.* New York: Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Inc., 1962. Pp. 47. $1.00 (paper).

GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY. *Psychiatrists as Teachers in Schools of Social Work: Formulated by the Committee on Psychiatry and Social Work.* New York: Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Inc., 1962. Pp. 766–817. $1.00.

HAZARD, JOHN N., and SHAPIRO, ISAAC. *The Soviet Legal System: Post-Stalin Documentation and Historical Commentary.* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1962. Pp. 174. $12.50.

HEMPSTONE, SMITH. *Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. 250. $4.95.

HESLINGA, M. W. *The Irish Border as a Cultural Divide.* New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 225. $5.00. A contribution to the study of regionalism in the British Isles.

HOFFMAN, PAUL G. *World without Want.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. 144. $3.50.

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT. *Hong Kong 1961.* Hong Kong: Government Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+467. $4.00. Includes a bibliography, diagram, maps, and tabular information.

HOYT, HOMER. *World Urbanization: Expanding Population in a Shrinking World.* Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1962. Pp. 50. $3.00.

HYMAN, HERBERT H., WRIGHT, CHARLES R., and HOPKINS, TERENCE K. *Applications of Methods of Evaluation: Four Studies of Encampment for Citizenship.* Berkeley: University of California, 1962. Pp. xiii+396. $6.50.

Industrial Relations Research Association. *The International Labor Scene.* Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1962. Pp. 118. (Paper.)

Jehring, J. J. (ed.). *Solving Problems of Productivity in a Free Society.* Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1962. Pp. iii+77. $1.00 (paper).

Jennings, Eugene Emerson. *The Executive: Autocrat, Bureaucrat, Democrat.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xiv+272. $5.75. Describes the orientation toward the executive role; heavy on illustrative case material.

Jennings, Hilda. *Societies in the Making: A Study of Development and Redevelopment within a County Borough.* New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+275+16. $6.50.

Jones, Kathleen, and Sidebotham, Roy. *Mental Hospitals at Work.* New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+210+16. $6.00. Measuring efficiency in three British Hospitals.

Jones, Mervyn. *The Antagonists.* New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1962. Pp. 328. $5.95.

Kain, Richard M. *Dublin in the Age of William Butler Yeats and James Joyce.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. Pp. xi+216. $2.75.

Kane, John J. *Social Problems: A Situational-Value Approach.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. xv+428. $6.95. A textbook. "Where religious values are associated with social problems—as they are in many cases—efforts have been made to utilize Christian and Judaic values, which have much in common, with particular concentration on Catholic values."

Keesing, Felix. *The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi+362. $7.50. Accounts for cultural differences among the lowland and highland people.

Kirton, M. J., and Sidney, Elizabeth. *Case Studies of Management Initiative.* London: Action Society Trust, 1962. Pp. 120. 20*s*. Eight British cases of management problems.

Kluckhohn, Clyde. *Navaho Witchcraft.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. xxii+254. $4.95. "A reprint of the 1944 edition."

Lannoy, Juan, and Perez, Gustavo. *Estructuras demográficas y sociales de Colombia* ("Demographic and Social Structures in Colombia"). Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1961. Pp. 199. Extensive contemporary and historical data concerning demographic and social characteristics of Colombian society.

Laqueur, Walter Z. *Young Germany.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962. Pp. xxii+253. $6.00. A history of the German Youth Movement.

Leavitt, Harold J. *Managerial Psychology: An Introduction to Individuals, Groups, and Industrial Organizations in Modern Psychology.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp +334+3. $1.95 (paper).

Lecky, Prescott. *Self-Consistency: A Theory Personality.* Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Pr 1961. Pp. v+275. $4.25. A reprint of the sec edition.

Lepsius, M. Rainer. *Denkschrift: Zur Lage Soziologie und der politischen Wissensch* ("Report on the Situation of Sociology and Political Science"). Wiesbaden: Franz Stei Verlag, 1961. Pp. viii+149. A review of the velopment and current status of sociology of political science in West Germany.

Levy, Reuben. *The Social Structure of Islam* N York: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Pp +536. $2.95 (paper). A reprint; first publis in 1931–33.

Loeb, Edwin M. *In Feudal Africa.* ("Part II, Int national Journal of American Linguistics, V XXVIII, No. 3.") Bloomington: Indiana U versity, 1962. Pp. xxi+383. $6.00. Political a social organization of the Kuanyama in Sou West Africa.

Lougee, Robert W. *Paul de Lagarde 1827–(A Study of Radical Conservatism in Germa* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Pr 1962. Pp. viii+357. $7.50.

Loveday, Peter, and Campbell, Ian. *Groups Theory and Practice.* Melbourne: F. W. Cheshi 1962. Pp. 98. 15*s*. Survey of group theories a study of Australian political groups.

MacGaffey, Wyatt, Barnett, Clifford R., a Others. *Cuba: Its People, Its Society, Its C ture.* New Haven, Conn.: Human Relation Ar Files Press, 1962. Pp. xx+392. $8.75. From t "Survey of World Culture Series."

Mechanic, David. *Students under Stress* N York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp viii+2 $5.00. Based on interviews and questionnai data secured from twenty-two graduate studen taking departmental written examinations

Melman, Seymour. *No Place To Hide* New York Grove Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 205+3. $0 75

Miller, Neal E., and Dollard, John. *Soci Learning and Imitation.* New Haven, Conn Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+341. $1 (paper). Reprint of the 1941 edition.

Montague, Ashley. *The Humanization of Ma* Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co, 196 Pp. 319. $6.00. A collection of twenty-eigh papers of which half were previously unpub lished.

Moore, Wilbert E. *The Conduct of the Corpo ration.* New York: Random House, 1962. Pp i +292. Organization theory for the layman.

Murphy, Lois Barclay. *The Widening World o Childhood.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962 Pp. xiv+399. $10.00. A longitudinal study o thirty-two children.

Myrdal, Gunnar. *An American Dilemma.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. lxxxiii+1483. $16.50. The Negro problem and modern democracy. A twentieth anniversary edition, with a new Preface by Gunnar Myrdal and a review of recent developments by Arnold Rose.

Naik, Ramarao N. *Brahmanism without Casteism.* Bombay: Naik Bros., 1961. Pp. xv+193+11. Rs. 4 (paper).

Nathan, Hans. *Dan Emmett and the rise of Early Negro Minstrelsy.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+496. $10.00. An account combining musicology, history, and biography.

Nixon, Robert E. *The Art of Growing: A Guide to Psychological Maturity.* New York: Random House, 1962. Pp. xxxi+159. $3.95. By a college psychiatrist.

Norwegian-American Historical Association. *Norwegian-American Studies.* Vol. XXI. Northfield, Minnesota: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1962. Pp. 311. $3.50. Twelve papers with historical materials.

Nuffield Foundation. *The Nuffield Foundation Seventeenth Report.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+159. Report for the year ended March 31, 1962.

Oliver, Symmes C. *Ecology and Cultural Continuity as Contributing Factors in the Social Organization of the Plains Indians.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp. 90. $1.75 (paper).

Ortman, E. J. *Philosophy of Teaching.* New York. Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. 398. $4.75. A treatise by an educationist.

Packard, Vance. *The Pyramid Climbers.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. 339. $5.00. The Packard version of executive careers.

Parker, Tony, and Allerton, Robert. *The Courage of His Convictions.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962. Pp. 181. $3.95.

Parsons, Talcott, and Shils, Edward A. (eds.). *Toward a General Theory of Action: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences.* New York. Harper & Row, 1962. Pp. xi+506+5. $2.45 (paper) A reprint of the 1951 edition.

Phillipps, Bernard S. *The Aging in a Central Illinois Community.* (University of Illinois Small Homes Council Building Research Council, Research Report 62-4.) Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962. Pp. viii+101. $2.50. An Interview survey in Decatur, Illinois.

Pin, Émile. *Les Classes sociales.* Paris: Spes, 1962. Pp. 253. New Fr. 2.60 (paper). On the causes of social stratification and social class behavior.

Pittman, David J., and Snyder, Charles R. *Society, Culture, and Drinking Patterns.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xvii+616. $9.75. A collection of thirty-five articles, with extensive editorial comment.

Popham, Robert E., and Schmidt, Wolfgang. *A Decade of Alcoholism Research: A Review of the Research Activities of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation of Ontario, 1951–1961* ("Brookside Monograph No. 3.") Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Pp. vii+64. $2.95.

Porter, Edward Sefton. *Conscience of the Court.* Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. xii+203. $3.95.

Porterfield, Austin L. *Marriage and Family Living as Self-Other Fulfillment.* Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1962. Pp. 408. $5.75.

Powdermaker, Hortense. *Copper Town: Changing Africa.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xxiii+391. $7.95. The human situation on the Rhodesian copper belt.

Preveden, Francis R. *A History of the Croatian People.* (Vol. II) New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. xii+240. $7.50. Section I, "Croatia and Slavonia from 1396 to 1664"; Section II, "Bosnia and Herzegovina (to 1669)"; Section III, "Dalmatia (1380–1718)."

Rada, Edward L. *The Cal-Vet Program: A Study of State-financed Housing in California.* Los Angeles: University of California Printing Department, 1962. Pp. xx+173. $4.50.

Ravitz, Abe C. *Clarence Darrow and the American Literary Tradition.* Cleveland, Ohio: Press of Western Reserve University, 1962. Pp. xv+163. $4.50.

Reichard, Suzanne, and Others. *Aging and Personality: A Study of 87 Older Men.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xv+235. $7.95.

Reifer, Arnold. *Design for Terror: An Analysis of the Organization and Function of the Oppressive Government Systems in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany.* New York: Exposition Press, 1962. Pp. 82. $2.50.

Restrepo, Camilo Torres y Rodriguez, and Berta Corredor. *Las Escuelas Radiofonicas de Sutatenza-Colombia· Evcluación Sociológica de los Resultados.* Bogotá: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, 1961. Pp 75. Research on effects of educational radio on change in rural life.

Rex, John. *Key Problems of Sociological Theory.* New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. ix+194 +16. $5.00.

Roberts, James Deotis. *Faith and Reason.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1962. Pp. viii +98. $3.00. A comparative study of Pascal, Bergson, and James.

Rollins, Alfred B., Jr. *Roosevelt and Howe.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+477+xviii. $5.95.

Rosenfels, Paul. *Psychoanalysis and Civilization: The Psychological Basis of Social Life.* New York: Libra Publishers, Inc., 1962. Pp. 222. $3.95.

Runes, Dagobert D. (ed.). *Classics in Logic: Readings in Epistemology, Theory of Knowledge*

and Dialectics. New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. xiv+818. $10.00.

SALIM, S. M. *Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta.* New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x+157. $6.00. A social anthropological field study of Bedouin society.

SAURIOL, PAUL. *The Nationalization of Electric Power.* Montreal: Harvest House Ltd., 1962. Pp. 95. $1.50 (paper).

SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Pp. xiv+431+2. $2.25 (paper). Third edition.

SCOTT, WILLIAM A., and WERTHEIMER, MICHAEL. *Introduction to Psychological Research.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xiii+445. $7.95.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. *Mental Illness and Due Process.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+303. $5.00.

SPICER, EDWARD H. *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and of the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962. Pp. xii+609. $12.50.

TABAKOV, GEORGE A. *Medicine in the United States and the Soviet Union.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1962. Pp. 310. $4.95. Contains description with polemics.

TAPPAN, PAUL W. *Crime, Justice and Correction.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960. Pp. xi+781. A textbook, covering the nature, prevalence, and causation of crime; procedures and problems in administering justice; and methods of correctional treatment.

TAX, SOL (ed.). *Anthropology Today.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp viii+481. $2.95 (paper). Twenty-five papers from the original inventory edited by A. L. Kroeber.

THOMAS, MILTON HALSEY, *John Dewey: A Centennial Bibliography.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xiii+370. $6.50.

TRASLER, GORDON. *The Explanation of Criminality.* New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. ix+134+16. $4.00. A clinical psychologist presents the "logic of the single-case explanation" and applies learning theory to criminal behavior.

TSANOFF, RADOSLAV A. *Worlds To Know: A Philosophy of Cosmic Perspectives.* New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. 230. $6.00.

TUNSTALL, JEREMY. *The Fishermen.* London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1962. Pp. 294. 25*s.* "An account of the Hull distant-water fisherman, follower of an extreme occupation."

TUREK, VICTOR. *The Polish-Language Press in Canada: Its History and a Bibliographical List.* Toronto: Polish Research Institute in Canada, 1962. Pp. 247. $3.00 (paper); $4.50 (cloth).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962. Pp. xii+1036 $3.50 (cloth). Eighty-third annual edition; contains 1,263 tables organized into thirty-three sections; an historical appendix; index to tables in which *Historical Statistics* series appear; a guide to sources of statistical information for the United States, etc.

VAN DER SPRENKEL, SYBILLE. *Legal Institutions in Manchu China.* New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. 179. $6.00.

VERNON, RAYMOND. *The Myth and Reality of Our Urban Problems.* Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1962. Pp. 84. The Stafford Little Lectures of 1961 with seminar discussion.

VIDYARTHI, L. P. (ed.). *Aspects of Religion in Indian Society.* Meerut.: Kedar Nath Ram Nath, 1962. Pp. x+410. Rs. 18. A collection of twenty-one papers.

WEINGARTNER, RUDOLPH H. *Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel.* Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1962 Pp. xii+203. $6.50.

WELFORD, A. T., ARGYLE, MICHAEL, GLASS, D. V, and MORRIS, J. N. (eds.). *Society: Problems and Methods of Study.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Pp. 586. $10 00. Thirty papers by British sociologists; a review of sociology today

WESCHLER, IRVING R., and SCHEIN, EDGAR H *Issues in Human Relations Training.* Washington, D C.. National Training Laboratories, National Education Association, 1962. Pp. 121. Ten papers previously published by staff members of the National Training Laboratories.

WILBER, DONALD N. *Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* New Haven, Conn : Human Relations Area Files, 1962. Pp. 320. $8.75.

WILBER, GEORGE L., and BRYANT, ELLEN S. (eds) *Population Research and Administrative Planning.* State College, Miss.: Mississippi State University, 1962. Pp. iv+74.

WILLHELM, SIDNEY M. *Urban Zoning and Land-Use Theory.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. x+244. $6.00.

WILLS, DAVID W. *Common Sense about Young Offenders.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp 175. $2.95. Popular treatise on the origin and treatment of juvenile delinquency.

WILNER, DANIEL M., and OTHERS. *The Housing Environment and Family Life.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. xvi+338. $7.50.

WINCH, ROBERT F., MCGINNIS, ROBERT, and BARRINGER, HERBERT R. (eds.). *Selected Studies in Marriage and the Family.* Rev. ed. New York. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962. Pp. xii+651 A revision of the 1953 edition.

'HE AMERICAN
OURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

lume LXVIII MAY 1963 Number 6

EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY
A REGRESSION ANALYSIS

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN AND ROBERT W. HODGE

ABSTRACT

:egression analysis of occupational mobility is made feasible by recent work providing socioeconomic :us scores for detailed occupations. Data from the Chicago portion of the 1951 Six-City Survey of ɔor Mobility reveal correlations of about .3 between respondents' occupational scores and those of their ıers, while respondents' educational attainment has a somewhat greater influence, as indicated by cor-tıons of .4 or .5. Sons of farmers and non-whites were handicapped by comparison with respondents of ı-farm origin and whites. Despite rising levels of educational attainment accompanied by decreasing ɔersion of number of school years completed, evident in intercohort comparisons, education was no important as a determinant of occupational status in 1950 than in 1940.

Ɔccupational mobility data typically are npiled by comparing the current or re-ıt occupations of a sample of subjects .h their own previous occupations or with : occupations their fathers held at some ıre or less determinate point in time. ıe cross-tabulation of later by earlier :upation yields an *intra*generational mo-ity table, the cross-tabulation of subjects' :upations by fathers' occupations an *er*generational mobility table. In most ıdies, only one observation is made on : father, his occupation being reported of the time of the subject's birth or ado-cence (for example), or as his longest cupation, or his occupation at a specified e. However, information on subjects' oc-pations at three or more points in time, detailed work histories, has sometimes en collected.

Several techniques have been used to alyze occupational mobility tables: sim-: percentage analysis of origin by desti-tion or vice versa;[1] contingency table ıalysis by means of one or another meas-ure of association;[2] and, most recently, analysis of the properties of mobility tables regarded as stochastic matrices.[3] A refine-ment of this last approach that is particu-

[1] Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1927); P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1937); S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959).

[2] Livio Livi, "Sur la mesure de la mobilité sociale," *Population*, V (January, 1950), 65–76; Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); D. V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain* (Glencoe, Ill : Free Press, 1954); W. Z. Billewicz, "Some Remarks on the Measurement of Social Mobility," *Population Studies*, IX (July, 1955), 96–100.

[3] S. J. Prais, "Measuring Social Mobility," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Ser. A, CXVIII (1955), 56–66; S. J. Prais, "The Formal Theory of Social Mobility," *Population Studies*, IX (July, 1955), 72–81; Judah Matras, "Comparison of Intergenerational Occupational Mobility Patterns: An Application of the Formal Theory of Social Mobility," *Population Studies*, XIV (November, 1960), 163–69.

larly suggestive for our work was made by Carlsson, who showed how an intervening variable like educational attainment may be introduced by matrix methods into the treatment of mobility as a Markov process.[4]

Still another approach, the investigation of intercorrelations and regression relationships among occupations reported for two or more points in time, has not yet been adequately explored, although incidental use of such techniques is mentioned in the literature.[5] A procedure suggested by Tumin and Feldman is, in fact, a rough approximation to regression analysis.[6] It is the purpose of this paper, accordingly, to exemplify the regression approach with a somewhat meticulous analysis of a set of data sufficiently interesting to merit attention on substantive as well as methodological grounds.

DATA AND METHODS

The data in question derive from the Chicago portion of the Six-City Survey of Labor Mobility, the techniques and general findings of which are described in a summary report of the survey.[7] Our main analysis pertains to some 1,105 males who were twenty-five to sixty-four years old in early 1951, when the survey was taken. We focus attention on the respondent's educational attainment (number of years of school completed) and three occupation items: the occupation of the respondent's longest job held during 1950; that of his job held during January, 1940; and the occupation of his "father's longest job." Classifications of the respondents by age, race, migrant status, veteran status, and number of jobs held between 1940 and 1950 are incidental to the analysis. All three occupation reports were originally coded according to the census detailed (three-digit) system. Information is likewise available on detailed (three-digit) industry, which is needed for the assignment of socioeconomic status scores to occupations by the method described below.

The regression approach requires one fundamental assumption that is not intrinsic to several of the other techniques commonly used in studying occupational mobility. It must be assumed that occupations can be assigned values on the scale of a quantitative variable. In point of fact, occupations differ in a number of ways,[8] and the great variety of differences among kinds of work can by no means be reduced to variation along a single dimension. The typical interest in studies of occupational mobility, however, is in movement between occupations at different levels of so-called "socioeconomic" status, that is, in vertical mobility, so that the assumption necessary here is not an idiosyncratic one.

Certain recent mobility studies, indeed, have included extensive preliminary investigations of the prestige ratings or socioeconomic levels of occupations, in order to present mobility tables with occupations listed in rank order or by grades.[9] In this regard, the present study is in a stronger position than its predecessors, in consequence of recent work on the status of occupations.[10] In brief, this work has sub-

[4] Gösta Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1958), chap. vii.

[5] S. M. Lipset and F. T. Malm, "First Jobs and Career Patterns," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, XIV (1955), 247–61; Carlsson, *op. cit.*, ch. viii; Kaare Svalastoga, *Prestige, Class and Mobility* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1959), p. 351.

[6] M. Tumin and A. S. Feldman, "Theory and Measurement of Occupational Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (June, 1957), 281–88; errors in this paper are corrected in James A. Geschwender, "Theory and Measurement of Occupational Mobility: A Re-examination," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (June, 1961), 451–52.

[7] Gladys L. Palmer, *Labor Mobility in Six Cities* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954).

[8] D. J. Bogue, *The Population of the United States* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), chap. xvii.

[9] Glass, *op. cit.*; Svalastoga, *op. cit.*; Carlsson, *op. cit.*

[10] Albert J. Reiss, Jr., with collaborators, *Occupations and Social Status* (New York. Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), chaps. vi–vii.

stantiated the following propositions concerning occupational status in the contemporary United States: (1) The general public manifests a remarkable consensus on the prestige rating of well-known occupations; different strata or segments of the population rank occupations in almost precisely the same order. (2) The ratings by the general public scarcely vary according to the nominal criteria of rating. That is, respondents who claim to assess the "general standing" of occupations primarily on the basis of monetary returns rate the occupations in almost exactly the same way as do respondents who vouchsafe such a criterion as "service to others." (3) The prestige rating of an occupation, ascertained from queries addressed to a cross-section of the general public, can be reproduced to a close approximation, given census information on the educational levels and income distributions of males pursuing those occupations. Thus, for forty-five occupations rated in the 1947 National Opinion Research Center study of occupational prestige, there is a multiple correlation of 0.91 corresponding to the regression of the percentage of positive ("excellent" plus "good") ratings received by the occupation in the survey on the percentage of males in the occupation reporting 1949 incomes of $3,500 or more and the percentage with educational attainment at the level of high-school graduation or higher (both independent variables being standardized for age). (4) The regression weights obtained in this analysis may be applied to occupations for which prestige ratings are not available so as to compute a "socioeconomic index," which is tantamount to a prediction of the prestige rating they would receive if included in a survey. Such an index, therefore, has both external validity (as an efficient predictor of prestige rating) and internal or prima facie validity, being a composite of the two items most commonly recognized as signs of socioeconomic status.[11]

Values of the socioeconomic index are available[12] for some 446 occupations in the census detailed classification. A number of subcategories in this classification actually refer to class of worker or industry (e.g., occupations in the group of managers, officials, and proprietors are subdivided into self-employed and salaried; foremen, operatives, and laborers not elsewhere classified are subdivided by detailed industry). In the present study, then, each detailed occupation was assigned a two-digit score, ranging from 0 to 96, to represent its socioeconomic status (SES). Some modifications of the published values of the index were required for lack of information on class of worker of father's longest job. Scores for the salaried and self-employed subcategories of several occupations were averaged using 1950 labor force weights.

It must be conceded that the occupational SES score lacks the properties of a true interval scale, and any reasonable monotonic transformation of it might be justified as easily as the particular set of values used here. In our view, however, such a justification should be sought in whatever contribution a transformation might make to the ease of executing or interpreting a statistical analysis of correlates of occupational SES. There was no occasion to consider a transformation in the present analysis.

There is little question that the SES index is more suitable for measuring vertical mobility than is the classification of occupations by census major occupation groups. The well-known heterogeneity of occupations within each category of the latter is easily illustrated. Among "professional, technical, and kindred" occupations one finds entertainers (SES score, 31) as well as dentists (96). "Managers, officials, and proprietors" include building managers and superintendents (32) along with credit men (74). Shipping and receiving clerks (22) are classified as "clerical and kindred workers," as are ticket and

[11] E.g., in the well-known work of Alba M. Edwards, *Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), Part III.

[12] Reiss, *op. cit.*, Appendix B.

express agents (60). Scores for "craftsmen" range as widely as 19 for carpenters to 52 for compositors and typesetters. Even "laborers" are somewhat differentiated: the SES score for construction laborers is 7, as compared with 26 for laborers in petroleum refining. Nevertheless, the major occupation group classification accounted for about three-quarters of the variation in occupational SES among all males in the United States experienced civilian labor force in 1950, weighting each occupation and occupation group by its frequency in this population.

Two limitations of the SES index should be acknowledged, although they are not unique to it. First, there is the well-known difficulty of measuring the status of farm periods during which some of the fathers were engaged in their longest jobs. Unfortunately, the present study cannot cope with this problem any more effectively than have earlier investigations. A specific point of vulnerability for a time-specific index is discussed subsequently.

With one exception, our analysis employs conventional linear zero-order and multiple regression equations. The exception is the introduction of a squared term to account for the anticipated curvilinearity in the relationship of occupational SES to education.[14] The results suggest that this refinement could have been omitted without great loss, although the squared term has significant coefficients in several of the regression equations.




FIG. 1.—Assumed causal sequence of variables (diagram purports to identify relationships among selected factors determining an individual's access to occupational status, not the determinants of aggregate movements in the total economy that affect the availability of opportunities).

and non-farm occupations on a single scale. Although the work summarized above provides index values for the occupations of farmer and farm laborer, it seemed prudent to hold these values suspect and to confine the main part of the analysis to men with non-farm origins. No doubt this is a less serious problem in a study concerning the working force of a metropolitan center than it would be in a national study. Second, for lack of information on the matter, it is necessary to ignore spatiotemporal variation in occupational SES, applying the same scale to occupations pursued at different times and places. Such information as we have suggests that there is considerable short-run stability in the relative prestige and SES of occupations,[13] but this information does not pertain to the fairly remote

The causal paths that we conceive to underlie the statistical associations in the data are suggested by Figure 1, where the variables are ordered by their assumed temporal sequence. Occupational SES is examined only for men at least twenty-four years old; the 1940 occupations of men twenty-five to thirty-four years old in 1951 are disregarded. In most cases (the conspicuous exceptions being veterans of World War II resuming their schooling after the War) the assumption that completion of education precedes our observations of occupational status is close to the truth. The time reference of "father's longest job," however, is more equivocal. In the first place, the father-son age difference may vary from as little as twenty to as much as fifty years. In the case of a

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 151–54.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

son born late in his father's life who prolonged his schooling, there is a strong likelihood that the father had begun, if not completed, the tenure of his "longest job" by the time the son completed his education. By contrast, a son who was born early in his father's life and who dropped out of school early may well have established his own occupational career line before the father entered what was to be his longest job. The fathers of some of the younger men in the survey were doubtlessly still at work in 1951—indeed, the universe from which the sample of men fifty-five to sixty-four years old was drawn must have included many of the fathers of the men twenty-five to thirty-four years old. The "longest job" reported for a father who was still at work in 1951 need not be the same as the one that would be reported after his working life terminates. Our assumption that father's occupation is temporally prior to son's education and occupation, therefore, neglects an undetermined number of anachronistic cases. There is no basis, however, for correcting the assumption in individual cases, or for estimating whether it leads to errors more serious than those of misreporting known to afflict all surveys.

MAJOR FINDINGS

The sample means and standard deviations of the education and occupation variables (Table 1) serve not only to describe the groups under study but also to suggest the advisability of making inferences with caution. Means of occupational SES are observed to fall below the midpoint of this variable's range (0–96) and to be small in comparison with the standard deviations. The variable is, therefore, somewhat skewed to the right. Conventional regression techniques, however, are not invalidated if, as appears to be the case from cursory study of residuals, the dependent variable is almost normally distributed around the regression surface.

TABLE 1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES, BY AGE, FOR WHITE MALES OF NON-FARM ORIGINS, CHICAGO LABOR MOBILITY SAMPLE, 1951

AGE (IN 1951)	OCCUPATIONAL SES		EDUCATION (SQ)	EDUCATION*	FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL SES	NO. OF CASES†
	1950	1940				
	Means					
25–34	37.2	. . .	131.8	11.2	31.7	315 (281)
35–44	41.3	35.5	118.5	10.5	31.2	381 (346)
45–54	39.4	38.8	98.7	9.4	34.1	316 (285)
55–64	43.1	42.3	89.8	8.8	36.0	207 (193)
	Standard Deviations					
25–34	21.8	. . .	56.7	2.5	20.7	
35–44	21.5	22.1	61.8	2.8	22.0	
45–54	21.7	21.4	64.9	3.2	22.7	
55–64	22.0	22.4	67.3	3.5	23.5	

* Data are coded in intervals of school years completed. The following values were assumed: None, 0; 1–4 years, 2.5, 5–7 years, 6; graduation from elementary school, 8, 1–3 years of high school, 10, graduation from high school, 12, 1–3 years of college, 14, graduation from college, 16, 1 or more years of graduate study, 17.5.

† Number in parentheses excludes observations duplicated in weighting samples to secure unbiased estimates.

An excess of upward over downward mo-

bility is suggested by several comparisons of mean occupational SES. Respondents in each age group had higher mean scores in both 1940 and 1950 than did their fathers. Intrageneration changes, 1940–50, were positive for all three cohorts; but intercohort, age-constant, comparisons are not wholly consistent, since the 1950 mean for men 45–54 years old falls below the 1940 mean for men 55–64 (in 1951). With this exception, however, all comparisons thus far mentioned are in accord with the supposition of a positive time trend of occupational SES in the population and a general tendency toward upward mobility over the greater portion of the working life-cycle. By contrast, cross-sectional age comparisons of mean occupational SES of fathers may appear to be inconsistent with known trends. At least part of the explanation derives from the elimination from the sample of men with farm origins, who comprise the following proportions of all white males in the survey: 5.7 per cent of men 25–34, 7.1 per cent of men 35–44, 15.5 per cent of men 45–54, and 26.9 per cent of men 55–64. If we assign a score of 14 as the father's occupational SES for all men with farm origins, we obtain the following means for the total sample by age groups (in the order just given): 30.7, 30.0, 31.0, and 30.1. Since the men of farm origins had lower SES scores than those of non-farm origins, the 1950 mean occupational SES for the two groups combined varied by age in the following manner: 36.5, 40.7, 37.1, and 36.8.

Table 2 presents the salient results of calculations pertaining to regression equations of the form,

$$\hat{Y} = a + b_{Y3\cdot 12}X_3 + b_{Y2\cdot 13}X_2 + b_{Y1\cdot 23}X_1 , \quad (1)$$

where Y is the respondent's occupational SES in 1950 or in 1940, X_1 is his father's occupational SES, X_2 is his educational attainment in number of school years completed, and X_3 is the square of X_2. The logic of our causal model (Fig. 1) suggests that the following questions are most relevant to the interpretation of the results: (1) What is the gross association between the SES of sons and their fathers? (2) How is this association mediated by the intervening factor of educational attainment? (3) What is the net association of this intervening factor with the SES of sons, apart from its dependence on father's SES?

The answer to the first question may be somewhat surprising to readers familiar with the apparently high "indexes of association"[15] or "inheritance ratios"[16] reported in previous studies of intergenerational mobility, for the zero-order father-son correlation (r_{Y1}) is only about .3 (last column, lower panel of Table 2). Thus, of the total variation in occupational SES, roughly one-tenth, at most, can be attributed to level of origin. Inasmuch as the standard deviations of son's and father's SES are quite similar (Table 1), the zero-order regression coefficient likewise approximates .3. There is, therefore, a very pronounced "regression toward the mean," which implies that sons originating at the lowest SES levels undergo appreciable upward mobility (on the average), while those whose fathers' jobs were of high SES experience downward mobility on the whole. This, in our view, is a more fundamental feature of a mobility table than is the repeatedly stated finding that "all sons are more likely to engage in their fathers' occupation than in any other single occupation."[17] The amount of occupational inheritance, of course, is strictly relative to the system of occupational classification employed. In our data, some 9.8 per cent of the respondents' 1950 occupational SES scores were identical with those of their fathers, variation by age being quite minor. Identical SES scores, of course, do not necessarily imply identity of specific occupations, and even the latter does not necessarily imply "occupational inheritance" in the strict sense of the transmission of a skill, business enterprise, or professional

[15] Glass, *op. cit.*

[16] Rogoff, *op. cit.*

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

practice from father to son. Ten per cent, therefore, is clearly a maximum estimate of the amount of occupational inheritance experienced by men in this sample.

We should, of course, expect a higher proportion of occupational inheritance and a father-son occupational SES correlation exceeding .3 in a national sample, wherein interarea covariation and, particularly, occupational inheritance in farming would be salient factors. In a national sample of the Danish population about 1954, however, the father-son correlation was no higher than .485 for sons born before 1884 and dropped to .408 for those born in 1914–23.[18]

The second question is motivated by the assumption that sons originating at high SES levels enjoy an advantage over those with more modest origins in respect to educational opportunity. This assumption is confirmed by the correlations (r_{12}) of education with father's occupational SES: .30 for men 25–34, .43 for men 35–44, .36 for men 45–54, and .37 for men 55–64 (r_{12} is

[18] Svalastoga, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS RELATING RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATIONAL SES IN 1950 AND 1940 TO EDUCATION AND FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL SES, BY AGE, FOR WHITE MALES OF NON-FARM ORIGINS, CHICAGO LABOR MOBILITY SAMPLE, 1951

DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND AGE (IN 1951)	CONSTANT TERM	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE			CORRELATION	
		Education Sq (X_3)	Education (X_2)	Father's Occupational SES (X_1)		
	Regression Coefficients in Raw Score Form				$R_{Y(123)}$	$R_{Y(23).1}$
Y = 1950 Occupational SES:						
25-34	34 92	0.475	−5 738	0 124	.65	.60
35-44	37 46	0 348	−3.838*	0 097	.57	.50
45-54	32 51	0 295	−2.838*	0 131	.55	.48
55-64	23 49	0 152	0.196†	0 117*	.55	.48
Y = 1940 Occupational SES:						
35-44	11 65	0 098†	0 565†	0 201	47	.33
45-54	32 53	0 254	−2 744*	0.205	.50	.38
55-64	21 22	0 066†	1 370†	0 087*	.45	.39
	Regression Coefficients in Standard Measure				Indirect Path‡	r_{Y1}
Y = 1950 Occupational SES:						
25-34	...	1 238	−0 667	0.118	0 175	.29
35-44	...	1.003	−0 498*	0.100	0 215	.31
45-54		0 884	−0 420*	0.137	0 163	.30
55-64	..	0 464	0 031†	0.124*	0 176	.30
Y = 1940 Occupational SES:						
35-44	..	0.274†	0.071†	0.199	0 148	.35
45-54	..	0.773	−0 412*	0 218	0 126	.34
55-64	......	0.197†	0 215†	0 091*	0.150	.24

* Individual regression coefficient is less than twice its standard error; in every case, however, the combination of the two education variables makes a significant increase in explained variation over X_1 (Calculations of standard errors included no correction for departure of sample design from simple random sampling)

† Individual regression coefficient is less than its standard error.

‡ Indirect path = $r_{12}b^*_{Y2.13} + r_{13}b^*_{Y3.12}$; two terms are involved because education is represented in both linear and squared form (The direct path, $b^*_{Y1.23}$, is given in the adjacent column to the left)

virtually identical with r_{13} in each instance). In treating education as an intervening variable it is convenient to regard the gross father-son SES correlation as having two components, the "direct" effect (or "delayed" effect in the terminology of Carlsson[19]) independent of the association of education with father's SES, and the "indirect" effect of father's SES manifested via education. We make use of the identity employed in the theory of path coefficients:

$$r_{Y1} = b^*_{Y1.23} + r_{12} b^*_{Y2.13} + r_{13} b^*_{Y3.12},$$

where the b^*'s are the net regression coefficients obtained when each variable is expressed in units of its standard deviation. The last three columns of the lower panel of Table 2 present the father-son SES correlation and its decomposition into the two additive "effects." Note that the indirect path ($r_{12} b^*_{Y2.13} + r_{13} b^*_{Y3.12}$) outweighs the direct ($b^*_{Y1.23}$) in each of the four age groups as far as 1950 occupational SES is concerned, but in only one of the three age groups whose 1940 SES was studied. However, the indirect path makes a substantial contribution to the gross father-son SES correlation in both instances.

Turning to the association of education with son's occupational achievement, we should first note that on a zero-order basis, this association is appreciably greater than that between son's and father's occupations. Table 3 shows that the correlation between education and occupational SES was about .5–.6 for 1950 occupation, and a little more than .4 for 1940 occupation in each age group (cols. [3]–[5] of the table will be referred to presently). These gross associations, however, do not answer our third question, for they reflect in part the correlation between education and father's occupation. The more relevant statistic is the multiple-partial coefficient, shown in the last column, top panel of Table 2. This measure is defined by the relation,

$$R^2_{Y(23).1} = (R^2_{Y(123)} - r^2_{Y1}) / (1 - r^2_{Y1}),$$

where $R_{Y(123)}$ is the multiple correlation between respondent's occupational SES in the specified year and his education and his father's occupational SES. The multiple-

TABLE 3

REGRESSION AND CORRELATION OF RESPONDENT'S OCCUPATION IN 1950 AND 1940 WITH EDUCATION, BY AGE, FOR WHITE MALES OF NON-FARM ORIGINS, CHICAGO LABOR MOBILITY SAMPLE, 1951

YEAR AND AGE (IN 1951)	CORRELATION OF OCCUPATIONAL SES (Y) WITH		ZERO-ORDER REGRESSION OF OCCUPATIONAL SES (Y) ON EDUCATION (X_2)	CORRELATION RATIO OF EDUCATION (X_2) ON MAJOR OCCUPATION	
	Education (X_2) (1)	Education Sq (X_3) (2)	(3)	Actual (4)	Expected* (5)
1950:					
25–34	58	62	4 95	.55	.40
35–44	.53	55	4 11	52	.49
45–54	49	52	3.31	52	47
55–64	52	54	3.28	53	
1940.					
35–44	43	43	3 39	42	
45–54	.42	.45	2 80	.49	
55–64	44	44	2 80	.51	

* Correlation ratio expected on basis of education-occupation relationship observed for cohort at comparable age in 1940 and the education distribution of later cohort (see text).

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

partial coefficient, $R_{Y(23).1}$, would be a conventional partial correlation between respondent's occupational SES and education, holding constant father's occupation, but for the fact that we are representing education by two variables. It will be noted that the multiple-partial coefficient for education differs little from the zero-order coefficients in Table 3, particularly as far as 1950 occupation is concerned. It is, moreover, substantially greater than the zero-order correlation between father's and son's occupational SES, at least for 1950 occupation.

Our findings, then, are reasonably unequivocal on two points, if we state them conservatively: (*a*) Education is a more important determinant of occupational achievement than is father's occupation. (*b*) Education accounts for an important component of such effect on occupational achievement as father's occupation does have.

A third conclusion—that education was a less important factor in 1940 than in 1950, in both the foregoing senses—is perhaps even more interesting but requires more detailed examination. It is true that the multiple-partial correlation for education and the indirect path from father's to son's occupational SES via education are higher for 1950 than for 1940, making either intercohort or intracohort comparisons. Switching to a regression framework, it may be seen in column (3) of Table 3 that the zero-order regression coefficients of occupation on linear education also increase substantially from 1940 to 1950 (in both intercohort and intracohort comparisons), suggesting that the "tightening" of the education-occupation relationship revealed by the movement of the correlation coefficients may have been fostered by an increased rate of return upon educational "investments" resulting from unspecified movements in the supply and demand for personnel of various grades. This possibility is not mitigated by holding father's occupation constant. For example, when the partial derivatives with respect to education are computed from the regression equations in the top half of Table 2, their values for high-school graduates are patterned in much the same way as the zero-order regression coefficients:

Age in 1951	Value of Partial Derivative for $X_2=12$	
	1940	1950
25–34 . .		5 66
35–44 . .	2 92	4 51
45–54	3.35	4 24
55–64 . . .	2 95	3 84

Although these illustrative results diverge from the pattern of the zero-order regression coefficients in minor ways, namely, an accentuation of the intercohort difference between those aged 25–34 in 1950 and 1940 and reversals in the 1940 cross-sectional pattern, both the intercohort and intracohort comparisons show gains in the expected status increment for completing an additional year of schooling subsequent to high-school graduation. While the latter set of findings may hinge on the increased percentage of professionals in later cohorts —and, hence, accentuation of the curvilinearity in the education-occupation relationship—the congruence of the differences observed in each of the sets of findings reviewed above suggests that they may not be accidental.

There is, however, the possibility that they are spurious. Recall that the index of occupational SES was constructed from national data on occupations *as of 1950*. Had 1940 data been used, the index values would have been somewhat different, though not greatly so. The finding that occupation and education were more closely related in our sample as of 1950 than as of 1940 may, therefore, have simply been "built into" the index of occupational status we are using. We cannot repeat the analysis with an index of occupational SES based on 1940 relationships, but it is pos-

sible to calculate a measure of the occupation-education association based on an occupational classification, the census major occupation groups, that was introduced in 1940 and was "biased," if at all, toward the earlier year. This measure, the correlation ratio of education on major occupation group, is shown in column (4) of Table 3. Since education is taken to be the same in both years, differences between the years are due solely to occupational shifts. These shifts were, indeed, in the direction of increasing the correlation, although the increase was appreciable in only one of the three intracohort or intercohort, age-constant comparisons. The conservative phrasing of the conclusion, then, is that education was no less important as a determinant of 1950 than of 1940 occupational SES. The possibility of an increase in the relative importance of education is, however, consistent with the finding that its apparent effect is certainly no less for the younger than for the older age groups, despite the fact (Table 1) that the dispersion of number of school years completed is inversely related to age.

Since "as schools enrol progressively larger proportions of children and retain them longer, the correlation between schooling and later occupations can diminish over time,"[20] some observers have interpreted the declining variance in educational attainment as prima facie evidence of an increasing independence of occupation from education. Such a view, although it may well prove correct in the long run, does not entertain the possibility of increased selectivity of occupational recruitment. Moreover, the data at hand indicate that no more than a negligible decline in the occupation-education association could have resulted from changes in educational distribution. Under the assumption that occupational attainment for each education level remained constant at comparable ages over the 1940–50 decade, the cohorts aged 25–34, 35–44, and 45–54 in 1950 were distributed by occupation at each educational level according to the rates observed in cohorts reaching identical ages in 1940. The "expected" correlation ratio of occupation on education derived from these distributions is reported in column (5) of Table 3. The expected values of .40, .49, and .47 for those aged, respectively, 25–34, 35–44, and 45–54 in 1950 differ only slightly from the observed values of .42, .49, and .51 for those at the same ages in 1940. Such decline as may be observed in two of the comparisons is, however, due solely to changes in educational distribution.

If the data do not negate the possibility of an increase in the influence of education, they hardly suggest any increase in the gross or net association of son's with father's SES. Indeed, the finding that may warrant greatest emphasis, at least as a corrective to premature conclusions concerning increased "rigidity in the status structure,"[21] is that no more than one- to two-fifths of the variation (as shown by $R^2_{Y(123)}$) in current occupational SES can be accounted for by the combination of two admittedly critical background factors, education and level of origin.

MOBILITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The reader will have noticed that the dependent variable in our analysis is son's occupational status, not his occupational mobility. Our procedure thus stands in contrast to the fairly common one of tabulating a sample simultaneously by level of educational attainment and pattern of mobility as represented by such categories as ascent, stability, and descent, derived from the comparison of the son's with his father's occupation.[22] This conventional type of analysis is vulnerable on several counts. First, both "ascent" and "descent" include

[20] C. Arnold Anderson, "A Skeptical Note on the Relation of Vertical Mobility to Education," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVI (May, 1961), 560.

[21] A. B. Hollingshead, "Trends in Social Stratification: A Case Study," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (December, 1952), 679–86.

[22] E.g., Svalastoga, *op. cit.*, pp. 399–402.

father-son differences of widely varying degree, while the frequency of "stability" (or occupational inheritance, as already discussed) is a function of the breadth and heterogeneity of occupation categories. Second, the gross association of mobility with education is difficult to interpret without taking into account the level of origin, which is, of course, the base line for detecting mobility. To introduce level of origin in any detail as a third classificatory factor, however, would require samples of much larger size than are ordinarily available. The regression approach, by contrast, permits an analysis that is both more precise (assuming occupational status is quantified acceptably) and more effective in taking more than one variable into account simultaneously. Moreover, as we shall indicate, results that would be obtained taking "mobility" as the dependent variable emerge as a by-product of the regression model employed here, although they actually contribute no additional information.

Suppose we define a "mobility" variable, $M = Y - X_1$, the difference between son's and father's occupational SES (positive differences, of course, represent upward mobility or "ascent," negative differences "descent"). To ascertain how mobility is related to education, taking level of origin into account, we might naturally work out the regression,

$$\hat{M} = a' + b_3'X_3 + b_2'X_2 + b_1'X_1 , \quad (2)$$

elaborating the results along somewhat the same lines as those of the preceding analysis. It can easily be shown, however, that the intercept and the coefficients of X_3 and X_2 in equation (2) are identical with the corresponding ones in equation (1), and that $b_1' = b_{Y1\cdot23} - 1$. If the partial correlation is accepted as an indication of the importance of education, this rearrangement of the variables does not affect the estimate of its importance, for $R_{M(23)\cdot1}$ is identical with $R_{Y(23)\cdot1}$. Since the variances of Y and X_1 are about equal and $r_{Y1} < 0.5$, M has a larger variance than Y, and the proportion of variation in M "explained" by X_1 is greater than the proportion of variation in Y explained by X_1. The analysis-of-variance table for the two multiple regressions will, therefore, look somewhat different. For example, the percentages of sums of squares attributed to each source of variation are as follows for men 25–34 years old:

Source	Sum of Squares, Y	Sum of Squares, M
Regression on X_1, X_2, X_3	42 0	56 9
Regression on X_1 alone	*8.6*	*32.1*
Increment for X_2 and X_3	*33 4*	*24.8*
Remainder . .	58 0	43 1
Total	100 0	100 0

In the second manner of arranging the results, father's occupation apparently becomes much more prominent as an explanatory factor, but only because the same phenomenon of "regression toward the mean" has been expressed in a different way. It is thus quite possible that controversies concerning the relative importance of factors affecting mobility[23] really have more to do with preferences as between mathematically equivalent ways of displaying the data than with differences as to the facts of the case.

If this suggestion requires additional emphasis, the reader is invited to study Table 4, the first panel of which presents the data in the conventional form, "mobility" versus education, for one of the age groups. In the second and third panels, we make use of regression equation (1) to classify the cases according to "expected mobility." Setting $\hat{Y} = X_1$ and rearranging terms to provide an explicit solution for the latter, we obtain,

$$X_1 = \frac{a + b_{Y3\cdot12}X_3 + b_{Y2\cdot13}X_2}{1 - b_{Y1\cdot23}} , \quad (3)$$

which defines the locus of all combinations of values of X_1, X_2, and X_3 ($= X_2^2$) compatible with "stability" as the expected out-

[23] C. Arnold Anderson, *op. cit.*

come for the son. Geometrically, equation (3) defines two regions in the $(X_1\ X_2)$ plane such that "upward" mobility is the expectation for any instance to the left, "downward" mobility for any to the right (see Fig. 2). Comparison of the bottom two panels of Table 4 makes it clear that the likelihood of a son's experiencing upward mobility, given his educational attainment, is very much dependent upon his level of origin. At the higher levels of origin, as one can see from Figure 2, very nearly a maximum amount of education is required to forestall downward mobility, while at the lower origin levels, upward mobility is in prospect irrespective of the amount of education.

TABLE 4

INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN RELATION TO EDUCATION FOR WHITE MALES OF NON-FARM ORIGINS, 25–34 YEARS OLD, CHICAGO LABOR MOBILITY SAMPLE, 1951

Education and Expected Mobility	No. of Cases*	Observed Mobility: Upward	Stability	Downward	Per Cent Upward
All cases:					
College, 1 year or more	58	40	10	8	69 0
High school graduation.	103	51	6	46	49.5
Some high school .. .	110	57	13	40	51.8
No high school	44	21	5	18	47.7
Upward.†					
College, 1 year or more.	46	37	5	4	80 4
High school graduation	67	44	5	18	65 7
Some high school	74	52	8	14	70 3
No high school . ..	27	17	2	8	63 0
Downward:†					
College, 1 year or more	12	3	5	4	25 0
High school graduation	36	7	1	28	19 4
Some high school .	36	5	5	26	13 9
No high school	17	4	3	10	23 5

* Includes thirty-four cases duplicated in weighting sample to secure unbiased estimates

† Expectation based on regression equation relating 1950 occupational SES to education and father's occupational SES, see Fig 2 and first line of Table 2




FIG. 2.—Prediction of intergenerational mobility from education and father's occupational SES.

FURTHER RESULTS

Intrageneration mobility has not been dealt with explicitly as yet, although differences in the findings for 1950 and 1940 occupations can only be due to this factor The three age groups for which we have measures of intrageneration mobility were, of course, at different stages of their work careers in both 1940 and 1950. All previous evidence suggests that mobility should have been more pronounced for the younger men. This is borne out by the intracohort mean shifts, 1940–50, recorded in Table 1, and by interannual correlations, which were

0.55 for men 35–44 years old in 1951, 0.77 for men 45–54, and 0.87 for men 55–64. More important than the confirmation of this point, however, is the question of whether any "delayed effects" on 1950 status may be attributed to the background factors, education and father's occupation, net of their contribution to the determination of 1940 status. The pertinent evidence is summarized in Table 5. The answer is clearly in the affirmative for the youngest men, since the background factors make a net contribution to the estimate of 1950 status fully as important as that of 1940 status. Even for the older men, however, the background factors retain a significant position, though their independent contribution is small as compared with status ten years earlier.

TABLE 5

PROPORTION OF VARIATION IN 1950 OCCUPATIONAL SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS ACCOUNTED FOR BY SELECTED COMBINATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, BY AGE, FOR WHITE MALES OF NON-FARM ORIGINS, CHICAGO LABOR MOBILITY SAMPLE, 1951

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	AGE		
	35–44	45–54	55–64
Father's occupational SES, education*	32	30	30
1940 occupational SES*	30	60	75
Father's occupational SES, education, 1940 occupational SES*	44	64	78
Father's occupational SES, education, holding constant 1940 occupational SES†	19	10	14
1940 occupational SES; holding constant father's occupational SES, education†	17	48	69

* Zero order or multiple coefficients of determination.
† Multiple partial coefficients of determination.

A number of personal characteristics other than education often are supposed to influence occupational mobility. In confining our main analysis to white males we have, in effect, recognized one of the most important—color. Although there are not enough data for a full examination of this factor, some indirect evidence is fairly conclusive. We have 107 observations on non-white males of non-farm origins, 25–64 years old (including five cases duplicated in weighting the sample). If these non-white men had the same average 1950 occupational SES scores as whites of the corresponding ages, their over-all mean would be 39.3. If their educational background and occupational origins are taken into account, making use of the appropriate age-specific regression equations, an expected mean of 34.4 is obtained. Both of these hypothetical values contrast sharply with the observed mean, 23.4. The inferior occupational achievement of non-whites apparently can be attributed in only a minor degree to the two background factors, since the difference (39.3 — 34.4) is less than a third of the difference (39.3 — 23.4). This inference, however, depends on the assumption of qualitative equivalence of white and non-white educational and occupational backgrounds when the background variables have equal numerical values. The implausibility of this assumption makes us think that the above calculation gives too little weight to the non-white's background handicap, as compared to white-non-white discrimination between men with equal backgrounds. We should hardly be disposed, however, to discount the possibility of discrimination entirely.

Another background characteristic whose importance was assumed in the design of our analysis is farm origin. On the occupational SES scale, farmers are scored 14; hence, the men with farm origins might simply have been given this score for father's occupational SES (except for the very

few reporting their fathers' occupations as farm laborers). It was suspected, and the data confirm this suspicion, that farm origin offers considerably more of a handicap than is implied by even so low a score. Using the appropriate age-specific regression equations established for males of non-farm origins, and assigning fourteen points for father's occupational SES, we obtain an average expected value for 182 (including thirteen duplicates) white males, 25–64 years old with farm origins, that is 9.9 points higher than their observed mean 1950 occupational SES score. The discrepancy is even larger, 13.6, for eighty-two (including three duplicates) non-white males of farm origins. Thus, the occupational achievement of farmers' sons in Chicago is well below that of the sons of non-farm fathers whose occupations have nominally equivalent SES scores. In fact, one can calculate that it would be necessary to attribute a rather substantial *negative* SES score to farmers if the regression equation calculated for sons of non-farm fathers were to yield unbiased estimates. Although the difficulty of placing farmers in a status system dominated by non-farm occupations has been observed frequently, we are not aware of any previous work on occupational achievement that makes the point quite so conclusively. We should mention the likelihood that a large proportion of the older men with farm origins were born abroad or had a foreign-born father.

An additional piece of evidence concerning the occupational attainment of those with farm origins is derived from the regression of 1950 occupational SES on linear education for fifty-eight (including six duplicates) farm background white males aged 45–54 in 1950 and for seventy-six (including four duplicates) individuals aged 55–64. Both the regression coefficients (0.92 for those aged 45–54 in 1951 and 0.51 for those 55–64) and the correlations (respectively, .22 and .15) are substantially less than those observed for whites of non-farm origin (see Table 3). While these differences are to be expeced given the restricted level of educational attainment among these groups (the means are 7.4 for those 45–54 and 6.0 for those 55–64), an observed intracohort decline in both the correlation and regression coefficients is worthy of comment. The correlation of occupational SES in 1940 with education was .44 for those aged 45–54 in 1951 and .28 for those aged 55–64; the corresponding regression coefficients were 2.00 and 0.99. Since all but five of these individuals had left the farm by 1940, the declines cannot be attributed to the pursuit of low-status farm occupations at the earlier date. Our suggestion is that occupational "socialization" and on-the-job training play much greater roles in eventual occupational attainment for those with quantitatively (and in the case of those with rural origins, we assume qualitatively) inferior educational backgrounds, even though educational attainment may persist as an initial criterion for occupational selection.

The final personal characteristic, veteran status, to which we refer, unlike the others is not so much a "background" as a "contingent" factor. It may serve to illustrate how developments subsequent to the launching of a work career may be taken into account in analyzing the relationship of current status to background characteristics. Both veterans and non-veterans are included in the sample analyzed earlier, although no distinction between them was made in the regression calculations. Table 6 introduces the classification as a grouping of the residuals from the regression surfaces. Among males 30–39 years old, veterans in 1950 held occupations somewhat higher in SES than did non-veterans. Because of their slightly superior backgrounds, they could be expected to enjoy superior achievement; yet their actual superiority was greater than that expected on the basis of the regressions. Superficially, this looks as though veterans had come to enjoy some advantages in the competition with non-veterans. But this interpretation is rendered

suspect by the observation that, as far as the 35–39 year age group is concerned, men who were later to become veterans already in 1940 held higher occupational statuses than did those who remained non-veterans. The process of selection of members of the armed forces, therefore, is a more plausible explanation of the findings. The results differ for the 40–44 age group, in which veterans manifested no superiority. If this reversal is not a mere sampling fluctuation, one would have to hypothesize a process of selection operating differently on this cohort than on the younger ones. Bearing in mind the rather advanced age of these men at the outbreak of World War II, such a hypothesis might be attractive.

Although the findings on veteran status are merely suggestive, they do indicate that any further analysis, where sample size is adequate, could profit by using this classification as a "treatment factor" in a standard analysis-of-covariance setup. Close control on age would be especially important here.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The substantive conclusions of this study can claim no greater generality than those of any study based on a local population observed during a restricted time period. Dependable relationships established for mid-century Chicago, nevertheless, are of potential interest to the student who may be in a position to compare them with results for other times and places or to accept them as hypotheses for testing in another situation. In summary, we have learned that the occupational status of males in the 1951 Chicago working force was quite loosely related to the status of their fathers. For white males whose fathers were not

TABLE 6

MEAN OCCUPATIONAL SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS IN 1950 AND 1940, ACTUAL AND EXPECTED ON THE BASIS OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS, FOR SELECTED WHITE MALES OF NON-FARM ORIGINS, BY AGE AND VETERAN STATUS, CHICAGO LABOR MOBILITY SAMPLE, 1951

Age in 1951	Veterans*			Non-Veterans*		
	1940	1950		1940	1950	
		A	B		A	B
30–34						
No.†	88 (81)			35 (32)		
Actual mean	. . . .	38.0		.	31.4	. . . .
Expected mean‡		35.9	.	.	33.3	
Difference . .	. . .	2.1	. .		1.1	
35–39						
No.†	58 (53)			81 (75)		
Actual mean	37.1	40.3		30.8	35.1	
Expected mean‡	34.5	40.9	41.9	33.7	39.4	38.3
Difference . . .	2.6	−0.6	−1.6	−2.9	−4.3	−3.2
40–44						
No.† .	43 (41)			79 (67)		
Actual mean	31.9	39.8		36.8	42.4	
Expected mean‡	34.6	40.6	39.6	36.1	41.9	42.1
Difference	−2.7	−0.8	0.2	0.7	0.5	0.3

* Excludes persons not residing in Chicago metropolitan area in 1940 and those holding only one job, 1940–50

† No. in parentheses excludes cases duplicated in weighting sample to secure unbiased estimates

‡ 1940 and 1950, A derived from regressions of son's occupational SES on education and father's occupational SES, 1950, B from regressions of 1950 son's occupational SES on 1940 son's occupational SES, education, and father's occupational SES

farmers, education was an appreciably more important determinant than was father's occupation; and the latter factor, moreover, was influential in large part because of its association with education. The small minority of males whose fathers were farmers experienced a marked handicap in comparison with men of non-farm origins having similar amounts of education. Nonwhite males were likewise handicapped as compared with white males of similar origins and educational attainment. Such background factors as father's occupation and education appeared to exert a sustained effect, for their influence could be discerned, albeit in attenuated form, on occupational status as of 1950, apart from their influence on status as of 1940.

The data are consistent with the supposition that education was becoming a more important determinant of occupational status, in terms of both its net influence apart from level of origin and its role as a variable intervening between origin and destination. Measurement problems preclude our stating this finding as confidently as the preceding ones. The data suggest that certain cohorts of veterans may have gained an advantage from circumstances connected with, or consequent to, their military service, but it is possible that the primary significance of veteran status is selective rather than causative. This suggestion is likewise highly tentative.

The regression approach developed and advocated in this paper appears to be at once more general and more powerful than some of the techniques used hitherto in analyses of the amount and determinants of occupational mobility. Regarding achieved occupational status, rather than occupational mobility per se, as the dependent variable to be explained, the regression approach permits relatively straightforward causal interpretations of statistical associations. It is not without its limitations, of course, but by and large these are shared by all its popular alternatives. Not the least of the merits of the approach is the fact that it constrains the analyst to make his assumptions explicit, even though it is quite flexible enough to permit the entertaining of alternative assumptions.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
AND
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NEGRO PRESTIGE CRITERIA: A CASE STUDY IN THE BASES OF PRESTIGE[1]

NORVAL D. GLENN

ABSTRACT

A survey of Negro stratification studies indicated that formal education has been the most important prestige criterion among American Negroes during recent decades and has been a more important basis of prestige among Negroes than among whites. The apparently greater importance of education as a basis of Negro than of white prestige can be accounted for by (1) greater differentiation of Negroes in educational attainment and (2) greater occupational utility to Negroes of additional education at some levels.

Since the publication in 1941 of the first two Warner community studies,[2] community prestige stratification has occupied a prominent place of interest among American students of social stratification. Despite the conceptual and methodological weaknesses of the Warner studies, and the unwarranted generalizations that Warner and others have drawn from them, they focused attention upon a highly significant social phenomenon. Prestige, the Warner studies showed, can be looked upon as the unifying stratification variable, the variable that makes it meaningful to speak of an integrated community system of stratification rather than of disparate systems for the different stratification variables.

Because of the unifying function and the summary nature of prestige, its relationships to other variables are of major importance in stratification theory. A question of primary theoretical relevance is: What accounts for the relative importance of the variables that are the bases of prestige?

An examination of the prestige criteria used by American Negroes to evaluate one another can throw light upon this question. The relative importance of the various bases of prestige is or has been considerably different among Negroes than among whites. Accounting for this difference can be of value in accounting for variations in prestige criteria in general.

THE BASES OF NEGRO PRESTIGE

Although, there is no dearth of Negro prestige-stratification studies, their conceptualization is, without exception, hazy and their methods are, at best, only moderately rigorous. Many of the reports of these studies merely enumerate the characteristics of people at the different prestige levels, failing to distinguish between what Powdermaker has called *primary* and *secondary* class characteristics, that is, between the bases of prestige and its correlates and consequences.[3] Such a distinction can be made empirically only with difficulty, but it is of theoretical importance. For instance, if most high-prestige Negroes are found to be light-skinned, it is important to know whether their prestige is based to a large extent upon their skin color or whether it is based largely upon other attributes, which, for historical reasons, mulattoes are more like to possess than other Negroes. The relationship between prestige and the associated attributes is further complicated by the probable tendency for correlates and consequences of pres-

[1] This paper is based upon chap. v of the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation ("The Negro Population in the American System of Social Stratification: An Analysis of Recent Trends" [The University of Texas, 1962]). I wish to express my appreciation to Leonard Broom of the University of Texas for his many helpful suggestions concerning the data and interpretations presented here.

[2] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941); and Allison Davis, Burleigh Gardner, and Mary Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

[3] Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), p. 70.

tigė to evolve into prestige criteria. In other words, if all or most high-prestige people exhibit a certain type of behavior, for whatever reason, such behavior may become requisite to, or at least an aid to, the acquisition of high prestige.

Despite the difficulty of distinguishing bases from correlates of prestige, we have been able to find sixteen Negro prestig stratification studies where the researchei clearly believe they have identified the mor important bases of prestige. These studie and the major prestige criteria identified b each are given in Table 1. Several wel known Negro stratification studies, includ ing the study of Chicago Negroes by Wa

TABLE 1

MAJOR CRITERIA OF PRESTIGE DISCOVERED IN SIXTEEN EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Study and Date of Publication or Completion	Major Criteria*
DuBois: Negroes in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward, 1899	Respectability, income, occupation, style of life, education, general social efficiency
Daniels: Boston Negroes, 1914	Occupation, wealth, education, refinement
LaGrone: Negroes in Marshall, Texas, 1932	*Education*, cultural similarity to whites (especially with respect to morals)
Burke: Tulsa Negroes, 1936	*Education, wealth*, occupation
Dollard: A small town in the Deep South, 1937	Property ownership, occupation, white ancestry, education, morality
Powdermaker: A small town in the Deep South (same community studied by Dollard), 1939	*Sex morality and stable family life, education*, occupation, forms of religious worship
Frazier: Louisville Negroes, 1940	Wealth, family background, skin color, occupation
Warner: New Haven, Connecticut, Negroes, 1940	Morality, refinement, education, income, occupation
Davis, Gardner, and Gardner: A small town in the Deep South, 1941	Education, occupation, manners and refinement, skin color, morality, status of employer
Johnson: Rural Negroes in eight southern counties, 1941	Family social heritage, education, occupation, income, property ownership, stability of residence, cultural standard
Drake and Cayton: The Chicago Black Belt, 1945	*Education*, wealth, occupation, standards of behavior, organizational affiliations, skin color
Hill: A small all-Negro community in Oklahoma, 1946	Cultural pattern, wealth education, family status leadership
Jones: Negroes in a small Virginia town, 1946	Education, wealth, occupation, family tradition
King: Negroes in a southern city, 1953	*Education*, occupation, source of income
Lewis: Negroes in a southern Piedmont community, 1955	*Respectability*, education, occupation
Rohrer and Edmonson: New Orleans Negroes, 1960	Occupation, education, income

* Criteria that are clearly more important than the others are italicized.

Source: Francis D. Burke, "A Survey of the Negro Community of Tulsa, Oklahoma" (unpublished M.S W thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1936), pp 29–30, John Daniels, *In Freedom's Birthplace* (Boston Houghton Mifflin Co , 1914), pp 174–83, Allison Davis, Burleigh B Gardner, and Mary R Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p 246, John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (3d ed ; Garden City, N.Y · Doubleday & Co , 1957), pp. 83–87; St Clair Drake and Horace R Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York Harcourt, Brace & Co , 1945), pp 515, 520–26, 543–46, 712, W E B DuBois, *The Philadelphia Negro* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1899), pp 310–15; E Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways* (Washington, D C.: American Council on Education, 1940), pp 25–28, Mozell C Hill, "A Comparative Analysis of the All-Negro Society in Oklahoma," *Social Forces*, XXV (October, 1946), 70–77; Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D C American Council on Education, 1941), p 73, Clifton R Jones, "Social Stratification in the Negro Population· A Study of Social Classes in South Boston, Virginia," *Journal of Negro Education*, XV (Winter, 1946), 4–12, Charles E. King, "The Process of Social Stratification among an Urban Southern Minority Population," *Social Forces*, XXXI (May, 1953), 1253–63, Cyrus W LaGrone, "A Sociological Study of the Negro Population of Marshall, Texas" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Texas, 1932), p 35; Hylan Lewis, *Blackways of Kent* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), pp 234–37, Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom* (New York. Viking Press, 1939), pp 62–69; John H Rohrer and Munro S Edmonson (eds), *The Eighth Generation* (New York Harper & Bros., 1960), pp 48–61, and Robert A Warner, *New Haven Negroes* (New Haven, Conn : Yale University Press, 1940), pp 184–90

ner, Junker, and Adams,[4] are so vague concerning the determinants of prestige that they could not be included.[5]

Those criteria emphasized in more than one study and the number of studies in which each is emphasized are given in Table 2. Education is emphasized most frequently (in all but one of the sixteen studies), and occupation and wealth or income rank second and third. The exact frequencies should not be taken too seriously since the decision as to whether a criterion was or was not emphasized was necessarily made on a subjective basis. However, the ranking of education, occupation, and wealth or income above the other criteria is very likely to reflect the empirical rank order. Also, education very likely does rank first in importance (or has until recently), since the studies most frequently identify it as the Number 1 criterion. For instance, King writes of his study of Negroes in a southern city:

> The informants generally stressed or implied that education is the chief item, followed by occupation and source of income, that makes for social differentiation. The rating of occupations tends to be determined by the amount of education basic to the occupation.[6]

Drake and Cayton point out that in Chicago in the early 1940's a heavier weighting of education than of occupation was a peculiarity of the Negro social-status (prestige) scale. They write:

> Securing an education is the most effective shortcut to the top of the Negro social pyramid. Money and occupation are important, but an educated man without a high-status occupation or a very large income, might be admitted to circles that a wealthy policy king or prizefighter would find it hard to enter.[7]

Those authors who do not list education as the most important criterion generally list it very near the top. For instance, Powdermaker writes that education "is second only to the code of sexual behavior as an index of status, and is the chief means of ad-

TABLE 2

FREQUENCY OF EMPHASIS OF NEGRO PRESTIGE CRITERIA IN SIXTEEN EMPIRICAL STUDIES, BY REGION*

Criterion	No of Studies in Which Emphasized			
	Four Northern Studies	Three Border Studies	Nine Southern Studies	Total
Education	4	2	9	15
Occupation	4	2	8	14
Wealth or income	4	3	3	10
Respectability or morality	3	....	5	8
Refinement or "culture"	2	1	2	5
Skin color or white ancestry	1	1	2	4
Family background	....	2	2	4
Property ownership	....	....	2	2

* Only those criteria emphasized in two or more studies are listed.

[4] W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker, and Walter A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941).

[5] In addition to those criteria listed frequently in Table 1, "style of life" is likely to be a major Negro prestige criterion. Those attributes that constitute style of life are not listed in the table because the authors identify them only as characteristics of prestige strata and not as bases of prestige.

[6] Charles E. King, "The Process of Social Stratification among an Urban Minority Population," *Social Forces*, XXXI (May, 1953), 352.

[7] St. Clair Drake and Horace R Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945), p. 516.

vancing one's social position."[8] No one places either occupation or income above education in order of importance.

That Negroes value education more than high occupational status tends to be corroborated by a study in which Rosen found that Negro mothers had high educational but low occupational aspirations for their sons relative to the aspirations of mothers in several ethnic groups.[9] Relative aspiration and relative evaluation are not necessarily the same, of course. The Negro mothers may have had higher educational than occupational aspirations for their sons mainly because they perceived greater opportunities for educational attainment.

The prestige criteria found by the different studies listed in Table 1 vary considerably. However, it is difficult to discern whether the variations reflect regional differences, differences among communities of varying sizes, temporal changes, or simply differences in the perceptions of the investigators. That the latter accounts for some of the variation is evidenced by the fact that both Dollard and Powdermaker studied the same community.

The studies show no clear-cut pattern of temporal change in criteria. Education and occupation are emphasized in the two earliest as well as in the several latest studies. The six studies that do not emphasize income or wealth range from one of the earliest (1932) to one of the latest (1955). Respectability or morality is emphasized in the earliest (1899) and in the next to the latest study (1955). On the other hand, "culture" and refinement appear to have declined in importance, being emphasized in only one study after 1941 and in none after 1946. White ancestry and skin color are emphasized neither in the earliest nor in the latest studies. The absence of stress on these attributes in recent studies supports the rather general agreement in the literature that Caucasoid features are declining in importance as Negro prestige criteria.[10]

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

[9] Bernard C. Rosen, "Race, Ethnicity, and the Achievement Syndrome," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI (February, 1959), 47–60.

Not enough very recent studies are included in Table 1 to form a basis for conclusions about current trends in Negro prestige criteria. Nor can much speculation about these trends be found in the recent literature. Frazier claims that income and its concomitant style of life have emerged as the most important Negro prestige criteria, having surpassed education and occupation.[11] This conclusion is impressionistic, however, and may or may not be correct.[12] For a reason that is discussed below, income probably has increased in importance as a Negro prestige criterion, but it may not yet be more important than education and occupation.

When the studies are divided into those of southern, northern, and border communities (see Table 2), some ostensible regional differences appear. Wealth or income is emphasized in all of the studies of northern and border communities but in only three of the nine southern studies. Family background is emphasized only in the border and southern studies. This may reflect a general North-South difference in the relative degrees of achievement as opposed to ascription of prestige.

Of the prestige criteria listed in Table 2, only one, skin color or white ancestry, is pe-

[10] E.G., see Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, *op. cit.*, p 246; Drake and Cayton, *op. cit.*, p 506; Alvin Boskoff, "Negro Class Structure and the Technic-Ways," *Social Forces*, XXIX (December, 1950), 131, E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 291; and Maurice R. Davis, *Negroes in American Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), pp 417–18.

[11] E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), p. 199.

[12] A recent study by Shirley Caldwell of Negro Freshman women at the University of Illinois lends support to Frazier's conclusion. Twenty of thirty-six women interviewed seemed to value a college education mainly as a means to high occupational and economic status rather than as a direct means to higher prestige. Fifteen of the thirty-six said they would drop out of college if they could find a suitable job that did not require a college education ("Why Negro Freshman Women Come to College" [unpublished paper, 1961]). However, the small and non-random sample of this study makes it an inadequate basis for generalization.

culiarly Negro. While each of the others is, to some extent, important in white prestige evaluations, their rank order of importance among whites appears to be different. In reports of white prestige-stratification studies, strong emphasis upon education is conspicuously absent. Primary emphasis is placed upon wealth, income, family background, and a variety of other variables that can be subsumed under "style of life." For example, Davis, Gardner, and Gardner point out that among the whites of "Old City" the social strata were delineated primarily by economic variables at the lower and middle levels and by family background at the highest level.[13] Education was of secondary importance and could be used to aid upward mobility only if the person had or could obtain the requisite economic status for the level to which he aspired.[14]

Warner, in his study of prestige stratification in Morris, Illinois, found several variables more highly correlated than education with the Evaluated Participation (E.P.) ratings (which are essentially measures of prestige). The correlation of the E.P. with education was +.78, whereas it was +.91 with occupation, +.85 with source of income, +.85 with house type, and +.82 with dwelling area (each variable having been rated on a seven-point scale).[15] Although correlation must not be equated with causation, it is likely that the variables most highly correlated with the E.P. were the most important bases of prestige.

A means of estimating the relative importance of education and income as prestige criteria that is available for whites is not available for Negroes. The relative importance of these two variables as bases of occupational prestige is probably similar (although not necessarily identical) to their relative importance as bases of personal prestige. In the NORC (North-Hatt) occupational prestige study published in 1947, a number of occupations were rated as to prestige by a national sample.[16] Forty-five of these occupations are comparable or roughly comparable with occupations used in the 1950 Census reports. Among these, the prestige ratings and the median incomes of male experienced workers in 1949 correlate with a value of +.83. The correlation of the prestige scores with the median years of school completed in 1950 is exactly the same—+.83.[17] The identity of the two correlations indicates that income and education were of about equal importance among whites as bases of occupational prestige, and probably also of about equal importance as bases of personal prestige.

It seems, therefore, that education was relatively more important as a basis of prestige in the white population as a whole than in the small communities studied by Warner and by Davis, Gardner, and Gardner. However, education was not markedly more important than income for whites, as it apparently was for Negroes.

POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE PRE-EMINENCE OF EDUCATION AS A NEGRO PRESTIGE CRITERION

There is little doubt that, up until recently at least, formal education has been more important in Negro than in white prestige considerations. Three possible explanations for this difference come to mind. First, Negroes may value education more than do whites because it is scarcer among Negroes. Second, education may be of greater utility to Negroes in the acquisition of other valued attributes that are bases of prestige (although the reverse is usually assumed to be true). Third, Negroes may be more differ-

[13] *Op. cit.*, pp. 70, 75–76.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

[15] W. Lloyd Warner, Marchia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, Publisher, 1957), p. 168.

[16] National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, IX (September 1, 1947), 3–13.

[17] Income and education data were taken from United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1950*, Special Report P-E No. 1B, *Occupational Characteristics*, pp. 107–114, 183–190. The median years of school completed are given for some occupations as 16+. In such cases, the actual median was estimated. For instance, the median for physicians and surgeons was estimated as 20 years, for college professors as 18 years, for dentists as 19 years, for public school teachers as 16.5 years, and so on.

entiated than whites in educational attainment, and the importance of a valued attribute as a prestige criterion may depend, to a large extent, upon how unequally it is distributed.

Relative scarcity.—Greater scarcity cannot in itself account for the great prestige value of education to Negroes. It can explain why a Negro at a given educational level enjoys greater prestige in the Negro community than his white counterpart enjoys in the white community, but it cannot account for education being more important than income in Negro prestige considerations nor for education being a more important Negro than a white prestige criterion. Income is even scarcer than education among Negroes, if the white levels of income and education are used as standards in determining scarcity. In 1950, non-whites had an estimated 7.6 per cent of the total years of school completed by persons twenty-five years old and older, whereas in 1949, non-whites had only about 5.4 per cent of the total personal income.[18] In 1950, the median years of school completed by non-whites twenty-five years old and older was 71 per cent of the white median, whereas in 1949, the median income of non-white families was only 51 per cent of that of white families.[19] If income after taxes rather than total income were considered, the relative scarcity of non-white income would be less. However, one may safely assume that in 1949–50 formal education was at least not much scarcer than disposable income among Negroes.

Relative utility.—The question of the relative utility of formal education to Negroes and to whites is somewhat more complicated. The data in Table 3 show that in 1950, according to our Index of Occupational Status, non-whites between the ages of twenty-four and thirty-five at each educational level had a lower occupational status than whites.[20] This means that young non-white adults were, on the average, getting less reward in occupational status than whites from a given amount of education. However, these data also reveal that, at some levels, an added increment of education was likely to bring a greater gain in occupational status to the non-white than to the white person. This can be seen from the absolute and percentage differences between the Index of Occupational Status at each educational level and the index at the next higher level.[21] The dif-

[18] Estimated from data in United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1950*, Vol. II, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part I, *U.S. Summary*, pp. 237-414. The frequency table from which the educational estimate was made has an open-ended upper interval of 16+ years of school completed. The average value of cases in this interval was estimated as 16, which is slightly low for both whites and non-whites and somewhat lower for whites than for non-whites. The frequency table from which the income estimate was made has an open-ended upper interval of $10,000 and over. The average value of cases in this interval was estimated as $14,000 for whites and $12,000 for non-whites.

Several times in this article data for non-whites are used as bases for conclusions about the Negro population. This is justifiable since 95.5 per cent of the non-whites in the United States in 1950 were Negroes (United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1960*, p. 28).

[19] United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1960*, p. 108; and *Current Population Reports, Consumer Income*, Series P-60, No. 35 (January 5, 1961), pp. 6-7.

[20] See Table 3, n.*, for the formula for the Index of Occupational Status. Since the index values are derived from the distributions of workers among the eleven "occupational groups" used in the 1950 Census reports, differences between the white and the non-white values do not fully reflect the extent of the differences between the white and non-white occupational distributions. In some of the occupational groups, the distributions of whites and non-whites among the detailed occupations differed considerably in 1950. However, the differences were less at each educational level than among all workers.

[21] Although we make inferences here concerning the occupational utility of education by comparing occupational distributions at different educational levels, the data are not direct evidence of the occupational utility of education. Persons at one educational level may differ in their occupations from those at another level partially because of differences in native intelligence, motivation, and the like. In other words, differences in other attributes may be common causes of some of the differences in educational attainment and in occupational status.

Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the

ferences indicate that going from less than five years of school to five to seven years or from five to seven to eight years of school had on the average more occupational utility to non-whites. Graduation from college, likewise, seems to have brought much greater occupational gain on the average to non-whites than to whites. For males, all other added increments of education had, according to this measure, more utility to whites, whereas for females, going from four years of high school to one to three years of college had more occupational utility to non-whites.

Another measure of occupational differences between adjacent educational levels is given in Table 4. This measure, Duncan's Index of Dissimilarity, is the percentage of individuals at an educational level who would have to change occupational categories in order for their occupational distribution to equal that at the adjacent level.[22] Weaknesses of this measure are that it takes into account all intercategory differentiation, horizontal as well as vertical, and it

TABLE 3

INDEX OF OCCUPATIONAL STATUS* FOR PERSONS 25–34 YEARS OF AGE, BY COLOR, SEX, AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1950

YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED	NON-WHITES			WHITES		
	Index Value	Change from Next Lower Level		Index Value	Change from Next Lower Level	
		Absolute	Per Cent		Absolute	Per Cent
Males:						
Less than 5	80	...	...	88	..	.....
5–7	85	5	6 3	92	4	4 5
8	89	4	4.7	94	2	2.2
1–3 years of high school	92	3	3 4	101	7	7 4
4 years of high school	98	6	6 5	108	7	6 9
1–3 years of college	107	9	9 2	121	13	12.0
4 years or more of college	136	29	27 1	141	20	16 6
Females:						
Less than 5	63	...	.	87	...	....
5–7	65	2	3 2	84	− 3	− 3.4
8	69	4	6 2	85	1	1 2
1–3 years of high school	72	3	4 3	92	7	8.2
4 years of high school	83	11	15 3	107	15	16.3
1–3 years of college	105	22	26 5	119	12	11 2
4 years or more of college	128	23	18 0	130	11	8 5

* The Index of Occupational Status was derived in the following manner: The occupational status value for a worker = $(a/A + b/B)/2$ when
a = median income for workers in his occupational group (1949)
A = median income for all experienced workers
b = median years of school completed by workers in his occupational group (1950)
B = median years of school completed by all experienced workers
The Index of Occupational Status = Mean Occupational Status Value for workers at an educational level.
The index values were computed for males using male income and education data and for females using female data

Source: Computed from data in Donald J Bogue, *The Population of the United States* (Glencoe, Ill : Free Press, 1959), pp. 513–14; and United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1950*, Special Report P-E No 1B, *Occupational Characteristics*, pp 107–21, 183–90, 215–22

inferences made here concerning the increases in occupational status that were likely to come from added education apply to one or a small number of individuals rather than to a large number. If enough people were to move up educationally to alter appreciably the educational distribution, the occupational payoff of education at the higher levels no doubt would diminish.

[22] This index is defined, among other places, in Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, LX (March, 1955), 494.

does not distinguish between vertical differences of varying magnitudes. Nevertheless, it leads to substantially the same conclusions as those arrived at from the examination of the Index of Occupational Status: (1) college graduation was more important vocationally to non-whites than to whites; (2) one to three years of college had more utility to white than to non-white males and more utility to non-white than to white females; (3) one to three years of high school or completion of high school had more utility to whites, both male and female; (4) completion of elementary school had more utility to non-whites; and (5) going from less than five to five to seven years of school had more utility to non-white than to white males. The only disagreement between the two measures is on the relative utility to white and non-white females of going from less than five to five to seven years of school. The Index of Dissimilarity indicates that this added increment of education had more utility to white females, whereas the differences between the values of the Index of Occupational Status at the two levels indicate the opposite.

TABLE 4

INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY* BETWEEN ADJACENT EDUCATIONAL LEVELS FOR PERSONS 25–34 YEARS OF AGE, BY COLOR AND SEX, 1950

Years of School Completed	Males		Females	
	Non-whites	Whites	Non-whites	Whites
Less than 5				
	15 0	13 8	9.5	18 4
5–7				
	11.9	5 3	10 5	8.5
8				
	10.2	15 0	7.0	17 3
1–3 years of high school				
	15.8	17 7	19.2	37.3
4 years of high school				
	18.2	28 5	34 5	25.2
1–3 years of college				
	49.8	39 9	45 3	38.1
4 years or more of college				

* The Index of Dissimilarity is the percentage of workers at one educational level who would have to change occupational groups in order for their distribution to equal that of workers in the other educational level.

Source: Computed from data in Donald J. Bogue, *op. cit.*

These data make it obvious that the conclusion that formal education has more occupational utility to whites than to Negroes is too sweeping a generalization. Added years of schooling at some levels apparently are, or have been, more conducive to Negro than to white occupational advancement (above the occupational status that could have been attained at the lower educational level). This makes the high Negro evaluation of education less of an enigma. That a college degree should be more highly valued by Negroes than by whites is strictly rational, for the degree brings about, on the average, a greater increment of occupational gain to a Negro. The fact remains, of course, that, on the average, the Negro college graduate has a lower occupational status than the white graduate.

At this point, a pertinent question arises. Must the occupational utility of education be as great to Negroes as to whites in order for education to bring as much occupational prestige to Negroes? The answer apparently is "No." Since high occupational status is much scarcer among Negroes, many occupations are likely to have higher prestige value to Negroes than to whites. The occupations represented in the upper prestige stratum according to thirteen empirical studies of Negro communities are given in Table 5. Some of the occupations listed for several of the studies, both early and recent, would give whites only lower-middle-class status. Examples are artisans, storekeepers, and people in clerical occupations; these require less education than most of the occupations that afford upper-stratum status to whites, thus making education more useful to Negroes than to whites in the acquisition of occupational prestige.[23]

[23] Morgan C. Brown replicated the NORC occupational prestige study with a sample of Negroes in Columbus, Ohio. He found that the Negro prestige ratings for most occupations did not differ greatly from the NORC ratings and that the Negroes rated more occupations much lower (five points or more) than much higher than the NORC respondents

With income, as with occupational status, the payoff to non-whites was less than to whites at each educational level.[24] However, unlike occupational status, additional years of schooling in 1949 were consistently associated with less additional median income for non-whites than for whites. Anderson has shown that from each educational level to the next higher one the increment of additional median income generally was more than twice as great with whites as with non-whites.[25] The percentage difference from each level to the next higher one was more similar for whites and non-whites, but in each case the difference for whites was greater.[26] The apparent anomaly of the income increment consistently being greater for whites and the occupational increment at some levels being greater for non-whites can be accounted for by a greater disparity between white and non-white incomes at the higher occupational levels.[27] The greater occupational increment to non-whites at some educational levels remains important in spite of the fact that it was not accompanied by a greater income increment. Occupation can be an important basis of prestige independent of prestige it brings through income.

Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow from the smaller non-white income increment associated with additional years of schooling that the additional education brought less income-based prestige to non-whites. Since income is much scarcer among Negroes, a given amount of income, no doubt, has more prestige value to a Negro than to a white person. Therefore, if additional education was *consistently* associated with additional income (although a lesser amount) among Negroes, income utility could account for as much of the prestige value of education to Negroes as to whites.

("The Status of Jobs and Occupations as Evaluated by an Urban Negro Sample," *American Sociological Review*, XX [October, 1955], 564–65). However, the occupations that the Negroes rated much higher are ones in which Negroes are highly or moderately well represented, and therefore they are occupations into which upwardly mobile Negroes are likely to move. By contrast, the occupations that the NORC respondents rated much higher are either agricultural occupations or ones in which Negro representation is very low, and therefore they are occupations into which few Negroes are likely to be upwardly mobile. Consequently, Brown's data do not refute the hypothesis that a given increment of increase in occupational status is likely to bring more added prestige to the Negro than to the white person.

[24] For 1949 income data by educational level and color see C. Arnold Anderson, "Regional and Racial Difference in Relations between Income and Education," *School Review*, LXIII (January, 1955), 39. The difference between the white and non-white median incomes was least at the lowest educational level and increased up the scale of education. For instance, in the South the ratio of the non-white to white median income was .822 at the level of one to four years of school but was only .501 with college graduates. In the North and West the corresponding ratios were .854 and .597.

[25] *Ibid.* For instance, in the South the difference between the median incomes of white high school and college graduates was $1,929, whereas the non-white difference was only $859. In the North and West the white difference was $1,852 and the non-white difference was only $774.

[26] In the South the median income of white college graduates was 55 per cent greater than the median income of white high-school graduates, but the non-white percentage was almost as great—46 per cent. In the North and West the white and non-white percentages were 50 and 31 per cent, respectively. At the other educational levels, the disparity between the white and non-white percentages ranged from slight to moderate (see *ibid.*, Table 1).

[27] For instance, in 1949 the ratio of the median income of employed non-white males who were professional, technical, and kindred workers to the median for all males employed in that category was .575; and for managers, officials, and proprietors the ratio was .500. By contrast, the ratio was .911 for private household workers, .716 for farm laborers, .810 for other laborers, .776 for service workers, and .721 for operatives and kindred workers. The lower relative non-white incomes in the higher occupational groups are partially accounted for by non-whites being concentrated in the lower-paying detailed occupations within the groups. However, there was a great disparity between white and non-white incomes in many of the detailed occupations. For instance, the ratio of the non-white to the total median income (for males) for physicians and surgeons was .589, for clergymen it was .581, for funeral directors and embalmers it was .632, and for teachers it was .717 (source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1950*, Special Report P-E No. 18, *Occupational Characteristics*, Tables 19 and 21).

Since it is not feasible to measure the association of education with income among all adult Negro and all adult white individuals, we have measured the association among broad categories of individuals; namely, the male experienced workers in the eleven "occupational groups" used in the 1950 Census reports. Among these categories of non-whites, median income in 1949 and median years of school completed in 1950 correlated with a value of +.79. Among these categories of all experienced male workers, the correlation was +.83.[28] These correlations suggest that education and income were about equally associated among whites and non-whites. However, since the correlations of group and of individual characteristics may

[28] Computed from data in United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1950*, Special Report P-E No. 1B, *Occupational Characteristics*, pp. 107–21, 183–90, 215–22. The regression of median income on median years of school completed was $158.45 with non-whites and $341.55 with all male workers. This indicates that an increase of one year of schooling was associated with less than half as much increase in income with the non-whites as with all male workers.

TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UPPER NEGRO PRESTIGE STRATUM ACCORDING TO THIRTEEN EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Study and Date of Publication or Completion	Occupations Represented in the Upper Stratum	Study and Date of Publication or Completion	Occupations Represented in the Upper Stratum
DuBois: Negroes in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward, 1899	Persons not engaged in menial service	*Davis, Gardner, and Gardner:* A small town in the Deep South, 1941	Professional men, planters, storekeepers, contractors, artisans, and employees of the federal government
DuBois: Negroes in Athens, Georgia, 1902	Teachers, physicians, barbers, tailors, carpenters, shoemakers, waiters, ministers, blacksmiths, postal employees, *et al.*	*Johnson:* Rural Negroes in eight southern counties, 1941	Doctors, teachers, and school principals, successful landowners
Daniels: Boston Negroes, 1914	Lawyers, physicians, salaried employees, business proprietors, literary and musical people	*Drake and Cayton:* The Chicago Black Belt, 1945	Doctors, lawyers, school teachers, executives, successful business people
Powdermaker: Negroes in a small town in the Deep South, 1939	Teachers, education officials, doctors, dentists, businessmen	*Jones:* Negroes in a small Virginia town, 1946	Professionals, businessmen, contractors, school teachers
Frazier: Louisville Negroes, 1940	High-school teachers and principals, college faculty, pastors of prominent churches, more successful physicians and dentists, executives of large Negro businesses	*Frazier:* Negroes in Washington, D.C., 1949	Professionals, businessmen, people in clerical occupations
Warner: New Haven, Connecticut, Negroes, 1940	Doctors, lawyers, dentists, social workers, teachers, ministers of large, long-established churches, wealthy proprietors and businessmen	*King:* Negroes in a southern city, 1953	Physicians, dentists, lawyers, college presidents, college instructors, high school teachers, insurance executives, professionally trained ministers
		Rohrer and Edmonson: New Orleans Negroes, 1960	Professionals, managers, proprietors

Source: Daniels, *op cit.*, p. 181; Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, *op cit*, p 457; Drake and Cayton, *op cit*, p 522; DuBois, *The Philadelphia Negro*, p 310, and *The Negro in the Black Belt: Some Social Sketches* (Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No 22 [Washington, D.C., 1902]), Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways*, p 23, and *The Negro in the United States*, p 286, Johnson, *op cit*, pp 73–74, Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 8; King, *op cit.*, p. 352; Powdermaker, *op. cit.*, p. 65; Rohrer and Edmonson (eds), *op cit*, p. 26, and Robert A Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

differ considerably, this conclusion cannot be made with certainty.[29]

The above discussion suggests that occupational and income utility may account for about as much or even slightly more of the prestige value of education to Negroes as to whites. However, it seems unlikely that this utility accounts entirely for the apparently much greater importance of education as a basis of Negro than of white prestige. Furthermore, the occupational and income utility of Negro education can hardly account for the ranking of education above both occupation and income as a Negro prestige criterion.

Relative differentiation.—It is obvious that a population must be differentiated to a certain minimum extent with respect to an attribute before that attribute can serve as a basis for invidious distinctions. Because Negroes in the American South were fairly homogeneous with regard to income, wealth, occupation, and education until the early decades of this century, the major bases of prestige were, of necessity, other attributes such as skin color, ancestry (free or slave, household or field slave), status of employers, and the like.[30] Income, occupation, and education emerged as the dominant criteria only where and when the Negroes became fairly well differentiated in these attainments. Perhaps, in most places, the educational differentiation proceeded most rapidly.

It is easy to go from the obvious requirement for minimal differentiation to the proposition that the prestige value of an attribute varies directly with the differentiation of the population with respect to the attribute. If this is a correct proposition, earlier and greater differentiation of Negroes in education than in occupation or income could account for the pre-eminence of education as a Negro prestige criterion. However, the proposition is not an obvious truth and should be regarded as only a hypothesis. Furthermore, it is not certain that educational differentiation of Negroes proceeded much more rapidly than occupational and income differentiation.

Since occupation is not a quantitative variable, educational and occupational differentiation cannot be compared precisely. And, unfortunately, data that can be used to estimate the relative degrees of Negro and white educational and income differentiation are not available for years prior to 1949–50. However, the data in Table 6 provide a reasonably good estimate of relative degrees of educational and income differentiation of whites and non-whites in 1949–50. The greater the percentage of an attribute that resides with an uppermost segment of a population, the more unequally the attribute is distributed. Therefore, the higher the percentages in Table 6, the greater was the differentiation.

TABLE 6

ESTIMATED PERCENTAGES* OF INCOME AND OF FORMAL EDUCATION POSSESSED BY THE UPPERMOST SEGMENTS OF ADULT INDIVIDUALS, WHITES AND NON-WHITES, 1949–50

Individuals	Education (1950)		Income (1949)	
	Entire United States	South	Entire United States	South
Upper 10 per cent:				
Whites ..	16.8	17.8	30 4	32.8
Non-whites	21 4	23 7	27 9	24 1
Upper 50 per cent:				
Whites	66 8	68 8	80 8	82.7
Non-whites	77 4	76.7	82 2	81 5

* The frequency tables from which the education estimates were made have an open-ended upper interval of 16+ years of school completed The average value of cases in this interval was estimated as 16 The frequency tables from which the income estimates were made have an open-ended upper interval of $10,000 or more The average value of cases in this interval was estimated as $14,000 for whites and as $12,000 for non-whites.

Source: Estimated from data in United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: 1950*, Vol II, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part I, *U.S. Summary*, pp. 163, 237, 298, 363.

[29] For a discussion of the sometimes great discrepancy between correlations among categories of individuals and among the individuals in those categories see W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, XV (June, 1950), 351–57.

[30] Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 257, and Frazier, *op. cit.*, pp. 394–95.

According to the estimated percentages in Table 6, non-whites were more differentiated than whites in education. The difference remains even if whites with 16+ years of school are estimated to have an average of 17 years of school, an estimate undoubtedly too high![31] On the other hand, if our estimates are substantially correct, there was no appreciable difference in the differentiation of whites and non-whites in income. In fact, non-whites were almost certainly more differentiated than whites in *disposable* income, since more of the white income extended into the higher tax brackets. Therefore, if prestige value is a function of differentiation, education should have been a more important prestige criterion to non-whites, and income should have been about equally important to whites and to non-whites, or somewhat more important to non-whites. This may have been the case.

According to our estimates, both whites and non-whites were more differentiated in income than in education, although the difference was greater with whites. This would lead us to expect income to be more important than education as a prestige criterion among both non-whites and whites; in fact, education apparently was more important than income for non-whites (or Negroes) and the two variables were of about equal importance for whites. However, the differentiation of both whites and non-whites in disposable income was less than in total income, and disposable income may be more important in prestige considerations. Because of the income taxes that take much or most of added increments of income, and possibly for other reasons, income exhibits what may be called "diminishing marginal prestige value." To illustrate, $5,000 added to a $5,000 income brings much greater increased prestige than $5,000 added to a $50,000 income. Possibly with disposable income also, $5,000 added to $5,000 brings greater increased prestige than $5,000 added to $50,000, but this is less certain. By co[n]trast, education does not exhibit diminishi[ng] marginal prestige value. Not all added yea[rs] of school have the same prestige value, b[ut] the prestige value of added years does n[ot] decrease uniformly from lower to high[er] levels. For instance, a year of college add[ed] to twelve years of school has more presti[ge] value than a year added to three years [of] school. Consequently, if income could [be] stated in units of equal prestige value, an[d] if education could be stated in the sam[e] manner, there probably would be conside[r]ably greater differentiation of both whit[es] and non-whites in the education-presti[ge] units than in the income-prestige units.

An additional consideration is that th[e] educational differentiation of non-whit[es] may have been greater relative to their in[-]come differentiation prior to 1949-50. [A] comparison of the data given in Table 6 f[or] the South with those given for the enti[re] country suggest that such a change prob[-]ably occurred. In 1949–50, non-whites we[re] less differentiated in income in the Sout[h] than in the country as a whole, and we kno[w] that, with regard to many Negro social an[d] economic characteristics, the trend has bee[n] away from the southern and toward the na[-]tional pattern. A trend toward greater in[-]come differentiation could account for in[-]come becoming a more important Negr[o] prestige criteria, if, as Frazier claims, incom[e] has become a more important criterion.

This treatment of relative differentiatio[n] illustrates that attempts to deal empiricall[y] with the relative differentiation of two popu[-]lations with respect to a variable or of on[e] population with respect to two variables ar[e] complicated by a number of factors and tha[t] the results of such attempts have uncertai[n] meaning. However, the discussion does sug[-]gest that greater differentiation of Negroes than of whites in education and greater dif[-]ferentiation of whites than of Negroes in in[-]come can account, partially or wholly, fo[r] the one-time differing rank order of impor[-]tance of the two prestige criteria among Negroes and whites.

[31] According to this estimate, the upper tenth of the whites had 19.5 per cent of the total years of school completed by whites, and the upper half had 75 per cent.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Formal education (apparently) has been the most important determinant of Negro prestige, at least until recently, ranking above occupation, income, and all other prestige criteria. Among whites, by contrast, occupation and income have been as important as education, and possibly more so.

These differences in the rankings of Negro and of white prestige criteria could be accounted for solely by variation in the relative differentiation of the different bases of prestige. In fact, the data presented in this article are compatible with the hypothesis that the importance of a variable as a prestige criterion depends upon how unequally the variable is distributed.

However, social phenomena rarely are amenable to simple, one-factor explanations, and there is little reason to believe that variation in the weighting of prestige criteria is an exception. Therefore, a more tenable restatement of the above hypothesis is: *All other pertinent factors remaining constant*, the importance of a variable as a prestige criterion varies directly with how unequally the variable is distributed. Other relevant factors are relative scarcity and relative utility. Additional factors possibly are pertinent.

The data given in this article do not disprove the importance of relative scarcity as a determinant of the weighting of a prestige criterion. Education probably has been more important than income as a basis of Negro prestige *in spite of* income being scarcer. Had other pertinent factors been equal, the scarcer attribute probably would have been the more heavily weighted prestige criterion. However, degrees of differentiation in income and in education were not equal, and, apparently, relative scarcity is less important than relative differentiation as a determinant of the weighting of a prestige criterion.[32]

The role of utility (for the acquisition of other valued attributes) in determining the importance of a prestige criterion is in no way minimized by the data presented here. Added increments of education at several levels have been associated with greater occupational gains to Negroes than to whites, a little known fact that can partially account for education having been a more important prestige criterion among Negroes. Furthermore, because of the greater scarcity of income and high occupational status among Negroes, a given increment in income or in occupational status is likely to bring more added prestige to a Negro than to a white person. Therefore, education may bring greater rewards in occupational and economic prestige to Negroes than to whites.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

[32] It should be pointed out that scarcity and differentiation are not completely independent dimensions. High differentiation of a population in regard to an attribute necessarily entails relative scarcity among some members of the population. On the other hand, if the standard of abundance is some quantity aside from the central tendency of the distribution of the attribute in the population (such as level of need or the central tendency of the distribution of the attribute in another population), low differentiation may occur with either scarcity or abundance.

INFLUENCE OF THE "RELIGIOUS FACTOR" ON CAREER PLANS AND OCCUPATIONAL VALUES OF COLLEGE GRADUATES[1]

ANDREW M. GREELEY

ABSTRACT

Previous studies have indicated a strong tendency toward antiscientism among American Catholics; i particular, the recent work of Lenski has suggested that Catholics will score low on indicators of econom rationality (the "Protestant Ethic"). These hypotheses are not substantiated by data gathered in a surve of June, 1961, college graduates. Catholics were as likely to go to graduate school, to choose an academ career, to specialize in the physical sciences, and to plan a life of research as Protestants, even under a batte of socioeconomic and demographic controls. Nor was there any indication that Catholics were any less i clined to economic rationality than Protestants. It is suggested that the differences between these findin and those of Lenski might be connected with the different ethnic compositions of the two samples. A r examination of an earlier study supports this suggestion.

Considerable interest has been expressed recently in the use of religion as a predictor variable.[2] Gerhard Lenski has maintained that, across a wide range of political, economic, intellectual, and family-value dependent variables, religion is at least as efficient a predictor as social class.[3] He also suggests that Catholics will score lower on items indicating economic rationality (the "Protestant Ethic") and higher on items indicating antiscientism. In attempting to find explanations for the latter phenomenon, he discovers both conscious and subconscious forces at work:

> On the basis of the findings of this study it appears that overt conflict between the churches and modern scientific movement . . . is only one of the factors accounting for the disinclina tion of Catholics to enter scientific careers. I our opinion, other less visible factors are equall important—perhaps far more important—es pecially influential is the basic intellectual orie tation which Catholicism develops: an orienta tion which values obedience above intellectua autonomy. Also influential is the Catholic tend ency to value family and the kin group abov other relationships. In brief, at both the co scious and subconscious levels of thought an action, membership in the Catholic group i more likely to inhibit the development c scientific careers than is membership in eithe Protestant or Jewish groups. The implication of this for the future of American society are no difficult to discover.[4]

Lenski would find substantial agreemen for his analysis from the self-critics withi American Catholicism. Writers like O'Dea, Weigel,[6] Ellis,[7] and others[8] attribute the in

[1] The author is grateful for the help of Professors James A. Davis and Peter H. Rossi in the preparation of this paper.

[2] One thinks especially of the voting and fertility studies: on fertility cf. Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton, and Arthur A. Campbell, *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959) and Charles Westoff, Robert Potter, Philip Sagi, and Elliot Mishler, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961). On voting cf. Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944); Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and Philip E. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1961.

[3] *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N Y Doubleday & Co., 1960).

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[5] Thomas O'Dea, *American Catholic Dilemma* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958).

[6] Gustave Weigel, "American Catholic Intellectualism—a Theologian's Reflections," *Review of Politics*, XIX (1957), 275–307.

[7] John Tracey Ellis, "American Catholics and the Intellectual Life," *Thought*, Vol. XXX (Autumn, 1955).

[8] Summarized in Frank L. Christ and Gerard E. Sherry, *American Catholicism and the Intellectual Ideal* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961).

tellectual deficiencies of American Catholicism to the absence of a scholarly tradition, clerical domination, fear of modern science, lack of concern for temporal values, materialism among the Catholic laity, low valuation on curiosity and initiative in Catholic training, and the tendency to encourage talented youth to enter the religious life. The findings of Knapp and his associates on the poor productivity of scholars by Catholic schools apparently confirm these conclusions.[9]

However the Knapp data refer to graduates in the years before 1950, and the self-critics have materials that are even older. Lenski's study, although recent, was limited to the Detroit metropolitan area. A recent survey by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) permits us to test the Protestant Ethic and antiscientism hypotheses against contemporary data from a national sample.[10] Some 35,000 questionnaires were administered to June, 1961, graduates from 135 colleges and universities in a study of career plans, academic experiences, and occupational values.[11] Since questions about original and current religion were included in the questionnaire, it is possible to analyze the influence of religion on these dependent variables.[12]

The following hypotheses were constructed from the conclusions of previous studies to be tested against the NORC materials:

1. Catholics will be less likely to go to college.
2. Catholic graduates will be less likely to go to graduate school.
3. Catholics who go to graduate school will be less likely to choose the arts and sciences, that is, the academic fields.
4. Catholics in the academic fields will be less likely to go into the most scientific of sciences, that is, the physical sciences.
5. Catholics who go into the academic fields will be less likely to plan a research career.
6. Catholics who go into the academic fields will be less likely to be religious and more likely to be apostates.
7. Catholics will tend to overchoose large corporations as employers, business as an occupation, and security and the avoidance of high pressure as occupational values.

Previous research findings would also lead us to suspect that, on both the "intellectualism" and economic rationality scales devised in the hypotheses, Protestants would be intermediate between Catholics and Jews.

The use of the word "intellectualism" in this paper needs to be clarified. It is clear that going to graduate school in the physical sciences and planning a career of research in this area, for example, are not necessarily indicators of intellectuality, much less of potential scholarship. It is argued merely that the first six hypotheses proposed above would seem to follow logically from those writings that question the intellectuality or at least the orientation toward science of

[9] Robert H. Knapp and H. B. Goodrich, *Origins of American Scientists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), and Robert H. Knapp and Joseph J. Greenbaum, *The Young American Scholar: His Collegiate Origins* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

[10] The survey was carried out under grants from the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the United States Office of Education. The careers of the respondents will be followed for several years to come by a continuing series of surveys.

[11] The sample was of stratified-cluster design. All American colleges and universities were grouped into four strata based on previous productivity of students going on to graduate degrees. Then schools were sampled randomly within each stratum. Twenty-page questionnaires (with sixty-two questions, principally about future career and educational plans) were administered to all graduating seniors within these schools; the response rate was well in excess of 90 per cent for most schools. Schools in the more productive strata were oversampled. In order to compensate for the unequal sampling rates, the observations were then weighted proportionately to the reciprocals of these rates, thus providing unbiased estimates. An indication of the interest of the students in the survey is that the response rate to a second questionnaire sent to the same graduates in June of 1962 was over 85 per cent.

[12] The part of the analysis reported in this paper was done on a 10 per cent representative subsample. The preliminary report on the total project is contained in James A. Davis *et al.*, *Great Aspirations: The Career Plans of America's June 1961 Collegiate Graduates* (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1962).

American Catholics. If the hypotheses are not supported by the data, previous researches are not necessarily disproved, but at least must be seriously re-examined. It might well be true that Catholics are entering "intellectual" careers for reasons different, and somehow less "intellectual," than Protestants and Jews, but surely this explanation cannot be presumed.[13]

Table 1 shows the distribution of the 10 per cent subsample by original religion.[14] It will be noted that about one-fourth of the graduates are Catholic,[15] approximately the same proportion of Catholics in the population of the United States.[16] An immediate reaction would be to maintain that the first hypothesis (Catholics are disinclined to go to college) is not supported. The matter is not that simple, however, since there are more Protestants who are rural or Negro and these two latter groups are less likely to go to college. The kind of comparison that would be most satisfactory would be between urban white Catholics and Protestants at the specific ages of college graduation.

TABLE 1

RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF 1961 COLLEGE GRADUATES*

	Per Cent
Protestant....	61
Catholic...	25
Jew	8
Other...	3
None.	3

* N = 3,330, no answer = 67; total 10 per cent sample = 3,397.

There are, however, no available national population figures that permit such a comparison to be made. However, if the racial factor is taken into account, it appears that Catholics are still slightly underrepresented in the college population, comprising 28 per cent of the white population[17] of the nation and 26 per cent of the white population of the NORC sample. On the other hand, it seems quite certain that the educational gap between white Protestants and white Catholics is narrowing rapidly; Catholics make up 18 per cent of the total population with college education but 25 per cent of the June, 1961, graduates, despite the fact that the proportion of the Catholic population at college graduation age is about the same as the proportion of the national population at this age.[18] One can, therefore, say of the first hypothesis that there is no strong evidence supporting it, and that whatever differences exist between Catholics and non-Catholics in college education seem to be diminishing rather rapidly.[19]

[13] It is embarrassing but probably necessary to enter a word about personal bias. At the present state of American culture it may not be true that, if a Catholic researcher discovers some indications that Catholics are not as antiscientific as previously thought, his findings are immediately subject to grave suspicion. Nevertheless, let it be recorded that the six "intellectualism" hypotheses in this paper were not straw men; the writer is close enough intellectually and personally to the self-critics to have thought "before the data" that this study would provide grist for the self-critics' mill. The findings of the NORC survey were therefore something of a rude surprise.

[14] It was felt that the religion in which one was reared was the most important in shaping one's values, if indeed they were shaped at all by religion.

[15] The vagaries of the sampling process selected sixteen Catholic schools; some 45 per cent of the graduates whose religion was Catholic came from these schools. However, as we hope to point out in another paper, the differences between Catholic graduates of Catholic colleges and Catholic graduates of other colleges were minimal on virtually all items herein reported, The differences that do exist would have the graduates of Catholic colleges scoring *higher* on "intellectual" and "Protestant" items than Catholic graduates of other colleges.

[16] For a discussion of the Catholic population in the United States see my "Some Information on the Present Situation of the American Catholics," *Social Order*, April, 1963, pp. 9-24.

[17] The percentages in this sentence are based on data reported by Bernard Lazerwitz in "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, LVI (September, 1961), 568-79.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Significant demographic differences among the three religious groups were computed from the Davies *Table of Significant Differences* with a correction factor added because of the fact that the sample was taken by a cluster technique. The independent assessment of the significance of Protestant-Catholic,

EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Table 2 summarizes the different educational experiences of the three religious groups. Jews are more likely to have attended "quality" colleges.[20] They are also more likely to score high (upper 20 per cent) on the Academic Performance Index. (The difference between Catholics and Protestants approaches significance; however, there is no difference between the two groups when a comparison is made of the upper half academically.) All three groups contain about the same proportion of graduates who would attribute a "liberal" purpose to college, although Catholic graduates are more likely than Protestants and Protestants more likely than Jews to concede to their fellow students a "liberal" orientation. Protestants have a somewhat higher percentage who feel loyal to their schools than the other two groups. Protestants found the biological sciences more interesting than the other groups, and Catholics found English more interesting than the other groups. Each course was rated separately, so the respondents were not forced to choose one course as their favorite. The former finding might result from the more rural origins of American Protestants and the latter from the supposed tradition of humanistic studies in the Catholic colleges. The Catholic interest in science and mathematics is not what prevous findings would lead us to expect. Generally speaking, there was little in the way of major differences in reactions to courses.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES ON EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES

(Percentage Distribution)

Educational Experiences	Protestant (P)	Catholic (C)	Jew (J)	Statistical Significance		
				P-C	P-J	C-J
School quality A or B. . .	12	12	26	N S	01	01
High academic performance	19	15	26	N S.	05	01
Appreciation of ideas:						
Purpose of college:						
Subjective. . .	65	65	65	N S.	N.S.	N.S.
Projective .	35	44	27	01	01	01
Positive school loyalty	77	71	71	01	N.S.	N.S.
Course reactions:						
Science interesting. .	34	33	37	N.S	N.S.	N.S.
Mathematics interesting	32	34	37	N S	N S.	N.S.
Biology interesting.	44	37	37	01	05	N.S.
Social science interesting .	63	65	65	N S	N.S.	N.S.
English interesting	49	54	37	01	01	01
N	(2,007)	(833)	(272)			

Protestant-Jewish, and Catholic-Jewish differences is not completely legitimate, owing to the intercorrelation among them. However, the complicated nature of the sampling technique left little other choice It was not feasible to modify the χ^2 test to take into account the cluster sample. The differences between Protestants and Catholics, however, are still relatively minor in almost all instances, and the differences between Jew and gentile are sufficient enough to be of importance, even if the tests are relatively crude. It might be noted that in an analysis of the total weighted sample of some 55,000, to be published shortly by J. A. Davis of the NORC staff, the same conclusions with regard to the religious factor have been reached as are reported in this article.

[20] The quality of the schools was based on an index prepared from the scores of students in the colleges on the National Merit Scholarship examinations. The Academic Performance Index mentioned in the next sentence was based on grade-point average weighted for school quality.

FUTURE PLANS

Table 3 summarizes information on future plans of the college graduates of the three religious groups. The Jews are most likely to plan to attend graduate school in the coming year and Protestants least likely. There is no significant difference in the proportions of each group going into graduate study in the academic fields. These findings are in direct opposition to the hypotheses derived from previous research. No support is found for the notion of Catholic anti-intellectualism.

Catholics overchoose large companies[21] (according to the prediction), Jews overchoose small companies and self-employment (no difference between Protestants and Catholics on this item), and Protestants overchoose elementary education for future career employment.[22] In the choice of future occupations, Jews are more inclined to law and medicine, Catholics more inclined to business, Protestants more inclined to education and "other professions." No other differences are significant.

OCCUPATIONAL VALUES

Table 4 gives the reaction of the graduates of the three religious groups to the question: "Which of these characteristics would be important in picking a career?" The "Protestant Ethic" hypothesis is not supported for Catholic-Protestant differences. Catholics are more interested in making money than Protestants, no different in avoiding high pressure, and no different in the quest for security through slow, sure progress. They are also more interested in "leadership," which may or may not be a

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES ON FUTURE PLANS

(Percentage Distribution)

Future Plans	Protestant	Catholic	Jew	Statistical Significance		
				P-C	P-J	C-J
Graduate school next year	28	33	47	.05	.01	01
Per cent of graduate students in arts and sciences	43	46	39	N.S.	N.S.	N S
Career employer:						
Large company	25	33	26	.01	N.S.	N S.
Small company	7	11	21	N.S.	.01	01
Self	7	8	14	N.S.	.05	05
Education	36	27	27	.01	.01	N.S.
Career occupation:						
Science	7	6	8	N.S.	N S.	N.S
Social science and humanities	10	10	10	N.S.	N.S.	N S
Medicine	2	3	6	N.S.	.05	05
Law	2	3	10	N.S.	01	01
Engineering	7	8	8	N S.	N.S.	N S
Education	34	26	27	.01	01	N S
Business	15	23	17	.01	N.S.	01
Other professions	16	12	6	05	.01	01
Other	7	9	8			
N	(2,007)	(833)	(272)			

[21] The percentages on career employer do not add to 100 because only those items that showed a difference are included in Table 3.

[22] It has been suggested that the Protestant lead in education is the result of the fact that Negro Protestants overchoose this field; they do, indeed, but no more than other Protestants, according to the NORC data. It should be noted also that Negro Protestants who graduate from college are just as likely to go to graduate school as white Protestants

"Protestant Ethic" type of item. Protestants are more interested in being helpful to others, which, however praiseworthy it might be, is hardly in keeping with the economic individualism of the "Protestant Ethic." Jews score higher on monetary ambition but also on the desire for creativity, and on a chance to work in a world of ideas. The basic cleavage on occupational values is between Jew and Gentile, not between Protestant and Catholic.

Catholics were six percentage points ahead of Protestants in plans for graduate school the autumn after graduation. This lead continues (by four points) in the key group of high-SES, large-home-town males and is also unaffected in all female groups (Table 5). Only among small-city, low-SES males do Catholics fall behind Protestants (5 per cent) in graduate-school plans; among large-city, low-SES males there is exact parity. In general, we can say that the surprising showing of Catholics in the matter of graduate-school plans cannot be explained away by background characteristics. In all but one of the eight comparison groups, Catholics are either ahead of Protestants in graduate-school plans or even with them. In the four groups in which there are enough cases to make a comparison, the Jewish lead over the other two groups continues, although it seems that among high-SES males from large home towns, the Jewish lead is substantially reduced (from thirteen to seven points ahead of Catholics).

TABLE 4

OCCUPATIONAL VALUES, BY RELIGION

(Percentage Distribution)

Occupational Values	Protestant	Catholic	Jew	Statistical Significance		
				P-C	P-J	C-J
Making a lot of money	21	27	38	.01	.01	.01
Chance to be creative	50	50	64	N.S.	.01	.01
Helpful to others	68	61	60	01	.01	N.S.
Avoid high pressure	15	17	15	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
World of ideas	39	35	50	N.S.	.01	.01
Freedom from supervision	18	17	21	N.S.	N S.	N.S.
Slow and sure progress	33	32	25	N.S.	.05	N.S.
Leadership	34	40	40	.01	N.S.	N.S.
Same area	4	8	9	05	.05	N.S.
New area	10	10	11	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Work with people, not things	57	55	56	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
N	(2,007)	(833)	(272)			

THE EFFECT OF CONTROLS

Only three control variables seem to produce much in the way of a change in the measures described in the preceding paragraphs, so these three were combined into a new index—the Index of Background Characteristics (IBC). Each religious group was subdivided into eight subgroups based on sex, home-town size (over 100,000 or under 100,000), and socioeconomic status (SES) (upper half or lower half). Even though the numbers in some of these subgroups are rather small and comparisons must be made with some care, there are enough respondents in the important groups (e.g., big-city, high-SES males) for each of the three religions to enable us to judge to what extent background characteristics are responsible for the similarities and differences above.

We saw previously that there was virtually no difference among the three religions in those planning arts and science careers, despite the prediction that Jews would be more likely than gentiles to plan such careers and Protestants more likely

than Catholics. Table 6, part *A*, shows a very interesting phenomenon for Jews. More than twice as large a proportion of low-SES Jewish males choose the academic professions as do high-SES males (although the reverse is true for Jewish girls). Indeed, high-SES Jewish males are much less likely to choose the academic life than either Protestants or Catholics. There is little difference between Protestants and Catholics in the large home towns, whether they be male or female, in their plans for academic careers, though the small home-town Protestant males are ahead of the Catholics and the small home-town Catholic females are ahead of the Protestants. We note once again no evidence for a disinclination of Catholics to go into the academic life, and a somewhat surprising underchoice of academia by well-to-do Jewish sons.

TABLE 5

PER CENT GOING TO GRADUATE SCHOOL IN FALL, 1961, BY RELIGION AND BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:*			
High SES† . .	44 (248)	48 (159)	55 (103)
Low SES. .	39 (161)	39 (161)	55 (48)
Small home town:			
High SES. . . .	35 (304)	38 (94)	36 (14)
Low SES . .	26 (431)	21 (115)	50 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES. .	29 (260)	28 (96)	44 (60)
Low SES .	24 (92)	28 (67)	35 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES.	15 (248)	29 (74)	27 (18)
Low SES.	16 (263)	22 (67)	. . . .

* Large home towns are those with a population over 100,000.

† High socioeconomic status (SES) indicates those whose parents had attended college and had a white-collar job (professional or manager) or who had a white-collar job and made more than $7,500 a year even if they had not attended college or who had a blue-collar job, but made more than $7,500 a year and had attended college.

The reason for the underchoice of academia by this group becomes clear in Table 6, part *B;* almost two-fifths of the high-SES Jewish males from big cities are choosing the traditional professions of law and medicine, while only one-tenth of the low-SES Jewish males are making the same choice. Thus well-to-do Jewish sons choose the traditional professions and "lower" class sons choose the academic professions. Even though the numbers on which this last statement is based are somewhat small, it should be noted that the differences are statistically significant. The Catholic overchoice of the professions in comparison with Protestants holds up in all male categories.

Table 6, part *C*, supports the finding that primary and secondary education is the Protestant field. The Protestant lead over Catholics in this career is to be found in all groups with the exception of the low-SES, small home-town females (where there are so few Catholics that the finding is dubious). It is worth noting that Jewish girls are the ones most likely to choose education, while Jewish males are the least likely. It is also worth noting that while Protestant males are ahead of Catholic males in all categories in the choice of education, the lead is especially pronounced among the low-SES groups. Apparently education is the popular means of upward mobility for "poor" Protestant males just as the academic life is for "poor" Jewish males.

Something of the same phenomenon is to be observed among Catholics in the choice of business careers (Table 6, part *D*). Catholics are ahead of Protestants in choosing business in all categories (except the troublesome low-SES, small home-town females), but the biggest overchoice is among low-SES males. Each religious group apparently has its own favorite path of upward mobility—the Protestants choosing education, the Catholics choosing business, and the Jews choosing academia. For the first two groups the choice is merely an exaggeration of what the upper-SES groups are choosing, but for the Jews the choice is totally different from the upper-SES choice of the traditional professions.

Background characteristics have no ef-

TABLE 6

FUTURE CAREER PLANS, BY RELIGION AND BY BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

A. PER CENT CHOOSING ACADEMIC PROFESSION (PHYSICAL SCIENCES, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUMANITIES)

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	22 (248)	18 (159)	12 (103)
Low SES	18 (161)	20 (161)	28 (47)
Small home town:			
High SES	19 (304)	12 (94)	7 (14)
Low SES	17 (431)	11 (115)	25 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	25 (260)	28 (96)	29 (60)
Low SES	14 (92)	15 (67)	13 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES	16 (248)	23 (74)	23 (18)
Low SES	9 (263)	7 (67)	.

B. PER CENT PLANNING CAREER IN PROFESSIONS (LAW AND MEDICINE)

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	12 (248)	18 (159)	38 (103)
Low SES	7 (161)	10 (161)	9 (47)
Small home town:			
High SES	13 (304)	16 (94)	28 (14)
Low SES	4 (431)	7 (115)	0 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	0 (260)	1 (96)	0 (60)
Low SES	1 (92)	0 (67)	4 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES	0 (248)	1 (74)	0 (18)
Low SES	0 (265)	2 (67)	.

C. PER CENT PLANNING CAREER IN PRIMARY OR SECONDARY EDUCATION

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	11 (248)	7 (159)	4 (103)
Low SES	25 (161)	15 (161)	13 (47)
Small home town:			
High SES	15 (304)	12 (94)	0 (14)
Low SES	27 (431)	22 (115)	0 (4)

TABLE 6—*Continued*

C—*Continued*

	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	48 (260)	41 (96)	64 (60)
Low SES	59 (92)	57 (67)	74 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES	58 (248)	53 (74)	56 (18)
Low SES	68 (263)	69 (67)	.. ...

D. PER CENT PLANNING CAREER IN BUSINESS

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	30 (248)	35 (159)	30 (103)
Low SES	19 (161)	28 (161)	9 (47)
Small home town:			
High SES	26 (304)	36 (94)	43 (14)
Low SES	19 (431)	34 (115)	50 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	10 (260)	15 (96)	7 (60)
Low SES	5 (92)	10 (67)	4 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES	3 (248)	4 (74)	11 (18)
Low SES	6 (263)	3 (67)	. .

fect on the ordering of the three religions as to the importance of money as an occupational value (Table 7). It is more important to Jews than to Catholics in all categories and to Catholics than to Protestants. The slight Catholic deficiency in the desire to be "original and creative" seem to result primarily from the performance on this item of low-SES Catholics in large home towns, regardless of sex, and of Catholic girls from large home towns. The Jewish lead in "people, not things" on the other hand is a high-SES phenomenon, probably not unrelated to the interest of this group in the professions of law and medicine. We find no evidence in these values of any anti-intellectualism or anti-economic achievement in Catholics.

To sum up this section, we may say that Catholics are more likely to choose business, Jews more likely to choose law and medicine, and Protestants more likely to choose education. All three groups are about equally represented in the arts and sciences. There seem to be different paths of upward mobility for the lower-SES members of each religion. One need not look too far for a historical explanation of the differences we have reported: the American public school system, whatever its present orientations, was surely Protestant in its origins and early history; the Jews, traditionally victims of prejudice, would be inclined to look to the professions as the best way to get ahead despite prejudice; and the Catholics as latecomers to the economic battles, would find that the business corporation was best suited to their needs. Whether there is anything in

Selected Occupational Values, by Religion and by Background Characteristics

A. "Making a Lot of Money"

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	30 (248)	38 (159)	56 (103)
Low SES	25 (161)	28 (161)	46 (48)
Small home town:			
High SES	29 (304)	35 (94)	36 (14)
Low SES	26 (431)	30 (115)	0 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	12 (260)	16 (96)	18 (60)
Low SES	7 (92)	12 (67)	8 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES	10 (248)	12 (74)	33 (18)
Low SES	13 (263)	24 (67)	...

B. "Opportunities to Be Original and Creative"

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	59 (248)	58 (159)	61 (103)
Low SES	55 (161)	49 (161)	62 (48)
Small home town:			
High SES	47 (304)	41 (94)	43 (14)
Low SES	42 (431)	43 (115)	50 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	59 (260)	53 (96)	68 (60)
Low SES	52 (92)	46 (67)	76 (23)
Small home town:			
High SES	56 (248)	56 (74)	72 (18)
Low SES	42 (263)	51 (67)	...

C. "Opportunity to Work with People Instead of Things"

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
	Male		
Large home town:			
High SES	46 (248)	46 (159)	54 (103)
Low SES	45 (161)	50 (161)	35 (48)
Small home town:			
High SES	46 (304)	45 (94)	64 (14)
Low SES	46 (431)	46 (115)	74 (4)
	Female		
Large home town:			
High SES	71 (260)	68 (96)	72 (60)
Low SES	48 (92)	64 (67)	64 (23)

each religion that would predispose its members in these directions remains to be seen. It could be argued that the practical bent of rabbinic scholarship would incline the Jews to the professions, and the large organizational apparatus of the Catholic church would orient its members toward the large corporation. Perhaps even the "service" tradition of much of American Protestantism could be linked with primary and secondary education. But such propositions require much more careful investigation.

TABLE 8

PLANS OF POTENTIAL SCHOLARS, BY RELIGION

(Percentage Distribution)

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Significance		
				P-C	P-J	C-J
Field of study:						
Physical sciences	30	32	33	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Biological sciences	14	11	9	N.S.	01	N.S.
Social sciences	20	18	25	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Humanities	36	39	32	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Total per cent	100	100	99			
Total N	2,159	970	489			
Career activities:						
Teaching	73	73	76	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Research	62	60	73	N.S.	.05	01
Administration	17	17	16	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.
Service	8	9	15	N.S.	.05	N.S.
None of these	2	2	4	...	...	.

POTENTIAL SCHOLARS

Table 8 begins an investigation of the potential scholars from the three religious groups (those with no religion are added). A potential scholar was defined as someone who was planning to go to graduate school in the arts and sciences the coming fall.[23] We note that the only significant difference in field of choice is the Protestant lead over Jews in the biological sciences. We note further that, in the career activities favored by members of the three religious groups, the Jews lead both other groups significantly in choosing research. There is no support for the hypotheses that Catholics will underchoose physical sciences or research. Table 9 compares religiosity rates[24] and apostasy rates[25] for "scholars" and the group mean on these rates for each of the religious groups.

[23] A different deck of cards was used for the analysis reported in this paragraph. It represented all respondents who planned fall graduate school in the arts and sciences: $N = 3{,}816$. It will be noted that in this deck the proportion for each religious group is different from that in the deck analyzed in previous paragraphs. The reason for this is that the three groups enter arts and sciences graduate school in different proportions than they exist in the total population.

[24] The "group mean" is the percentage religious or apostasizing in the total college population as measured by the survey; the "scholar mean" is the percentage in the scholar deck.

[25] Two questions were used to measure apostasy "In what religion were you raised?" and "What is your present religious preference?" An apostate was defined as one who had listed "religion in which he was raised" as Protestant, Catholic or Jew, and listed his present religion as "none." It is to be noted that only among Catholics is there no appreciable increase of apostasy among "scholars." This could mean that Catholics perceive little conflict between orientation to the arts and sciences as a career and religious membership or that Catholics are better able to compartmentalize their lives than members of the other groups. A forthcoming paper will discuss the fact of apostasy and the variation in rates within the three major religious groups.

There is a slight increase in apostasy among Catholic "scholars" (about 2 per cent), and the amount of irregular church attendance increases moderately; however, in neither apostasy nor irregular church attendance is the increase among Catholic "scholars" comparable to the increase among the other religious groups. There is no evidence that the apparently heightened interest in the academic life among American Catholics has led to a large scale movement away from the Church.

As a conclusion to this section, we might note that in a resurvey a year after graduation, 87 per cent of the Jews, 81 per cent of the Protestants, and 80 per cent of the Catholics who said that they were going to graduate school the autumn after their graduation were in fact taking graduate-school courses; 24 per cent of the Jewish graduates of June, 1961, 22 per cent of the Protestants, and 21 per cent of the Catholics affirmed their eventual intention of getting the Ph.D. (although an approximately equal proportion of each group had not yet begun their academic work for the degree).

TABLE 9

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION OF ARTS AND SCIENCES GRADUATE STUDENTS

(Per Cent)

	PROTESTANTS		CATHOLICS		JEWS	
	Graduate Students	All Protestants	Graduate Students	All Catholics	Graduate Students	All Jews
Regular church attendance*	36	65	73	85	36	68
Irregular church attendance	33	20	16	6	37	16
Apostate	31	15	11	9	27	16
N	(2,159)†	(2,007)‡	(970)†	(833)‡	(489)†	(272)‡

* For Catholics, weekly or several times a month; for Protestants, at least once a month, for Jews, at least two or three times a year

† Total sample.

‡ Ten per cent sample.

THE ETHNIC FACTOR

Only two predictions of our initial hypotheses have been supported. Catholics overchoose large corporations and business as a career (although the general Jew-gentile differences emerge pretty much as expected). Why our findings are so different from Lenski's needs to be explored. A possible explanation (suggested by Bernard Rosen[26] and others) is that the ethnic composition of the two Catholic samples might be considerably different. Lenski gives no data on ethnic subdivisions within the Catholic sample and no ethnic question was asked in the NORC survey. However, it is generally assumed that the Catholic population of Detroit has a very large Polish element. An earlier study made of graduate students by NORC[27] did ask an ethnic question and enables us to see whether there are any differences between the various Catholic ethnic groups. It seemed possible that those ethnic groups who came in the later waves, largely southern and eastern European groups, might be experiencing a somewhat slower acculturation process than the earlier groups and, therefore, would be less likely to go to college, to plan academic careers, and to be strongly oriented toward economic or academic achievement. Two items in the graduate-student study enabled us to measure the college plans and the self-confidence of the various ethnic groups within American

[26] In his review of Lenski's book in *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February, 1962), 111.

[27] This survey was reported by James A. Davis in *Stipends and Spouses: The Consumer Finances of Graduate Study in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

Catholicism: a question about whether college was taken for granted in high school and a question about evaluation of one's own abilities. In Table 10 we note that the Irish-German-British wave was more likely to have taken college for granted when in high school and to have a higher estimate of its own abilities than the Italian-Slavic group. There seems to be sound reason for suggesting that the differences between Lenski's findings and those reported here might be connected with ethnicity. It would appear that perhaps ethnicity has no ceased to be an important factor for sociological concern.

The question remains as to whether the influence of the ethnic factor that we described in the preceding paragraph is truly ethnic or is rather the result of the fact that members of one group have simply less in the way of an American background, since their families have been in America for a shorter period of time. Will the ethnic effect vanish under a control for generation or socioeconomic status? In Table 11 we note that a control for father's occupation does not eliminate the two differences that had correlated with ethnicity. First-wave ethnic groups are more likely to have a higher estimate of their native ability than second-wave ethnic groups regardless of father's occupation, even though both increase their estimate of native ability as status improves. Further, ethnic groups of the first wave with white-collar background are more likely to have come from families where college education was taken for granted than such groups of the second wave. The reverse seems to be true of the lower class of both waves, although the case base is very small.

Nor does a control for generation eliminate the differences between the two waves. It is true that the early (first to third) generations of both waves have about the same percentage ranking their native ability high. However the later generations of the first wave have far more self-confidence than the later generations of the second wave. Finally, the later generations of the first wave

TABLE 10

DIFFERENCES AMONG CATHOLIC ETHNIC GROUPS

(Percentage Distribution)

	Irish-German-British	Italian-Slavic	Significance
College taken for granted . .	43	30	01
High estimate of abilities. . .	33	23	.05
N. .	(556)	(147)	

TABLE 11

ETHNIC VARIABLES BY FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND BY GENERATION

(Percentage Distribution)

	High Estimate of Native Ability		College Taken for Granted When in High School	
	First Wave*	Second Wave†	First Wave*	Second Wave†
Father's occupational status:				
Upper class‡. . . .	35 (424)	27 (80)	52 (424)	45 (80)
Lower class. . . .	32 (132)	18 (67)	15 (132)	19 (67)
Generation:				
1st to 3d generation§. .	26 (140)	23 (107)	31 (140)	36 (107)
4th or after. . . .	38 (416)	25 (40)	47 (416)	33 (40)

* Irish, German, British.

† Italian, eastern European.

‡ Non-manual occupation.

§ At least one grandparent not born in America.

re substantially more likely to have taken ollege for granted than the later generaions of the second wave (although the reerse seems to be true for the earlier generaions). Since the number of respondents involved is rather small and since the interactions under controls are often ambiguous, we can hardly regard this analysis as definitive. However the finding that differences in self-confidence and the taking of college for granted do not disappear even in the fourth generation of the two ethnic categories strongly suggests that the pure ethnic factor deserves much further investigation.

SUMMARY

It was the purpose of this essay to examine certain hypotheses about the influence of the Protestant Ethic and of Catholic anti-intellectualism in light of the data gathered by a national cluster sample of college graduates. Only one item in the Protestant Ethic complex (the overchoice by Catholics of large corporations) and one item in the anti-intellectualism syndrome of the self-critics within the American Catholic church (the overchoice of business as a career) were supported. There was no substantial evidence of anti-intellectualism among Catholic college graduates. (And as we will report elsewhere there were no significant differences between graduates of Catholic colleges and Catholic graduates of other colleges.) The main lines of division on the variables examined were on the Jew-gentile axis rather than on the Protestant-Catholic axis. It was further suggested after a brief examination of materials from another survey that the differences between our findings and those of other investigators might have to do with the different ethnic composition of the samples and that, therefore, the ethnic factor was still an important one in American society.

The abandonment of previously held concepts does not and must not proceed precipitously. Many of the survey findings reported in this paper are at variance with ideas that have been popular both within and outside of the American Catholic community. One survey does not a revolution make. The NORC data provide little support for theories of antiscientism among American Catholics. Considerably more research will be required, however, before one can in fact argue that the values of Catholics with regard to scholarship are not different from their non-Catholic fellow Americans. It will then be necessary to determine whether this similarity represents a major social change and, if it does, what the mechanisms of this change have been.

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP: A CASE STUDY AND CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENT[1]

CHARLES M. BONJEAN

ABSTRACT

Most studies of power-leadership decision-making go no further than the determination of the leadership base or power elite by the positional or reputational method (or a combination). This traditional approach has been criticized for implying an a priori assumption that a monolithic power structure exists in the community, for including only a segment of the real "elite" or for including individuals who, in fact, are not members of the "elite," for inaccuracies in respondent perception, and for questionnaire or schedule ambiguity. To some degree, these shortcomings may be overcome by a conceptual refinement of "leader" based on an extension of method. Both method and concepts show heuristic value when applied to the study of leadership in a small Southern city.

The phenomenon of power-leadership decision-making at the community level has received a great deal of attention from both sociologists and political scientists during the past decade.[2] Many of these investigations, especially those conducted by sociologists, have been criticized on the grounds that the method of investigation used—the reputational approach—is inadequate for several reasons.[3] (1) The approach enables the investigator to find a monolithic power

[1] This investigation involves one facet of community affairs in the Piedmont Industrial Crescent being studied by the Institute for Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina under a grant by the Ford Foundation. The leadership studies are under the direction of E William Noland, who suggested a number of revisions and modifications of this investigation. Revisions and useful suggestions were also made by Richard L. Simpson and Ernest Q. Campbell of the University of North Carolina.

[2] Including Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); Roland J. Pellegrin and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (March, 1956), 413–19; Charles Freeman and Selz C. Mayo, "Decision Makers in Rural Community Action," *Social Forces*, XXXV (May, 1957), 319–22; Robert O. Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (February, 1958), 3–9; Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (February, 1958), 9–15; Ernest A. T. Barth and Stuart D. Johnson, "Community Power and a Typology of Social Issues," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (October, 1959), 29–32; Nelson W. Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (December, 1959), 796–803; Orrin E. Klapp and L. Vincent Padgett, "Power Structure and Decision-making in a Mexican Border City," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXV (January, 1960), 400–406; Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960), Robert A Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), and Benjamin Walter, "Political Decision Making in Arcadia," in F Stuart Chapin, Jr., and Shirley F. Weiss (ed.), *Urban Growth Dynamics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, forthcoming).

[3] By reputational approach, of course, is meant asking certain members of the community under investigation to list and rank the most powerful and influential leaders in the community. The approach has also been termed the "snowball technique" since one informant's nominees become the next informants. Critics of this technique include Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June, 1958), 463–69; Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, XIV (Summer, 1954), 205–12; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," *Social Forces*, XXXVII (March, 1959), 232–36; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (October, 1960), 636–44, and a number of the investigations listed in n. 2.

structure when, in fact, such a structure may not exist in the community. (2) Assuming there is a monolithic structure, this approach may lead to premature closure (not including all the leaders) or may lead to the inclusion of non-leaders. The problem is the cutoff point in the final list of nominees. (3) If the reputational approach is used, we must take into consideration inaccuracies in respondent perceptions. Private citizens, it is claimed, may be unreliable sources of information. (4) Interviewer and respondent may not agree on what is meant by "power." Certain questions used may not mean the same thing to both interviewer and respondent or there may be no consensus in regard to the meaning of the question among respondents.

The purpose of this investigation is to attempt to indicate how these shortcomings may be overcome through an extension of method and a refinement of concepts. The collection of additional data—sociometric and other—on a sample of community leaders so designated by the reputational approach makes it possible to probe group characteristics and internal differentiations of the sample. Analysis of the data indicates that reputational leaders are, in fact, meaningful groups and not artifacts of the operational measures in at least one community—Burlington, North Carolina. Because of the heuristic nature of this investigation no specific hypotheses will be tested, but one general hypothesis of an exploratory nature will be entertained: A conceptual refinement of the term "community leader" based on the method of investigation itself will lead to greater agreement among investigators, will satisfy to some degree the basic criticisms listed above, and may serve as a useful basis for comparative studies in the future.

THE COMMUNITY

Burlington, located in north-central North Carolina, has a population of approximately 33,000 (1960) and a suburban population of about 15,000 (1958 est.). Approximately 125,000 live in the city's trade area, which extends 8 miles to the west and 20 miles in all other directions. The population of the city increased slightly more than 33 per cent between 1950 and 1960, an increase due primarily to industrial expansion and new industries. Eighty-eight per cent of the population is native-born white, and 11.4 per cent is Negro (1960).

Primarily an industrial community, Burlington ranks sixth in the nation in hosiery production and leads the South in the number of hosiery plants. Of the city's seventy-eight industrial establishments, thirty are hosiery mills and fifteen others produce textile products. Among the 3,073 counties in the United States, Alamance, of which Burlington is the largest city, ranks 216th in the number of manufacturing plants and 203d in the number of industrial wage earners—well in the top 10 per cent on both items. A total of 19,000 persons are employed in Burlington's industries.[4]

The city operates under the mayor-council type of government.

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

The empirical objectives of the investigation have already been stated: to isolate a group of community leaders according to standard methodology and to further delimit this group on the basis of other measures. A two-step reputational analysis supplemented with sociometric and interaction data was used to attempt to fulfil these objectives.

The executive secretary of an established community association, was asked: "Who are the community leaders who really get things done around here?"[5] He was asked to rank up to twenty leaders in order of over-all influence and to specify those leaders he had worked with as well as the areas

[4] *Hill's Burlington and Graham City Directory* (Richmond, Va.: Hill Directory, Inc., 1958), pp. i–xiii.

[5] This was but one question included in a standardized interview schedule consisting of seventy-eight questions (both poll type and open end) and requiring from forty-five minutes to four hours to complete.

of participation.[6] Using his list as a starting point, interviewers asked each individual named by him to do the same. This was continued until new lists yielded many more duplications than nominations. After forty-five interviews it was evident that there was relatively high agreement in regard to sixteen community leaders and little agreement on the remaining one hundred nominations. Additional interviews would probably have had the same results—more nominations for the sixteen top leaders and more names to add to the remaining list of one hundred. According to Moreno, this assumption has general validity and may be termed the "sociodynamic effect":

> It might be anticipated that increasing the chance probability of being chosen by allowing more choices within the same size population and thus lessening the chance probability to remain unchosen will gradually bring the number of unchosen to a vanishing point and likewise reduce more and more the number of comparatively little chosen.
>
> However, in actuality, this does not take place. . . . The further choices allowed go more frequently to the already highly chosen and not proportionately more to those who are unchosen or who have few choices. The quantity of isolates and little chosen comes finally to a standstill whereas the volume of choices continues to increase for those at the upper end of the range.
>
> The sociodynamic effect apparently has general validity. It is found in some degree in all social aggregates.[7]

Thirty-eight of the forty-five respondents became informants by naming individuals and ranking them. Their 116 nominations were tabulated and weighted—a weight of 20 assigned to each first-place choice, 19 to a second place choice and so on down to one for a twentieth-place choice. The total leadership score assigned to each of the 116 individuals mentioned consists merely of the sum of the weighted choices.

Leadership scores ranged from 350.5 for Neal Allen, the top leader in the community, to one for Mrs. Robert Cain, who received one twentieth-place vote.[8] Fourteen of the 116 persons mentioned received scores of more than 100 and two received scores between 90 and 100. No other person received a total leadership score higher than 70 and most were far below this score.[9] Thus, because of the high agreement regarding the selection of the first sixteen as leaders and because of the lack of consensus in regard to the remainder of the sample, it was assumed that, *if* a power elite existed in Burlington, these sixteen individuals would be the basic element of its membership.

Most power structure studies stop here in regard to the reputational approach. (Two exceptions, studies conducted by Robert O. Schulze and A. Alexander Fanelli, will be discussed briefly below.) But using the same data and analyzing them from a different standpoint may yield additional valuable information. Thus a second step in the data analysis is incorporated. In Burlington, of the forty-five informants, twelve were in the leader category (members of the top sixteen),[10] the other thirty-three were not. The second analysis utilizes only the choices and rankings of ten of the twelve "leaders."[11] When

[6] Thirty specific activities were listed. They could be grouped into seven general participation areas: economic, welfare, livability, educational, political, philanthropic, and desegregational.

[7] J. L. Moreno *et. al.*, *The Sociometry Reader* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 36.

[8] "Neal Allen" and "Mrs. Robert Cain" are pseudonyms as are the names and affiliations of the other leaders and non-leaders specifically referred to in this investigation.

[9] It is impossible to include the full data here because of space limitations. The investigator will provide mimeographed copies of additional data or will answer more specific questions on request

[10] Of the sixteen top leaders in Burlington, only twelve were interviewed. One died shortly after the study had started, one was not in the city during the time of the study, and, although the other two were interviewed, they asked to keep the schedule in order to complete some "difficult" questions and did not return it.

[11] Of the twelve leaders interviewed, two refused to rank leaders and to indicate those they interact

this is done, a new picture emerges—the "power elite" has gained new members (because of high agreement among these twelve, but no or few nominations from the remainder of the informants) and assigns much less power to other nominees (because of no or few choices from the elite). This modification of the reputational approach does not incorporate an arbitrary cutoff point, and, at the same time, it reduces the likelihood of inaccuracies in respondent perception (in that the "judges" are determined by the first analysis). The wording of the question and the additional requirement for judges to list the nominees' spheres of influence seems to overcome the problem of ambiguity. The possibility of ambiguity and the desirability of judges is indicated by comparing leader and non-leader rankings (Table 1). That there is little agreement between the two sets of rankings is supported statistically, as Spearman's rank correlation for the two groups is .012.

Two questions must be answered before further discussion. First, does this method imply an a priori assumption that a monolithic power structure does exist in the community? Second, have we really established a power elite?

In regard to the first question, it should be noted that this technique allows for disagreement as well as for agreement in regard to leadership choices. If there were no leadership elite in the community we would expect little or no agreement in leadership selection. There is no reason to reject the assumption that the technique is able to indicate the absence of a power structure, as well as its presence.

Obviously, all of Burlington's 48,000 residents (including suburbs) could not conceivably play leadership roles, strictly on the grounds of accepted role definition. When one starts cutting down a population of this size by factors of two for sex (excluding females), perhaps three for age

TABLE 1

RANKING OF SIXTEEN LEADERS BY THEMSELVES AND BY NON-LEADERS

Leader	Total Sample ($N=38$)	Leaders ($N=10$)	Non-Leaders ($N=28$)	Difference	Leader Type*
Neal Allen	1	1	2	− 1	*v*
James Barton	2	2	3 5	− 1 5	*v*
George Welles	3	10	1	9	*s*
Mike Reynolds	4	3	5	− 2	*v*
Tom White	5	9	6	3	*v*
R. V. Daniels	6	4	11	− 7	*c*
Terry Jones	7	13	7	6	*s*
Percy Roberts	8	17	3 5	13 5	*s*
Charles Martin	9	11	12	− 1	*v*
Thomas Mintler	10	14	9 5	4 5	*s*
A G Curtis	11	7	13	− 6	*c*
Richard Murphy	12	16	8	8	*s*
Harold Smith	13	5	14	− 9	*c*
Harold B. Green	14	6	15	− 9	*c*
LeRoy Barton	15	8	16	− 8	*c*
Harvey Harris	16	15	9 5	5 5	*s*
Dan Morley		12	..	− 5	*c*

* Leader types *v*, visible, *s*, symbolic, *c*, concealed

with. Thus, sociometric choices and actual information regarding interaction are available for ten of the sixteen leaders.

bracket (excluding those too old and those too young), X_1 for income sufficient to insure some leisure, X_2 for education and so on, the result *is* a limited group. The size of this group is unknown in Burlington, but it is reasonable to assume that it is *at least* 116 (based on nominations alone). The 445 choices made by the 38 informants *could* have been distributed evenly, indicating a power vacuum. In fact, they were not. Of the 445 choices, 201 were directed to the top sixteen nominees ($\overline{X} = 12.6$); the other 224 were directed to the remaining 100 nominees ($\overline{X} = 2.24$). Had there been the least possible agreement in leadership selection in regard to the leadership pool of 116, each nominee would have received almost four (actually 3.86) votes. Adopting 3.86 as the mean and 4.6 as the standard deviation (an estimate based on the range, which in this case is 22), an upper confidence limit of 4.97 (at the 99 per cent level) may be computed. In other words, we may assume that choices are no longer random if we are able to isolate a number of individuals, each receiving five or more choices. As a matter of fact, the number of choices assigned to the judges selected by the first step of the method ranges from six to twenty-two. No one in the remainder of the "leadership pool" has more than four choices and most have only one. An informal analysis of rankings (as opposed to sheer number of choices) seems to indicate, even more convincingly, that a power vacuum does *not* exist in Burlington.[12]

At least two validity checks may be employed to ascertain whether or not the technique actually has established a power elite.

First, if most top leaders also select one another as top leaders and, second, if, in fact, they actually indicate that they interact with one another, it seems reasonable to assume that a *group* has actually been discerned as opposed to a mere aggregate of individuals with similar characteristics.

By constructing a sociogram (Figure 1) showing the first three leadership choices of the ten top leaders completing this section of the interview schedule, an index of the degree to which these leaders form a group is available. Of the thirty possible choices (ten leaders times three choices each), twenty-four are within the elite designated by the entire sample. Thus, the *ratio of interest*, one aspect of group cohesiveness, is .80.[13] This statistic (the number of in-group choices divided by the total possible number of such choices) is meaningful only when compared with that of another group. The only group available for comparison at this point is the remainder of our sample of informants. Of their eighty-four possible choices, forty-five are directed to the top sixteen (ratio of interest = .53). Assuming the remainder of our informants do not form a group and are not a part of the elite group, we have a basis for comparison and consequently can test for statistical significance of differences between proportions. In this case, a *t*-test yields $P < .001$.

A second validity check, "interaction," also indicates that Burlington's power elite resembles a group more than it does an aggregate. As was indicated above, after listing and ranking leaders, each informant was provided with a check list of thirty community activities (although not all were found to be salient in Burlington) and was asked to indicate those individuals he "worked with" on each of the thirty activities. Significant here is the fact that a number of interaction patterns could be noted that *were not* connected with formal memberships.[14] For example, a cross-tabulation

[12] These data were not subjected to the same sort of statistical analysis as described above because of time and cost limitations and because the first test was thought to be convincing enough to support the argument in question. The informal analysis was used merely as a quick check.

[13] For a discussion of the ratio of interest and other statistics of social configuration see Moreno *et. al., op. cit.*, pp. 19–51.

[14] This is not the first investigation conducted where interaction has been designated as a necessary "check." An "acquaintanceship scale" was used successfully by Schulze and described in a

f responses indicates that five of the ten aders say they have worked with one another regarding "who gets elected to municipal office," yet none hold offices themselves nor do they hold formal positions in political party. Eight of the power elite ame one another in the area of attempting attract new industries to the community. ll in all, interaction patterns *within* the leadership elite are discernible in twenty one of the possible community activities. In each case the patterns involve between three and eight of the ten interviewed leaders.

Thus, because the data indicate mutual choices between members of the power elite as well as interaction within the elite, most of the sixteen leaders uncovered by the reputational approach may be considered as a group rather than merely an aggregate. It should be noted, however, that four of the top sixteen leaders—ranks 8, 10, 11 and 12 (see Fig. 1)—received no first, sec-

ort published subsequent to the research de-ibed here (see Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcan of Power in a Satellite City," in Morris Janotz [ed], *Community Political Systems* [Glencoe, Free Press, 1961], p. 51).




FIG. 1.—Leadership ranking by ten leaders. Uncircled are not top leaders

ond, or third place choices within the power elite. It is apparent that their position in the leadership group is thus derived from one or both of two phenomena: their leadership score was a consequence of rankings beyond three by members of the elite *or* their leadership score was a consequence of high ranking by non-leaders. Also, several other individuals, not originally identified as elite members, were given such choices. This brings us more directly to the second step in data analysis—an attempt to determine differentiations *within* the power elite.

TYPES OF LEADERS

Assuming that the sixteen persons uncovered by the first step in data analysis are the most qualified to perceive others of their kind, the next step should be to compare the leaders as perceived by one another with how they are perceived by that proportion of the sample not designated as part of the power elite. Such a comparison would yield three possible leadership types: (1) The leader who is assigned approximately the same amount of power by both other leaders and non-leaders. (2) The leader who is assigned more prestige by leaders than by non-leaders. (3) The leader who is assigned more prestige by non-leaders than by leaders.

Leaders of the first type will be termed *visible leaders* because they are playing roles in the community that are perceived and known by the community at large. Leaders of the second type will be termed *concealed leaders* because they have more influence within the leadership circle or power elite, and consequently in the community in general, than the community at large realizes. Leaders of the third type will be termed *symbolic leaders* because they probably do not wield as much influence in the community as the community at large thinks they do.

Looking at the comparison of leaders shown in Table 1, all three types may be distinguished. Arbitrarily setting a rank variation of five (true limits of 4.5 or greater) as the point where leaders are classified as concealed or symbolic rather than as visible, there are five visible leaders, six concealed leaders and six symbolic leaders. Sixteen of the leaders, of course, were uncovered by the general reputational approach; but a seventeenth was located by the modification described here. Leader types are indicated on both the sociogram and Table 1 by the symbols "*v*" (visible), "*c*" (concealed), and "*s*" (symbolic).

For this differentiation to be meaningful, the next step is to determine whether or not there is a relationship between leader type and other variables. In attempting to locate differences between symbolic and concealed leaders, there are no patterns or trends in regard to age, type of business, number of employees, types of activities engaged in, memberships (including religion), or education.

There is, however, one basic difference between the two extreme types of leaders—symbolic and concealed. Four of the six symbolic leaders are members of prominent Burlington families—families that have lived in the city for several generations, that are wealthy, and that have passed the family business on to the person listed as a leader. Murphy (12), before his death, was the top officer in a hosiery mill that had been in his family for three generations. Roberts (8) is the second-generation administrator of his family's hosiery mill. Jones (7) inherited his father's automobile dealership, and Harris (16) is the member of a family possessing all of the characteristics except the last (inheritance of family business). Only Welles (3) and Mintler (10) differ in this respect from the other symbolic leaders. Welles's symbolic placement may be explained by the fact that he is paid by the city businessmen for work in community affairs. Thus he occupies a position highly visible to the community in general, but one of perhaps less importance in the sphere of policy formation and decision-making than in the actual execution of policy. Thus, this deviant case analysis seems to further validate the method

proposed here. Only Mintler's placement as a symbolic leader is unexplainable. This may indicate a necessary change in method. The arbitrary rank variation set forth for classification as a concealed or symbolic leader was five (4.5 true limit). Mintler was a borderline case. The difference between leader and non-leader ranking was exactly 4.5. This may indicate that the arbitrary difference is set too low—perhaps, for example, the true limit should be raised to five.

The concealed leaders differ markedly from the symbolic leaders. Only one of the six concealed leaders *owns* a large business or industry and this leader, Congressman Green, founded his businesses himself, rather than inheriting them. In other words, his wealth is at least a generation newer than is the wealth of most of the symbolic leaders. His concealed status may also be due to the fact that he is the local power structure's link with a larger, more influential power structure at the state or national level.[15] As such, perhaps he would be more closely connected to the elite personnel and consequently more visible to them at the community level than to the remainder of the sample, who perhaps have a more macroscopic conception of his role. It is interesting to note that Allen, the leader receiving the greatest number of choices and highest ranks, ranked Green first. The other five concealed leaders do not own businesses—two are professionals and three are the local administrators of subsidiaries of state or national corporations. Five of the concealed leaders spent their childhood or longer outside of Burlington and thus, compared with the symbolic leader group, are relative newcomers. The outstanding observation is that none is from a traditionally prominent Burlington family. This suggests that non-leaders perhaps think more in terms of the status or class dimensions of stratification when asked to name community leaders, whereas leaders themselves are more apt to think in terms of the power dimension. It suggests further that non-leaders may not recognize changes in the leadership base or power elite but think instead that those that have always been powerful will probably continue to be so. In other words, individuals who have formerly ranked high on all three dimensions of social stratification —class, status, and power—may through time have lost, to some degree, one of these characteristics, but for several years a "halo effect" will operate to influence the general viewpoint. Schulze's Cibola findings lend some credulity to this hypothesis (economic dominants exerted sociopolitical power as well as economic power in the past, but currently have relinquished the former in that community).[16]

Critics of stratification studies continually remind us of the necessity to distinguish between class and status.[17] Studies of the third major aspect of stratification—power—face the same problem. High status or class position may lead to the assumption by informants of high power positions. Thus it becomes necessary to differentiate between three different types of community leaders—class (economic) leaders, status (reputational) leaders, and true power leaders. The *hypothesized* relationship between the methodological distinction of visible, concealed, and symbolic leaders to class, status, and power leaders, as suggested by this sensitizing exploratory in-

[15] See Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership U.S.A.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) for a discussion that supports this tentative hypothesis.

[16] Schulze, in Janowitz (ed), *op. cit.*, pp. 40–41.

[17] Including Paul K. Hatt, "Stratification in the Mass Society," *American Sociological Review*, XV (April, 1950), 216–22; Harold F. Kaufman, Otis Dudley Duncan, Neal Gross, and William H. Sewell, "Problems of Theory and Method in the Study of Social Stratification in Rural Society," *Rural Sociology*, XVIII (March, 1953), 12–24; Kurt Mayer, "The Theory of Social Classes," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXIII (Summer, 1953), 149–67; Gregory P. Stone and William H. Form, "Instabilities in Status: The Problem of Hierarchy in the Community Study of Status Arrangements," *American Sociological Review*, XVIII (April, 1953), 149–62, and others.

vestigation, is summarized in Table 2. Two important relationships should be noted: (1) the traditional reputational approach uncovers symbolic leaders who are actually not members of the power elite. (2) It may *not* uncover actual members of the power elite if these members rank low in either class or status.[18]

Thus, a second step needs to be added to the reputational approach if its use is to be continued in this type of study. The second step, of course, is the one that has been outlined here—the comparison of rankings by leaders and non-leaders and the classification of leaders into three types based on rank differences. This method itself is a useful heuristic device at the single case-study level of investigation. When power studies reach the comparative level (examining two or more leadership structures simultaneously), it should be even more useful as it is one means of assessing one of the most controversial and central characteristics of such structures—their visibility. Are leaders and leadership behavior overt or covert? Furthermore, is this characteristic, the structure's visibility, related to community attributes?

TABLE 2

HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METHODOLOGICAL TYPES AND STRATIFICATION COMPONENTS

	Class	Status	Power
Symbolic . . .	High	High	Low
Visible	High	High	High
Concealed. . .	Low	Low*	High

* The concealed leader may rank high in either class or status position, but not in both.

The first question may be answered in regard to the case at hand. The second answer must be delayed until a uniform methodological approach is applied to the study of other communities. In Burlington, the leadership structure is partly visible and partly concealed. The structure's "star," Neal Allen, is visible. Although it is a subjective impression, it seems that one factor coinciding with Allen's number one rank in the community may be that he is a co-ordinator of community affairs. In other words, because so many of the other top leaders, each with his own specialized community interests, select Allen as the top leader, his function may be that of assigning priority to various projects (some visible and some concealed) and attempting to integrate and interrelate them. Supporting evidence is that he is a member of all important civic organizations but holds formal offices in none of them. Informants furthermore remarked, for example, "He really isn't active himself as far as *doing* things goes, but he certainly has more influence than anyone else in town." On the other hand, most of the other top leaders (both visible and concealed) direct their activities toward only one or two institutional spheres of the community—usually economic plus one other. Other than Allen, only two leaders, Welles (3) and Reynolds (4) are active in more than two institutional areas of participation. In summary, Burlington's leadership structure may be seen as a network of overlapping subgroups, some visible and some concealed, co-ordinated by one central visible figure. This structure is not too unlike the smaller and simpler power structure described by Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman in Springdale and is similar to the structure described by Schulze in Cibola—three groups

[18] A. Alexander Fanelli ("A Typology of Community Leadership Based on Influence within the Leader Subsystem," *Social Forces*, XXXIV [May, 1956], 332–38), sets forth a method that enables the investigator to distinguish between the symbolic and visible leaders (he calls them prestige influentials and active influentials), but that ignores the possibility of concealed leaders. Schulze's distinction between economic dominants and public leaders (in Janowitz [ed.], *op. cit.*, pp. 19–80) has the same shortcoming, but obviously the economic public leader distinction has other merits and is thus not as comparable to the method being discussed as is the Fanelli distinction.

of dominants linked by two individuals occupying "dual statuses."[19]

CONCLUSION

Adding a second step in data analysis, interaction checks, and statistics of social configuration to the traditional reputational approach used in the study of community power-leadership decision-making and distinguishing between three types of leaders (1) takes account of and, to varying degrees, answers the criticisms of the traditional reputational approach, (2) serves as a heuristic device leading to more penetrating modes of analysis in itself, (3) emphasizes that structural characteristic—visibility—that has been a major source of disagreement and discussion, and (4) suggests interrelationships between the concepts "class," "status," and "power" that may later contribute to a more general theory of stratification.

The fact that all generalizations discussed above are based on, and derived from, only one case study obviously requires cautious interpretation. They are offered here only as material for hypotheses —hypotheses to be tested by this investigator in the near future in other communities and to be modified, improved, or rejected by other interested investigators.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

[19] Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–230, and Schulze, in Janowitz (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 52.

UPROOTEDNESS AND WORKING-CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS[1]

JOHN C. LEGGETT

ABSTRACT

A recent study of Detroit blue-collar workers reveals that workmen born in agrarian regions express a higher degree of working-class consciousness than those reared in industrial settings. This finding runs contrary to Marx's hypothesis on the sources of class consciousness, but is consistent with evidence gathered by several social scientists. Following G. D. H. Cole and A. Ulam, our interpretation of this militance among "the uprooted" stresses the jarring effects of industrialization. To further buttress this argument, data presented indicate that uprooted workmen reared in settings *least* likely to provide them with intellectual tools usable in the urban environment are the ones *most* likely to express militance.

THE PROBLEM

The population of the industrial community is heterogeneous. Among other things, it contains workmen with dissimilar pasts, personal biographies notably different from one another. Some workmen are immigrants previously socialized by essentially *Gemeinschaft* values, while others can claim an industrial heritage. This paper will focus on how these two types differ in terms of working-class consciousness.

Marx, too, was concerned with this problem, and he concluded that workers, seasoned throughout their work lives to the harsh realities of industrial capitalism, would hold a higher degree of class consciousness than those who had but recently migrated from rural areas.[2] Largely because of this assumption, Marx held that revolutionary enthusiasm would seize the working class of industrialized Germany before a working-class revolution could occur in agrarian-industrial countries such as Russia. Of course, Marx did not say that an embryonic working class would express a low degree of class *élan*. For example, he was well aware of the Chartists and even more militant British working-class movements that existed at the time. Yet, he viewed these early movements as immature expressions of a working class less class conscious than a proletariat steeled for several generations through exposure to industrialization and the agitational activities of labor unions.

On the other hand, many students of working-class social movements have noted that the proletariat of peasant origin is un-

[1] I am deeply indebted to the Social Science Research Council, the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies, the Department of Sociology of the University of Michigan, and the Department of Political Science of Wayne State University for their assistance. In addition I would like to thank Gerhard Lenski, Morris Janowitz, Daniel Katz, Werner Landecker, and Robert Mowitz for their provocative criticisms and suggestions.

[2] Karl Marx, *Communist Manifesto*, in T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Reubel (eds.), *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (London: Watts & Co., 1956), pp. 184–85. Interestingly, Engels in his later years revised his opinions on this matter and developed a position consistent with the one to be presented in this paper. He observed that workers express a high degree of revolutionary consciousness during the early period of industrialization when the process proves to be rapid, discontinuous, and dangerous to large sections of inexperienced workmen. Later, however, generations of workers become less militant, as large-scale industry passes beyond the early period of development and, presumably, rate of capital accumulation declines, economic security increases, condition of work place improves, and an enlarged industrial base elevates the worker beyond bare subsistence. Engels' comments on this matter can be found in "Letter to Karl Kautsky," November 8, 1884, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Correspondence 1846–1895* (New York: International Publishers, 1946), p. 422. Without mention of Engels, Trotsky made a similar attempt to account for the revolutionary character of the Russian working class, largely by referring to its *agrarian* origins and the rapid speed of its introduction into a highly advanced, industrial environment. His reference can be found in "The Russian Revolution," in F. W. Dupee (ed.), *The History of the Russian Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1959), p. 9.

doubtedly one of the most volatile and militant elements within any industrial community. A great deal of historical evidence points to the solidary efforts of workers who are thrust from agrarian into industrial regions. G. D. H. Cole[3] and A. Ulam[4] have noted the revolutionary fervor of many British workers during the 1830's and 1840's and contrasted them with the less rebellious offspring of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Isaacs has analyzed the revolutionary quality of the Shanghai, Wuhan, and Hong Kong workers as they took up arms during the 1920's.[5] The vast bulk of these workers had only recently been introduced into the Chinese industrial labor force, itself largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. In the United States, Pope has found that many of the workers who took part in the bitter 1929 textile strike in Gastonia, North Carolina, were also recent immigrants from rural areas.[6] Jones has noted that an exceedingly large number of Akron workers involved in the 1936 sit-down strikes had but lately come from rural areas located in West Virginia.[7] Wilensky and Lebeaux have contrasted the impact of early and late industrialization on workmen in the United States and noted the relative militance of uprooted workers as they entered the industrial labor force in the last part of the nineteenth century.[8] Lipset and Kornhauser have presented information on the differential tempo of industrial development and incidence of political extremism in Scandinavia.[9] Their findings support the contentions of Cole and the others mentioned. Of course, no attempt is being made to say that workers born in industrial regions lack class militance, but only that they might be less extreme in their class enthusiasm than those reared in non-industrial areas.

PROCEDURE

The sample.—In order to study this problem, 375 blue-collar residents of Detroit were interviewed in the spring and early summer of 1960. These respondents were selected from seven districts of high ethnic concentration, that is, locales known to be highly homogeneous in terms of ethnic social organization. A list random sample procedure was used to select respondents from these districts, three of which were predominantly Negro, three Polish, and one northwest European. Only male Negro, Polish, Ukrainian, German, and British (non-Southern-born) blue-collar workers were interviewed. Although the sample was completely random within each one of the seven districts, it cannot be considered as "representative" of any universe. The data gathered only suggest the actual parameters within each ethnic group.

The sample was selected and most of the interviews were conducted during the late spring and early summer of 1960, a period

[3] Cole's analysis of the embryonic and mature British working class can be found in *A Short History of the British Working Class* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1952). The Hammonds have also analyzed the conditions and spirit of revolt common to uprooted workmen of early nineteenth-century England (see J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Labourer (1760-1832)* [London: B. Longmans, Green & Co., 1949], Vols. I and II).

[4] Adam Ulam presents a poignant analysis of conditions that prompted uprooted workmen to take extremist positions on the question of industrialization and concentrated power of the middle class (see his *The Unfinished Revolution* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960], pp. 58–90).

[5] Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951). For a more detailed analysis of Chinese workers during the early 1920's see William Ayers, *The Hong Kong Strikes, 1920–1926* ("Papers on China, Regional Studies Seminars," Vol. IV [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950]); also see William Ayers, *Shanghai Labor and the May 30th Movement* ("Papers on China, Regional Studies Seminars," Vol. V [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950]).

[6] Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 213-306.

[7] Alfred W. Jones, *Life, Liberty, and Property* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1941), pp. 61–66.

[8] Harold Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), pp. 27–132.

[9] Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 68–71; and William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 150–55.

of relative economic prosperity for the community as a whole, although its economic structure was obviously not up to par. The 1957–58 recession had ended and the percentage of unemployed had dropped from 20 per cent of the total labor force to 6 per cent in April and May of 1960. However, even though unemployment had declined considerably, many men laid off during the 1957–58 recession had failed to find work after the automobile industry had recovered. The study, then, drew its sample from a population of workmen many of whom had faced considerable economic insecurity during the late 1950's. A large proportion of this category, it might be added, were Negro immigrants from the southern United States.[10]

Early and advanced industrial types.—Perhaps a useful distinction can be made between an *agrarian-industrial* and an *industrial* society. In an agrarian-industrial society, industrial organization plays a relatively unimportant part in the total economy, while sustenance is derived primarily from agricultural pursuits. Yet the society has been touched by industrialization as evidenced by the beginnings of modern transportation networks, mining, and light industry. Also, trade has developed between it and industrial societies, as indicated by its dependence on markets that exist in the more developed countries.

Ideally, an industrial society exists when the population depends almost entirely upon an industrial base for its sustenance, and agricultural endeavors supply only a fraction of the population with its livelihood. Most of the people are located within industrial regions, that is, areas within which the combination of economic and demographic factors has created a homogeneity of economic and social structure resting upon a modern technological base.

However, located within an industrial society one may find regions where (1) industry creates relatively little wealth, and (2) the population maintains agrarian forms of social organization and values. This agrarian enclave may be called an agrarian region. In many ways the social organization and value system of an agrarian region are quite similar to those of an agrarian-industrial society. The latter, in fact, may be thought of as consisting almost exclusively of agrarian regions, although industrial enclaves may exist within it.

Movement out of agrarian regions into industrial areas is a common phenomenon in Europe and elsewhere and has been during the last two centuries. As former peasants take positions as industrial workers, their migration constitutes the human base for the industrialization of many societies. When peasants or other inhabitants of an agrarian area move to an industrial region and become part of the working class, the process may be labeled "agrarian-industrial mobility." Those who make this transition from the agrarian to the industrial setting may be labeled "the uprooted."[11]

Southern-born Negroes and European-born Poles, presently resident in Detroit, constitute examples of uprooted persons. Members of both groups, with few exceptions, were steeped in agrarian cultures before migrating to Detroit. Until World War II, the South was essentially a non-industrial area whose culture, that is, norms, values, social organization, and technology, more nearly approximated an agrarian, than an industrial, model. This was also true of Poland, which did not begin to industrialize seriously until after World War II. Since all Southern-born Negro and European-born Polish respondents were over twenty-one and hence born prior to World War II, they can be considered born in agrarian-industrial societies.

Interindustrial mobility refers to movement within or between industrialized regions. It occurs when individuals move about

[10] The impact of widespread economic deprivation on Detroit Negroes during the late 1950's has been described by David Street and John C. Leggett ("Economic Deprivation and Extremism: A Study of Unemployed Negroes," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII [July, 1961], 53–57).

[11] Oscar Handlin was the first to popularize this rubric in *The Uprooted* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1952).

within the larger framework of an industrial region or regions, perhaps from one blue-collar position to another, or in some cases from farming to industry. Farmers living in industrial regions often become workers; workers frequently shift their place of residence or perhaps move from one blue-collar job to another. The label to be used when referring to individuals who engage in this movement is "the prepared," because since birth they have acquired skills that facilitate their ready adaptation to an industrial community. Negro and Polish workers born in Michigan or other sections of the Midwest and the East constitute "the prepared" in this study. These workers either grew up in Detroit or emigrated from regions that have been industrialized since at least the 1900's.[12] Before determining to what extent prepared workmen are more or less militant than are the uprooted, it will be useful to discuss what is meant by working-class consciousness.

Degree of working-class consciousness.—Working-class consciousness can be defined as a cumulative series of mental states, running from class verbalization through skepticism and militance to egalitarianism. "Class verbalization" denotes the tendency of working-class individuals to discuss topics in class terms. They need not do so consistently. In fact, only the occasional use of class symbols designates one as having some facility in their usage. "Skepticism" occurs when an individual believes that wealth is allocated within the community so as to benefit primarily the middle class. "Militance" refers to a predisposition to engage aggressively in action to advance the interests of one's class. "Egalitarianism" refers to favoring a redistribution of wealth so that each individual within the community would have (1) the same amount and (2) the material basis thereby for the full development of his natural talents.

In order to measure "class verbalization," the first aspect of class consciousness considered, a battery of eight unstructured questions was used. Each question deliberately made no reference to class, so as not to prejudice the answers of the respondent. He was asked whom he had voted for in the last election and why, who was his favorite president and why, and so forth. If the worker used class terms in just one of these instances, his comments constituted class verbalization. "Skepticism" was operationalized through the use of the following question: "When business booms in Detroit, who gets the profits?" If the respondent used categories such as "rich people," "upper class," "big business" and similar class references, he was treated as class conscious in this regard. "Militance" was measured by asking the respondent to project himself into a situation where workers were about to take action against a landlord, and to indicate whether or not he would join the group in a series of activities, including picketing. If he would take part in the *latter*, the study classified him as militant. "Egalitarianism" was determined to exist when the worker agreed with the notion that the wealth of our country should be divided up equally so that people would have an equal chance to get ahead.

These various aspects of class consciousness in turn were linked to one another so as to measure the degree to which each worker had developed class consciousness. Ideally, workers thereby fell into one of the following five categories: militant egalitarians, militant radicals, skeptics, class verbalizers, and class indifferents. Table 1 indicates how workmen were typed.

It should be noted that approximately

[12] Categorizing foreign-born Germans and Britons as either uprooted or prepared proves to be impossible, because the study's data do not indicate whether they were born in agrarian or industrial regions. However, had data on region of birth been available, no doubt most of them would have been categorized as prepared, given the industrialized character of most of Britain and Germany prior to World War I, the period when most of the foreign-born in the sample were growing up. Parenthetically, it should be noted that German and British workers as a whole were decidedly *less* class conscious than either Poles or Negroes, even when one controls for personal income, union membership, and a host of other considerations (see John C. Leggett, "Working Class Consciousness in an Industrial Community" [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962], pp. 136–75).

three-quarters of the respondents held opinions that corresponded either exactly or consistently with this model. Unfortunately, one-fourth of the workers maintained a point of view that was inconsistent with this configuration. Although they were clearly "error types," they, nevertheless, were categorized as were the rest on the basis of a point system suggested by Guttman. Thus, a total of 375 workers were classified. Of these, 38 qualified as militant egalitarians, 87 as militant radicals, 114 as skeptics, 98 as class verbalizers, and 38 as class indifferents.[13]

This treatment of class consciousness, although original, rests on several formulations found in the sociological literature. Not only the ideas of Marx and Guttman, but those of Manis and Meltzer, as well as Alfred Jones, have been used to define the various aspects of class consciousness. Marx has pointed to the utility of thinking in terms of degree of class consciousness,[14] while Guttman has suggested a suitable measurement technique.[15] Manis and Meltzer have wisely suggested that class consciousness can be treated in terms of its many aspects,[16] while the findings of Jones, in his study of the Akron sit-down strikers, have warned the researcher against ignoring its militant forms.[17] Clearly, then, this definition is a synthesis of several important writings. The next task is to weigh its utility.

EXPECTATIONS AND FINDINGS

The historical illustrations referred to in the first part of this paper suggest that the uprooted should express a higher degree of class consciousness than the prepared. The data presented in Table 2 support this expectation: 52 per cent of the uprooted are either militant radicals or militant egalitarians, while only 22 per cent of the prepared can be so classified. At the other extreme, 13 per cent of the uprooted and 47 per cent of the prepared are either class verbalizers or class indifferents. The Kendall's Tau measure of correlation is .41, while the difference between the uprooted and the prepared respondents is significant at the <.001 level.

Other relevant variables do not upset our findings. Table 3 demonstrates that, when one controls for ethnicity, the relationship still obtains. First, among Negroes, the Southern-born are more class conscious than

TABLE 1

IDEAL CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS ON FOUR ASPECTS OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Individuals Typed According to Class Perspective	Egalitarianism*	Militance	Skepticism	Class Verbalization
Militant egalitarians	+	+	+	+
Militant radicals	−	+	+	+
Skeptics	−	−	+	+
Class verbalizers	−	−	−	+
Class indifferents	−	−	−	−

* "+" refers to class conscious; "−" refers to non-class conscious

[13] For further information on the construction of these types, see *ibid.*, pp. 73–135. In addition, it should be noted that the Menzel coefficient of reproducibility for this measure of class consciousness is .77. The formula used to compute this measure has been presented by Herbert Menzel, "A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVII (September, 1953), 124–133.

[14] Some of Marx's most provocative notions on class consciousness appear in his *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1960).

[15] Guttman's presentation of a useful measurement technique can be found in Samuel Stouffer *et al.*, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), IV, 3–90, 172–212.

[16] Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, "Attitudes of Textile Workers to Class Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, LX (1954), 30–35.

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 250–80.

those born in Michigan and elsewhere in the North.[18] Second, if one considers Poles and Ukrainians only, those of European background are more likely to express a high degree of class consciousness than those born in the northern United States.[19] How can one explain these consistent findings?

[18] Needless to say, the relatively small number of cases of prepared workmen found among Negroes does not constitute compelling evidence.

[19] In addition, it should be noted that a series of statistical controls fail to upset the relationship between uprootedness and class consciousness. Length of residence, union membership, downward mobility, generational membership, and several measures of present economic position cannot erase the importance of the uprooted hypothesis.

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

Peasants and farmers transplanted from an agrarian-industrial to an industrial environment will frequently express a high degree of class consciousness partially because they are speedily injected into an economic system where their lack of formal education and urban *savoir faire* often places them in marginal occupational roles. Exploitation of these workmen, combined with their lack of skills, effectively limits the chances of the uprooted to achieve job security or to move upward into the middle class. Marginal economic position, exploitation, and lack of skills, linked to blocked mobility, in turn create grievances against the business com-

TABLE 2

REGIONAL BACKGROUND AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

(Per Cent)

Regional Background	Militant Egalitarians	Militant Radicals	Skeptics	Class Verbalizers	Class Indifferents	Total
The uprooted*	17	35	35	11	2	100
The prepared†	3	19	31	37	10	100

* $N = 139$. † $N = 95$.

TABLE 3

ETHNICITY, REGIONAL BACKGROUND, AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

(Per Cent)

Regional Background	Militant Egalitarians	Militant Radicals	Skeptics	Class Verbalizers	Class Indifferents	Total
	Negroes					
Southern-born	21	37	32	9	1	100 (102)
Northern-born	6	29	29	24	12	100 (17)
	Poles					
European-born	6	28	44	16	6	100 (36)
Northern-born	3	17	30	40	10	100 (78)

munity and sometimes generate collective protests demanding alteration of the status quo. The situation of the uprooted has these consequences, in part, because workmen are able to compare their present economically insecure positions with (1) their original optimistic expectations developed prior to movement to the industrial community and (2) the relatively high standard of living maintained by the middle class and much of the working class as well.[20]

A host of other considerations no doubt contribute to the class consciousness of the uprooted. One factor deserves particular mention. The uprooted presumably develop an antipathy toward the supraordinate classes in general because the latter, in both agrarian and industrial regions, have exploited them. In agrarian regions (such as much of Poland prior to World War II), communities have a high degree of class crystallization. Upward mobility and improvement of status among the lower classes are generally impossible. Rigid norms and legal structures backed by the landed gentry control them, to the extent that the subordinate classes find it difficult to express their grievances without being severely repressed by the upper class or its representatives. For this reason, those so adversely affected develop a marked dislike for this particular supraordinate class. This attitude is later generalized to include all supraordinate classes when the dominant class in the urban industrial community also acts with little regard for their economic and social welfare.

The impact of past membership in a society where there is a high degree of class crystallization should not be overestimated, however. One cannot say that subordinate class membership within an agrarian-industrial society (or an agrarian region) is the sole source of working-class consciousness for the uprooted. Rather, it would seem that an exploited position in an industrial community, when coupled with past membership in an agrarian region, contributes to the formation of a high degree of class consciousness among the uprooted.

The uprooted differ markedly from the prepared in previous experiences. The latter are natives of an industrial region and are thus in a much better position to acquire the occupational skills and urban values so useful in adapting successfully to the demands of the industrial community. Because of their greater sophistication, they are subject to less economic exploitation, blocked mobility, and economic insecurity. In addition the prepared do not carry with them a strong dislike of ruling groups found in preindustrial society, for, after all, they were never members of this form of social organization. Partially because of these differences in past experiences, the prepared develop a lower degree of class consciousness than the uprooted.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Among the uprooted those who were agricultural workers in an agrarian region prior to movement to an industrial community should be extremely class conscious, partially because economic problems for this subunit relocated in the industrial community are distressing in the extreme. No other population faces so many problems on a nearly continuous basis with so little preparation. Indeed, they are all but totally *unprepared.*

If our assumptions are correct, the *extremely uprooted*, those of agricultural, agrar-

[20] Werner Landecker has developed a quite similar interpretation of the sources of class consciousness. His explanation both achieves a higher degree of generality than the one advanced in this study and presents a point of view consistent with my own: "It seems then that in one form or another a large proportion of the population perceive their present social positions as stepping stones to higher levels. Under such conditions, one will tend to view oneself or one's family as being potentially above the transitional level occupied at the present time. Only if prospects for up-mobility seem to be dim, do people come to think of themselves as being in the same boat with others of similar status and as being part of a distinct class. It seems then that the frequency of up-mobility which is assumed to occur stands in an inverse relation to the prevalent degree of class consciousness. *The higher the apparent frequency of up-mobility is,* the lower the degree of class consciousness will tend to be" (see Ronald Freedman *et al.*, *Principles of Sociology* [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952], p. 426).

ian-region background, should be more class conscious than the *moderately uprooted* (those of non-agricultural, agrarian-region[*] background). This expectation is supported by Table 4. Southern-born Negroes who have spent some time on a farm prior to moving to Detroit express a higher degree of class consciousness than do Negroes who have never lived on a farm but who come from regions that are predominantly agricultural. The same pattern holds true for Poles, although the differences are considerably smaller and based upon few cases.

TABLE 4

PAST FARMING STATUS, ETHNICITY, REGIONAL BACKGROUND, AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

(Per Cent)

Ethnicity and Regional Background	Militant Egalitarians	Militant Radicals	Skeptics	Class Verbalizers	Class Indifferents	Total
	Lived on Farm in Past					
Negroes:						
Southern-born	33	34	28	5	0	100 (61)
Northern-born	.. (0)	.. (2)	.. (1)	.. (0)	.. (0)	.. (3)
Poles:						
European-born	8	34	31	15	12	100 (26)
Northern-born	0	23	27	45	5	100 (22)
	Did Not Live on Farm in Past					
Negroes:						
Southern-born	17	39	27	15	2	100 (41)
Northern-born	0	21	36	36	7	100 (14)
Poles:						
European-born	0	30	50	20	0	100 (10)
Northern-born	4	27	29	31	9	100 (55)

The extremely uprooted should express an even higher level of class consciousness when they belong to unions, since the latter often use class terms and class action to deal with the economic problems common to the working class in general, but accentuated among members drawn from the rural areas of agrarian regions. The data presented in Table 5 certainly support this expectation. If one examines only the uprooted who have lived on farms, 70 per cent of the Southern-born Negroes (and 50 per cent of the twenty-two foreign-born Poles) classified as union members are either militant egalitarians or militant radicals. On the other hand, 57 per cent of the Southern-born, farm-experienced, but non-unionized Negroes fall in the same categories. (Unfortunately, lack of a sufficient number of comparable Polish cases does not allow a comparison.) Thus, extreme uprootedness in conjunction with union membership produces an especially high degree of class consciousness.

However, one might question the utility of these findings, since the items found within the measure of class consciousness do not make any reference to class identification, perhaps the most popular measure of class consciousness in sociological literature.[21] Indeed, this objection is reasonable. However, a closed-ended measure of awareness of class position, when *substituted* for class verbalization and coupled with the remaining measures of class consciousness, can be related to considerations taken up in Table 4.[22] When

[21] The most prominent writer on class identification is Richard Centers. See his *Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949). A valuable critique of this landmark has been presented by Neal Gross, "Social Class Identification in the Urban Community," *American Sociological Review*, XVIII (1953), 398–404. A successful attempt to modify Centers' usage of the concept through Guttman scaling technique has been presented in Leggett, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–16, 386–419.

[22] Five types based on a Guttman scale comparable to the one already presented in this paper have been devised. With one exception, these five types are labeled in the same manner as those already presented in Tables 2–5. The "class identifiers" replace the "class verbalizers," while the measure remains valid. The Menzel coefficient of reproducibility is .75. See *ibid.*, pp. 111–13. Similar coefficients of reproducibility for the egalitarian-verbalization and egalitarian-identification scales suggest that perhaps the closed-ended measure of class identification considered by itself is very highly correlated with the more complex measure of class consciousness

TABLE 5

UNION MEMBERSHIP, PAST FARMING STATUS, REGIONAL BACKGROUND BY ETHNIC GROUP, AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (SOUTHERN-BORN NEGROES AND EUROPEAN-BORN POLES ONLY)

(Per Cent)

	Militant Egalitarians	Militant Radicals	Skeptics	Class Verbalizers	Class Indifferents	Total
			Union Member			
Lived on farm in past:						
Southern-born Negroes	36	34	26	4	0	100 (47)
European-born Poles...	9	41	27	14	9	100 (22)
Did not live on farm in past:						
Southern-born Negroes.	23	32	23	19	3	100 (31)
European-born Poles.	...... (0)	...... (3)	...... (3)	...... (2)	...... (0)	...... (8)
			Non-Union Member			
Lived on farm in past:						
Southern-born Negroes.	21	36	36	7	0	100 (14)
European-born Poles	...... (0)	...... (0)	...... (2)	...... (1)	...... (1)	...... (4)
Did not live on farm in past:						
Southern-born Negroes	0	60	40	0	0	100 (10)
European-born Poles...	...... (0)	...... (0)	...... (2)	...... (0)	...... (0)	...... (2)

this is done, the results obtained (see Table 6) are almost identical to those found in Table 4. Moreover, when union membership is taken into account, the pattern of findings presented in Table 5 reappears in almost identical form. The relationship still stands,

used in Tables 2–5. Perhaps all workmen who identify with the working class are located in the militant or skeptic categories, while those who think of themselves as middle class are situated in the class-verbalizer and class-indifferent positions. If so, the measure used in these tables would be largely gratuitous. However, a high correlation of this sort does not occur, although a disproportionately large number of workers who consider themselves either "working" or "lower" class also score as militants.

The similar coefficients for the two scales suggest yet another possibility: perhaps the lower ends of the two measures are in fact measuring the same empirical material. This possibility raises an interesting question: Are class verbalization and class identification two distinct concepts that when operationalized nevertheless gauge approximately the same thing, or do the operational definitions measure two different phenomena, both of which represent a minimal level of class consciousness? If the operational definitions of both concepts measure the same phenomenon, then individuals who are class identifiers should also be verbalizers. Of course, both measures could weigh different phenomena yet be highly intercorrelated, and if this were the case, then the verbalizers would turn out to be the same people as the identifiers. Neither is the case, however. Evidence presented elsewhere (see *ibid.*, p. 115) clearly indicates that class identification and verbalization measures *do* in fact quantify different phenomena, although the verbalizers are somewhat better able to properly identify their social class than the non-verbalizers. On the whole, however, it is safe to conclude that both gauge minimal but different forms of consciousness. This observation should be kept in mind in interpretations of the findings of Centers and others who have used this type of instrument for measuring class consciousness.

TABLE 6

PAST FARMING STATUS, ETHNICITY, REGIONAL BACKGROUND, AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

(Per Cent)

Ethnicity and Regional Background	Militant Egalitarians	Militant Radicals	Skeptics	Class Identifiers	Class Indifferents	Total
			Lived on Farm in Past			
Negroes:						
Southern-born	24	41	28	7	0	100 (61)
Northern-born	(0)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(3)
Poles:						
European-born	8	31	38	15	8	100 (26)
Northern-born	0	14	41	27	18	100 (22)
			Did Not Live on Farm in Past			
Negroes:						
Southern-born	15	35	38	10	2	100 (41)
Northern-born	7	14	36	29	14	100 (14)
Poles:						
European-born	0	20	60	20	0	100 (10)
Northern-born	4	18	27	44	7	100 (55)

while the unionized, extremely uprooted are once again the most militant. Clearly then, the substitution of class identification in place of class verbalization within the larger measure of class consciousness does not change the findings.

CONTEMPORARY CROSS-CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

Today the uprooted workers found in many Latin American countries have joined peasants and the new middle class within social movements dedicated to the modification, if not eradication, of the old ruling classes and the quasi-feudal economic structures upon which they rest.[23] Certainly, the latter conditions promise nothing but continued economic insecurity, if not deprivation, for large numbers of restive workers who, in turn, are learning to use unions and political parties to advance their interests. Indeed, the militant behavior of many Latin American workers is consistent with our findings and theoretical expectations for the uprooted.[24]

[23] For a valuable qualitative analysis of this new alliance see Richard N. Adams *et al.*, *Social Change in Latin America Today* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).

SUMMARY

Contrary to Marx's expectations, uprooted workers are found to express a higher level of class consciousness than the prepared, partially because the uprooted bring with them fewer skills and experiences that might help them to deal effectively with their new environment. Consequently, they are readily exploited during part, if not all, of their work lives. This exploitation, coupled with insufficient skills, effectively limits their chances to obtain secure working-class positions or to move into the middle class. Marginal economic position linked to blocked mobility in turn creates grievances and sometimes engenders collective protests demanding an alteration of their condition. These protests function so as to solidify and strengthen the class consciousness of the uprooted, especially those who both derive from rural backgrounds and presently belong to labor unions.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELY

[24] In addition, the data on the uprooted in this paper may have application to many African countries as well, as workmen of tribal background find themselves in positions in many ways comparable to the uprooted of other continents.

John William Albig

1899–1963

J. W. Albig died on January 2, 1963, at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, the place which he had selected as the ideal location in which to spend what he, his wife, and his friends had expected would be the many years of productive life left to him after his retirement from the University of Illinois at the early age of sixty. He felt that by retiring to Gettysburg he could achieve at last in a quiet and secluded college town what he called "the conditions for the leisurely thinking of the reflective scholar"—free from the bustle and distractions of the large state university where he spent thirty-one years, and yet near enough to several great centers of public affairs and learning where he could find, when wanted, all the mental stimulation and materials needed to support his scholarly work.

During his years of active service Albig published two books and numerous journal articles on public opinion and other topics. For some years prior to his retirement he had also been working steadily on a massive enterprise, the production of a treatise on international communications. He stepped up the pace of this work after retirement, and by the time of his death he had brought the manuscript almost within sight of completion. In addition to his work on international communications, Albig had also accumulated a large collection of notes and other materials that he intended to be used in a projected book on social control.

A native of Pennsylvania, Albig attended Gettysburg College where he graduated in 1921. In 1923 he took his master's degree at the same college. Nearly forty years later, his alma mater awarded him the honorary degree of L.H.D. (1960), in recognition of his having become one of its most distinguished alumni. He received his Ph.D. degree in 1929 from the University of Michigan, and held short-term academic appointments at the universities of Washington, Oregon, and Pittsburgh before settling at Illinois. At Michigan, Albig became a student and disciple of Charles H. Cooley, the man who was to serve for the rest of his life as his ideal model of the wise and humane academic man. He was one of the last, if not the last, of Cooley's students, and Albig never forgot how fortunate he had been to have been able to study under Cooley before the great man's own career came to its close.

Albig's substantive contributions to sociology are well enough known to his colleagues and peers so that a detailed description of them is unnecessary. From the beginning his main interest was focused on the study of communication and the public opinion process. For a few early years he was also a contributor to the literature on the residential mobility of urban populations. By the time he had become a mature scholar he had acquired an almost unmatched command of the literature on communications and opinion, and by 1939 he was able to publish his *Public Opinion*, the first book that gathered together all the scattered empirical, journalistic, and theoretical materials relating to the subject, and that gave a straightforward and systematic sociological character to the field. In its day and for some years more, *Public Opinion* was the definitive sociological work on the subject. A revised and expanded version was brought out in 1956 under the title *Modern Public Opinion.*

During most of his later career Albig saw his role as that of the systematizer, synthesizer, and critic in his field. He was at the same time a stanch supporter and advocate of empirical research in communications and opinion, and he became a great admirer of a number of his contemporaries who were eminent research scholars. He had much confidence in the techniques of content analysis and in survey and polling methods, but he was somewhat suspicious of the use of and dependence on elaborate statistical methods of data analysis, for, as Cooley had said, "The study and measurement of behavior, the outside of life, is a fruitful and promising method, but the idea of a human science consisting wholly of such study, without sympathetic observation of the mind is, I think, only mystification." In keeping with this view, Albig came to deplore what he believed to be the tendency of sociology in general to lower its sights with respect to the level and generality of its theory, and the tendency of many younger and lesser scholars to apply elaborate mathematical and statistical techniques to the study of trivial and fragmentary problems, the results of which (he said in 1957) had "not provided the basis for much generalization or grand theory."

In addition to his contributions to sociology as a scholar, for many years Albig served his university faithfully and well as a teacher and administrator. He was thirty years old when he came to Illinois. For sixteen years, from 1937 to 1953, he was the executive officer and chairman of the Department of Sociology. Besides overseeing the work in sociology, he fostered the development of instruction in social work and in anthropology within the department, and saw both of these fields finally achieve their independence and become distinguished separate departments in the university. Upon his retirement he became visiting professor of social science at Gettysburg, a position he held until his death

Albig was a congenial and sympathetic colleague. He was an idealist who set his goals a little beyond what could be attained in an imperfect world, and he was a sturdy character who never burdened others with complaints about his occasional difficulties and disappointments. He was a modest, tolerant, and open-minded individual, a man of good spirits, dignity, and integrity.

J. E. Hulett, Jr.

University of Illinois

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

PRESTHUS, *THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY*

January 23, 1963

To the Editor:

I suppose anyone who writes an interdisciplinary book in an age of disciplinary introversion should expect to be kicked. However, I do find Professor Grusky's review of my book in the November, 1962, issue of this *Journal* patronizing and curiously ambivalent. There is an obvious effort throughout to counter praise with criticism. After beginning with the cold douche that a "plethora" of books has appeared on organizations, he goes on to call the book a "far-ranging synthesis which combines uniquely the basic contributions to organization theory of Max Weber, the interpersonal theory of psychiatry of Harry Stack Sullivan, aspects of a number of learning theories, research on authoritarianism, and on occasion, a polemic reminiscent of C. Wright Mills."

Some other examples: (1) "Although the author suggests otherwise . . . his approach cannot be tested by empirical research. . . . Nevertheless, the book does provide a useful device for looking at important aspects of our society." (2) The latter "is justification enough," but "unfortunately, the book was either published too hastily or it was written too hurriedly, or both." Parenthetically, the book was begun in 1956 and it took the publisher twenty-five months to produce it. (3) "The first time I read the book I was disappointed" but "the second time around I was considerably more pleased [*sic*] and felt well rewarded for the time spent." This is patronizing. However, it is interesting to speculate on what a third reading might have inspired! (4) Similarly, "This is an imaginative book—speculative and often overstated, but nevertheless provocative."

With a liberal use of italics, Grusky dramatizes several "misstatements" and "overstatements." One example of such is the judgment that "incontrovertible" evidence now exists as to our *declining superiority* in atomic weapons (my italics). In the context, it is clear that this is a *historical* judgment, based among other things on our government's loss in 1949 of its monopoly of the atomic bomb. Recent developments which mean that the Russians can put into the air missiles of substantially more thrust and load potential than ours are also germane. Also, I do not attempt "to demonstrate that big organization, in destroying the creativity of research scientists, retards seriously our defense effort." The "defense" context is used merely to show how organizational logic and claims are often at odds with scientific needs for free-ranging and "pure" research.

Another offending "misstatement" or "overstatement" is "we know that a fear of failure is common among successful executives." While it is fashionable and presumably scholarly to deny that one knows anything, this claim rests upon research by Henry, Gardner, Rosen, and Warner. Grusky similarly objects to my statement: "We know that adaptive anxiety is largely an upper- and middle-class phenomenon." This conclusion, which relates mainly to the highly functional ability to turn aggression inward, is based upon the work of Hollingshead and Redlich, and Miller and Swanson, as well as upon a good deal of research on class differences in child-rearing methods that generally concludes that middle- and upper-class parents systematically instil this ability and related qualities of discipline and ambition in their children.

I cannot avoid mentioning another curious tactic of the reviewer. He concludes that

"sociologists' feelings about this study are likely to be ambivalent but certainly not indifferent." One wonders why the need to specify "sociologists." Since the review appears in the *American Journal of Sociology*, one might think the point redundant. But, of course, this is just another tired example of the delicious parochialism that characterizes academia and its more anxious members.

ROBERT PRESTHUS
Cornell University

REJOINDER

March 1, 1963

To the Editor:

An exchange of this kind makes the most sense if it is confined to the substantive issues. Since Professor Presthus has not challenged any specific merits attributed to his book, my comments will be concerned primarily with an elaboration of criticisms made in the review.

1. A fundamental deficiency of Professor Presthus' book lies in the mode of interpreting research findings. By underlining "know" and "undeniable" in a number of quotations I was criticizing the author for performing poorly in his role as a social scientist. Professor Presthus apparently believes that the issue is one of fashion, that it is "presumably scholarly to deny that one knows anything." He misses the point completely. Qualification, as Ernest Nagel and other philosophers of science have noted, lies at the very root of the difference between science and common sense. Scientific generalizations such as the ones he reported must be concerned with qualification in at least two respects. First, scientific propositions, unlike common-sense statements, must consider carefully the conditions under which a relationship is presumed to exist. Precise terms of speech are essential. Second, scientific propositions, since they demand empirical confirmation and reconfirmation, are always confronted with the possibility that contradictory evidence might be forthcoming. To qualify is not a sign of intellectual weakness. Rather it is in the best tradition of scholarly scientific inquiry.

The need for skepticism with regard to scientific propositions applies not only to the newer social sciences, but to the more highly developed physical sciences as well. A recent issue of *Science* (October 12, 1962) reports that the proposition describing xenon as an inert or non-reactive gas, taught in elementary chemistry classes for about fifty years, now needs to be revised in light of recent research by N. Bartlett. Of all places, it would seem the lesson should not be lost on the social sciences.

When the distinguished Editor of *Administrative Science Quarterly* reports with apparent finality that we *know* a particular empirical relationship exists, he is doing an injustice to his lay audience, to the researchers whose work he reports, and ultimately to the social sciences as a whole. If the author had examined carefully the studies he cited, he would have found that the investigators typically did not make the grand claims he indirectly attributed to them. Instead, they were more likely to note carefully the many methodological limitations of their research.

2. Professor Presthus stated in his letter that he did not attempt to demonstrate in *The Organizational Society* that big organization, in destroying the creativity of research scientists, retards seriously our defense effort. Yet, in the summary section of chapter ix he wrote: "In weapons research and missile development, as we have seen, the testimony of distinguished scientists has revealed the strain between organizational values and the scientists' needs for autonomy. This suggests a growing awareness of the conditions that seem to be hampering our efforts to maintain parity with Russian military and space power" (p. 323).

3. The last sentence of the quotation above, suggesting that we seek to maintain

parity with Soviet military strength, should be considered alongside the author's statement that "we are confronted at this critical juncture with incontrovertible evidence of our declining superiority in atomic weapons" (p. 288). Professor Presthus claims this latter statement was a historical judgment based on our government's loss of its monopoly of the atomic bomb. In checking back, I found no reference to this incident in the part of the chapter that preceded or directly followed the statement. A reader could not readily have known this was his referent. The reference in his letter to recent Soviet accomplishments in missile development might provide readers with a misunderstanding of present estimates of the strategic strength of the major powers. A considerable amount of data suggest that Professor Presthus was incorrect on both counts when he claimed in his book that (1) We seek parity with Soviet military strength. (2) There is incontrovertible evidence of our declining superiority in atomic weapons. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London has annually for four years compiled comparative estimates of the strategic military strength of the Western and Communist nations. A recent study compares the two power blocs on eleven categories of arms: ICBM's, MRBM's, long-range bombers, medium-range bombers, battleships and carriers, nuclear submarines, conventional submarines, cruisers, escorts, tanks, and mobilized manpower. These estimates, which in certain respects appear to be conservative, point strongly toward Western military superiority. Best present evidence suggests that he would have been considerably more accurate if he had stated that Soviets seek parity with Western over-all military strength. Careful checking of sources and qualification of statements when required by the nature of the available data would have resulted in a more adequate presentation.

It should be clear that Professor Presthus' book was not criticized because of its interdisciplinary bent. On the contrary, as noted in the review, many of the book's virtues stemmed from its broad perspective.

OSCAR GRUSKY

University of California
Los Angeles

BOOK REVIEWS

Rural Land Tenure in the United States: A Socio-economic Approach to Problems, Programs, and Trends. Edited by ALVIN L. BERTRAND and FLOYD L. CORTY. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. Pp. xii+313. $7.50.

Tenure may be defined as a defensible claim to a flow of income (or other goods and services) from a job, a piece of property, or an enterprise. The most important classification of these claims is by the degree to which their enjoyment is dependent on current performances as judged by someone else, ranging from slavery (with no socially defensible claims), to labor in a perfectly free labor market (where the claim is immediately dependent on current performance), to temporary leases or term labor contracts, to tenure of the sort that university professors or holders of a life-interest in a piece of property have, to fee-simple ownership that does not depend on performance (except paying taxes) at all Marx, and Weber after him, largely defined capitalistic enterprise by its distinctive tenure arrangements, with fee-simple ownership of the means of production and purely performance claims to wage income.

A study of land tenure is therefore a study of the determinants of flows of income to land, of the forms of appropriation of these flows, and of the social relations these two things imply. The book reviewed aims to summarize a tradition of rural sociology and agricultural economics organized around the problem of tenure. The tradition is most prevalent at Southern land-grant universities. This review is therefore a review of a tradition.

Three characteristics of the book and of the tradition stand out. The first is theoretical poverty, and, as a consequence, an empiricism which, even if it has a certain vigor, tends to misinterpret the facts. A second is a stubborn family-farm romanticism. A third is its American parochialism, which is not to be forgiven even though the title specifies "in the United States," for it means that the tradition misses many relevant facts.

The theoretical poverty of the book is well illustrated by the apparent ignorance of the theoretical classics on tenure problems, such as, in sociology, Max Weber's brilliant section on "The Forms of Appropriation" in his *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, or in economics, John R. Commons' *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, or in history, Stanley Elkins' excellent *Slavery*. As an illustration of the difficulties of interpreting facts that this theoretical poverty involves, on page 199 a graph shows that "Farm real estate values have traditionally fluctuated less than farm income on a per acre basis." But, of course, in economic theory this is not a relation between independent variables. For farm real estate values are a capitalization of a future income flow (land rent) which is well known to depend on total income per unit. Since in agriculture land normally bears part of the risks of the enterprise, especially in a family smallholding system, land rents are variable in about the same degree as gross income. If no process besides capitalization of the flow is going on, the price of land depends on the expected values of the flow over a period of years, which, if there is any unpredictability in the flow, is less variable for purely statistical reasons. If the variability from year to year is predictable, the capitalized value, being a weighted average of future annual income (weighted by the factor $[1 + i]^{-t}$ where i is the interest rate and t is time), is still less variable for mathematical reasons. That is, rather than being an isolated relation between two variables, the graph is evidence that farm real estate prices are the capitalization of land rent —hardly an earth-shaking finding. If, as is found in the stock market, the price of a claim to income is more variable than the income itself, it is immediate evidence that more is going on than capitalization. If the problem had been stated correctly in the first place (namely, what are the current values of tenures in land of different types, and how do these values vary with the variation in farm income?), then different, more decisive, data would have been used.

Family-farm romanticism shows up in a number of ways. For instance, obviously the rapid destruction of marginal family farms in

the South by out-migration largely accounts for the fact that southern per farm income has been advancing more rapidly, relative to other farming areas, during the Second World War and the postwar period. Likewise, creating economically viable family farms in modern times means creating larger farms, which means of course the destruction of other family farms. Neither of these destructive implications is stated clearly. Similarly, the question is never asked whether lettuce, or cotton on good land, or sugar cane, or fruits with seasonally variable work requirements, can be grown economically in an enterprise where the family provides most of the labor. The farmers who grow them evidently do not think so. A recurrent theme in the work is the question of whether young men entering agriculture can obtain sufficient capital, whereas, on the basis of the evidence in the book, the relevant policy question seems to be how to keep young men out of agriculture. The central policy question in American agriculture is how to prune it drastically without quite killing it, not how to make it grow as large as possible.

The lack of comparative consideration is undoubtedly directly related to the lack of theory; at least the theorists of tenure noted above, Marx, Weber, Commons, and Elkins, all worked on either historical or cross-cultural comparisons. But there are some direct lacks in interpretation of data in the book that derive from parochialism. For instance, in the whole discussion of the problem of lower rural income levels, it is not noted that the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural per capita income is higher in the United States than in most other countries of the world (this ratio is generally higher in developed countries, as has been established by Kuznets). When looked at in this way, the problem is less to explain why rural people in the United States are at an income disadvantage than to explain why the disadvantage is so much smaller than is "normal" (i.e., found in most other countries). Likewise, most developed countries have family smallholding agricultural systems, so the problem is not to find distinctive features of American history which make it distinctively a family-farming system, but to explain the generality of family farms in the modern developed world and then to explain historically or economically the exceptions (e.g., England, northwestern France, the American South, the valleys in California), and also to explain why the underdeveloped world is often different.

In sum, in spite of the work on tenure of this tradition, there are still a number of land-tenure systems better understood than that of the United States, including, for instance, those of medieval England, early modern Prussia, and postwar Japan. One of the main failures of American sociology and economics is represented by this book. The authors ought not be blamed entirely for the failure of the disciplines.

ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE

Johns Hopkins University

The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Economic and Social Factors. A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research and the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council. (A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series, Vol. XIII.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xi+635. $12.50.

The history of the dismal science should be instructive to those sociologists who think that top priority ought to be given to ratiocination about the logical interrelations among components of a generalized conceptual scheme. With respect to technology, economists used to reason from a set of assumptions including a "given state of the arts." When they could no longer ignore the fact of technological development, they sought to accommodate it to their system by treating technical changes as alterations of the "data" and to assess the impact thereof by an idealized, before-and-after analysis called comparative statics. When it finally and belatedly became clear that economic factors may give rise to technological innovation, as well as respond thereto, the economists sought ways to handle technology as an "endogenous" variable, with results of varying degrees of plausibility. Established patterns of thought are modified only with reluctance, however. The introduction to the present volume of conference papers notes that many of them are "attempts to analyze inventive activity with the traditional tools of economics." More instructive than such efforts to save appearances are the analyses indicating some severe limitations of the "traditional tools," and especially those that defy tradition by actually examining the phenomenon hitherto treated as a "black box."

I found most exciting a paper by Irving Siegel (located in a group of contributions on "non-market factors") that outlines, among other things, a "broader context" of discovery and invention. Siegel observes: "From an economic appreciation of material substance, including fuels, man has naturally progressed to an appreciation of energy in more abstract terms. Today, we are witnessing the emergence of information as an economic stuff with the recognition of the special value of energy signals in communication." An explicit co-ordination of information with matter and energy requires recognition of a "spectrum of operations" including (1) creation of information (discovery), (2) processing of information, (3) storage, maintenance, and retrieval, (4) distribution and acquisition, and (5) application. If, as Siegel states, "material, energy, and information processes underlie all manifestations of life," then they likewise underlie all manifestations of economy and society. While it may be a mistake to suppose that the fine detail of the superstructure derives in an obvious way from "underlying processes," it is equally true that understanding of the latter is prerequisite to realistic study of the former. Human ecologists, therefore—economists and other sociologists, too, if they were willing—might well attend to analogies among the patterns of flow of materials, energy, and information in ecosystems as well as the strategic facets of each that disrupt the analogies.

One suspects that other readers, like the reviewer, will profit most from some one or a few of the highly varied papers in the symposium without being impressed by the success of the conference as a whole. The report includes useful exercises in definition and conceptual clarification, pieces exhibiting virtuosity in both theoretical and econometric analysis, detailed case histories of specific episodes in research and development, and thoughtful observations on perplexing issues of policy. There is little doubt that the problem here posed, that of discovering the determinants of invention, will be tackled energetically in coming years.

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN
University of Michigan

The Analysis of Social Change Reconsidered: A Sociological Study. By J. A. PONSIOEN. ("Publications of the Institute of Social Studies, Series Major," Vol. IV.) The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp. 170. Gld. 1.

A great many sociologists these days, like the author, are "reconsidering" social change, particularly the assumption, recently fashionable, that it is necessary to know all the laws of statics before it becomes profitable to investigate alterations of structure. Unfortunately, the reconsiderations may not come to much if they consist only of the "review of the main theories developed" and the "critical reformulation" thereof, however ingenious the classification of the theories and however enlightened the "evaluation."

Dr. Ponsioen does deserve credit for noting that elaboration of structural ideal types of societies tells us little about "dynamics" but at best provides "a kind of comparative statics." He thinks it might be helpful to construct "types of societies in transition," but notes that in its present state social science does not provide the requisite tools, a knowledge of the "prime movers." The only topic treated in other than the sketchiest way is "industralization as the prime mover." Interestingly enough, the author allows that not only changes in social structure but also changes in values may be a "consequence" of industrialization. Concluding with the observation that social change today often is planned, he suggests that study of this "new dimension" may "open a completely new chapter in the study of social change"—new, one must suppose, to anyone who never heard of, say, Lester F. Ward.

The volume as a whole may be worth a quick perusal by teachers and students, some of whom will find an intriguing point or two, such as the author's discussion of anomie, in which he gives a "logical theorema" [*sic*] that adds several "modes of reaction" to the list proposed by R. K. Merton.

OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN
University of Michigan

The American Small Businessman. By JOHN H. BUNZEL. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962. Pp. xxi+307. $4.95.

Although they represent an important segment of the American population both numerically and symbolically, the four million owners of small business enterprises have been extensively neglected by social scientists. True, the economic problems of small business have been the subject of a good deal of public discussion, much of it carried on with more emotion than objectivity, but sociological and psy-

chological analyses are conspicuous by their rarity, if not total absence. Recently, however, two political scientists have attempted to scrutinize the political life of small business. In *The Politics of Small Business* Harmon Ziegler presented a critical analysis of the pressure groups that presume to speak for small business and of the congressional committees and the government agencies concerned with its welfare. John Bunzel, the author of the study under review here, also relies heavily on the opinions expressed by some of the same self-appointed spokesmen of small-business organizations but the scope of his analysis is considerably wider. "The book I had in mind was essentially an anatomy of the small businessman, and my principal interest, after describing his economic position, was to analyze the roots and qualities of his political behavior." The author is well aware that this is a daring undertaking since we actually "know very little about his ideas, beliefs, or values. In many respects we know more about small *business* than we do about small businessmen." He therefore cautions the reader that his study was intended to be suggestive rather than definitive.

Beginning with an evaluation of its present economic position and the changes it has undergone in recent years, Bunzel concludes that the mass-production economy has rendered small business weak and insecure but not moribund; essentially it is still hanging on. Despite the continual erosion of his economic position, however, the small businessman continues to be considered a culture hero. He is viewed and he views himself as the contemporary representative of the "agrarian spirit" of the Jeffersonian era, the guardian of the values of a frontier long since vanished. Clinging to a preindustrial ideology, the small businessman reacts to the environment and spirit of large-scale industrialism and big-business dominance with the hostility and resentment of the dispossessed. As Bunzel puts it, the small businessman lives in the industrial world but does not belong to it. He is caught in the squeeze between big business, big labor, and big government and cannot see any clear way out. That is the reason why small businessmen are attracted to extremist antidemocratic movements, and there is evidence that many small businessmen supported the Nazis in Germany, Poujade in France, and McCarthy in this country.

Bunzel's thesis is plausible and well argued. But as he himself admits it is highly speculative because we have very little hard evidence about the opinions and the political behavior of small businessmen. Aside from three surveys of small businessmen's attitudes conducted by a commercial polling organization, two of them with small samples, Bunzel relies mainly, and uncritically, on the statements of two small-business organizations which also conduct private membership opinion polls. But this is very dubious evidence. As Zeigler has shown, these organizations are in effect the personal property of their officials, who greatly exaggerate their membership claims and who are not averse to soliciting funds from big business. Although Bunzel admits that these organizations are by no means spokesmen for all small businessmen, he nevertheless draws heavily on their declarations as expressions of the political philosophy of small business.

The facts are undoubtedly much more complex. As Bunzel realizes, the owners of small businesses represent "one of the most heterogeneous groups in the country." Several studies of voting behavior, to which he refers only briefly, have clearly shown that the attitudes of small businessmen vary sharply with income, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. The very title of Bunzel's book is therefore a misnomer, there is no such thing as *the* American small businessman. Consequently Bunzel's speculative interpretations must remain open to considerable doubts until more adequate empirical data are presented.

KURT B. MAYER

Brown University

Industry, Labor and Community. By WILLIAM H. FORM and DELBERT C. MILLER. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. Pp. xi+739 $9.00.

At an early point in the development of industrial sociology, it was recognized that a truly adequate discipline in this area would have to take account of the relationships between industrial institutions and the social context in which these institutions existed. However, for various reasons, interest has centered mainly on intra-institutional phenomena; studies of the social context have been largely ignored or relegated to the back of textbooks, like the chapters on social change that end many introductory texts. Now Form and Miller have attempted to make a beginning in filling this gap, and have pro-

duced a treatise which places relationships between industry and its social context at the center of attention.

Their focus in this large, complex, and often diffuse work is on the relationship between industrial institutions and communities of various sizes, rather than on industry-society relationships. Their data are drawn largely from American communities; communities in Mexico and England are also analyzed for comparative purposes. Using a structural-functional framework, they analyze, first, the relationships between industry and labor, on the one hand, and various community institutions, on the other; specifically, government, mass communications, education, welfare, religion, and the family. This analysis forms about half of the book; much of the other half is devoted to a study of power in industrial communities. The last two chapters contain an analysis of the role of the community specialist and a discussion of research problems and techniques.

Although it is difficult to summarize their conclusions in a short review (one also gets the feeling that the authors did not always agree in their interpretations of data), what emerges from this book is a picture of communities dominated by their industrial institutions. Or, put more accurately, the picture is one of communities, at least in the United States, dominated by their business elites, whether locally based or not; for instance, except for certain local issues, labor everywhere plays a subordinate role, a point which the authors try to demonstrate quantitatively. This general conclusion cannot be attributed to a theoretical bias on the part of the authors, because the structural-functional framework which they employ would allow for a number of models of institutional dominances and subordinations, as the authors show.

However, the importance of this work lies less in its content than in its pioneering efforts to put down the foundations of a discipline dealing with the relationships between industrial institutions and their social contexts, and to stimulate further research in this area. As a pioneering effort, this work demonstrates certain limitations, as the authors are fully aware. For one thing the book does not, and does not purport to, deal with the relationships between industrial institutions and the larger society. For another thing, there are many gaps in knowledge on specific interrelationships, gaps which the authors are forced to fill with speculation and untested hypotheses. Again, even where data do exist, the number of studies is limited in many fields; it is significant that often the authors must generalize on the basis of their own pioneering research efforts, particularly in the field of power. Finally, there are many aspects even of industry-community relationships which the authors barely touch; for instance, the extension of the psychological effects of work into the community. Nevertheless, a start has been made, and by taking this courageous step the authors have made a most important contribution to industrial sociology.

EUGENE V. SCHNEIDER

Bryn Mawr College

Social Science Approaches to Business Behavior. By CHRIS ARGYRIS, ROBERT DUBIN, MASON HAIRE, R. DUNCAN LUCE, W. LLOYD WARNER, and WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE. Edited by GEORGE B. STROTHER. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, Inc., and Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962. Pp. vii+183. $5.00.

This collection of six papers examines various aspects of business behavior and attempts to illustrate the potential contributions of social science to the modern executive. The papers reflect a wide scope of interests, and accordingly, their usefulness to either sociologists or other readers of this *Journal* will vary greatly.

Robert Dubin examines studies of actual business behavior. He argues that much of our knowledge to date records attitudinal data rather than actual behavioral material. Thus we really know very little about what executives really do. Focusing upon such variables as power, authority, decision-making, the social environment, etc., Dubin integrates existing data into a number of suggestive hypotheses for further research.

Chris Argyris extends his formulation of integrating basic personality characteristics with organizational demands. He develops a model of the axiologically good organization that is consonant with individual mental health. (Anyone familiar with Argyris' basic assumptions knows that an individual's mental health will take a terrible beating by the axiologically not-good organization.) If the individual's mental health is enhanced, then there will be greater possibilities for organizational growth and survival. Argyris then specifies a number of changes which would bring about the "good"

organization. These center about modifications in leadership and power. Specific decisions should determine a functional and shifting distribution of power. As always, Argyris provides many stimulating ideas even for those of us who may find his basic framework somewhat unacceptable as a research strategy.

Lloyd Warner's contribution consists of an empirical analysis comparing top business executives and top federal officials according to fathers' and grandfathers' occupations, degree of occupational endogamy, and the colleges they attended. Warner's over-all point is that mobility in the United States is far from decreasing, and the complexities of operations demand the upward movement of talent. This is supported by a concluding note that upward mobility seems to be greater in larger organizations than in smaller ones.

In a paper concerned with the mutual influence of social science and business, William Foote Whyte reviews some of his own experiences as well as those of Elliott Jaques at Glacier Metals and Floyd Mann at Detroit Edison. Whyte feels that the split between basic and applied research is less than usually conceived; greater collaboration would provide valuable data and insights to social scientists as well as assistance to management problems.

Duncan Luce reviews some of the experimental work concerned with utility, preference, and learning theories of choice. Focusing on risky decision-making, Luce finds that much evidence to support the utility theories still remains ambiguous. He concludes that experiments will have to be designed to test a merged learning and preference theory. Luce's presentation is a clear and concise exposition of the problems and more pertinent literature in this area.

The concluding paper by Mason Haire attempts to account for changing attitudes of business organizations toward the utilization of social scientists. Haire describes a shift from authority based outside the organization to that based within: broadly, from state to management, and then from staff specialists to the work group. The concept of man has changed from one denying responsibility to one of increasing initiative and participation on all levels. These changing attitudes will make the plant of the future more decentralized and integrated through shared activities and goals. Basically, Haire believes that, by modifying the attitudes of management, change is most readily effected.

PHILIP M. MARCUS

Survey Research Center
University of Michigan

The Corporation in the Emergent American Society. By W. LLOYD WARNER. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xviii+64. $3.00

This slim volume is based on three lectures in the Ford Distinguished Lectures Series given in 1961 at New York University. They represent, in a certain sense, a summary and conclusions of much of Professor Warner's previous work, which is, no doubt, as distinguished lectures should be. The themes are not unfamiliar. The local community has had to lose its autonomous life in order to save it in the larger national community, and the corporation, national or even international in scope, has played an important part in this development. This has led to the development of a national labor market with extensive occupational, geographical, and status mobility. Mobility, however, may have a cost in the loss of autonomy of the individual or of the family, and it is often the traditional forms inherited from the past that defend the individual from the ever rising waters of the Great Society. The lectures end with a passage almost lyrical in its intensity, a hymn of mingled praise and fear addressed to the Great Society that is engulfing us.

Those who are familiar with the work of Warner will probably not find much that is new in this volume. It is, however, a very useful summary, even though in the condensation something is inevitably lost; and for those who are less familiar with this work, it will serve as a useful introduction.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

University of Michigan

Sentiments and Activities: Essays in Social Science. By GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. 326 $6.50.

There are many satisfactions in reviewing this collection of essays. A minor satisfaction lies in the fact that the artless reviewer's

cliché—"Everyone interested in (whatever the book is about) should read this work"—is clearly inappropriate. For one thing, the admonition would be addressed to a profession already familiar with the major papers, "Social Behavior as Exchange," and "Marriage, Authority, and Final Causes," a classic study of unilateral cross-cousin marriage.

Furthermore, it is difficult to pinpoint the interest group to whom the admonition should be directed. The subject matter ranges from kinship and anthropological theories regarding anxiety and ritual, to small group behavior, industrial sociology, and medieval history (including, of all things, "The Frisians in East Anglia").

Homans recognizes that he has scattered his shots, and in an autobiographical Introduction (49 pages) he seeks to "take advantage of this very deficiency by explaining it" (p. 1). The Introduction thus becomes an intriguing personal and intellectual history, detailing the accidents that led from English literature to a distinguished career in sociology, and recounting the "dialogue" between data and general ideas that moved Homans to take up such varied topics.

These general ideas provide the unity of the volume, a unity that gets a bit tenuous at times (especially in the lighter pieces, like the one titled "Giving a Dog a Bad Name," an engaging discussion of the position of sociology in Britain). One of the major satisfactions comes from the opportunity to observe the development of these unifying themes in different contexts over a period of some twenty years. A suggestion (and it is only that) of the character of this dialogue can be given through a radically condensed version of Homans' position on certain strategic questions:

1. He has fought a running battle against the type of functionalism which asserts that an institution exists *because* it contributes to the society's continuity.

2 Parsonian theory is not a theory, but a set of categories or generalized concepts; and insofar as sociology would derive a theory proper, it must do so by an inductive process rather than by grand schematization.

3. Whatever else science is, it is considerably more open-minded with respect to methods than the rigorous experimentalists would have one think.

4 Durkheim to the contrary notwithstanding, sociology is "a corollary of psychology" (p. 48); and for Homans that leads to the adoption of Skinnerian behavioral psychology.

The final satisfaction derives from the typical Homans clarity and style. In fact, things are so clear that one can sometimes have what may be the reviewer's ultimate satisfaction—knowing just where one disagrees with the author. For example, like Homans, I find the basic stance of learning theory congenial; but, unlike Homans, I find it more helpful to start from Rotter's social learning theory (which is an expectancy as well as a reinforcement theory) rather than from Skinner. But important as that difference might be, it is far less important than the searching yet tolerant attitude of mind that Homans brings to bear on such intellectual differences. That attitude is nicely reflected in the final sentences of the Introduction: "No method can go far wrong that puts human behavior under close scrutiny. And all we finally need be afraid of is that sociologists will come to do any mad thing in order to avoid being at the pains of studying men" (p. 49).

MELVIN SEEMAN

University of California
Los Angeles

The Educated African. Compiled by RUTH SLOAN ASSOCIATES. Edited by HELEN KITCHEN. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. 542. $12.50.

The title of this book is unfortunate since it is not so much a study of the educated African as it is a survey of the structural characteristics of contemporary African educational systems. The volume is no less welcome for that and constitutes a useful sourcebook for the scholar and general reader. Its value is enhanced by succinct descriptions of the development of systems of formal education in colonial times and there are some insightful observations on the contrasting policies of the various colonial powers.

However, in view of the massive expansion in the number of schools in all newly independent and some presently colonial territories, it should be clear that this book will need constant statistical revision if it is to be useful. In addition, the development of a fairly uniform statis-

tical format, so far as this is possible, would have greatly facilitated the task of comparison in rates of growth as between different parts of the continent. For example, many readers will miss the rather surprising fact that the provision of schooling in parts of East Africa is now rapidly approaching levels on the West Coast in spite of the latter's substantial period of contact with Europe and its far longer tradition of formal education. Development in Kenya, for example, compares very favorably with Ghanaian achievements. More adequate statistical presentation would have indicated these features more clearly.

One is not impressed by the differences between the colonial and newly independent areas but rather by the similarity of their perennial problems. To be sure there is much talk of an educational break with the colonial past, but there is precious little evidence that real efforts are being made in this direction. In fact, most of the new nations show an almost slavish adherence to the policies of the former metropole, and many "new solutions" and approaches are no more than reiterations of colonial precedents. A great deal of current discussion on the "Africanization" of the curriculum, for example, finds many earlier parallels and it is a sobering experience to compare the observations of African nationalists in this context with the comments of H. F. Verwoerd on page 268 of the volume. "Curricular adaptation" is, indeed, a double-edged weapon and African educationists would do well to indicate precisely what they mean by it.

It is perhaps in the discussion of current reform proposals and in the examination of the relationship between educational expansion and economic growth that this book is inadequate. The uncritical belief in the special efficacy of technical education in economic development, the attributing of current unemployment levels in some African territories to the "white-collar" preference of educated Africans, the rather naïve enthusiasm for that new panacea, the "Manpower Survey," point to a willingness on the part of some authors to substitute dogma for research. To be sure, not all the contributors are so afflicted, but it should be clear that our current level of knowledge on these matters is not sufficient to enable us to present unequivocal judgments. Indeed, limited current data would tend to explicitly reject the conclusions of some of the authors of this volume.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the bo[ok] is a contribution to one of the least-document[ed] areas in current research on Africa. It will pr[o]vide a valuable "launching pad" for schola[rs] seriously concerned with educational problem[s] in developing areas.

PHILIP J. FOST[ER]

University of Chicago

The Chosen Few: An Examination of Som[e] Aspects of University Selection in Britai[n]. By W. D. FURNEAUX. New York: Oxfo[rd] University Press, 1961. Pp. xxv+245. $4.0[0]

This short book deals with certain results [of] a study pertaining to the problem of stude[nt] selection and survival in British universitie[s]. Although the data are limited to English inst[i]tutions of higher education, the techniques em[]ployed and the conclusion presented should b[e] of value to American behavioral scientists.

The investigation, portions of which cover [a] ten-year period, was conducted by the Nuffiel[d] Foundation Student Selection Unit. Althoug[h] most individuals involved in the business of ac[]cepting and rejecting candidates recognize th[e] need for the development of more efficien[t] means of student selection, this is one of th[e] first attempts at a systematic handling of th[e] problem.

Because of the method employed and th[e] ten-year span, numerous difficulties were en[]countered. For one thing, several participatin[g] institutions dropped out of the investigation leaving the researchers with no choice but to substitute schools and curtail ongoing analysis.

Second, the ten-year gap in data compilation, analysis, write-up, and publication resulted in the presentation of findings that were in part already antiquated by rapid changes in the organization of educational systems.

Despite these limitations, the author does provide the reader with carefully documented materials (more detailed statistical data will be provided upon request) that help clarify the role of certain near-demographic variables on student selection and survival.

The conclusions pinpoint, for example, the impact of socioeconomic status on student selection. We learn that "a child's academic history is strongly influenced by the social class in which he is born," and that "social class effects do not operate through any social class bias on

the part of the selectors." Since the author deals with a variety of variables, we are better able to see how specific factors do operate and what variations occur as the student moves from one stage of development to another.

By differentiating among students who would normally be placed in a single social class category, the author is able to show differences in the academic desires of children with semi-skilled fathers as opposed, for example, to those whose fathers are involved in clerical occupation. In this case, it is the child of the clerical worker who is least likely to wish university entrance.

An interesting finding, although limited in value since the author does not control for the quality or status of the university, is that there is remarkably little agreement among academic gatekeepers as to who is and who is not an acceptable risk.

From a practical or applied point of view this work makes clear that irrational criteria are often employed in the student selection decision, and that there is a serious need for more precise and efficient selection techniques.

DAVID GOTTLIEB

Michigan State University

The Principals Look at the Schools: A Status Study of Selected Institutional Practices. By NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1962. Pp. x+76. $1.50 (paper).

This report summarizes results from a national questionnaire survey that asked public elementary- and secondary-school principals to compare their schools' current (1960–61) instructional practices with those of pre-Sputnik days (1955–56) and those anticipated in the future (1965–66). Although the report is neither intended to be nor adequate as a sociological study, several of the findings presented may interest sociologists of education, organization, and modern society.

First, the book provides a picture of significant change in the American system of public education. Despite the fact that this system is highly decentralized and innovations tend to occur principally through diffusion among atomized units, clear patterns of change emerge across the system. Increasingly, greater stress is being put upon science, mathematics, foreign languages, and the "fundamentals." Subjects are being taught earlier in the students' careers, and the students often are being given more work to do. The schools are making greater use of the new media and of such non-traditional social arrangements as ungraded classes, homogeneous grouping, and team teaching. In part, these changes appear to result from the public clamor, felt at the local level, for increasing the quality of education. They also seem to reflect the workings of an incipient national system of influence upon education, through such mechanisms as rising college entrance requirements, heightening skill criteria in the labor market, and increased leadership from national groups of experts.

Second, the report presents a number of findings relevant to the classical question of the correlates of organizational size. Generally, increasing size is associated with two major aspects of bureaucratization, specialization (through departmentalization and grouping of students) and formalization (e.g., placing greater reliance on standardized tests rather than personal judgments). Size also is related to the propensity to innovate.

The major defect of this work is its lack of methodological sophistication and perseverance. Results are broken down only by the elementary-secondary dichotomy and by the size either of the district (for elementary schools) or of the school itself (for secondary schools). For discerning not only gross trends but their intricacies and the reasons for them, the findings need to be analyzed by the size of both the school and system, by region, and by such variables as community income level and degree of urbanization. Such analyses also would allow the reader to make a better judgment of the generalizability of the findings to the American educational establishment as a whole than he can on the basis of the brief description of sampling which is given. Sociologists can only hope that these interesting data will be more rigorously analyzed in further publications of the National Education Association's Project on Instruction, for which this report was prepared as a working paper.

DAVID STREET

University of Chicago

Cottage Six—the Social System of Delinquent Boys in Residential Treatment. By HOWARD W. POLSKY. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962. Pp. 193. $3.25.

The social system in *Cottage Six* is tough. It is rooted in power, aggression, exploitation, and hierarchy. It is the kind of system in which newcomers, inmates and observers alike, can find a place only with their fists. The setting of Cottage Six is Hollymeade (pseudonym), a private Eastern "residential treatment center" for delinquents. The cottage contains about twenty of Hollymeade's roughest inmates. After eight months of participant observation, Polsky provides an absorbing empirical account of the social processes and structure of this group.

Polsky's major theoretical concern is to improve current concepts of deviant subculture by establishing firmly the importance of the patterns of social relations that exist within the deviant group and the role these patterns play in creating antisocial orientations among its members. Such an analysis is not new to students of correctional institutions, and may have its greatest utility only in the penal setting, where members cannot withdraw and groups are more circumscribed and, presumably, stable. Yet Polsky's analysis and arguments are incisive enough to warrant consideration by those studying all kinds of delinquent groups.

The author also is concerned with showing how treatment programs can go awry. Hollymeade's program, like those of many juvenile institutions, is segmental. Boys see their therapists once a week in the clinic, but actually live in the cottage—where the program could be better characterized as "permissive custodial." Cottage staff are accommodated to the inmate system (e.g., they ignore the "coolie" system and, like the leaders, look down on "weaklings"), and are interested only in "keeping the lid on" disruptions that might become known outside the cottage. This study provides another clear illustration that those attempting to implement treatment must abandon the simple two-person therapeutic model and pay attention to the total round of institutional events and the patterns of leadership and social relations of the inmate group.

An important deficiency of this work is the lack of reports of observations on other groups that would provide a baseline for comparison Polsky occasionally contrasts Cottage Six with other cottages, but gives no data on the latter Without such data, the reader is left to wonder if the author, who starts from the assumption that the Cottage Six group processes are deviant, may overestimate the level of negativism in this group, compared with other groups of boys, inmates or even schoolboys. Further observations by the author, who also presents an interesting discussion of the tribulations of his field technique, would be welcome.

DAVID STREET

University of Chicago

The Organization from Within. By CYRIL SOFER. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962. Pp. xiii+178. $6.50.

The "within" of this work stems from the author's role as social consultant to the upper reaches of three complex organizations—a family firm, a research-treatment unit of a hospital, and a management training department in a technical college. "Within" does not refer to a narrow focus on internal structure and dynamics. In fact, the theoretical chapter at the end of the book has the decided virtue of treating the external environment's effects on the flow of resources to and products from the organization.

This book has many other things to recommend it. In general, it represents an important contribution toward what Gouldner has called "clinical sociology." The chapter, "Regularities and Principles in Social Consultancy," is the heart of the book. It is derived out of rich experience and deep reflection. The strains, resistances, and dangerous client dependencies faced by the adequate, self-aware consultant are well presented. While considerable attention is given elsewhere in the literature to the problem of gaining entrée, in this chapter and throughout the book there is a refreshing attention given to gracefully "pulling out." The section on group discussions is particularly valuable in pointing out the information and insights that may be gained by bringing some of the principal actors in an organization or part-organization together.

The emphasis on the introduction of change in organizations, both in the step-by-step nar-

ration of the three consulting experiences and in the theoretical chapter, is very welcome indeed. After all, how much attention have sociologists given to forces facilitating and forces resisting change in an organization? In reading this book, one realizes that social invention may be our most important product.

It is the reviewer's duty to point out weaknesses in the book. The most serious is that the reader is never quite sure what one problem or objective the author is attempting to elucidate or achieve. Is it to introduce the clinical method of practice? Is it to introduce this method as a research tool for gaining generalizations about organizations? Or is it to present a logically related set of generalizations induced from some clearly relevant and clearly reported empirical events? One might suggest other objectives that the author may be seeking, but the achievement of even one of the above would require the six chapters of the book and perhaps more. For example, if he were presenting a successful consulting approach for purposes of organizational therapy, it would be necessary to compare some unsuccessful consultations with some successful ones. Further, it would be desirable to report the experiences of more than one consultant and to be clearer as to what samples of organizations and organizational problems one was dealing with. It would also be important to specify the criteria for identifying an organizational problem. How does the consultant know he has found one at all or whether he has found an important one? Certainly there would be need, too, of at least considering the problem of criteria of "more adequate functioning" of an organization, even if it is not possible to offer a complete solution. While the author provides many valuable insights into the consultation process, a much more comprehensive and systematic treatment is given in the work of Gerald Kaplan of the Harvard School of Public Health.

There are other problems with the book, some of which we only mention here. While the author declares that his intention is to focus on the organizational system, he has an obvious tendency to point out the operation of various psychodynamic mechanisms in individuals. No doubt this stems from his association with a British institute where the psychoanalytic framework has been a major part of the toolkit. (There is, incidentally, a mildly disturbing advertisement for the institute in these pages.) Another disturbing thing is the lack of integration between the narrated case experiences in the first three chapters and the sudden shift in the last three chapters to generalizations not necessarily derivable from the first three. The consultation itself focuses much too heavily on the upper levels of the organizations. It raises thereby some serious moral problems and questions of inherent conservation that are not adequately dealt with. While the author has worked out an impressive rationale for using the consultation approach for gathering research data, he does not examine the implications for theory development and testing of taking whatever problems are presented to him, nor does he discuss the implications of not telling his clients that he has research as well as therapeutic goals in mind.

The book has a pleasing print and few typographical errors. One apparent mistake that is confusing makes the man who prepared the index the author of the acknowledgments.

In general, this reviewer found the emphases of the volume valuable and he gained insights into the consultation process and the dynamics of organizational life. The book does not offer all that the jacket seems to promise.

RAY H. ELLING

Sloan Institute of Hospital Administration
Cornell University

The Fishermen. By JEREMY TUNSTALL. London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1962. Pp. 294. 25*s*.

Although the life of fishermen has fascinated the novelist, this is its first major sociological treatment. Tunstall's exemplary book is an addition to the growing literature on isolated non-factory occupations, to which British industrial sociologists have contributed markedly. Impressive in *The Fishermen* are its analyses of the community context in which fishermen are recruited, and of the impact of the occupation on family life.

Tunstall sees the long-distance fishermen of Hull, England, as following an "extreme" occupation. The working conditions on the small whitefish trawlers seem more appropriate to the "unenlightened" period of the early Industrial Revolution. The deckhands who handle

the nets and "gut" the catch average ninety hours of work per week. For ten or eleven straight days, they work eighteen hours or more a day. Calculated by the hour, theirs are by far the lowest wage rates in England, although their total annual earnings are relatively high. Because of the hazards of the sea, the accidental death rate among fishermen far exceeds that in coal-mining, and is the highest in British industry.

Trawling is an extreme occupation because the work milieu so totally dominates the life of the fisherman and determines the patterns of his family life and his outlook on the world. The twenty-one-day sea voyages are punctuated by shore periods of only two or three days, so that the fisherman spends almost 90 per cent of his time aboard ship. Although Tunstall suggests that deckhands hate their work because of the weather, intense speed-up, and the long hours that make sleeplessness the normal state, the occupation calls forth strong loyalties because it provides a close warm communal existence.

Because two-thirds of Hull fishermen go to sea before or by the age of seventeen, the author looks at the situation in the town's secondary-modern school. The better students in the "A" stream class, the children who belong to organized youth clubs in the community, do not become fishermen. The worst students in the "B" stream class who feel farthest removed from the middle-class values of the teachers and are most isolated from community groups do take to the sea. The immediate attraction is money; a sixteen-year-old on board ship can average twice as much as he could in a shore job. But more underlying motives, according to Tunstall, are the working-class adolescent's need to assert his virility, and resentment against the class system. Boys who are least successful with girls seem most likely to go to sea, and for these youths the deckhand apprenticeship is a fierce initiation into the world of men. Returning to shore fortified by his mates, even the timid youth now has courage to drink lustily in the pubs and engage a woman of the waterfront district. In addition, going to sea is a way of saying "No" to an inferior position in the class system. On the trawler, the relevant distinctions are between different jobs and pay; class distinctions of accent and culture do not operate.

Tunstall's analysis of fishing's impact on family patterns is important because so little is known of the relation between work and domestic life. Infrequently at home, the fisherman becomes a disruptive influence in his family when he is ashore more than a few days. His welcome wears thin and the fisherman tends to feel that all his wife wants is his wages. Mutual suspicion accumulates and the divorce rate is twice the working-class average in Hull.

The Hull fisherman is a casual laborer with no regular employment relationship to one shipowner. The insecurity endemic in such labor markets leads to an institutionalized system of petty bribery much like the old New York waterfront. Unlike workers in many other extreme isolated occupations, the fisherman's labor union is neither strong nor militant. Tunstall's explanation for this does not seem totally convincing. This, along with insufficient attention to the economic structure of the industry, seem to be the principal weaknesses in this fascinating and well-written book

ROBERT BLAUNER

University of Chicago

Society as Process: Essays in Social Science Method. By C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp 281 Gld. 28.

This book opens with the welcome statement that it is going to make a fresh inquiry into the very foundations of what we are doing. From then on, one is plunged into a rather tiresome chase to find out literally what the author is talking about or why he is saying what he is at any given point. There is, for example, a long discussion of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics as a contrast to our own view. But in Aristotle's *Politics* metaphysics is virtually undiscussed. The book can be read—indeed, as its structure shows, it is intended to be read—in independence of Aristotle's writings on metaphysics, logic, and physics. Its problems are set by reflections not on natural science but on political experience directly which is the only guide one needs in order to understand it. One would have to ponder very deeply over the significance of this fact, which is an important clue to the character of classical social science. Yet, the author of this book

does not even so much as mention the existence of Aristotle's *Politics,* let alone discuss its content and character. His failure to do this implies that classical social science was derivative from classical natural science and metaphysics, rather than something that stands on its own feet; and this is to miss the whole point of what classical social science in particular and the "Platonic-Aristotelian pattern of thought" in general is all about.

Underneath all of this is the fact that the author stands very much within the horizon of the present and, hence, is not self-conscious about its properties. This horizon is constituted by the belief, powerful for more than a hundred years, that physics can indeed be the model for politics. This is a model of science that is, on the one hand, deterministic and, on the other hand, non-evaluative or non-critical. But life, as we cannot help knowing it and living it, consists of the attempt to make intelligent choices vis-à-vis a future that is not wholly determined. We act to try to bring about, within limits set by necessities, a future that we wish. We do not simply adjust to necessities. This means that there is a fundamental disproportion between a science of society conceived in terms of the deterministic model of natural science, and actual life. In order to live, one has sometimes to make a stand; and one does not know how the future will come out until one makes this stand. The inability to comprehend this crucial property of action is thus the rock on which all deterministic models of action come to grief.

The author, after skirting this issue, which is the central issue of the social sciences today, finally comes to it in a footnote on page 159. But, of course, it really is present, whether he is aware of it or not, throughout the whole work. It is certainly what stimulates him to compare the arts and the social sciences in the chapter dealing with this topic. Here one finds a conglomeration of such passages as these: "The ultimate perspective of the arts is actually or virtually metaphysical. It is, truth, in the sense of concordance or congruence between reality and theory" [p. 155]. "The arts go by facts, the social sciences by functions" [p 157]. What arts? The art of the goldsmith, the statesman, the sculptor? He never bothers to say.

This book is a useful illustration of the maxim that serious methodology, that is, a critical examination of foundations and assumptions, ought not to be attempted unless, first, one has a haunting sense that something is wrong and, second, one knows what is wrong.

H. BROTZ

Smith College

Scientific Method: Optimizing Applied Research Decisions. By RUSSELL L. ACKOFF. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. x+464.

This rather technical book should be of primary interest to methodologists and social scientists interested in decision theory, rather than to the general sociologist. The stated purpose of the book is "to improve the skill of the scientist in the conduct of inquiry." The primary orientation, however, is to applied research in which there is a decision-maker (e.g., a manufacturer) with highly specific goals who wishes to obtain optimal solutions of some sort. For this reason, plus the abstract and mathematical nature of much of the contents of the book, the average sociologist is not likely to find answers to most of his immediate and pressing research problems.

Nevertheless, if viewed as a work on the logic of the scientific method rather than a practical handbook (as the title implies), this book may have considerable merits in terms of the sociology of the future. There are a number of chapters that are primarily oriented to optimal decision-making and that, in terms of present-day sociological research, would seem to be of only very indirect interest to most sociologists. But portions of the remainder of the book are highly appropriate for a sociological audience.

The introductory chapter on the nature of science and methodology, while condensed, is quite good. A chapter on measurement discusses various levels of measurement (e.g., nominal, ordinal, and interval scales) in a standard manner but then goes on to consider the more general question of exactly what measurement is. This chapter also contains a discussion of various sources of measurement error.

Of particular interest is an excellent chapter on the nature of the defining process. The concept of "operational definition" is discussed in

some detail, and some practical suggestions are made concerning the kinds of specifications that operational definitions should contain. According to Ackoff, these specifications will differ according to whether one is dealing with structural properties, on the one hand, or functional properties, on the other.

A chapter on model-building may also be of interest to sociologists, though the major emphasis is on models that would be most appropriate for the decision-maker with specific goals and definite utilities. In addition, there are four chapters that take up the statistical topics of sampling, estimation, testing hypotheses, and experimentation. These latter chapters are all rather technical and perhaps too condensed for the general sociologist.

In summary, this work would seem to be somewhat too advanced and specialized to be used as a textbook or practical handbook in sociology, though it contains specific chapters and sections that should be of general interest. This should not be taken as an implied criticism of the book, which appears to be of high technical quality. Instead, it is an indication of how far sociology must advance before we can attain the goal of developing testable theories that can be of direct value in the decision-making process and in making useful predictions that apply to the real world.

H. M. Blalock, Jr.

Yale University

Birth Rates of the White Population in the United States, 1800–1860: An Economic Study. By Yasukichi Yasuba. ("The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," Series 79, No. 2.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. 198. $5.00 (paper).

Birth rates in the United States and in nearly every individual state or territory fell consistently throughout the period 1800 to 1860. Scattered records suggest that this decline began in the original states long before 1800. Differentials and trends in general mortality and in child mortality can account for only a small part of the decline in fertility ratios. Child mortality may have increased during much of this period, largely as a response to the unhealthy conditions in cities during the early period of urbanization in the Unite States.

The trend toward later marriage accounts f a small portion of the decline in fertility in t United States, and for a large portion of di ferences between areas within the Unite States and between the United States and ot er countries. Population density, here inte preted as a measure of the relative availabilit of land, was more closely correlated with fe tility and changes in fertility during this peric than were measures of industrialization, urba ization, and per capita income. Not until t latter half of the nineteenth century can u banization be considered a major factor i lowering fertility at the national level.

The data and conclusions are of value t students of American social history and to st dents of the demographic transition. Availab data are scrutinized meticulously, and detai of much of the previous work on this topic a criticized. Methodologically, the weakest pa of the study is the analysis of socioeconomi correlates of fertility using states as units. Th proposed standardized measure of rank corr lation is interesting, and seems amenable to simple binomial probability significance tes The monograph is burdened by a painful thes style.

Karl E. Taeube

Population Research and Training Center University of Chicago

Problems of Historical Psychology. By Zevede Barbu. New York: Grove Press, 1961. P x+222. $1.95 (paper).

Of all the social sciences, history has prove to be most resistant to the seductive overture of modern behavioral sciences. Confident i their own methodology and traditions, his torians have pursued their course relativel untouched by intrusions from the newer quan titative techniques and theoretical models tha are rapidly becoming dominant in the othe social sciences. Even such an eminent defecto as Professor Langer, who has urged his col leagues to pay more attention to development in psychology, has been unable to produce sig nificant cracks in their resistance.

The author of this book, a lecturer in socia

psychology at the University of Glasgow, is deeply interested in the history of Western civilization and longs for at least a liaison if not a true marriage between the theories and findings of modern psychology and the study of history. This book is an attempt to promote such a liaison, although many of the points made about the potential contributions of psychology to the study of history are equally applicable to sociology and anthropology. The strategy of courtship employed by the author is ingenious, beginning with several chapters indicating ways in which history might come to the aid of psychology and illuminate some problems in the study of perception and emotion. Having brought his historian-readers around to thinking that they might, after all, be of some help to their poor misguided colleagues in psychology, he shifts the attack and, n what is really the core of the book, elab- rates two examples of the way in which sychological theory can help in the under- tanding of historical processes. These two ex- mples concern the emergence of personality n the Greek world, and the evolution of the ersonality characteristics that produced the ndustrial Revolution and an individualized lemocratic society.

Unfortunately for the study of history and or readers who, like the reviewer, basically hare Barbu's values, the book for the most art focuses on those aspects of psychological heory that have the shakiest foundations and eglects many aspects of behavioral sciences hat could make more substantial contributions historical study. Thus considerable use is nade of psychoanalytic concepts, albeit modi- ed from their orthodox formulations, in in- erpreting personality development in ancient reece, while there is practically no mention f some of the more empirically based con- pts deriving from non-Freudian personality eory, learning theory, or the empirical lit- ature on socialization. An exception, how- er, is the intriguing use of some of the lit- ature on perception, to suggest that, at dif- rent periods in history, different sensory odalities have had greater prominence and at, for instance, the dominance of olfactory, ctile, and auditory perception over visual erception in sixteenth-century France may ve had important consequences for the ways which experience was structured.

Most importantly, however, what is missing from the book as a whole is any emphasis on the formulation of hypotheses and their testing by the *systematic* collection of data. While the author speaks in several places of testing hypotheses, the psychologist-reader is hard put to find a single explicitly stated hypothesis, let alone anything that could be construed as a test of a hypothesis. In fact, the author allows himself to be seduced early in the game when he admits that the methods of "historical psychology" are those of history rather than psychology, that is, the use of the judicious example and the intuitive leap rather than the explicit hypothesis and the empirical test. The child of this sort of union between psychology and history cannot help but be illegitimate.

NORMAN M. BRADBURN

University of Chicago

College Students in a Mental Hospital. By CARTER C. UMBARGER, JAMES S. DALSIMER, and OTHERS. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1962. Pp xix+168. (Paper.)

This book describes the experiences of volunteers from Harvard and Radcliffe at a Massachusetts state mental hospital. The book, written by four of the student volunteer leaders, describes volunteer visiting in wards of acutely ill patients, visits in a children's unit, and an individual casework program. Judged as a description of the volunteer program, and as a manual for persons undertaking similar programs, it is a valuable and worthwhile contribution. When the authors attempt to become analytical about the program, the result is some good sense and some nonsense.

The book exudes enthusiasm about the success of the program, and the authors are impatient with those for whom "action is sidetracked for research, experience is sacrificed for concepts, and the status quo is upheld in practice." The clear impression given is that only a "lunkhead" would doubt the success of the enterprise; with as little clear evidence as the book actually provides, I trust that there will be some sociologists who will be willing to assume the risk of being so labeled.

Although the quantitative success of such a volunteer enterprise may be an open question,

it is difficult to perceive a group of energetic students invading our state mental hospitals without bringing something of value and significance to these dreary surroundings. Community attitudes and organizational apathy are likely to be affected to some degree, and "hope and interest," so well reflected by the student effort, are variables not to be underestimated in the life of the mental patient.

The book is not a sociological work, but it raises some sensible questions about the sociology of mental hospitals, mental patients, and rehabilitation. The students are rightfully not particularly impressed by the argument that technical and professional competence is essential to working with mental patients; and if the success of the student effort is still unproved, their position is no less tenuous than that of the professionals who work with the mentally ill. The students believed that what the patients needed most were "love, respect and simple but purposeful activities that would raise their self-esteem and hope," and they may not be too far wrong. Perhaps this is the answer to the Hollingshead-Redlich call for a five-dollar psychiatrist.

Although this book has nothing new of sociological value, it reviews a considerable amount of sociology in laymen's terms. Particularly useful were the students' descriptions of the resistance of attendants to the volunteer program, and the use of Goffman's notions of the patient experience. The book is at its worst when the students write like junior analysts.

One of the most interesting questions raised in the book is unfortunately relegated to a footnote under the title "Is screening needed?" The argument against screening volunteers is sophisticated, and one can only hope that some of the mental health programs and professions can see the issues as clearly as the students.

In sum, this book is an enthusiastic report of a program of volunteer work in mental hospitals. It should be particularly valuable for students undertaking such work and faculty members directing such endeavors.

David Mechanic

University of Wisconsin

The Scope of Psychoanalysis, 1921–1961: Selected Papers. By Franz Alexander. New York: Basic Books, 1962. Pp. ix+5[illegible] $12.50.

Franz Alexander played a crucial role in [illegible]veloping psychoanalysis in this country a[illegible] in giving the new science a specifically Ame[illegible]can tone. In 1930 he became the first profes[illegible] of psychoanalysis at the University of Chica[illegible] and thus was instrumental in transporti[illegible] psychoanalysis from the Eastern strongho[illegible] of Boston and New York, both of which h[illegible] maintained a largely European tradition. [illegible] also, for the first time, allied psychoanaly[illegible] with university education, a relationship th[illegible] has continued to become closer as the ye[illegible] have gone by. Alexander has been a pione[illegible] in the area of psychosomatic medicine, a[illegible] diligent in developing collaboration with phy[illegible]iology, the social sciences, and other allied d[illegible]ciplines. He has always been highly conscio[illegible] of the need to relate the new science both [illegible] the traditional, rationalistic, scientific a[illegible]proach, and to find a place for it in a changi[illegible] and dynamic society.

His particular stance cannot be understo[illegible] without appreciating the significance of his r[illegible]action to the United States. Writing of t[illegible] cultural climate in this country in *Our Age [illegible] Unreason,* he observed, "I sense the freshne[illegible] of a youthful world, deeply involved in t[illegible] problems of adolescence, full of energy, as y[illegible] unsure of itself, hectically competitive, a[illegible] always on trial, a dormant colossus, unawa[illegible] of his exceptional potentialities." In contra[illegible] Europe had for him "the regressive mentali[illegible] of a disillusioned, tired old man, living on t[illegible] forced vigor of second childhood." In "Revie[illegible] of Two Decades," a paper reprinted in th[illegible] present volume, he writes, "I can only than[illegible] fate, which brought me to this country whic[illegible] believes in change and development and whe[illegible] the feud between Freud and official science wa[illegible] not so deeply rooted, where the repatriation o[illegible] psychoanalysis was a realistic possibility."

Constantly he has served as a gadfly and spur in the side of a new science that, stil[illegible] insecure, tended to fall back into position[illegible] of dogmatism and precocious traditionalism[illegible] When the American Psychoanalytic Associa[illegible]tion considered setting up a unitary curriculum for all training institutions, his voice wa[illegible] raised on the side of flexibility and autonomy for educational standards. He has continued to campaign for experimentation, diversity and boldness of approach. He has served a[illegible]

a constant reminder to others that the spirit of psychoanalysis could not flourish in an atmosphere of closure or rigidity.

This book admirably delineates the range and vastness of his interests. Here we have papers dealing with psychoanalytic theory, psychoanalytic treatment, psychosomatic medicine, sociology, politics, aesthetics, criminology, philosophy, literature, methodology, history, and education. Forceful, clear, impatient with dogma, liberal in outlook, grandiose in conception, he has served as a constant ferment and instigator for fresh conceptualizations and methodological approaches.

In the early twenties his interests were confined largely to the analytic concerns of a clinician and the elaboration of psychoanalytic theory. The volume includes several of his classic papers in this area. He demonstrated the experiential factors in early childhood that predispose to the intensity with which castration anxiety is conceived of as a threat. He indicated that prior to the oedipal phase of development the child has experienced losses that prepare him for the possibility of still another threatened loss, this time of his prized sexual organ. He brilliantly remarked on the significance of series of dreams, their interconnections and their meanings, and thus prepared the way for further studies that have resulted from the development of new techniques for studying dreams. He experimented with varying approaches to psychoanalytic treatment, urging flexibility in the application of psychoanalytic techniques. He extended himself into the field of general medicine, and displayed courage and incisiveness in concerning himself with specific psychological etiological conflicts for a whole host of psychosomatic illnesses. Fertile in ideas, his contributions continue to serve as an impetus for detailed experimental and clinical work by others.

Vastness in conception carries with it the danger of superficiality in outlook, and this defect is unfortunately present when one assesses Alexander's contributions to the social sciences. In this area the papers reprinted are disappointing. The most one can say is that Alexander took an open-minded and reasonable position. He stands at a mid-point between Roheim, who saw social phenomena as expressions of instinctual derivatives, and Kardiner, who derived basic personality structure from specific social forces. In his middle position Alexander's forcefulness deserted him and he presented rather glib generalizations and cautioned against tendencies toward one-sidedness. When he wrote of psychoanalysis for social scientists he sounded like a popularizer for psychoanalysis. When he wrote of the social sciences he was inclined to accept rather blandly the most superficial of sociological concepts, and appeared unacquainted with contemporary sociological thought.

Perhaps he became disillusioned with America as he had been disillusioned with Europe. He came expecting to find a vital and adventurous country, and instead saw evidences of regressive pulls in the direction of security and conservatism. Reactively, he described the criminal as "the Don Quixote" of America, a further manifestation of the original "frontier ideal," bypassing the complexity of criminal behavior as well as the social psychological processes involved in criminal acts. The emphasis he placed upon psychological dependency needs both as a force in molding personality and as a force in explaining sociological phenomena led him essentially into a blind alley. The "dependency" concept appears to have little utility in either field and is an unfortunate point for conceptualization to come to rest. And, lastly, his recent introduction to the reprint of Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* stands out by the mildness and diffidence of its statements in contrast both to his own boldness in his other writings and to the daring sweep of Freud's own formulations.

Accepting the limitations as stated, the book makes clear that without the contributions of this unique man, psychoanalysis would be less rich and more narrowed in scope.

HARRY TROSMAN, M.D.

University of Chicago

The Manipulation of Human Behavior. Edited by ALBERT D. BIDERMAN and HERBERT ZIMMER. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961. Pp. xii+323. $7.95.

This book consists of seven papers by as many authors who discuss particular aspects of the problem of the interrogation of an unwilling subject. An introduction by the editors

describes the great interest developed in this area following the Korean War and the subsequent anxiety in various quarters. Now that this has abated somewhat the appearance of this book is particularly timely. The great gap that exists between laboratory conditions and conditions in the field, however, poses many problems that are apparent throughout. This is recognized by the various authors; yet efforts at clarifying areas to research differ widely, and it is felt that the editors would have performed a service if they had used a postscript for this purpose.

The papers range from what amounts to a discussion of the organic brain syndrome to a consideration of the problems of diagnosing a malingerer. The latter paper, entitled "Countermanipulation through Malingering" by Malcolm L. Meltzer, discusses the risks the malingerer takes among captors from a different culture. This, of course, raises the issue of death and the fear of dying. That this has not deserved a separate paper seems somewhat remarkable, for the focus of attention on stress is primarily on that stress related to the fear of death. That front-line troops have committed suicide to escape the continuing uncertainty as to when death would befall them supports this contention.

A matter that is frequently pointed to in the papers is that of the role of interpersonal relationships between captives and captors. This is studied at some length in "The Experimental Investigation of Interpersonal Influence," by Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton. Here one finds a careful and scholarly discussion of conformity behavior, yet, once again, the difficulty of transposing laboratory findings to field conditions is apparent. For example, these authors state:

> A personality profile of the kind of individual who is least able to resist conformity pressures, and probably interrogation pressures as well, would include such characteristics as submissiveness, lack of self-confidence, lack of originality, lack of achievement motivation, desire for social approval, and being uncritical, conventional, and authoritarian.

However, the fact that conformity pressures are even roughly equivalent to interrogation pressures appears to be anything but proven.

As already mentioned there is considerable value in the appearance of this book at this time. Certainly it removes some of the gross distortions entertained by some as to the ability of drugs, hypnosis, etc., to influence hu man behavior. This is particularly worthwhil in that military personnel reading this boo should subsequently be able to recognize th aura of magic associated with these practice However, it is with some disappointment tha one realizes that large areas of study appro priate to the topic have been entirely omitte For example, studies of why certain individual collapse under the stress of front-line condi tions whereas others do not would seem t provide an opportunity for scientific inquir into the question under consideration. Th editors stated that there has been a focus o attention in this book on techniques of in terrogation. However, there is little questio that the interpersonal relationships of the cap tives and the captors as well as those betwee the captives should be considered. Certainl these relationships can be scrutinized scien tifically just as readily as can malingering o hypnosis. Without doing so, the problem o the interrogation of the unwilling subject be comes somewhat sterile.

HERBERT E. THOMAS, M.D

University of Pittsburgh

My Language Is Me. By BEULAH PARKER M.D. New York: Basic Books, 1962. Pp viii+397. $8.50.

This account of the extended psychothera peutic treatment of a borderline schizophreni adolescent patient is probably unique in psy chiatric literature. If not, it is nevertheless on of the very few case reports with sufficien verbatim dialogue to communicate clearly wha the therapist actually said and did The trans actions of experienced psychotherapists wit their patients are rarely recorded or reported Consequently, the literature is comprised main ly of gratuitous assertions that cannot be evaluated objectively because the primary data on which they are based are unavailable for scrutiny by interested and qualified observers. Dr Parker's candid and detailed disclosures are a refreshing departure from the characteristic reticence of her professional colleagues.

The author undertook the treatment of sixteen-year-old "David" several years ago while engaged in research on schizophrenia at Yale University. It was her interest in symbolic

nmunication that initially led her to keep a rbatim or quasi-verbatim record of her more in two hundred encounters with the patient ending over six years. Her plan to present report of the treatment in book form ma-ed in time to discuss the project with her tient and obtain his consent.

As a symptom of his profound fear of, and ed for, protection in a close relationship, vid's most significant feelings were com-nicated through elaborate abstract word ages. Reflecting his current interests, these re often framed in the language of me-nics and electronics or drawn from science tion.

There is a powerful element of suspense ated by the patient's setting for his thera-t the task of translating "the code" as one many severe tests of her continuing interest d trustworthiness and then over a painfully otracted period drawing from the relation-ip the self-esteem necessary to make some commodation to adult life. The patient's in-hts as he struggles toward some dependable odes of gratification are frequently profound servations on maturational crises of all olescents.

An issue central to the practice of psycho-erapy is implicit in Dr. Parker's report. She scribes her typical attitude toward the pa-nt as being characterized by "benevolent utrality," yet many of her actions in his be-lf seem closer to loving concern over his ell-being. Is it possible that a therapist can sustained throughout a long, demanding re-tionship with a patient like David only by e gratification inherent in exercising skills sociated with a professional role? The testi-ony in this book suggests that this is unlike-. In fact, it may well have been Dr. Parker's intuitive" departures from the behaviors most ommonly accepted as comprising the "prop-r" role of psychotherapist that were most in-uential in helping the patient. Moreover, any ttempt at deception with respect to genuine-ess and depth of her interest would have een instantly detected by the patient.

The relative contribution to successful psy-hotherapy of technical skills comprising the ole of "psychotherapist" and what for want of a better term might be called "caring" about he patient remains an open question. If it is he latter quality which makes the major con-ribution, what is its source? Contemporary training in psychotherapy while approving "genuineness" emphasizes "benevolent neutral-ity" as the appropriate therapeutic posture and departure from this "position" presumably jeopardizes outcome. Yet it may be the thera-pist's occasional partisan feeling for the patient and acts in his behalf that are from the patient's standpoint the source of energy for change.

RALPH W. HEINE

University of Chicago School of Medicine

A Pastoral Democracy. By I. M. LEWIS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xiii+320. $7.20.

A Pastoral Democracy is an excellent study, based on two years of field research, of social and political relations among the northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. This book is particularly welcome as it is a sophisticated work, by a British structural anthropologist, of an interesting and important people (now masters of their own republic) who are hardly known to social science.

The Somali are primarily pastoral nomads, concerned above all with the care and increase of their herds of camels and flocks of sheep and goats. They live in barren semidesert re-gions where competition for water and pas-turage is intense and frequently leads to vio-lence. As they recognize no chiefs or other po-litical authorities, feuding is constant and their basic political units are organized pri-marily to protect members from harm and to maintain access to vital resources in a lawless land.

Frequently on the move, with families and their livestock often dispersed, the Somali make little use of territoriality and vicinage for social organization, but rely upon agnatic kinship, supplemented by formal contractual agreements. Kinsmen are thereby united into political units with sufficient manpower and wealth to protect themselves. Members are pledged to fight together, to avenge wrongs inflicted by outsiders, to aid each other in meeting blood-wealth payments, and to solve internal disputes peaceably, obeying the deci-sions of informal councils of elders.

One of the most striking aspects of Somali social organization is the extent to which the

ıastoral nomad, while representing the ideal ıf Somali manhood, is only one occupational lement (albeit the most important) in Somali conomic and political life. In addition to amel herders, families and lineages may inlude farmers, sailors, traders, town-dwelling hopkeepers, and (today) bureaucrats. All hare the same responsibilities and feuds, own nimals in the family herds, and men readily nift from one role to another. (This bears ut Kroeber's observation that most pastoralıts "exist in some degree of cultural and soıal symbiosis" with people who are not herdrs.) The maintenance of close ties among ıese occupational specialists must certainly ɔntribute to economic security in a land that poor at best and where effective use of reıurces requires the exploitation of several :ological zones.

A Pastoral Democracy adds carefully deiled material to the growing literature on ɔlitical groups, recruitment, interaction, and ɪnflict resolution in non-Western societies. eaders concerned with comparative politics ight wish that the author had included more ıta on the organization and leadership of ıch activities as warfare, camp movements, ell-digging, and council meetings. But Lewis, ho has for several years been bringing the ɪmali to the attention of anthropology, has ıt finished publishing his material and he ıy still supply us with this information. One pes it will not be long before other peoples Northeast Africa will find such able interıeters.

HERBERT S. LEWIS

ɪrthwestern University

ıerican Women: The Changing Image. Edted by BEVERLY BENNER CASSARA. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. xv+141. $3.95.

The Alliance of Unitarian Women has ɪnsored this collection of articles, believing, the editor states, that "women should face problem" of their greatly changed status. ven more or less eminent women (six conutors are listed either in *Who's Who in erica* or in its feminine counterpart) have :ed the problem" in sharply differing ways. icles range from Margaret Mead's polemic inst the "retreat into fecundity" to Edith Hunter's warmly anecdotal plea that women "combine as their vocation and their avocation, the transmission of values to each new generation of children," and from Agnes Meyer's invective against "an extreme and unwholesome overemphasis on sex as women's greatest asset" to Agnes DeMille's (reprinted) commentary on the asexuality of some great women dancers.

Each contributor has written from a limited perspective, and most articles tend to consist almost entirely in the expression of personal values—regardless of the topic nominally dealt with. (Thus Lillian Gilbreth, writing on "Women in Industry," says: "Scientific management has much to offer women in every facet of their lives"—and self-management and household management are her prime examples. There is little attempt at comprehensive or even systematic treatment of this among other important topics.) An exception is Ethel Alpenfels' report of some research suggesting that women students hold even more stereotyped views of professional women than do men students. A few historical and demographic facts are scattered through the articles—all better presented in other volumes.

The only sociological interest this book may have is as a document illustrating that widely divergent and indeed incompatible views of what is and what ought to be can comfortably coexist in this society.

JOAN W. MOORE

University of California
Los Angeles

The Culturally Deprived Child. By FRANK RIESSMAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1962. Pp. xv+140. $3.95.

In this small book, Riessman covers a number of problems that have increasingly become a matter of grave concern to those who must train other people's young. In this instance, the others are the "culturally deprived," a category that, at least according to Riessman, includes almost everyone who does not fall into the "middle class." The author uses "culturally deprived" interchangeably with "educationally

deprived," "deprived," "underprivileged," "disadvantaged," "lower class," and "lower socioeconomic group." Given this almost global classification scheme, it is not too surprising that the author is able to make a number of sweeping generalizations about the attributes of this group. We are told, for example, that this deprived group makes up about one-third of all school age children and that they tend to be: traditional (i.e., "old-fashioned"), patriarchal, somewhat religious, pragmatic, and anti-intellectual. Following group analysis, Riessman makes a number of action-oriented suggestions as to how teachers might most effectively socialize this group.

While the book is interesting and should be of some value to some teachers in some communities, it fails to come to grips with certain realities that are crucial to an understanding of the problem. For one thing, the problem is not really with the "lower socioeconomic group," but rather with a more particular segment of the population. In most cases, the dilemma is with teaching Negroes and, in some instances, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and southern white migrants. Recognition of this fact is important since any type of training program will be very much influenced by how the total community perceives of, and responds to, these minority groups. Second, we are no longer dealing with the middle-class teacher versus the lower-class child as was the case in Yankee City, Elmtown, and Middletown. The contemporary situation is one where minority-group children are being trained by teachers who come from the same minority-group backgrounds and must teach in relatively segregated neighborhoods. This creates additional problems insofar as both parents of the minority group and minority-group teachers feel that they are getting the short end of the academic stick. Finally, it is not enough to concentrate on the elementary school since it is in the secondary school that many of these youngsters depart from the formal school setting and head for the streets.

The ultimate value of this book lies in the questions it raises and the challenge it offers to behavioral scientists who are concerned with the survival of our society.

DAVID GOTTLIEB

Michigan State University

Jazz and the White Americans: The Acceptance of a New Art Form. By NEIL LEONARD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. 215. $4.50.

Mr. Leonard analyzes the history of jazz as an example of the process by which a society receives and incorporates an aesthetic innovation. The process, as he sees it, is more or less Hegelian: a thesis of traditional music, an antitheis of jazz, and a synthesis that produces a compromised version of the innovation, represented by the big swing bands of the thirties. Specifically, jazz outraged traditional musicians who, by associating it with Negroes, sex, and ignorance, attempted to do away with it. At the same time, by serving as the focus for rebellious adolescent needs, it provoked the emergence of a group of modernists who espoused the innovation in all its original purity and flouted traditional values. Finally, moderates appeared who took much that was valuable in the original conception and, by paying some attention to tradition norms, made the innovation accessible to a wider audience. The three types are typified by Sigmund Spaeth, Bix Beiderbecke, and Benny Goodman.

Leonard bases his analysis on materials that appeared in the popular and musical press of the twenties, autobiographies of musicians, and a content analysis of some popular song lyrics. He regrets that he does not have the musical competence necessary for analysis of changes in the music itself. His lack of musical competence is unfortunate, for it is the changes in musical patterns that would be of most significance and interest for his problem.

My first reaction to the book was: How can anybody write such a dull book about such an interesting topic? The answer is simple enough: By failing to get down to the specific and concrete changes that took place in the music and the institutions surrounding it in any sociological frame of reference. What were the institutions in which jazz developed? What kinds of people met in them? What changes in perspectives of both performers and audiences took place as a result of those meetings? What were the consequences for the kind of music played? (With respect to the musical analysis, Leonard cannot plead that no critical vocabulary is available. The pioneering work of André Hodier in *Jazz: Its Evolution and Essence*

provides a perfectly workable set of terms and concepts.) To answer these questions, Leonard would have had to make a far more searching analysis of the thousands of available documents (listed in Alan P. Merriam's *Bibliography of Jazz*), with much more of an eye for institutional structure and process. Such answers as he gives are superficial, dealing primarily with attitudes rather than structures.

Sociologists, in short, will find little of value in this book. Even those sociologists with a particular interest in jazz will find that they know most of what is reported and will be surprised by some of the egregious misinterpretations. One example will suffice. Desiring to show that as jazz became more respectable so did its performers, Leonard argues that the major bandleaders became more reserved and restrained and remarks that Tommy Dorsey came to look like a respectable businessman. Whatever Mr. Dorsey's business-like qualities, reserve and restraint were not among them; his public fistfights were not only legendary but were reported at length in the public and trade press Leonard consulted in preparing his book.

HOWARD S. BECKER

Stanford University

British Guiana. By RAYMOND T. SMITH. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi +218. $4.00.

This definitive analysis of Guianese society by the author of *The Negro Family in British Guiana* is the end product of four field trips totaling twenty-eight months. Smith is an English sociologist with a deep respect for historical perspective.

Chief findings: historical enthusiasm for the "benevolent paternalism of slavery"; rationalization by all races of the historical accident of skin color with social status as a natural law, together with strong public moral sentiment that racial origin should be unimportant in public life and the gradual lessening of prejudice; sharp dividing line maintained by European staffs between themselves and colored Guianese while maintaining an officially open and tolerant attitude; the lowly status of the Portuguese as compared to that of the English; East Indian interest in assimilation and abar donment of caste observances; foreign ecc nomic and political control; concentration c the sugar economy in 130 years from over tw hundred owners to one independent owner an two companies, one of which is especially we run, prosperous, and a model of what can b done in the society; historical domination o sugar plantations as virtual fiefs in which eve in the 1950's estate managers held forma "courts" in which they arbitrated private dis putes between resident workers; nominal churc membership in most areas closely related t amenities, such as schools, provided; search b sick for both material and spiritual cures; rec ognition of Hinduism and Islam as respectabl and equally valid religions; mother-child rela tionship the cornerstone of family life; dis appearance of practically all African folk art general tendency to devalue all forms of foll culture and to place exaggerated emphasis upor certain elements of English culture.

The volume appears well balanced, the writ ing closely knit, the observations acute. Of spe cial interest to sociologists are the analyses oi racial attitudes and practices, far removed as they are from the comparative lack of prejudice in neighboring Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking societies.

JOHN BIESANZ

Wayne State University

From Charity to Social Work: In England and the United States. By KATHLEEN WOODROOFE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Pp. vi+247. $5.00.

This is a readable comparative social history, starting with the Charity Organization Society, of casework, group work, and comunity organization development in England and the United States. As history, it has the aura of a familiar litany, although there is new material on Charles S. Loch. As a Fabian analysis of the philosophical bases of present-day social welfare practice, this work makes a distinct contribution and raises issues that social workers need to consider.

The emphasis is on the social context in which care for society's rejects has evolved. This is not for those who like their history with sequential dates, a program for each date, and

three facts to go with each program, all of which can be neatly packaged and put on the blackboard without evaluation.

The shift from private aid to a growing dependence on public welfare for all types of social dysfunction is carefully traced. These well-known facts take on a new perspective when related to the professionalization of social work; the development of practice methods; and most importantly, the continuum of blame that ranges from placing responsibility for social deviance entirely on the individual to placing it in the social structure. In an interpretation strikingly similar to Nettler's conclusions about belief in free will Miss Woodroofe presents evidence to show that those who favor public welfare have tended to be humanitarian reformers who locate the major cause of personal difficulty in the social structure; while private welfare advocates who express their humanitarian impulses in a guilt-ridden "lady bountiful" attitude are conservative status quo supporters, and feel that those in trouble are in some way to blame for their situation.

This evaluation isolates the central pinions on present-day social work practice. For example, the major method, social casework, grew out of private welfare that attempted to separate the worthy from the unworthy poor (p. 55). "This identification of casework with a conservative political ideology has proved a handicap. On the one hand, it has often retarded recognition of the value of casework as a method of helping individuals to live more effectively, and on the other, it has made more difficult the task of adapting social casework to the changed conditions of this modern age."

On this basis the author feels that the social work profession should move in the direction of being institutionalized as part of a state social welfare apparatus. This reviewer has some reservations about this sophisticated justification for the Welfare State. There is ample evidence, in the book itself, that state welfare services can be administered in a degrading "self-blaming" way, that bureaucrats set up procedures that place organizational maintenance ahead of service goals, and that bureaucrats stifle the reform spirit. All utopian movements that have attained their goals, including England's Labour Party, have been unable to counteract the loss of vitality that inevitably occurs. The positive effects of ideological conflicts that keep basic humanitarian values sharply focused have been underestimated. Even at the present time, conditions in public welfare are such that there is need for a reform spirit. Despite the author's selection of the best available evidence, in both public and private welfare, muckraking is, sadly, conspicuously lacking. On the American social work scene, only Alvin Schorr shows signs of being able to carry on the tradition of constructive social criticism that may have died with Albert Deutsch.

This book will be useful to sociologists who are interested in the history of social problems or who have an approach that rises above specific categories such as delinquency or alcoholism. The book should be widely used and discussed in schools of social work—but it won't be, precisely because of its position. American schools of social work have evolved mainly from the conservative tradition. It will be a pleasant surprise if any social work journal provides a major review. Despite some shortcomings in scholarship, which cannot be discussed in this brief critique, this book is a fine attempt to examine the implications of what social workers actually do when they say they are trying to help a person.

HARRIS CHAIKLIN

School of Social Work
University of Maryland

Key Problems of Sociological Theory. By JOHN REX. New York: Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. ix+194. $5.00.

In this thin but ambitious volume, Rex sets out "to consider some of the methodological problems involved in the construction of a [general sociological] theory." As the argument proceeds, however, it becomes clear that the author is concerned not only with the *methodology* of theory construction but also with the *substance* of theory.

On the *methodological* side, it is easier to tell what Rex is against than what he is for. He argues convincingly against positivism (using early Durkheim as a foil); empiricism (using Booth, Rowntree, and the Webbs—strange anachronisms in many respects—as examples); and functionalism (using Radcliffe-Brown's organic analogy as a target). His own positive statements about "a model for the analysis of interaction systems" are methodologically indefinite and incomplete.

On the *substantive* side, Rex defines the objective of sociology as "making verifiable statements about social interaction," the main dimensions of which are perfect co-operation to perfect conflict and perfect co-operation to anomie. His own analysis, however, concentrates heavily on conflict alone. He views this concentration as a corrective. He asserts, in a familiar vein, that current sociology emphasizes situations of perfect integration (here he refers to a few statements in Parsons' works); when it departs from this emphasis, it focuses on anomie rather than conflict (here he refers to Merton's essay).

Discussing conflict itself, Rex joins Coser and Dahrendorf in calling for the study of conflicts other than the "safety-valve" sort stressed in the "perfect integration" school of Parsons and others. But he sees Coser's and Dahrendorf's analyses of the "functional" aspects of conflict as also limited. Rex wishes to include genuinely "disruptive" conflicts, examples of which he finds in Weber, Myrdal, and Mannheim. He goes on to classify a number of conflict situations—including ruling-class, revolutionary, and true situations. Class conflict, he argues, is an especially fruitful area for study. In the chapter devoted to this subject he attempts to synthesize some of Marx's and Weber's arguments on class. In the same chapter he offers a curious interpretation of Warner's Yankee City studies, in which the lower-upper class turns out to be the "ruling class." In general, Rex's insistence on the incorporation of a variety of conflict situations into sociological theory is to be commended; yet his own argument falls short of a theoretical synthesis.

A few evidences of carelessness mar the book. Merton's famous phrase, "theories of the middle range," for instance, is quoted inaccurately several times as "middle principles." And the proofs apparently were not read.

NEIL J. SMELSER

University of California
Berkeley

Law and Sociology. Edited by WILLIAM M. EVAN. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xii+235. $5.00.

Although the papers collected in this volume cover a wide range of subject matter, from a general theoretical discussion of the function of law and legal institutions in the wider society to a very specific consideration of research techniques that may be employed for the solution of law problems, they have in common a concern with the direction that the newly revived interest in the sociology of law should take. The first paper, by Riesman (in my view, the best, and certainly the liveliest essay in the collection) takes a very clear position on this issue; in effect, it rejects the possibility, at least for the present, of any fruitful sociological analysis of law or legal institutions: "So far as I can see" Riesman asserts, "sociology is not now prepared to embrace the legal order within its own categories in terms sufficiently detailed and concrete to shed new illumination. There is not only a certain intellectual impenetrability about law . . . there is an even more important factual impenetrability resulting from the sheer overwhelming and opaque bulk of data that must be mastered to link the empirical with the interpretive or the ideal typical." Reisman then proceeds to a most illuminating discussion of how lawyers and sociologists get on with one another, in the light of their respective origins and training, leaving the sociology of law pretty much behind.

Both the Parsons and Bredemeir articles present a sociological view of the place of law in society. Both explore, on a very general level, some of the implications of the proposition that the legal system performs an integrative function in society. The focus of the Parsons article is on law as a system of rules (which may be applied to any set of social relationships and which are backed by certain sanctions and legitimations) and the functional prerequisites for the effective operation of these rules. The Bredemeir article focuses on the relationship between the legal system (the court system) and other "functional subsystems" of the society, the political system, the adaptive system (science and technology), and the pattern maintenance system (socialization). While these authors are dealing with some of the central problems in the sociology of law, they do not, it seems to me, provide any clear lines to guide future investigators in this area. This arises partly from the definitional character of so much that is presented in these essays, and partly from the very high level of abstraction of the propositions (e.g., Bredemeir: "the courts' integrative contribution to the adaptive system may be regarded as an output of organic solidarity").

A common ground between law and sociology is found by Evan in the proposition that legal

systems have organizational structures, and, conversely, that (at least some) organizations have legal systems. This approach has the advantage of directing attention to the relationship between public and private legal systems—a most promising area of inquiry, as seen in the recent work of Evan and Selznick.

While the Blumrosen essay on labor law deals principally with the relationship between the growth of the labor movement and changes in legal doctrine (as reflected in Supreme Court decisions), the conclusions that he draws for the relationship between law and sociology come very close to those advanced by Zeisel and Strodtbeck. Thus Blumrosen notes: "The discussion to this point suggests that the legal system is receptive to information regarding value and fact." He goes on to say: "In fact, the dominant motivation that leads me to relate law and sociology is the desire for tools that will improve the quality of the legal system. And these tools sociology has. . . ." So speaks a lawyer. A sociologist (Zeisel) replies: "[The sociologist] now has in his possession a set of tools that has proved useful in exploring all kinds of social institutions and that should therefore prove useful with respect to the law as a social institution." This desire to prove the usefulness of the sociologist to the law and to gain acceptance from the lawyer, rather then any interest in the presumably "bigger" issues of the law, appears to be the strategy advanced for the sociology of law by Zeisel and Strodtbeck.

We have in the Cowan article (and to some extent in the Blumrosen article) a discussion of some of the ways in which lawyers and legal analysis might prove useful to sociologists. Cowan suggests that "cross-examination may turn out to be a usable tool in social investigation [that] judges, legislators, and administrators might prove useful collaborators in controlled experiments" (a suggestion also made by Zeisel), and finally, that "the mass of feeling judgments" which the law contains should be studied empirically by social scientists.

At a time when increasing numbers of lawyers and sociologists are being attracted to the sociology of law, it is most appropriate to consider, as many of the authors in this collection of essays have, the nature of the problems to be investigated and the direction that such efforts should take. While one may have wished for a more fully developed, and at times more lucid exploration of the problems in this area, for those who wish to acquaint themselves with some of the more important issues I would recommend this book.

JEROME E. CARLIN

Bureau of Applied Social Research
Columbia University

Crime, Justice and Correction. By PAUL W. TAPPAN. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960. Pp. xiii+781. $7.95.

One of the tasks incumbent upon a good textbook writer is to review, analyze, and interpret an abundance of research and theory in his field. But this labor must also discriminate carefully so that shoddy unimportant materials are either omitted or put in their proper place. A good textbook can therefore serve the dual function of providing a learning process for the student and a useful source of reference and summary review for the professor. The writer must then organize his material so that a sense of continuity and integration is evident. His own views may be presented as he deems necessary in order to differentiate his from some other text.

Professor Tappan's book does these things admirably. This is a work of scholarship and much experience in teaching, writing, and study of the problems of analyzing crimes, criminals, and the administration of justice. There are excellent reviews and limited interpretations of well-selected studies in each of the three major sections: (1) crime and causation, (2) the administration of justice, (3) correction. The book should please both audiences, for the student will be introduced to the field but quickly pulled along into the most important problems faced by criminology; and the instructor will find familiar materials analyzed and perhaps some unfamiliar but useful data presented. In short, Tappan has written not just another textbook but a good compendium of the field.

There are some characteristics that distinguish the book from others and that instructors should be aware of. Criminologists familiar with the author's writings will not be surprised to note the lack of emphasis placed on sociocultural factors, the stress upon crime and the criminal as matters of legal definition. While agreeing that the multiple-factor approach deserves criticism, and frequently calling for an integrative approach to the study of crime causation, the author is usually content to lay

before the reader only segmented pieces of diversified data and theory. Perhaps a textbook is not the place to expect this kind of integration, but expectation is inherent in the approach of the book and still remains at the end.

Greater emphasis than usual is given to the significance of individual variability in physique and psychology. The problems of court and correctional administration are carefully described; they are not generally set within a sociological framework that could currently provide good analysis in terms of social organization theory. But the author's view that many probation officers do not necessarily have to be social workers, that the validity of prediction research is very much questioned, and that our preventive techniques have been considerably less than successful is most worthwhile.

The legal emphasis in this book may be viewed by some as unduly strong for a sociology course, but no one can deny that criminals have violated the law and that many are arrested, adjudicated, and incarcerated. This stress does provide a consistent framework, and perhaps sociological criminology can benefit from more knowledge of the structure and function of the law that this book provides.

MARVIN E. WOLFGANG

University of Pennsylvania

Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years: Class Roles and Perspectives in the 1952 and 1956 Elections. By HEINZ EULAU. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xx+162. $4.50.

This book aims at placing survey analysis of voting behavior in a framework of theory about the functioning of political institutions. The theory proposed in the initial and concluding chapters centers on the need for a balance between consensus and cleavage in the relation between class and party. In its broad outlines it is reminiscent of the earlier theories of Berelson and Lipset.

Between the theoretical chapters is a secondary analysis of data from the 1952 and 1956 Michigan surveys. Almost all the tables are cross-tabulations of three variables, for each of the two election years. The independent variables are the respondent's class identification (working or middle) and a dichotomized measure of his "objective" class position. The dependent variables include party identification, expectation as to which party will do mor certain problems, participation, sense of litical efficacy, and expectations as to how working and middle classes will vote.

The association between either measu class and partisanship declined between and 1956; its association with variables suc participation and sense of efficacy did not. ception of the working-class vote as Democ was stable both from 1952 to 1956 and a the four class categories. Perception of middle-class vote as Republican or Democ varied more with the respondent's own position and identification. This difference i tributed to the fact that the Democratic p has an explicit class ideology, while the publican party does not.

The tables may be of value to resear interested in the relative predictive pow subjective and objective class in these two y Their usefulness is limited, however, by facts that the details of the "objective" dichotomization (based on occupation, ec tion, and income) are not given, and that c sion of income as a component of the 1956 sification renders the two years less compar Moreover, the tables are very hard to r figures for the two years studied are me and no clear comparison of the predictive v of subjective and objective class measur given.

The broader assertions of the theory are given a very hard test by the data. The au asserts that "a competitive two-party sy ... tends to blur lines of social cleavage" (p and claims as a finding that "the bound between class and party interpenetrate flexible and fluid fashion" (p. 141). But dat the United States in 1952 and 1956 ca verify the necessity, or even the persistenc this condition. We cannot expect the degr classlessness of the Eisenhower elections to persistent requisite of American democracy, certainly not of two-party representative ernment. The country survived a higher de of status polarization in 1948, and G Britain has a continually higher associatio class with the vote. An analysis that help place the 1952 and 1956 elections in a bro context has been supplied in considerable gree in *The American Voter*, based on the s data, published two years earlier, but unci All but one of the references cited, in fact, from before 1960.

It would have been preferable to submit

contents of this book as a series of journal articles. They would have received more careful editing, could have been reduced in length, and might have been published in time to be up to date.

DUNCAN MACRAE, JR.
University of Chicago

Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics. Edited by AUSTIN RANNEY. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Pp. xi+251. $5.00.

Since World War II it has become increasingly common for political scientists to view themselves as social scientists and to adopt the intellectual standards and research techniques that earlier won acceptance in fields such as sociology and psychology. Indexes of the shifting character of the study of politics include the growing interchangeability of articles published in political science journals with contributions to (say) this *Journal;* the tendency of graduate departments of political science to offer training in quantitative methods to their students; and, perhaps most visibly, an inordinate amount of intradisciplinary soul-searching.

Scholars who choose to underscore the "science" in political science have come to be known as "behaviorists." Hence the adjective in *Essays in the Behavioral Study of Politics*, a collection of nine papers delivered as a 1960 International Political Science Association conference on "the study of political behavior" plus an additional essay by Evron M. Kirkpatrick, executive director of the American Political Science Association, on "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science." The only unifying principle of the conference seems to have been that the participants were "behaviorally oriented" political scientists who were urged to discuss "the findings of substantive behavioral research" rather than "disputations about method isolated from substance."

As might be anticipated from the vagueness of the criterion for soliciting papers, the resulting compendium is a hodgepodge. The conference papers vary not only in quality, but also (independently) in the degree to which the author attempts a comprehensive canvass of the area of research he discusses, and in whether he addresses himself to a general audience of students of politics or to his fellow specialists.

Richard C. Snyder's review of recent international politics research (to this reviewer, the most impressive chapter in the volume) is comprehensive, even exhaustive. Snyder presumes that the reader has followed the literature in some detail, although his orderly presentation and copious citations do provide the uninitiated with a sense of where to begin reading. Other essays that attempt reasonably broad coverage of a topic are John C. Wahlke's discussion of legislative behavior studies and Austin Ranney's remarks on the use of aggregate election statistics in political analysis. Both of these clearly written discussions were evidently aimed at non-specialists.

James G. March (organization theory) and Angus Campbell (survey research) cover limited territories in their contributions, the former directing himself to readers with a good bit of familiarity with the literature, the latter writing in terms of a much more lay audience. March's avowedly "parochial" concern is with "the study of organizations as information-handling and decision-making systems." He tersely summarizes a number of recent theoretical developments and proposes programs of model-building (through computer simulation) and experimental research. Campbell notes with approval the growing tendency of survey research to deal with "broader and more important problems of the functioning of the political system," referring, among others, to recent studies of the effects of institutions on individual behavior and to research on leader-citizen relations. Stein Rokkan, in an essay on "The Comparative Study of Political Participation," spins out an elaborate taxonomy of variables affecting citizen participation and their interrelationships, then impressionistically remarks on what he considers to be promising lines of inquiry.

Three additional papers report on research (largely electoral) outside the United States. Pertti Pesonen's account of Finnish studies reveals a spate of activity, much of it replication of the Columbia voting and personal influence investigations. Jerzy J. Wiatr's discussion of Polish electoral research is as interesting for the glimpse it offers of a Communist political system providing both the voter and the social scientist with a degree of freedom as it is for the findings reported. David E. Butler's contribution is little more than a chronology of published British studies of British electoral behavior.

Kirkpatrick comments in his introductory essay that in 1959 the American Political Sci-

ence Association, after three years of including panels on "political behavior" in the program of its annual meeting, abandoned the practice. Since then "the results of behavioral studies" have been "reported and discussed in regular panels on Political Parties, Legislation, International Relations, Public Administration, and so forth." Thus perhaps it can be seen in retrospect that a 1960 conference with nothing more than "behaviorism" as its motif was already an anachronism. A more focused conference and therefore a less diffuse collection of essays might have been produced if the sponsors had concluded that it was redundant to speak of a "*behavioral* study of politics" (can one study any social phenomenon without studying behavior?) and found some more concrete theme for their gathering.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN

Wesleyan University
Middletown, Connecticut

The State Universities and Democracy. By ALLAN NEVINS. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Pp. vii+171. $2.95.

This book is based on a collection of lectures delivered by Pulitzer Prize winner Allan Nevins at the University of Illinois. The occasion for the lectures was to mark the centennial of the Morrill Act, an act that led to the emergence of land-grant universities throughout this country. Four lectures are recorded in this book, each dealing with a different stage in the development of the state and land-grant institutions, with special emphasis on the impact of these institutions in their service to democracy.

From a purely empirical sociological point of view, this work will be of limited value except in the questions it raises as to the function and operation of American educational institutions. For one thing, the reader should be impressed with the fact that public land-grant institutions are a growing phenomena playing an ever increasing role in the socialization and professional training of American youth. As the author points out, these schools enrol about one-third of the college and university students in the nation and their faculties have trained more than one-half of the country's holders of doctoral degrees. Second, the author notes that, whereas in the past these schools had a heavy agricultural orientation, they have moved into a number of other specialties with a heavy emphasis on national and international programs.

It is time that the popular commentators on the American educational scene as well as those engaged in empirical research recognize the impact of these schools and the fact that they are, in many respects, quite distinct from the smaller and more selective private colleges and universities. Too much about undergraduate life as described in *Harper's*, *Commentary*, and the *Saturday Review* has been based on a few elite schools, thereby giving the impression that all college experiences are universal and applicable to all educational institutions.

Nevins' lectures should help fill a gap in our knowledge if behavioral scientists are willing to investigate some of the questions he raises.

DAVID GOTTLIEB

Michigan State University

Children of the Gilded Ghetto: Conflict Resolutions of Three Generations of American Jews. By JUDITH R. KRAMER and SEYMOUR LEVENTMAN. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. xviii+228. $5.00.

It is the intention of this study to trace the progressive integration of the members of a local Jewish community into the larger dominant social structure of "North City." The operation of the race-relations cycle—from competition and conflict to acculturation and assimilation—is linked to the succession of generations While the immigrants, the members of the first generation, have to fight for economic survival, their children achieve economic and political equality but are refused social acceptance by the dominant group. The creation of the "gilded ghetto" with its proliferation of voluntary associations is the second generation's response to this inequality of status. The third generation—"the children of the gilded ghetto"—are seen to be moving from the socially separate but otherwise equal status of their parents toward social integration. The operation of the race-relations cycle in the direction of progressive integration should produce a distinct level of intermarriage for each generation, from about 0 per cent for the first to x per cent for the second and y per cent for the third generation. Although the authors recognize the crucial significance of intermarriage, the study was not designed to measure the progressive stages of assimilation. Instead of drawing a sample of the total—Jewish as well as non-Jewish—popula-

tion of "North City" the authors limited themselves to a study of the organized Jewish community. The result is that they have uncovered only a small proportion of intermarried families, namely, those that have chosen to stay within the fold.

An intensive analysis of the second generation, however, reveals that acculturation is not only related to generation but also to socioeconomic class in such a manner that upper-class Jews—defined as members of a country club—are more acculturated than lower- and lower-middle-class Jews—represented by a fraternal order. Members of the country club observe fewer religious holidays and customs, provide a less effective religious education, enter into mixed marriages more frequently, change their names more often, and belong to non-Jewish organizations more often than do the lower-status members of the fraternal order. This finding raises the question of whether the factor of generation deserves as much weight as it has been accorded by the authors in their theoretical scheme. Still more important is the relevance of this finding for the proper study of the third generation. It would appear that the third generation will have to be separated along parental class lines: On the one hand there are the children of the country-club group who would be expected to be in a state of advanced assimilation with a high level of intermarriage; on the other hand there are the children of the lower-status fraternal order, who will have improved their socioeconomic status and be in a condition of full acculturation with a relatively low level of intermarriage. It is not only the defect in the basic design that prevents the study from taking this course. There are, in addition, two factors—beyond the authors' control—which create difficulties. One is the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of third-generation families at this time; the other is the likelihood that those members of the third generation who have severed their relationships with the Jewish group may have moved to another city in order to cut their ancestral ties more effectively. The authors have, however, separated the members of the third generation into two groups according to the nature of their occupation, and they found that those who are in "non-Jewish" occupations are farther along the path of social integration in behavior and attitudes than are those who have remained in occupations that are considered to be typically Jewish.

As for the description of the behavior of the members of the Jewish community of "North City" the authors' interpretations at times appear to exceed the limits of the data. However, there are numerous observations, particularly in the area of religious behavior among the third generation, that no worker interested in this field can afford to overlook.

ERICH ROSENTHAL

Queens College

CURRENT BOOKS

ABDEL-MALEK, ANOUAR. *Egypte Société Militaire* ("Egypt: A Military Society"). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962. Pp. 380.

ARDENER, EDWIN. *Divorce and Fertility: An African Study.* ("Nigerian Social and Economic Studies," No. 3.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. xvi+171. $3.20 (paper). Survey of the Bakweri in the Cameroons.

BAKER, GEORGE W., and COTTRELL, LEONARD S., JR. (eds.). *Behavioral Science and Civil Defense.* (National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council Publication 997.) Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences–National Research Council, 1962. Pp. ix+169. $2.00. Ten conference papers.

BALL, JOHN C. *Social Deviancy and Adolescent Personality: An Analytical Study with the MMPI.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962. Pp. ix+119. $3.00. MMPI administered to 224 ninth-graders in two Kentucky towns.

BATTEN, T. R. *Training for Community Development: A Critical Study of Method.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 192. $3.60.

BERKOWITZ, LEONARD. *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962. Pp. xv+361. $7.95.

BIDERMAN, ALBERT D. *March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1963. Pp. 326. $5.95.

BIRKET-SMITH, KAJ. *Primitive Man and His Ways: Patterns of Life in Some Native Societies.* Translated from the Danish by ROY DUFFELL. New York: New American Library, 1960. Pp. 222. $0.75 (paper). First published in 1959.

CARLIN, JEROME E. *Lawyers on Their Own: A Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1962. Pp. x+234. $6.00.

CLARK, S. D. *The Developing Canadian Community.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+248. $4.75. Fifty papers and essays.

COOPERMAN, DAVID, and WALTER, E. V. *Power and Civilization: Political Thought in the Twentieth Century.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1962. Pp. ix+587. $6.50. Interpretive essays by the authors supplement readings in social and political thought.

CRISWELL, JOAN, SOLOMON, HERBERT, and SUPPES, PATRICK (eds.). *Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes.* ("Stanford Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences," Vol. VIII.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. viii+361. $9.75. Twenty-two papers from the Stanford University Symposium, June, 1961.

CUMMING, JOHN, and CUMMING, ELAINE. *Ego and Milieu: Theory and Practice of Environmental Therapy.* Foreword by ALFRED H. STANTON. New York: Atherton Press, 1962. Pp. xv+292. $7.50.

DESPERT, J. LOUISE. *Children of Divorce.* ("A Dolphin Handbook.") New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962. Pp. ix+306. $0.95 (paper). First published in 1953.

EATON, JOSEPH W. *Stone Walls Not a Prison Make: The Anatomy of Planned Administrative Change.* Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1962. Pp. xvi+212. $7.50.

EELLS, RICHARD. *The Government of Corporations.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xiv+338. On the constitutional basis of corporate government; nature and sources of power to govern within the corporation; restraints on the power to govern, etc.

ELDER, GLEN H., JR. *Adolescent Achievement and Mobility Aspirations.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962. Pp. x+238. $2.00

FINER, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics.* New York: Frederick A Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. ix+268. $6.50.

FRANKL, VIKTOR E. *Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy.* Preface by GORDON W. ALLPORT. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. Pp. xii+142. $3.50.

FRIEDMAN, MILTON. *Capitalism and Freedom.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. 202 $3.95. On the role of capitalism, from the perspective of nineteenth-century liberalism.

GALENSON, WALTER (ed). *Labor in Developing Economics.* (A Publication of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. Pp x+299 $6.00. Six papers on labor markets in Pakistan, India, Brazil, Argentina and Chile, Israel, and Turkey.

GANS, HERBERT J. *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans* New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xvi+367. $7.00.

GLUECK, SHELDON. *Law and Psychiatry.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Pp. ix+181. $4.95. Based on four public lectures concerning the legal and psychiatric perspective on insanity.

GOLDBERG, E. M. *Family Influences and Psychosomatic Illness: An Inquiry into the Social and Psychological Background of Duodenal Ulcer* With a foreword by ERIC D. WITTKOWER. New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. xii+308. $7.50.

GOODMAN, PAUL. *The Community of Scholars*. New York: Random House, 1962. Pp. xi+175. $3.95. Critique of the American college system.

GUTKIND, E. A. *The Twilight of Cities*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. x+201. $5.00. A review of trends in urban renewal and city planning.

HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J., BOWMAN, PAUL HOOVER, LIDDLE, GORDON P., MATTHEWS, CHARLES V., and PIERCE, JAMES V. *Growing Up in River City*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xii+189. $4.50. Sixth-grade public school children followed up nine years later.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J. *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv+500+lv. $6.95. Historical and cultural factors including change and resistance to change in sub-Saharan Africa.

HOLT, ROBERT T., and TURNER, JOHN S. (eds.). *Soviet Union: Paradox and Change*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiii+240. $2.50 (paper). Seven papers.

IRVING, JOHN A. (ed.). *Mass Media in Canada*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1962. Pp. viii+236. $5.50. Ten papers by Canadian mass-media specialists.

JACKSON, BRIAN, and MARSDEN, DENNIS. *Education and the Working Class*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962. Pp. ix+268. $6.75. Survey of eighty-eight upwardly mobile working-class children in an industrial city in northern England.

JOHNSTON, NORMAN, SAVITZ, LEONARD, and WOLFGANG, MARVIN E. *The Sociology of Punishment and Correction*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. xi+349. $6 50 (cloth); $4.25 (paper). A collection of fifty papers.

JOSEPHSON, ERIC, and JOSEPHSON, MARY (eds) *Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society*. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. 592. $0.95 (paper). An anthology.

KAMENKA, EUGENE. *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism*. New York · Frederick A Praeger, Inc , 1962. Pp. xvi+208 $6.50. A treatise on Karl Marx's ethics and the development of Marxism

KASTELL, JEAN. *Casework in Child Care*. Foreword by M. BROOKE WILLIS. New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. xi+320. $7 00. The British child-care officer and his client.

KENNEDY, RAYMOND. *Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures*. ("Behavior Science Bibliographies.") Revised and edited by THOMAS W. MARETZKI and H. TH. FISCHER. New Haven· Human Relations Area Files, 1962. Pp. xxii+207. $8.50.

KENNEDY, THOMAS. *Automation Funds and Displaced Workers*. With the research assistance of FRANK D. PLAUT. Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 1962. Pp. xvii+374. $5.00. Analysis of the goals, benefits, financing, and legislative restrictions on automation funds; with case studies of seven funds.

KING, STANLEY H. *Perceptions of Illness and Medical Practice*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1962. Pp. 405. $6.00. A review of social-science concepts and research for the health professions.

KOFMEHL, KENNETH. *Professional Staffs of Congress*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University, 1962. Pp. xi+282. $6.00. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and its implementation during the 80th and 82d Congresses.

KUHN, THOMAS S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. xv+172. $4.00. An essay on the breakdown and resurgence of conceptual framework in the physical sciences in the past three hundred years.

LANE, ROBERT E. *Political Ideology*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xi+509. $10.00. On the meanings, sources, and political consequences of ideology.

LEVENSTEIN, AARON. *Why People Work: Changing Incentives in a Troubled World*. New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962. Pp. 320 $3.95.

LIKERT, RENSIS. *New Patterns of Management*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961. Pp. ix+279. $6.95. Based on work conducted since 1947 at the Institute of Social Research on managerial practices in formal organizations.

LONG, NORTON E. *The Polity*. Edited with an Introduction by CHARLES PRESS. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1962. Pp. xiv+247. Seventeen papers previously published by the author.

LUBOVE, ROY. *The Progressives and the Slums: Tenement House Reform in New York City, 1890–1917*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963. Pp xviii+284, $6.00.

MACHLUP, FRITZ. *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*. Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. xix+416. $7.50. The "knowledge industries" analyzed by an economist.

MCKAY, VERNON. *Africa in World Politics*. New York. Harper & Row, 1963. Pp. xii+468. $6.75. Analysis of Africa and the U.N.; Pan-African movements; relations with India and the Soviet Union; and American policy in Africa.

MCNERNEY, WALTER J., and RIEDEL, DONALD C. *Regionalization and Rural Health Care*. With the assistance of DARWIN O. FINKBEINER and EDWARD M. DOLINSKY. Ann Arbor· University of Michigan, 1962. Pp. xi+209. $5.00. Patterns of hospital utilization in northern Michigan.

MAURER, DAVID W., and VOGEL, VICTOR H. *Narcotics and Narcotic Addiction*. 2d ed. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1962. Pp. ix+339. $9.00.

MENDELSON, WALLACE. *Discrimination: Based on the Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. x+175. $1.95 (paper).

MILLS, ENID. *Living with Mental Illness*. Foreword by MORRIS CARSTAIRS. ("A Survey by the Institute of Community Studies.") New York:

Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. xii+198. $5.50. Interviews with mental patients and their families.

MITCHELL, WILLIAM C. *The American Polity*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xiv+429. $6.00. Structural-functional analysis of institutional and behavioral materials.

OI, WALTER Y., and SHULDINER, PAUL W. *An Analysis of Urban Travel Demands*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1962. Pp. x+281. $12.50. An origin-and-destination survey of households in Detroit and Modesto.

ORLANS, HAROLD. *The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education: A Study of 36 Universities and Colleges*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1962. Pp. xvi+361. $5.00 (cloth); $2.50 (paper).

PARES, SIR BERNARD. *Russia between Reform and Revolution: Fundamentals of Russian History and Character*. Edited by FRANCIS B. RANDALL. New York: Schocken Books, 1962. Pp. xvi+425. $1.95.

PONSIOEN, J. A. *The Analysis of Social Change Reconsidered: A Sociological Study*. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp. 170. Gld. 1. A treatise.

RAFFAELE, JOSEPH A. *Labor Leadership in Italy and Denmark*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Pp. xviii+436. $10.00. Comparative analysis employing interviews and questionnaires.

REINHARDT, JAMES MELVIN. *The Psychology of Strange Killers*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1962. Pp. xiii+196. $7.00. Case-study analysis of murder.

ROGERS, EVERETT M. *Diffusion of Innovations*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xiii+367. $5.50. Analysis of research and theory.

SAITO, HIROSHI. *O Japones no Brasil* ("The Japanese in Brazil"). São Paulo: Fundacao Escola de Sociologia e Politica de São Paulo, 1961. Pp. 238. Statistical and historical materials are employed to describe migration and adaptation.

SCHUR, EDWIN M. *Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America: The Impact of Public Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. Pp. 281. $7.50.

SCUDDER, THAYER. *The Ecology of the Gwembe Tonga*. ("Kariba Studies.") New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. xxi+274. $7.50. Population and agricultural pattern of a subsistence economy.

SELOSOEMARDJAN. *Social Changes in Jogjakarta*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962. Pp. xxvii+440. $6.75. By an American-trained Indonesian anthropologist.

SHANAS, ETHEL. *The Health of Older People: A Social Survey*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xii+250. $6.00.

SHERIF, MUZAFER (ed.). *Intergroup Relations and Leadership*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963. Pp. xiv+284. Ten papers from a social psychology symposium at the University of Oklahoma.

SHOSTAK, ARTHUR B. *America's Forgotten Labor Organization: A Survey of the Role of the Single-Firm Independent Union in American Industry*. ("Industrial Relations Section.") Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1962. Pp. vii+141. $3.75.

SMITH, M. G. *Kinship and Community in Carriacou*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. xiv+347. $6.00. On the life-cycle, kinship, and mating in an eastern Carribean island.

SNYDER, RICHARD C., BRUCK, H. W., and SAPIN, BURTON. *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. Pp. vii+274. $5.00. Four papers on the subject.

STEINBERG, S. H. (ed.). *The Statesman's Year-Book, Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1962–1963*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1962. Pp. xxviii+1702. $9.50.

STONE, DORIS. *The Talamancan Tribes of Costa Rica*. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum, 1962. Pp. x+108. $5.75.

STRAUSS, ANSELM L., and RAINWATER, LEE. *The Professional Scientist: A Study of American Chemists*. With MARC J. SWARTZ and BARBARA G. BERGER, and with a contribution by W. LLOYD WARNER. Foreword by ALBERT L. ELDER. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. xiv+282 $6.00.

THOMAS, BRINLEY. *International Migration and Economic Development*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1961. Pp. 85. $1.50 (paper).

THORNER, DANIEL and ALICE. *Land Labour in India*. Ballard Estate, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. ix+227. $8 50. Fifteen papers on agrarian structure and agricultural production

TOMKINS, SILVAN S. *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, Vol I: *The Positive Affects*. With the editorial assistance of BERTRAM P. KARON. New York Springer Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. xi+522. $8.00

UBEROI, J. P. SINGH. *Politics of the Kula Ring: An Analysis of the Findings of Bronislaw Malinowski*. New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. xv+162. $5.00. A reinterpretation of the Trobriand data.

VANSTONE JAMES W. *Point Hope: An Eskimo Village in Transition*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. Pp. x+177. $5.25.

WALKIN, JACOB. *The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Political and Social Institutions under the Last Three Czars*. New York Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. viii+320. $6.50.

WARNER, STANLEY LEON. *Stochastic Choice of Mode in Urban Travel: A Study in Binary Choice*. ("The Metropolitan Transportation Series.") Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1962. Pp. 90. $5.00. The influence on consumer choice exerted by three economic variables.

WEBER, MAX. *The Sociology of Religion*. Translated by EPHRAIM FISCHOFF. Introduction by TALCOTT PARSONS. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. Pp. lxvii+304. $6.50.